nist big data working group (nbd-wg) - executive …€¦ · web viewat the nist cloud and big data...

NIST Big Data Security and Privacy Requirements

Version 0.5

September 25, 2013

Security & Privacy SubgroupNIST Big Data Working Group (NBD-WG)

September, 2013

Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................................51 Introduction........................................................................................................................................5

1.1 Background...........................................................................................................................51.2 Objectives.............................................................................................................................61.3 How This Report Was Produced............................................................................................61.4 Structure of This Report........................................................................................................7

2 Big Data Security and Privacy..............................................................................................................82.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................82.2 Scope.....................................................................................................................................92.3 Actors..................................................................................................................................102.4 Classification and Discussion of Topics................................................................................11

3 Use Cases..........................................................................................................................................163.1 Retail/ Marketing................................................................................................................16

2.1.1 Scenario 1: Modern Day consumerism...............................................................162.2.1 Scenario 2: Nielsen Homescan...........................................................................162.3.1 Scenario 3: Web Traffic Analytics......................................................................17

3.2 Healthcare:..........................................................................................................................182.4.1 Scenario 1: Health Information Exchange.........................................................18 Security:.............................................................................................................19i. Light-weight but secure off-cloud encryption: Need the ability to perform light-weight but secure off-cloud encryption of an EHR that can reside in any container that ranges from a browser, to an enterprise server, that leverages strong symmetric cryptogaphy........................................................................................................................19ii. Homomorphic Encryption..................................................................................19iii. Applied Cryptography: Tight reductions, realistic threat models, and efficient techniques...........................................................................................................................19 Privacy:...............................................................................................................19i. Differential Privacy: Techniques for guaranteeing against inappropriate leakage of PII 19ii. HIPAA.................................................................................................................19Current research: Homomorphic Encryption, Off-cloud Encryption....................................192.5.1 Scenario 2: Genetic Privacy................................................................................192.6.1 Scenario 3: Pharma Clinic Trial Data Sharing [3].................................................20

3.3 Cyber-security.....................................................................................................................202.7.1 Scenario..............................................................................................................20

3.4 Government........................................................................................................................212.8.1 Scenario 1: Military (Unmanned Vehicle sensor data).......................................212.9.1 Scenario 2: Education (“Common Core” Student Performance Reporting).......22

3.5 Industrial: Aviation..............................................................................................................222.10.1 Scenario..............................................................................................................22

4 Abstraction of Requirements............................................................................................................244.1 Privacy of data.....................................................................................................................244.2 Provenance of data.............................................................................................................244.3 System Health.....................................................................................................................24

5 Internal Security Practices.................................................................................................................255.1 Internal Access control rules for general industry...............................................................25

6 Taxonomy of Security and Privacy Topics.........................................................................................27

2

6.1 Taxonomy of Technical Topics............................................................................................276.2 Privacy.................................................................................................................................276.3 Provenance.........................................................................................................................276.4 System Health.....................................................................................................................28

7 Security Reference Architecture.......................................................................................................297.1 Architectural Component: Interface of Sources → Transformation...................................297.2 Architectural Component: Interface of Transformation → Uses........................................297.3 Architectural Component: Interface of Transformation ↔ Data Infrastructure.................297.4 Architectural Component: Internal to Data Infrastructure..................................................297.5 Architectural Component: General.....................................................................................29

8 Mapping Use Cases to Reference Architecture.................................................................................308.1 Cargo Shipping....................................................................................................................30

(Image from William Miller)................................................................................................302.11.1 Sources → Transformation:...............................................................................302.12.1 Transformation → Uses:....................................................................................302.13.1 Transformation ↔Data Infrastructure:..............................................................312.14.1 Data Infrastructure:............................................................................................312.15.1 General:..............................................................................................................32

8.2 Nielsen Homescan...............................................................................................................322.16.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................322.17.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................32

8.3 Pharma Clinical Trial Data Sharing.......................................................................................332.18.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................33

Under an industry trade group proposal, clinical trial data for new drugs will be shared outside intra-enterprise warehouses. Regulatory submissions commonly exceed “millions of pages.”.......33

2.19.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................338.4 Large Network Cybersecurity SIEM.....................................................................................34

2.20.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................342.21.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................34

8.5 Consumer Digital Media Usage...........................................................................................362.22.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................36

Content owners license data for usage by consumers through presentation portals, e.g., Netflix, iTunes, etc. Usage is Big Data, including demographics at user level, patterns of use such as play sequence, recommendations, content navigation...........................................................................36

2.23.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................368.6 Unmanned Military Vehicle Sensor Systems.......................................................................37

2.24.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................37Unmanned vehicles (“drones”) and their onboard sensors (e.g., streamed video) can produce petabytes of data that must be stored in nonstandard formats. Refer to DISA large data object contract for exabytes in DoD private cloud......................................................................................37

2.25.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................378.7 Common Core K-12 Student Reporting...............................................................................38


8.8 Web Traffic Analytics...........................................................................................................402.28.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:................................................40

3

Visit-level webserver logs are high-granularity and voluminous. Web logs are correlated with other sources, including page content (buttons, text, navigation events), and marketing events such as campaigns, media classification.......................................................................................................40

2.29.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:..............................................408.9 Title: Health Information Exchange.....................................................................................41


9 References........................................................................................................................................44

4

Executive Summary

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

There is a broad agreement among commercial, academic, and government leaders about the remarkable potential of “Big Data” to spark innovation, fuel commerce, and drive progress. Big Data is the term used to describe the deluge of data in our networked, digitized, sensor-laden, information driven world. The availability of vast data resources carries the potential to answer questions previously out of reach. Questions like: How do we reliably detect a potential pandemic early enough to intervene? Can we predict new materials with advanced properties before these materials have ever been synthesized? How can we reverse the current advantage of the attacker over the defender in guarding against cybersecurity threats?

However there is also broad agreement on the ability of Big Data to overwhelm traditional approaches. The rate at which data volumes, speeds, and complexity are growing is outpacing scientific and technological advances in data analytics, management, transport, and more.

Despite the widespread agreement on the opportunities and current limitations of Big Data, a lack of consensus on some important, fundamental questions is confusing potential users and holding back progress. What are the attributes that define Big Data solutions? How is Big Data different from the traditional data environments and related applications that we have encountered thus far? What are the essential characteristics of Big Data environments? How do these environments integrate with currently deployed architectures? What are the central scientific, technological, and standardization challenges that need to be addressed to accelerate the deployment of robust Big Data solutions?

At the NIST Cloud and Big Data Forum held in January 15-17, 2013, the community strongly recommends NIST to create a public working group for the development of a Big Data Technology Roadmap. This roadmap will help to define and prioritize requirements for interoperability, portability, reusability, and extensibility for big data usage, analytic techniques and technology infrastructure in order to support secure and effective adoption of Big Data.

On June 19, 2013, the NIST Big Data Public Working Group (NBD-PWG) was launched with overwhelmingly participation from industry, academia, and government across the nation. The scope of the NBD-PWG is to form a community of interests from all sectors including industry, academia, and government, with the goal of developing a consensus in definitions, taxonomies, secure reference architectures, and a technology roadmap. Such a consensus would therefore create a vendor-neutral, technology and infrastructure agnostic framework which would enable Big Data stakeholders to pick-

5

and-choose best analytics tools for their processing and visualization requirements on the most suitable computing platform and cluster while allowing value-added from Big Data service providers.

Currently NBD-PWG has created five subgroups namely the Definitions and Taxonomies, Use Case and Requirements, Security and Privacy, Reference Architecture, and Technology Roadmap. These subgroups will help to develop the following set of preliminary consensus working drafts by September 27, 2013:

1. Big Data Definitions2. Big Data Taxonomies 3. Big Data Requirements 4. Big Data Security and Privacy Requirements5. Big Data Reference Architectures White Paper Survey6. Big Data Reference Architectures7. Big Data Security and Privacy Reference Architectures8. Big Data Technology Roadmap

Due to time constraints and dependencies between subgroups, the NBD-PWG hosted two hours weekly telecon meeting from Mondays to Fridays for the respective subgroups. Every three weeks, NBD-PWG called a joint meeting for progress reports and document updates from these five subgroups. In between, subgroups co-chairs met for two hours to synchronize their respective activities and identify issues and solutions

1.2 Objectives

Scope

The focus of the NBD-PWG Security and Privacy Subgroup is to form a community of interest from industry, academia, and government, with the goal of developing a consensus secure reference architecture to handle security and privacy issues across all stakeholders. This includes gaining an understanding of what standards are available or under development, as well as identifies which key organizations are working on these standards.

Tasks

Gather input from all stakeholders regarding security and privacy concerns in Big Data processing, storage, and services.

Analyze/prioritize a list of challenging security and privacy requirements that may delay or prevent adoption of Big Data deployment

Develop a Security and Privacy Reference Architecture that supplements the general Big Data Reference Architecture

Deliverables

1. Produce a working draft for Big Data Security and Privacy Requirements Document2. Produce a working draft Big Data Security and Privacy Reference Architecture

6

1.3 How This Report Was Produced[Wo will put more thoughts into this section; each subgroup will be slightly different]

1.4 Structure of This Report[Subgroup will come up this section and hope it will be consistent with other subgroups’ approach]

7

2 Big Data Security and Privacy

2.1 Introduction

To standardize on a security reference architecture there is a need to leverage specialists in diverse application and technological domains. Application domains include Health Care, Drug Discovery, Finance, Corporate, and Government. Examples of scenarios within these application domains include Health Exchanges, Clinical Trials, Mergers and Acquisitions, Device Telemetry, and International anti-Piracy. Technology domains include identity, authorization, audit, network and device security, and federation across trust boundaries. When there is leverage of cloud service providers and federation across trust boundaries, there is a need to leverage technology domains such as cryptography to augment traditional security. Just as it would be difficult to align schemas and protocols within implementations of a technical domain, it would be quite difficult to standardize, align, or even provide a mapping between terms that are used across these application and technology domains. To effectively communicate across domains, there is a need to socialize the usage of terms related to security and compliance across these domains. But there is also a need to do this in a manner that minimizes the barrier to entry for any specialist to participate, while minimizing the dilution of the working group’s core focus.

Within a vertical, and often across verticals, there tends to be a common vocabulary because of the underpinning of GRC (Governance, Risk Management and Compliance) requirements, which include a degree of litigation preparedness. However there are disparate regulatory bodies across sovereign boundaries, and often the entities that certify are distinct from those that audit or adjudicate. Technologies to be leveraged are quite diverse and include devices and services for perimeters, networks and devices. While these techniques and solutions have grown organically, there is a trend toward consistent blueprints for Policy Authoring, Decision and Enforcement, and for federation of demands, claims and obligations across organizations. Clouds and Federation tend to complicate things for the Application and the Technology domains, because compliance requirements did not presuppose technological advances, and security mechanisms are often a previous generation of enterprise solutions that are being repurposed inappropriately for a radically different threat model. In the legal domain for instance, the classification of data can change when it moves from an enterprise data center, to the data center of a service provider, hence the laws pertaining to discovery can be interpreted in a manner that would be detrimental to litigants. This is further complicated by the fact that participants and service providers can reside in distinct legal jurisdictions with consistent civil procedure.

In compliance domains, even if all participants were to have state of the art security, it is possible that they would be in violation of compliance requirements if they did not federate identity, authorization and audits in a manner that would enable each party to address obligations such as audits, alerts, document lifecycle management, and others. When compliance requirements are mingled with

8

technologies for security, things can get quite complicated. It is not uncommon to encounter situations where an ostensible compliance requirement causes a security requirement to be compromised, and vice versa.

Therefore it is an imperative to enable working across specializations, but to do this in a manner that is lightweight and does not require a specialist to have any significant knowledge of other domains. There is a need to communicate terms, but also the broader intent, along with opportunities and risks.

There has been an explosion of big data applications and solutions, but there has been no significant effort at understanding the business or GRC requirements of participants in order to do business at scale in the clouds. Hence there has been no significant effort at capturing and communicating essential terms and requirements across application and technology domains. Infrastructure has been largely designed and deployed before any sufficient consideration of cloud security requirements. Hence, given the difficulty in retrofitting security mechanisms, there is growing interest in leverage of cryptographic techniques that can provide content-level security such as format preserving encryption. In addition, recent news about government surveillance could catalyze changes in how clouds are used, and there is likelihood that infrastructure will fragment along sovereign and compliance boundaries, and that it will become even more necessary to leverage cryptographic techniques.

It is becoming increasingly likely that Big Data without Big Data Security will be just silos of fragmented data. Therefore, it is increasingly important to work effectively and efficiently across specializations to address opportunities and reduce risks so that we can define reference architecture that is sovereign friendly and cloud effective. The immediate need is to efficiently communicate terms and intent.

2.2 Scope

Firstly, a distinction needs to be made between fault tolerance and security. Fault tolerance is resistance to unintended accidents, while security is resistance to malicious actions. Secondly, we need to understand how Big Data security concerns arise out of the defining characteristics of Big Data and how it is differentiated from traditional security concerns.

1. Big data is gathered from diverse end-points. So there are more types of actors than just Provider and Consumers – viz. Data Owners: for example, mobile users, social network users and so on.

2. Data aggregation and dissemination have to be made securely and inside the context of a formal, understandable framework. This should part of the contract that has to be provided to Data Owners.

3. Availability of data to Data Consumers is an important aspect in Big Data. Availability can be maliciously affected by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.

4. Searching and Filtering of Data is important since all of the massive amount of data need not be accessed. What are the capabilities provided by the Provider in this respect?

5. The balance between privacy and utility needs to be thoroughly analyzed. Big Data is most useful when it can be analyzed for information.

9

6. However, privacy would restrict the form and availability of data to analytics technologies.7. Since there is a separation between Data Owner, Provider and Data Consumer, the integrity of

data coming from end-points has to be ensured. Data poisoning has to be ruled out.

2.3 Actors

A person has relationships with many applications and sources of information in a big data system.

We describe a number of instances to exemplify this assertion:1. A retail organization refers to a person who “may” buy goods or services as a consumer, before

the purchase and a customer after a purchase.2. A retail organization may use a social media platform as a channel for their online store.3. The person may be a patron at a food and beverage organization for as few as none and as

many as 3 before a warning may need to be triggered. 4. A person has a customer relationship with a financial organization in either prepaid or personal

banking services.5. A person may have a car or auto loan with a different or same financial institution. 6. A person may have a home loan with a different or same bank as a personal bank or each may

be different organizations for the same person. 7. A person may be “the insured” on health, life, auto, homeowner or renters insurance. 8. A person may be the beneficiary or future insured person by an employer payroll deduction

through a payroll service in the private sector employment development department in the public sector.

9. A person has been educated by many or few educational organizations in either public or private schools for the first 15-20 years of their childhood making the right decisions.

10

10. A person may be an employee, temporary worker, contractor or another 3rd party employee for one or more companies or businesses.

11. A person may be underage and have special conditions around collection of data.

2.4 Classification and Discussion of Topics

The set of topics were initially adapted from the scope of the CSA BDWG charter, organized according to the classification in [1]. Security and Privacy concerns are classified in 4 categories:

1. Infrastructure Security2. Data Privacy3. Data Management4. Integrity and Reactive Security

In this section, we describe the topics in detail, along with community discussion around them.

Infrastructure Security

1. Review of technologies and frameworks that have been primarily developed for performance, scalability and availability. (e.g., Apache Hadoop, MPP databases, etc.,)

2. High-availabilitya. Security against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.

Data Privacy

1. Impact of social data revolution on security and privacy of big data implementations.a. Unknowns of Innovation - When a perpetrator, abuser or stalker misuses technology to

target and harm a victim, there are various criminal and civil charges that might be applied to ensure accountability and promote victim safety. There are a number of U.S. federal and state/territory/tribal laws that might apply. To support the safety and privacy of victims, it is important to take technology-facilitated abuse and stalking seriously. This includes assessing all ways that technology is being misused to perpetrate harm, and, considering all charges that could or should be applied.

b. Identify laws that address violence and abuse. Identify where they explicitly or implicitly include the use of technology and electronic communications:a. Stalking and cyberstalking (felony menacing by, via electronic surveillance, etc.)b. Harassment, threats, assaultc. Domestic violence, dating violence, sexual violence, sexual exploitationd. Sexting and child pornography: electronic transmission of harmful information to

minors, providing obscene material to a minor, inappropriate images of minors, lascivious intent

e. Bullying and cyberbullyingf. Child abuse

11

c. Identify possible charges related to technology, communications, privacy and confidentiality:a. Unauthorized access, unauthorized recording/taping, Illegal interception of

electronic communications, illegal monitoring of communications, surveillance, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unlawful party to call

b. Computer and Internet crimes: fraud, network intrusionc. Identity theft, impersonation, pretextingd. Financial fraud, telecommunications fraude. Privacy violations: Reasonable expectation lawful purposesf. Consumer protection lawsg. Violation of no contact, protection and restraining ordersh. Finding Laws To Charge Perpetrators Who Misuse Technology. Defamatory libel,

slander, economic or reputational harms, privacy tortsi. Burglary, criminal trespass, reckless endangerment, disorderly conduct, mischief,

obstruction of justice.

2. Data-centric security to protect data no matter where it is stored or accessed in the clouda. For example, attribute-based encryption, format-preserving encryption

3. Big data privacy and governancea. Data discovery and classification b. (Flexible) policy management for accessing and controlling the data.

i. For example, language framework for big data policiesc. Data masking technologies: anonymization, rounding, truncation, hashing, differential

privacyi. It is important to consider how these approaches degrade performance or

hinder delivery all together. Often these solutions are proposed and then cause an outage at the time of the release forcing the removal of the option.

d. Data monitoringe. Compliance with regulations such as HIPAA, EU data protection regulations, APEC Cross-

Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) requirements, and country-specific regulationsi. Regional data stores enable regional laws to be enforced

1. Cyber-security Executive order 1998 - assumed data and information would remain within the region.

ii. People centered design makes the assumption that private sector stakeholders are operating ethically and respecting the freedoms and liberties of all Americans.

1. Class action and Civil Suits are highly likely based on the volume significant increase in threats with Big Data.

a. People before profit must be revisited to understand the large number of Executive Orders overlooked

12

, 09/24/13,

Bev Corwin:Somewhere within the governance discussions of big data privacy, I believe that there are also important considerations regarding accessibility issues, users, usability, and perhaps "small data" integration guidelines, data ownership models, etc.

, 09/24/13,

Bev Corwin:Perhaps more "small data" control models for people to better manage their personal data within big data models?

b. People before profit must be revisited to understand the large number of domestic laws overlooked.

2. Indigenous and Aboriginal people and privacy of all associated vectors and variables must be excluded from any big data store, in any case a person must OPT IN versus OPT Out.

a. all tribal land is an exclusion from any image capture and video streaming or capture.

b. Human Rightsf. Government access to data and freedom of expression concerns

i. Some believe people in general are not nearly concerned about the freedom of expression as they are about misuse or inability to govern private sector use.

1. Cisco’s Internet of Everything is directly dependent on Big Data, as shown in the survey summary the greatest concern respondents chose “threats to data(loss) and fear for physical safety”

g. Potentially unintended/unwanted consequences or usesi. Appropriate uses of data collected or data aggregation and problem

management capabilities must be enabled. ii. Mechanisms for the appropriate secondary or subsequent data uses.

1. Filtered upon entry processed and presented in the inbound framework.h. Permission to collect data, (opt in/opt out), consent,

i. If Facebook or google permissions are marked ONLY MY FRIENDS, ONLY ME or ONLY MY CIRCLES the assumption must be that the person believes the setting in Facebook and google control all content presented through Google and Facebook.

1. Permission based on clear language and not forced by preventing users to access their online services.

13

, 09/24/13,

Luca Lepori:Re: 2. d. vii. 1, a, b This led me to think about how one might outline and implement a framework [using the term informally, not in the programmatic sense] to identify, interpret and apply rules based on the incoming data's properties/metadata as in the very useful example provided here. Just considering the different settings that Facebook, Google + and Flickr allow users to set currently (since these settings are not static) provides a glimpse into the potential complexity of preserving privacy policies in collecting, analyzing data from various sources.Lisa Martinez:I agree

, 09/24/13,

Luca Lepori:Re: point 2. d. v. 1. I may not understand this statement and its intention, but on the surface I think it needs to be re-examined and/or tested. Recent events vis a vis government surveillance of electronic communications has revealed very strong feelings, opinions and perspectives on how government and business gather and share information. Please correct me if I am misinterpreting this statement.Lisa Martinez:I agree, we should test.

2. People do not believe the government would allow business people to take advantage of their rights.

i. Responsibility to purge data based on certain criteria and/or eventsi. Examples include legal rulings that affect an external data source. Let’s say that

Facebook loses a legal challenge and one of the outcomes is that Facebook must purge their databases of certain private information. Isn’t there then a responsibility for downstream data stores to follow suit and purge their copies of the same data? Absolutely, the provider, producer, collector or social media supplier or the host must inform and remove all versions.

e. Computing on the encrypted data i. De-duplication of encrypted data

ii. Searching and reporting on the encrypted dataiii. Fully homomorphic encryptioniv. Anonymization of data (no linking fields to reverse identify)v. De- identification of data (individual centric)

vi. Non-identifying data (individual and context centric)f. Secure data aggregationg. Data Loss Preventionh. Fault Tolerance - recovery for zero data loss

a. Aggregation in end to end scale of resilience, record and operational scope for integrity and privacy in a secure or better risk management strategy.

b. Fewer applications will require fault tolerance with clear distinction around risk and scope of the risk.

Data Management

1. Securing data storesa. Communication protocols

i. DBLINKSii. ACL

iii. APIiv. Channel segmentation v. Federated (eRate) migration to cloud

b. Attack surface reduction2. Key management, and ownership of data

a. Providing full control of the keys to the data ownerb. Transparency of data lifecycle process: acquisition, uses, transfers, dissemination,

destruction c. Maps to aid a non-technical person in seeing who and how the data is being used.

14

Integrity and Reactive Security

1. Big data analytics for security intelligence (identifying malicious activity) and situational awareness (understanding the health of the system)

a. Large-scale analyticsi. The largest audience with a “true” competency to make use of large scale

analytics is no more than 5% of the private sector. ii. Need assessment of the public sector.

b. Streaming data analyticsi. REQUIRES a virtual machine and secure channel

ii. This is a low level requirement or phase iii1. roadmap2. priority on secure and return on investment must be done to move to

this degree of maturity2. Event detection

a. React upon deep analysis due to the API and ability for physical table source>work>target during work the information is transformed and reloaded.

b. Data-driven abuse detection3. Forensics4. Security of analytics results

15

3 Use Cases

3.1 Retail/ Marketing

2.1.1 Scenario 1 : Modern Day consumerism

Scenario Description: Consumers, with the help of smart devices have become very conscious of price, convenience and access before they make decision on a purchase. Content owners license data for usage by consumers through presentation portals, e.g., Netflix, iTunes, etc.

Comparative pricing from different retailers, store location and/or delivery options and crowd sourced rating have become common factors for selection. On the flip side, retailers, to compete, are keeping close watch on consumer locations, interests, spending patterns etc. to dynamically create deals and sell them products that consumers don’t yet know that they want.

Current S&P: Individual data is collected by several means such as Smart Phone GPS/ Location, Browser use, Social Media, Apps on smart devices, etc.

Privacy: Most means described above offer weak privacy controls, however consumer unawareness and oversight allows 3rd parties to “legitimately’” capture information. Consumers can have limited to no expectation of privacy in this scenario.

Security: Controls are inconsistent and/ or not established appropriately to i. Isolate, containerize and encrypt data,

ii. Monitor and detect threats, iii. Identify users and devices for data feediv. Interfacing with other data sources, etc.v. Anonymization: Some data collection and aggregation uses anonymization

techniques, however individual users can be re-identified by leveraging other public ‘big-data’ pools

vi. Original DRM model not built to scale to meet demand for forecast use for the data.

Current Research: Limited research in enabling Privacy and security controls that protect individual data (Whether anonymized or non-anonymized).

2.2.1 Scenario 2 : Nielsen Homescan

Scenario description: This is a subsidiary of Nielsen that collects family level retail transactions. A general transaction has a checkout receipt, contains all SKUs purchased, time, date, store location, etc. It is currently implemented using a statistically randomized national sample. As of 2005 this was already a multi-terabyte warehouse for only a single F500 customer’s product mix, mostly with structured data set. Data is in-house but shared

16

with customers who have partial access to data partitions through web portions using columnar databases. Other Cx only receive reports, which include aggregate data, but which can be drilled down for a fee.

Current S&P: Privacy: There is considerable amount of PII data. Survey participants are compensated

in exchange for giving up segmentation data, demographics, etc. Security:

i. Traditional access security with group policy, implemented at the field level using the DB engine.

ii. No Audit and opt out scrubbing.

Current Research: TBD

2.3.1 Scenario 3 : Web Traffic Analytics

Scenario Description: Visit-level webserver logs are high-granularity and voluminous. To be useful, log data must be correlated with other (potentially big data) data sources, including page content (buttons, text, navigation events), and marketing level event such as campaigns, media classification, etc. There are discussions of, if not already deployed, plans for traffic analytics using CEP in real time. One nontrivial problem is to segregate traffic types, including internal user communities, for which collection policies and security are different.

Current S&P: Non-EU: Opt-in defaults are relied upon to gain visitor consent for tracking. IP address

logging enables potential access to geo-coding to potentially block-level identification. MAC address tracking enables device ID which is a form of PII.

Some companies allow for purging of data on demand, but it’s unlikely to expunge previously collected webserver traffic.

EU has more strict regulations regarding collection of such data, which is treated as PII and is to be scrubbed (anonymized) even for multinationals operating in EU but based in the US.

Current research: TBD

17

3.2 Healthcare:

2.4.1 Scenario 1 : Health Information Exchange

Scenario Description: Health Information Exchanges (HIEs) aspire to facilitate sharing of healthcare information that might include Electronic Health Records (EHRs) such that they are accessible to relevant Covered Entities, but in a manner that enables Patient Consent.

HIEs under construction tend to be federated, where the respective Covered Entity retains custodianship of their data, which poses problems for many scenarios such as Emergency. This is for a variety of reasons that include technical (such as inter-operability) business, and security concerns.

Cloud enablement of HIEs through strong cryptography and key management that meets the HIPAA requirements for PHI, ideally without requiring the cloud service operator to sign a Business Associate Agreement, would provide several benefits that would include patient safety, lowered healthcare costs, regulated accesses during emergencies that might include break the glass and CDC scenarios.

Some preliminary scenarios proposed are:

Break the Glass: There could be situations where the patient is not able to provide consent due to a medical situation, or a guardian is not accessible, but an authorized party needs to get immediate access to relevant patient records. Using cryptographically enhanced key lifecycle management we can provide a sufficient level of visibility and nonrepudiation that would enable tracking violations after the fact.

Informed Consent: Often when there is a transfer of EHRs between Covered Entities and Business Associates, it would be desirable and necessary for the patient to be able to convey their approval, but also to specify what components of their EHR can be transferred (for instance, their Dentist would not need to see their psychiatric records.) Through cryptographic techniques we could leverage the ability to specify the fine-grain cipher text policy that would be conveyed.

Pandemic Assistance: There will be situations when public health entities, such as the CDC, and perhaps other NGOs that require this information to facilitate public safety, will require controlled access to this information, perhaps in situations where services and infrastructures are inaccessible. A cloud HIE with the right cryptographic controls could release essential information to authorized entities in a manner that facilitates the scenario requirement, but does this through authorization and audits

Current and/or proposed S&P:

18

Security: i. Light-weight but secure off-cloud encryption: Need the ability to perform light-

weight but secure off-cloud encryption of an EHR that can reside in any container that ranges from a browser, to an enterprise server, that leverages strong symmetric cryptography.

ii. Homomorphic Encryption.iii. Applied Cryptography: Tight reductions, realistic threat models, and efficient

techniques.

Privacy:i. Differential Privacy: Techniques for guaranteeing against inappropriate leakage

of PIIii. HIPAA

Current research: Homomorphic Encryption, Off-cloud Encryption.

2.5.1 Scenario 2 : Genetic Privacy

Scenario Description: A consortium of policy makers, advocacy organizations, individuals, academic centers and industry have formed an initiative, Free the Data!, to fill the public information gap caused by the lack of available genetic information for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and plans to expand to provide other types of genetic information in open, searchable databases, including the National Center for Biotechnology Information’s database, ClinVar. The primary founders of this project include Genetic Alliance, University of California San Francisco (UCSF), InVitae Corporation and patient advocates.

This initiative invites individuals to share their genetic variation on their own terms and with appropriate privacy settings, in a public database so that their families, friends, and clinicians can better understand what the mutation means. Working together to build this resource means working towards a better understanding of disease, higher quality patient care, and improved human health.

Current S&P: Security:

i. SSL based authentication and access control. Basic user registration with low attestation level

ii. Concerns over data ownership and custody upon user deathiii. Site administrators may have access to data- Strong Encryption and key escrow

recommended. Privacy:

i. Strict privacy which lets user control who can see information, and for what purpose.

ii. Concerns over data ownership and custody upon user death.

Current research: Under what circumstances can the data be shared with private sector?

19

Under what circumstances can the user data be shared with government?

2.6.1 Scenario 3 : Pharma Clinic Trial Data Sharing [3]

Scenario Description: Companies routinely publish their clinical research, collaborate with academic researchers, and share clinical trial information on public web sites at the time ofpatient recruitment, after new drug approval, and when investigational research programs have been discontinued.

Biopharmaceutical companies will apply these Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing as a common baseline on a voluntary basis, and we encourage all medical researchers, including those in academia and in the government, to promote medical and scientific advancement by adopting and implementing the following commitments

Enhancing data sharing with researchers Enhancing public access to Clinical Study Information Sharing results with Patients who participate in clinical trials Certifying procedures for sharing trial information Reaffirming commitments to publish clinical trial results

Current and Proposed S&P: Security:

i. Longitudinal custody beyond trial disposition unclear, especially after firms merge or dissolve

ii. Standards for data sharing uncleariii. Need for usage audit and Securityiv. Publication restrictions : additional security will be required to ensure rights of

publishers, e.g. Elsevier or Wiley Privacy

i. Patient-level data disclosure - elective, per company. ii. The association mentions anonymization (“re-identification”) but mentions

issues with small sample sizesiii. Study Level data disclosure – elective, per company

Current Research: TBD

3.3 Cyber-security

2.7.1 Scenario

Scenario Description: Network protection includes a variety of data collection and monitoring. Existing network security packages monitor high-volume datasets such as event logs across thousands of workstations and servers, but are not yet able to scale to Big Data. Improved security software will include physical data correlates (access card usage for devices as well as building entrance/exit), and likely be more tightly integrated with applications, which will generate logs and audit records of hitherto undetermined types or sizes. Big data analytics systems will be required to process and analyze this data and

20

provide meaningful results. These systems could also be multi-tenant, catering to more than one distinct company.

This scenario highlights two sub-scenarios: Security for big-data Big-data for security

Current S&P: Security:

i. Traditional Policy-type security prevails, though temporal dimension and monitoring of policy modification events tends to be nonstandard or unaudited

ii. Cyber-security apps themselves run at high levels of security and thus require separate audit and security measures

iii. No cross-industry standards exists for aggregating data beyond operating system collection methods

iv. Desired security characteristics for such systems are: data governance, encryption/ key management, tenant data isolation/ containerization,

Privacy:i. Enterprise authorization for data release to state/ national organizations

ii. Protection of PII data

Current research: Vendors are adopting big data analytics for mass scale log correlation and incident response.

3.4 Government

2.8.1 Scenario 1 : Military (Unmanned Vehicle sensor data)

Scenario Description: Unmanned vehicles (“drones”) and their onboard sensors (e.g., streamed video) can produce petabytes of data that must be stored in nonstandardized formats. These streams are often not processed in real time, but DoD is buying technology to do this. Because correlation is key, GPS, time and other data streams must be co-collected. Security breach use case: Bradley Manning leak.

Current S&P:iii. Separate regulations for agency responsibility apply. For domestic surveillance,

FBI. For overseas, multiple agencies including CIA and various DoD agencies. Not all uses will be military; consider NOAA.

iv. Military security classifications are moderately complex and based on “need to know.” Information Assurance practices are followed, unlike some commercial settings.

Current Research:v. Usage is audited where audit means are provided, software is not installed /

deployed until “certified,” and development cycles have considerable oversight, e.g., see [4].

21

vi. Insider Threat (a la Snowden, Manning or spies) is being addressed in programs like DARPA CINDER. This research and some of the unfunded proposals made by industry may be of interest.

2.9.1 Scenario 2 : Education (“Common Core” Student Performance Reporting)

Scenario Description: A number of states (45) have decided to unify standards for K-12 student performance measurement. Outcomes are used for many purposes, and the program is incipient, but will obtain longitudinal Big Data status. The datasets envisioned include student level performance across their entire school history, across schools and states, and taking into account variations in test stimuli.

Current S&P:i. Data is scored by private firms and forwarded to state agencies for aggregation.

Classroom, school and district tagging remains. Status of student PII is unknown; however it’s known that teachers receive classroom-level performance feedback. Do students/parents have access?

ii. According to some reports [5], parents can opt students out, so that data must be collected.

Current Research: i. Longitudinal performance data would have value for program evaluators

if data scales up.ii. Data-driven learning content administration [6] will require access to

performance data at learner level, probably more often than at test time, and at higher granularity, thus requiring more data. Example enterprise: Civitas Learning [7] Predictive analytics for student decision-making.

3.5 Industrial: Aviation

2.10.1 Scenario

Scenario Description: Most commercial airlines are equipped with hundreds of sensors to constantly capture engine and/or aircraft health information during a flight. For a single flight, the sensors may collect multiple GB’s of data and transfer this data stream to big data analytics systems. Several companies manage these Big data analytics systems, such as parts/ engine manufacturers, airlines, plane manufacturer company etc., and data may be shared across these companies. The aggregated data is analyzed for maintenance scheduling, flight routines, etc. One common request from airline companies is to secure and isolate their data from competitors, even when data is being streamed to the same analytics system. Airline companies also prefer to keep control of how/ when / to whom the data is shared, even for analytics purpose. Most of these analytics systems are now being moved to Infrastructure cloud providers.

Current and desired S&P:

22

i. Encryption at rest: Big data systems need to encrypt data stored at the infra layer so that cloud storage admins cannot access that data.

ii. Key management: The encryption key management should be architected such end customers (airliners) have sole/shared control on the release of keys for data decryption.

iii. Encryption in Motion: Big data systems need to ensure that data in transit at the cloud provider is also encrypted.

iv. Encryption in use: Big data systems will desire complete obfuscation/ encryption when processing data in memory (especially at a cloud provider).

v. Sensor validation and unique identification (device identity management).

Current Research: i. Virtualized infra layer mapping on cloud provider

ii. Homomorphic Encryptioniii. Quorum based Encryptioniv. Multi-party computational capabilityv. Device PKI

23

4 Abstraction of Requirements

4.1 Privacy of dataRetail: Nielsen Homescan data: family level retail transactions. Data is in-house, but shared with customers who have partial access to data partitions. Others only receive reports, which include aggregate data, but which can be drilled down for a fee. Access security is traditional group policy, implemented at the field level using the DB engine. PII data is considerable. Survey participants are compensated in exchange for giving up segmentation data, demographics, etc.

Healthcare: An employer should never have access to an employee’s medical history, nor the medical records of family members. Need for HIPAA-capable cryptographic controls and key management. Doximity is a secure way for doctors to share research, clinical trial data, and patient records in the cloud. It is widely adopted already. Data ownership issues for genetic data have to be looked at. Usage audit and security is required.

Media and Communications: Collection and monitoring of PII data has to be looked at. Currently, policy based access control is enforced. Cybersecurity apps themselves run at high levels of security and thus require separate audit and security measures.

Military: Insider threat and leakage of military data, such as those collected by unmanned vehicles.

Education: Privacy of student performance data needs to be preserved. Access control policy among teachers, students and parents needs to be specified. On the other hand, this data is useful for predictive analytics for enhancing learning and decision making.

Marketing: Visit level webserver logs are used in correlation with other data sources. Opt-in consent is in place for tracking Non-EU visitors. EU regulations are stricter. IP address reveals geographical data. MAC address tracking can be construed as PII.

4.2 Provenance of dataRetail: Fraudulent padding of data and double counting has to be prevented.

Media: Digital Rights Management.

4.3 System HealthMedia: Data collection, monitoring and correlation for gauging health of the system.

24

5 Internal Security Practices

5.1 Internal Access control rules for general industry

Access control is one of the most important areas of Big Data. There are multiple entities, such as mandates, policies, and laws that govern the access of data. The overarching rule is that the highest classification of any data element or string governs the protection of the data. In addition, access should only be granted on a need to know / use basis that is reviewed periodically to control the access.

In addition, access control for big data covers more than access to the data. The security of the account that is used for access needs to be considered. If an account is shared amongst different systems and environments then there is a possibility that access control can be easily compromised. Moreover, data may be accessed multiple ways. For example, the same data may be accessed by a user, administrator, another system, etc. In addition, it may be accessed externally or copies of it transmitted, transferred, etc. so there may be duplicates of full or partial data in multiple locations. Therefore, knowing who / what accesses the data becomes increasingly important. Of course, very restrictive measures to control accounts would be impractical. However, there are best practices, such as protection based on classification of the data, least privilege and separation of duties that can reduce the risks.

General1. Least privileges – access to big data should be based on the minimum amount of privilege

need to perform the function.2. If one of the data elements is protected because of its classification (for example – PII, HIPAA,

PCI, etc.), then all of the data that it is sent with it, will inherit that classification. That way if the data is joined to / associated with other data that may cause a privacy issue, then all of that data is already protected.

3. If data is accessed from, transfer to, or transmitted to the cloud, internet or another external entity, then the data should be protected based on its classification.

4. There should be an indicator / disclaimer on the display of the user, if privacy or sensitive data is being accessed or viewed.

5. All accounts (except for system related accounts) should be reviewed at a minimum of one year to insure that they are still required.

6. All accounts (except for system related accounts) that have not been used within 180 days should be deleted. If the system will not allow deletion of the account then the account should be disabled.

7. Access to privacy of sensitive data should be logged. The minimum logging requirements should be timestamp, account number.

8. Role-based-access to big data should be based on roles. Each role should be assigned the least privileges needed to perform the function.

25

9. Roles should be reviewed a minimum of every 2 years to insure that they are still valid and to insure that the accounts assigned to them are still valid.

User10. Each user should have his or her personal account. Shared accounts should not be used

unless there is a systems limitation.11. A user account should not be a multipurpose account. For example, the user account should

not be used as an administrative account or to run production jobs.

System12. In case of system to system access, there should not be shared accounts.13. Access for a system that contains big data needs to be approved by the data owner or their

representative. The representative should not the system administrator, since that may cause a separation of duties issue.

14. The same type of data stored on different systems should the same classification and rules for access controls to ensure that it has the same level of protection.

Administrative15. System administrators should maintain a separate user account that is not used for

administrative purposes. In addition, an administrative account should not be used as a user account.

16. The same administrative account should not be used for access to the production and non-production (test, development, QA, etc.) systems.

26

6 Taxonomy of Security and Privacy Topics

6.1 Taxonomy of Technical Topics

6.2 Privacy

6.3 Provenance

Semantic Validation. Semantic validation is an important concern. Generally, semantic validation would validate typical business rules such as a due date. This capability can extend to the relationship of the particular file format and that the constructs which may be based on a standard can have a variance that may poise a denial of service in the form of a lockup of an application. This may also be observed even when using data translators which may not recognize the particular variant. Protocols and data formats may be altered by a vendor using reserved data field for example that will allow their products to have capabilities that differentiate their products from other products. This may also appears in differences in versions of systems for consumer devices, such as mobile devices such as cell phones.

27

PrivacyCommunication Privacy

Confidentiality Access Policies Systems

Crypto Enforced

Computing on Encrypted Data Searching and Reporting

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Secure Data Aggregation

Key Management

ProvenanceEnd-point Input Validation

Communication Integrity

Authenticated Computations on Data Trusted Platforms

Crypto Enforced

Granular Audits

Control of Valuable Assets Lifecycle ManagementRetention, Disposition, HoldDigital Rights Management

System Health

Security against DoS Construction of cryptographic protocols proactively resistant to DoS

Big Data for Security Analytics for Security Intelligence

Data-driven Abuse Detection

Large-scale and Streaming Data Analysis

Event Detection

Forensics

The semantic of a message and the data that is to be transported should be validated to assure at minimum conformant with standards. The use of digital signatures will be important to provide assurance that the data has been verified using a validator or data checker. This may be important to provide assurance that data from a sensor or from the data provider. This capability is important particularly if the data is to be Transformed or in the Curation of the data. If that data fails to meet the requirements it may be discarded and if that data continues to present a problem the source may be restricted in its ability to submit the data.

These types of errors would be logged and prevented from being able to be disseminated to consumers. The Big Data system is a special case where use of digital signatures will be very important.

6.4 System Health

28

7 Security Reference Architecture

7.1 Architectural Component: Interface of Sources → Transformation

7.2 Architectural Component: Interface of Transformation → Uses

7.3 Architectural Component: Interface of Transformation ↔ Data Infrastructure

7.4 Architectural Component: Internal to Data Infrastructure

7.5 Architectural Component: General

7.6

29

8 Mapping Use Cases to Reference Architecture

8.1 Cargo Shipping

(Image from William Miller)

2.11.1 Sources → Transformation:

End-Point Input Validation Ensuring integrity of data collected from sensors

Real Time Security Monitoring

Sensors can detect abnormal temperature/environmental conditions for packages with special requirements. They can also detect leaks/radiation.

Data Discovery and ClassificationSecure Data Aggregation Aggregating data from sensors securely

2.12.1 Transformation → Uses:

Privacy preserving data analytics and dissemination

Sensor collected data can be private and can reveal information about the package and geo-information. Revealing such information needs to be privacy preserving.

30

Compliance with regulationsGovt access to data and freedom of expression concerns

Dept of Homeland Security may monitor suspicious packages moving into/out of the country.

2.13.1 Transformation ↔Data Infrastructure:

Data Centric Security such as identity/policy-based encryption

Policy management for access control

Private, sensitive sensor data, package data should only be available to authorized individuals. Third party companies like LoJack have low level access to the data.

Computing on the encrypted data: searching/filtering/deduplicate/fully homomorphic encryption

Audits

2.14.1 Data Infrastructure:

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs

Logging sensor data is essential for tracking packages. They should be kept in secure data stores.

Key Management For encrypted data.

Security Best Practices for non-relational data stores

Diversity of sensor types and data types may necessitate use of non-relational data stores.

Security against DoS attacks

Data ProvenanceMeta-data should be cryptographically attached to the collected data, so that the integrity of origin and progress can be ensured.

31

2.15.1 General:

Analytics for security intelligence

Anomalies in sensor data can indicate tampering/fraudulent insertion of data traffic.

Event detectionAbnormal events like cargo moving out of the way or being stationary for unwarranted periods can be detected.

Forensics Analysis of logged data can reveal details of incidents post facto.

8.2 Nielsen Homescan

2.16.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:Family level retail transactions and associated media exposure utilizing a statistically valid national sample. A general description is provided by the vendor. This project description based on the 2006 architecture.

2.17.1 Mapping to the Security Reference Architecture:

RA Component Security & Privacy Topic Use Case MappingSources → Transformation

End-Point Input Validation Device-specific keys from digital sources; receipt sources scanned internally and reconciled to family ID . (Role issues)

Real Time Security Monitoring NoneData Discovery and Classification Classifications based on data

sources (e.g.,retail outlets, devices, paper sources)

Secure Data Aggregation Aggregated into demographic crosstabs. Internal analysts had access to PII.

Transformation → Uses

Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Aggregated to (sometimes) product-specific statistically valid independent variables

Compliance with Regulations Panel data rights secured in advance & enforced through organizational controls

Govt access to data and freedom of N/A

32

http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/nielsen-solutions/nielsen-measurement/nielsen-retail-measurement.html

expression concerns

Transformation ↔ Data Infrastructure


Encryption not employed in place; only for data center to data center transfers. XML cube security mapped to Sybase IQ, reporting tools.

Policy management for access control Extensive role-based controlsComputing on the encrypted data: searching/filtering/deduplicate/fully homomorphic encryption

N/A

Audits Schematron, process step audits

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs Project-specific audits secured by infrastructure team

Key Management Managed by project CSO. Separate key pairs issued for customers, internal users


Regular data Integrity checking via XML schema validation

Security against DoS attacks Industry standard webhost protection provided for query subsystem.

Data Provenance Unique

General Analytics for security intelligence No project-specific initiativesEvent detection N/AForensics Usage, cube-creation, device merge

audit records were retained for forensics & billing.

8.3 Pharma Clinical Trial Data Sharing

2.18.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:

Under an industry trade group proposal, clinical trial data for new drugs will be shared outside intra-enterprise warehouses. Regulatory submissions commonly exceed “millions of pages.”



End-Point Input Validation Opaque – company-specificReal Time Security Monitoring None

33

Data Discovery and Classification Opaque – company-specificSecure Data Aggregation 3rd party aggregator


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Data to be reported in aggregate but preserving potentially small-cell demographics

Compliance with Regulations Responsible developer & 3rd party custodian

Govt access to data and freedom of expression concerns

None considered: research limited community use; possible future public health data concern. Clinical Study Reports only, but possibly selectively at study-, patient-level



TBD

Policy management for access control Internal roles; 3rd party custodian roles; researcher roles; participating patients’ physicians


TBD

Audits Release audit by 3rd party

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs TBDKey Management Internal varies by firm; external TBDSecurity Best Practices for non-relational data stores

TBD

Security against DoS attacks Unlikely to become publicData Provenance TBD – critical issue

General Analytics for security intelligence TBDEvent detection TBDForensics

8.4 Large Network Cybersecurity SIEM

2.20.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is a family of tools used to defend and maintain networks.


34


End-Point Input Validation Software-supplier specific; e.g., http://support.microsoft.com/kb/323076

Real Time Security MonitoringData Discovery and Classification Varies by tool, but classifies based on

security semantics, sourcesSecure Data Aggregation Varies: subnet, workstation, server


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Platform-specific; example: Windows groups

Compliance with Regulations Applicable, but regulated events not readily visible to analysts


NSA, FBI access on demand



Usually feature of O.S.

Policy management for access control E.g.: Windows group policy for event logComputing on the encrypted data: searching/filtering/deduplicate/fully homomorphic encryption

Vendor, platform-specific

Audits Complex – audits possible throughout

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs

Vendor, platform-specific

Key Management CSO, SIEM product keysSecurity Best Practices for non-relational data stores

TBD

Security against DoS attacks N/AData Provenance E.g., how know an intrusion record was

actually associated w/ specific workstation

General Analytics for security intelligence FeatureEvent detection FeatureForensics Feature

35

http://support.microsoft.com/kb/323076

8.5 Consumer Digital Media Usage


Content owners license data for usage by consumers through presentation portals, e.g., Netflix, iTunes, etc. Usage is Big Data, including demographics at user level, patterns of use such as play sequence, recommendations, content navigation.



End-Point Input Validation Varies, vendor-dependent. Spoofing is possible. E.g., Protections afforded by securing Microsoft Rights Management Services. S/MIME

Real Time Security Monitoring Content creation securityData Discovery and Classification Discovery / classification possible

across media, populations, channelsSecure Data Aggregation Vendor-supplied aggregation

services – security practices opaque


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Aggregate reporting to content owners

Compliance with Regulations PII disclosure issues aboundGovt access to data and freedom of expression concerns

Various issues, e.g, playing terrorist podcast, illegal playback



unknown

Policy management for access control User, playback admin, library maintenance, auditor


Unknown

Audits Audit DRM usage for royalties

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs unknownKey Management unknownSecurity Best Practices for non-relational data stores

unknown

Security against DoS attacks N/A?Data Provenance Traceability to right entities to be

preserved. (Add’l use case:

36

http://bit.ly/14LdzU1

http://bit.ly/14LdzU1

Wikipedia privacy issues when distributing data to researchers)

General Analytics for security intelligence Machine intelligence for unsanctioned use/access

Event detection “Playback” granularity definedForensics Subpoena of playback records in

legal disputes

8.6 Unmanned Military Vehicle Sensor Systems


Unmanned vehicles (“drones”) and their onboard sensors (e.g., streamed video) can produce petabytes of data that must be stored in nonstandard formats. Refer to DISA large data object contract for exabytes in DoD private cloud.



End-Point Input Validation Need to secure sensor (e.g., camera) to prevent spoofing/stolen sensor streams. New transceivers, protocols in DoD pipeline. Sensor streams to include smartphone, tablet sources

Real Time Security Monitoring On-board & control station secondary sensor security monitoring

Data Discovery and Classification Varies from media-specific encoding to sophisticated situation-awareness enhancing fusion schemes.

Secure Data Aggregation Fusion challenges range from simple to complex. Video streams may be used unsecured, unaggregated.


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Geospatial constraints: cannot surveil beyond a UTM. Military secrecy: target, point of origin privacy.

Compliance with Regulations Numerous. Also standards issues.Govt access to data and freedom of See Google lawsuit over Street

37

http://defensesystems.com/articles/2012/10/31/agg-drone-video-encryption-lags.aspx

http://gcn.com/articles/2013/04/12/disa-plans-exabytes-large-data-objects.aspx

http://gcn.com/articles/2013/04/12/disa-plans-exabytes-large-data-objects.aspx

expression concerns View.



Policy-based encryption, often dictated by legacy channel capacity/type

Policy management for access control Transformations tend to be made within DoD-contractor devised system schemes.


Sometimes performed within vendor-supplied architectures, or by image-processing parallel architectures.

Audits CSO, IG audit

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs The usual, plus data center security levels are tightly managed (e.g., field vs. battalion vs. HQ)

Key Management CSO – chain of commandSecurity Best Practices for non-relational data stores

Not handled differently at present; this is changing in DoD.

Security against DoS attacks DoD anti-jamming e-measures.Data Provenance Must track to sensor point in time

configuration, metadata.

General Analytics for security intelligence DoD develops specific field of battle security software intelligence – event driven, monitoring – often remote.

Event detection E.g.: target identification in a video stream, infer height of target from shadow. Fuse data from satellite IR with separate sensor stream.

Forensics Used for AAR (after action review) – desirable to have full playback of sensor streams.

8.7 Common Core K-12 Student Reporting

2.26.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:Cradle-to-grave student performance metrics for every student are now possible – at least within the K-12 community and probably beyond. This could include every test result ever administered.


38


End-Point Input Validation Application-dependent. Spoofing is possible.

Real Time Security Monitoring Vendor-specific monitoring of tests, test-takers, administrators & data.

Data Discovery and Classification unknownSecure Data Aggregation Typical: Classroom level


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Various: e.g., teacher level analytics across all same-grade classrooms.

Compliance with Regulations Parent-, student-, taxpayer disclosure & privacy rules apply


Yes. May be required for grants, funding, performance metrics for teachers, administrators, districts.



Support both individual access (student) & partitioned aggregate

Policy management for access control Vendor (e.g., Pearson) controls, state level policies, federal level policies; probably 20-50 roles?


unknown

Audits Support 3rd party audits by unions, state agencies, resp to subpoenas

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs Large enterprise security, trx controls – classroom to Feds

Key Management CSO’s from classroom level to national


unknown

Security against DoS attacks standardData Provenance Traceability to measurement event

requires capturing tests @ point in time

General Analytics for security intelligenceEvent detectionForensics

39

8.8 Web Traffic Analytics


Visit-level webserver logs are high-granularity and voluminous. Web logs are correlated with other sources, including page content (buttons, text, navigation events), and marketing events such as campaigns, media classification.



End-Point Input Validation Device-dependent. Spoofing often easy.

Real Time Security Monitoring Webserver monitoringData Discovery and Classification Some geospatial attributionSecure Data Aggregation Aggregation to device,

visitor,button,web event, others


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics IP anonymizing, timestamp degrading. Content-specific opt-out.

Compliance with Regulations Anonymization may be required for EU compliance. Opt-out honoring.


Yes.



Varies depending on archivist. E.g., Adobe Omniture

Policy management for access control System-, application-level access controls


unknown

Audits Customer audits for accuracy, integrity supported

Data Infrastructure

Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs Storage archiving – big issueKey Management CSO + applicationsSecurity Best Practices for non-relational data stores

unknown

Security against DoS attacks StandardData Provenance Server, application, IP-like identity,

page point-in-time DOM, point-in-time marketing events

40

General Analytics for security intelligence Access to web logs often requires priv elevation.

Event detection Can infer e.g., numerous sales, marketing & overall web health events

Forensics See SIEM use case.

8.9 Title: Health Information Exchange

2.30.1 General Description of the Industry / Use Case:Health Information Exchange data aggregated from various data providers that might include covered entities such as hospitals, and CROs identifying participation in clinical trials. The data consumers would include emergency room personnel, the CDC, and other authorized health (or other) organizations. Since any city, or region might implement its own HiE, these might also serve as data consumers and data providers for each other.



End-Point Input Validation Strong authentication, perhaps through X.509v3 certificates, potential leverage of SAFE bridge in lieu of general PKI.

Real Time Security Monitoring Validation of incoming records to ensure integrity through signature validation, and HIPAA privacy through ensuring PHI is encrypted. May need to check for evidence of Informed Consent.

Data Discovery and Classification Leverage HL7 and other standard formats opportunistically, but avoid attempts at schema normalization. Some columns will be strongly encrypted, while others will be specially encrypted (or associated with cryptographic metadata) for enabling discovery and classification. May need to perform column filtering based on policies of data source, or HiE Service Provider.

Secure Data Aggregation Clear text columns can be de-duplicated, perhaps columns with deterministic encryption. Other

41

columns may have cryptographic metadata for facilitating aggregation and de-duplication. We assume retention rules, but no disposition rules in the related areas of Compliance.


Privacy-preserving Data Analytics Searching on Encrypted Data, Proofs of Data Possession. Identification of potential adverse experience due to Clinical Trial Participation. Identification of potential Professional Patients. Trends and epidemics, co-relations of these to environmental and other effects. Determine if drug to be administered will generate an adverse reaction, without breaking the double blind. Patient will need to be provided with detailed accounting of accesses to, and uses of their EHR data.

Compliance with Regulations HIPAA Security and Privacy will require detailed accounting of access to EHR data. To facilitate this, and the logging and alerts, will require federated identity integration with Data Consumers.


CDC, Law Enforcement, Subpoenas and Warrants. Access may be toggled on based on occurrence of a pandemic (ex: CDC) or receipt of a warrant (Law Enforcement).



Row-level and Column-level Access Control.

Policy management for access control Role-based and Claim-based. Defined for PHI cells.


Privacy preserving access to relevant events, anomalies and trends, to CDC and other relevant health organizations.

Audits Facilitate HIPAA readiness, and HHS audits.

Data Securing Data Storage and Transaction logs Need to be protected for integrity

42

Infrastructure and for privacy, but also for establishing completeness, with an emphasis on availability.

Key Management Federated across Covered Entities, with need to manage key lifecycles across multiple covered entities that are data sources.


End-to-end encryption, with scenario specific schemes that respect min-entropy to provide richer query operations but without compromising patient privacy.

Security against DoS attacks Mandatory – Availability is Compliance Requirement.

Data Provenance Completeness and integrity of data with records of all accesses and modifications. This information could be as sensitive as the data, and is subject to commensurate access policies.

General Analytics for security intelligence Monitoring of Informed Patient consent; authorized and unauthorized transfers, accesses and modifications.

Event detection Transfer of record custody, addition/modification of record (or cell), authorized queries, unauthorized queries and modification attempts.

Forensics Tamper resistant logs, with evidence of tampering events. Ability to identify record-level transfers of custody, and cell-level access or modification.

43

9 References

[1] Cloud Security Alliance Big Data Working Group, “Top 10 Challenges in Big Data Security and Privacy”, 2012.

[2] Retail research and benchmarking and design of an integrated solution a person centered design “A problem or do you have a wicked problem?”

[3] Phrma.org, “Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing”: http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMAPrinciplesForResponsibleClinicalTrialDataSharing.pdf

[4] Army Regulation 25-2, http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/r25_2/main.asp

[5] Wall Street Journal, “Before Tougher State Tests, Officials Prepare Parents”, http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2013/04/15/before-tougher-state-tests-officials-prepare-parents/

[6] InformationWeek, “Common Core Meets Aging Education Technology”,http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/news/common-core-meets-aging-education-techno/240158684

[7] Civitas Learning, http://www.civitaslearning.com/about/

10

11

44

http://www.civitaslearning.com/about/

http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/news/common-core-meets-aging-education-techno/240158684

http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/news/common-core-meets-aging-education-techno/240158684

http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2013/04/15/before-tougher-state-tests-officials-prepare-parents/?mod=dist_smartbrief

http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/r25_2/main.asp

http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMAPrinciplesForResponsibleClinicalTrialDataSharing.pdf

nist big data working group (nbd-wg) - executive …€¦ · web viewat the nist cloud and big data...

Documents