Noam Chomsky and the Law

Robert Barsky

Many of those people vaguely familiar with Noam Chomsky's political stance, notably his

anarchy, would find it difficult to imagine what relationship might exist between Noam

Chomsky and The Law.[1] The reasons for this reflect misconceptions about anarchy,

which lead people to associate it quite specifically with lawlessness; chaos, violence,

destruction, and challenges to authority (including the police and other representatives

of state order). Other people may have heard Chomsky's political lectures, which often

contain references, generally positive, to international law, rule of law, domestic law, and

specific legal remedies that rely upon documents such as the Bill of Rights, the US

Constitution, the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms, as well as a range of United

Nations resolutions and international laws. Despite the problems inherent in the status

quo, it does have these mechanisms which, if followed would cut down on some of the

misery of the world. "Choice of policy is determined by the goals that are sought. [For

example,] if the goal had been to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, settle regional

issues, and move towards a more decent world, then Washington would have followed

the peaceful means prescribed by international law: sanctions and diplomacy. If the goal

is to firm up the mercenary-enforcer role and establish the rule of force, then the

Administration policy of narrowing the options to capitulation or war has a certain chilling

logic.[2] Finally, there are the personal anecdotes about Chomsky, including those that

emanate from widely-reproduced articles such as "Noam is an Island", by Jay Parini

(Mother Jones October 1988), in which Parini expresses his surprise at the care that

Chomsky takes in crossing the street, and his respect for traffic laws generally. I would

suggest that Chomsky is wholly consistent in his views of law, and that a critical source

for understanding his approach is, yet again, found in the writings of Rudolf Rocker,

notably in the 1933 book Nationalism and Culture, if only because it indicates how a link

between Cartesian thinking of the type that Chomsky has long upheld and the anarchist

society to which he aspires could be made.[3] I will therefore begin with references to

Rocker and the law as a means of unearthing them basic values that underwrite

Chomsky's anarchist approach to law, discuss current debates relating thereto, notably

discussions concerning the rule of law, and then turn to some specific examples in

Chomsky's writings to illuminate the uses he makes of this work.

Generally speaking, the easiest way to understand Chomsky's approach is to understand

first his sense of the functioning of the elitist status quo, which is reinforced by

education, and then through reference to a distinction that is everywhere present in his

writings, a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate laws, on the one hand, and

legitimate and illegitimate applications of those laws on the other. As to the former, we

have his discussion about law school, with Michael Albert, the point of which reflects his

sense of education overall:

NC: Let me tell you a story I once heard from a black civil rights activist who came up to

Harvard Law School and was there for a while. This must have been twenty years ago.

He once gave a talk and said that kids were coming in to Harvard Law School with long

hair and backpacks and social ideals and they were all going to go into public service,

law and change the world. That's the first year. He said around April the recruiters come

for the summer jobs, the Wall Street firms. Get a cushy summer job and make a ton of

money. So the students figure, What the heck? I can put on a tie and jacket and shave

for one day, because I need that money and why shouldn't I have it? So they put on a tie

and a jacket for that one day and they get the job for the summer. Then they go off for

the summer and when they come back in the fall, it's ties and jackets and obedience and

a shift of ideology...Sometimes it takes two years; that's overdrawing the point. But

those factors are very influential. I've fought it all my life. It's extremely easy to be

sucked into the dominant culture. It's very appealing. And the people don't look like bad

people. You don't want to sit there and insult them. You try to be friends, and you are.

You begin to conform, to adapt, to smooth off the harsher edges. Education at a place

like Harvard is in fact largely geared to that, to a remarkable extent.[4]

As to distinction between legitimate an illegitimate laws, we have once again recourse to

Rudolf Rocker, who is a central reference for this distinction, and much else, in

Chomsky's own writings. In the course of a discussion the subject of free speech, for

example, Chomsky reminds us that:

[F]reedom of speech is by no means a deeply entrenched tradition even in the United

States, which by comparative standards is quite advanced in this regard. The same is

true of other rights. Half a century ago, the anarchist writer Rudolf Rocker observed that

"Political rights do not originate in parliaments; they are rather forced upon them from

without. And even their enactment into law has for a long time been no guarantee of

their security. They do not exist because they have been legally set down on a piece of

paper, but only when they have become the ingrown habit of a people, and when any

attempt to impair them will meet with the violent resistance of the populace." History

provides ample warrant for this conclusion. As is well known, even the right to vote was

achieved in the United States only through constant struggle. Women were

disenfranchised for 130 years, and those whom the American Constitution designated as

only three-fifths human were largely denied this right until the popular movements of the

past generation changed the cultural and political climate. While the franchise has slowly

been extended through popular struggle, voting continues to decline and to become a

concomitant of privilege, largely as a reflection of the general depoliticization of the

society and the disintegration of an independent culture challenging business

dominance, along with popular groupings to sustain it. What formal participation remains

is often hardly more than a gesture of ratification with only limited content, particularly

at the higher levels of political power. The same is true of freedom of speech. Though

these rights appear to be granted in the First Amendment, as interpreted in practice the

grant was limited. At its libertarian extreme, the legal doctrine remained that of

Blackstone, reiterated in 1931 by Chief Justice Hughes in a decision regarded as a

landmark victory for freedom of expression: "Every freeman has an undoubted right to

lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the

freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he

must take the consequence of his own temerity." Prior restraint is barred, but not

punishment for unacceptable thoughts.[5]

So part of the job of an anarchist, surprisingly enough perhaps, is to support

legitimate laws, those which incline in the direction of the oppressed against

their oppressors. Much of Chomsky's discussion in this regard makes reference to the

US's abuses of international law, however he also makes frequent reference to US allies,

and their ability to break similar laws and conventions if it is deemed to be in the US

interest.[6] Anarchism as described by Rocker relies very strongly upon another

distinction, also present in Chomsky's work but less overtly, between natural and

positive law, the former being those which are in line with the fundamental needs of a

given society, as demonstrated over a prolonged period of time, and the latter more

clearly linked to class and power interests in society. The rhetoric suggests that we are

strong upholders of natural law, and the rule of law; but the actions of the US indicate

the opposite, something that Chomsky constantly emphasizes in order to draw attention

to the hypocrisy of the US system. For example, Chomsky recalls in a discussion of a

ruling of the World Court that had gone against the US on the subject of Nicaragua that

"the [US] media had dismissed the World Court as a "hostile forum" whose decisions are

irrelevant, while liberal advocates of world order explained that the U.S. must disregard

the Court decision. With this reaction, U.S. elites clearly articulate their self-image: the

United States is a lawless terrorist state, which stands above the law and is entitled to

undertake violence, as it chooses, in support of its objectives. The reaction to the

"indispensable element" of the Central America accords merely reiterated that

conviction.[7] In his view, these laws are legitimately ingrained within the classical liberal

conception of law as put forth by the likes of Rousseau, Humboldt, and then upheld in

later periods by those who have combated the rise of arbitrary, discretionary,

administrative and totalitarian law. It is interesting that prevailing opinions about

anarchy exclude the possibility that it could have a legalistic side, just as

prevailing opinions suggest that an anarchist society would be necessarily

technologically retrograde. Both of these ideas are specifically refuted by

Chomsky, and by critical precursors or fellow-travelers such as Seymour

Melman, Murray Bookchin, Zellig Harris, Anton Pannekoek and Rudolf Rocker,

to no avail; if such ideas were accepted, then anarchism would be examined as the

serious challenge that it is, something that's best avoided by ruling class ideologues

across the spectrum. It is not, as the accepted wisdom goes, simply violence, chaos or

utopianism: The overall viewpoint is that change   can   occur, and that there's

ample evidence that it's desired by the population, which has only to recognize

through examination the constant hypocrisy of their own government and

media:

If we take the trouble to distinguish doctrine from reality, we find that the political and

economic principles that have prevailed are remote from those that are proclaimed. One

may also be skeptical about the prediction that they are ´´the wave of the future,''

bringing history to a happy end. The same ´´end of history'' has confidently been

proclaimed many times in the past, always wrongly. And with all the sordid continuities,

an optimistic soul can discern slow progress, realistically I think. In the advanced

industrial countries, and often elsewhere, popular struggles today can start from a

higher plane and with greater expectations than those of the past. And international

solidarity can take new and more constructive forms as the great majority of the people

of the world come to understand that their interests are pretty much the same and can

be advanced by working together. There is no more reason now than there has ever

been to believe that we are constrained by mysterious and unknown social laws, not

simply decisions made within institutions that are subject to human will - human

institutions, which have to face the test of legitimacy, and if they do not meet it, can be

replaced by others that are more free and more just, as often in the past.[8]

Is this naïve? Is this utopian? There are concrete examples that suggest that significant

moves forward can be made, and that the capacity for populations of being `defooled' is

great: "Skeptics who dismiss such thoughts as utopian and naive have only to cast their

eyes on what has happened right here in the last few years, an inspiring tribute to what

the human spirit can achieve, and its limitless prospects - lessons that the world

desperately needs to learn, and that should guide the next steps in the continuing

struggle for justice and freedom here too, as the people of South Africa, fresh from one

great victory, turn to the still more difficult tasks that lie ahead.[9]

Classical Liberalism and the Rule of Law

Rudolf Rocker insists in his writings about anarchy upon the importance of individual

responsibility, which he discusses in the sections of his work that recall the importance

of "natural law" for an anarchist society. Rocker links the idea of responsibility to issues

of human creativity and potentiality, and thus it is not surprising that in discussions of

law and responsibility, he makes frequent reference to the domain of cultural activity. He

devotes considerable attention to the cultural forces in society because, in his words,

they "involuntarily rebel against the coercion of institutions of political power on whose

sharp corners they bark their shins. Consciously or unconsciously they try to break the

rigid forms which obstruct their natural development, constantly erecting new bars

before it. The possessors of power, however, must always be on the watch, lest the

intellectual culture of the times stray into forbidden paths, and so perhaps disturb or

even totally inhibit their political activities. From this continued struggle of two

antagonistic aims, the one always representing the caste interests of the privileged

minority, the other the interests of the community, a certain legal relationship gradually

arises, on the basis of which the limits of influence between state and society, politics

and economics - in short, between power and culture - are periodically readjusted and

confirmed by constitutions." (86) In other words, in a move that seems surprising to

those who consider that anarchy is necessarily against organised state institutions, he

herein suggests that the judicial system, like government itself, is legitimate to the

degree that it promotes freedom, and idea that Chomsky has adopted in his own

writings, notably the recent book Power and Prospects. In Rocker's work this idea leads

to a fundamental legal distinction: "In law it is primarily necessary to distinguish two

forms: `natural law' and so-called `positive law'. A natural law exists where society has

not yet been politically organised - before the state with its caste and class system has

made its appearance. In this instance, law is the result of mutual agreements between

men confronting one another as free and equal, motivated by the same interests and

enjoying equal dignity as human beings. Positive law first develops within the political

framework of the state and concerns men who are separated from one another by

reason of different economic interests and who, on the basis of social inequality, belong

to various castes and classes". This "positive law" hands power over to the state which,

in Rocker's view, "has its roots in brute force, conquest and enslavement of the

conquered" (86). In other words, it is quite possible to promote legal resolutions to

conflict, and indeed to found communities upon legal grounds, even from an anarchistic

standpoint. There are statements here that, in a postmodern setting, may be considered

by some as unsettling or dubious. The idea that "mutual agreements" could exist

between "free and equal" individuals, necessarily constituted as stable subjects with

consistent and knowable needs and desires, and upheld by international organs such as

the United Nations, has been everywhere upset by postmodern and poststructuralist

thought. This is not an area into which I'll venture at any length, but instead would

suggest that the reader refer to a current debate between those who uphold the writings

of Carl Schmitt as appropriate to our present-day world (notably Chantal Moufffe and

Jean Leclau), and those who consider such a heavily discretion-based system as a

menace to fundamental rights and freedoms, and thus consider that it was no accident

that Schmitt became the advocate and architect of Nazi law (notably William

Scheuerman, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.[10]

What's interesting about Chomsky's adaptation of Rocker's approach is that he suggests

that the USA practices positive law, imposing its will virtually wherever it pleases on

account of its massive military might and international authority, while it both claims

adherence to the rule of law and imposes it upon others when this suits US government

or corporate purposes. Here the examples abound, first in terms of the US impeding the

work, in this case considered positive, of the UN: "For the past 20 or 25 years the U.S.

and Britain have been in a virtual war against international law at the United Nations. If

you take a look at the record of the United Nations, that is very clear. In the Security

Council since 1970, fully 80 per cent of the vetoes are by the U.S. and Britain, with the

U.S. in the lead. In third place is France, and in fourth place, far behind, is the Soviet

Union. It has fewer than one-third as many vetoes as England and about one-seventh as

many vetoes as the U.S. That is not too surprising. After all, these are the two imperial

states, and they are therefore naturally opposed to international law. International law is

a very weak barrier against the depredations of the powerful, and naturally the powerful

are against it. You have to be willfully blind not to see these things".[11] In the second

case, the US uses the UN to satisfy its imperialist will: "Not all U.N. resolutions are

ignored. The day before the unreported 1987 General Assembly resolution again calling

on the United States to comply with international law, the Times ran a substantial story

headlined "U.N. Urges Soviet to Pull Forces from Afghanistan," reporting that the General

Assembly voted "overwhelmingly today for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces

from Afghanistan, brushing aside Moscow's first concerted attempt to deflect such

criticism from the United Nations" in this "annual resolution." A Times review of the

General Assembly session on December 26 is headlined "General Assembly delivers

setbacks to U.S. and Soviet," subheaded "Washington Loses on Budget, Moscow on

Afghanistan and Cambodia issues." The report mentioned nothing about the 94-to-2 vote

on the World Court decision, in which the majority included U.S. allies Australia, Canada,

Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain, as well as major

Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay,

Venezuela), along with Sweden, Finland, and others".[12]

Similar to Rocker's view, the classical liberal approach emphasises the need for stable,

consistent and founded laws which would be applied in a formal fashion across time and

space:

The administrative state is an immense and tutelary power, in which the will of man is

not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but

they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it

prevents existence; it does not tyrannise, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes,

and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid

and industrious animals, of which government is the shepherd. (cited in Boesche, The

Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville, 251)

In line with this view, Scheuerman suggests that the tendency in most Western states is

to move away from a classical liberal notion of `rule of law,' with its insistence upon

consistent and universal legal norms, and towards a form of law that "takes an

increasingly amorphous and indeterminate structure as vague legal standards like `in

good faith' or `in the public interest,' proliferate" (1). Scheuerman claims that Franz

Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, who were both associated with the Frankfurt Institute

for Social Research in the late thirties and forties, saw in this trend a danger which they

saw confirmed in the reliance of the Nazi state upon the work of conservative scholars

such as Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Hayek for the elaboration of a legal system

appropriate for Nazi Germany. Scheuerman's book has implications beyond either a

social history of Germany or a more adequate appraisal of the Frankfurt School, because

he discusses the inherent dangers of a system that relies upon situation-specific

administrative decrees, or upon interpretations of claims that depend upon notions such

as custom, indwelling right, morality, fairness, or discretion. The danger of "extensive

state intervention in an unprecedented variety of spheres of social and economic

activity" is that the division between state and society is undermined, reducing the

degree to which government action can be deemed predictable or, to use Rocker's

conception, legitimate. The link to Chomsky, as we'll see, is found in Scheuerman's

concern that state action is directed towards solidifying its power and expanding its

influence, and that the classical liberal conception of law is one of the only consistent

and reliable counter-weights to this move, which suggests that the state's desire to

dismantle formal mechanisms of law is not in the interest of fairness but, logically and

obviously, in the interests of consolidating illegitimate (from a natural law perspective)

authority, which tends to be linked with force. One example that frequently recurs in this

area is Israel, in particular in terms of its actions in the occupied territories:

David Barsamian: I remember talking to Mona Rishmawi of Al Haq in Ramalla. She told

me that when she would go to court, she wouldn't know whether the Israeli prosecutor

would prosecute her clients under British mandate emergency law, Jordanian law, Israeli

law, or Ottoman law.

Noam Chomsky: Or their own laws. There are administrative regulations, some of

which are never published. The whole idea is a joke, as any Palestinian lawyer will tell

you. There is no law in the occupied territories. There's just pure authority. Even within

Israel itself, the legal system is a joke when it comes to Arabs. It has to be covered up

here. Arab defendants who come to the Supreme Court come after having been

convicted. The convictions are in the high ninetieth percentile based on confessions.

When people confess, everybody knows what that means. Finally, after about sixteen

years, when one of the people who confessed and was tried turned out to be a Druse

army veteran who was proven to have been innocent, it became a scandal. There was an

investigation, and the Supreme Court stated that for sixteen years the secret services

had been lying to them, had been torturing people and telling them that they hadn't.

There was a big fuss in Israel about the fact that they had been lying to the Supreme

Court. How could you have a democracy when they lie to the Supreme Court? Not the

torture. Everyone knew it all along.[13]

The example here is rather dramatic, but not all commentators would consider that

resorting to discretion-ridden administrative law is always negative; Hayek, for instance,

proposes that the demise of formal law allows a space for the development of an

"egalitarian legal alternative" that would be based upon some form of "indwelling right"

or custom. But the real advocate of a turn away from rule of law was Carl Schmitt, a

right-wing authoritarian political thinker under the Weimar regime who went on to

theorise numerous elements of fascist law. He has been revitalised of late by the left

(especially Paul Piccone and G.L. Ulman in Telos), the right (William Buckley and Paul

Gottfried in the National Review), by various `postmodern' historians and writers such as

Chantal Mouffe, and by mainstream writers including Joseph Bendersky and George

Schwab. Chomsky has not entered this debate directly, however as we'll see he has a

strong interest in what would be considered formal law through his support for the

classical liberal rule of law. Neumann and Kirchheimer supported this idea of the "rule of

law" and opposed the Schmitt viewpoint because they upheld a belief that "state action

must be based on cogent general rules." In their view, which is supported by

Scheuerman, "only clear general norms restrain and bind the activities of the state

apparatus, provide a minimum of legal security, and counteract the dangers of a

`creeping authoritarianism'" (2). Rather than relying upon legislators or bureaucrats to

right the wrongs of modern society, they supported a law which would regulate them

because "a genuinely democratic society requires a high degree of legal regularity and

predictability to achieve autonomous and uncoerced political deliberation and action"

(3). This predictability is for Neumann especially strongly linked to the idea of a legal

norm that overrides all other decisions. He defines this norm as "a rule which does not

mention particular cases or individual persons but which is issued in advance to apply to

all cases and all persons in the abstract; and... as specific as possible in its general

formulation".[14] Scheuerman is very sympathetic to this approach, although wary of

some of its implications for the present welfare state when he writes that:

Neumann concedes that this model can have only limited applicability in a setting

necessitating extensive governmental action, and that cogent formal law today is

necessarily replaced by vague legal standards and various forms of equity law and

bargaining seemingly essential to the contemporary welfare state and its reliance on

unprecedented forms of state intervention. Complex state activity requires equally

complex (nonformal) modes of law. (207)

So even if it could be put into play, the rule of law, according to Scheuerman "can never

be rendered perfect, and legal gaps, exceptions, and irregularities are unavoidable side-

effects of a social setting having particularistic power concentrations necessarily

regulated by clandestine individual measure and administrative commands" (207-8).

What Scheuerman does consider a realisable goal is that irregular law be exercises in a

rational fashion. This of course is another problem both for the advocates of a

postmodern approach to law, and to those who question Chomsky's own appeals to

Enlightenment thinking, and to some vague notion of `freedom'.

The fact is, and this is the link to Rudolph Rocker and his conception of the anarchist

society, freedom also creates the responsibilities that come naturally in train with

liberation: "Only in freedom does there arise in man the consciousness of responsibility

for his acts and regard for the rights of others; only in freedom can there unfold in its full

strength that most precious social instinct: man's sympathy for the joys and sorrows of

his fellow men and the resultant impulse toward mutual aid in which are rooted all social

ethics, all ideas of social justice. Thus Godwin's work became at the same time the

epilogue of that great intellectual movement which had inscribed on its banner the

greatest possible limitation of the power of the state, and the starting point for the

development of the ideas of libertarian socialism" (148). Reason and responsibility

become the bases for individual decisionmaking, not authority and power. And for this

conception of law Rocker draws upon various sources, including Richard Hooker, who

"maintained that it is unworthy of a man to submit blindly, like a beast, to the

compulsion of any kind of authority without consulting his own reason" (140);[15] John

Locke, who maintained "that common and binding relationships existed between

primitive men, emanating from their social disposition and from considerations of

reason" (142); and to others who "aimed to set limits to hereditary power and to widen

the individual's sphere of independence", including Lord Shaftesbury, Bernard de

Mandeville, William Temple, Montesquieu, John Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Buffon, David

Hume, Mably, Henry Linguet, A. Ferguson, Adam Smith. Most of them, writes Rocker,

"inspired by biological and related science, had abandoned the concept of an original

social contract" and " recognised the state as the political instrument of privileged

minorities in society for the rulership of the great masses". (142) Classical liberalism

upholds individual rights against the privileged, partly on account of the world from

which it comes, says Chomsky:

One may argue, as some historians do, that these principles lost their force as the

national territory was conquered and settled, the native population driven out or

exterminated. Whatever one's assessment of those years, by the late 19th century the

founding doctrines took on a new and much more oppressive form. When Madison spoke

of ´´rights of persons,'' he meant humans. But the growth of the industrial economy, and

the rise of corporate forms of economic enterprise, led to a completely new meaning of

the term. In a current official document, ´´´Person' is broadly defined to include any

individual, branch, partnership, associated group, association, estate, trust, corporation

or other organization (whether or not organized under the laws of any State), or any

government entity,''[16] a concept that doubtless would have shocked Madison and

others with intellectual roots in the Enlightenment and classical liberalism - pre-

capitalist, and anti-capitalist in spirit. These radical changes in the conception of human

rights and democracy were not introduced primarily by legislation, but by judicial

decisions and intellectual commentary. Corporations, which previously had been

considered artificial entities with no rights, were accorded all the rights of persons, and

far more, since they are ´´immortal persons,'' and ´´persons' of extraordinary wealth

and power. Furthermore, they were no longer bound to the specific purposes designated

by State charter, but could act as they chose, with few constraints. The intellectual

backgrounds for granting such extraordinary rights to ´´collectivist legal entities'' lie in

neo-Hegelian doctrines that also underlie Bolshevism and fascism: the idea that organic

entities have rights over and above those of persons. Conservative legal scholars bitterly

opposed these innovations, recognizing that they undermine the traditional idea that

rights inhere in individuals, and undermine market principles as well.[17] But the new

forms of authoritarian rule were institutionalized, and along with them, the legitimation

of wage labor, which was considered hardly better than slavery in mainstream American

thought through much of the 19th century, not only by the rising labor movement but

also by such figures as Abraham Lincoln, the Republican Party, and the establishment

media.[16]

What is interesting here in the Rocker-Chomsky relationship is the emphasis placed upon

individuality and creativity, both of which will flourish in the anti-authoritarian societies

described. But so too will a higher conception of responsibility and ethics for, as Rocker

writes, "all schemes having their roots in natural rights are based on the desire to free

man from bondage to social institutions of compulsion in order that he may attain to

consciousness of his humanity and no longer bow before any authority which would

deprive him of the right to his own thoughts and actions" (143). So, like Chomsky,

Rocker is animated by a sense that great popular movements should look to overthrow

institutions of power and authority in favour of free associations in which the seeds of

freedom, and everything that grows along with them, will germinate vigorously; this is

not simply a political objective but a personal one as well, for, as Rocker (like Godwin,

Warren, Proudhon and Bakunin) recognised, "one cannot be free either politically or

personally so long as one is in the economic servitude of another and cannot escape

from this condition" (167).

One final point; the anarchist conception does not accept compulsion to act, even if

around desirable ends, as acceptable; compulsion no matter what the ends is a power

relation which will ultimately separate people. Compulsion, says Rocker, "lacks the inner

drive of all social unions -- the understanding which recognises the facts and the

sympathy which comprehends the feeling of the fellow man because it feels itself related

to him. By subjecting men to a common compulsion one does not bring them closer to

one another, rather one creates estrangements between them and breeds impulses of

selfishness and separation. Social ties have permanence and completely fulfil their

purpose only when they are based on good will and spring from the needs of men. Only

under such conditions is a relationship possible where social union and the freedom of

the individual are so closely intergrown that they can no longer be recognised as

separate entities" (246). So what we have here is the anarchist conception, the freedom

to act, create and to enter into relationships of love, compassion and responsibility

based upon shared and common concerns.

Illegitimate law:

Hypocrisy: international law, deemed acceptable by Chomsky, being violated

in the name of the "rule of law" by the Americans.

1.The second question is rarely raised explicitly, except in the course of complaints

about our faint-hearted and money-grubbing allies, who lack the courage, integrity and

sturdy national character of the Anglo-American duo. The general question, however,

suffers from no shortage of answers, including impressive phrases about the sanctity of

international law and the U.N. Charter, and our historic mission to punish anyone who

dares to violate these sacred principles by resorting to force. President Bush declared

that "America stands where it always has, against aggression, against those who would

use force to replace the rule of law." While some questioned his tactical judgment, there

was widespread admiration for the President's honorable stand, and his forthright

renewal of our traditional dedication to nonviolence, the rule of law, and the duty of

protecting the weak and oppressed. Scholarship weighed in, adding historical and cross-

cultural depth. A noted Cambridge University Professor of Political Science wrote in the

Times Literary Supplement (London) that "Our traditions, fortunately, prove to have at

their core universal values, while theirs are sometimes hard to distinguish with the

naked eye from rampant (and heavily armed) nihilism. In the Persian Gulf today,

President Bush could hardly put it more bluntly...." Others too basked in self-adulation,

though it was conceded that we had not always applied our traditional values with

complete consistency, failures that we are sure to rectify as soon as we have finished

with the business at hand.[17]

The presses collusion with US violations of international law.

4. The first, and one of the most revealing, is Nicaragua. Recall that just as the Wall fell,

the White House and Congress announced with great clarity that unless Nicaraguans

voted as we told them, the terrorist war and the embargo that was strangling the

country would continue. Washington also voted (alone with Israel) against a UN General

Assembly resolution calling on it once again to observe international law and call off

these illegal actions; unthinkable of course, so the press continued to observe its vow of

silence. When Nicaraguans met their obligations a few months later, joy was

unrestrained. At the dissident extreme, Anthony Lewis hailed Washington's "experiment

in peace and democracy," which gives "fresh testimony to the power of Jefferson's idea:

government with the consent of the governed.... To say so seems romantic, but then we

live in a romantic age." Across the spectrum there was rejoicing over the latest of the

"happy series of democratic surprises," as Time magazine expressed the uniform view

while outlining the methods used to achieve our Jeffersonian ideals: to "wreck the

economy and prosecute a long and deadly proxy war until the exhausted natives

overthrow the unwanted government themselves," with a cost to us that is "minimal,"

leaving the victim "with wrecked bridges, sabotaged power stations, and ruined farms,"

and providing Washington's candidate with "a winning issue," ending the

"impoverishment of the people of Nicaragua."[18]

US as a lawless state, again unreported by the press.

This central feature of the accords is redundant, since such actions are barred by a

higher authority: by

international law and treaty, hence by the supreme law of the land under the U.S.

Constitution, which we are enjoined to celebrate this year. The fact was underscored by

the World Court in June 1986 as it condemned the United States for its "unlawful use of

force" against Nicaragua and called upon it to desist from these crimes. Congress

responded by voting $100 million of aid and freeing the CIA to direct the attack and to

use its own funds on an unknown scale. The U.S. vetoed a UN Security Council resolution

calling on all states to observe international law and voted against a General Assembly

resolution to the same effect, joined by Israel and El Salvador. On Nov. 12, 1987, the

General Assembly again called for "full and immediate compliance" with the World Court

decision. This time only Israel joined with the U.S. in opposing adherence to international

law, another blow to the Central American accords, unreported by the national press as

usual.[19]

Violations of international law.

3. Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams conducted a news conference by radio in the

Central American capitals on Oct. 22, unreported in the national press, at which he

announced that the United States will "never accept a Soviet satellite in Central

America" -- meaning a country that is not a loyal U.S. satellite -- and that "We're going to

continue the aid to the resistance," to be sure, in violation of the "indispensable

element" for peace. The Reagan administration announced its intention to seek

congressional backing for its war, and Congress obliged by providing "humanitarian" aid

-- meaning, any form of aid that the government chooses to send -- in direct violation of

the accords. Secretary of State George Shultz informed the OAS that the U.S. would

persist in the unlawful use of force by its "resistance fighters" until a "free Nicaragua" is

established by Washington standards, thus consigning the accords to oblivion, along with

international law. This announcement was noted in a 140-word item in the Times

stressing Washington's intent to give the accords "every chance," while a headline in the

liberal Boston Globe reported approvingly that the U.S. is "easing stance."[20]

International law applies to everyone else except the US; no law, just authority

(as in administrative area)

DB. The conditions of the US-Israel alliance have changed, but have there been any

structural changes?

NC. International law transcends state law, but Israel says these resolutions are not

applicable. How are they not applicable? Just as international law isn't applicable to the

United States, which has even been condemned by the World Court. States do what they

feel like -- though of course small states have to obey.

DB. I remember talking to Mona Rishmawi, a lawyer for the human rights organization Al

Haq in Ramallah on the West Bank. She told me that when she would go to court, she

wouldn't know whether the Israeli prosecutor would prosecute her clients under British

mandate emergency law, Jordanian law, Israeli law or Ottoman law.

NC. Or their own laws. There are administrative regulations, some of which are never

published. As any Palestinian lawyer will tell you, the legal system in the territories is a

joke. There's no law -- just pure authority.

The continued value of the Constitution, UN Charter, US law.

These are, again, truisms, with broad application. In the U.S. Constitution and its

Amendments, one can find nothing that authorizes the grant of human rights (speech,

freedom from search and seizure, the right to buy elections, etc.) to what legal historians

call "collectivist legal entities," organic entities that have the rights of "immortal

persons"--rights far beyond those of real persons, when we take into account their

power. One will search the U.N. Charter in vain to discover the basis for the authority

claimed by Washington to use force and violence to achieve "the national interest," as

defined by the immortal persons who cast over society the shadow called "politics," in

John Dewey's evocative phrase. The U.S. Code defines "terrorism" with great clarity, and

U.S. law provides severe penalties for the crime. But one will find no wording that

exempts "the architects of power" from punishment for their exercises of state terror,

not to speak of their monstrous clients (as long as they enjoy Washington's good

graces): Suharto, Saddam Hussein, Mobutu, Noriega, and others great and small. As the

leading Human Rights organizations point out year after year, virtually all U.S. foreign

aid is illegal, from the leading recipient on down the list, because the law bars aid to

countries that engage in "systematic torture." That may be law, but is it the meaning of

the law?[21]

No restrictions are allowed on investment in countries with human rights violations:

South Africa in the days of "constructive engagement," Burma today, etc. It is to be

understood, of course, that the Don will not be hampered by such constraints. The

powerful stand above treaties and laws. [22]

US can compel others to change their laws, but not vice versa. Inconsistent

process, since only the outcome is over any interest (ie. anti formal law)

2. At the very same moment, Washington and the media were lauding the W.T.O.

Telecommunications agreement as a ´´new tool of foreign policy'' that compels other

countries to change their laws and practices in accord with Washington's demands,

incidentally handing over their communications systems to mainly U.S.

megacorporations in yet another serious blow against democracy. But the W.T.O. has no

authority to compel the U.S. to change its laws, just as the World Court has no authority

to compel the U.S. to terminate its international terrorism and illegal economic warfare.

Free trade and international law are like democracy: fine ideas, but to be judged by

outcome, not process.[23]

UN as tool for US desires.

In its new-found zeal for international law and the United Nations, the New York Times

repeatedly turned to one heroic figure: Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He was brought forth as

an expert witness on "the new spirit of unanimity at the United Nations," explaining that

there were "some pretty egregious violations of international law in the past," but now

"the major powers have convergent interests and the mechanism of the U.N. is there

waiting to be used." His "firm espousal of international law" was lauded in a review of his

study The Law of Nations. The reviewer took note of his "sardonic, righteous anger,"

which recalls "the impassioned professor who suspects no one's listening" while he is

"clearly fuming that an idea as morally impeccable as international law is routinely

disregarded as disposable and naive." In a Times Magazine story, we learn further that

Moynihan is "taking particular delight" in being proven right in his long struggle to

promote international law and the United Nations system, "abstractions" that "matter

dearly" to him. At last, everybody is "riding Moynihan's hobbyhorse" instead of ignoring

the principles he has upheld with such conviction for so many years. No longer need

Moynihan "revel in his martyrdom." Now "history has caught up with him." Omitted from

these accolades was a review of Moynihan's record as U.N. Ambassador, when he had

the opportunity to put his principles into practice. In a cablegram to Henry Kissinger on

January 23, 1976, he reported the "considerable progress" that had been made by his

arm-twisting tactics at the U.N. "toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up

the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed

against us in international forums and in diplomatic encounters generally." Moynihan

cited two relevant cases: his success in undermining a U.N. reaction to the Indonesian

invasion of East Timor and to Moroccan aggression in the Sahara, both supported by the

U.S., the former with particular vigor. He had more to say about these matters in his

memoir of his years at the United Nations, where he describes frankly his role as

Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975:

The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to

bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations

prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was

given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.

He adds that within a few weeks some 60,000 people had been killed, "10 percent of the

population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during

the Second World War."[24]

The U.N. episode, briefly sampled here, gives no little insight into the intellectual culture.

The U.N. is "functional" today because it is (more or less) doing what Washington wants,

a fact that has virtually nothing to do with the end of the Cold War, the Russians, or Third

World maladies. The "shrill, anti-Western rhetoric" of the Third World has, very often,

been a call for observance of international law. For once, the U.S. and its allies happen to

be opposed to acts of aggression, annexation, and human rights violations. Therefore

the U.N. is able to act in its peacekeeping role. These truths being unacceptable, they do

not exist. They belong to the domain of "abuse of reality" (actual history), not reality

itself (what we prefer to believe).[25]

US vetoes of UN resolutions

The U.N. session just preceding the "wondrous sea change" (Winter 1989-90) can serve

to illustrate. Three Security Council resolutions were vetoed: a condemnation of the U.S.

attack on the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama (U.S. veto, Britain abstained); of the U.S.

invasion of Panama (U.S., U.K., France against); of Israeli abuses in the occupied

territories (U.S. veto). There were two General Assembly resolutions calling on all states

to observe international law, one condemning the U.S. support for the contra army, the

other the illegal embargo against Nicaragua. Each passed with two negative votes: the

U.S. and Israel. A resolution opposing acquisition of territory by force passed 151 to 3

(U.S., Israel, Dominica). The resolution once again called for a diplomatic settlement of

the Arab-Israeli conflict with recognized borders and security guarantees, incorporating

the wording of U.N. resolution 242, and self-determination for both Israel and the

Palestinians in a two-state settlement; the U.S. has been barring such a settlement,

virtually alone as the most recent vote indicates, since its January 1976 veto of this

proposal, advanced by Syria, Jordan, and Egypt with the backing of the PLO. The U.S. has

repeatedly vetoed Security Council resolutions and blocked General Assembly

resolutions and other U.N. initiatives on a whole range of issues, including aggression,

annexation, human rights abuses, disarmament, adherence to international law,

terrorism, and others.[26]

What we're left with are some contradictory opinions about the value of democracy, and

the possibilities for change in the status quo. DB: Christmas came early in 1992 for at

least six former Reagan administration officials implicated in the

Iran-Contra scandal. There was a presidential pardon on Christmas Eve. Bush said of the

pardonees, "The common denominator of their motivation, whether their actions were

right or wrong, was patriotism." That doesn't sound like the position of German defense

lawyers at Nuremberg.

NC: No. They couldn't have gotten away with it, but it was quite accurate. Probably

Himmler and Goering were acting as patriotic Germans. I frankly didn't take the pardons

all that seriously. It was a highly selective prosecution. They didn't go after top people or

the important issues. What they were being charged with is minor issues. Lying to

Congress is bad, it's a serious violation of law which carries a five-year jail sentence. But

as compared with carrying out huge international terrorist operations, it's pretty small

potatoes. Nobody was charged with conducting an illegal war against Nicaragua. They

were only charged with lying to Congress about it. It indicates the values that lie behind

the prosecution. In other words, kill and torture whoever you like, but be sure to tell us.

We want to take part too.

Administrative law, lack of formal law; law as authority

Rocker, cited by Chomsky

US above international law

After one such border incident in March 1988, the editors of the Toronto Globe and

Mail observed that when Nicaraguan forces cross "the border in hot pursuit of the

contras," "the United States responds only selectively to this supposed outrage, the

deciding factor apparently being whether a contra vote is imminent," as in this case,

when "Mr. Reagan was revving up to ask Congress for renewed aid to the rebels." They

add that the peace agreement signed by Honduras "forbids Honduras or any other

country to give aid to foreign insurgents such as the contras," and it is far from clear that

Nicaragua is in violation of international law in "crossing the border in hot pursuit of

contras," apparently penetrating a few kilometers into southern Honduras where the

contras had established their bases after expelling thousands of Honduran peasants. It is

U.S. policy, not Nicaraguan defense of its territory, that "exhausts outrage," or would,

the editors continue, "if it were not for the extraordinary suffering U.S. policy causes in

the region." An insight foreign to the Free Press south of the Canadian border, which also

cannot permit itself to perceive that what is clearly in violation of international law is the

U.S. support for the contra forces attacking Nicaragua from foreign bases. The reigning

dogma holds that the United States stands above the law, free to use violence as it

pleases, and that this is just and right. Correspondingly, the media avoid repeated

Nicaraguan offers to have the border monitored by international authorities, always

dismissed by the U.S. for the obvious reasons; and little notice can be given to the World

Court's demand that the U.S. cease its aggression and observe its treaty obligations, or

its endorsement of Nicaragua's call for reparations from the world's most pious advocate

of the rule of law.[27]

Relying on international law/disregarding international law

The occupation is in violation of UN Security Council resolution 425 of March 1978,

calling on Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Lebanon. The

government of Lebanon has reiterated this demand, notably in February 1991 during the

Gulf conflict; apart from odd corners like this journal, the request was drowned out by

the

self-congratulatory oratory about the wondrous new order of law and justice. Israel is

free

to ignore such minor annoyances as the Security Council and international law thanks to

the stance of its superpower patron, which is powerful enough to reduce the UN to an

instrument of its foreign policy and to shape international law as it chooses, as was seen

once again in the ludicrous legal arguments put forth to justify Clinton's bombing of Iraq

in June.[28]

Democracy and its demise

Well, without proceeding in detail, if you look through these things, here's what you

discover. Decision-making on major issues is now vested in international institutions

which are so remote from public influence, that the public has no idea what's going on. I

mean, in the case of NAFTA, incidentally the Labor Advisory Committee report was never

reported in the press, right, I'd be surprised if any of you know about it, here's a case

where the government radically violated the law, demonstrated utter contempt for the

democratic process, rammed through a secret executive agreement of enormous

influence, wouldn't even let the one popular group that is supposed to see it by law, the

labor- based group, even look at it, they write the report, and then the press censors it.

All right, here we have the ultimate in the destruction of democracy, the ideal that

everybody's been dreaming of. Not only is the rabble excluded, they don't influence

policy, but they don't know what's in policy, and finally they don't know that they don't

know. Virtually nobody knows that they don't know what is going on. Well, you know,

now we've reached the ultimate. That's the ultimate possibility in the destruction of

democracy.[29]

Forgetting the importance of the past: May Day

The effectiveness of the state-corporate propaganda system is illustrated by the fate of

May Day, a workers' holiday throughout the world that originated in response to the

judicial murder of several anarchists after the Haymarket affair of May 1886, in a

campaign of international solidarity with U.S. workers struggling for an eight-hour day. In

the United States, all has been forgotten. May Day has become "Law Day," a jingoist

celebration of our "200-year-old partnership between law and liberty" as Ronald Reagan

declared while designating May 1 as Law Day 1984, adding that without law there can be

only "chaos and disorder." The day before, he had announced that the United States

would disregard the proceedings of the International Court of Justice that later

condemned the U.S. government for its "unlawful use of force" and violation of treaties

in its attack against Nicaragua. "Law Day" also served as the occasion for Reagan's

declaration of May 1, 1985, announcing an embargo against Nicaragua "in response to

the emergency situation created by the Nicaraguan Government's aggressive activities

in Central America," actually declaring a "national emergency," since renewed annually,

because "the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual

and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States"

-- all with the approbation of Congress, the media, and the intellectual community

generally; or, in some circles, embarrassed silence.[30]

"Felling Trees and Indians"

These tasks, and the rhetorical accompaniment, have been eminently reasonable by

reigning standards of Political Correctness; the challenge to them in the past few years

has, not surprisingly, elicited much outrage among guardians of doctrinal purity. Hugo

Grotius, a leading 17th century humanist and the founder of modern international law,

determined that the "most just war is against savage beasts, the next against men who

are like beasts." George Washington wrote in 1783 that "the gradual extension of our

settlements will as certainly cause the savage, as the wolf, to retire; both being beasts of

prey, tho' they differ in shape." What is called in official PC rhetoric "a pragmatist,"

Washington regarded purchase of Indian lands (typically, by fraud and threat) as a more

cost-effective tactic than violence. Thomas Jefferson predicted to John Adams that the

"backward" tribes at the borders "will relapse into barbarism and misery, lose numbers

by war and want, and we shall be obliged to drive them, with the beasts of the forests

into the Stony mountains"; the same would be true of Canada after the conquest he

envisioned, while all blacks would be removed to Africa or the Caribbean, leaving the

country without "blot or mixture." A year after the Monroe Doctrine, the President called

for helping the Indians "to surmount all their prejudices in favor of the soil of their

nativity," so that "we become in reality their benefactors" by transferring them West.

When consent was not given, they were forcibly removed. Consciences were eased

further by the legal doctrine devised by Chief Justice John Marshall: "discovery gave an

exclusive right to extinguish the Indian right of occupancy, either by purchase or by

conquest"; "that law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations

between the conqueror and conquered was incapable of application to...the tribes of

Indians, ...fierce savages whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn

chiefly from the forest."

The colonists, to be sure, knew better. Their survival depended on the agricultural

sophistication and generosity of the "fierce savages," and they were familiar with the

prevailing norms of violence on all sides. Observing the Narragansett-Pequot wars, Roger

Williams remarked that their fighting was "farre less bloudy and devouring than the

cruell Warres of Europe," from which the colonists had learned their trade. John Underhill

sneered at the "feeble Manner" of the Indian warriors, which "did hardly deserve the

Name of fighting," and their laughable protests against the "furious" style of the English

that "slays too many men" -- not to speak of women and children in undefended villages,

a European tactic that had to be taught to the backward natives. These were common

features of the world conquest, as noted earlier.[31]

[1]

There are a range of articles by and about Chomsky that deal with law, but seldom

directly or in a sustained fashion. See for example Chomsky, Noam. "The Intifada and the

Peace Process", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 1990 14 n2 p345-353;

"World Order and its Rules: Variations on Some Themes", Journal of Law and Society,

Summer 1993 20 n2 p145-165; Wilson, James G. "Noam Chomsky and Judicial

Review", Cleveland State Law Review, Fall 1996 44 n4 p439-472.

[2] "The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine, February 1991.[3]

I think it crucial that we make reference to the historical precedents that inform

Chomsky's work, as does Chomsky himself. It helps guide our understanding of his

relationship to earlier milieus, and also helps undermine arguments of those who would

use history to justify their oppression. Examples of Chomsky's efforts in this regard

abound in his writings; for example: "The effectiveness of the state-corporate

propaganda system is illustrated by the fate of May Day, a workers' holiday throughout

the world that originated in response to the judicial murder of several anarchists after

the Haymarket affair of May 1886, in a campaign of international solidarity with U.S.

workers struggling for an eight-hour day. In the United States, all has been forgotten.

May Day has become "Law Day," a jingoist celebration of our "200-year-old partnership

between law and liberty" as Ronald Reagan declared while designating May 1 as Law

Day 1984, adding that without law there can be only "chaos and disorder." The day

before, he had announced that the United States would disregard the proceedings of the

International Court of Justice that later condemned the U.S. government for its "unlawful

use of force" and violation of treaties in its attack against Nicaragua. "Law Day" also

served as the occasion for Reagan's declaration of May 1, 1985, announcing an embargo

against Nicaragua "in response to the emergency situation created by the Nicaraguan

Government's aggressive activities in Central America," actually declaring a "national

emergency," since renewed annually, because "the policies and actions of the

Government of Nicaragua constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national

security and foreign policy of the United States" -- all with the approbation of Congress,

the media, and the intellectual community generally; or, in some circles, embarrassed

silence". (Necessary Illusions Copyright © 1989, Chapter 2: Containing the Enemy)[4]

Michael Albert and Noam Chomsky, From ZNet. In January 1993 Michael Albert and

Noam Chomsky recorded a series of conversations which were later distributed by Z

Magazine. Here we present a transcription of some material from the 1993 tapes,

essentially verbatim. Some of the topical material is now historical, of course, but the

rest is as timely as when first discussed.

[5] Necessary Illusions, 1989 by Noam Chomsky, Appendix V, The Continuing Struggle

177

[6] The principal offender here is Israel, mentioned frequently in this regard. For

example, There is an intriguing sidelight to the US-Israeli insistence that the political

representatives of the Palestinians be excluded from negotiations. The official reason is

that the PLO is a terrorist organization. Under Israeli law, anyone who has any dealings

with it is subject to criminal penalties under the Law for the Prevention of Terror. The

prime targets are Palestinians, but the law has also been used to punish Jews for

contacts with the PLO, most recently, the courageous Abie Nathan, jailed once again.

The background for the law was reviewed by one of Israel's leading legal commentators,

Moshe Negbi, discussing a recent academic study of Lehi (the "Stern gang"), published

on its 50th anniversary. Negbi's article is entitled "The Law to Prevent Meetings with the

Head of State." As he explains, the Law for the Prevention of Terror was instituted on the

initiative of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion six days after the assassination of UN

Ambassador Folke Bernadotte. Ben-Gurion's goal was to break up Lehi, known at once to

be responsible for the assassination. One of the three commanders of Lehi was Yitzhak

Shamir. The law not only barred any contact with Shamir, but was also applied against

Menahem Begin's terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etsel), impelling Begin to dismantle his

Jerusalem organization. It was also used to jail religious extremists, including Rabbi

Mordechai Eliyahu, currently chief Rabbi. It was bitterly denounced as a "Nazi law,

dictatorial, immoral" and hence illegal, by Menahem Begin and other civil libertarians.

Despite efforts to have it modified under Labor governments, it remained in force,

formally directed against Shamir and his Lehi associates, until 1977, when Begin was

elected Prime Minister. Today the "Nazi law" still remains in force, but only to bar

contacts with the PLO and to justify the US-Israeli refusal to permit Palestinians to select

their own representatives for negotiations. ("Middle East Diplomacy: Continuities and

Changes", November 5, 1991, Z Magazine, December 1991).

[7] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988.

[8] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture,

University of Cape Town, May 1997).

[9] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture,

University of Cape Town, May 1997).[10]

Cf. Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law , MIT

P 1994.[11]

"Noam Chomsky on An Unjust War" V. K. Ramachandran Frontline, March 2-15. The same

applies to peacekeeping; U.N. peacekeeping efforts have regularly been frustrated by

the United States. The first post-Cold War U.N. session (1989-90) was typical in this

regard. Three Security Council resolutions were vetoed, all by the U.S. Two condemned

George Bush's murderous invasion of Panama, the third condemned Israeli human rights

abuses; the U.S. vetoed a similar resolution the following May. Britain and France joined

the U.S. in blocking one of the resolutions on Panama; the other, condemning U.S.

violations of diplomatic rights, was voted 13-1, Britain abstaining. The General Assembly

passed two resolutions calling on all states to observe international law. The U.S. voted

against both, alone with Israel. The first condemned the continuing U.S. support for the

contras, the second, U.S. economic warfare against Nicaragua -- both declared

"unlawful" by the World Court, but irrelevantly, by the standards of the U.S. and its allies.

A resolution condemning the acquisition of territory by force passed 151-3 (U.S., Israel,

Dominica); this was yet another call for a political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict,

which the U.S. has blocked for 20 years" ("The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine,

February 1991).

[12] Necessary Illusions, "Adjuncts of Government".

[13] Keeping the Rabble in Line, 1994 by Noam Chomsky and David Barsamian, January

21, 1993[14]

Neumann, "The Concept of Political Freedom," 165.[15]

. In his work, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, published in 1593.

[16] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture,

University of Cape Town, May 1997).

[17] "The Gulf Crisis" January 1991, Z Magazine, February 1991.

[18] "Democracy Enhancement" Z Magazine, May 1994.

[19] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988.

[20] "Is Peace at Hand?" November 1987, Z Magazine, January 1988.

[21] "Domestic Constituencies".

[22] "Domestic Constituencies".

[23] Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality (Davie Lecture,

University of Cape Town, May 1997).

[24] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression

[25] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression

[26] Deterring Democracy, 1991, South End Press. Chapter 6: Nefarious Aggression [27]

Necessary Illusions Appendix III.[28]

"Limited War" in Lebanon Z Magazine, September 1993

[29] Old Wine, New Bottles: Free Trade, Global Markets and Military Adventures,

University of Virginia, February 10, 1993

[30] Necessary Illusions Copyright © 1989, Chapter 2: Containing the Enemy

[31] Year 501 Copyright © 1993 by Noam Chomsky. Published by South End Press.

Chapter 1: The Great Work of Subjugation and Conquest.