nicole suissa v. penn state dickinson school of law answer

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICOLE SUISSA, Plaintiff, vs. THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY; CARLA PRATT, individually and in her official capacity; MEGAN RIESMEYER, individually and in her official capacity; and, JAMES HOUCK, individually and in his official capacity; Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14-cv-01626 Judge Robert D. Mariani Complaint filed: 08/19/14 Electronically Filed

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, CARLA PRATT,

MEGAN RIESMEYER, AND JAMES HOUCK TO PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff Nicole

Suissa (Suissa or Plaintiff) has filed this action alleging a deprivation of her

rights. It is denied that said allegations are meritorious.

2. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Answering Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the

Case 3:14-cv-01626-RDM Document 29 Filed 09/10/14 Page 1 of 41

averments contained in paragraph 2. The same is therefore denied and strict proof

thereof demanded.

II. JURISDICTION & VENUE

3. Admitted.

4. It is admitted that venue is proper in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania.

III. THE PARTIES

5. Admitted, upon information and belief.

6. Admitted in part and denied in part. The Dickinson School of Law

(DSL) is a law school and college within The Pennsylvania State University

(Penn State). DSL is not an entity distinct from Penn State. The Pennsylvania

State University is a state-related institution of higher learning that is organized

and exists as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. Penn State operates two law school campuses, one of which is

located in University Park and the other which is located in Carlisle.

7. Denied. The allegations in paragraph 7 are denied as moot insofar as

the parties have stipulated to the dismissal of the Defendant identified as The

Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association. By

way of further response, it is believed, and therefore averred, that the proper name

of the entity is the Dickinson Law Association and that the Dickinson Law


Association is a non-profit entity organized and existing under the laws of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The remainder of the averments of paragraph 7

is denied.

8. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissa has

purported to sue Defendant Carla Pratt (Pratt) individually and in her official

capacity. It is denied that Pratt has violated Suissas rights in any way. It is

admitted that Pratt maintains an office at DSLs Carlisle campus.


purported to sue Defendant Megan Riesmeyer (Riesmeyer) individually and in

her official capacity. It is denied that Riesmeyer has violated Suissas rights in any

way. It is admitted that Riesmeyer maintains an office at DSLs Carlisle campus.


purported to sue Defendant James Houck (Houck) individually and in his official

capacity. It is denied that Houck has violated Suissas rights in any way. It is

admitted that Houck maintains an office at DSLs University Park campus.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11. Admitted.

12. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissa

completed her first two years of law school. However, Suissa was charged with

violating the DSL Honor Code based on conduct that occurred in December 2013


during final examinations. Suissa was charged with violations in connection with

her Evidence exam and her Mediation exam. Suissa requested and received an

Honor Code proceeding that was initially scheduled for January 31, 2014. Suissa

and her attorney requested and received multiple continuances of the Honor Code

hearings such that the liability portion of the hearings did not begin until March 29,

2014. Hearings were held on March 29, March 30, April 15, and April 21, 2014.

Ms. Suissa was adjudicated to be responsible for two violations of the Honor Code

and sanctions were recommended for those violations on April 22, 2014. Suissa

appealed the adjudication of responsibility on April 29, 2014. Suissas appeal was

denied on June 27, 2014. Suissa filed the instant action August 19, 2014, one day

before the commencement of classes for the Fall 2014 semester. To the extent any

of the above is inconsistent with Suissas averments in paragraph 12, said

averments are denied and strict proof thereof demanded.

13. Admitted.

14. Admitted.

15. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt contacted

Suissa on December 19, 2013 to pursue an investigation of the then-alleged Honor

Code infraction. It is admitted that Holly Parrish was then the Director of Student

Services at DSL and it is further admitted that Ms. Parrish was present for the

interview of Suissa. It is further admitted that Pratt received Suissas permission to


examine her smartphone. It is denied that Suissa was interrogated. Rather, she

was questioned concerning the charges. It is admitted that Pratt took notes of

Suissas responses during her questioning of Suissa.

16. Denied. At all times Pratt conducted herself professionally,

appropriately, and in full conformity with the express and implied requirements of

the Honor Code and her role as the prosecuting or presenting law school official.

It is denied that Pratt bore any personal animus towards Suissa. At all relevant

times, Pratt pursued the prosecution of the Honor Code violations vigorously,

appropriately and professionally both generally and as more specifically addressed

hereafter;

a. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Pratt

accused Suissa, or that Pratt lacked sufficient evidence to question Suissa

based on the report of an Honor Code violation from another student. It is

admitted that Suissa voluntarily submitted her cell phone for examination. It

is further admitted that Suissas cell phone revealed that the morning of the

Evidence exam she had visited websites containing information about the

federal rules of evidence;

b. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

was unable to locate timestamps noting the specific time at which the rules

of evidence websites were visited. It is denied that Pratt was obligated to


dismiss any charges, or that she intensified her pressure on Suissa. Rather,

Pratt vigorously and appropriately pursued the charges. It is admitted that

Pratt advised Suissa that she could face expulsion from the law school and

that she recommended that Suissa accept responsibility for any violation of

the Honor Code. It is admitted that Pratt properly informed Suissa of a

potential Honor Code violation relating to Suissas Mediation exam

submissions. To the extent this averment expresses or implies that Pratt did

not receive a report of an alleged Honor Code violation with respect to the

Mediation exam, it is denied. To the contrary, Pratt did receive a verbal

report of an Honor Code violation relating to the Mediation exam, which

Pratt properly investigated and pursued and which ultimately resulted in the

Hearing Board concluding that violations of the Honor Code had, in fact,

occurred. To the extent this averment expresses or implies that a written

memorandum must be received in order to initiate an Honor Code violation,

this allegation is denied. To the contrary, the Honor Code makes clear that

an Honor Code violation may be initiated by a written memorandum. Honor

Code proceedings may also be commenced by verbal reports;

c. Admitted in part and denied in part. To the extent this

averment expresses or implies that the submission of a written memorandum

is required to initiate an Honor Code investigation, it is denied for the


reasons set forth above. It is admitted that Pratt appropriately, pursued an

investigation of the verbal report of an Honor Code violation relating to the

Mediation exam. It is admitted that Suissa uploaded two different responses

to the take home Mediation exam, the first of which was timely and the

second of which was not timely. It is further admitted that Suissa, at the

time of the Mediation exam, alleged that she had received an error message

indicating her exam had not been completely uploaded the first time. It is

denied that Suissa ever presented any evidence of said alleged error in

support of her defense to the Honor Code violation at the Honor Code

proceeding. In fact, Suissa did not testify at her Honor Code hearing. It is

admitted that Suissa sent an email to the employee, Linda Evans, who was

responsible for receiving the electronic submission of the Mediation exam.

It is further admitted that Suissa urged Evans to accept Suissas second

submission of her examination as opposed to the first. It is denied that

Evans never made any investigation of the situation. To the contrary, Evans

reviewed and compared the two submissions and determined that the

second, untimely submission contained additional content that had been

added after the deadline for the submission of the exam answer, including an

additional 129 words and an answer to a previously unanswered examination

question;


d. Admitted in part and denied in part. As stated above, it is

denied that no report regarding the Mediation exam was ever made to Pratt.

To the contrary, Evans contacted Pratt regarding the two submissions by

Suissa, the emails from Suissa urging acceptance of the second submission,

and the additional content that was added to the second submission. It is

admitted that Evans was uncertain as to whether the facts supported an

Honor Code violation, particularly because Evans had refused to accept the

second, untimely, embellished submission. However, Evans was

sufficiently concerned with the conduct of Suissa to bring the matter to the

attention of Pratt via a verbal report. For the reasons set forth above, it is

denied that there was a violation of Section 5.1 of the Honor Code;

e. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Pratt was

biased or that there was any absence of evidence regarding the Mediation

exam violation. To the contrary, there was plain and undisputed evidence

that Suissa made a second submission of her examination that was untimely

and contained additional content added after the time of the first submission.

It is admitted that Suissa did not testify at her Honor Code hearing. It is

admitted that Professor Welsh testified at the Honor Code hearing on behalf

of Suissa regarding Professor Welshs understanding of the exam rules.

Professor Welshs views were merely her opinion and that opinion was not


shared by the members of the Hearing Board, nor by the Appellate

Reviewer. It is denied that the Honor Code violation associated with the

Mediation exam submission relies in any way, shape or form on the

allegations surrounding the Evidence exam violation. To the contrary, the

facts relating to the Mediation exam speak for themselves and independently

support violations of the Honor Code;

f. It is admitted that Pratt expressed her opinion to Suissa and her

counsel that the evidence against Suissa was overwhelming and that she did

not see how Suissa could avoid expulsion in the face of this evidence. It is

denied that Pratt threatened to add additional charges of witness intimidation

if Suissa continued to pursue a hearing. It is admitted that Pratt advised that

additional charges of witness intimidation would be added to the charge if

Suissa continued to engage in behavior that intimidated witnesses whom the

law school planned to call to testify against her at the Honor Code hearing.

It is denied that Pratt did not have any evidence to support the charge of

witness intimidation. To the contrary, Pratt determined after interviewing

the witnesses that although there was some evidence of witness intimidation,

it was insufficient to warrant bringing an additional charge against Suissa;

g. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

properly informed Suissa that a finding of an Honor Code violation could


result in Suissa facing expulsion from the law school, and that an expulsion

from law school could have devastating consequences for the student; it is

admitted that Pratt attempted once again to persuade Suissa to accept

responsibility for her dishonorable conduct. It is admitted that Pratt, in

negotiation with Suissas counsel, agreed to accept less than expulsion as a

sanction for Suissas conduct and that Dean Reilly and Pratt agreed to

accept either voluntary withdrawal from law school or a two-year

suspension.

h. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that the

majority of the students who have faced Honor Code violations have

accepted responsibility for their actions pursuant to the Honor Code and

have received sanctions that reflected their acceptance of responsibility and

contrition. Students who accept responsibility for their actions render moot

the need for a hearing. Because other students that Pratt had brought honor

code charges against had accepted responsibility for their actions rather than

proceed to a hearing, this was the first hearing that Pratt had prosecuted

under the law schools disciplinary process;

i. Denied. It is denied that Pratt attempted to intimidate Suissa or

that Pratt disseminated any defamatory information about Suissa within the

law school community. Pratt communicated with the Dean and Senior


Associate Dean regarding the disciplinary matter affecting Suissa, as she

was obliged to do. It is believed, and therefore averred, that it was Suissa

who spoke about the Honor Code proceedings at length to members of the

law school community. It is admitted that it was necessary for Pratt to

inform Professors Mogill and Welsh about the charges in order to investigate

the charges and to present their testimony. It is denied that Pratt attempted

to dissuade Welsh from testifying;

j. Denied. It is denied that Pratt disseminated information about

Suissas case beyond those who had a legitimate need to know in connection

with the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Honor Code. It is

denied that Suissas case was discussed in Professor Terrys Legal Ethics

Course;

k. Denied. It is denied that Suissa has been defamed by Pratt or

any other Defendant. With regard to the allegation that Suissa has suffered

damage to her reputation within the law school community, this allegation is

denied in that, after reasonable investigation, Answering Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief thereon. By

way of further response, to the extent Suissa has suffered damage to her

reputation, it is believed and therefore averred that said damage has been

caused by the actions or omissions of Suissa, and not by Defendants.


17. Denied. It is denied that Pratt attempted to intimidate Suissa or that

Pratt attempted to dissuade Suissa from seeking legal counsel.

18. 19. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

appropriately sent Suissa a letter advising her of the charges of violating the Honor

Code and that the letter was dated January 6, 2014. That letter, being a written

instrument, speaks for itself and any expression or implication inconsistent

therewith is denied. To the extent this paragraph expresses or implies that it was

inappropriate to copy Defendant Houck on the letter, this allegation is denied.

20. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissa

informed Pratt on January 17, 2004 that Suissa wanted to proceed to a hearing on

her Honor Code charges. Said January 17, 2004 letter, being a written instrument,

speaks for itself, and any expression or implication inconsistent therewith is

denied. Additionally, it is admitted that Exhibit 2 to Suissas Complaint appears to

be a true and correct copy of the applicable law school Honor Code. Said Code,

being a written instrument, speaks for itself and any expression or implication

inconsistent therewith is denied. With regard to Suissas representation that all of

the information requested within her January 17, 2004 letter was in the exclusive

possession of the law school, said allegation is denied in that, after reasonable

investigation, Answering Defendants are without knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief thereon. The same is therefore denied and strict proof


thereof demanded. By way of further response, nothing within the Honor Code

affords an accused student the rights to discovery in the civil litigation sense. The

Honor Code proceeding is an academic proceeding. It is not civil litigation.

21. Admitted in part and denied in part. The Honor Code, being in

writing, speaks for itself and any expression or implication inconsistent therewith

is denied. It is admitted that the Honor Code provides that the accused student has

the right to receive all evidence including exculpatory evidence at least one week

prior to the hearing. The Honor Code does not provide accused student discovery

rights. Pratt provided Suissa with all evidence to which she was entitled under the

Honor Code. It is denied that two of the law schools witnesses testified that Pratt

took notes during Pratts meeting with them.

22. Denied. It is denied that Pratt tried to assassinate Suissas

character. To the contrary, Pratt did not call any character witnesses in her

prosecution case, and offered to stipulate that, prior to the misconduct at issue,

Suissa was generally regarded as a having good character. Pratt also agreed to

allow Suissa to present numerous character witnesses via pre-recorded video and

further agreed to waive the law schools right to cross examine these witnesses in

the Honor Code hearing.

23. Denied. It is denied that there were due process denials or failures to

adhere to the Honor Code, or that there was a pattern thereof. With respect to the


claim that Suissa has suffered irreparable damage, these allegations are denied in

that, after reasonable investigation, Answering Defendants are without knowledge

or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. The same are

therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded. With regard to Plaintiffs

contention that the Hearing Board was given a packet of Pratts evidence before

the hearing, it should be noted that in accordance with the Honor Code rules, the

exhibit binders were provided to the Hearing Board and to Suissa and her counsel a

short time before the original hearing was scheduled to occur. The original hearing

did not occur as scheduled because Suissa requested serial continuances, which

requests were granted. Furthermore, on February 27, 2014 Pratt provided Suissas

counsel with a summary of each witness she intended to call as well as the material

information she expected to elicit from those witnesses. Suissa and her attorneys

had the exhibit binder and the witness names and testimonial summaries well in

advance of the hearing.

24. Denied. It is denied that Pratt or any other Defendant interfered with

the investigative or adjudicative processes or that the Honor Code proceedings

were compromised in any way. To the contrary, Pratt and all other Defendants

conducted the Honor Code proceedings reasonably and appropriately generally and

as more specifically set forth below.


a. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Suissa was

in any prevented from confronting her accusers. To the contrary, Suissa was

represented by counsel of her choosing, provided notice of all evidence and

witnesses supporting the prosecutors case well in advance of the hearing,

and afforded a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses

following direct examination by Pratt. It is admitted that a no contact order

was issued preventing Suissa from contacting the witnesses before the

hearing. However, the no contact order was a standard and appropriate

measure under the circumstances and did not prevent Ms. Suissas counsel

from contacting witnesses before the hearing. It is believed, and therefore

averred, that Suissas counsel did contact witnesses before the hearing. By

way of further response, it is admitted that Pratt contacted individuals who

were likely to be witnesses as part of her investigation and prosecution of the

case, which is entirely appropriate. It is denied that Pratt attempted to

dissuade any witness from testifying;

b. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Pratt

engaged in any non-disclosure or that key witnesses were not identified. It

is admitted that Suissa, through her various attorneys, exercised Suissas

rights to challenge a board member for cause pursuant to the Honor Code

and that challenge was sustained and the board member was removed and


replaced with an alternate. It is further denied that the student identified as

the reporting student was not, in fact, the student who reported observing a

possible Honor Code violation by Suissa. To the contrary, the student was

indeed the reporting student and was the eyewitness to the events in question

regarding the Evidence exam charges. The student was properly identified

and disclosed to Suissa;

c. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

vigorously pursued prosecution of the Honor Code violations against Suissa,

which is her responsibility as Associate Dean and Prosecutor. It is further

admitted that this investigation included an interview of a student who was,

until he provided testimony unfavorable to Suissa, known to be Suissas

boyfriend. It is further averred that this student had important and relevant

evidence to share regarding the violation, but was reluctant to do so due to

his then-close relationship with Suissa. It is admitted that the student was

upset with the prospect of sharing information with Pratt that was

inculpatory towards Suissa and that he would have preferred to not have

done so. It is further admitted that Pratt properly apprised this student of his

potential exposure to Honor Code violations if he failed to respond truthfully

in response to questions posed by Pratt regarding the Honor Code violations.

Pratt recommended that this individual consult with independent counsel of


his own choosing prior to determining whether or not to reveal information

to Pratt. Following that consultation, the individual voluntarily returned to

Pratts office and related the inculpatory information with Pratt. The

information at issue pertained solely to the Evidence exam charges;

d. Admitted in part and denied in part. In order to meaningfully

question the student who had been Suissas boyfriend, it was necessary for

Pratt to share very general information about the then-accusations against

Suissa. However, Pratt was careful not to disclose specific details about the

accusation so as to avoid influencing or affecting the students recollection.

Moreover, as a student over the age of 18, it was appropriate for Pratt to

avoid sharing FERPA-protected information with Suissas mother absent an

appropriate waiver on file. Suissa, at all times, was free to share information

with her mother.

e. Denied. It is denied that Pratt ever attempted to prejudice the

hearing board. Pratt requested security for the hearing after receiving a

number of visits from student witnesses expressing concern about security

and asking if security would be present; and after receiving a hostile

telephone call from a woman representing herself as Suissas mother who

planned to attend the hearing. The arrangement for security neither

prejudiced the board nor impacted the proceedings adversely in any way. It


was entirely consistent with the duty of Penn State to take reasonable

precautions to provide for the safety of its law school community, including

the hearing members and the hearing participants to arrange for security

under the circumstances;

f. Denied. It is denied that Pratt had any obligation to drop the

Evidence exam charges against Suissa. It is further denied that exculpatory

evidence surfaced. Rather, the time clock for the video recording device

had not been reset in some time and was not calibrated to actual time at the

time of recording Suissas hallway movements during the Evidence exam.

When the time, as shown on the video recorder, was synchronized to actual

time, the video footage showed Suissa entering the restroom precisely during

the time that the other law school records showed WiFi access by Suissas

cell phone. Once the recorder time was synchronized with actual time, the

video evidence was inculpatory, not exculpatory. Further, all of the above-

referenced evidence pertains to the Evidence exam charges, which charges

were not found by the Honor Board to have been proven by clear and

convincing evidence;

g. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that

Plaintiffs counsel requested a copy of a hearing transcript. It is denied that

the University was, or is presently, in possession of a transcript from the


hearing. Rather, the hearing was videotaped but not transcribed. Suissa was

invited to view the videotape in order to prepare her appeal, consistent with

University policy.

25. Denied. As stated above, there was no transcript of the testimony

provided at the hearing. Moreover, Suissa was offered full access to the video, and

it is believed that Suissa and her attorneys did review the video.

26. Denied. Suissa was provided a fair and impartial tribunal through

which she was afforded full opportunity to dispute the charges against her. The

Hearing Board did not find the Evidence exam charges to have been proven, but

did find Suissa responsible for two Honor Code violations related to the Mediation

exam. The faculty Honor Code committee members, as per longstanding policy

and practice, were appointed by the Dean at the beginning of the academic year, in

this case, the faculty committee members were appointed in Fall semester, 2013.

The Student Honor Code Committee members, per policy and practice, were

chosen via a student election held in the Spring, and the elected students serve for

the following academic year. The Student Honor Code Committee members, in

this case, were elected in Spring 2013, for service in Fall 2013 and Spring 2014.

Regarding the mechanism for selection of student and faculty committee members

for service in Ms. Suissas hearing, customary practices were followed. The

Student Chair of the Honor Committee selects students to serve based on their


availability and the Associate Dean asks faculty members to serve based on their

availability. The Honor Code afforded Suissa the right to challenge any Board

member. (Honor Code, 3.1.C). At no time did Suissa seek to dismiss any

student or faculty Honor Committee member based on alleged animus or bias

against Suissa. It is denied that the rules provided for Suissa or her counsel to

participate in the selection of the Hearing Board members. It is denied that the

chosen Board was biased or partial or that Suissa ever alleged that a Board member

was biased or impartial during the proceedings.

27. Denied. At all relevant times, Suissa received full due process rights

which comported in all respects with internal rules and regulations and with state

and federal constitutional parameters. The Board was neutral and unbiased and

thoughtfully and appropriately considered the case. No objection or request to

dismiss any Board member for bias or impartiality was ever made by Suissa.

28. Denied. It is denied that Riesmeyer was biased in favor of Pratt or

that her rulings were fundamentally confounding. It is further denied that Suissa

was in any way limited from exercising her rights regarding witnesses and

evidence that were afforded under the Honor Code. To the contrary, Suissa was

afforded full and complete due process rights generally, and as more specifically

set forth below:

1. Precluding Plaintiff from Cross Examining Witnesses


a. Denied. Pratt did identify and present the reporting eyewitness.

It is admitted that Pratt opposed a request for yet another continuance of the

hearing, and that Suissas request for a third continuance was denied. Prior

to that instance of Suissas continuance request being denied, Suissa had

been granted two (2) prior continuance requests, which resulted in the

hearing, which was originally scheduled to occur on January 31, 2014, to be

delayed until April 2014. Further, the witnesses at issue in this averment

were only relevant with respect to the Evidence exam charges and not with

respect to the Mediation exam charges. Moreover, Suissa never attempted to

call the challenged and dismissed Honor Board member as a witness at the

hearing;

b. Denied. Suissa, through her counsel, did question Dean

Gardner at length and was not prevented or limited in doing so. Further, it is

denied that Dean Gardner was proffered as an expert in Evidence or for the

purpose of analyzing the contents of Suissas Evidence exam. Pratt asked

Gardner no questions about the content of the Evidence exam. To the

contrary, Gardner was questioned only about technology issues relating to

when Suissa was actively typing answers and when she was not during the

Evidence exam. This averment also deals solely with the charges relating to

the Evidence exam;


c. Denied. It is denied that the rulings relative to Mr. McGeorges

testimony resulted in a due process violation. Suissas counsel was afforded

a meaningful opportunity to cross Mr. McGeorge regarding his direct

examination. The Honor Code specifically affords the Hearing Board the

right to reconvene to ask additional questions of witnesses, which right it

exercised. Further, the testimony and evidence at issue in this averment

involve only the Evidence exam charges;

2. Demonstrated Bias and Impropriety Throughout the Hearing and Appeal Processes

a. Denied. Riesmeyer properly served as an impartial and

independent Board President. At appropriate times, Riesmeyer sought input

from counsel for Suissa and from Pratt. Then, she would rule on the matter

issue. This is standard behavior for an impartial adjudicator;

b. Denied. It is denied that Riesmeyer deferred to Pratt

throughout the pre-trial conference. To the contrary, Riesmeyer heard

input from both sides on disputed issues and made good faith rulings;

c. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

prosecuted the charges. It is denied that Riesmeyer having been copied on

emails from Pratt periodically through the process was improper or

otherwise deleteriously affected the fundamental due process that Suissa was

afforded. Counsel for Suissa was also copied on emails regarding the


matter. It is admitted that Pratt provided to Plaintiff the evidence supporting

the Honor Code violations charges, as she was obligated to do under the

Honor Code. It is admitted that Pratt declined to allow Suissa to engage in

unlimited discovery, as the Honor Code does not entitle the accused to

engage in unlimited discovery. Suissa was provided with notice of all

evidence that was being relied upon by Pratt more than one week before the

hearing, as required by the Honor Code;

d. Denied. Pratt and Riesmeyer had one conversation prior to the

hearing which related to Riesmeyer agreeing to serve as the President of the

Hearing Board. Riesmeyer and Pratt did not further communicate regarding

the hearing except to discuss the time of the hearing. Riesmeyer did not

have any conversations with Pratt about the substance of the evidence

supporting the violations prior to the hearing, and had no ex parte

communications with Pratt after the hearing began;

e. Denied. To the best of Riesmeyers knowledge, Pratt provided

to Suissas counsel all evidence that she was required to provide by Section

3.1 of the Code;

f. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Pratt

made a statement relating to Suissas appellate review rights. However,

Riesmeyer ruled on all evidentiary objections in good faith at the time the


objections were made. Suissas counsel routinely followed adverse rulings

with lengthy arguments about why he disagreed with the rulings, and did so

in the presence of the full Honor Board;

g. Denied. The Honor Code states that an individual may report a

violation by submitting a memorandum to the Associate Dean. However,

the Honor Code does not require a written memorandum as an exclusive

mechanism for reporting Honor Code violations. Historically, violations

have routinely been initiated based on verbal reports of perceived

misconduct;

h. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that

Riesmeyer advised Suissas counsel as to the status of the dismissed and

proven charges. It is denied that Riesmeyer denied the motion for

reconsideration without hearing or considering the merits of the motion.

Rather, Suissas counsel discussed the anticipated motion for reconsideration

and the basis for same in a conversation involving Riesmeyer, Suissas

counsel, and Pratt that occurred at the conclusion of the March 30 hearing

day, before the motion was formally made by Suissas counsel. Riesmeyer

and the Board discussed the anticipated motion for reconsideration for over

an hour and concluded that it would not be granted when or if made. When

Suissas counsel later made the motion for reconsideration on the record


during the April 15, 2014 hearing day, the decision to deny the motion based

on the previously-referenced deliberation was communicated to Suissas

counsel;

i. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissas

counsel requested 10 years worth of disposition reports. It is admitted that

Suissas counsel received two years worth of the most recent disposition

reports as opposed to the 10 years that was requested. It is admitted that

disposition reports must be published pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Honor

Code. It is denied that the one case referenced by Suissa at the sanctions

hearing was analogous to Suissas case. Rather, the case referenced by

Suissa involved a student who accepted responsibility for the Honor Code

violation, unlike Suissa;

j. Admitted in part and denied in part. The sanctions

recommended by the Honor Committee, being in writing, and contained

within the email dated April 22, 2014, speak for themselves, and any

expression or implication inconsistent therewith is denied;

k. Admitted;

l. m. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that after

receiving Suissas counsels letter of appeal dated April 29, 2014, Houck asked

Pratt and Riesmeyer to provide a response to same. Houck advised counsel for


Suissa of the fact of the letters and invited counsel for Suissa to review them via an

email dated May 30, 2014. It is denied that there was anything inappropriate or

improper about allowing the individuals accused of improprieties the opportunity

to respond to same, or in allowing Suissa and her counsel the opportunity to review

those responses;

n. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissa

and her counsel were told they could not make copies. It is denied that

Suissa and her counsel were supervised while reviewing Pratts and

Riesmeyers letter. Rather, they were alone in the room reviewing the

letters;

o. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that

information was redacted. The information that was redacted involved other

students education records and was redacted in order to comply with the

requirements of the FERPA. These minor redactions did not materially

affect Suissas ability to meaningfully review the letters;

p. Denied. This allegation appears to be an expression of

Plaintiffs counsels opinion, to which no responsive pleading is required.

By way of further response, since Pratt and Riesmeyer both saw and heard

the same things during the hearing, it should come as no surprise to Suissa or

her counsel that their recollections were similar;


q. r. Denied. It is denied that Riesmeyer was biased in the process or that

she overlooked or refused relevant evidence in considering sanctioning. To

the contrary, the Board reviewed the evidence and the prior sanctions

information and developed its own views as to what sanction it felt

appropriately addressed the violations committed by Suissa. Riesmeyers

letter indicated that the Board specifically emphasized its concern that

Suissa failed to accept or acknowledge responsibility for her misconduct.

While the Board saw fit to call attention to this point, it nevertheless

properly considered all applicable criteria;

s. Denied. It is denied that Suissas sanctions were unusually

severe. The remainder of the averment appears to be a statement of

Plaintiffs counsels opinion regarding the evidence presented below, which

opinion was not shared by the Hearing Board. Defendants do not believe

Suissas counsels opinions require a response, but to the extent a response is

required, it is denied that Suissas counsels opinions are accurate or

reasonable;

t. Denied. It is denied there were any material departures from

the mandates of the Honor Code. To the contrary, the Honor Code was

followed in spirit and in substance. It is believed, and therefore averred, that

it is the result attained to which Suissa takes issue.


29. 30. Admitted in part and denied in part. Defendant Houcks letter of

June 27, 2014 to Suissa, being in writing, speaks for itself and any expression or

implication inconsistent therewith is denied.

31. Denied. It is denied that Houck revoked Suissas certification, or that

the revocation was in retaliation for her appeal of the Board findings. To the

contrary, the sponsoring attorney(s) who submit certificate(s) on behalf of students

have a professional obligation to withdraw the certification if they became aware

of facts and circumstances that render the averments made in the certification no

longer true. That is precisely what happened when Plaintiff was adjudicated to be

in violation of the Honor Code and that adjudication was upheld on appeal.

32. 33. Denied. As a result of Suissas misconduct and her adjudication

of responsibility by the Honor Board, it was necessary to revoke the Certificate.

The downstream consequences that ensued were the result of Suissas conduct

alone.

34. Denied. Suissas suspension, which has now been deferred until the

Spring 2015 semester to allow for the presentation of Suissas Motion for

Preliminary Injunction in the instant action, resulted from Suissas misconduct, and

not from Defendants conduct.

35. Denied. Upon information and belief, Suissa still has available to her

scholarship and financial aid monies as of the time for the Fall 2014 academic


semester. 36. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is denied that Houck

advised the Pennsylvania courts that Suissa no longer possesses good character

as averred. Defendants incorporate herein by reference their response to paragraph

31 above. Regarding the ultimate effect of the adjudication of responsibility for

the Honor Code violation on Suissas ability to sit for the bar exam or to be

admitted into the bar after graduation, that effect is unknown. This will be a matter

for the bar examiners of the jurisdiction(s) in which Suissa intends to apply to

determine.


important interests at stake in connection with the Honor Code proceeding. The

same is true for Defendants. However, the responsibility for the downstream

effects of the Honor Code violation lies with Suissa and arises from her underlying

misconduct, which resulted in the adjudication of responsibility generally and as

more specifically set forth below.

a. Denied. Suissa has been permitted to continue her law school

education for the Fall 2014 semester while the instant dispute is addressed

via a Motion for Preliminary Injunction; however, she will be suspended for

the Spring 2015 semester absent a valid Court Order to the contrary;

b. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Suissa

may potentially face the loss of financial resources in the Spring of 2015. It


is denied that she faces a loss of financial resources presently in the Fall of

2014. As to the averments that Suissa could not return to law school due to

a lack of financial resources, Defendants are, after reasonable investigation,

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief thereon. The

same are therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded;

c. Denied. It is denied that Houck communicated to the

Pennsylvania courts as averred. Defendants incorporate their response to

paragraph 31, above, inclusive. After reasonable investigation, Defendants

are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to

whether Suissas adjudication of responsibility for the Honor Code

violations will adversely impact her ability to practice law;

d. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief thereon and the same

are therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded;

e. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without


are therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded. By way of further

response, Defendants have not disseminated the facts of the underlying

Honor Code proceeding nor have they disseminated the result of the

underlying proceeding in any way connected to Plaintiffs name. That


Plaintiff has chosen to do so with her publicly available Complaint and

Motion filed in this action or otherwise is clearly her right, but that

publication cannot be ascribed to Defendants;

f. Denied. After reasonable investigation, Defendants are without


are therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded.

38. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that The

Pennsylvania State University is, pursuant to applicable authority, considered to be

a state actor for the purposes of claims arising under Section 1983. It is further

admitted that Defendants Pratt, Riesmeyer and Houck, with respect to the conduct

that has been placed at issue by Plaintiffs pleadings, were acting within the course

and scope of their employment for Defendant Penn State. To the extent there are

additional implied averments within this allegation, Defendant is, after reasonable

investigation, without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief thereon

and the same are therefore denied and strict proof thereof demanded.

COUNTI Violation of Due Process Rights Under Fourteenth Amendment

(42 U.S.C. 1983) Plaintiff v. All Named Defendants

39. Answering Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1

through 38, inclusive.


40. Denied. It is denied that Defendants denied Suissa her constitutional

right to due process of law in connection with the Honor Code violations. To the

contrary, at all times material and relevant hereto, Plaintiff was fully afforded all

due process rights to which she was legally entitled and in fact received far more

process than the Constitution requires generally and as more specifically set forth

below:

a. Denied. Plaintiff received a fair and impartial hearing process;

b. Denied. The Honor Code was substantially complied with in

all material regards;

c. Denied. The hearing and appeal process was fair and

appropriate;

d. Denied. Plaintiff received a fair and impartial hearing and it is

denied that Riesmeyer supported Pratt as alleged.

41. Denied. Suissa received all due process to which she was legally

entitled and indeed received more process than was constitutionally required.

42. Admitted in part and denied in part. It is admitted that Plaintiff may

suffer some adverse impact from the imposition of the sanctions imposed upon her.

As to that extent of the alleged harm, insofar as most of the alleged harm has not

yet and may never materialize, this allegation is denied in that after reasonable

investigation, Defendants are without sufficient information to form a belief as to


the truth of this allegation. It is denied that any harm or injuries has been caused

by the actions of any of the Defendants. To the contrary, it has been Plaintiffs

own misconduct that has caused any alleged harm or injuries.

WHEREFORE, Defendants request that this Honorable Court enter an

appropriate Order declaring that: (a) Plaintiff received all due process to which she

was constitutionally due; (b) Denying and dismissing Plaintiffs request for

injunctive relief with prejudice; (c) Denying and dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint,

with prejudice; (d) Entering judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff;

(e) Awarding Defendants all reasonable monetary relief to which they may be

entitled, including attorneys fees, interest, costs of this suit, and such other relief

as may be just and appropriate.

COUNT II Breach of Contract (42 U.S.C. 1983)

Plaintiff v. The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University and The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania

State University Association 43. Answering Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1


44. 45. Denied. At all times, Penn State substantially complied with the

terms of any enforceable contracts between it and Suissa.


46. Denied. It is denied that Defendants failed to follow any applicable

procedural requirements. It is further denied that Plaintiff was improperly found to

have violated the Honor Code or that any conduct of Defendants caused any

damages to Plaintiff. To the contrary, any harm that Plaintiff may prove was

caused by her own misconduct.









COUNT III Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Fourteenth Amendment

(42 U.S.C. 1983) Plaintiff v. Pratt, Riesmeyer and Houck (in their individual

capacities)

47. Answering Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1


48. Denied. At all times Defendants acted in a manner that was

professional, reasonable, appropriate and that fully afforded Plaintiff all due


process rights to which she was constitutionally due. Defendants in no way

impeded or impaired Plaintiffs rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Furthermore, even assuming without accepting that Plaintiff has suffered harm to

her reputation, it is denied that the harm suffered, if any, was caused by the

conduct of Defendants. Rather, it is believed and therefore averred that the harm

to Plaintiffs reputation, if any, was caused by the misconduct of Plaintiff.

49. Denied. The averments of paragraph 49 constitute a conclusion of

law to which no responsive pleading is required. To the contrary, the individual

Defendants are entitled to immunity, qualified or otherwise, in this case.

50. Denied. It is denied that Defendants conduct caused Plaintiff any

harm. To the contrary, to the extent Plaintiff has suffered injuries and damages

arising from the Honor Code proceedings and/or sanctions, those injuries and

damages have been the consequence of Plaintiffs misconduct and do not result

from any actionable conduct on the part of the Defendants.










AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

51. Defendants incorporate herein by reference its responses to Paragraphs

1 through 50 of its Answer as though set forth at length herein.

52. Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

53. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable

statute of limitations and/or timeliness.

54. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiffs failure

to exhaust administrative remedies.

55. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of

waiver, estoppel, and/or laches.

56. Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of

unclean hands.

57. Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, to establish a right to

trial by jury.

58. Plaintiffs claims are subject to all limitations on damages available

under the relevant statutes and other provisions of law, including failure to

mitigate.


59. Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs

conduct has been the superseding causal factor in any harm Plaintiff has suffered

relating to the Defendants challenged conduct.

60. Plaintiffs Complaint fails, in whole or in part, because she lacks the

constitutional right to the additional process she seeks and/or because the process

provided to Plaintiff was constitutionally adequate and she suffered no actionable

deprivation of rights.

61. Plaintiffs Complaint fails to identify a federal basis for jurisdiction

over her claims based on Pennsylvania law, and/or for jurisprudential

considerations, this Court should properly abstain from addressing Plaintiffs

constitutional claims until Plaintiff has exhausted her adequate state law remedies.


absolute immunity, qualified immunity, or conditional immunity.


absolute or conditional privilege and/or justification.


abstention, preemption and/or preclusion.

65. Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of

license and/or sound contractual basis.


66. Plaintiffs claims based upon alleged deficiencies in the Evidence exam

charges are moot due to the dismissal of those charges.

67. Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part by the absence of

irreparable harm and/or by the availability of an adequate remedy at law.

68. Defendants reserve the right to assert additional Affirmative Defenses

as this matter moves forward.









Respectfully submitted,

McQUAIDE BLASKO, INC.

Dated: September 10, 2014 By: s/John A. Snyder John A. Snyder, Esquire I.D. No. 66295 [email protected] Jaime S. Bumbarger, Esquire I.D. No. 308708 [email protected]

811 University Drive


State College, PA 16801 Phone: (814) 238-4926

Fax: (814) 234-5620

Attorneys for Defendants The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, Carla Pratt, Megan Riesmeyer, and James Houck


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICOLE SUISSA, Plaintiff, vs. THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY; CARLA PRATT, individually and in her official capacity; MEGAN RIESMEYER, individual and in her official capacity; and, JAMES HOUCK, individually and in his official capacity; Defendants.

: : : : : : : : : : : : : :

Case No. 3:14-cv-01626 Judge Robert D. Mariani Complaint filed: 08/19/14 Electronically Filed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Answer of Defendants

The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, Carla Pratt, Megan Riesmeyer, and James Houck to Plaintiffs Complaint in the above-captioned matter was served this 10th day of September, 2014, upon the attorney of record via U.S. Mail and ECF as follows:

J. Edward Bell, esquire Bell Legal Group, LLC 219 Ridge Street Georgetown, SC 29440 (843) 546-2408 [email protected] (for Suissa)

J. Dwight Yoder, Esquire Gibbel Kraybill & Hess LLP 41 East Orange Street Lancaster, PA 17602 (717) 291-1700 [email protected] (Local Atty for Suissa)


McQUAIDE BLASKO, INC.

By: s/John A. Snyder John A. Snyder, Esquire I.D. No. 66295 [email protected] Jaime S. Bumbarger, Esquire I.D. No. 308708 [email protected] 811 University Drive

State College, PA 16801 Phone: (814) 238-4926

Fax: (814) 234-5620

Attorneys for Defendants The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, Carla Pratt, Megan Riesmeyer, and James Houck


nicole suissa v. penn state dickinson school of law answer

Documents

dickinson law association

dickinson law case

dickinson school of

commonwealth of pennsylvania

law school campuses

defendant carla pratt

official capacity defendants

plaintiff nicole suissa