nietzschean security k

Norman-The Black Attack January/February (Nuke War) Security K 1

YOU AIN’T SAFE ON THESE STREETS NIGGA!

You can call this argument HOT OFF DA PRESS. The modern age is committed to a disavowal of, and escape from, tragedy, The triumph of Socratic reason manifests in our attempt to order life and renounce death and suffereing. This requires the construction of an ideal real in opposition to the the apparent world of chaos and violence. Enter the Affirmative. In the modern drive toward certainty and security and, in an attempting at resolving disorder and insecurity, the AC labors to mold the world to make it fit an idealized image of order. Paul Saurette professor at Johns Hopkins furthers. 1

Nietzsche suggests therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and completion. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered and chaotic and suffering aspects of life were accepted and affirmed and as inescapable aspects of human existence. However Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason.

The Socratic Will to Truth is charecterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian [chaotic] elements of existence and privileging an idealized Apollonian [joyful] order. As life is inescapably compromised of both order and disorder, however the promise of control throughout Socratic reason is only possible by creating a Real World of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomized model led to the emergence of a uniquely modern understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent world. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian [chaotic] elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. According to Nietzsche ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomization by employing the Apparent World

as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Through this redirection, the real 1 Saurette, Paul, Professor of Political Theory at JHU 1996. [I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in international Relations Theory, Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1 pp.1-28]

Hoe this ain't punch, I'm sippin' on some syzurpI roll a fat joint and do my fingers like scissors


world has transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. Unable to accept the Dinoysian [chaotic] suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering. This escape is possibly only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The will to order, then is the aggressive need increasingly to order the apparent world in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of

the Real World. First ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal also asserts that a ‘truer’, more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretive structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World.

The Aff is only another breaking news story warning us of the chaos which surrounds us and compelling us toward resolving that chaos by some form of action. Unfortunately, our attempts at securing the world are damned to fail. It is not a coincidence that breaking new occurs every fifteen minutes because international politics ARE unpredictable, and the affirmative attempting to order them is problematic. The uncomfortable yet irresistible truth is that human life is dangerous. Rather than coming to terms with this condition, the Aff encourages us to combat this with hollow actions that don’t deal with this truth, they merely delay it. At issue here is not just life but what makes life worth living. A negative ballot is the only way to reclaim the joy from the affirmative’s world of paranoia. James Der Derian 2elaborates:

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbe’s and Marx’s interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His [the key]method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for

Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox . In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical other of life, terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying, into a fearful sameness. The will to power then

should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading in Nietzsche’s view to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings—including self preservation—are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears

2 James Der Derian The value of Security:Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard. On Security. Ed Ronnie Lipschultz 1998.



endemic to life, for life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war. But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference—that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the casually sustainable. In the Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer

disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest

protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything

true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil and evil provokes hostility—recycling the desire for security. The influence of timidity, as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the necessities of security:” they feat change, transitoriness: this

expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences. The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. Trust, the good, and other common values come to rely upon an artificial strength: the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust,

to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god. For Nietzsche,

of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. The point of Nietzsche’s critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative—and the western

metaphysics that perpetuate it—have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists. Nietzsche’s worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls thorugh conformity and

rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox—all that makes a free life worthwhile. How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? In Nietzsche’s lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of new philosophers who would restore a reverence for fear and

reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche [we must]holds up the notion of indifference to and contempt for security. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as [these are] opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

The mindset to adopt is to do nothing. This ontological disarmament in the face of dangerous others is the only means to real peace, which cannot exist physically but only



in the mind. I would rather die than promote the affirmative’s futile search for certainty. Living life is more important than averting some danger to our feaux sense of security. Your ballot is a remote control, turn off DA BREAKING NEWS. Nietzsche 3writes:

The means to real peace.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one’s own morality and the neighbor’s immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also

keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor’s bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane , as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as

I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the

heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, “ We break the sword ," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed , out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one’s neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared —this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a “gradual decrease of the military burden ." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

LINKSHEG-My opponent valuing the preservation of US hegemony is exacerbating the problem. It links right into the mindset Der Derian talks about. “We are the US, our view is the right one, now support us as we attempt to conquer all that which we feel is wrong 3 Nietzsche. The anti-christ, Human All Too Human. Aphorism #284 1878



in the name of security.” This is allowing for a negative will to power or the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown, insofar as we can’t ever know what will happen with nuclear weapons since they are an invention of man in every sense of the word invention. Generic Aff Link-The affirmative is linking into this mindset by acting on an unknown threat to security. Valuing our security above affirmative values. The aff is a clear example of a negative Will to Power, the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown, which is extremely problematic.

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IMPACTThe terminal impact of the negative orientation toward life, and a negative will to power is the the inability to live life to its fullest. Instead, the affirmative holds life in contempt for its pains, never understanding that life is suffering, starvation, and dying. The desire to seek redemption from life through the creation of a future moral order annihilates life in the present. This is the worst possible danger: our existence becomes a dreary perpetuation of biological life, devoid of meaning, waiting only for passive death. Friedrich Nietzsche 4states:

This the world was made to appear, at every instant, as a successful solution of God’s own tensions, as an ever new vision projected by that grand sufferer for whom illusion is the only possible mode of redemption. Yet in its essential traits it already prefigured that spirit of deep distrust and defiance which, later on, was to resist to the bitter end any moral interpretation of existence whatsoever. It is here that one could find a pessimism situated beyond good and evil a philosophy which dared place ethics among the deceptions. Morality became a mere fabrication for purposes of gulling: at best, an artistic fiction, at worst, an outrageous imposture. The furious, vindictive hatred of life implicit in that system of ideas and values that in order to be consistent with a system of this sort was forced to abominate art. From the very first Christianity spelled life loathing itself, and that loathing was simply disguised, tricked out, with notions of an other and better life. A hatred of the world, a curse on the affective urges, a fear of beauty and sensuality, a transcendence rigged up to slander moral existence, a yearning for extinction. This whole cluster of distortions had always stuck me as being the most sinister form the will to destruction can take, a sign of profound sickness exhaustion, biological etiolation. And since according to ethics life will always be in the wrong, it followed that one must smother it under a load of contempt, security, and constant negation; must view it as an object not only unworthy of our desire BUT ABSOLUTELY WORTHLESS IN ITSELF.As for morality, could it be anything but a will to deny life, a secret instinct of destruction, the beginning of the end? and for that very reason, the supreme danger?

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, Translated Golffing 1956 p. 9-11


nietzschean security k

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