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No more pro-European?

The pattern of politicisation of Europe in Italy

Nicolò Conti

Unitelma Sapienza University, Rome

(nicolo.conti@unitelma.it)

Introduction

In the recent past, the traditional wide-spread consensus of the Italian citizens and elites on the

process of European integration has eroded. Surveys show that the Italians have become less pro-

European than the EU average. The economic crisis and the combination of cuts to public spending

and increased taxation that have been agreed by the national government with the EU made the

costs of integration more evident to the Italians. For the first time, parties can gain from this

unprecedented discontent, so Euroscepticism has permeated the political spectrum giving a main

raison d’etre to some newly created as well as to more established parties. At the same, the pro-

European stance of other parties has become even more pronounced, in a context of deep

confrontation on Europe. The paper presents the pattern of increased polarisation of the issue of

European integration in Italy, with a specific focus on the most recent developments. I will first

present the long-term patterns of contestation of the EU issue in the Italian party system. Then, I

will discuss the most recent developments. Finally, I will summarise the main results of the analysis

mapping the space of party competition on Europe. Throughout the analysis, I will attempt

answering the following questions: What are the attitudes of the Italian parties toward the EU? Is

there a specific pattern of contestation of the EU in the Italian system and how has it evolved under

the economic crisis?

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Politicising Europe in Italy: long-term trends

Although it is one of the founding members of the EU, for a long time (1940s-1970s) Italy

was characterised by a polarisation of the Italian party system that also affected the politicisation of

the issue of European integration. The country was divided between fervent Europhilia on the side

of government parties and hard Euroscepticism on the side of the Italian communist party (PCI),

the second largest Italian party and main opposition force (it was never in government). Within this

context, the pro-European government represented membership in the EEC not only as a matter of

economic interest: it was a choice for the Western camp, one that found its other main pillar in

membership in NATO. This conception of two nested supranational communities (one strategic and

one mainly economic) developed among Italian government parties (particularly the Christian

democrats, DC) in a context of bi-lateralism and Cold War, when the country was under the double

pressure resulting from physical proximity to the Warsaw Pact block and a large popular support for

the PCI (the largest communist party in Western democracies) domestically. Thus, the choice of

the Italian government for the Common Market was part of a broader strategy including Atlantism

and isolation of the PCI, and the EEC was considered as a means to stabilise capitalism, democracy

and interdependence within the framework of Western alliances. Conversely, for the same reasons,

the Italian left (including the socialists until the 1950s, then only the communists) rejected the

Common Market that they considered an engine of capitalism and a tool of Americanisation (Conti

and Verzichelli 2012).

However, starting from the 1970s, consequent to developments in Soviet imperialism (such

as repression of the Prague Spring) that favoured an ideological revision within the PCI, and also

due to wide-spread benevolent attitudes of the Italian leftist voters toward the EEC and the West

(Isernia and Ammendola 2005), the communists started a process of re-alignment on Europe that

took the party closer to the mainstream left. As a consequence, in Italy the political supply on the

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European issue gradually became simpler, moving from polarised positions on the EEC (a centrist

principled support vs. a leftist rejection) to a simplified version of wide-spread support. Radicalism

on the EEC was gradually banned from the political discourse of the main political actors and their

reciprocal distance was drastically reduced (Conti and Verzichelli 2012). Indeed, once the PCI

changed its position and supported Italian participation in the European Community - particularly

since it was renamed Party of Left Democrats (PDS, then renamed DS) in 1991 - no party of any

relevance could be found that questioned the Italian participation in the process (Sbragia 2001, 93).

Thus, consensus on European integration developed in Italy after a process of re-alignment

lasting over three decades (1950s-1980s) that made in the end this country one of the most pro-

European among the member states. Party consensus on the EEC/EU was shared by the Italian

public opinion that in the same period was among the most enthusiastic of Europe (Bellucci and

Serricchio 2012). Such popular support was determined by several factors: identification with the

Western camp and the Atlantic community (Isernia and Ammendola 2005), higher trust for the

European level of government than for the domestic government that was considered inefficient and

corrupt (Battistelli and Bellucci 2002), perceived economic benefits of membership since at the

time Italy was still a net-recipient of the EEC/EU budget (Dyson and Featherstone 1996).

Finally, this consensus involved most socio-economic and technocratic elites. The largest

part of employers found convenience in being allowed access to a broader market and in a

consequent higher demand of Italian goods abroad. Indeed, the Common Market was a driving

factor in the export-driven Italian economic boom of the 1960s and export has always been crucial

for the Italian economy whose internal demand maintained comparatively low standards (opposite

to savings that were instead high). Unions perceived free movement of labour as an opportunity for

the economic migrants of the South. They also hoped that membership in the EEC would push the

country to develop a welfare state as modern as other member states such as France and Germany

(until the 1970s the Italian welfare was still based on a corporatist non-universalistic model).

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Experts and technocrats (particularly those operating within crucial ministries in the economic field

and in foreign affairs) have always facilitated the compliance of Italy with the EU challenges,

particularly in the most crucial steps of the integration process. They have even contributed

substantially to anchor the country to the most ambitious European commitments when the

domestic political scene was more unstable (such as in the early 1990s, but also in 2012 under the

Monti government), thus promoting domestic stabilisation locking the government agenda within a

European frame (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). Beyond their inherent tendency to a supranational

ethos particularly observable in those technocratic elites occupied in the monetary fieldi

(Schimmelfennig 2000), Italian technocrats considered the European external constraint necessary

in order to stop the distributive laxity and abuse in public spending of the government and to rescue

the country from the drifts caused by clientelism and corruption (Cotta and Isernia 1996, Ferrera

and Gualmini 1999).

In the end, from different perspectives and following different but converging interests,

parties, citizens, socio-economic elites and technocrats all joined support for the process of

European integration in the crucial period between the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the end of

the so-called first republic in 1993 - that was consequent to corruption scandals involving the main

parties, and also consequent to the end of a communist/anti-communist confrontation after the fall

of communism in Eastern Europe - marked 1. the disappearance of the traditional parties (DC, PCI

as well as other smaller centrist parties governing in coalition with the Christian democrats), 2. a de-

polarisation of the party system, 3. the creation of a new party system based on bipolarism and

alternation in government. At the same time, negotiations for the European Monetary Union were

taking place. As we have seen, in the past few voices were heard outside the two positions of

principled support and principled rejection of the Common Market, since any pragmatic approach to

the issue of European integration was scantly represented in the Italian party system. Then,

consensus on principled support for European integration prevailed as from the 1980s. But since

1994, for the first time all positions – from hard Euroscepticism, through contingent attitudes, to

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fervent pro-Europeanism – have become represented in the Italian system, thus making Europe a

issue of unprecedented politicisation.

Indeed, since the 1990s a new tendency toward divergence over EU issues has developed. A

first discontinuity to note is that the major parties of the centre-right have shown clear signs of

Euroscepticism. Their political discourse has been described as moving back and forth from soft

Euroscepticism to vagueness to broad un-specific pro-Europeanism. On the other side of the

political spectrum, the literature documents that the Italian centre-left has brought Europe at the

centre of its programme more than the right has done and that the former has developed the

traditional commitment of the Italian governments of the first republic towards the idea of a united

Europe (Conti and Memoli 2010). It is worth noting that several authors maintain that across

Europe, as well, parties have swapped their positions on the EU starting from the 1990s and the left

has become more pro-European than the right (Gabel and Hix 2004, Ladrech 2000). So the Italian

case would not be an exception to the rule. Although other authors (Conti 2013) contend that left

and right play an influence on attitudes to the EU that is not linear across the member states, it is a

matter of fact that Italy is in line with the above pattern, as in this country the centre-left really has

become more pro-European than the centre-right.

Secondly, at the extremes of the political spectrum, hard Euroscepticism has become a

remarkable feature, though not a stable one. The small Communist party Rifondazione Comunistaii

has shown clear signs of opposition to European integration, voting in parliament against the

ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty establishing a Constitution

for Europe.iii

At the other extreme of the political spectrum, the Lega Nord (LN) has also criticised

the achievements of European integration and voted against the ratification of the Treaty

establishing a Constitution for Europe (but in favour of the Lisbon Treaty). These parties have

become electorally weak in recent times, particularly the former has become rather irrelevant and

since 2008 is not represented in the Italian Parliament. But the Lega Nord has been rather influential

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until 2011, as it was part of the governments led by Silvio Berlusconi in 2001-2006 and in 2008-

2011. Finally, a new radical internet party (the Five Star Movement, 5SM) made its appearance in

the political scene since 2012 with an unprecedented success in the general elections of 2013 when,

in a context of a fragmented party system, it became the first party in the country with over 25% of

votes. The 5SM failed to reach a plurality in the parliament only because the Italian electoral law

benefits substantially those parties that constitute pre-electoral alliances.iv The ideological character

of the 5SM is radical and protest-based, with a charismatic leader and a populist rhetoric, a hard

Eurosceptic stance.

It is likely that the electoral success of a fierce Eurosceptic party like the 5SM marks the end

of a honeymoon between Italians and Europe. Indeed, an increase in Euroscepticism has concerned

public opinion and socio-economic elites in recent times. As to the former, the fall in public support

for the EU has been impressive over the past twenty years, to the point that in the last decade the

attitudes of the Italians have become more pessimistic than the European average, mainly due to

perceived threats to their economic conditions and to their identity and values perceived as

challenged by immigration from the new member states (Bellucci and Serricchio 2012). The Italian

socio-economic elites have also become more cautious about the EU. Their support for the

integration process has become more contingent as long as they have started to perceive the impact

of the EU on their interests less favourable. Their approach to the issue of European integration has

become more pragmatic, for example they now express mixed views on the EU institutions and

policies and they support intergovernmentalism as a decision-making mode more than

supranationalism, because in their view national interests can be better defended through the former

methodv (De Giorgi and Verzichelli 2012). Finally, even the Italian media (once, very enthusiastic

about the integration process and even celebratory of the EU, see Bayley and Morley 2012) have

become more cautious. Under the economic crisis the main national newspapers have started to

portray the EU as ineffective and confused and to place grater faith in the action of individual

countries than on coordinated EU-programmes (Mazzoni and Barbieri forthcoming). Certainly, the

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increased resistance to the EU and to European integration by a substantial share of public opinion

and socio-economic elites, as well as by so many relevant parties, could give birth to an enduring

social block that might dramatically change the relationship between Italy and Europe in the near

future.

Party preferences on European integration: the different views on the EU process and the

impact of the economic crisis

Among the parties of the second republic, the major forces of the centre-right, Forza Italia and

the National Alliance (AN) that merged in the new People of freedom party (PDL) in 2008, show

clear hints of Euroscepticism. Their political discourse moved back and forth from soft

Euroscepticism to vagueness to broad un-specific pro-Europeanism, where the latter was mainly

comprised of a supportive rhetoric largely used to gain domestic and international legitimacy for

these parties whose leadership (the media tycoon Berlusconi and the post-fascist Fini, respectively)

was distrusted by many. Indeed, support for European integration from these two parties was rarely

issue-specific. Instead, Forza Italia and National Alliance alternated hints of support for the general

idea of integration with issue-specific Eurosceptical stances. In particular, the record of Forza Italia

– until 2007 the largest Italian party and the main partner of every centre-right government – was

striking. The party started in 1994 with a rather pro-European stance, but then became more reticent

proving the lowest level of programmatic commitment to EU issues in the Italian party system. This

could be due either to party internal divisions on the EU – between former Christian democrats and

conservatives – or to the difficulty to voice a clear Eurosceptical stance for a party many times in

government in key posts such as Prime minister and Minister of the economy. While AN’s rhetoric

referred more intensely to the EU but alternating pro-European and Eurosceptical stances.

Forza Italia and National Alliance agreed on the broad principle of defence of national

interests and preference for intergovernmentalism within the EU. Otherwise, on other issues the

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distance in the positions of these two parties was remarkable. For instance, AN was very interested

in the EU playing an autonomous international role (even from NATO), something that in the end

would enhance the international role of Italy (otherwise a middle-rank power with limited

international influence). AN also showed an interest in the capacity of the EU to protect the

European economies from the challenges of globalisation. The focus was on the protection of the

goods produced in the EU from low-cost production of third countries and the European level was

seen as the only environment where a defensive strategy of economic protectionism could be

achieved. On the opposite, the priority of Forza Italia was to create an ever-larger free-market area,

more than a federal and politically integrated entity (several times the party proposed the integration

of Russia and Israel in the EU in order to expand the Common market). On the contrary, the issue

of the international role of the EU was little developed by Forza Italia as its preference was instead

for a dominant role of NATO.

From its very creation in 2008, the stance of the PDL on the EU proved hesitant and

confused, probably as a result of the different orientations of its party factions (mainly Forza Italia

and AN). Due to the economic crisis and the related austerity measures, the EU has become a more

contended issue in recent times, as the political discourse in the general elections of 2013 shows.

Some of the patterns already at work in the party system were reinforced on this occasion. For

example, the PDL developed its critical stance into bitter antagonism with EU institutions, this time

represented as alien to the interests of the people and undemocratic (‘More Europe of the peoples,

less technocrats’)vi. Particularly, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn

was represented as an enemy of the Italian state and, together with German’s Chancellor Angela

Merkel, as conspirators against the Italian interests (a ‘Germano-centric Europe’)vii

. The electoral

campaign was indeed conducted by the PDL building on stories of conspiracy and socio-economic

panic. Berlusconi accused the EU technocracy to force his government (2008-11) to resign under

threat of economic sanctions against Italy. Then, he accused the EU to make pressures to replace his

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government with one led by former Commissioner Mario Monti, in his view a more acquiescent

Prime minister to German and EU interests than Berlusconi would be.

According to the PDL, the EU should instead take on the burden of the Italian financial

difficulties, the ECB should lend money to those states in trouble generously and issue Euro-bonds

and project-bonds to support investments and economic growth in Europe. These were the main

themes in the discourse of PDL during the election campaign of 2013. As one can see, they go in a

direction that is very critical on the current trajectory of the EU, indeed blame and representation of

EU interests as separate from those of the Italians prevail, under a ‘we’ as opposed to ‘them’ kind of

approach. Interestingly, when reading the manifesto of PDL of 2013 one can find that if the EU

changes its current trajectory to accommodate the Italian interests along the above lines, then the

PDL is ready to support its political integration through popular election of the President of the

Commission and empowerment of the European Parliament. However, despite its importance, this

shows just as a brief statement in the 2013 manifesto, especially compared to the spoken campaign

where attacks by the PDL to the EU were so recurrent. As we discuss in greater depth in the

following section, this is a sign of the fact that the PDL does not have Europe at the centre of its

programme. The pro-European statements, such as those in favour of political integration, are rather

underdeveloped in the party supply and even implausible considering that they are so inserted in a

broad sceptical rhetoric. The EU is instead a major theme in the representation of ‘enemy’ (of the

people, the Italians, the Italian state, etc.) that is forwarded by the party.

On the other side of the political spectrum, from the early 1990s the Italian centre-left has

placed Europe at the centre of its programme. The Italian People’s Party/Margherita – a party

merging then into the Democratic party (PD)viii

– developed the traditional commitment of the

Christian democrats towards the idea of a united Europe, while the social democrats (PDS/DS)ix

reflected the positive commitment of their party family marking a clear distance from a past of

cautiousness (at the time of the PCI). These two parties were strongly committed to the principle of

an ever-closer union. When in government, they appointed Romano Prodi (President of the

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European Commission in 1999-2004) as Prime Minister twice. Both parties supported the idea of

federal Europe and, therefore, of intense political integration. They became more and more in

favour of a supranational mode of decision-making and critical about intergovernmentalism. They

also favoured the reinforcement of the EP and the Commission to the detriment of the Council and

promoted mechanisms for enhancing popular legitimacy of the EU institutions, particularly through

direct election of the President of the Commission. They proposed the EU (either exclusive or

shared) involvement in the management of fields such as foreign and defence, justice, immigration

and social policy. They were also in favour of a strong role of the EU in the international arena and

of creation of an independent European military force, while in their view NATO should be

transformed into an instrument of the United Nations. They proposed a permanent seat for the EU

in the Security Council.

Since its creation in 2007, the PD proved coherent with a pro-European line, even in the

most recent period of growing popular disenchantment under the economic crisis.x During the

electoral campaign of 2013, there was indeed an attempt by the PD to bring into the agenda the

issues of economic growth and relaxation of the EU austerity measures, but still within a framework

of loyalty and commitment to the EU and to its guidance (‘We are Europe, because Europe is the

only way to rescue Italy’, ‘nothing without Europe’)xi. Even in this most troublesome period, the

PD proposed a representation of the EU external constraints playing in the interests of Italy and of

Europe as saviour of the country. It is an optimistic representation of the EU that has become very

solid with each centre-left government over the past two decades (Ferrera and Gualmini 1999).

The 2013 general elections saw the creation of a new party (Civic choice) led by the

incumbent Prime minister of the time, Mario Monti. This party and his leader made loyalty to the

EU a firm priority, needless to say that Monti’s government (2011-2012) built its international

reputation on its capacity to respond positively to the EU recommendations and to create a climate

of trust for the Italian government. The fact that during the election campaign Olli Rehn made

public endorsement of the Italian pro-European parties, particularly Monti’s Civic choice,

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contributed negatively to the bitterness of the campaign and increased domestic polarisation on the

EU. Indeed, after its first appearance in 2013, the party made loyalty to Europe a main raison

d’etre, salience of European integration in its discourse was very prominent, and support for the EU

was highest in the whole party system.

At the extremes of the political spectrum, throughout the past two decades Euroscepticism

has been a solid feature. The small Communist party Rifondazione Comunista declared its strong

opposition to European integration and the radical right-wing party, Lega Nord, also held positions

of fierce opposition to the EU. In 2013, the 5SM developed such stances further and took them to

unprecedented electoral success.

More specifically, Rifondazione Comunista defined the EU as an instrument of

Americanisation, and also as an international technocratic power associable with IMF and WTO.

Furthermore, the reconstructed communists opposed involvement of the EU in most policy fields

(particularly foreign and defence policy) with the only exception of social policy where, in their

view, the role of the EU in promoting best practices would be beneficial to overcome welfare

asymmetries across the member states and to fix the most advanced standards as role model for all

countries, including Italy. It is interesting to note that, contrary to the centre-left, in its discourse

Rifondazione mainly represented the negative outcomes of the integration process, particularly in

terms of domestic impact of the EU. They defined European politics as a cause of the diminishing

quality of life of the lower classes and of the disadvantaged social groups, and of shrinkage in

consumer demand. Rifondazione started a process of re-alignment as from the mid-2000s that took

the party to be part of a government led by Europhile Prime Minister Romano Prodi in 2006-2007.

However, after this period and before this re-alignment could be completely fulfilled, the party

became irrelevant for the party system, with minimal electoral support and little coalition potential,

hence it became rapidly confined to fringe politics. Its role has been taken by Sinistra e Libertà

(SeL), a tiny party (around 3% of votes) with a green-left platform.

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At the other extreme of the political spectrum, the regionalist Lega Nord strongly criticised

the achieved results of European integration as well. While defending intergovermentalism within

the EU, the European institutions were accused of aiming at a process of state-building to replace

nation-states with a new ‘Super-state’. According to the party, the EU law should become

secondary as compared to state law that should instead be given supremacy. The Lega Nord

expressed a pessimistic evaluation of the impact of the EU on the main goal promoted by the party

(self-determination of the Northern regions of Italy) as well as on its targeted social groups

(Northern farmers, milk producers and small firms). LN rejected the EU policy competence in most

fields and framed stories of moral panic focused on immigrant flows from the new member states

and candidate countries. The party represented the European meta-culture as independent from the

EU and rooted in Christianity, apart from other cultures such as those of potential new member

states (particularly, Turkey). Actually, the discourse on shared identity among the Europeans has

become a central point in the discourse of the party, one that is actually used to justify another

theme on which the Lega Nord exerts a sort of issue-ownership within the system: a rejection of

non-EU citizens (particularly Muslims) considered as aliens and enemies of European civilization.

In the end, despite its nature of regionalist party, when dealing with the EU the discourse of the

Lega Nord resonates that of other nationalist radical parties (Mudde 2007), focused as it is on

condemnation of the EU, preference for an alternative Europe at the same time deferential to state

sovereignty internally, and closed as a fortress externally. After the break-out of the economic

crisis, the party strengthened its anti-European rhetoric, with emphasis on conspiracy theory about

the EU acting against Italian interests, in a way similar to that of PDL. Actually, in the recent past,

the European discourse of these two parties has become closer.

Finally, the 5SM is a new party with no past record, the first time it actually contested

nation-wide elections was in 2013. It is interesting to note that on this occasion the party leader,

Beppe Grillo, made the EU central in its campaign. Interestingly, the Eurosceptical discourse of

Grillo was similar to the recent one of Berlusconi, just more radical. This phenomenon shows that

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competition around the Eurosceptical pole of the political spectrum has become more intense, with

parties giving more and more salience to representation of Europe as a pessimistic normative issue.

During the campaign, the 5SM insisted on stories of conspiracy about the EU and Germany against

Italy. Particularly, Grillo contended that the European Central Bank lent money to the Italian banks

to make them buy Italian government bonds that before were held by German and French banks.

This would serve as means to clean France and Germany from toxic assets, while shifting to Italy

the whole burden of financial uncertainty and indebtedness. Additionally, many times Grillo

proposed a referendum on exit of Italy from the Euro-currency. Today, the future of this party is

very uncertain, it is to be seen whether it will survive institutionalisation and political responsibility

that are normally associated with parties of such large share of votes. However, it is interesting to

note that a party with such a hard Eurosceptical stance, definitely harder than that of parties such as

PdL or the Lega Nord, could become so successful in Italy. It is a clear sign of a shift in the

attitudes of citizens towards Europe.

Ultimately, over a long period of time, Italy evolved from having a polarised party system

with polarised attitudes to the EU, to a segmented party system and Euroscepticism confined to its

flanks, to a segmented party system with a tendency to become polarised again. Indeed, conflict

over the European issue produced divergence when polarisation in the party system was higher and

convergence when polarisation was lower. In this respect, Conti and Verzichelli (2012) proposed

the argument of internalisation of the European issue along the established lines of party division in

Italy: a process largely characterised by a fit between the conflict over EEC/EU and the domestic

patterns of party competition. The European issue has neither disrupted the Italian party system, nor

has it created a new cleavage. Typically, Europe becomes more politicised as long as the system

becomes more polarised, as it has been in the recent past with the outbreak of the 5SM. Finally,

competition over the EU has been internalised by the established patterns of competition

characterising the party system, and it might also have contributed to their reinforcement.

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Mapping party positions on the EU

In this section the positions of the Italian parties on the EU are mapped systematically. For

this purpose, I make use of the Euromanifesto data that were collected in 2009, the year of the most

recent EP elections. As I have illustrated above, these attitudes have not changed in the recent past

but have just been reinforced after the outbreak of the economic crisis in the country. The

information that we could get from the Euromanifestos does not include the 5SM and Civic Choice,

two parties that contested the elections and issued a manifesto for the first time only in 2013

(general elections). So, for these two parties we do not dispose of any specialised platform on

Europe. Actually, Civic choice made reference to the EU in its manifesto of 2013 extensively, but

the 5SM dids not. Moreover, the strict party discipline forbids members and MPs of the 5SM to be

interviewed. Despite its nature of internet party with a large number of followers, the 5SM is

organized as a personalistic party, with no real central office and with a public office very much

subordinate to the party leader. It is a party that delegates its main political choices and

programmatic positions to Grillo in person, who every time decides without necessarily formalising

them in a programmatic platform. For example Grillo attacked the EU vehemently in its spoken

campaign of 2013, but not in the party manifesto of 2013. Thus, we dispose of limited systematic

information on the stance of this party.

Thus, for Civic Choice and the 5SM, I propose a positioning based on a broad assessment of

their stance voiced in the recent (spoken and written) campaign of 2013. For all other parties, I

make use of the Euromanifesto data that were collected by the INTUNE project that allow a greater

level of depth and accuracy.xii

In particular, these data allow, firstly, to assess whether parties

formulate specific positions and preferences on the most particular aspects of the EU process.

Secondly, whether their stance could be inserted into more pro-European, or more Eurosceptical

attitudes. Thirdly, to illustrate patterns of party contestation of the EU issues. Making use of a

coding scheme (see Appendix), experts coded the Italian Euromanifestos extracting from the text

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the content analytic variables that can well describe their positions on a set of different EU issues,

across the three dimensions of identity, representation and policy scope. These dimensions cover

both symbolic (identity) and functional (representation, policy scope) aspects of integration and are

therefore useful to give a comprehensive and systematic representation of party attitudes toward the

different aspects of the integration process (on this, see also Best et al. 2012).

To map the political space of contestation of the EU issue, I make use of a Principal

component analysis (PCA) based on content analytic measurements of the Euromanifestos. The

PCA allowed to reduce the wide range of indicators considered here (and reported in the appendix)

into a more limited number of factors. As a first step, I built four indexes, respectively, for

representationxiii

, policy scopexiv

, nationalxv

and sub-nationalxvi

identity. I used one indicator of

European identityxvii

. Then, through the SPAD N software, I calculated the relationship among the

two indexes of representation and policy scope and the three layers of identity. The result was the

reduction of so many variables into a bi-dimensional space with two factors: the first one is

represented through the horizontal axis and explains 59.4% of the total variance, while the second is

represented by the vertical axis and explains 26.8% (fig. 1).xviii

In terms of results, we can see that as to identity, only the European and the sub-national

layers were salient in 2009, together with representation they characterize the horizontal axis.

Interestingly, national identity, although present in our coding system, was absent from the

programmatic platforms of 2009. Although identity has become increasingly important in the public

discourse on Europe in the member states (Hooghe and Marks’ 2009), especially in terms of a

defense of national identity (Conti 2013), this was not the case in Italy. Identity nationalism was

absent in the programmatic supply of 2009 and appeals to nationalism were especially of a

economic nature. The vertical axis is instead characterized by policy.

[Fig. 1]

When I charted parties in this bi-dimensional space, I found that the two major political

forces of the time, the newly created centre-right PDL and the centre-left PD took opposite

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positions. Actually, the PDL is located in the bottom-right area of the graph, the area of the most

uncertain positions and lack of salience of Europe. As a matter of fact, the Euromanifesto of the

PDL only partly referred to the EU and it was not characterized by any of the analyzed themes (of

either representation, policy, identity).xix

Although a member of the European People’s Party (EEP),

the PDL originated outside the Christian democrat party family and, as we have seen, some of its

founding figures were rather Eurosceptic.xx

In 2009 the PDL did not produce a real manifesto, but

only a short list of priorities that only partially referred to the EU, such as the re-building of the

Abruzzi region after a disastrous earthquake with use of EU funds, the involvement of the EU in the

fight against illegal immigration, a broad sharing of the values and ideas of the EEP. Otherwise, this

list of priorities dealt with other subjects unrelated to the EUxxi

On the contrary, in 2009 the PD issued a proper Euromanifesto that was characterized by the

highest standards of Europhilia of the whole Italian party system. Their programmatic platform was

characterized in particular by open support for delegation of powers from the state to the EU in

many policy areas, defence of the Lisbon Treaty, support for the reinforcement and direct

legitimacy of the EU institutions even through direct election of the President of the Commission.

As to the Lega Nord, in 2009 the party emphasized very negatively the democratic deficit of the

EU, any delegation of power from to the EU, any project of constitution for Europe and

enlargement to new member states, particularly to Turkey. Beyond these themes, as it was easy to

expect from a regionalist party, the Lega Nord supported preservation and self-determination of

local identities. However, its identity discourse was at the same time local and European, the

reference to shared identity roots among the Europeans based on Christianity is an underlying

principle for rejection of non-EU citizens considered as alien and enemies of the European

civilization. As for representation, the party took a broad critical stance: a preference for

intergovermentalism, for the Council as compared to the supranational institutions, and for defense

of national interests in the EU. Moreover, the party made a negative evaluation of the effects

deriving to Italy from the EU membership. On the contrary, the party did not make explicit

17

reference to the policies that were selected for the analysis, a sign of the under-developed nature of

the programmatic platform of this party with reference to the EU. Overall, the party position was

manifest with reference to the horizontal axis of the bi-dimensional space, where an interaction

between the party (positive) stance on identity and (negative) posture on representation is at play,

but the party is close to the zero point in relation to the vertical axis.

Other smaller parties had a limited programmatic supply in 2009. For example, the

Euromanifesto of Italia dei Valori (IdV), a single-issue party led by the ex-judge Antonio di Pietro

and specialized in the fight against public corruption, was a list of twelve priorities, most of which

in support of the EU-isation of Justice and Defense. Finally, the communist and the green-

alternative-libertarian left (Rifondazione comunista in a joint list with the Comunisti italiani) and

Sinistra e Libertà favored a shared national-EU competence in all policy sectors that have been

analyzed, but they did not make any reference to European or sub-national identity themes (they

declare to be more interested in cosmopolitanism), nor to representation themes (apart from broad

criticisms to the democratic deficit and the under-representation of the most disadvantaged citizens

within the EU system). As their positions in the bi-dimensional space show, in spite of their broad

criticism against the current trajectory of the EU, radical left parties do not show a principled

opposition to the EU, on the contrary they trust future developments of EU policy.

Finally, we should add to the picture other two (extreme) cases: Civic Choice that has

positions of highest support for the EU in all analyzed dimensions, and the Five Star Movement that

on the contrary displays lowest levels of support.

In the end, the results of the analysis of 2009 show that the centre-left (PD + Civic Choice)

represents the most pro-European camp of the Italian party system (yellow area in figure 1).

Considering the electoral results in the general elections of 2013, these parties represent just over

one third of the Italian electorate. The centre-right (PDL + Lega Nord) is instead more ambivalent

about the EU and definitely less enthusiastic than the centre-left. Reluctance mainly takes the form

of silence, hence of lack of programmatic supply in a context of broad pessimism on the EU, as

18

compared to the pro-Europeanism of the centre-left that is also more assertive. The centre-right now

represents around one third of the Italian electorate. Finally, the radical left has become electorally

very large (5SM + Sel + Rifondazione Comunista, around 30 per cent of votes)xxii

but internally

very divided. If Sel and Rifondazione display levels of conditional support for the EU that are quite

remarkable (but their electoral support is very limited), the 5SM has emerged as the main actor of

this political area and also as the most Euroscpetic party of the Italian party system. Ultimately, the

Italian case has over-stepped the exceptional consensus on the EU that emerged in this country by

the end of the 1980s and has shaped a pattern of competition on the EU that opposes a pro-

European centre-left to a more suspicious centre-right and to a large Eurosceptical radical left.

Final remarks

Italy was a country of extraordinary Europhilia until the mid-1990s, the symbiosis between

integration, modernisation and economic stability was very effective in the eyes of domestic

politicians and decision-makers, and it also enjoyed a wide-spread permissive consensus on the side

of citizens, socio-economic elites and the media. However, this pattern has completely changed

after the Maastricht treaty and the new parties born after the end of the first republic channelled

within the system a growing popular unhappiness with the EU. After the economic crisis, a new

period has started where Euroscepticism and protest voting have become even more significant,

some mainstream parties (PDL) made their anti-EU rhetoric more intense and a new Eurosceptical

party (5SM) has become very popular. In the end, party attitudes to the EU have become largely

Eurosceptical in Italy in the recent past. The most pro-European forces are crucial for government

formation but, at the same, rather limited in terms of electoral support. After the Europhile Monti

government, Italy has now a more divided government based on a grand coalition (PD, PDL and

Civic Choice). Changing the rooted loyal (even acquiescent) conduct of the government to the EU

might prove difficult for the Eurosceptical forces of the Italian party system, especially at a time of

19

economic weakness and heavy dependence of the country on international credibility for the

survival of its finances. At the moment, the Italian cabinet looks very much embedded in a role of a

government that rules but does not represent. Particularly, the government does not represent those

demands of change of the trajectory of the EU that have become so prominent in the party system,

but do not find access in the government policy.

20

Fig. 1 – A map of the EU political space in Italy

Note:

Party positions are mapped based on the 2009 Euromanifestos, with the exception of Civic Choice and 5SM whose positions have been estimated by the author based on their

broad stance.

Party positions can be read from the external to the internal circle from the most pro-European to the most Eurosceptical ones.

Outside the circles, in the bottom-right area, no reference to any of the analysed dimensions.

21

APPENDIX

Excerpts from the codebook for the analysis of textsxxiii

INTUNE project

The coding unit

The coding unit is the entire document.

To conduct the coding, you should proceed as follows. Read a whole unit, and assign codes applying the following scheme.

For example, if a text contains sentences such as the following…

Give national parliaments a say for the first time over proposed European legislation; enhance the role of the European Council, the body which

represents the EU's members states; ensure that individual sovereign member states maintain control over core issues like tax, defence, foreign policy

and future treaty change

…then, in the Coding sheet, you should assign value 2 (labelled “intergovernmental”) to this unit under DOMAIN II → EUDEC.

Additionally, you should also copy and paste the above text in the Excerpt sheet, because saving relevant quotations will allow a qualitative analysis

of texts. You should not inflate the Excerpt sheet with too many quotations, for each document you are allowed a maximum of three quotations per

domain. When in doubt about how to save excerpts, always think that the reader will need such excerpts to find evidence of the codes you have

assigned to texts. Therefore, saved excerpts should always be parsimonious in size but meaningful in content.

General rules:

Rule 1. We are only interested in the manifest content of texts and not in any hidden content. You should not make any guessing, when references to a

particular issue are missing, only use the no reference/not applicable codes. Any coding you do relying on previous knowledge and not on the

manifest content of texts will result in misleading information.

Rule 2. Before using the no reference/not applicable codes you should make sure that reference to the issue you are analysing is really missing. Check

the whole text one more time before assigning these codes that express lack of salience. This information is crucial, please be cautious when assigning

such codes.

The coding scheme (only the variables analysed in the volume are shown)

MEMBERSHIP European impact on country matters

Favourable opportunities

Europe has mainly brought benefits and improvements to the country. Agreement and consensus are expressed for European

integration processes.

Negative constraints

Europe has mainly limited and constrained the country without bringing positive results. Discontent is expressed for

European integration processes.

Mixed

No reference

NATACT National action in Europe

Leadership

A desire to influence, guide and direct European processes and major decisions dominates. Willingness to be at the forefront

of bargaining and decision-making and not to stand on the sidelines.

Cooperation

Predominantly pledges in favour of working together to achieve a common aim, even taking an active part in Europe

decision-making.

Defence/Rejection

Preference for opting-out/withdrawing the EU or some of its building-block policies (eg. Monetary Union, Common

Market). Strong protection of national interest(s) seen as threatened by the EU.

Mixed (any two or more categories)

No reference

22

EUDEC Supranational

Preference for decisions made by majority voting

Positive mentions of this method of decision-making

Positive mentions of the empowerment of the supranational level

Intergovernmental

Decision-making should be kept central to the member-states and decisions in the EU made by unanimity. Negative mentions

of the empowerment of the supranational level.

Mixed supranational and intergovernmental

National preference

European institutions are severely criticised, powers should be shifted back to member states. European institutions should

have solely advisory or implementation functions.

No reference

SGFORE Foreign Policy

SGDEF Defence Policy

SGJHA Justice and Crime Policy

SGIMMI Immigration Policy

SGSOC Social Policy (includes employment)

SGENV Environmental Policy

The favourite level of competence is registered for each policy area. Combinations of different levels are registered only

when mentioned explicitly.

Preference for:

Supranational only

National only

Sub-national only

Supranational+ National

Supranational + Sub-national

Supranational+ National + Sub-national

National + Sub-national

No reference

EUCULT European cultural belonging

Reference

Reference to ascribed or acquired elements that define belonging to Europe, such as a common culture, values, customs,

history or traditions

Reference to elements differentiating the in-group (the Europeans) from the out-group (the others).

No reference

IDNAT National Identity

Reference

Reference to national identity or to commonalities/similarities among the country citizens.

No reference

NACULT National cultural belonging

Reference

Reference to ascribed or acquired elements defining membership or belonging to the nation, such as reference to common

culture, values, customs, history or traditions. Reference to elements differentiating the in-group (nationals) from the out-

group (foreigners).

No reference

IDSUB Sub-national Identity

Reference

Mentions are made of sub-national identity or more generally of commonalities/similarities among local community fellows.

23

No reference

SUBCULT Sub-national cultural belonging

Reference

Reference to ascribed or acquired elements defining membership or belonging to the sub-national identity(ies), such as

reference to common culture, values, customs, history or traditions. Reference to elements differentiating the in-group

(community fellows) from the out-group (outsiders).

No reference

24

References

Bailey, P. and J. Morley (2012), ‘Quanta e quale Europa nei media’, in P. Bellucci and N. Conti

(eds.), Gli Italiani e l’Europa.

Battistelli, F. and P. Bellucci (2002), ‘L’identità degli italiani tra euroscetticismo e

europportunismo’,

in Il Mulino, 1, 52: 77-85.

Bellucci, P. and N. Conti (eds.) (2012), Gli Italiani e l’Europa, Rome, Carocci.

Bellucci, P. and F. Serricchio (2012), ‘Cosa pensano i cittadini dell’Europa?’, in P. Bellucci and N.

Conti (eds.), Gli Italiani e l’Europa.

Conti, N. (forthcoming in 2013), ‘Introduction’, in N. Conti (ed.), Party Attitudes Toward the EU in

the Member states, London, Routledge.

Conti, N. and E. De Giorgi (2011), ‘L’Euroscetticismo a parole: Lega Nord e Rifondazione

comunista, tra retorica e comportamento istituzionale’, in Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 41, 2:

265-289.

Conti, N. And V. Memoli (2010), ‘Italian Parties and Europe: Problems of Identity, Representation

and Scope of Governance in the Euromanifestos (1989-2004)’, in Perspectives on European

Politics and Society, 11: 166-181.

Conti, N. and L. Verzichelli (2012), ‘Italy’, in E. Kuhlaci (ed.) Europeanisation and Party

Politics, Essex, ECPR Press.

Cotta, M. and P. Isernia (1996) Il Gigante dai Piedi d’Argilla, Bologna: Il Mulino.

De Giorgi, E. and L. Verzichelli (2012), Classe politica e integrazione europea: segnali di crisi?, in

P. Bellucci and N. Conti (eds.), Gli Italiani e l’Europa.

Dyson, K. and K. Featherstone (1996), ‘Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno’: Empowering the

Technocrats, Transforming the State’, South European Society and Politics, 1, 2: 272-299.

Ferrera, M. and E. Gualmini (1999) Salvati dall’Europa, Bologna: Il Mulino.

Isernia, P. and T. Ammendola (2005), L’Europa vista dagli italiani, i primi vent’anni, in M. Cotta,

P. Isernia, L. Verzichelli (eds.), L’Europa in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Gabel, M. J. and S. Hix (2004) ‘Defining the EU Political Space: an Empirical Study of the

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Integration and Political Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooghe, L., G. Marks and C. Wilson (2004) ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on

European Integration?’, in G. Marks e M. Steenbergen (eds.), European Integration and Political

Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hix, S., A. Noury and G. Roland. (2007) Democratic politics in the European Parliament, New

York: Cambridge University Press.

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Ladrech, R. (2000), Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union, London: Lynne

Rienner Publisher.

Mudde, C. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University

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Mazzoni, M. and G. Barbieri (forthcoming), ‘Grasshoppers against Ants or Malfunctions of

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Szczerbiak, A. and P. Taggart (eds.) (2008) Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of

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Schimmelfennig, F. (2000), ‘International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an

Institutional Environment’, in European Journal of International Relations, 6: 109-39.

i The Bank of Italy in particular gave many of its officers for key posts in the Italian government, such as the Prime

Minister (1993-1994) and then President of the Republic (1999-2006) Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, or the Ministers of the

Economy Tommaso Padoa Schioppa (2006-2008) and Fabrizio Saccomanni (from 2013). ii This party was created by a faction of the PCI that did not agree with the ideological re-alignment of PDS toward

moderation. It was represented in the Italian Parliament from 1992 until 2008 and had its electoral peak in 1996 with

8.5% of votes. It was in government in a broad centre-left coalition in 2006-2007 and gave external support to

government in 1996-1998. iii As from 2008, the party is not represented in the Italian parliament anymore, therefore it has not participated in the

ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty. iv The Five Star Movement gained less than 40% of those seats of the Democratic party that came second in the

elections but gained a generous bonus of seats thanks to its pre-electoral alliance with other small parties. v Their trust in the other member states and in the EU institutions has consequently decreased as they find these do not

take Italian interests into due consideration, while they believe the interests of other member states tend to prevail. vi From the PDL official manifesto of 2013. vii PDL official manifesto of 2013. viii The Democratic party was created in 2007 when the Left democrats merged with Margherita. Today, it is the main

party of the centre-left. ix This party represented the largest heir of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) that dissolved in the early 1990s. It has

moved from a post-communist legacy to a more moderate social democrat platform. x In the PD official manifesto of 2013 positive reference was made of the vision of the Italian founding fathers of

European integration, such as Alcide De Gasperi, Luigi Einaudi and Altiero Spinelli. xi PDL manifesto of 2013. xii The INTUNE project (Integrated and United: A quest for Citizenship in an an ever closer Europe) was financed by

the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Union, Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based

Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421). xiii The Index aggregates the variables on membership, national action in Europe and EU decision-making

(MEMBERSHIP, NATACT, EUDEC) that are reported in the Annex to the introduction of this special issue. xiv The Index aggregates the variables on foreign policy, defence, social policy, justice, immigration and environmental

policy (SCFORE, SGDEF, SGSOC, SGJHA, SGIMM, SGENV). xv The Index aggregates the variables national identity and culture (IDNAT, NACULT). xvi The Index aggregates the variables sub-national identity and culture (IDSUB, SUBCULT) xvii The variable is European cultural belonging (EUCULT). xviii

The Eigenvalues of the first and second factors are, respectively, 2.377 and 1.073 xix Because of this lack of salience , the position of PDL is opposite to the top-left area that is the one characterised by

discreet positions on all analysed dimensions.

26

xx Indeed, the relationships between the PDL and the EU have sometimes between tense. To make an example, when he

was Prime Minister in 2008-2011, Berlusconi threatened to boycott the works of the EU by making use of his veto

power any time possible, if the Commission continued to criticize the policies of the Italian government, particularly in the fields of immigration and freedom of information. xxi

Among them, there are pledges in favour of strengthening the cooperation between Italy, Russia and Libya and to

over-pass - thanks to the Italian mediation - the resistance of Turkey in the appointment of the Secretary General of

NATO. xxii Inclusion of the 5SM in the radical left can be controversial when one considers its populist character and its

positions on immigration. However, most of its pledges are typical of the radical left and concern preservation of the environment, re-distribution of income, anti-growth economy, social harmony through welfare state, fight against

political corruption, condemnation of large enterprise, market regulation and defence of consumers. xxiii Before coding the Euromanifestos, the coding system was tested on a standard text in English by all country experts.

For the variables that are reported in the Appendix, the average inter-coder convergence was 71.3%, a rate considered

adequate by Krippendorff (2004: 241) for reliable content analysis. Moreover, after the coding exercise, the variables

with lower convergence rates were further simplified and made dichotomous in order to reduce the probability of

coding errors and to approximate the rate of 80% that was considered by Krippendorff as optimal.