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    VIII. INTELLIGENCE C OM MUNITY CO LLECTION ACTIVITIESAGAINST IRAQS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC TION(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence focused its work in reviewing U S .

    intelligence on the quality and quantity of intelligence analysis, the objectivity andreasonableness of the Intelligence Communitys (IC) judgments, and whether any influence wasbrought to bear to shape that analysis to support policy objectives. The Committee alsoexamined the role of intelligence collectors in providing the fundamental information uponwhich the intelligence analysts based their assessments of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction(WMD) capabilities. To understand how intelligence collectors worked to obtain information onIraqs WMD capabilities, what the ICs collection efforts entailed, and whether those effortsproduced tangible results, Committee staff interviewed the Assistant Director of CentralIntelligence fo r Collection (ADCIK) and various members of the National IntelligenceCollection Board (NIC3)32.Committee staff also interviewed Iraqi collection officers in theCentral Intelligence Agencys (CIA) Directorate for Operations and National Security Agency(NSA) Iraqi signals intelligence analysts to gain further insight into the ICs post-Gulf Warhuman and signals intelligence collection strategies for Iraq. Committee staff also reviewed theNational Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Directives on Iraq, which are intended toprioritize and guide collection, to determine where IC collectors were requested to focus theircollection efforts.

    (U) The NICB told Committee staff that prior to the Gulf War there had been a robust,U.S., all-source intelligence collection program against Iraq and its WMD programs. After theGulf War, however, most of the ICs knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs was obtained from, inconjunction with, and in support of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)inspections. NICB members and IC analysts told Committee staff that infomation fromUNSCOM provided a significant portion of the information the IC had on Iraqs WMD programsand capabilities. One NICB representative told Committee staff, its very difficult to overstatethe degree to which we were focused on and using the output fiom the U.N. inspectors.

    While inspectors were in Iraq from 1991 through 1998, the IC was notaggressively pursuing collection against the WMD target and most of the assets tasked for Iraqi

    32TheNICB comprises the most senior collection managers from each intelligence discipline (humanintelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], and measurement andsignature intelligence [MASINT]) .

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    collection were focused on satisfying support-to-military operations requirements, support toUNSCOM inspections, and to indications and warning. Due to com peting collection prioritiesglobally: and regionally: Operations Northern and SouthernWatch, and the emphasis on current, rather than strategic or national, intelligence, there was nofocused, collaborative collection effort on the Iraqi WMD target.m)When United Nations (UN) inspectors left Iraq in D ecember 1998, the IC wasleft with a limited unilateral collection capability against Iraqs WMD. A report fromintelligence collectors in 200133noted, with the end of UNSC OM activity inside Iraq, . . . th eICs collection capability on Iraqi WMD programs diminished significantly. . . .

    (U ) In 1998, a new ADCUC led a major effort to exam ine worldwide end-to-endc011ection.~~o undertake this effort, the Director of Central Intelligence (D CI) established theCollection Management Task Force. Led by the ADCI for Collection, the CollectionManagem ent Task Force identified both the successes and challenges of the ICs collectionactivities and made several recommendations to improve collection, including bringing thecollection disciplines together in a more synergistic way, looking for innovative ways thatimprove collaboration and innovation across the Com munity, and establishing a center toexamine the ICs most intractable intelligence problems and develop new ways to improvecollection. In 2000, the Collection Concepts Development C enter (CCD C) was created toachieve these goals and took on Iraqs WM D capabilities for its first study.m)n the C CDC study, collectors and analysts within the IC worked together toidentify collection gaps and develo p new, unilateral collection strategies designed spe cifically totarget Iraqs WMD programs. The study looked at all four aspects of WMD (nuclear, biological,chemical an d delivery) and recommended ways to address the collection gaps. The CCDCreleased its report, titled, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Recommendationsf o r331raqiWeapons of Muss Destruction: Recomnzendationsfo r Improvements in Collection. The CollectionConcepts Development C enter, June 2000.34En d-to-endcollection refers to th e collection cycle which entails the development of collectionrequirements, allocating tasks to specific collection assets, collecting, processing, exploiting, and then disseminating

    the information that is collected.- 259 -

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    __.-

    Improvements in Collection, in June 2000. Immediately after the report was released, the ICbegan to implement the CCDCs recommendations to improve intelligence collection in alldisciplines (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence[MINT], open source intelligence [OSINT] and measurement and signature intelligence[MASINTI) against Iraqs=.he NICB briefed Committee staff on the how theserecommendations were implemented and how intelligence collection improved as a result ofthese efforts.A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

    In order to more fully understand why the CCDC recommended certainchanges to the Intelligence Communitys (IC) HUMINT collection activities, Committee staffinterviewed HUMINT collection officers in the CIAs Directorate of Operations, includingcollection officers in the Near East (NE) Division and the CounterproliferationDivision (CPD).These officers briefed Committee staff on the ICs HUMINT collection posture against Iraq fromthe end of the Gulf War until the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). CIA officers toldstaff that the ICs HUMINT collection efforts throughout this period were dedicated to

    intelligence on a variety of issues. Most of this information obtained through CIAs sources wasrelated to political and military issues, not WMD, however. The CIA had no dedicated WMD. - _._.- -.- _ _ . . - __sources on the ground in Iraq until the late nineties.1.heCIA

    did not have any WMD sources in Iraq after 1998. When asked about the lack of sourceswith access to WMD, the Deputy Chief of CPD told Committee staff that despite an intense,vigorous recruitment campaign against Iraq WMD targets . . .we were never able to gain directaccess to Iraqs WMD programs.m)CIA officer from NE told staff that when he came to his position in 2001,

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    m)The recommendations in the CCDC study responded to these deficiencies inHUMINT WMD collection. The CCDC study found that HUMINT operations against IraqWMD were extremely limited. HUMINT was heavily dependent on liaison sources andalthough, by 2001, there were-ources inside the country and=1 outside the country, HUMINT collection against the Iraq WMDtarget was still negligible. When Committee staffasked why there had not been an aggressive HUMINT strategy developed to target Iraqs WMD

    The NICE! told Committee staff that getting people on the ground was difficultand said that Iraq was a tough-roblem. the CCDC recommended insteadthat the IC focus its HUMINT strategy r The CCDC study teamrecommended them:

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    The NICB told Committee staff that even before the CCDC study was finalized,the IC began implementing many of these recommendationsand aggressively pursued HUMINTcollection. The NICB said both the CIA and the DIA develoDed well organized efforts-These operations failed to provide any usable intelligence. The NICB told Committeestaff that the negative results were reported in intelligence reports.m)n September, 200 1, the DCI established a Joint Task Force within CIASCounterproliferation Division (CPD) of the Directorate of Operations (DO). According to theDeputy Director of CPD, there was a full complement of UNSCOM inspectors inside Iraq from91 until December 98, so the focus wasnt as intense as it was after that in recruiting sources onWMD. The DCIs Iraqi WMD issue manager for the clandestine service told staff that beforethe Task Force was set up, there were fewer than half a dozen at some times, individuals workingon Iraq.- There were very few assets-at all reporting onIraqs WMD efforts. After the Task Force was established, the CIA recruited=ources,-whose information resulted in the production and dissemination of over400 intelligencereports. This was an increase from only 90 reports in 2000.m )Some other examples of how the IC tried to improve HUMINT collection againstIraqs WMD programs included:

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    resulted

    mFrom late summer 2002 until the start of OIF in March 2003, the CIAdramatically picked up the pace of HUMINT collection accordingto a CIA collector.=

    CIA officials told Committee staff thisor more sources reporting-y March 2003. Just prior to the start of OIF,=inNone of these sourcesprovided information on Iraqs biological, chemical or nuclear weapons programs.= Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered placing a CIA officer in the

    years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraqs WMD programs. A CIA officer said,because its very hard to sustain . . . it takes a rare officer who can go in and-

    survive scrutiny-or a long time.- 263 -

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    B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

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    C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)As with the other intelligence disciplines, there was a coordinated effort within

    the IC to improve imagery collection against th e WMD target. The CCDC study found thatthat imagery assets were in high demand for

    the Iraq WMD target and for support to military operations. This required imagery assets to betasked more efficiently and effectively.

    The CCDC study made several recommendationsaimed at overcoming the-hallengesof competing priorities= The recommendations included: airborne missions=over the entireNorthern and Southern no-fly zones;- 265 -

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    (U) Increase the use of commercial imagery to supplement imagery from U.S. intelligencecollection satellites;

    D . Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)m)he IC also developed MASINT collection strategies to target Iraqs WMDprogram. The CCDC study found that there was negligible use of MASINT sensors against IraqiWMD,

    The study recommended that MASINT assets be used moreeffectively The CCDC study alsorecommended that MASINT sensors be increasingly used9

    )he NICB said that the IC implemented several recommendationsto improveMASINT collection,

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    -he NICB told Committee staff that from June 2000to January 2003 these collection efforts resulted in over 20 0 chemical-related reports, over 60biological reports, and over 80 0 nuclear-related reports, which, the NICB said contained bothpositive and negative information on activity related to WMD. When asked by Committee staffwhich of these reports contained positive hits, the vice deputy director fo r MASINT andof the reports were available to analysts via INTELINK.E, Impact of Increased Collectionon Analysism)epresentativesfrom each collection discipline reported to Committee staffthat collection increased significantly in their areas after the recommendations of the CCDC wereimplemented. Committee staff asked the collectors how they work with the all-source analysts tomake sure that when they see a large increase in collection, that they understand that the increaseis a result of an increase in collection, not necessarily an increase in activity by the Iraqis. Ananalyst who worked on the Iraq WMD CCDC study told Committee staff that WMD analystsregularly participated in NICB meetings on all WMD collection issues. This analyst noted thatthere was a constant feedback mechanism available throughout this period from certainly 2001through the present that enabled [analysts] to get a gauge of whether this was a collection bias orif it was new collection or if it was a scale-up in activities. This same analyst also noted that insome places, [the IC] was collecting1..in other cases [theIC] was collecting for the-hat had been under way for quitesome time . . . and frequently the reporting would show that.

    Comments from analysts to Committee staff, however, suggest that some IraqWMD analysts did not believe that collection had increased significantlyas a result of theimproved effort against Iraqs WMD. A CLA BW analyst told Committee staff, we increasedour collection efforts, but that did not necessarily equate to increased collection. We tried veryhard to focus them to collect on areas we thought were most important, but it did not necessarilytranslate into us getting more collection. Two analysts from CIASoffice of Near East and

    collectionas a result of the CCDC.- 267 -

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    I)While some analysts did not believe that collection had increased, severalanalysts pointed to intelligence reporting obtained by the IC after late 2000 (and after the ICbegan implementing the CCDC study recommendations) as having played a significant role in

    Imagery reports from 2002 onwere key to chemical analysts assessments

    that Iraq had and was producing chemical weapons (CW). In addition, intelligence assessmentson all of Iraqs suspect WMD programs - nuclear, chemical, biological, and delivery programs,pointed to increased procurement activity after 2000 as part of the judgment that Iraq hadincreased WMD activity.F. CollectionDirectives

    Committee staff reviewed the ICs national HUMINT collection directives(NHCDs) covering Iraqs WMD programs published in the years preceding Operation IraqiFreedom. Th e NHCDs are the ICs primary guidance to its HUMINT collectors around theworld on how to prioritize and guide HUMINT collection efforts. The NHCDs provide lists ofquestions and information requirements, categorized by subject, to be explored with sources thathave the appropriate knowledge and access to information. The NHCDs are reviewed byappropriate analysts in the IC to ensure that their analytic questions and requirements are beingmet. All of the questions and requirements in the NHCDs on Iraqs WMD programs werewritten with the clear presumption that Iraq had active WMD programs, an d focused oncollecting information about issues such as the extent of Iraqs WMD activities,-None of the NHCDs reviewed by Committee staff contained any questions orrequirements that suggested that collection be focused on determiningwhether Iraq ha d weaponsof mass destruction or active WMD programs.G. CL4 HUMINT Compartmentation(U ) IC officials provided Committee staff with reporting from a number of sensitive CIAHUMINT sourceswho reported on Iraqs WMD programs before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thereporting from these sources was restricted to a limited list of recipients within the IC, or washandled in special access programs (SAP). SAPS limit distributionto a small group of ICpersonnel who have been formally granted access to the intelligence based on their need to knowthe information being reported. When the IC provided these reports to the Committee, they told

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    Com mittee staff that they could not be sure that they were providing all of the limiteddistribution and special access reporting on Iraqs weapons programs, because of the difficulty ofsearching for reports across the different special access compartments.H. Weapons of Muss Destruction @?AID) Collection Conclusionsd, Conclusion 77. The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on United Nations (UN)

    information about Iraqs programs and did not develop a sufficientunilateral collection effort targeting Iraqs weapons of mass destruction programs andrelated activities to supplement UN-collected information and to take its place upon thedenarture of the UN inspectors.

    (U) Conclusion 78. The Intelligence Community depended too heavily on defectors andforeign government services to obtain human intelligence (HUMINT) information onIraqs weapons of mass destruction activities. Because the Intelligence Community did nothave direct access to many of these sources, it was exceedingly difficult to determine sourcecredihilitv.

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    (U) Conclusion 79 , The Intelligence Community waited too long after inspectors departedIraq to increase collection against Iraqs weapons of mass destruction programs.

    (U) Conclusion80, Even after the departure of United Nations (UN) inspectors, placementof human intelligence (HUMINT) agents and development of unilateral sources inside Iraqwere not top priorities for the Intelligence Community.

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    c (U) Conclusion 81. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continues to excessivelycompartment sensitive human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting and fails to shareimportant information aboutHUMINT reporting and sources with IntelligenceCommunity analysts who have a need to know.

    a)onclusion 82. . The lack of in-country humanintelligence (HUMINT) collection assets contributed to this collection gap.

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