non-lethal weapons in reactive crowd ...non-lethal weapon mix study non-lethal weapons in reactive...

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NON-LETHAL WEAPON MIX STUDY NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN REACTIVE CROWD CONFRONTATION: CAEn WARGAME NICKEL ABEYANCE III Dr. P. Dobias LFORT Dr. K. Sprague LFORT Maj S. Bassindale LFORT Mr. Dan Sinclair Ajilon Mr. Jason Demaine Ajilon

Defence R&D CanadaCentre for Operational Research and Analysis

Land Forces Operational Research Team

DRDC CORA TM 2008-046November 2008

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NON-LETHAL WEAPON MIX STUDY NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN REACTIVE CROWD CONFRONTATION: CAEn WARGAME NICKEL ABEYANCE III

Dr. P. Dobias LFORT

Dr. K.B. Sprague LFORT

Maj S. Bassindale LFORT

Mr. Dan Sinclair Ajilon

Mr. Jason Demaine Ajilon

Distribution of this publication is Unlimited

DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum

DRDC CORA TM 2008-046

November 2008

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Authors

Original signed by

Dr. Peter Dobias

Approved by

Original signed by

Dr. Dean Haslip

Section Head, Land and Operational Command OR

Approved for release by

Original signed by

Mr. Dale Reding

Chief Scientist DRDC CORA

The information contained herein has been derived and determined through best practice and adherence to the highest levels of ethical, scientific and engineering investigative principles. The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed therein, remain those of the authors and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official opinion or position of DND or the Government of Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2008

© Sa Majesté la Reine, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2008

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Abstract Director of Land Requirements 5 (DLR 5) has requested that a study be conducted to determine the optimal distribution of non-lethal weapons at the Section level for reactive crowd confrontation operations (CCO). This study, denoted as NICKEL ABEYANCE III, is a continuation of the NICKEL ABEYANCE series that looks at the employment of non-lethal weapons in the context of CCO. The study was based on two scenarios involving a rifle Section conducting operations during daylight conditions within a semi-complex terrain, equipped with blunt trauma non-lethal weapons. For the study, various mixes of 40 mm launcher with sponge rounds and 12-gauge shotgun with drag stabilized rounds were considered. Close Action Environment (CAEn) was used as the war-gaming tool for gathering the necessary information. To disperse a benign crowd the option with the most non-lethal launchers was the most effective for the considered scenario, and under the assumptions made for the crowd behaviour. To disperse a hostile crowd serving as a cover for one or more armed constituents (suicide bombers and/or rocket-propelled grenade operators) a prolonged use of non-lethal weapons put BLUE and innocent civilians at a greater risk by providing the insurgents with extended time to carry on with their plan. Therefore it was concluded that speed of identification of the threat was the most critical consideration. In the modeled scenario and with the options considered the most efficient means was the escalation of force. It is thus desirable to conduct a follow on investigation of the possibility of employing area-targeting non-lethal weapons (e.g., acoustic, CS gas, etc.). The opinion of the military personnel involved was that such capability would be much more effective than the blunt trauma rounds considered.

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Résumé Le Directeur – Besoins en ressources terrestres 5 (DBRT 5) a demandé qu’une étude soit effectuée afin de déterminer la distribution optimale d’armes non létales dans une section, pour les opérations d’affrontement de la foule (OAF). L’étude, intitulée NICKEL ABEYANCE III, est la suite de la série NICKEL ABEYANCE, qui porte sur l’utilisation des armes non létales pour des OAF. L’étude comportait deux scénarios pour une section de fusiliers effectuant des opérations de jour sur un terrain partiellement accidenté et avec des armes non létales à traumatisme contondant. Dans le cadre de l’étude, plusieurs combinaisons de lance-grenades de 40 mm avec des munitions en mousse et de fusils de calibre 12 avec des munitions stabilisées ont été prises en considération. Un environnement de combats rapprochés (CAEn) a été utilisé à titre de jeu de guerre afin de recueillir l’information nécessaire. Pour disperser une foule peu hostile, l’option comprenant le plus grand nombre de lance-grenades non létaux s’est avérée la plus efficace. Pour disperser une foule hostile qui sert d’écran à une ou des personnes armées (kamikazes ou tireurs de grenades propulsées par fusée), une utilisation prolongée d’armes non létales a exposé l’équipe des BLEUS et des civils innocents à un danger accru puisque les insurgés ont eu davantage de temps pour mettre leur plan à exécution. Par conséquent, il a été conclu que la vitesse à laquelle la menace est déterminée est le point le plus essentiel. Dans le cadre de ce scénario, le moyen le plus efficace était l’escalade de la force. Il est donc tout indiqué d’effectuer un suivi sur la possibilité d’utiliser des armes non létales pour des objectifs non ponctuels (p. ex., arme acoustique, gaz CS, etc.). L’opinion du personnel militaire qui a participé à l’étude était qu’une telle capacité serait plus efficace que les munitions à traumatisme contondant utilisées.

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Executive Summary Director of Land Requirements 5 has requested that a study be conducted to determine the optimal distribution of non-lethal weapons at the Section level for reactive crowd confrontation operations (CCO). This study, denoted as NICKEL ABEYANCE III, is a continuation of the NICKEL ABEYANCE series that looks at the employment of non-lethal weapons in the context of CCO.

The scope of the study was as follows:

• The study was based on two scenarios involving a rifle Section conducting operations during daylight conditions within a semi-complex terrain equipped with blunt trauma non-lethal weapons. Scenario 1 involved dispersal of a relatively benign crowd while Scenario 2 involved identification and elimination of a lethal threat (suicide bombers and RPG gunners) in an otherwise benign crowd; and

• In order to focus on the Section level non-lethal weapons, no platoon level assets were available to be used.

The following key assumptions were made for this study:

• The non-lethal capability included M203 40 mm launchers with five (5) sponge rounds for each launcher, and/or a 12-gauge shotgun with five (5) drag-stabilized bean bags. The sponsor also wished to have pepper spray included, however this was not modeled since it was not applicable in the context of the ranges of engagement considered in the study scenarios;

• The incapacitation probability for a regular crowd member was assumed to be 90% for a single sponge round and 60% for a single bean bag round. In other words, a regular crowd member was considered incapacitated and posed no immediate threat after being hit by an average of two (2) bean bag rounds or an average of one (1) 40mm sponge round;

• A suicide bomber was assumed to require a greater number of hits, on average, to incapacitate (up to three (3) hits by the 40 mm sponge rounds or the 12-gauge bean bags, equivalent to 33% incapacitation probability per round). This reflected the assumption of a greater determination of the suicide bomber compared to other crowd members, and enabled his identification (and subsequent elimination by lethal force) by BLUE.

Following are the key findings from the study:

• For the investigated scenarios and under the assumptions made the effectiveness of the considered blunt trauma rounds was limited. It was difficult to hit the desired targets. In the first scenario, especially in the case of RED using women as human shields, it was very difficult to incapacitate legitimate targets (men) without accidentally hitting women. In the second scenario, the non-lethal capability employed was ineffective at quickly determining the adversarial intent of suicide bombers within the crowd, and a prolonged reliance on the non-lethal weapons actually had a detrimental effect on mission effectiveness by providing RED the ability to carry on with their intents;

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• The two considered rounds have a very short engagement range (under 20 m). In Scenario 1 it exposed BLUE to the rocks thrown by the crowd, and in Scenario 2 (suicide bomber) it did not allow for a safe standoff distance from a potential blast. The minimum recommended distance for non-lethal weapons is 35-50 m (outside of the rock-throwing range);

• For Scenario 1, the worst-case situation for BLUE was RED using women as human shields. Since it was assumed that hitting a woman aggravated the situation, in almost all of the cases there was escalation to the lethal force. None of the weapon mixes were sufficiently effective against this tactic;

• For Scenario 1, Option 2 (shotgun only) did not provide sufficient non-lethal capability. Lack of at least a second launcher led to a fast escalation to the lethal force. Furthermore, a 12-gauge shotgun does not have sufficient range to effectively deal with the threats encountered, and thus the operator was more exposed to rocks thrown by the crowd. Option 3 (two 40 mm launchers and a shotgun) was the best if human shields were not used by RED;

• In Scenario 2, under the assumptions made for the crowd behaviour, the two considered systems did not provide sufficient operational effectiveness. They did not enable rapid identification of the lethal threat in the crowd, giving RED time to carry on with their plans. The only means to identify the threat quickly enough was to escalate the force early, which is generally not desirable.

Based on the results of the study for the considered scenarios, the following recommendations are made:

• To confront a benign crowd, more non-lethal launchers seem to be beneficial, and the best out of the considered options was to have two M203 launchers and a 12-gauge shotgun;

• If there is a possibility that suicide bombers are using the crowd as a cover, a rapid identification of the threat is critical, and therefore a capability enabling rapid targeting of multiple individuals is desirable. The considered options were generally ineffective in providing a rapid identification, and an area-targeting capability might be more appropriate, and a follow-on investigation is recommended;

• Given the reality that a patrol in the context of the 3-block war (peacekeeping, counterinsurgency) could be confronted by a crowd, suicide bombers, approaching individuals with no hostile intent, or an insurgent ambush during the same patrol, it would desirable to investigate scenarios exploring the best combination of lethal and non-lethal capabilities in general counterinsurgency scenarios; and

• All of the scenarios in the Nickel Abeyance series focused on the employment of specific non-lethal weapons in crowd confrontation situations. It would be desirable to address the question of non-lethal capability requirements in a more comprehensive fashion, including anti-materiel and area denial weapons.

Dobias, P., Sprague, K., Bassindale, S., Sinclair, D., Demaine, J., Non-Lethal Weapon Mix Study: Non-Lethal Weapons in Reactive Crowd Confrontation, CAEn Wargame Nickel Abeyance III, DRDC CORA TM 2008-046

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Sommaire Le DBRT 5 a demandé qu’une étude soit effectuée afin de déterminer la distribution optimale d’armes non létales dans une section, pour les OAF. L’étude, intitulée NICKEL ABEYANCE III, est la suite de la série NICKEL ABEYANCE, qui porte sur l’utilisation d’armes non létales pour des OAF.

La portée de l’étude était la suivante :

• L’étude était basée sur deux scénarios pour une section de fusiliers effectuant des opérations de jour sur un terrain partiellement accidenté et avec des armes non létales à traumatisme contondant. Le premier scénario portait sur la dispersion d’une foule relativement peu hostile, alors que le deuxième portait sur la détermination et la neutralisation de la menace létale (kamikazes ou tireurs de grenades propulsées par fusée) au milieu d’une foule hostile;

• Afin de mettre l’accent sur les armes non létales d’une section, aucun actif du niveau du peloton n’était accessible dans les scénarios.

Les hypothèses clés suivantes ont été prises en considération dans le cadre de l’étude :

• La capacité non létale comprenait des lance-grenades M203 de 40 mm, avec cinq (5) munitions en mousse chacun, et/ou un fusil de calibre 12, avec cinq (5) sacs de fèves stabilisés. Le bureau responsable voulait également que des vaporisateurs au poivre de Cayenne soient mis à la disposition des militaires, mais cette option n’a pas été retenue puisque les distances d’engagement nécessaires ne pouvaient s’appliquer aux scénarios;

• La probabilité de neutralisation d’une personne dans la foule était de 90 % pour une munition en mousse et de 60% pour un sac de fèves. En d’autres mots, une personne dans la foule était considérée comme neutralisée et ne représentant pas une menace immédiate après avoir été atteinte par environ deux (2) sacs de fèves ou environ une (1) munition en mousse de 40 mm;

• Il a été présumé qu’un kamikaze devait être touché un plus grand nombre de fois, en moyenne, pour être neutralisé (atteint par jusqu’à trois [3] munitions en mousse de 40 mm ou sacs de fèves de calibre 12, ce qui équivaut à une neutralisation de 33% par munition). Cette présomption est principalement attribuable à la plus grande détermination du kamikaze comparativement aux autres membres de la foule. Par la suite, l’équipe des BLEUS a pu l’identifier (et subséquemment, l’éliminer en utilisant une force létale).

Les principales conclusions sont les suivantes :

• Selon les scénarios utilisés et les hypothèses établies, il a été déduit que l’efficacité des munitions à traumatisme contondant est restreinte. En effet, il était difficile d’atteindre les cibles. Dans le premier scénario, particulièrement dans le cas où l’équipe des ROUGES a utilisé des femmes comme bouclier humain, il était très difficile de neutraliser les cibles légitimes (hommes) sans toucher accidentellement les femmes. Dans le second scénario, la capacité non létale utilisée était inefficace pour déterminer rapidement l’intention d’opposition des kamikazes dans la foule, et l’utilisation prolongée des armes non létales a eu, en réalité, un effet néfaste sur

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l’efficacité de la mission puisque l’équipe des ROUGES a eu la possibilité d’exécuter son plan;

• Les deux types de munition utilisés ont une distance d’engagement très courte (moins de 20 m). Dans le premier scénario, l’équipe des BLEUS était à la portée des pierres lancées par la foule et dans le second (avec les kamikazes), la distance d’engagement ne permettait pas d’être à une distance sécuritaire pour éviter d’être blessé par une détonation potentielle. La distance minimale recommandée pour les armes non létales varie entre 35 et 50 m (plus loin que la portée des pierres lancées);

• Pour le premier scénario, la pire des situations pour l’équipe des BLEUS a été que l’équipe des ROUGES a utilisé des femmes comme bouclier humain. Étant donné qu’on avait pour hypothèse que le fait de blesser une femme aggraverait la situation, une escalade de la force létale a été observée dans la plupart des cas. Aucune combinaison d’armes n’a été suffisamment efficace contre cette stratégie;

• Pour le premier scénario, la seconde option (fusil uniquement) n’a pas fourni une capacité non létale acceptable. Le fait qu’il manquait un lance-grenades a mené à une rapide escalade de la force létale. De plus, la portée d’un fusil de calibre 12 n’est pas suffisante pour neutraliser efficacement les menaces. Le tireur était par conséquent plus exposé aux pierres lancées par la foule. La troisième option (deux lance-grenades de 40 mm et un fusil) aurait été la meilleure si l’équipe des ROUGES n’avait pas utilisé un bouclier humain;

• Dans le cadre du deuxième scénario et selon les hypothèses sur le comportement de la foule, les deux systèmes pris en considération n’ont pas fourni une efficacité opérationnelle suffisante. Ils n’ont pas permis d’identifier rapidement les personnes représentant une menace létale, ce qui a donné amplement de temps à l’équipe des ROUGES pour mettre ses plans à exécution. Le seul moyen d’identifier rapidement les personnes menaçantes était l’escalade précoce de la force, ce qui n’est généralement pas souhaitable.

En se basant sur les résultats de l’étude des scénarios utilisés, les recommandations suivantes ont été formulées :

• Pour affronter une foule peu hostile, un plus grand nombre de lance-grenades semble être avantageux et la meilleure option a été la combinaison de deux lance-grenades M203 et d’un fusil de calibre 12;

• S’il y a une possibilité que des kamikazes utilisent la foule comme écran, une identification rapide est primordiale. Par conséquent, il est préférable d’être en mesure de cibler rapidement plusieurs personnes. En général, les options considérées ont été inefficaces pour effectuer une identification rapide. C’est pourquoi une capacité de cibler un objectif non ponctuel serait plus appropriée;

• Il serait tout indiqué d’effectuer un suivi sur la possibilité d’utiliser des armes non létales pour objectifs non ponctuels (p. ex., arme acoustique, gaz CS, etc.) étant donné que les intervenants dans les deux scénarios ont jugé qu’une telle capacité serait plus efficace que les munitions à traumatisme contondant utilisées;

• Étant donné qu’il est fort probable qu’une patrouille, dans une guerre à trois volets (maintien de la paix, mesures anti-insurrectionnelles), puisse être confrontée par une

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foule, des kamikazes, des personnes peu hostiles ou des insurgés embusqués au cours d’une même journée, il serait préférable d’approfondir les scénarios afin d’examiner la meilleure combinaison de capacités létales et non létales pour des cas d’anti-insurrection;

• Tous les scénarios de la série Nickel Abeyance mettent l’accent sur l’utilisation d’armes non létales pour des OAF. Il serait donc opportun d’aborder la question des exigences en matière de capacité non létale d’une façon plus exhaustive, notamment les armes anti-matériel et anti-personnel.

Dobias, P., Sprague, K., Bassindale, S., Sinclair, D., Demaine, J., Non-Lethal Weapon Mix Study: Non-Lethal Weapons in Reactive Crowd Confrontation, CAEn Wargame Nickel Abeyance III:, DRDC CORA TM 2008-046

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Table of contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................ i

Résumé ....................................................................................................................................... ii

Executive Summary................................................................................................................... iii

Sommaire.................................................................................................................................... v

Table of contents ....................................................................................................................... ix

List of figures ........................................................................................................................... xii

List of tables ............................................................................................................................xiii

1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Background ...................................................................................................... 1

1.2. Aim................................................................................................................... 1

1.3. Objective .......................................................................................................... 1

1.4. Scope ................................................................................................................ 2

2. METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................ 4

2.1. Tools................................................................................................................. 4

2.1.1. CAEn................................................................................................... 4

2.1.2. Modeling Non-Lethal Weapons in CAEn........................................... 5

2.1.3. Crowd Behaviour ................................................................................ 5

2.1.4. Suicide Bomber................................................................................... 6

2.1.5. Other Weapons.................................................................................... 6

2.1.6. Sensors ................................................................................................ 6

2.2. Analysis ............................................................................................................ 6

2.2.1. Statistical Analysis .............................................................................. 7

2.2.2. Ranking Options.................................................................................. 7

2.3. Scenario 1: Crowd Dispersal ............................................................................ 7

2.3.1. General Setting.................................................................................... 7

2.3.2. Terrain................................................................................................. 8

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2.3.3. Forces .................................................................................................. 8

2.3.4. Blue Plan ............................................................................................. 9

2.3.5. Red Plan ............................................................................................ 10

2.3.6. Games and Replications.................................................................... 10

2.3.7. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) .................................................... 10

2.3.8. Relative Importance of MOEs .......................................................... 12

2.3.9. Measures of Performance (MOP) ..................................................... 12

2.4. Scenario 2: Adversarial Intent at a Checkpoint .............................................. 12

2.4.1. General Setting.................................................................................. 12

2.4.2. Terrain............................................................................................... 13

2.4.3. Forces ................................................................................................ 13

2.4.4. Blue Plan ........................................................................................... 14

2.4.5. Red Plan ............................................................................................ 15

2.4.6. Games and Replications.................................................................... 15

2.4.7. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) .................................................... 15

2.4.8. Relative Importance of MOEs .......................................................... 17

2.4.9. Measures of Performance (MOP) ..................................................... 17

3. Results for Scenario 1.................................................................................................. 18

3.1. Game History ................................................................................................. 18

3.2. Qualitative: Judgements and Insights ............................................................. 18

3.3. Quantitative Results for Scenario 1................................................................ 19

3.3.1. Mission Success ................................................................................ 19

3.3.2. Summary of MOEs ........................................................................... 19

3.3.3. MOPs ................................................................................................ 21

3.3.4. Summary for Scenario 1.................................................................... 22

4. Results for Scenario 2.................................................................................................. 23

4.1. Game History ................................................................................................. 23

4.2. Qualitative: Judgements and Insights ............................................................. 23

4.3. Quantitative Results for Scenario 2................................................................ 24

4.3.1. Mission Success ................................................................................ 24

4.3.2. BLUE RCS........................................................................................ 24

4.3.3. Civilian Fatalities .............................................................................. 25

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4.3.4. Summary of MOEs ........................................................................... 25

4.3.5. MOPs: Range of Engagement and Ammunition Expenditure .......... 27

4.3.6. Summary for Scenario 2.................................................................... 28

5. Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................................................................... 31

5.1. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 1 ................................................................ 31

5.2. Sensitivity Analysis for Scenario 2 ................................................................ 31

6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 35

6.1. Summary ........................................................................................................ 35

6.2. Recommendations .......................................................................................... 36

7. REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 37

Annex A: Non-Lethal Weapons Analysis for Joint Task Force Afghanistan........................... 39

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms .................................................................................. 41

Distribution List........................................................................................................................ 43

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List of figures

Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100m............................................ 8

Figure 2. BLUE Force and RED Force Dispositions for Scenario 1.......................................... 9

Figure 3. Terrain layout for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100m......................................... 13

Figure 4. BLUE Force and RED Force Dispositions for Scenario 2........................................ 14

Figure A.1. The 40 mm sponge round can disintegrate in high temperatures such as in Afghanistan. ...................................................................................................................... 40

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List of tables

Table 1. Non-Lethal Weapon Options........................................................................................ 2

Table 2. Mission Success definitions for Scenario 1................................................................ 11

Table 3. Scoring table for individual MOEs for Scenario 1. The best score is 10, the worst score is 0............................................................................................................................ 11

Table 4. MOE Weights for Scenario 1. .................................................................................... 12

Table 5. Mission Success Definitions for Scenario 2. .............................................................. 16

Table 6. Scoring table for individual MOEs for Scenario 2. The best score is 10, the worst score is 0............................................................................................................................ 16

Table 7. MOE weights for Scenario 2. ..................................................................................... 17

Table 8. Mission Success for Scenario 1. The sub-criteria, as well as the final assigned value between 0 and 2 are shown. .............................................................................................. 19

Table 9. Summary of MOEs for Scenario 1. ............................................................................ 20

Table 10. Scores for individual MOEs for Scenario 1.............................................................. 21

Table 11. MOPs for Scenario 1. ............................................................................................... 21

Table 12. Mission Success (score between 0 and 2) for Scenario 2. The variance expresses 95% confidence interval.................................................................................................... 24

Table 13. BLUE RCS for Scenario 2 (%)................................................................................. 25

Table 14. Civilian Fatalities for Scenario 2 (average number of fatalities)............................. 25

Table 15. Summary of MOE for Scenario 2............................................................................. 26

Table 16. Scores for individual MOEs for Scenario 2.............................................................. 27

Table 17. Range of Engagement (m) for Scenario 2. ............................................................... 27

Table 18. Average Relative Ammunition Expenditure (%) for Scenario 2.Only the replications of interactive Games in which a particular weapon was used were considered in the averages............................................................................................................................. 28

Table 19. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 1............................................................................ 32

Table 20. Sensitivity analysis for Scenario 2............................................................................ 33

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background The current and near-future security situation includes the possibility of facing a full spectrum of operations ranging from peace keeping, to peace enforcement, to counterinsurgency and up to all out combat. Furthermore, the nature of a conflict or confrontation can change rapidly, and multiple operations might be taking place concurrently within the same locale. This lead to the identification of a requirement for non-lethal capability, and in 2007 a (limited) preliminary investigation was performed by the analysts deployed with Joint Task Force Afghanistan (Annex A).

In the full spectrum of operations, one of the possible situations that the Canadian Forces must be prepared to handle is a Crowd Confrontation Operation (CCO). It was proposed that the CCO situations most likely to occur are those labelled “reactive CCO”. These situations occur when troops on a routine task encounter a situation where troops or mission success are threatened by a crowd, and a non-lethal response by the troops might be the best solution to avoid unnecessarily escalating the situation. Therefore it was deemed useful to assess effectiveness of various non-lethal weapon mixes in this type of scenarios.

Another possible situation warranting employment of non-lethal weapons is a cordon or a checkpoint operation. In this case the non-lethal weapons might be used to prevent unauthorized entry without unduly escalating the situation, or they might be employed to determine the adversarial intent of approaching individuals.

Director of Land Requirements 5 (DLR 5) has requested that a study be conducted to determine the optimal distribution of non-lethal weapons at the Section level for a reactive CCO situation. This study, denoted as NICKEL ABEYANCE III, is a continuation of the NICKEL ABEYANCE series that looks at the employment of non-lethal weapons in the context of CCO.

Previous parts of the series [ref. 1,2,3] focused on a pre-planned CCO at a company (platoon) level. These scenarios included combinations of non-lethal launchers and also a baton & shield line providing the first defence against the crowd. NICKEL ABEYANCE 3 assumes that the BLUE Force is not on a mission to confront a crowd. Rather, they are faced by an unexpected situation that requires dealing with a crowd. Consequently, there is no baton & shield capability available. Furthermore, as for the previous parts of the series, the study is limited to the consideration of blunt-trauma weapons intended to target selected individuals in a crowd. Two scenarios are considered – a patrol suddenly ambushed by a small ad hoc crowd, and a checkpoint faced by a small crowd including a possible suicide bomber and a RPG ambush using the crowd as a cover.

1.2. Aim The aim of this study is to determine the optimal distribution of selected non-lethal weapons at the Section level for reactive CCO situations during patrols and at ad hoc checkpoints.

1.3. Objective The objective of this study is to recommend the optimal non-lethal weapon distribution in the Infantry Section for reactive CCO situations in a potentially hostile environment. It is

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assumed that the dismounted Section needs to maintain a lethal capability at all times due to possible threats from insurgent or other armed elements. Table 1 outlines the non-lethal options considered for this study. It reflects the fact that a Section would carry two M203 grenade launchers that can be used either as a non-lethal (when used with sponge rounds) or as a lethal weapon (when used with high explosive rounds), and a shotgun that can be used either as a non-lethal launcher or to breach doors in urban combat. In addition to the M203 launcher operators, the Section would include a Section commander and 2IC armed with C8 assault rifles, two C9 light machine gunners, and two riflemen with C7 rifles. The shotgun is carried by one of the riflemen. It was assumed that the Section would be further supplemented by a translator who was modeled simply as an additional entity. Option 4 with one shotgun and one of the M203 launchers equipped with non-lethal rounds was added to investigate if there is any benefit in maintaining the HE capability of one of the launchers in the increased threat environment.

Table 1. Non-Lethal Weapon Options

Non-Lethal Weapon Options Distribution Options for Non-lethal Weapons Remarks

Option 1 2 x 40mm

Option 2 1 x 12-gauge

Option 3 2 x 40mm and 1 x 12-gauge Baseline

Option 4 1 x 40mm and 1 x 12-gauge Only for Scenario 2

1.4. Scope The scope of the study was as follows:

• The study was based on the results of two scenarios involving a rifle Section conducting operations during daylight conditions within a semi-complex terrain;

• In order to focus on the Section level non-lethal weapons, no platoon level assets were available to be used;

• This project used data gathered from current CCO Doctrine and TTPs to provide input to the modeling of the scenario; and

• Close Action Environment (CAEn) was used as the war-gaming tool for gathering the necessary information at the Section level. CAEn is described later in this document.

The following assumptions were made for this study:

• External elements, such as local police, medical staff, media effects and the use of loud hailers and speakers were not modeled. An interpreter was modeled, but only as an additional person with the BLUE section during the simulation;

• The non-lethal capability included five (5) 40 mm sponge rounds for each of the M203 launchers, and five (5) drag-stabilized 12 gauge bean bags for the shotgun. The sponsor also wished to have pepper spray included, however this was not modeled since it was not applicable in the context of the ranges of engagement applicable for the study scenarios;

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• The incapacitation probability for a regular crowd member was assumed to be 90% for a single sponge round and 60% for a single bean bag round. In other words, a regular crowd member was considered incapacitated and posed no immediate threat after being hit by an average of two (2) bean bag rounds or an average of one (1) 40mm sponge round (for the details see Section 2.1.2);

• A suicide bomber required a greater number of hits, on average, to incapacitate (up to three (3) hits by the 40 mm sponge rounds or the 12-gauge bean bags, equivalent to 33% incapacitation probability per round). This reflected the assumption of a greater determination of the suicide bomber compared to other crowd members, and enabled his identification (and subsequent elimination by lethal force) by BLUE;

• Possible fatalities caused by non-lethal rounds were not considered; and

• The crowd, referred to as RED Force, remained constant across all of the options for each of the vignettes. The assumptions for the crowd behaviour were crucial for the study, and are discussed separately in Section 2.1.3.

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2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. Tools For the conduct of this study a combat modelling tool, CAEn, was used for modeling the scenario and thereby generating and gathering the necessary effectiveness data.

2.1.1. CAEn

CAEn [4] is a close-combat interactive wargame capable of producing numerous non-interactive ‘replications’ of a scenario previously gamed by interactors. The replications are created by re-running the interactive game under a regeneration of the random chance events (e.g., ‘re-rolling the dice’ for detection, hit and kill probabilities). CAEn’s replication capability allows the analyst to generate large amounts of data for subsequent analysis. It is a multi-sided, multi-layered model that simulates combat systems and the environment at the tactical level. CAEn is a versatile tool for simulating ground combat mostly at the individual soldier, section and platoon levels and is capable of modeling many of the factors that influence the mission outcome. Military players control the movement of forces and react to detections and engagements by interacting with the computer through computer screens/keyboards. The screens provide each user with a two-dimensional, map-like overhead view of the battlefield and representations of various “sensor-eye” viewing applicable. In the overhead view, icons represent the forces involved and an array of menus allows the user to control his/her icons. The probability of each system detecting, and killing other systems must be accurately defined in the CAEn database.

CAEn results, like any wargame/simulation, are affected by the assumptions and modeling techniques used by the model’s developers. For example, the user interacts with a graphical screen that provides perfect situational awareness of the players’ forces. Therefore, it may be necessary to input external controls, such as start times for activities to account for communication delays, on those users who would not normally have access to battlefield management systems which allow commanders near-perfect command and control capabilities. Human factors such as training, morale, fatigue, fear and aiming error are not explicitly modeled. Consequently, weapon systems perform at their theoretical maximum rather than at their operational norm. These and other modeling limitations/anomalies do not diminish the CAEn output credibility, but require consideration when evaluating results. CAEn, while unable to provide definitive absolute outcomes for particular battles, is a powerful tool for supporting analyses of a wide range of options, such as operational impact assessment (including the effectiveness of combat systems, technology alternatives, force structure alternatives and development and validation of new and current TTPs) for different operations like conventional warfare, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations in urban and rural environments.

The study was conducted using CAEnXP Version 9.3.0.11 and DRDC CORA’s unclassified CAEn database. The parameters of the weapon systems that were used were defined in conjunction with the subject-matter experts (DLR 5 staff and interactors).

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2.1.2. Modeling Non-Lethal Weapons in CAEn

CAEn does not provide the capability to model non-lethal weapons directly. Furthermore, it does not include the ability to incapacitate targets temporarily. The latter is not a serious limitation, since the modeled scenarios happened within several minutes; thus sufficient recovery time was not available for the incapacitated targets.

Since only blunt-trauma weapons were modeled, there was a simple work-around bypassing the CAEn limitations. The non-lethal weapons were modeled as regular direct fire weapons. Their accuracy was lower than would be the accuracy of lethal rounds (due to lower speed and lower weight). The angular error for the non-lethal rounds was set to be about 0.5°. The maximum range of the 40 mm sponge round was set to be 46 m, while for the 12-gauge shotgun the maximum range was 33m. CAEn calculates the trajectory of a round given the accuracy characteristics. If the trajectory intersects the target, kill probability is used to determine the outcome. However, should the round miss the intended target, it will continue until it reaches either the end of its range, or another target. Consequently, unintended targets (e.g. women can be hit if the primary target is missed).

The incapacitation probabilities given hit of the two weapons were 90% for the 40 mm launcher and 60% for the shotgun regular crowd members. The values were decreased to 33% for both weapons for the suicide bombers given their determination to reach the BLUE troops and inflict casualties.

Realistically, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the incapacitation probabilities, since the actual effectiveness depends on many diverse factors such as physical build, resistance to pain, and determination [5]. The latter is extremely difficult to quantify, since there are no actual studies concerning the psychological effects of non-lethal weapons.

A special type of weapon was designed in the study to represent rocks thrown by the crowd. They were modeled as a hand grenade with a very low kill probability (5%) and a small kill radius (0.5 m). It was assumed that the maximum range of the rocks was 30 m.

2.1.3. Crowd Behaviour

The crowd behaviour presented yet another uncertainty in the study (besides the effects of non-lethal weapons). The assumptions for the crowd dynamics were based on the review performed by LFORT in 2006 [6]. The key assumptions for Scenario 1 of the study – ad hoc crowd – were:

• The general crowd was not overly determined, with little inclination towards aggression;

• The BLUE Force had to demonstrate sufficient resolve to disperse the crowd;

• A certain number of incapacitations had to be achieved to demonstrate BLUE determination (one third of the men – five – had to be incapacitated);

• The crowd was especially sensitive to a woman being hit – such an event would increase the determination and aggression of the crowd (the number of required incapacitations would increase to 50% of the men – 8 men); and

• The crowd was not resolute enough to withstand fatalities; therefore it was assumed that a single fatality would disperse the crowd.

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For Scenario 2 of the study – checkpoint – there was a limited crowd confrontation. It was assumed that a regular person would be discouraged from continuing towards the checkpoint by a single hit whether incapacitated or not. It was further assumed that the suicide bomber would continue until incapacitated or killed. This assumption meant that if the individual continued after two hits, it was positively identified as a threat, and consequently BLUE were justified in using lethal force since the individual had just demonstrated his adversarial intent.

2.1.4. Suicide Bomber

A suicide bomber was gamed in the checkpoint scenario. He was modeled as having a short-range (essentially zero) range high-explosive (HE) weapon. The lethal radius for the suicide bomber was 4.0 m, with the kill probability dependent on the distance from the centre of explosion. At 2 m distance the kill probability against standing or kneeling infantry was 98%, at 3 m it was 60%, and at 4 m it was 15%. The suppression radius for the suicide bomber was 10 m. The blast was assumed to be strong enough to damage a building. The ranges were selected arbitrarily since in reality a lethal radius of a suicide bomber could vary significantly.

2.1.5. Other Weapons

Other weapons considered for the BLUE Force were the C7A1 (5.56 mm), C9 light machine gun (5.56 mm), and HE rounds for the M203 40 mm launcher. In some of the options RED used the RPG 7. These simulated weapons relied on parameters from the standard Canadian CAEn database.

2.1.6. Sensors

Both scenarios assumed daytime conditions. No specialty sensors were used; all the BLUE and RED actors used only the standard eyeball as a sensor. It has a 60° field of view (FOV), and no magnification. Its maximum range is 1000 m.

2.2. Analysis The results of the study are dependent on the assumptions made for the physical and physiological effects of non-lethal weapons. Since there is a significant degree of uncertainty in these assumptions, and no general consensus among experts, it needs to be reiterated here that the findings are valid for the assumptions made in the context of modeled scenarios. While they provide certain insights that can be generalized for a wider range of scenarios and assumptions, the particular results (rate of mission success, casualty numbers) etc. are valid only in the context of modeled scenarios.

There are two types of results in this study:

Qualitative Results. Qualitative results were based on Military Judgments and Insights (J&I). J&I are formulated through group discussions between the game players. The results of J&I were based on careful synthesis of players’ observations during war-gaming combined with individual expertise and background.

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Quantitative Results. Quantitative results were based on the statistical analysis of specific measures of effectiveness (MOEs) extracted from CAEn replication output files. J&I were supported by quantitative analysis where possible.

2.2.1. Statistical Analysis

Two ways of estimating statistical significance of differences among results were used. If the rankings could be determined using pair-wise comparisons, the overlap of 95% confidence intervals (1.96 x uncertainty in the mean1 [7]) was used. If there was an instance when out of three (or more) options {A,B,C}, options A and C both had an overlap with option B, but they themselves did not overlap, the pair-wise comparison could not be used. In such cases an ANOVA-based tool called BRANDO was used [8]. The results obtained for individual measures were then combined to obtain final rankings of the analyzed options.

2.2.2. Ranking Options

Traditionally, LFORT used a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) tool called MARCUS [9]. One of the drawbacks of MARCUS is that it only considers relative rankings of the individual measures, rather than the relative performance on these measures. Therefore it is not able to provide any information about by how much is one option better than another. It also does not capture the possibility that one option far outperforms the others on one measure, but does not perform so well on the rest of the measures. Therefore, while the rankings using MARCUS were still used as a baseline, an alternative scoring method was utilized to capture these differences in the relative performance of individual measures.

An absolute scale was devised for each MOE to prevent rank-switching in case one or more options was removed from consideration in the post-analysis stage. The scores ranged between zero (0) and ten (10), and were common for all measures to enable comparison across measures. The detailed scoring tables were scenario dependent, and are shown in Sections 2.3.7 and 2.4.7. In the end, the scores were combined with the relative weights of the individual MOEs to obtain the final weighted scores (and ranks) of the considered options.

Sensitivity of the rank order with respect to variations (i.e., uncertainty) in the relative MOE weights was also tested.

2.3. Scenario 1: Crowd Dispersal

2.3.1. General Setting

In a bombing by friendly forces, an innocent civilian in a nearby village was accidentally killed. The BLUE forces are still patrolling the area in an attempt to maintain a presence in the area and to find more of the enemy forces. A small crowd has gathered on the outskirts of the village to protest the killing. The protestors confront the BLUE Force patrolling down a

1 Uncertainty in the mean is estimated from standard deviation as ( ) )1(22 −−= nnxxxδ . It expresses the probability of an obtained value to differ from the actual mean if an infinite number of measurements were performed.

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dirt track near the village. While the villagers are angry because of the killing, they are not ready for a full-blown confrontation leading to more fatalities.

R ED F orce

B LU E Force

B LU E Patrol Path 3 Feet-high

W alls

100 m

Figure 1. Terrain layout for Scenario 1. The grid spacing is 100m.

2.3.2. Terrain

The terrain (Figure 1) used for Scenario 1 was based on the McKenna (1km x 1km) Mixed Open Urban Terrain (MOUT) site in Fort Benning, Georgia. A few minor changes were made to this terrain for tactical reasons. It was assumed that BLUE had to remain on the patrol path (marked by blue arrows) because of a possible mine/IED threat.

2.3.3. Forces

The BLUE Force consisted of a dismounted infantry section complete with all of their usual weapon systems and including non-lethal rounds for the 2 x M203s and 12-gauge shotgun. The section also had an interpreter with them appropriate for the theatre of operations (modeled only as an additional individual present). At the time of the encounter, the BLUE Force was undertaking a routine presence patrol in the vicinity of a village. BLUE would move in a staggered fashion, appropriate for the high-risk area of operation in order not to be

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a concentrated target. The formation would be maintained during the confrontation, with the non-lethal weapons positions at the leading edge of the staggered columns.

The RED Force consisted of 30 personnel from a village comprised of 15 men and 15 women/children. They have an unlimited supply of rocks available if required. They have no other weapons at their disposal. Their intent is not to kill anyone from the BLUE Force, but to show their displeasure with the senseless killing.

Figure 2 shows the BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 1.

RED Force Gathering around

intersection

BLUE Force in patrol formation

Figure 2. BLUE Force and RED Force Dispositions for Scenario 1.

2.3.4. Blue Plan

Initially, the BLUE Force was conducting a routine patrol operation and had to complete its task on time. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were based on the Escalation of Force policy2. For gaming purposes, the next step of the escalation of force was not carried out until it became obvious that the previous step was ineffective. If a BLUE Force member became incapacitated, then automatically the BLUE Force would escalate to the use of lethal force. Also, if the group did not disperse after all the non-lethal ammunition was used, then lethal warning shots were fired by the BLUE Force, and as these were assumed to be ineffective, lethal force was used.

2 These are omitted here for security classification reasons.

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BLUE’s objective was to successfully complete its patrol and reach its objective. The least force required to dissipate the crowd was to be used. The BLUE Force had two tactical variations that were played. First, the BLUE Force would “punch through” the crowd as time was of the essence. The BLUE Force moved quickly to disperse the crowd in order to complete its mission. The second tactical option considered the situation in which the BLUE Force would “stand off” from the crowd as there was more time available to persuade the crowd to disperse and the BLUE Force would be farther from the crowd.

2.3.5. Red Plan

Initially, RED planned to demonstrate peacefully. They were extremely unhappy about the “senseless” death of one of their villagers. However, after a brief verbal engagement with the BLUE Force, the crowd became unhappy with the outcome. They began to throw rocks at BLUE in an attempt to stop them from continuing down the road. The RED Force ultimately wanted BLUE to turn around and go back to their camp. RED would continue to demonstrate and throw rocks until at least five (5) of their group became incapacitated by the non-lethal rounds. Under normal circumstances, when five had been thus incapacitated the group dispersed. However, if women or children were hit with any projectiles from the BLUE Force, the group became more aggravated and now eight (8) of their group had to be non-lethally incapacitated before they dispersed. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the warning shots did not have any effect on the crowd, but once one (1) villager had been killed, the crowd dispersed.

A third tactical option was considered in addition to the two BLUE options. In this third option, the BLUE Force would have to deal with RED using some of their constituents (women) as “human shields”.

2.3.6. Games and Replications

As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any potential learning curve effects. Once players were familiar with the games, each of the options (three weapon mixes, with three possible tactical scenarios for each of them) was gamed five times for a total of 45 games. For each game played, 20 non-interactive replications were generated.

2.3.7. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

The following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the BLUE Force in Scenario 1:

• Mission Success. This is the measure of how successfully the BLUE Force performed its mission, that being the ability to extract the patrol with no loss on either side. A detailed definition of Mission Success is in Table 2;

• RED Fatalities. This MOE considers if there was a fatality caused by the use of lethal force in the crowd. Since it was assumed that a single fatality would be enough to disperse the crowd, this MOE can only have value of zero or one for each replication. Thus the average number of RED fatalities will be between zero and one and will

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express the portion of instances when there was a fatality. The desired end state is no fatalities; and

• BLUE Residual Combat Strength (RCS). This is the measure of the capability of the BLUE Force to be able to conduct another mission (without reinforcements). It is defined as the number of BLUE remaining at the end divided by the initial number of BLUE. The desired end state is 100%. A note must be included here. Since RED only had rocks (non-lethal capability), the BLUE casualties would be incapacitations, not fatalities.

Table 2. Mission Success definitions for Scenario 1.

Type of Mission Success

Crowd Disperses BLUE Fatality RED Fatality Score

Full Yes No No 2

Yes Yes No 1 Partial

Yes No Yes 1

No No No 0 Fail

No Yes Yes 0

Table 3 contains the scoring table for Scenario 1. The scores were selected so that they uniformly span the entire possible value range for Mission Success (between 0 and 2) and RED Fatalities (between 0 and 1) as discussed earlier. For the BLUE RCS, a value of more than one casualty per replication (on average) was deemed unacceptable. Therefore the values of RCS less than 90% were given score of zero. The interval between 90% and 100% was mapped uniformly to the scores 0 to 10.

Table 3. Scoring table for individual MOEs for Scenario 1. The best score is 10, the worst score is 0.

Mission Success RED Fatality Blue RCS

Value Range (0 – 2)

Score Value Range (0 – 1)

Score Value Range (0 - 100%)

Score

0.00 0 0.91 – 1.00 0 0.0 – 90.9 0

0.01 – 0.20 1 0.81 – 0.90 1 91.0 – 91.9 1

0.21 – 0.40 2 0.71 – 0.80 2 92.0 – 92.9 2

0.41 – 0.60 3 0.61 – 0.70 3 93.0 – 93.9 3

0.61 – 0.80 4 0.51 – 0.60 4 94.0 – 94.9 4

0.81 – 1.00 5 0.41 – 0.50 5 95.0 – 95.9 5

1.01 – 1.20 6 0.31 – 0.40 6 96.0 – 96.9 6

1.21 – 1.40 7 0.21 – 0.30 7 97.0 – 97.9 7

1.41 – 1.60 8 0.11 – 0.20 8 98.0 – 98.9 8

1.61 – 1.80 9 0.01 – 0.10 9 99.0 – 99.9 9

1.81 – 2.00 10 0.00 10 100.0 10

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2.3.8. Relative Importance of MOEs

Table 4 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision concerning which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to quantify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights that were chosen.

Table 4. MOE Weights for Scenario 1.

Measure of Effectiveness Weight (%)

Mission Success 60

RED Fatalities 20

BLUE Residual Combat Strength 20

TOTAL 100

2.3.9. Measures of Performance (MOP)

A set of MOPs was used to provide further insight into the results. The MOPs characterize weapon performance rather than operational effectiveness, and therefore were not used in ranking the considered options. However, they can provide useful information, or flag potential problems associated with a particular option. The following MOPs were used:

a. Range of Engagement. This is the average engagement range at which the non-lethal rounds were fired;

b. Non-Lethal Ammunition Expenditure. This MOE measures the average number of rounds expended by each weapon; and

c. Ammunition Effectiveness. This ratio is based upon the number of non-lethal rounds fired to the number of effective hits.

2.4. Scenario 2: Adversarial Intent at a Checkpoint

2.4.1. General Setting

In a small compound, friendly forces are holding meetings with local leaders and have cordoned off the road leading into the compound. BLUE forces are not allowing anyone entry to the compound while the meetings are taking place. A small crowd has gathered outside the compound. Unknown to the BLUE Force, enemy terrorists are mixed in with the regular civilian population and are part of the crowd that has gathered near the cordoned off area. Some of these terrorists are in fact suicide bombers who wish to get close to the meeting that is taking place in the compound.

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2.4.2. Terrain

The terrain (Figure 3) used for Scenario 2 was developed by the interactors specifically for this scenario. The cordoned off area was close to a bridge over a river. The distance between the bridge and the gate was used as a natural exclusion area (no access to civilians). BLUE would be positioned at the gate to the compound.

Compound

River Bridge

Roadway

100 m

Figure 3. Terrain layout for Scenario 2. The grid spacing is 100m.

2.4.3. Forces

The BLUE Force consisted of a dismounted infantry section complete with all of their usual weapon systems and including non-lethal rounds for the 2 x M203s and 12-gauge shotgun. The section also had an interpreter with them appropriate for the theatre of operations. The BLUE Force has been given the task to cordon off the main entrance to the compound and ensure that no one gains entrance to the compound.

The RED Force was composed of a 30-person crowd, consisting of women (14) and men (16). Two (2) of the men and two (2) of the women were in fact suicide bombers. The RED Force also had an RPG team of two (2) terrorists that were used in one of the RED options. The intent of the majority of the RED Force was curiosity. They simply wanted to find out what is going on in the compound by getting closer. These people would have very low determination to approach the compound, and were easily scared off. The suicide bombers were trying to get as close to the compound as they could to achieve maximum destruction when they detonated their device. They were highly determined to reach the objective.

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Figure 4 shows the BLUE and RED Force dispositions for Scenario 2.

RED Force Disposition

BLUE Force Disposition

Figure 4. BLUE Force and RED Force Dispositions for Scenario 2.

2.4.4. Blue Plan

Initially, the BLUE Force was conducting a cordon operation to ensure that the meetings taking place in the compound were secure. No one was allowed to pass through while the meetings were in session. The cordon was being set up and manned by a Rifle Section, armed with both lethal and non-lethal weapons. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were as follows:

• Once RED crosses the river, employ non-lethal force to warn and stop penetrators;

• If a person continues after being hit by two (2) non-lethal rounds, resort to the established Escalation of Force procedures;

• In self-defence, use non-lethal capability against non-lethal threats (in this study rocks were assumed to be a non-lethal capability as mentioned in Section 2.3.7);

• If RED uses lethal force, respond with lethal force against positively identified targets. This includes suicide bomber, and RPG gunners; and

• If non-lethal capability is unavailable, resort to the established Escalation of Force procedures.

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The BLUE objective was to successfully protect the cordoned area with no civilian or BLUE casualties. For this specific scenario it included preventing any suicide bombers in the crowd from detonating by incapacitating or killing them.

2.4.5. Red Plan

Initially, the majority of the RED Force was curious as to what was going on in the compound, and attempted to get close to see what was happening. However, mixed in with the crowd were suicide bombers intent on disrupting the meetings and causing maximum destruction. They were determined to try whatever was necessary to get as close as possible to the entrance of the compound before detonating. Three options were played for RED Force tactics:

• R1: A group of 3-5 people moving towards the entrance of the compound, in which one is a suicide bomber;

• R2: A group of 3-5 people moving towards the entrance of the compound, in which one is a suicide bomber and the rest of the crowd is throwing rocks; and

• R3: A group of 3-5 people moving towards the entrance of the compound, in which one is a suicide bomber and a secondary attack with an RPG occurs at the entrance to the compound.

2.4.6. Games and Replications

An additional option was included for Scenario 2. It was to assess the possibility of keeping only one M203 launcher equipped with non-lethal rounds, while the second one used regular HE rounds. As part of the learning process, the players used practice games to better acquaint themselves with the tactics to be employed as well as to reduce any potential learning curve effects. Once players were familiar with the games, each of the options (four weapon mixes, with three possible tactical scenarios for each of them) was gamed five times for a total of 60 games. For each game played, there were 20 non-interactive replications run.

2.4.7. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

The following MOEs were used to assess the relative capabilities of the BLUE Force in Scenario 2:

• Mission Success. This measures how successfully the BLUE Force performed its mission, that being to protect the meeting site by eliminating the bomber with no loss among either BLUE or civilians. The detailed definition of Mission Success is in Table 5;

• Civilian Fatalities. This MOE measures the number of fatalities caused by lethal rounds. The desired end state is no civilian fatalities (the suicide bomber or RPG gunners were considered a legitimate target); and

• BLUE Residual Combat Strength. This is the measure of the capability of the BLUE Force to be able to conduct another mission (without reinforcements). It is defined as the number of BLUE remaining at the end divided by the initial number of BLUE.

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The desired end state is 100%. Unlike in Scenario 1, the BLUE casualties in this case were actual fatalities caused by the suicide bomber or the RPG gunner.

Table 5. Mission Success Definitions for Scenario 2.

Type of Mission Success

Bomber Incapacitated BLUE Fatality CIV Fatality Score

Full Yes No No 2

Yes Yes No 1 Partial

Yes No Yes 1

No No No 0 Fail

No Yes Yes 0

Like for Scenario 1, a scoring system was used to provide rankings together with an estimate of the relative performance of the individual options for Scenario 2. Table 6 contains the scoring table that was used. Like for Scenario 1, the scores for Mission Success uniformly span the entire possible value range. For the Civilian Fatalities, it was determined that the desired state is no fatalities, so this end-state was given a score of 10. It was also determined that more than five fatalities are unacceptable, so anything more than five was given score of 0. The rest was distributed almost uniformly, with the exception of the score of 1, which spanned the range between four and five casualties. For the BLUE RCS it was deemed unacceptable to lose more than half of the Section, and the desired state was no losses at all. Like for the Civilian Casualties, the distribution was almost uniform, with the exception for the score of 1 when the interval was slightly larger.

Table 6. Scoring table for individual MOEs for Scenario 2. The best score is 10, the worst score is 0.

Mission Success Civilian Fatalities Blue RCS

Value Range (0 – 2) Score

Value Range (number of killed) Score

Value Range (%) Score

0.00 0 More than 5.0 0 0 – 49 0

0.01 – 0.20 1 4.1 – 5.0 1 50 – 59 1

0.21 – 0.40 2 3.6 – 4.0 2 60 – 64 2

0.41 – 0.60 3 3.1 – 3.5 3 65 – 69 3

0.61 – 0.80 4 2.6 – 3.0 4 70 – 74 4

0.81 – 1.00 5 2.1 – 2.5 5 75 – 79 5

1.01 – 1.20 6 1.6 – 2.0 6 80 – 84 6

1.21 – 1.40 7 1.1 – 1.5 7 85 – 89 7

1.41 – 1.60 8 0.6 – 1.0 8 90 – 94 8

1.61 – 1.80 9 0.1 – 0.5 9 95 – 99 9

1.81 – 2.00 10 0.00 10 100.0 10

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2.4.8. Relative Importance of MOEs

Table 7 contains the weights of individual MOEs arrived at in consultation between the research team and the sponsor. The weights convey the relative importance of each MOE to the decision on which option is better. A sensitivity analysis was performed to verify the dependence of the outcome on the relative MOE weights.

Table 7. MOE weights for Scenario 2.

Measure of Effectiveness Weight (%)

Mission Success 60

Civilian Fatalities 20

BLUE Residual Combat Strength 20

TOTAL 100

2.4.9. Measures of Performance (MOP)

Two MOPs were used to provide further insight into the results of Scenario 2:

a. Range of Engagement. This is the average engagement range at which the non-lethal rounds were fired; and

b. Relative Non-Lethal Ammunition Expenditure. This MOE measures the average number of rounds expended by each weapon relative to the initial load.

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3. Results for Scenario 1

3.1. Game History All of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no problems or difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans. The key to BLUE success was to maintain a reasonable distance between the crowd and the soldiers, and to avoid inadvertently incapacitating female crowd members. For the modeled scenario, hitting a female crowd member resulted in a situation where BLUE did not have sufficient non-lethal rounds remaining to incapacitate the required number of men.

3.2. Qualitative: Judgements and Insights J&I are the opinions of the military war gamers and should be considered in relation to the quantitative results and analysis. The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 1:

• Generally speaking, the more non-lethal weapons that BLUE had, the more likely that the situation could be resolved without using lethal force.

• The M203 sponge round created the best stand-off distance between the BLUE and RED Forces. This of course allowed BLUE to stay farther away from the harassing rocks that were being thrown at them.

• The interactors felt that the reloading of the M203 was a problem. It took too much time between rounds and allowed the RED Force to recover and the opportunity to throw more rocks.

• The option with only the 12-gauge caused BLUE to utilize lethal force earlier than the other options due to lower accuracy, faster ammunition expenditure (due to a fast rate of fire) and a lack of stand-off.

• It was noticed that the initial targets of the RED Force were the soldiers with the non-lethal weapons. This was probably due to the fact that they were the closest to RED, as they had to get closer to be within the range to use the non-lethal weapons.

• The BLUE tactic of “punching through” caused a faster expenditure of non-lethal rounds and therefore earlier use of lethal force. It also seemed that more women were shot using this tactic, probably due to less time aiming and being in a hurry to get through the crowd.

• The BLUE tactic of “standing-off” was the most effective one. More space was created between the two forces and there was better command and control. However, this tactic usually caused the 12-gauge to be out of range and it had to move closer to fire effectively.

• The RED tactic of using women as “human shields” caused the BLUE Force to take longer to identify targets and try not to hit the women. However, it seemed inevitable that some women would get shot in this scenario by both non-lethal and lethal fire.

• The considered non-lethal weapon systems were not ideal for this type of scenario. It would have been preferable to have the ability to target a general area rather than to randomly select targets in the crowd. The lack of ability to target a general area was most felt if RED used women as human shields.

UNCLASSIFIED


3.3. Quantitative Results for Scenario 1 Following are the results of Scenario 1. To summarize the considered options, there were three weapon mixes (NLW Mix) – Options 1 (two 40 mm launchers), 2 (one 12 gauge shotgun), and 3 (two 40 mm launchers and one shotgun). These are marked OP1, OP2, and OP3. There were three tactical options (TTP) – SB (BLUE stand back and disperse the crowd), PT (BLUE pushes through the crowd) and HS (RED using women as human shields).

3.3.1. Mission Success

As shown in Table 2, Mission Success contained three components. To achieve full success, the crowd had to be dispersed within 60 seconds, with neither RED nor BLUE fatalities. In that case the Mission Success value would be 2. If the crowd was dispersed with some fatalities, Mission Success would be 1. If the crowd was not dispersed, Mission Success was given a value of 0. These values were then averaged over all replications for each RED and BLUE option. The results for individual criteria, as well as the overall average Mission Success are shown in Table 8. It can be concluded that the inability to disperse the crowd quickly was primarily responsible for the lower scores in Mission Success. Furthermore, the lower scores were usually coupled with a higher incidence of RED fatalities. On the other hand, BLUE casualties (non-lethal, caused by rocks) were rare, as was expected, since RED only had rocks, and no lethal weapons.

Table 8. Mission Success for Scenario 1. The sub-criteria, as well as the final assigned value between 0 and 2 are shown.

TTP NLW Mix *Crowd Dispersed

(% of success) BLUE Casualty

(% of occurrences) Civilian Fatality

(% of occurrences) Mission Success

(Value, 0-2)

OP1 3 ± 3 5 ± 3 42 ± 8 0.06 ± 0.05

OP2 31 ± 7 8 ± 4 86 ± 5 0.31 ± 0.07 HS

OP3 9 ± 4 6 ± 4 43 ± 8 0.17 ± 0.09

OP1 24 ± 7 2 ± 2 13 ± 5 0.49 ± 0.13

OP2 56 ± 8 0 ± 0 81 ± 6 0.58 ± 0.08 SB

OP3 64 ± 8 2 ± 2 5 ± 3 1.24 ± 0.15

OP1 79 ± 6 3 ± 3 0 ± 0 1.55 ± 0.13

OP2 45 ± 8 4 ± 3 56 ± 8 0.58 ± 0.11 PT

OP3 70 ± 7 2 ± 2 0 ± 0 1.39 ± 0.14

* To qualify, the crowd must have dispersed within 60 seconds of the first casualty.

3.3.2. Summary of MOEs

In general there was a very small difference in the number of BLUE casualties across all of the options, and consequently the BLUE RCS was almost 100% across all options. With regard to RED fatalities, Option 2, containing only a shotgun, performed by far the worst for both PT and SB scenarios. There was only a small difference between Options 1 (containing only two 40 mm launchers) and 3 (containing two 40 mm launchers and a shotgun) for this MOE across all possible tactical options.

UNCLASSIFIED


With respect to Mission Success, if RED used women as human shields, surprisingly the option containing only the shotgun performed best. This was likely caused by the fact that the non-lethal rounds were expended very quickly, forcing earlier escalation to lethal force, thus dispersing the crowd faster. In this particular case the requirement of dispersing the crowd within 60 seconds might have been too restrictive. For the option in which BLUE decided to stand back and disperse the crowd, Option 3 far outperformed the other two options. If BLUE pushed through the crowd, there was a difference between Options 1 and 3. Overall, the two options containing two 40 mm launchers (with or without the shotgun) performed comparably well, outperforming Option 2, which had only a single non-lethal launcher (shotgun). The results are shown in Table 9. The ranks on individual MOEs were obtained using BRANDO, and the total ranks were subsequently obtained using MARCUS (see Section 2.2).

Table 9. Summary of MOEs for Scenario 1.

TTP NLW Mix Mission Success

(0..2) RED Fatality

(average, 0-1) RCS (%) Total*

Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Rank OP1 0.06 ± 0.05 2 0.42 ± 0.08 1 99.38 ± 0.44 1 2 OP2 0.31 ± 0.07 1 0.86 ± 0.05 2 99.17 ± 0.45 1 1 HS OP3 0.17 ± 0.09 2 0.43 ± 0.08 1 99.31 ± 0.42 1 2 OP1 0.49 ± 0.13 2 0.13 ± 0.05 2 99.79 ± 0.23 2 2 OP2 0.58 ± 0.08 2 0.81 ± 0.06 3 100.00 ± 0.00 1 2 SB OP3 1.24 ± 0.15 1 0.05 ± 0.03 1 99.79 ± 0.23 2 1 OP1 1.55 ± 0.13 1 0.00 ± 0.00 1 99.65 ± 0.30 1 1 OP2 0.58 ± 0.11 2 0.56 ± 0.08 2 99.51 ± 0.36 1 2 PT OP3 1.39 ± 0.14 1 0.00 ± 0.00 1 99.79 ± 0.23 1 1

* Rankings obtained using MARCUS

In terms of total scores (Table 10), the relative performance of the weapon mixes (Options 1 to 3) reinforced the observations made above. For the situation with RED using women as human shields there was very little difference between the three options, with Option 2 slightly lagging behind. For the option when BLUE stayed back and attempted to disperse the crowd, Option 3 far outperformed the other two options. For the option when BLUE decided to push through the crowd Option 1 actually slightly outperformed Option 3, but the difference was rather small, and both Options 1 and 3 far outperformed Option 2.

UNCLASSIFIED


Table 10. Scores for individual MOEs for Scenario 1.

TTP NLW Mix Mission Success

(60%) RED Fatality

(20%) RCS

(20%) Total Score

(0-1000) Rank

OP1 1 5 9 340 1 OP2 2 1 9 320 2 HS OP3 1 5 9 340 1 OP1 2 8 9 460 2 OP2 3 1 10 400 3 SB OP3 7 9 9 780 1 OP1 8 10 9 860 1 OP2 3 4 9 440 3 PT OP3 7 10 9 800 2

3.3.3. MOPs

MOPs provide insight into the performance of the considered systems (e.g., weapons), but they do not measure the operational effectiveness directly. Therefore they are only listed here, without any bearing on the rankings of individual options. Three MOPs were considered – range of engagement, non-lethal ammunition expenditure, and non-lethal ammunition effectiveness. The results are below in Table 11. Separate values are shown for the 40 mm launcher and for the shotgun. As a reminder, there were ten rounds available for the two 40 mm launchers (five each) and five rounds available for the shotgun. The lower effectiveness of the shotgun was caused by two factors – smaller effect of a hit on an individual and lower accuracy of the shotgun. Only in the “Push Through” option all of the non-lethal ammunition was consistently used up. The range of both weapons was rather short, with the shotgun being usually employed at a very close range (about 10 m) and the 40 mm launcher being employed at slightly further range (20 m). The ammunition effectiveness is a combination of the weapon accuracy and the probability of incapacitation. Since, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, the physiological effects of the non-lethal weapons are not well understood, and can vary significantly from person to person, the values are only guidance in an “average” sense.

Table 11. MOPs for Scenario 1.

NL Ammo Expenditure (number of rounds) NL Ammo Effectiveness

(%) Range of Engagement (m)

TTP NLW Mix 40 mm

launcher 12-gauge shotgun

40 mm launcher

12-gauge shotgun

40 mm launcher

12-gauge shotgun

OP1 9.0 +/- 0.3 --- 83 +/- 2 --- 16.1 +/- 0.3 --- OP2 --- 4.9 +/- 0.1 --- 52 +/- 3 --- 13.7 +/- 0.3 HS OP3 7.2 +/- 0.4 4.3 +/- 0.1 79 +/- 2 45 +/- 3 17.1 +/- 0.4 12.7 +/- 0.4 OP1 8.2 +/- 0.3 --- 66 +/- 3 --- 21.4 +/- 0.7 --- OP2 --- 4.4 +/- 0.2 --- 46 +/- 4 --- 12.8 +/- 0.5 SB OP3 5.6 +/- 0.3 2.9 +/- 0.1 74 +/- 3 47 +/- 5 19.4 +/- 0.5 13.9 +/- 0.6 OP1 5.7 +/- 0.2 --- 93 +/- 2 --- 12.6 +/- 0.5 --- OP2 --- 5.0 +/- 0.0 --- 67 +/- 4 --- 7.2 +/- 0.4 PT OP3 4.2 +/- 0.3 2.9 +/- 0.2 98 +/- 5 67 +/- 6 13.9 +/- 0.5 8.6 +/- 0.6

UNCLASSIFIED


3.3.4. Summary for Scenario 1

Following are the key points identified from the analysis:

• Use of blunt trauma rounds for this type of scenario proved to be fairly difficult and not too effective. Despite efforts to target only men, due to crowd movements, low speed, and high drag (and thus dependence on environmental conditions such as wind), fairly often a woman was hit. This aggravated the situation and often led to the necessity to escalate force to a lethal level.

• The worst-case scenario for BLUE was the HS scenario (RED using women as human shields). There was not a great difference between the PT and SB tactics. A caveat needs to be included here. In a real-life situation, pushing through the crowd would expose BLUE to the possibility of RED grabbing their weapons. This was impossible to model in CAEn.

• Under the study assumptions, none of the weapon mixes were sufficiently effective against the human shield (HS) tactic3. This corroborates well with the observation made in J&I that it would be desirable to have area weapons available that would allow for targeting the crowd in general, rather than trying to hit particular individuals with blunt trauma rounds. While in Option 2 (shotgun only) BLUE were somewhat effective in dispersing the crowd that was using women as human shields, it was only because they were forced to escalate to lethal force very quickly, which actually contradicted the stated mission objective.

• Option 2 (shotgun only) did not provide sufficient non-lethal capability. Lack of at least a second launcher led to a more frequent and much earlier escalation to lethal force. Furthermore, the 12-gauge shotgun does not have sufficient range to deal with the threats effectively, and thus the operator was more exposed to the rocks thrown by the crowd. This was especially problematic for the SB scenario. The desirable range would be greater than the rock-throwing range (at least 35-50 m).

• While two 40 mm launchers (Option 1) were fairly effective on their own in dealing with the crowd, especially in the PT scenario, Option 3 (two 40 mm launchers and a shotgun) provided solid effectiveness for both PT and SB scenarios.

Overall for Scenario 1, it can be concluded that in terms of non-lethal capability provided by blunt trauma, the more rounds are available the better. However, it is plausible that a better effect could be achieved using area weapons that would not necessitate targeting particular individuals in the crowd, but instead would act on the crowd as a whole or at least a significant portion of it. This is especially true in situations when there is likelihood that one component in the crowd would resort to using women and children as possible human shields. If the intent of non-lethal weapon use is to send a strong message to the crowd to disperse, then it can be argued that non-lethal area of effect weapons might be capable of getting the message across more efficiently than point weapons since their effects are felt personally by more crowd members. Furthermore, insurgents within a crowd intent on acting against the BLUE Force might be more easily identified by their uncommon persistence against dispersing, relative to other crowd members.

3 The crowd dispersal rate was less than 30% in the best case, achieved mostly with the use of lethal force. The best result in terms of civilian fatalities was a fatality in 40% of cases (but for these options the crowd was dispersed in only up to 9% of runs).

UNCLASSIFIED


4. Results for Scenario 2

4.1. Game History As with Scenario 1, all of the games played out according to the initial plan. There were no technical problems or difficulties in executing the RED and BLUE plans. The key to BLUE success was to identify the suicide bomber quickly (by dispersing the benign crowd as quickly as possible), and at the greatest possible standoff distance. It was also identified that the blunt trauma rounds were not sufficient for this type of scenario, and that an area-type non-lethal weapon would be preferable, since such a device would enable targeting of the entire approaching group at the same time and thus determine any possible threat faster.

4.2. Qualitative: Judgements and Insights The following J&I were gathered during gaming of Scenario 2:

• The interactors felt that of the three RED Force tactics, the hardest one to defend against was the tactic that involved throwing rocks. This tactic caused the BLUE Force to be suppressed and distracted much of the time, permitting the suicide bomber to move closer to their target unnoticed before detonating.

• The RED Force tactic that involved the RPG was deadly. It was extremely difficult for the BLUE Force to distinguish them from the crowd and due to this the RED Force would almost always be able to fire at least one RPG round.

• Overall, the interactors felt that the more hostile the crowd became, the more ineffective the considered non-lethal weapons were. The available rounds were not sufficient to quickly deter a hostile crowd and to identify possible lethal threat in the crowd.

• If the BLUE Force succeeded in pinning the suicide bomber down, he would detonate himself further from the checkpoint, leading to increased civilian, but decreased BLUE fatalities.

• Once the BLUE Force escalated to lethal force, the

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