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No-fly Zones and China’s Diplomatic Dilemma

CIR September/October 2012CIR Vol. 22 No. 5

No-fly Zones and China’s Diplomatic

Dilemma

Zhao Guangcheng*

The no-fly zone first appeared in August 1992. After being employed inIraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Libya, it has become a model of United

Nations-mandated humanitarian intervention. However, we can see thatthis kind of intervention under the“humanitarian”banner was not forhumanitarian purposes but rather used to force regime change under theauthority of the United Nations. Indeed, these no-fly zones, to varyingextents, have exceeded the authority of the United Nations and have led tothe excessive use of force. However, more and more countries haveaccepted the legitimacy of the zones. The West now uses them as a tool toforce regime change. This article examines these“no-fly zones”, analyzestheir legal basis and operational rules, and then examines how this hascreated a diplomatic dilemma for China.

The Nature of the No-fly Zone: a Middle Way of

International Intervention

No-fly zones have a special meaning in international relations. Ano-fly zone is an area where no aircraft without special permission isallowed to enter. A no-fly zone can be enforced in two ways: (1) asovereign state takes restrictive measures to limit aircraft routes over partof its territorial air space; or (2) one or more countries or organizations setup special restrictions on flight paths in a specific airspace over a conflictregion. The first type concerns a nation’s sovereign right and is not covered

* Zhang Guangcheng is a post-doctoral student at the School of History and Culture,Southwest University. He is also a lecturer at the Middle East Institute of NorthwestUniversity. The author focuses on international relations theory, diplomatic andMiddle East Studies.

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by this article. The second kind of no-fly zone concerns setting up anairspace in a sovereign state, or an armed intervention by more powerfulstates over weaker ones.

Big powers have always meddled in the affairs of weaker ones.Powerful countries can often shape the fate of others because of theirstrength. This could mean invasion or interference in their affairs evenwhen that smaller country has not infringed on the national interests ofother countries. Before the era of state sovereignty and humanitarianvalues, these big powers did not need to seek high-minded excuses fortheir actions. Although the 1648 peace treaty of Westphalia established theprinciple of sovereign equality and inseparable sovereignty, big powerscontinued to wantonly interfere in the internal affairs of smaller andweaker states. For example, the royal successions in Spain, Austria andPoland were all purely internal issues, but in the 18th Century they led tothree Wars of Succession that involved all the major countries in Europe.The Opium War, launched by Britain on China in 1840, was a prelude toforeign powers’aggression against China. It can also be included in thislist of cases of international intervention.

With the influence of the Enlightenment in the early 19th Century, theconcepts of human rights and humanitarian values were widely adopted bythe international community. This is when excuses had to be made tocontinue these kinds of interventions. The Ottoman Empire began todecline from the 17th century, and ethnic and religious conflicts within itsterritory gradually became international issues. Foreign powers beganinterfering whenever there were national uprisings. After the Second WorldWar, the U.N. Charter defined national sovereignty as a pillar ofinternational law. Since then, international interventions have beenincreasingly staged under the banner of“humanitarianism”. During theCold War, because of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation, it was difficult forthe U.N. to play an important role in“humanitarian”interventions. Thus anumber of countries chose to bypass the Security Council in taking actionto protect their national interests. The end of the Cold War made it possiblefor the U.N. Security Council to take unified action, thus paving the wayfor legitimate humanitarian interventions. From the early 1990s, the

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number of U.N.-mandated humanitarian interventions have grown, andthere have been several cases of enforced peace through military action.These include Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, the formerYugoslavia in 1992-1995, and Libya in 2011.

We can see from these examples that there are two types ofinternational intervention. The first is when the intervention isunauthorized (action was taken without U.N. agreement) but is taken onthe pretext of humanitarianism. The Kosovo war and the war in Iraq aretwo typical cases of this kind. We can call them the“Kosovo/Iraq warmodel”. Because these interventions were not authorized by the U.N.Security Council, they do not have legitimacy under international law eventhough many countries took part or supported the action. In that sense, theyare no different to outright armed aggression. The second type isintervention that is legitimized first with a U.N. resolution. The action isusually taken against countries that have violated human rights or are seento threaten international peace and security. The U.S.-led interventions inSomalia and Haiti, and the U.S.-led multinational military action againstIraq’s invasion of Kuwait, were all conducted under the authority of theUnited Nations. We can call these the (U.N. authorized )“Gulf Warmodel”.

Which of these two models is adopted depends on whether the targetcountry has behaved in a way as to cause the outrage of the internationalcommunity or not. Violation of other countries’sovereignty and the use offorce are prohibited by international law. Thus most countries would firstseek U.N. Security Council authorization to avoid strong internationalopposition and moral condemnation. If the target country has seriouslyviolated the U.N. Charter and the norms governing international relations,and are unanimously condemned by the international community, a U.N.mandate will most probably be sought. In that way, countries can make anintervention legal under the banner of“safeguarding world peace”and atthe same time they can pursue their own national agendas. However, if thetarget country has not caused sufficient international outrage, it will bedifficult to get U.N. support. But a big power can still act, either alone orwith other countries, and bypass the U.N. Security Council, if it believes its

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actions would not cause the interference of other big countries.The no-fly zone is actually a model that is midway between these two

models. In both models, countries are driven by their national interests, andthey are determined to remove all obstacles to an armed intervention. Theonly difference is whether they have been able to secure a U.N. mandatefor their action or not. Setting up a no-fly zone has aspects of both thesemodels, but there are significant differences. When a no-fly zone isproposed, the situation must have caused grave concern in the internationalcommunity. Those nations pushing for a no-fly zone have their ownagendas. However, if the target country’s internal situation has not arouseda“serious” level of international concern, an armed intervention isunlikely to be supported by the international community and the U.N.. Ifthe issue is not that important, then the countries wishing to interfere willbe unlikely to go against world opinion, but these countries would stillwish to take some action, particularly if there are some plausible excuses.If they cannot get support for direct armed intervention then they can takea roundabout route and make limited military strikes. This is a middle way.And by setting up a no-fly zone it utilizes international authority andallows them to achieve their goals legally.

Therefore, we can see that no-fly zones are a“legitimate”way ofbullying another country. If a no-fly zone model is chosen, it means thatthe countries wishing to interfere are not ready to launch an all-out warwhen they cannot secure international support. However, they may not beable to achieve their goals when all they can do are limited military strikes.For example, take the case of the Iraqi no-fly zone: the U.S. and Britainbattled with Iraq inside and outside the Iraqi no-fly zone for 10 years, butthey failed to uproot the Saddam regime. No-fly zones will only workwhen rebel forces in the target country are strong enough to set up aseparatist regime. Limited military strikes can be used to protect the rebelsfrom being destroyed and allow them to grow stronger so they can attackgovernment troops. In this way they may eventually topple the targetcountry’s regime. It should be pointed out that promoting regime change inthis way is certainly contrary to the spirit of the U.N. Charter, but since itcan obtain the authorization of the United Nations and wide international

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supports, there is a basis of international law that can justify such approach.

Legal Basis for the No-fly Zone: Between Sovereignty and

Human Rights

The concept and practice of national sovereignty originated in theWest. The word“sovereignty”was first put forward by the ancient Greekphilosopher Aristotle.1 Then in 1576, the French philosopher, Jean Bodin,gave the first clear definition of this concept in its modern sense as“theabsolute and perpetual power of a Republic”.2 During the Thirty Years’War, sovereignty was transformed from a political ideal into internationalpractice. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia absorbed Bodin’s and Grotius’ideas on sovereignty, and established the principles of territorialsovereignty (the highest internal sovereignty), sovereign equality (andindependence) and the principle of sovereignty as being inseparable. Afterthe two World Wars of the last century, a new international order wasfounded, and the principle of national sovereignty was recognized as apillar of the system of international law. Three of the seven principlesstipulated in Article II of the U.N. Charter concern national sovereigntyand the equality and inviolability of the sovereignty of all nations.

Once the principle of national sovereignty was established, people’sideas about surpassing national sovereignty came into being. When themodern nation-state was still in its infancy in the later Middle Ages, Dantefirst proposed establishing a“world empire”to be ruled by a unifiedmonarchy to create a rule of peace and justice and to realize the fulldevelopment of mankind.3 At the end of the 18th Century, Kant suggestedthe idea of“world citizen”, in which he advocated that everyone had rightsas world citizens and they should form a global commonwealth and

1 In Aristotle’s Political Science, the word“sovereignty”refers to a city-states’rightto rule or the highest authority, the highest legislative and executive power andjudicial power. See:［古希腊］亚里士多德著，吴寿彭译：《政治学》，商务印书馆，1965年，第134-148、314-317、477页。

2［美］《百科全书》（国际版）第 25卷，1978年版，第 347页。转引自王逸舟：“当代国际政治背景下的国家主权问题”，《欧洲》，1993年，第6期，第7页。

3［意］但丁•阿利盖里著，朱虹译：《论世界帝国》，商务印书馆，1997年，第1-25页。

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establish international laws.1 In modern times, this idea of world citizenshas been further developed to gradually become the theoretical basis of the

“human rights above sovereignty”argument. The German philosopherJuergen Habermas said:“The key to global citizenship is that such a rightmust surpass national governments who are the subjects of internationallaw and should be given to individuals who are legal subjects.”2 Thetheory of“citizens of the world”advocates that people are first andforemost human beings and then citizens of a country. How a nation treatsits own citizens is not something which is absolutely its own internalaffairs.3

Armed interventions to protect human rights then began basedaround this concept of world citizens. These humanitarian interventionschallenged the principles of national sovereignty and the idea ofnoninterference in the internal affairs of other nations in internationallaw. It meant that a sovereign state no longer had the right to treat itscitizens any way it wanted to within its own territory.4 The earliesthumanitarian interventions were largely aimed at protecting religiousminorities facing persecution in their own countries. In the 1860s,European multinational forces, led by France, intervened in theMuslim-Christian conflicts in the Ottoman Empire, creating a precedentfor collective humanitarian intervention against a sovereign state. Afterthe Second World War, these kinds of armed interventions have beenmore and more numerous under a humanitarian banner. During the ColdWar, all these armed“humanitarian” interventions never succeeded ingetting U.N. backing.

After the end of the Cold War, the big powers began to cooperate andthe U.N. Security Council started to approve humanitarian interventions

1［德］康德著，沈叔平译：《法的形而上学原理——权利的科学》，商务印书馆，2002年，第189-190页。

2 章国锋：《关于一个公正世界的“乌托邦”构想》，山东人民出版社，2001 年，第192-196、202页。

3 曲相霖：“人•公民•世界公民：人权主体的流变与人权的制度保障”，Web. 8May 2011, <http://law.china.cn/thesis/txt/2009-03/23/content_2807442.htm/>

4 李红云：“人道主义干涉的发展与联合国”，北京大学法学院国际法研究中心编：《北京国际法与比较法评论》，第一卷，北京大学出版社，2002年，第11页。

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and they were able to wear a cloak of legitimacy and collective will.Post-Cold War humanitarian interventions began to show some newfeatures. First, their numbers rapidly increased, and many of them securedU.N. Security Council authorization. Second, because more countries arenow taking part, these kinds of interferences have become more of acollective behavior. Some interventions have been led by NATO, theEuropean Union and other international organizations (e.g., 34 nations senttroops to the Gulf War, thus it become the largest war in terms of thenumber of participating countries since the end of World War II); Third, thereasons given for interventions has widened from simply protecting thenationals of participating countries to protecting human rights and thesecurity of other country’s citizens. The key change is the appearance ofthe U.N.-mandated no-fly zones.

The no-fly zone is a legal“bullying”practice which goes under thename of “safeguarding human rights”. Its legitimacy comes fromexception clauses in the U.N. Charter. Although the Charter makessovereignty a pillar of international law, it also makes provisions forhuman rights issues. While the Charter prohibits violation of thesovereignty of other nations and the use of force, it allows for twoexceptions: (1) Article 51 stipulates the right of the individual andcollective self-defense; (2) Article 39 provides that the Council has theright to take measures to“maintain or restore international peace andsecurity”. If a country’s internal affairs are considered to be threateningglobal or regional peace and security, then the Security Council has theright to take necessary measures, including“taking necessary air, navaland land military actions”, to maintain or restore international peace andsecurity. Under such circumstances, countries or internationalorganizations can take military action against the target country morally, toeliminate a“humanitarian disaster’and, legally, to exercise“collectiveself-defense”. Western countries have taken advantage of this gray area ofthe U.N. Charter to establish no-fly zones. U.N. sanctions on the SouthAfrican apartheid regime in the 1960s also provided a precedent for the

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establishment of the no-fly zone.1 As the U.N. is the core of the existingsystem of international law, if the Security Council gives its authorizationthen all intervention is legitimate. For this reason, no-fly zones have beenrepeatedly set up. Very few countries have opposed these and even manysmall and weak countries have supported them.

Implementation of No-fly Zones: Beyond Authorization and

Excessive Use of Force

From the perspective of international law, a sovereign state, as anactor of international relations, must have four attributes: a definedterritory, a stable population, effective governmental rule, and a wideinternational recognition.2 This suggests that sovereignty is the exclusivejurisdiction of a government over its territory and its citizens. The internalidentity of its people as well as external recognition by the internationalcommunity is a precondition for the effectiveness of this jurisdiction.Sovereignty is made up of three opposites: human rights and nationalself-determination, and foreign hegemony and supra-national authority.Challenges to national sovereignty also come from the following threeaspects: (1) The people of a nation may fight for their human rights againstthe authority of their government, in this case anti-government armedgroups may be formed; (2) Local ethnic minorities may use the principle ofnational self-determination to oppose the legitimacy of the central

1 After the Sharpeville massacre on March 21, 1960, the U.N. Security Counciladopted Resolution 134 on April 1, declaring that“the situation of the territory ofthe Union of South Africa has given rise to international friction, should suchsituations continue to develop, it will likely endanger international peace andsecurity”. So the United Nations had the right to take measures stipulated in ChapterVII of the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations subsequently adopted aseries of resolutions, declaring that apartheid was an international crime. It imposedan arms embargo against South Africa, suspended South Africa’s qualification toattend the U.N. General Assembly, and established a Special Committee againstApartheid. Although the Security Council did not decide to make an armedintervention, strong international pressure ultimately forced the South Africanauthorities to abolish the apartheid system. This case shows that the United Nationscan take enforcement action against a member state it considers in violation of itsCharter then in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

2 王铁崖主编：《国际法》，法律出版社，1995年，第65-66页。

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government or establish ethnic separatist forces; (3) Foreign governmentsor the international community as a whole may oppose the legitimacy of anational government and violate its right of sovereign equality usually onthe grounds that it is an authoritarian rule (of the people) or nationaloppression (of ethnic minorities). These three opposite elements thatconstrain the sovereignty of a country may end up with a nationalgovernment losing jurisdiction over its people or territory. No-fly zones arenow becoming an effective and convenient way to achieve this.

Setting up a no-fly zone certainly impinges on the target country’ssovereignty. From what happened in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, andLibya, the purpose of a no-fly zone is to protect vulnerable parties in theconflict. Obviously the government will inevitably strive to resist theestablishment of a no-fly zone, even resorting to force. In order to maintainthe no-fly zone, there must be a powerful third party to enforce it. No-flyzones only prohibit aircraft and not ground forces. Thus any aircraft of anyparty should be prohibited from flying in the controlled airspace. However,in practice, the enforcers of the no-fly zone also prevent ground troopsfrom using the space and carry out air strikes against military- and evennon-military targets outside the no-fly zone.

Since the establishment of a no-fly zone involves the use of force, itmust secure the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. Before anyintervention, the Security Council should decide that the domestic situationin the target country comprises a threat to international or regional peaceand security. Such a situation may arise if there is a humanitariandisaster -- either a large-scale violation of human rights which havearoused wide-scale international condemnation, or factional fighting insidethe country that has led to a flood of refugees. When the Security Councildetermines that the situation has reached this stage, it first needs to adopt aresolution urging the government itself to resolve the problem. If thegovernment does not adopt measures or adopts inadequate measures, theSecurity Council can once again pass a resolution to pressure thatgovernment to take effective measures, but that pressure must not includethe use of force. If after this stage, non-violent means have been shown tobe ineffective, the Council then can pass a resolution to authorize U.N.

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member states to“take all necessary means”to resolve the problem. Oncethis resolution is passed, a no-fly zone can be set up and force can be used.As the U.N. Charter strictly limits the use of force, the Security Councilwill always clearly define what kinds of force can be used when itauthorizes the establishment of a no-fly zone. The only exception was theno-fly zone in Iraq which was not authorized by the U.N.. Although theno-fly zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina was mandated by the U.N., theSecurity Council proceeded very cautiously, passing 25 resolutions in 13months. On May 30, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 757 toestablish a safe area in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the U.N.began to implement comprehensive economic sanctions against Yugoslaviaand Serbia in Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 Resolution 770, which was passed onAugust 13, for the first time authorized the use of force, but also requiredthat such action must be“coordinated with the United Nations”, and islimited to“providing humanitarian assistance”.2 Resolution 781, whichwas passed on October 9, established a“no-fly zone”over the whole ofBosnia-Herzegovina.3 But it was not until 31 March 1993 that the SecurityCouncil passed Resolution 816 which authorized U.N. member states andrelated international organization to “take all necessary measures toimplement a flight ban in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina”.4

Resolution 836, which was passed on June 4, 1993, authorized U.N.Protection Forces to use force to protect the safe areas and allow NATO tosend in its air forces to support the protection forces.5 In 2011, when the

1 联合国安理会第 770（1992）号决议，联合国官方网站, Web. 3 July 2011, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/379/65/IMG/N9237965.pdf?OpenElement/>.

2 Ibid.3 联合国安理会第 781（1992）号决议，联合国官方网站, Web. 3 July 2011, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/491/63/IMG/N9249163.pdf?OpenElement/>.

4 联合国安理会第 816（1993）号决议，联合国官方网站, Web. 3 July 2011,<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/187/16/IMG/N9318716.pdf?OpenElement/>.

5 联合国安理会第 836（1993）号决议，联合国官方网站, Web. 8 July 2011,<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/330/20/IMG/N9333020.pdf?OpenElement/>.

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Security Council passed Resolution 1973 to establish a no-fly zone inLibya, it expressly provided for the use of force and stressed in particularthat the use of ground forces was not legitimate.

Although no-fly zones are mandated by the U.N., Western countrieshave often moved beyond this and used excessive force. Western powersuse the no-fly zone to promote regime change in the target country. Theirintervention should have U.N. authorization first and should only be aimedat restoring peace and preventing a humanitarian disaster. Beingconstrained by the U.N. Charter and Security Council members, the U.N. isnot likely to authorize force arbitrarily. Instead it always restricts the use offorce. This has caused two pairs of interdependent contradictions:Although the Security Council has the right to adopt resolutions, it relieson the big powers to enforce it; if Western powers strictly implement theno-fly order in accordance with the authorization, they will not be able toachieve their desired regime change. So Western powers end up actingbeyond the authorizations of the Security Council. From the previous threeexamples of no-fly zones, we can see that once Western powers havesucceeded in pressing the U.N. Security Council to authorize the no-flyzone, they proceed as they wish, not only prohibiting aircraft, but alsoattacking the opposing parties’ground forces, even when they did notviolate the no-fly order. When the Libyan war started, the Arab LeagueSecretary General Amr Moussa angrily pointed out the situation on theground was at odds with the U.N. goal of setting up a no-fly zone.“Wewanted to protect the civilian population instead of bombing morecivilians”.1

To achieve regime change through limited military action, Westerncountries make use of opposition forces in the target countries. In the caseof a no-fly zone model of intervention, Western countries only have limitedmilitary action they can or are willing to take. In this case they can hardlyexpect to achieve their desired regime change. They have no intention ofsending in their own troops to overthrow the regime, rather they will

1“国际舆论质疑打击利比亚军事行动,”Web. 9 July 2012, <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/14242600.html/>.

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support vulnerable parties in the conflict to do this job for them. Thisstrategy is part aiding the weak party and part weakening the strong partyto gradually push for a change in power balance between the oppositionforces and the government. And ultimately achieve regime change.

All three no-fly zones were set up when opposition forces were at thebrink of defeat. The Iraqi no-fly zone protected the Shiite Muslims andKurds and created a situation where three ethnic groups shared power withthe central government. After the establishment of the no-fly zone inBosnia-Herzegovina, U.N. forces that were mainly composed of NATOtroops repeatedly carried out air strikes against the Serb ground forces. InAugust 1994 they carpet bombed the area for half a month, completelydestroying the Serb army’s combat capabilities. Muslim and Croat forcesalso took the opportunity to occupy large areas. In the end, the Serbs had toaccept the U.S. proposed cease-fire plan that eventually led to aMuslim-led regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similarly, when Gaddafi’sarmy was about to complete the encirclement of Benghazi, Westerncountries came to the aid of the rebel forces by setting up a no-fly zone inLibya. After that, NATO and other countries savagely bombed governmenttroops despite the opposition of China, Russia and other nations. At thesame time, they were providing many kinds of aid to the opposition forces,eventually helping them come to power in Libya.


No-fly zones and the idea that human rights are above sovereignty hasgained more and more support from more and more countries. Many small-and medium-sized countries have also supported the establishment ofno-fly zones. For example, the Libyan no-fly zone was first proposed bythe Arab League. Some African and Middle-Eastern countries even actedas the vanguard in the fight against Libya. This situation has left thoseAfrican nations in an awkward position, they need to spell out why or whythey don’t support no-fly zones. Under certain circumstances, now, no-flyzones have become the international norm. The reason is simple. If it hadnot become a norm, then many countries may oppose these zones duringvoting in the U.N. Security Council.

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China is a responsible big power in the international system and afirm defender of the U.N. Charter and other universally recognized normsgoverning international relations. As the principle of national sovereigntyis the cornerstone of the U.N. Charter and international law, Chinaadvocates resolving disputes between states through dialogue and politicalmeans. A country’s internal disputes should be resolved by concernedparties only. It is opposed to foreign intervention in the internal affairs ofanother country. Fundamentally speaking, no-fly zones constituteintervention in the internal affairs of another country, typically a weakerone by force. It certainly does not comply with the spirit of the U.N.Charter. The Security Council usually only give its authorization afterseveral big countries have pressured it. Because of this, China does notsupport these kinds of no-fly zones, and therefore it has abstained fromvoting on this issue at the U.N. Security Council. However, increasinglymore countries are accepting this kind of intervention and it has given riseto much controversy. China is now facing a diplomatic dilemma over thisissue.

Firstly, China is in a dilemma over the issue of internationalintervention and the principle of non-interference. In fact, the controversyon the issue of the no-fly zones is over whether to maintain the principle ofnational sovereignty or accept the idea of “human rights abovesovereignty”. China’s position is clear and consistent on this issue. Chinahas always attached importance to and is committed to promoting humanrights. At the same time, China also holds that the right to survival anddevelopment should be the basis of human rights, and it opposes anyconfrontation on human rights issues or any interference in the internalaffairs of other countries on the grounds of human rights. However, thisprinciple, which has been clearly written in the United Nations Charter isnow being seriously challenged by the West’s“humanitarian intervention”concept. If China supported a motion to set up a no-fly zone, it would notonly be detrimental to its national interests, but it would also mean that itvirtually gives up its cherished norms on international relations. However,if we adhere to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference inother’s internal affairs, we will neither be able to prevent Western countries

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from setting up no-fly zones nor will we be able to avoid a head-oncollision with the values that have been so painstakingly promoted byWestern countries.

In fact, since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the Libyanwar, China has often been in the minority when defending the principle ofnon-interference in the internal affairs of another nation. On February 4,2012, China and Russia vetoed the draft resolution on Syria jointly draftedby the Arab League and Western countries, but the other 13 member statesof the Security Council voted in favor of it. On February 17, when the U.NGeneral Assembly voted on a draft resolution of the same content, up to137 countries voted in favor, only 12 countries voted against it and therewere 17 abstentions. As well as China and Russia, the other countries thatvoted against it included some so-called outsiders in the international ordersuch as Cuba, North Korea, and Iran, etc. On March 1, the U.N. HumanRights Council passed a resolution condemning the Syrian government, theresult of the vote was: 37 affirmative, 3 negative and 3 abstentions. OnlyChina, Russia and Cuba voted against it. On June 1, the U.N. HumanRights Council held a special session on“the deteriorating human rightssituation in Syria and the Rahul Town Massacre”and passed a resolutionclaiming the Syrian government and pro-government militias wereresponsible for the massacre in the town of Rahul. This time, still onlythree countries (China, Russia and Cuba) voted against it and there were 2abstentions.

Secondly, China is caught between the vulnerable groups and theWestern countries. From past examples we can see that no-fly zones areusually established in those countries that are outsider in the currentinternational order. These countries had different political systems,refusing to pursue foreign policies which matched the West so they havebeen subjected to western sanctions and hostilities. Today, due to thecentralization and institutionalization of the international order, Westerncountries have the advantages of both real strength and moral superiority.Thus they are able to promote their own values as universal principles andcall regimes not in line with their own thinking,“rogue state”,“failedstate”, the“ axis of evil ”or“outposts of tyranny”, etc. They also mobilize

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and pressure a large number of small- and medium-sized countries toisolate or boycott these countries. These countries, facing such hostility,and being isolated, face difficulties both at home and abroad. Theythemselves have become part of a“vulnerable group”in the internationalcommunity. These countries include Syria, Iran, Cuba, North Korea,Myanmar, and Sudan, etc. While the West has treated them as hostilestates, they have all traditionally maintained friendly and cooperativerelations with China. What is more important is that China has importantstrategic interests to defend in many of these countries. Whenever the Westargues for sanctions on one of these nations, China is in a dilemma. IfChina opposes sanctions, then it is often maliciously attacked by Westerncountries; but if China agrees with sanctions, its own interests in thesecountries may be placed at risk. Currently, China faces such a dilemmaover Syria. After China and Russia jointly vetoed the draft resolution onSyria put forward by the League of Arab States to the Security Council,China has suffered a wave of attacks from Western countries.

Thirdly, China is in an awkward position in the U.N. Security Counciland other major international organizations. Although the establishment ofno-fly zones is not in line with the spirit of the U.N. Charter, such motionscan always be submitted to the Security Council by Western countries.Therefore, China is often placed in a diplomatic dilemma during theconsultation and voting processes in the Security Council. As a permanentmember of the Security Council, China’s support is essential for theadoption of any resolution. No-fly zones as a legitimate form of armedintervention must be authorized by the Security Council. As long as Chinavetoes such a resolution, it cannot be passed by the Security Council. Evenso, China’s veto would not stop the West from setting up a no-fly zone. Itwould instead seek an“international mandate”outside the framework ofthe Security Council and even the U.N.. They now have the support ofmany small- and medium-sized countries, and very few countries willoppose them on this issue. Western countries have nothing to fear inpromoting no-fly zones. In fact, there were reports that the U.S. and Britainhad prepared a contingency plan in case they could not get U.N. supportfor a no-fly zone in Libya (if China or Russia vetoed it for example). The

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contingency plan was that NATO and the Arab League would jointly setupa no-fly zone in Libya. As NATO includes all major Western countries andthe Arab League is also a unified pan-Arab organization, together thatenjoy a broad representation. If the Arab League and NATO jointly set up ano-fly zone even without authorization of the U.N., the opposition of othercountries would amount to very little.

After the Libyan war, Western countries have been increasingly tryingto interfere in Syria. On February 4, 2012, Britain, Germany and theLeague of Arab States jointly drafted a draft resolution on Syria. China andRussia vetoed it in the Security Council. Prior to this, on October 4, 2011,China and Russia also vetoed another draft resolution relating to Syria.Western countries carried out malicious attacks against China and Russiaand attempted to bypass the U.N. Security Council to seek the support ofthe U.N. General Assembly. On February 17, the General Assembly passeda similar resolution that asked the Syrian government to stop all aggressiveacts, release all conflict detainees, withdraw all armed forces from citiesand towns, allow peaceful demonstrations, and allow observers from theArab League and international media to carry out unhindered activities inSyria. According to the provisions of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. GeneralAssembly’s resolutions are not legally binding, and thus they cannot beused as a legal basis for imposing sanctions against Syria or to carry outmilitary action. Nevertheless, because the resolution was supported by themajority of U.N. member states, if Western countries and the League ofArab States jointly set up a no-fly zone in Syria, no other country couldquestion the legitimacy of their action.

Lastly, China is struggling with whether or not to continue to supportthe U.N. Charter. There is no doubt that China’s positions on Libya andSyria have been in full compliance with the spirit of the U.N. Charter,whereas as Western countries’practice of forcing regime change throughno-fly zones is certainly contrary to the spirit of the U.N. Charter. Butbecause of their dominant position in the international community and theU.N., the West has won the support of the majority of nations, includingmost members of the League of Arab States and so they have been able toact contrary to the U.N. Charter. This raises an issue worth considering: a

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minority of states have tried to safeguard the spirit of the U.N. Charter,while many nations have supported motions violating the spirit of the U.N.Charter. This presents China with a fourth diplomatic dilemma. If wecontinuously veto similar draft resolutions, we may weaken rather thansafeguard the authority of the Security Council and the U.N. Charter. TheU.N. Charter came out of a compromise between the big powers in thelater stages of World War II. Over the past 60 years, there have beenendless calls for the U.N. to be reformed. Obstacles to reform mainly comefrom serious differences between members states of the Security Council.When a majority of member states support a resolution contrary to thespirit of the U.N. Charter, it indicates that the Charter needs urgentmodification. The fact that China and Russia have repeatedly rejectedmotions from Western countries will likely mean that the West will step upits efforts to push forward U.N. reform, including accelerating the pace ofSecurity Council reforms. If U.N. reform is allowed to be led by the West,we will find ourselves being left behind, along with the U.N. Charter.

Conclusions

Since its emergence in 1992, no-fly zones have been set up in Iraq,Bosnia-Herzegovina and Libya. In all cases, Western countries have notonly succeeded in interfering in the internal affairs of the target countries,but they have also made the no-fly zone into a new model of internationalintervention, one that forces regime change. No-fly zones have beenpossible because of current changes to the international order from“onesuperpower parallel with multiple great powers”into a spindle-shapedpattern with one large center and two smaller centers at the two ends. Inthis new global power configuration, the hegemonic group possess theadvantages of strength and moral superiority, and thus is able to forceregime change on some weaker countries. Fundamentally speaking, no-flyzones are a form of“legitimatized”bullying. Western powers have usedthem to legitimize aggression in intervening in the internal affairs of othernations. It uses them to force regime changes on those countries that arenot part of the Western-led international system. This clearly does not meetthe“spirit of the U.N. Charter”, but since this practice has won the support

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Zhao Guangcheng


of the majority of U.N. member states, it has taken on the appearance ofhaving a legal basis under international law. Laws based on human rights,the just war theory, and the institutionalization of U.N. human rightsprotection as well as its collective security mechanism, have all providedlegitimacy for the no-fly zone.

We can see from the above that no-fly zones have won the consensusof the international community. The no-fly zone as a model ofhumanitarian intervention is evolving into an international norm. We cannow expect that whenever civil strife occurs in a nation, that is consideredcomparatively weak, the international community will be pressured bysome of the big powers to win the authorization of the U.N. SecurityCouncil to approve humanitarian intervention in the form of no-fly zones.This will become one of the most convenient and rapid ways to implementhumanitarian action. This puts China in a diplomatic dilemma, and it needsto adjust its diplomacy on this issue.

(Translated by Hong Jianjun)

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