no matter where you go, there you are: secure localization techniques for mobile wireless networks
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No Matter Where You Go, There You Are: Secure Localization Techniques for Mobile Wireless Networks. Seminar on Applications of Mathematics UVa Institute of Mathematical Science 2 December 2004 http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/talks/sam/. David Evans University of Virginia Computer Science. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
No Matter Where You Go, There You Are: Secure Localization Techniques for Mobile Wireless NetworksSeminar on Applications of MathematicsUVa Institute of Mathematical Science2 December 2004http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/talks/sam/
David EvansUniversity of Virginia
Computer Science
2
Computing is Entering Real World
Desktop PCProtected BoxNarrow Interface1 Machine per
User-Admin
Sensor NetworkUnprotected NodesRich InterfaceThousands of Nodes
per Admin
3
Sensor NodesMICA2 Typical 2004
Desktop
Memory 644 KB(128 K program flash memory /4 K config EEPROM / 512 K data)
400 x (just RAM)130 000 x (hard drive)
Processor Speed
7 MHz 500 x
Electrical Power
~40mW2 AA batteries
2000 x~100W (CPU only)
Mass 18 grams (+ batteries)
167 x3kg
MICA2 Mote (UCB/Crossbow)
4
MICA2 Typical 2004 Desktop
Memory 0.01 x(4K 14-bit words)
644 KB(128 K program flash memory /4 K config EEPROM / 512 K data)
400 x (just RAM)130 000 x (hard drive)
Processor Speed
0.007 x(add in 20s)
7 MHz 500 x
Electrical Power
1500 x~70W
~40mW2 AA batteries
2000 x~100W (CPU only)
Mass 1667 x30kg
18 grams (+ batteries)
167 x3kg
MICA2 Apollo Apollo Guidance Guidance ComputerComputer
Photo: http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/
Typical 2004 Typical 2004 DesktopDesktop
5
MICA2 Typical 2004 Desktop
Memory 0.01 x(4K 14-bit words)
644 KB(128 K program flash memory /4 K config EEPROM / 512 K data)
400 x (just RAM)130 000 x (hard drive)
Processor Speed
0.007 x(add in 20s)
7 MHz 500 x
Electrical Power
1500 x~70W
~40mW2 AA batteries
2000 x~100W (CPU only)
Mass 1667 x30kg
18 grams (+ batteries)
167 x3kg
MICA2 Apollo Apollo Guidance Guidance ComputerComputer
Photo: http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/
Typical 2004 Typical 2004 DesktopDesktop
6
Sensor Network Applications
Reindeer Tracking (Sámi Network Connectivity Project)
Battlefield Event Tracking
Volcano Monitoringhttp://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~werner/projects/volcano/
Photo: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2491501.stm
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This Talk
• Location Matters– How do nodes know where they are?
• Security (Sometimes) Matters
L. Hu and D. Evans. Localization for Mobile Sensor Networks. MobiCom 2004.
L. Hu and D. Evans. Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks. NDSS 2004.
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Determining Location• Direct approaches
– Configured manually• Expensive• Not possible for ad hoc, mobile networks
– GPS• Expensive (cost, size, energy)• Only works outdoors, on Earth
• Indirect approaches– Small number of seed nodes
• Seeds are configured or have GPS
– Other nodes determine location based on messages received
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Hop-Count TechniquesDV-HOP [Niculescu & Nath, 2003]Amorphous [Nagpal et. al, 2003]
Works well with a few, well-located seeds and regular, static node distribution. Works poorly if nodes move or are unevenly distributed.
r
1
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2
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3
33
4
4
4
44
5
5
6
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Local TechniquesCentroid [Bulusu, Heidemann, Estrin, 2000]:Calculate center of all heard seed locations
APIT [He, et. al, Mobicom 2003]:Use triangular regionsDepend on a high density of
seeds (with long transmission ranges)
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Our Goal
• (Reasonably) Accurate Localization in Mobile Networks
• Low Density, Arbitrarily Placed Seeds
• Range-free: no special hardware • Low communication (limited
addition to normal neighbor discovery)
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Scenarios
NASA Mars TumbleweedImage by Jeff Antol
Nodes moving, seeds stationary
Nodes and seeds moving
Nodes stationary, seeds moving
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Our Approach: Monte Carlo Localization
• Adapts an approach from robotics localization
• Take advantage of mobility:– Moving makes things harder…but
provides more information– Properties of time and space limit
possible locations; cooperation from neighbors
Frank Dellaert, Dieter Fox, Wolfram Burgard and Sebastian Thrun. Monte Carlo Localization for Mobile Robots. ICRA 1999.
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MCL: Initialization
Initialization: Node has no knowledge of its location.
L0 = { set of N random locations in the deployment area }
Node’s actual position
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MCL Step: Predict
Node’s actual position
Predict: Node guesses new possible locations based on previous possible locations and maximum velocity, vmax
Filter
Filter: Remove samples that are inconsistent with observations
Seed node: knowsand transmits location
rp(lt | lt-1) =
c if d(lt, lt-1) < vmax
0 if d(lt, lt-1) ≥ vmax
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Observations
Indirect SeedIf node doesn’t hear a seed, but one of your neighbors hears it, node must be within distance (r, 2r] of that seed’s location.
Direct SeedIf node hears a seed,the node must (likely) bewith distance r ofthe seed’s location
S S
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Resampling
Use prediction distribution to create enough sample points that are consistent with the observations.
N = 20 is good,N = 50is plenty
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Recap: AlgorithmInitialization: Node has no knowledge of its location. L0 = { set of N random locations in the deployment area }
Iteration Step: Compute new possible location set Lt based on Lt-1, thepossible location set from the previous time step, and the new observations. Lt = { } while (size (Lt) < N) do R = { l | l is selected from the prediction distribution } Rfiltered = { l | l where l R and filtering condition is met } Lt = choose (Lt Rfiltered, N)
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Convergence
Node density nd = 10, seed density sd = 1
Localization error converges in first 10-20 steps
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Avera
ge E
stim
ate
Err
or
(r)
Time (steps)
vmax=.2 r, smax=0
vmax=r, smax=0
vmax=r, smax=r
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Speed Helps and Hurts
Increasing speed increases location uncertainty ̶Y but provides more observations.
0
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0.9
1
0.10.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Est
imat
e E
rror
(r)
vmax (r distances per time unit)
sd=1, smin=0, smax=vmax
sd=1, smax=smin=r
sd=2, smax=vmax
sd=2, smax=smin=r
Node density nd = 10
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00.20.40.60.81
1.21.41.61.82
2.22.42.62.83
0.1 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Est
imate
Err
or
(r)
Seed Density
MCL
Centroid
Amorphous
Seed Density
nd = 10, vmax = smax=.2r
Better accuracy than other localization algorithms over range of seed densities
Centroid: Bulusu, Heidemann and Estrin. IEEE Personal Communications Magazine. Oct 2000.
Amorphous: Nagpal, Shrobe and Bachrach. IPSN 2003.
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Questionable Assumption:Radio Transmissions
r
Model: all nodeswith distance r heartransmission, no nodesfurther away do
r
Reality: radio tranmissionsare irregular
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Radio Irregularity
nd = 10, sd = 1, vmax = smax=.2r
Insensitive to irregular radio pattern
0
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0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Est
imate
Err
or
(r)
Degree of Irregularity (r varies ±dr)
MCL
Centroid
Amorphous
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Questionable Assumption:Motion is Random
Model: modified random waypoint
Reality: environment creates motion
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Motion
nd=10, vmax=smax=r
Adversely affected by consistent group motion
00.51
1.52
2.53
3.54
4.55
5.56
0 0.5 1 2 4 60
0.51
1.52
2.53
3.54
4.55
5.56
0 0.5 1 2 4 6
Est
imate
Err
or
(r)
Maximum Group Motion Speed (r units per time step)
sd =.3
sd =1
sd =2
0
1
2
3
4
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200Est
imate
Err
or
(r)
Time
Random, vmax=smax=.2r
Area Scan
Random, vmax=0, smax=.2r
Scan
Stream and Currents Random Waypoint vs. Area Scan
Controlled motion of seeds improves accuracy
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What about
security?
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Localization Security Issues
• Denial-of-Service: prevent node from localizing– Global: jam GPS or radio transmissions– Local: disrupt a particular nodes localization
• Confidentiality: keep location secret• Verifiability: prove your location to others• Integrity
– Attacker makes node think it is somewhere different from actual location
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MCL Advantages• Filtering
– Bogus seeds filter out possible locations– As long as one legitimate observation is
received, worst attacker can do is denial-of-service
• Direct– Does not require long range seed-node
communication
• Historical– Current possible location set reflects history of
previous observations
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Authenticating Announcements(Simple, Insecure Version)
1. S region IDS Broadcast identity2. N S IDN Send identity3. S N EKNS
(LS ) Respond with location encrypted
with shared key
S N
1. IDS2. IDN
3. EKNS
(LS)
KNS is a pre-loaded pairwise shared key
Vulnerable to simple replay attacks
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Authenticating Announcements
1. S region IDS Broadcast identity2. N S RN | IDN Send nonce challenge3. S N EKNS
(RN | LS ) Respond with location
S N
1. IDS2. RN | IDN
Prevents simple replay attacks (but not wormhole attacks)
3. EKNS(RN |
LS)
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Broadcast Authentication
• Requires asymmetry:– Every node can verify message– Only legitimate seed can create it
• Traditional approach: asymmetry of information (public/private keys)– Requires long messages: too
expensive for sensor nodes
• Instead use time asymmetry
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Using Time Asymmetry
Time n Time n + 1
Based on Tesla: Perrig, et. al. 2002
KSn-1 | Sign (IDS | LS , KSn)
f is a one-way function (easy to compute f(x), hard to invert)Initially: nodes know KS0 = f max(x) for each seed seed knows x, calculates KSn = f max-n (x)Nodes verifies each key as it is received f (KS0) = KS1
Requires loose time synchronizationSaves node transmissions, multiple seed transmissions
KSn | Sign (IDS | LS , KSn + 1)
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Wormhole Attack
X
Y
Attacker uses transceivers at two locations in the network to replay (selectively) packets at different
location
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Protocol Idea
• Wormhole attack depends on a node that is not nearby convincing another node it is
• Periodically verify neighbors are really neighbors
• Only accept messages from verified neighbors
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Previous Solutions: Light Speed is Slow
• Distance Bounding– Light travels 1 ft per nanosecond (~4
cycles on modern PC!)
• Packet “Leashes”• Use distance bounding to perform
secure multilateration• Need special hardware to instantly
respond to received bits
Yih-Chun Hu, Perrig and Johnson. INFOCOM 2003
Brands and Chaum, EUROCRYPT 1993
Capkun and Hubaux, 2004
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Our Approach: Use Direction
Model based on [Choudhury and Vaidya, 2002]General benefits: power saving, less collisionsImprove localization accuracy
1
23
4
5 6
North
Aligned to magnetic North, so zone 1 alwaysfaces East
Omnidirectional TransmissionDirectional Transmission from Zone 4
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Directional Neighbor Discovery A
1. A Region HELLO | IDA
Sent by all antenna elements (sweeping)
2. B A IDB | EKBA (IDA | R | zone (B, A))Sent by zone (B, A) element, R is
nonce3. A B R
Checks zone is opposite, sent by zone (A, B)
B
zone (B, A) = 4is the antennazone in whichB hears A
1
23
4
5 6
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1
23
4
5 6
A Bzone (B, A[Y]) = 1
zone (A, B [X]) = 1 False Neighbor:
zone (A, B) should be opposite zone (B, A)
Detecting False Neighbors
X Y
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A B
zone (B, A[Y]) = 4
zone (A, B [X]) = 1
Undetected False Neighbor: zone (A, B) = opposite of zone (B, A)
Not Detecting False Neighbors
1
23
45 6
X Y
Directional neighbor discovery prevents 1/6 of false direct links…but doesn’t prevent disruption
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Observation: Cooperate!
• Wormhole can only trick nodes in particular locations
• Verify neighbors using other nodes• Based on the direction from which
you hear the verifier node, and it hears the announcer, can distinguish legitimate neighbor
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Verifier Region
v
zone (B, A) = 4zone (V, A) = 3
1
23
4
5 6
A verifier must satisfy these two properties:1. B and V hear A in different zones:
zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A) proves B and V don’t hear A through wormhole2. Be heard by B in a different zone:
zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V) proves B is not hearing V through wormhole
zone (B, A) = 4zone (B, V) = 5(one more constraint will be explained soon)
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Worawannotai Attackv
B
A
Region 1
Region 2
X
1
23
5 6
23
4
5 6
V hearsA and B directly
A and B hear V directly
But, A and B hear each other only through repeated X
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Preventing Attack
1. zone (B, A) zone (B, V) 2. zone (B, A) zone (V, A)3. zone (B, V) cannot be both adjacent to zone (B, A) and adjacent to zone (V, A)
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V
Verified Neighbor Discovery
1. A Region Announcement, done through sequential sweeping2. B A Include nonce and zone information in the
message3. A B Check zone information and send back the
nonce
A B 4. INQUIRY | IDB | IDA | zone (B, A)
5. IDV | EKBV (IDA | zone (V, B))
Same asbefore
4. B Region Request for verifier to validate A5. V B If V is a valid verifier, sends confirmation6. B A Accept A as its neighbor and notify A
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Cost Analysis• Communication Overhead
– Adds messages for inquiry, verification and acceptance
– Minimal for slow-changing networks
• Connectivity– How many legitimate links are lost
because they cannot be verified?
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Lose Some Legitimate Links
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Link
Dis
covery
Pro
babili
ty
Node Distance (r)
Verified Protocol
Strict Protocol(Preventing
Worawannotai Attack)
Network Density = 10
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Node Distance (r)
0
Verified Protocol
Strict Protocol(Preventing
Worawannotai Attack)
Network Density = 3
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…but small effect on connectivity and routing
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4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Avera
ge P
ath
Length
Omnidirectional Node Density
Strict Protocol
Trust All
Verified Protocol
Network density = 10
Verified protocol: 0.5% links are lost no nodes disconnectedStrict protocol: 40% links are lost 0.03% nodes
disconnected
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Dealing with Error
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Rati
o
Maximum Directional Error Degree
Lost Links, Strict Protocol
Disconnected Nodes, Strict Protocol
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60Maximum Directional Error Degree
Lost Links, Strict Protocol
Disconnected Nodes
Network Density = 10Network Density = 3
Even with no control over antenna alignment, few nodes are
disconnected
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Vulnerabilities
• Attacker with multiple wormhole endpoints– Can create packets coming from different
directions to appear neighborly
• Antenna, orientation inaccuracies– Real transmissions are not perfect
wedges
• Magnet Attacks– Protocol depends on compass alignment
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Conclusion• Computing is moving into the real
world:– Rich interfaces to environment– No perimeters
• Simple properties of physical world are useful:– Space and time can be used to achieve
accurate localization cheaply– Space consistency requirements can
prevent wormhole attacks
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Thanks!
Students: Lingxuan Hu, Chalermpong Worawannotai Nathaneal Paul, Ana Nora Sovarel, Jinlin Yang, Joel Winstead
Funding: NSF ITR, NSF CAREER, DARPA SRS
For slides and paper links: http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/talks/sam/