The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 14 | Issue 21 | Number 4 | Article ID 4975 | Nov 01, 2016

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Nippon Kaigi: Empire, Contradiction, and Japan’s Future

Sachie Mizohata

Abe Shinzo speaking at Nippon Kaigi event“on the Meiji spirit,” 16 July 2012

Introduction

Nippon Kaigi (NK, the “Japan Conference”) isJapan’s largest and most powerful conservativeright-wing organization, whose membersinclude current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō andmost of his Cabinet.1 This nationalist non-partypolitical group was relatively unknown untilrecently. A surge in publication and mediaattention of late, however, has made thisarcane society suddenly visible, particularly inregard to its influence on politics, nationalistagenda, and revisionist causes. Many recentpublications2 associate Nippon Kaigi withJapan’s rightward leaning trends: politicalclimate, leadership, and a new current ofnationalist sentiment. They report that NKagendas are essentially aligned with Abe’spolitical ambitions and views, most notablyconstitutional revision. As the 2016 UpperHouse election results strengthened theirability to shape Japan’s political agenda,Nippon Kaigi merits concern and scrutiny. NK

adherents profess to promote Japan’sprosperity and international prestige, to restoreJapan’s national pride and unify the country.These goals seem honorable and appealing tomany Japanese. Nonetheless, since NKsupporters are uncritical in their affirmation ofthe imperial past and suppression of civilliberties, they may achieve the opposite results.Herein lies their contradictions and paradoxes.

In this paper, I first provide an overview ofNippon Kaigi and its emerging background.The next section examines NK’s vision of a‘proud’ nation. The third section reviews keyelements of NK's ideology. A final sectionexamines their contradictions.

What is Nippon Kaigi?

Nippon Kaigi’s ideological foundations andlegitimacy are rooted in two major religiousmovements in early 20th century Japan. One isSeicho no ie 生長の家 (literally House of Birthand Growth), a syncretic religious organizationfounded by Taniguchi Masaharu in 1930. Theother one is Jinja Honchō 神社本庁 , theAssociation of Shinto Shrines, an administrativeorganization organized in 1946 that overseessome 80,000 Shinto shrines.3

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Seicho no ie

Jinja Honchō

Nippon Kaigi was established in 1997 throughintegration of two existing groups. One wasNihon o mamoru kai (Society for the Protectionof Japan) founded in 1974. The other was Nihono mamoru kokumin ka ig i (Peop le ’ sConference/National Conference to ProtectJapan) founded in 1981).

Nihon o mamoru kai, originally a union ofShinto and Buddhist religious organizations,rallied under the banner of anti-communist andopposition to the Buddhist Soka Gakkai, whichthey branded a threat to Japanese society. Thisis ironic since New Komeito (an arm of SokaGakkai) is an indispensible coalition partner ofthe ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).4

Nihon o mamoru kokumin kaigi originallyconsisted of rightist cultural luminaries,business leaders, and imperial army veterans.They were keen on making the emperor againthe head o f s tate and implement ingconstitutional changes, education reforms, anda strengthened defense posture, which coincidewith present Nippon Kaigi objectives.5

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Today Nippon Kaigi has approximately 38,000members. Its monthly magazine, Nippon noibuki (Breath/Vigor of the Nation) dealsextensively with denouncing criticism of theNanking Massacre as historical fabrication orthe Tokyo Trial as victor’s justice andillegitimate. NK has 47 chapters in allprefectures, which are further divided intosome 240 local chapters. Although lacking astrong membership base, their outsizeinfluence rests on direct connections withlawmakers: the Parliamentary League forNippon Kaigi (Kokkai giin kondankai) of 280members (PM Abe as a special advisor to it;Inada Tomomi, Defense Minister; Koike Yuriko,former Defense Minister and present Tokyogovernor) as well as its Local Assembly Union(Nippon Kaigi chihō giin renmei) with 1,692members.6 In other words, “Nippon Kaigi hasbackroom clout … and a network that reachesdeep into the political establishment.”7

At present, NK’s president is Takubo Tadae,professor emeritus at Kyorin University, whohas succeeded Miyoshi Tōru, the third NKpresident (2001 ― 2015) and former ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court. In practice,secretary-general Kabashima Yūzō is at thehelm. Other key members include a spectrumof professionals from business such as formerchairperson of Bridgestone Tire to conservativeacademics, public figures, and Japan MedicalAssociation Chairperson. In addition, given itsreligious roots, it is worth mentioning that 24out of 62 NK representatives are from religiousorganizations.8

Miyoshi Tōru’s “Tennō Heika Banzai (Long live the Emperor)”charge at Meiji Jingu Kaikan on National Foundation Day onFebruary 11, 2016.

Active NK supporters in academia figureprominently in the debate over reinterpretingJapan’s pacifist constitution. In summer of2015, the role of NK academics becameobvious when tens of thousands of peopleprotested against the security legislation. Whilethe overwhelming majority of legal scholarsand practitioners condemned the “war bills” asunconstitutional, Cabinet Secretary SugaYoshihide claimed during the Diet discussionthat many constitutional scholars supported thebills. Having been urged to mention suchproponents to support the position, Sugalamely cited three scholars: Nagao Kazuhiro ofChuo University, Nishi Osamu of KomazawaUniversity, and Momochi Akira of NihonUniversity. All three are Nippon Kaigimembers.9 More tellingly, these professors arealso the members of the two offshoots set up bythe NK: Utsukushii Nihon no Kenpō o TsukuruKokumin no Kai (National Society to Create aConstitution for a Beautiful Japan; hereafter,the Kenpō group) as well as 21 Seiki noNihon to Kenpō Yūshikisha Kaigi (Associationof Experts on the Constitution for 21st CenturyJapan). We observe an intensification of thelobby ing capac i t y o f NK th rough amultiplication of groups and associations.10

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The authors of recent publications note thatNK’s strength resides with formidable skillsand sustained grassroots efforts for massorganizing to mobilize people and resources.They hold lectures and rallies to pressure localassemblies to submit resolutions to Tokyo bybombarding them with requests, petitions, andphone calls. NK predecessors pushed throughthe law recognizing the national anthem andflag as Japan’s national symbols in 1999. Then,NK collected about 4 million signatures callingfor reform of the Fundamental Law ofEducation (Kyoiku kihon hō), which in turn wasenacted in 2006 in Abe’s first stint as PrimeMinister.11 Furthermore, NK has unceasinglypressured, through various local and nationalgroups, against initiatives on gender-freeeducation, sex education in schools, and genderequality in political participation, whilepromoting traditional family values, gendernorms, and women’s primary roles as mothersand wives at home.12

These activities illustrate NK’s values. Theyfulminated against bills proposed by theDemocratic Party of Japan as ‘four bad laws,’which included 1) legalizing suffrage forforeign permanent residents, 2) women usingtheir maiden names after marriage, 3) anational Human Rights Protection Bill (Jinkenyōgo hōan), and 4) the right of a woman toaccede to the emperorship.13 NK launched asuccessful counter-campaign of signaturecollection against each of these. Overall, itspolitical activities and documents reveal notonly their ultra-conservative and inward-looking nature, but also their anathema to theleft and malaise with women ― except like-minded colleagues.

In short, NK has strong influence on leadingdecision-making bodies. They aim at promotingconstitutional changes and traditionaleducation and values.

What are NK's Objectives?

The above unveils NK's uncommon capacity tolobby and push forward bills and laws that havedeep impact on the daily life of the Japanese.The NK website14 describes six organizationalobjectives:

1.A beautiful tradition of thenational character for Japan’sfuture

(美しい伝統の国柄を明日の日本へ)

2. A new constitution suitable forthe new era

(新しい時代にふさわしい新憲法を)

3. Pol i t ics that protect thecountry’s reputation and thepeople’s lives

(国の名誉と国民の命を守る政治を)

4. Creating education that fostersJapanese sensibility

(日本の感性をはぐくむ教育の創造を)

5. Contributing to world peace byenhancing national security

(国の安全を高め世界への平和貢献を)

6. Friendship with the world tiedup with a spirit of co-existence andco-prosperity

(共生共栄の心でむずぶ世界との友好を)

The lengthy description of their objectives canbe summed up in the following points: 1)Promote worship of the imperial household atthe heart of our state and people, whoseimperial lineage can be traced over 125generations of unbroken descent (back to

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origins of the sun goddess). 2) Eliminate theoccupiers -draf ted const i tut ion andaccompanying problems that inhibit theindependent will of the state to protect itssecurity and turning national defense over to aforeign power. NK therefore seeks to amendthe constitution to fully utilize the Self-DefenseForces. 3) Restore a politics that emphasizesthe importance of national interests,reputation, and sovereignty, including payinghomage to Japan’s war dead at Yasukunishrine. 4) Nurture young people to cultivatepatriotic spirit, respect for the national anthem,flag, and history, and cherish quintessentialJapaneseness. 5) Bolster defense forces inorder to effectively assume global leadershipand counterbalance threats posed by China andNorth Korea. 6) Finally, build friendly relationswith other countries through exchangeprograms. In short, their overarching concernsare to promote a narrow state-centric notion ofprosperity and well being. Stated differently,they are unconcerned about the welfare ofordinary Japanese.

Aum Shinrikyo facility for manufacturingsarin, Satyan 7, Yamanashi Prefecture,

1995

Particularly notable is NK’s longing for nationalpride and traditional virtues, as noted in theirreiteration of pride and tradition. Why so? Agood way to understand them may be lookingat their historical background, starting twoyears prior to NK’s founding year; it was “theyear of the Kobe earthquake and AumShinrikyo’s deadly gas attacks on Japan’ssubway. … The two events … had a profoundi m p a c t o n t h e n a t i o n ’ sconfidence.”15 Especially, the latter generated avague sense of national drift and moral decay.Meanwhile, the LDP’s single-party rule shiftedto LDP-led coalition governments. In the post-bubble recession, persistent economic crisesdeepened and conditions that supportedreliance on the premier power (the U.S.)weakened, reinforced by population aging,overseas relocations of Japanese firms int a n d e m w i t h t h e r i s e o f C h i n a a n dglobalization. 1 6

At that time, the war generation whichexperienced war first-hand was aging anddisappearing. It made up 75% of the populationin 1950, and was reduced to roughly 23% by2000.17 By then, Emperor Shōwa, distantreminder of the lost war, was long gone. NormaField notes an undercurrent of revisionism:“Hirohito missed his moment for saying ‘I’msorry,’” leaving a legacy of still unresolvedproblems, and “a responsibility [of ordinaryJapanese citizens] whose continued denial hasbeen translated into silent acquiescence to theharsh discipline required by [countryrebuilding and] economic success.”18 MutoIchiyo thus stresses: “In this fashion, a vesselwas created to preserve and nurture the ideathat the wartime actions of the empire were notwrong, and even that they were right.”19

In this milieu, the political climate for Japan’swart ime deeds had changed. GavanMcCormack delineates:

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Beginning in the 1990s, the officialJapanese stance on its pastchanged. After four decades inwhich the past was set aside, … asthe Cold War crumbled andaffluence palled, the problem ofreconciliation with the regionbegan to be faced. … As part ofthis burgeoning internationalpressure on Japan, … dozens of lawsuits demanding apologies andcompensation have been lodgedwith Tokyo district courts onbehalf of former ‘comfort women’and the many other victims ofJ a p a n ’ s c o l o n i a l i s m a n daggression. 2 0

This conversely attests to the maturation ofhuman rights discourse, especially in the formof global feminism, as well as the gradualdecline of US hegemony in the post-Cold Warpolitical context. Moreover, 1995 marked theMurayama Statement in which the PrimeMinister delivered an official apology toneighboring countries. Humiliated by “apologydiplomacy”, NK forerunners gathered 5.2million signatures opposing the landmarkstatement.21 1996 saw the formation of the NKaffiliated group, Japanese Society for HistoryTextbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会) led by Nishio Kanji, Fujioka Nobukatsu, andothers to remove or downplay criticaldescriptions of Japan’s war conduct. Theiraction accorded with official textbooktreatments: “the Japanese system exercisescontrol primarily through state screening.”22

Japanese Society for History TextbookReform textbooks

Japan’s selective memory came underincreasing international censure. As AkikoHashimoto shows, such war reflections, identitypolitics, and scrutiny engendered or unraveleda sequence of emotions in the course of Japan’spostwar ‘long defeat.’ Hashimoto eloquentlydepicts “the desire to repair a damagedreputation” to create a positive nationalidentity.23 Kato Norihiro points out that wordssuch as “pride” were seldom used in the publicsphere when Japan enjoyed quiet confidence,gained by economic boom and pro-Americanpeace diplomacy under Article 9. Kato thussees Japan’s growing anxiety, malaise, andshaken confidence as leading to the emergenceof Nippon Kaigi: “In reality it is akin to Japan’sversion of the Tea Party: Like the Tea Party inthe United States, it is a product of deepconservative anxieties about the future. … BothNippon Kaigi and the Tea Party cast themselvesas ‘grassroots’ movements that represent‘traditional’ values of ‘the people.’ One TeaParty slogan is ‘Take Back America,’ and in thelast election one L.D.P. slogan was ‘Take BackJapan.’”24 In Kato’s view, there are two ways torehabilitate national identity to restore honorto Japan. One viable way is to face the pastwrongdoings. Another is to repudiate them andto forge or project a sense of pride in nationalbelonging through cover-ups and self-adulatory

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slogans.25 The two precisely oppose each other.NK chiefly adopts the latter (in a futile attempt)to change the national memory and to reclaim apositive Japanese identity.

Furthermore, according to historian YamazakiMasahiro, NK has two outstanding goals. Oneis to restore Yasukuni’s national status, andanother is to alter the constitution.26 As for thelatter, NK established the Kenpō group in 2014with local chapters across the country. NKlaunched a campaign to collect 10 millionsignatures for constitutional revision. In 2015,it held a national rally at the Nippon BudōkanHall, where PM Abe sent a congratulatoryvideo reaffirming his pledge to revise aconstitution suitable for the 21st century.27

In sum, NK’s emergence coincided with amoment in the 1990s when the postwar legacyof problems intensified in the historical contextof the rise of international criticism andinternational anger over memory of colonialismand war. This took the form of reactions toJapan’s international apologies, textbookdebates, the maturation of human rightsdiscourses, decline of the war generation, andwas accentuated by Japan’s economicdownturn. In parallel, revisionist discourse,impervious to pressures for a shared historywith neighboring countries, grew powerful asdid state leaders holding such views.

NK’S Ideological Foundations

Recall that both Nihon o mamoru kai and Nihono mamoru kokumin kaigi share the same wordto name their groups: “mamoru” (to defend,protect, preserve, or safeguard). The wordconveys their concern that something at stakewas being lost.

Taniguchi Masaharu

If Nippon Kaigi hopes to revive or “reclaim”past glory by rewriting history and revising theconstitution ― what are the ideological sourcesfor their legitimacy and justification? NK hastwo major religious components; the first isSeicho no ie, from which many of NK’s keyfigures originally came. The founder of thissyncretic religious organization, Taniguchi,embraced the idea of kokutai (national polity)― the central plank to worship the emperor asa divine ruler, and to see Japan as the center ofthe world and the Yamato race as superior toother races, which in turn could justify imperialventures abroad in the name of nationaldefense. He proclaimed that the postwarconstitution was the root of all evils and calledfor the revival of the prewar Meiji Constitution.As a war sympathizer, Taniguchi was barredfrom public service in the postwar era before

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restarting Seicho no ie in 1949 championingtwo major issues: anti-communism andemperor veneration.28 In 1964, Seicho no ieestablished its political wing called Seicho no ieseiji rengō (active until 1983) and its studentwing Seicho no ie gakuseikai zenkoku sōrengōin 1966 (Seigakuren, Confederation of NationalStudent Associations). Seicho no ie withdrewfrom the political arena in 1983. Subsequently,having shifted from its anti-leftist-nationalistapproach of the past to focus on ecology issues,it publicly criticized the Abe administrationbefore the 2016 Upper House election anddeclared that it would not to support it.29

One of the student adherents of the earlySeicho no ie was NK’s secretary-generalKabashima who built a right-wing movement atNagasaki University in the late 1960s with hissenior leader Andō Iwao, and subsequentlyestablished a rightist organization Nihon seinenkyōgikai in 1977 (Japan Youth Council). TheNihon seinen kyōgikai developed into asecretariat of the Nippon Kaigi and is presentlythe nucleus of NK. Kabashima is also thechairman of the Nihon Seinen Kyōgikai, whoseheadquarters is located in the same building asNK. Its goal of constitutional reform wasinscribed in the April 2015 issue of the SeinenKyōgikai magazine, Sokoku to seinen(Fatherland and youth). The organizationaffirmed its pledge for constitutionalamendment and promoted the campaign inlight of the results of the last parliamentaryelection.30

Another founding father of Nippon Kaigi isMurakami Masakuni, Liberal Democratic Partyveteran, and heavyweight.31 As a leader of bothof forerunner organizations, Murakami workedas a bridge to the political world for the NihonSeinen Kyōgikai and played a crucial role in theformation and development of NK. Nowadays,however, Murakami openly criticizes the Abeadministration and its underhanded dealingwith the state secrecy law, security laws andconstitutional changes. NK deliberately avoids

discussing its agenda before each election.With the focus of election campaigns placed onthe economy, NK’s issues are deliberatelyplayed obfuscated. However, with its electoralvictory in hand, the ruling coalition claimspublic endorsement for these contentiousissues and rams through the Diet unpopularlaws. His criticism implies the existence ofother dissidents inside NK.

Initial members of NK include at least threemore men from the former Seigakuren. One isMomochi Akira, as discussed earlier withregard to the security legislation. TakahashiShirō of Meisei University is former deputychairman of the Japanese Society for HistoryTextbook Reform and a revisionist scholarwhom the Japanese government sent toUNESCO meetings to oppose incorporatingNanjing Massacre-related materials in theMemory of the World Register list. Ito Tetsuo isthe head of the Japan Policy Institute, a rightistthink tank known as Abe’s brain trust fornationalistic policies. The above three wereinvolved with Seicho no ie in combatting theleftist student movement in the 1960s-70s, andall are members of Nippon Kaigi’s policycommittee.32 Another Seigakuren person, EtoSeiichi, has served to bridge NK and Abe’sLDP.33 Eto is a Nippon Kaigi backer and SpecialAdvisor to the Prime Minister. He is Abe’s long-term political associate who supported his drivefor a rare second term in office, which MiyoshiTōru calls one of NK’s great achievements.34

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Inada Tomomi

In addition to older male sympathizers, thereare female Se icho no ie - re la ted NKsympathizers. Inada Tomomi, who is viewed asa strong contender for the LDP presidency,shows her old copy of Taniguchi Masaharu’sSeimei no jissō (Truth of Life) in a meeting (thevideo is available in Japanese).35 She recallsthat the book was given by her grandmotherand her parents who were avid readers of it.Inada herself belongs to Taniguchi MasaharuSensei o manabu kai (the Association to LearnAbout Taniguchi Masaharu Sensei, led byNakajima Shoji), whose members advocateTaniguchi’s fundamentalist views.

This association is related to the managementof Tsukamoto Kindergarten in Osaka whichemphasizes cultivation of patriotism andrespect for the national flag and nationalanthem. In 2015, Madam Abe Akie wasappointed as honorary principal.36 The principalis NK’s representative in Osaka, and its

associated elementary school is to open nextyear.37 As shown in the video below, childrensing Japanese martial songs after they chantaloud the Imperial Rescript on Education(Kyōiku Chokugo): the imperial moralfoundation between 1890 and 1946.38 TheRescript officially adopted the idea of kokutai,Shinto as the state religion (State Shinto), inshort Shinto ultra-nationalism. This not onlyreflects their key goal but approach forindoctrinating young people in love for thenation, pride, and dedication to public ends,which have been subverted, in their reading, bythe postwar education system.

The June 1998 issue of Nippon no Ibuki arguesthat Japan needs to ‘rectify’ the educationalsystem, which is distorted by the supremacy oftest scores and educational qualifications,‘excessive’ focus on human rights, ‘excessive’individualism, a masochistic view of history,and strong biases supportive of Nikkyōso(Japan Teachers Union), which have resulted inanti-Japanese ideology in schools.39 Thus far,we have noted three central organizations; theNihon seinen kyōgikai, Japan Policy Institute,and Taniguchi Sensei o manabu kai, allassociated with NK. These key members ofSeicho no ie-related groups have playeds e m i n a l r o l e s . (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ORNRptWvKoo)

Tsukamoto kindergarten group recitation highlighting nationalistand imperial themes

Besides Seicho no Ie, another importantreligious organization is Jinja Honchō: “one ofJ a p a n ’ s m o s t s u c c e s s f u l p o l i t i c a llobbies.”40 Although the name conveys theimpression that it is a public institution, it is infact a private institution. Jinja Honchō wasestablished in February 1946, very soon afterthe abolition of the Jingiin (Institute ofDivinities) due to the Shinto Directive issued byGHQ (General Headquarters of the SupremeCommander for the Allies Powers) to preventthe use of Shinto for political purposes. Jingiin

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was formally incorporated into the statebureaucracy under the aegis of the HomeMinistry, which administered governmentalsponsorship, perpetuation, and disseminationof State Sh into . J ing i in evaded warresponsibility as a non-military entity, despitehaving the lead in propagating ultra-nationalistic ideology and promoting the war.Under provisions guaranteeing freedom ofreligion, Jinja Honchō was formed by thenreligious leaders to take over some of thefunctions of the Jingiin. This means that,although it did not enjoy the same privileges asbefore, it was able to restore its prewarreligious order and revitalize its ideologyprivately.41

The Jinja Honchō had long sought to reinstitutethe calendar system based on the emperor’sreign, the gengō prewar calendar having beenproscribed by the GHQ which saw it as avehicle for reassuring imperial authority. WithSeicho no ie, Nihon Seinen Kyōgikai, ShintoSeiji Renmei and others, Jinja Honchō foundedGengō Hōseika Kokumin Kaigi (People’sConference/National Conference to Implementthe Gengō Legislation), the forerunner of Nihono mamoru kokumin kaigi, in 1978.42 Soon itsgoal became a reality; “in 1979, Japan’sconservative government ensured that theemperor-centered calendar would continue bypassing legislation that mandated continueduse of the gengō practice.”43 To date the gengōhas been continuously used by public agencies.

Today Jinja Honchō has a political wing, whichis called Shinto Seiji Renmei (神道政治連盟Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership).In 2016, during the New Year holidays, shrinesprovided advertisements for constitutionalrevisions at the request of Jinja Honchō thatr e s p o n d e d t o t h e m o v e m e n t o f t h eabovementioned Kenpō group.44 After the 2016reshuffle of the Abe administration, 19 out ofthe 20-member Cabinet are members of theShinto Seiji Renmei, while 14 are members ofNippon Kaigi.45 Therefore, in other words, the

political elements and Shinto-inspired elementshave been yoked together to compose the Abegovernment. Note that Jinja Honchō’s presidentis Tanaka Tsunekiyo, a representative of theKenpō group and one of NK’s vice-presidents.

In addition to Jinja Honchō, NK boastsaffiliations with many Shinto and otherreligious organizations,46 though not limited tofaith-based organizations (e.g., Nihon Jyosei noKai or Association of Japanese Women thatadvocates traditionalist causes). These groupswith arguably irreconcilable differences ofreligion co-exist and collaborate under thesame NK organizational umbrella. In NK’sview, this may be seen as “a coexistence ofdeities without conflicts” in accord withJapanese “national spirit” to respect harmony,a s u n d e r s c o r e d i n t h e i r g o a lstatement.47 Certainly, this arrangement ofdifferent groups yoked together blurs theseparation between its religious and politicalinstitutions, which also link to NK’s goal toease “the excessive separation of religion andstate.”

While reading NK documents, we take note oftheir understanding of “tradition”. According toShimazono Susumu, professor in religiousstudies, the Japanese tradition cited by theNippon Kaigi is primarily equated with theconcept of kokutai, which denotes “the ideologyof bansei ikkei (‘ten thousand generations in asingle line’)”48, the allegedly unbroken line ofimperial rulers, plus notions of Japan as auniquely incomparable country, and thesupremacy of the Yamato race. Shimazonocontends that unbroken history withoutrupture, albeit mythological, is important tothem as demonstrative of imperial continuityand sacerdotal majesty.49

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Kokutai no Hongi

Yamazaki argues that NK’s ideology is wellarticulated in two treatises: Kokutai no Hongi(Fundamentals of the National Polity) andShinmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject),issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937 and1941 respectively. As for the first manifesto, heuncovers NK’s ideological links between thesedocuments and its goal statement; thediscredited wartime terms and rhetoric arereplaced with equivalent words. The kokutai(国体) is replaced with kunigara (国柄), andbanpōmuhi (万邦無比) with sekaini rui o minai(世界に類を見ない) ‘without parallel in theworld.’50 As for The Way of the Subject, itexplained how Japanese imperial subjects wereexpected to see “who they were ― or shouldaspire to be ― as a people, nation, andrace.” 5 1 These moral virtues includedprioritizing the spirit of harmony, self-sacrifice,and devotion to the public good, which are

found in a draft constitution compiled by theLDP.

Both manifestos relate to the wartime slogan“‘Hakko Ichiu,’ which literally means putting allthe eight corners of the world under oneroof.”52 Or more simply: the world as a singlefamily under Japanese control. The result is towrongly applaud Japan as a liberator of Asiafrom Western colonialism. Thus NK membersrefer to World War II as the Great East AsiaWar, supposedly viewing themselves assp i r i tua l successors o f the prewargovernment. 5 3

Concerning NK’s official ideology and its effortto “defend”, “protects”, or “preserve” thetradition, Muto Ichiyo summarizes:

The premise is that something hasbeen lost. What is it? It is theessence of the Empire of Japan. ToAbe, the ‘postwar’ has been anextremely unfortunate era. Thereason is that the honor of theglorious Japanese empire wasdenied and the Occupat ionimposed the constitution on Japan.It is not only Abe who thinks thisway; this thinking is fairly deeplyrooted in postwar Japaneseleadership long dominated by theLDP. In fact it is my contentionthat in the postwar Japanese state,the continuity of the Japanesee m p i r e w a s p r e s e r v e d , i fsurreptitiously, as a principle ofthe legitimacy of the state.54

Postwar Japan started in effect with theImperial Rescript on Surrender, as outlined byHerbert P. Bix: “a masterpiece of propagandapacked with terms like “preservation of thenational polity,” “subjects of the empire,” andthe “indestructibility of the divine land.”55 Theessence of imperial rule is the persistence of

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antiquated apparatus, tools, and inheritedpatterns of thinking in the NK: recycling thekokutai and myths, suggesting Japaneseuniqueness, self-deluding superiority56 (e.g.,recent boom in books and TV shows), patriotice x h o r t a t i o n , p r i s t i n e s i n g u l a ridentity,57 reinstatement of State Shinto58 torestore imperial divine sovereignty and itslegitimacy. This means, in NK’s view, there hasbeen no conclusive rupture with the past,except for war-renouncing Article 9 ― aconstant reminder of Japan’s defeat. That’s whyit is of utmost importance for them to regainbelligerency as the state’s lost sovereign rightto reclaim Japan’s unbroken history.

We have reviewed the major claims of NK.Significantly, some NK members are associatedwith members of Zaitokukai and participants inxenophobic hate speech rallies directed atJapan’s Korean population (Zainichi), whichcontain disturbing rhetoric and incite hostilitytowards disadvantaged groups.59 Nippon Kaigiseeks to return Japan to greatness, byrepurposing imperial essence, military powers,Shinto, and tradition ― in a quest for imperialcontinuity. These gaps between NK’s goals fora beautiful Japan and its offensive mindset andstrategies give rise to major contradictions.

NK's Contradictions

NK expresses hope to build a great and ‘proud’nation. Although NK members have notreached consensus on what parts and how toamend the constitution, we examine threeissues which the Japan Policy Institute (run bya Special Advisor to PM) identifies as prioritiesand the contradictions to which they give rise:1) Article 9; 2) the provision on emergencies intime of crisis; and 3) Article 24 on familyvalues. (For a comprehensive study, seeLawrence Repeta’s work: Japan’s Democracy atRisk ― The LDP’s Ten Most DangerousProposals for Constitutional Changehttp://apjjf.org/2013/11/28/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.html .)

Article 9

NK routinely dismisses the postwar constitutionas a humiliating reminder of Japan’s defeat andan American imposition. NK’s Miyoshi Japan’snational security is jeopardized by war-renouncing Article 9, which unfairly preventsJapan from achieving the necessary conditionsfor a sovereign state. PM Abe also insists onadherence to a ‘proactive pacifism’ that wouldenable Japan to become a “normal country”, bywhich he means that the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) would be a full-fledged National Army soas to protect against territorial threats bybolstering the U.S.-Japan alliance at home andabroad.

The right to collective self-defense is, however,a two-edged sword. Miyazaki Reiichi, a formerDirector-General of the Cabinet LegislativeBureau, argues that a state’s inherent right toindividual self-defense is clearly distinct fromthe right to collective self-defense, as the latterconstitutes the right to assist and defend anally under attack, even if Japan is not attacked.Miyazaki thus thinks that it would clearly goagainst Article 9.60 Moreover, Magosaki Ukeru,a former foreign ministry official, argues thatthe new security legislature makes nocontribution to Japan’s defense or regionalstability. Instead, it rather heightens regionaltensions and increases the risk of increasedconflict, bringing back disturbing echoes of itsimperial past to neighboring countries. It alsoallows the U.S. to make extensive use ofJapan’s SDF to assist it in its costly militaryoperations, a process likely to increase Japan’smilitary subordination.61

Retrospectively, these views have provenaccurate62 in light of the Prime Minister’spromise concerning the security legislature atthe U.S. Congress on April 29, 2015 to beenacted in the summer, even before the billswere brought up for deliberation in the Diet.Similarly, The Stars and Stripes on May 13 of2015 reported that the 2016 U.S. defense

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budget was drawn up in anticipation of Japan’spassage of the military expansion bills.63 AsJohn W. Dower concludes, “Japan will have nochoice but to become a participant in America’sglobal military policies and practices, evenwhere these may prove to be unwise and evenreckless.”64 Abe’s embrace of two allies’partnership only deepens Japan’s servility as aU.S. client state, which is incompatible with theinterests of national security and economicprosperity that the NK incumbents wish topursue to rebuild a ‘proud’ country capable ofglobal leadership. Similarly, rightists wish toplace the U.S.-Japan relationship on an equalfooting, contradicting their complacency aboutthe U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly the U.S.military presence in Japan and the unequalStatus of Forces Agreement between Japan theUnited States.

NK members stick to the traditional securitydiscourse that narrowly focuses on the safety ofthe state. Put differently, they virtually ignore amultitude of other threats to human security,and thus fail to get security priorities right.Moreover, they simply ignore civil societyinitiatives as a basic alternative to militarysolutions when managing conflicts whendiscussing threats posed by other countries.During the Upper House Budget Committeesession October 5, 2016, Defense MinisterInada (also a NK member) claimed that militarybudgets take precedence over child welfarewhile calling for doubling military investment.She stated: “If we use the money earmarked forchild-care benefits to increase the defensebudget [given limited financial resources],Japan’s military spending will come close to theinternational standards.”65

By contrast, Amartya Sen contends thatsecurity is ultimately a people-centered matter,hence “national security” is merely “onecomponent of human security.”66 “Humansecurity means protecting fundamentalfreedoms … It means protecting people fromcritical (severe) and pervasive (widespread)

threats and situations.”67 Sen notes that,“sometimes national security in the politicalcontext seems like a barrier rather than acomponent to fostering human security. But atthe same time, when we consider reducing thebudget for national security, we also have tothink of the other implications. There’s noreason why there should be a conflict betweenthe two.”68

In effect, we impose social costs thanks tomisplaced security priorities. Japan’s importantnational security issues certainly include itsworsening inequalities and poverty in recentyears. As for the latter, roughly one out in sixJapanese people live beneath the poverty line,wherein households earn less than half themedian income (1 .22 mi l l ion yen in2012).69 This makes Japan’s poverty rate fourthhighest among the Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) membercountries, and Japan’s child poverty rate iseven higher. This is at odds with Japan’sdeclared commitment to human security, whichthe Prime Minister recognized in his speech atHarvard’s Kennedy School in 2015.70 Asboasted, Japan embarked on the initiative onhuman security to demand protection fromvarious insecurities, which was co-chaired bySadako Ogata and Amartya Sen under theCommission in 2003 within the United Nationsframework. Therefore, NK’s narrative onprotection of the country rings hollow, due toits narrow conception of state security as wellas the NK-dominant government’s lack ofcommitment to improving human security.

An Emergency Clause Against HumanFreedoms and Human Rights

The second elements that NK claims to changeare constitutional democracy and individualfreedoms. The constitution drafted by the LDPgrants many new powers to the government inthe event of emergencies, if so declared by thePM, to suspend ordinary constitutionalprocesses. Simultaneously, it deletes the

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principles of popular sovereignty and theuniversality of human rights, and specifies thatthe exercise of individual freedoms and rightsshall not violate ‘the public interest and publicorder’, in any ways this might be interpreted bythe authorities (cf. the Meiji Constitution:“Freedom of speech, writing, press, assembly,and association were now guaranteed only ‘tothe extent that they do not conflict with thepublic peace and order’”71). If deemed asinfringement, the government can hencerestrict speech, press, and expression.Moreover, in compensation for freedoms andrights, the draft constitution invokes muchmore the individuals’ duties to the state, suchas respect for the national flag and anthem,defending the country stoutly, upholding thenew constitution, etc.72 Overall, NK memberssee democracy, human rights, and individualfreedoms as Western notions, which aretherefore irrelevant to Japanese characteristicsand values. To them, these imported orimposed notions have to be replaced by aJapanese-specific social order and traditionalpriorities, grounded in the imperial institution,thereby putting national interest aboveindividuals’ rights.73

Needless to say, the individual’s right isenshrined in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, irrespective of citizenship orculture. NK’s advocacy of limiting substantivefreedoms that people enjoy, runs counter tointernational efforts to expand freedoms thatare set out in the UN guiding principles.Specifically, it is the very opposite of humandevelopment, i.e. a shared vision of the UnitedNation agencies and countries, incarnated bythe United Nations Development Programme( U N D P ) . T h e U N D P d e f i n e s h u m a ndevelopment as enlarging people’s freedoms or“reducing the unfreedoms and insecurities ofvarious kinds that plague human lives.”74 Thisnotion has been fruitfully developed by Mahbubul Haq and Amartya Sen.75

Sen provides two major reasons to explain why

freedom is so valuable, by citing two distinctyet partially overlapping contents of freedom:opportunity freedom and process freedom. Heargues:

First, more freedom gives us moreopportun i ty to pursue ourobjectives ― those things that wevalue. It helps, for example, in ourability to decide to live as wewould like and to promote the endsthat we may want to advance. …Second, we may attach importanceto the process of choice itself(emphasis in the original). We may,for example, want to make surethat we are not being forced intosome state because of constraintsimposed by others (emphasisadded).”76

Today’s Japan tramples on both types offreedoms, and thus suffers from democraticdeficits. The deprivation of basic opportunityfreedom refers to widespread impoverishment(lack of freedom to achieve well-being), asdiscussed above. Process freedom refers toaccess to information, public participation indecision-making, transparency as well as freespeech and media freedom. As mentionedabove, NK’s Murakami severely criticizes thefact that new legislation was forced throughthe Diet over strong public opposition, whilethe present government obfuscated the issuesat stake. On top of that, Japan’s press freedomranking has declined sharply in recent years. Inthe 2010 Reporters Without Borders index,Japan (under the Hatoyama administration)ranked 11 out of 178 countries. In the 2016index, the country ranked 72 out of 180countries. These facts reflect deficiencies inassuring both opportunity and processfreedoms by a government that represents thewill of people.77 In short, NK’s advocacy ofscaling back civil liberties would expose Japanto domestic criticism as well as international

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scrutiny over universal norms and values ofdemocratic freedoms, human rights, and therule of law.78 Concomitantly, this wouldundermine the goal of securing a respectedplace for Japan’s standing in the worldcommunity (cf. Japan as claimant to apermanent seat on the United Nations SecurityCouncil).

Article 24 and Anti-Women Bias

Finally, NK is keen to limit women’s freedomsand human rights. Sugano Tamotsu, whosebook titled Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyu (Researchinto Japan Conference) has been a recent best-seller, points out that NK’s focus is mainly onissues of “women and children” (e.g., anti-gender equality, against woman as Empress,not to mention anti-abortion views since theearlier Taniguchi’s epoch).

This leads us to look at NK’s underlying biasesagainst women. They attribute today’s family-related problems (e.g. family instability) to thepostwar constitution. They assert that Article24, which affirms conjugal equality, individualchoice, and mutual consent for marriage, has anoxious influence on families due to suchWestern individualistic nature of marriage andpersonhood.79 To them, proponents of keepingseparate surnames for married couples wish todissolve marriage and family; thus, they believethat there should be a legal definition of thefamily to be safeguarded. (This means thattheir definition of the nature of the familywould consequently determine the relatedconcepts of gendered-roles within thehouseholds, marriage, and personhood of thewider society.) Since they define the ideal‘Japanese family’ as three generationhouseholds with ancestral lineage and familyties, they wish to revert from the nuclear familyto traditional family norms.

NK’s model fits the LDP’s long-held vision of “aJapanese welfare society”, which givescontinuing priority to economic growth overfamilies and social protections, consigning

women to family care.80 This reflects the LDPdraft, which extols and obligates traditionalfamily values. The LDP proposed Preamblestates: “The Japanese people take pride in theircountry and land…. they also respect harmonyand form a nation where families and the wholesociety mutually support each other.” HiguchiYōichi, leading authority on constitutional law,argues that the wordings of “land”, “harmony”,“support”, and “family” carry legal significanceand weight within Japan’s history. For the wargeneration, “support” evokes wartime systemsof neighborhood mutual group for mandatoryhelp and watch for the possible infractions oflaws; “harmony” means subservience to theinterests of the state, and “the family” standsfor male-domination to revoke genderequality.81 And, no doubt such family spirit,filial obedience, and hierarchy are a metaphorfor the imperial power structure.

NK’s idealized role of family is akin to theMeiji’s Civil Code on the legal regulations ofmarriage and kinship, enforcing obligations ofdomestic duties, gender divisions, etc. Suchfamilial ideal is suggestive of the ié, thepatriarchal family system, which traditionallyprivileged the family head and subjectedwomen to servitude to the ié. NK’s notionreinforces patriarchal primacy to produceoffspring to preserve blood lines, which isclosely associated with their male-preference-primogeniture in family arrangements: male-only imperial succession.82 NK’s belief inhewing to the tradition of male emperors,however, proves simply false since there wereformidable female emperors in Japan’s earlyhistory.

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Establ ishment of “of f ice for theencouragement of building a society inwhich all women shine,” 2014

Moreover, NK’s willful disregard of equalitybetween women and men is in opposition tointernational conventions and remedial actionsfor gender equality (e.g., the Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Discriminationagainst Women – CEDAW). NK’s obsoletetraditional model of family fails to keep up withwomen’s diverse lifestyles, families, and workstyles, and does not accommodate them withviable options. On the contrary, women areroundly penalized in various forms if they donot comply with or fit the NK/LDP model offamily functioning and of women’s roles.Consider the facts that “about 1 in 3 women inJapan aged between 20 and 64 who live aloneare living in poverty.”83 54.6% of singleparent/lone adult (overwhelmingly mothers)households containing one or more children isconsidered poor, living on less than half ofmedian income.84 Note, too, the genderdisparity found in the womenomics initiative topromote women’s advancement andempowerment in the business world underAbenomics. In the Gender Equality BureauCabinet Office, there is not a single woman inthe photo of “a group of male leaders who willcreate a society in which women shine.”85 It will

be difficult to build a proud and prosperousnation without overcoming Japan’s deep-seatedsexism and addressing women’s adversities(e.g. the very small percentage of women in theJapanese parliament86).

In sum, NK is fraught with contradictions andtheoretical incoherence. Interestingly, as notedabove, certain basic discrepancies haveemerged between the Abe administration andNK owing to their different emphasis andpriorities. Above all, NK’s reactionary effortsrun counter to international efforts andinternational commitments to human rightsincluding women’s rights.

Conclusions

Nippon Kaigi is embedded in Japan’sofficialdom, and its influence is re-directed tomainstream political activities under Abe’sstewardship. NK efforts go hand in hand withgovernment intervention in education,decl in ing invest igat ive journal ism,readjustment and glorification of the imperialpast, nationalistic sentiments, military buildup,unilateral decisions, impositions, and initiativesat the expense of human welfare and humandevelopment.87 Still, their efforts also includereconciling contradictions which, I think,emanate from the Janus-faced nature of theirident i ty in handl ing var ious issues:actions/practices as opposed to intentions,separate messages for domest ic andinternational audiences, etc. (e.g., pacifistnarrative versus their opposite insular stancetoward neighboring countries and affirmationof imperial Japan; different views about the roleof the emperor: “the emperor on the one handand the United States on the other, the innerand outer axes of national identity.” 88) In short,NK’s revisionist practices expose problems andcontradictions.

Related articles

1. David McNeill, Nippon Kaigi and the RadicalConservative Project to Take Back Japan

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http://apjjf.org/-David-McNeill/4409.

2 . H a y a s h i K e i t a(https://apjjf.org/-Hayashi-Keita) and Sato Kei(https://apjjf.org/-Sato-Kei), Japan’s LargestRightwing Organization: An Introduction to

N i p p o n K a i g ihttp://apjjf .org/-Mine-Masahiro/4410

3. Muto Ichiyo, Retaking Japan: The AbeAdministration’s Campaign to Overturn theP o s t w a r C o n s t i t u t i o nhttp://apjjf .org/2016/13/Muto.html

Sachie Mizohata is an independent consultant based in Luxembourg. She is the co-founderof social-issues.org (http://social-issues.org/community/), a collaborative online communityplatform for social scientific research, through which she promotes e-humanities andcollective modeling of social phenomena such as human well-being based on knowledgeelicitation system used for OECD surveys. Recently, she contributed four chapters to Japan’sShrinking Regions in the 21st Century (Matanle and Rausch with the Shrinking RegionsResearch Group, Cambria, 2011).

Notes1 There are 16 NK members out of 20 cabinet ministers, as of September 3, 2016; here(http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik16/2016-09-07/2016090701_03_1.html)2 Recently published books include: 1) Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyu by Sugano Tamotsu, 2) NipponKaigi no Zenbou by Tawara Yoshifumi, 3) Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō by Narusawa Muneo(ed), 4) Nippon Kaigi by Yamazaki Masahiro, and 5) Nippon Kaigi no Shotai by Aoki Osamu.3 See their site: here (http://www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/en/)4 Sugano, 2016; Yamazaki, 2016, pp. 66-67.5 Yamazaki, 2016, p. 68.6 Yamazaki, 2016, p. 28.7 See here(http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21653676-powerful-if-little-reported-group-claims-it-can-restore-pre-war-order-right-side-up)8 See Sugano, 2016, pp. 30-31 and here (http://blogos.com/article/159736/)9 Sugano, 2016; Yamazaki 2016.10 Some observers are dismissive of Nippon Kaigi describing it as devoid of outstanding talentand resources. (At the same time, they underline its influence on politics.) Sugano Tamotsunotes that NK is built on a handful of influential nationalists. For instance, jointrepresentatives of Utsukushii Nihon no Kenpō o Tsukuru Kokumin no Kai (National Society toCreate a Constitution for a Beautiful Japan) are Sakurai Yoshiko, Takubo Tadae, Miyoshi Tōru,etc. Sakurai and Takubo serve as representatives of the Japan Institute for NationalFundamentals. Many officers of the affiliated organization overlap those of NK.11 It made it compulsory to teach “love of country” as part of school curricula, and incorporateteaching guidelines about the national anthem and flag, moral virtues, respect for theemperor, mythology, national territories and waters, importance of the Self-Defense Forces,

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and so on. See Sugano, 2016.12 Yamaguchi, Tomomi. 2016. “Nippon Kaigi no target no hitotsu wa kenpō 24jyō no kaiaku” inNippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō, Tokyo: Shukan kinyōbi, pp. 172-183.13 In an interview (in Japanese), Kabashima Yuzō talked about the NK’s history and more:See here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4sctR8DxMlQ)14 See here (http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/mokuteki)15 See McNeill, David: here (http://apjjf.org/2013/11/50/David-McNeill/4047/article.html)16 See Kato, Norihiro. 2015. Sengo Nyūmon. Tokyo: Chikuma shinsho.17 Kato. 2015. Sengo Nyūmon. pp. 514-515.18 Field, Norma. 1993. In the Realm of a Dying Emperor. New York: Vintage Books, pp.201-202.19 See Muto, Ichiyo: here (http://apjjf.org/2016/13/Muto.html)20 See McCormack, Gavan: here (http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp38.html)21 See Kabashima’s video: here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4sctR8DxMlQ)22 See Nozaki, Yoshiko and Mark Selden: here (http://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/3173/article.html)23 Hashimoto, Akiko. 2015. The Long Defeat. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 5.24 See Kato, Norihiro: here(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/opinion/tea-party-politics-in-japan.html?_r=0)25 Kato, Norihiro. 2015. Sengo Nyūmon. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, p. 433.26 Yamazaki, 2016, p. 89.27 See Yoshida, Reiji: here(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/10/national/politics-diplomacy/thousands-rally-nippon-budokan-hall-constitutional-change/)28 Sugano, 2016; Yamazaki 2016.29 See Sugano, 2016, Yamazaki, 2016, here(http://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S12410836.html) and here(http://www.jp.seicho-no-ie.org/news/sni_news_20160609.html).30 Sugano, 2016, p. 85.31 See Sugano, 2016, p. 52, p. 62, and his interview: here(https://twitter.com/noiehoie/status/753469217635262464) as well as here(http://news.yahoo.co.jp/feature/256)32 Sugano, 2016, Yamazaki, 2016.33 See Sugano, 2016.34 Shimazono, Susumu and Yamazaki Masahiro. “Nippon Kaigi to Shūkyō Nationalism” inKotoba, summer 2016, p. 139.35 Around 30 minutes in the video here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAY2jsefbZA)36 See here (http://www.sankei.com/west/news/150108/wst1501080001-n1.html)37 See here (http://www.tv-tokyo.co.jp/mv/newsanswer/life/post_117059/)38 The Rescript requested that people as “loyal subjects” of “Our Emperor” should be “filial toyour parents,” “as husbands and wives be harmonious,” and “furthermore, advance the publicgood and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the law;should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard andmaintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.” See here(http://personal.carthage.edu/jlochtefeld/easian/materials/imperialrescript.html)

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39 See the June 1998 issue of Nippon no ibuki, p. 11, which was quoted by Yamazaki, 2016, pp.139-140 here (http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/mokuteki).40 McNeill, David: here (http://apjjf.org/2013/11/50/David-McNeill/4047/article.html)41 Shimazono, Susumu and Yamazaki Masahiro. “Nippon Kaigi to Shūkyō Nationalism” inKotoba, summer 2016, pp. 142-143. Yamazaki, 2016, pp. 72-74.42 Its founder was former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Ishida Kazuto. See Yamazaki,2016.43 Dower, John. 1993. Japan in War and Peace. New York: New Press, p. 2.44 Kataoka, Nobuyuki. 2016. “Jinja no nottori jiken” in Nippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō, Tokyo:Shukan kinyōbi, p. 141.45 See the list created by Yamazaki Masahiro: here(https://twitter.com/mas__yamazaki/status/762494298751311878)46 Such groups include Yasukuni Shrine, Ise Shrine, Reiyūkai (霊友会 Spiritual-FriendshipAssociation), Sūkyō Mahikari (崇教真光), Makuya of Christ (キリストの幕屋), Gedatsu-kai (解脱会), The Institute of Moralogy (モラロジー研究所), Rinri Kenkyūshō (倫理研究所, Institutefor Ethics or Ethics Study Group), and the like. 47 See here (http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/mokuteki)48 Dower, John. 1999.Embracing Defeat. New York: New Press, p. 307.49 Shimazono, Susumu. 2016. “Jinja to kokka no kankeiwa dō henka shitaka” in Nippon Kaigito Jinja Honchō, Tokyo: Shukan kinyōbi, p. 121.50 Yamazaki, 2016, p. 127.51 Dower, John. 1999.War Without Mercy. New York: Pantheon Books, p. 24.52 See here(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/03/24/editorials/wartime-slogan-should-stay-buried/)53 Yamazaki, 2016, pp. 164-165.54 Muto, Ichiyo: here (http://apjjf.org/2016/13/Muto.html)55 See Bix, Herbert P.: here (http://apjjf.org/-Herbert-P.-Bix/1787/article.html)56 See my working paper: here (http://mizohata.org/)57 For example, political scandal over Renhō’s dual citizenship: See Murai, Shusuke: here(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/07/national/renho-nationality-accusations-spur-debate-dual-citizenship/)58 For instance, Yasukuni pilgrimage, tour to Ise Shrine on the occasion of the G7 in 2016.59 Sugano, 2016.60 Miyazaki, Reiichi. 2014. “Kenpō 9 jo to shūdanteki jieiken wa ryōritsu dekinai,” Sekai,August. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, pp. 148-154.61 See Magosaki’s interview by Iwakami Yasumi: here(http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/143695); Magosaki Ukeru and John Junkerman, Japan'sCollective Self-Defense and American Strategic Policy: Everything Starts from the US-JapanAlliance here (http://apjjf.org/-Magosaki-Ukeru/4800/article.html)62 See McCormack, Gavan: here (http://apjjf.org/2016/17/McCormack.html); Recently, forexample, large SDF transport helicopters have been carrying construction equipment into theplanned site of the U.S. military helipad in Takae, Okinawa. See here(http://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2016/09/13/takae-helipad_n_11999032.html)

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63 See Slavin, Erik: here(http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-defense-budget-already-counting-on-japan-self-defense-plan-1.346012)64 See Dower, John: here (http://apjjf.org/2014/12/8/John-W.-Dower/4079/article.html)65 See Editorial: here (http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201610060020.html)66 See here(http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/interview-with-prof-amartya-sen-national-security-is-one-component-of-human-security/article8022388.ece)67 See here(http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf)68 See here(http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/interview-with-prof-amartya-sen-national-security-is-one-component-of-human-security/article8022388.ece)69 See here (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-tyosa13/dl/16.pdf)70 See here (http://biboroku.net/abe-shinzo-8/)71 Dower, John. Embracing Defeat. p. 381.72 See Lawrence Repeta’s work on the LDP draft consitution: here(http://apjjf.org/2013/11/28/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.html)73 See the Japanese videos: here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMvP2vGBlac) and here(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=16qz20-eico) 1) Inada Tomomi: “I think that such politicsplacing the people’s life first is wrong.” 2) Former Minister of Justice, Nagase Jinen: “Thepeople’s sovereignty, basic human rights, and pacifism ― these three are the postwar regimeitself imposed by MacArthur on Japan, therefore we have to get rid of them to make theconstitution on our own.” Their brazen remarks make clear their disinterest in achievingsocial improvement and prosperity for the public.74 Sen, Amartya. 2005. “Principal Voices,” in TIME magazine, November 21, p. 13.75 See here (http://apjjf.org/2011/9/39/Sachie-MIZOHATA/3648/article.html)76 Sen, Amartya. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, p. 228.77 See here (https://rsf.org/)78 See McCormack, Gavan: here(http://apjjf.org/2012/10/52/Gavan-McCormack/3873/article.html)79 Yamaguchi, Tomomi. 2016. “Nippon Kaigi no target no hitotsu wa kenpō 24jyō no kaiaku” inNippon Kaigi to Jinja Honchō, Tokyo: Shukan kinyōbi, pp. 172-183.80 See Osawa, Mari. 2011. Social Security in Contemporary Japan. New York: Routledge /University of Tokyo Series81 Higuchi’s interview by Iwakami Yasumi: See here (http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/287549)82 For example, see Fukushima Mizuho’s work on marriage and family.83 Aoki, Mizuho: See here(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/19/national/poverty-a-growing-problem-for-women/#.VPWhm46YG9c)84 See here (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-tyosa13/dl/16.pdf)85 See here (http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/)

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86 See: here (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm)87 See here(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/05/08/editorials/honor-current-constitution/)88 McCormack, Gavan: See here (http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp38.html)