nordic defense cooperation

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J u h a J o k e l a

Programme Director, Finnish Institute of Internatio-

nal Affairs

T u o m a s I s o - M a r k k u

Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Nordic Defence cooperation:

Background, current trends

and future prospects?(June 2013)

Rsum

En 2009, les pays nordiques ont fusionn lesaccords existants de coopration de dfense enune structure unique, la coopration de dfensenordique (NORDEFCO). Sous les auspices deNORDEFCO, les pays nordiques cooprentactuellement en Afghanistan, mnent des exer-cices conjoints et coordonnent leurs plans natio-naux de dveloppement afin d'identifier lescapacits qui pourraient tre dveloppes etentretenues en commun. Le niveau actuel deleur coopration en matire de dfense repr-

sente une rupture avec le pass. Pendant laGuerre froide, les questions de politique tran-gre et de scurit ont t largement exclues del'ordre du jour en raison des choix respectifs queles pays nordiques avaient fait en matire dedfense. Aprs la Guerre froide, de nouvellespossibilits de coopration sont apparues, maisles pays nordiques ont rapidement d faire face

de nouveaux clivages. Auparavant neutres, laSude et la Finlande ont rejoint l'Union euro-penne et se sont activement engages dans ledveloppement de la Politique europenne de

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This text is published as part of the NORDIKA programme,with the support of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Fin-

land.


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gements such as the EU and NATO. We will thenanalyse the current dynamics and key achieve-ments of the increasing Nordic defence coope-ration. We suggest that the main drivers ofcooperation are (i) changes in the Europeansecurity environment, (ii) developments in inter-national operations, and (iii) economic impera-

tives. Further, the current emphasis on retainingand developing (national) defence capabilitiesmarks a turn in Nordic defence cooperation.Finally, we consider the limits and futureprospects of Nordic cooperation. While many ofthe previous hindrances prevail, there is clearly anew momentum to deepen and expand Nordicdefence cooperation in the near future.

BackgroundNorden as a framework for regional cooperation

between five sovereign statesDenmark, Fin-land, Iceland, Norway and Swedenhas its rootsin the period between the two World Wars1.While Nordic cooperation in the inter-warperiod took place in different areas and settings,questions related to security and defence were acommon concern for all the Nordic states (cf.Saxi 2011: 31-32). However, the different expe-riences of the five Nordic countries during theSecond World WarDenmark and Norway wereboth occupied by Nazi Germany and Iceland byGreat Britain, Sweden remained formally neutral

and Finland fought two wars against the SovietUniongreatly influenced their respectiveforeign and security policy choices and, conse-quently, the trajectory of Nordic cooperation inthe post-war era.

After the Second World War, Swedish hopes fora neutral Scandinavian defence union wereburied when Denmark and Norway joined Ice-land, the United States and eight other statesand founded the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) in 1949. Sweden, by

contrast, hung on to its traditional neutrality.Meanwhile, Finland followed the developmentsin the Nordic neighbourhood from the side-lines.Having lost two wars against the Soviet Union,the country was subjected to close politicalscrutiny by the Soviet leadership and adopted apolicy of appeasement. In 1948, Finland and theSoviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMATreaty), which included security provisions. Atthe same time, the treaty also mentioned thatFinland intended to remain outside the conflicts

of the great powers. Accordingly, Finland strived

to strengthen its image as a neutral countrythroughout the Cold War years (Ferreira-Pereira2007: 60-61).

Considering the different paths chosen by theNordic states after the Second World War, itappears somewhat surprising that Nordic coope-ration quickly regained momentum. The NordicCouncil, an inter-parliamentary body that canmake proposals to the Nordic governments, wasestablished already in 1952. However, in the faceof the political realities, foreign and securitypolicy matters were almost completely excludedfrom the Nordic agenda, and the focus of Nordiccooperation shifted to less-politicised issues2.This meant that even Finland, initially wary ofthe Soviet reaction, could join the NordicCouncil in 1955 (Forsberg 2010: 128).

Even though foreign and security policy matters

remained a taboo subject throughout the ColdWar, a very specific form of Nordic cooperationstarted to take place in the field of defence fromthe 1950s onwards. The Nordic states (with theexception of Iceland that has no armed forces ofits own) became significant contributors to UNpeacekeeping operations, and their cooperationwithin the UN framework gave rise to the socalled Nordic peacekeeping model3. This modelconsisted of regular meetings between theNordic ministers of defence and different wor-king groups, joint UN peacekeeping courses for

officers, national standby forces and the mutualreadiness to provide personnel to UN missions(Jakobsen 2006: 381-382). The Nordic statesalso had a special organ for coordinating thedeployment of their standby forces in support ofUN operations, the so called Nordic CooperationGroup for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN),which was founded in 1964.

In many ways, UN peacekeeping formed theperfect setting for Nordic cooperation, as it ser-ved both the common and the national interestsof the Nordic states. As small states, they wereall keen to strengthen international law, contri-bute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts andprevent local hostilities from turning into aconfrontation between the superpowers. Inaddition, Denmark and Norway considered UNpeacekeeping as a way to demonstrate to theSoviet Union that even though they were mem-bers of NATO, they were also peaceful and

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1. Norway gained its independence in 1905, Finland in1917. Iceland became independent in 1918, but remainedsubject to the Danish crownand Danish foreign policyuntil 1944.

2. Notable milestones of Cold War-era Nordic cooperationinclude the establishment of the Nordic labour marketand the Nordic passport union as well as the introductionof the Nordic Convention on Social Security.

3. Eleven of the 13 UN operations that took place duringthe Cold War period saw Nordic participation, and about25 per cent of the personnel used for the operations camefrom the Nordic countries (Jakobsen 2006: 382).


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formed no threat. Finland, by contrast, saw UNoperations as an opportunity to showcase itsoften questioned neutrality and to strengthen itsposition between the blocs. Also Sweden wasconvinced that active participation in UN mis-sions would help it to garner internationalrespect for its neutrality (Jakobsen 2006: 383-

386). In addition, UN missions did not involveuse of force beyond self-defence, and the costs ofthe operations were low, as the troops mostlyconsisted of volunteers and were provided onlywith basic military equipment (ibid.: 386).

The end of the Cold War marked a significantturning point in the development of Nordiccooperation. The external political constraintsthat had put clear limits on Nordic cooperationmost notably in the case of Finlandwere sud-denly gone. At the same time, new possibilitiesopened up, new frameworks for cooperationwere established, and new dividing lines emer-ged (Tiilikainen 2006: 50). Denmark, Finland,Iceland, Norway and Sweden were among thefounding members of the Council of the BalticSea States (1992), the Barents Euro-Arctic Coun-cil (1993) and the Arctic Council (1996). Moreimportantly, Finland, Norway and Sweden alsore-evaluated their relationship to the Europeanintegration process. Sweden was the first of theNordic non-members to apply for EC member-ship in 1991, and Finland and Norway followed

suit in 1992. Norway did not, however, join theEC, as the Norwegian voters rejected the coun-trys membership in a referendum. Denmark, theonly Nordic member of the EC/EU, also redefi-ned its position in the Union. After the Danishelectorate had rejected the Maastricht Treaty ina referendum, Denmark negotiated national opt-outs from several areas of EU policy, includingdefence policy. Apart from the EU, both Finlandand Sweden also moved closer to NATO byjoining its newly-established Partnership forPeace (PfP) programme in 1994 and gradually

improving the interoperability between theirnational defence forces and NATO forces underthe auspices of the alliances Planning andReview Process (PARP) (Bailes 2006: 8).However, despite becoming members of the EC/EUa decision which in Finlands case had beenpartially motivated by security policy consi-derationsand seeking closer ties with NATO,neither Finland nor Sweden was willing to fullygive up its neutrality, although the word neutralwas eventually replaced by the terms militarilynon-aligned and militarily non-allied. This

process proved less controversial in Finland,where neutrality had always represented apragmatic foreign and security policy instrumentrather than an ideological choice (Tiilikainen

2006: 52-54).

Even though the attention of the Nordic statesshifted increasingly towards the EU and NATO,some developments took place also in the Nordicframework. After Finland and Sweden hadjoined the PfP, the Nordic states created the socalled Nordic Armaments Co-operation(NORDAC), a formal structure for coordinatingtheir armament development and procurementprogrammes (Saxe 2011: 16). However, inpractice cooperation proved a difficult task. Thedifferent foreign and security policy orientationsof the Nordic states during the Cold War hadsignificantly influenced both their defenceprocurement practices and the development oftheir defence industries (Hagelin 2006: 169-170). Two often cited cases, the Standard NordicHelicopter Programme (SNHP) and the Vikingsubmarine project, exemplify the difficultiesfacing Nordic armament cooperation. The ideabehind the NSHP was that the four Nordic stateswould agree on a suitable helicopter model andthen jointly purchase helicopters of that type.Denmark, however, went ahead on its own anddecided to acquire EH101 helicopters, whereasFinland, Norway and Sweden opted for theNH90. Furthermore, even the latter three failedto generate any additional savings, as each orde-red helicopters with different specifications,which makes joint maintenance, operation and

upgrading difficult (Gotkowska and Osica 2012:22). The Viking submarine project also proved afailure. Finland never participated in the project,Norway changed its status from member to mereobserver and Denmark eventually decided not toacquire further submarines (Hagelin 2006: 170;Gotkowska and Osica 2012: 22).

Apart from NORDAC, the Nordic states alsocontinued their traditional cooperation in mili-tary crisis management operations. In 1997, theNordic states made an attempt to step up theirefforts in this field by replacing NORDSAMFN

with a more comprehensive institutional frame-work, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement forMilitary Peace Support (NORDCAPS). At thesame time, the size of the Nordic force pool avai-lable for military peace operations was doubled(Jakobsen 2007: 460). However, the post-ColdWar military crisis management operationsgenerally posed serious challenges to the Nordicstates. First of all, the number of potential troopcontributors to missions had significantlyincreased, undermining the traditionally strongrole of the Nordic states. Secondly, unlike during

the Cold War, crisis management operationsnow often required use of force that went beyondself-defence. For this reason, the troops neededto be well trained and equipped, backed up with

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efficient logistical support and highly interope-rable with the contingents of other troop provi-ders. All this made operations more costly(Jakobsen 2006: 386-391).

The Nordic states adjusted to these challenges ata different pace. This was largely the result of theprevailing differences in the fundamental secu-rity policy outlooks of the four countries. Finlandcontinued to emphasise the need for an autono-mous territorial defence, whereas Denmark,Sweden andto a lesser extentNorway focusedincreasingly on combating indirect securitythreats in the framework of out of area ope-rations and reformed their defence forcesaccordingly (Saxi 2011: 32-35). Although all theNordic states contributed to several UN andNATO-led missions in the late 1990s and theearly 2000s, joint deployments within theNORDCAPS framework were the exceptionrather than the rule (Jakobsen 2007: 466-467).

The Nordic framework was presented with afurther challenge, as the EUs Common Securityand Defence Policy (CSDP) started to gatherpace after the Anglo-French St Malo summit.Due to the differing institutional affiliations ofthe Nordic states, the EUs growing role in thearea of security and defence policy had a verydifferent impact on each one of them. Denmark(due to its opt-out from defence policy) as wellas Iceland and Norway (as non-members of the

EU) were able to play only a marginal role in theEU framework. However, in order to gain someinfluence on the CSDP, Norway chose to makesubstantial contributions to EU-led operations(Grger 2003). Finland and Sweden, on theother hand, were both EU insiders to start with,but as a result of their emphasis on military non-alignment had some initial difficulties inadapting to the emerging CSDP structures (seeOjanen 2005; Tiilikainen 2006; Herolf 2006).This did not, however, impede Finlands fullparticipation in the CSDP, and the Finnish

government soon started to emphasise theimportance of the EUs security policy forFinnish security (Tiilikainen 2006: 58). AlsoSweden committed itself to the CSDP. That theEU had taken precedence over Nordic solutionswas apparent when the NORDCAPS force poolwas de facto replaced by a Nordic EU battlegroup (the Nordic Battle Group, NBG) in the mid-2000s (Jakobsen 2007: 461). Althoughaltogether three Nordic statesthe battle groupsframework nation Sweden, Finland and non-EUmember Norwaycontribute troops to the NBG4

and the group also takes advantage of theexisting NORDCAPS structures, it is still an EUeffort rather than a Nordic one. Furthermore,Finland initially divided its participation

between two battle groups, the NBG and theGerman-led Battle Group 107 (Archer 2010: 48).Nevertheless, the establishment of the NBGensured that practical cooperation between theNordic military forces continued.

Recent developments and currenttrendsIf Nordic defence cooperation seemed to beheading towards its demise in the late 1990s andearly 2000s, recent years have dramaticallychanged the situation. In June 2007, the Norwe-gian and Swedish armed forces presented ajointly prepared study in which they analysedhow enhanced defence cooperation could helpthem to improve cost-efficiency and to retain thefull range of military capabilities. At this point,also the Finnish defence forces became involved,

and in June 2008, the three countries publisheda further report identifying possible bilateral andtrilateral cooperation projects. The report wasfollowed in November 2008 by the esta-blishment of yet another formal framework forNordic defence cooperation, the Nordic Suppor-tive Defence Structures (NORDSUP). Denmarkand Iceland also signed the Memorandum ofUnderstanding on NORDSUP, in which theNordic countries expressed their wish to explorefurther areas and activities that may form thebasis for mutually reinforcing defence structuresin the future (MoU NORDSUP). While theinitial steps towards further cooperation weretaken by the armed forces, the political leader-ship in the Nordic countries quickly picked up onthe initiative. At their meeting in June 2008, theNordic foreign ministers tasked former Nor-wegian minister of foreign affairs, ThorvaldStoltenberg, to draw up concrete proposals forcloser cooperation between the five countries inthe area of foreign and security policy. This ledto the publishing of the Stoltenberg report inFebruary 2009. In his report, Stoltenbergconcluded that there was a widespread desireto strengthen Nordic cooperation and presentedaltogether 13 proposals for achieving this goal(Stoltenberg 2009).

Also the institutional architecture of Nordicdefence cooperation was further refined: InNovember 2009, the Nordic states signed a newmemorandum of understanding, establishing theNordic Defence Co-Operation (NORDEFCO)that merged the three existing frameworksNORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP into a

single structure. The central aims of NORDEFCOinclude the development of a comprehensive long-term approach to and a common understanding

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4. The two other participants are Estonia and Ireland.


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of defence related matters, the improvement ofthe cost-efficiency, operational efficiency,interoperability and quality of the Nordic armedforces, the enhancement of cooperation in theareas of multinational operations, security sectorreform and capacity building, the achievement oftechnological benefits as well as the promotion

of competitiveness of the Nordic defence indus-try (MoU on NORDEFCO). Activities within theNORDEFCO framework focus on five Coope-ration Areas (strategic development, capabilities,human resources and education, training andexercises as well as operations) and are dividedinto three categories: studies, projects andimplemented activities. Studies serve for map-ping potential areas of cooperation and makingcost-benefit analyses, whereas projects comprisethe activities that are necessary for imple-menting suggested cooperation projects. In the

final phase, projects are implemented througheach countrys national chain of command(NORDEFCO 2012). Both the chairmanship ofNORDEFCO and the responsibility for eachindividual Cooperation Area rotate betweenDenmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden5.However, activities initiated in the NORDEFCOframework do not require the participation of allthe members. Instead, the countries can pickand choose the activities that appear mostsuitable for their purposes. AlthoughNORDEFCO itself is limited to the Nordic states,cooperation with other states is also possible. InJanuary 2011, the Baltic States were invited tojoin some aspects of NORDEFCO.

While the Nordic armed forces advance practicaldefence cooperation within the NORDEFCOstructure, the Nordic governments andindividual government members have floatedalso further-reaching ideas. Inspired by theStoltenberg report, the Nordic foreign ministersissued a Nordic declaration of solidarity on 5April 2011. In the declaration, the five states

emphasised their shared values, highlightedpotential risks such as man-made and naturaldisasters as well as cyber and terrorist attacks,and stated that if one of them were to be affectedby any of these, others would, upon requestfrom that country, assist with relevantmeans (Nordic declaration of solidarity). In Ja-nuary 2013, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildtand Defence Minister Karin Enstrm called forenhanced Nordic defence cooperation includingjoint ownership and use of military materiel(Bildt and Enstrm 2013). The Finnish Minister

of Defence, Carl Haglund, expressed his supportfor the proposal but added that joint ownership

of military materiel would require a defencetreaty or a defence pact between Finland andSweden (YLE 2013a). This idea was, however,quickly dismissed by Prime Minister JyrkiKatainen (YLE 2013b) and President SauliNiinist (YLE 2013c). Such initiatives have,nevertheless, helped to keep Nordic defence

cooperation on the agenda. On 11 April 2013,even the Nordic Council dedicatedfor the firsttime in its historya separate theme session toforeign and security policy issues.

What explains the recent rediscovery of theNordic framework in the area of defencecooperation? We identify three overlappingdrivers for on-going developments: (i) changesin the European security environment; (ii) deve-lopments in international operations; and (iii)economic imperatives.

Changes in the European security environmentare multifaceted. First, traditional security consi-derations again feature high on the Nordicstates security agendas. The Stoltenberg reportsuggests that there is a widely held view in thefive Nordic countries that their region is beco-ming increasingly important in geopolitical andstrategic terms. Their geographical proximity tosea areas that are crucial for transit andproduction of oil and gas and the changes takingplace in the Arctic are cases in point.

Concurrently, the United States strategic focus

is shifting to Asia-Pacific. While the magnitudeof this trend, and its implications to Europeansecurity, are still largely unknown, it is com-monly accepted that Europeans will have tocarry a greater responsibility for security inEurope and its neighbourhood. The operation toestablish a no-fly zone over Libya in 2010 wasparticularly important in this respect. It revealedsome significant weaknesses in terms of Euro-pean capabilities. Although European statescould rely on the unique military capabilities ofthe United States, the US aspiration to limit itsengagement in this and potential futureoperations was widely noted. In the Nordicregion, the US withdrawal from Iceland after 55years in 2006 has been a concrete demons-tration of this shift in US foreign and securitypolicy and highlighted the need to strengthen thesurveillance of the Icelandic airspace. Recently,Sweden and Finland committed themselves toparticipating in unarmed training missions overIceland in 2014 within the framework of theNATO Peacetime Preparedness Mission. Thisdevelopment has been widely seen as exemplaryof deepening Nordic defence cooperation.

The strategic shift in US foreign and securitypolicy and the recent military operation in Libya

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5. As Iceland has no military forces of its own, it onlyparticipates in NORDEFCO at the political level.


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Union (AU) to take greater responsibility forsecurity and stability in their region. The jointsupport of the Nordic states to the AUs EastAfrican Standby Force (EASF) is aimed todecrease the need for international maritime andterritorial presence in the region to ensure secu-rity for commercial shipping and the protection

of humans. Nordic cooperation in terms of EASFis also hoped to offer experience in coordination,planning and execution of these types of Nordicsupport activities and to contribute to UNactivities.

Finally, the potential economic imperatives areclearly a driving force behind the current Nordicdefence cooperation at both the political and themilitary level. With the exception of Iceland,Nordic countries have managed to manoeuvretheir economies rather well in the midst ofrecent global and European crises. This is largelydue to their considerably strong economicgrowth and sound state finances prior to thecurrent crisis. However, the relatively small sizeand the openness of their economies make themhighly vulnerable for global and regionaldevelopments. Relatedly, the prolonged econo-mic uncertainty has highlighted the need forbalanced budgets and urged them to explore costeffective solutions also in the field of defence. Atthe same time, techflation (i.e the steadygrowth in the cost of military equipment) has

increased their motivation to overcome previousdifficulties and encouraged them to findcommon solutions propelling cost effectiveness.In this regard, Nordic cooperation is closelyconnected to wider initiatives for joint capabilitydevelopment such as the EUs pooling andsharing activities and NATOs Smart Defenceconcept. The EU has sought to identify and closecapability gaps through enhanced cooperationever since the initiation of the CSDP, and the on-going economic downturn has provided an evenstronger incentive to work together. As for

NATO, Secretary General Fogh Rasmussenpresented the alliances version of pooling andsharing, the Smart Defence concept, in February2011 (Fogh Rasmussen 2011). In June of thesame year, the then US Defence Secretary,Robert Gates, warned that the US could abandonNATO if the cuts in European defence budgetsand the resulting decline in military capabilitieswere not halted and reversed (Howorth 2012: 1-2). However, both the EUs and NATOs abilityto achieve progress in this field is yet to be seen.This has underlined the importance of exploring

alternative avenues, in particular in smallerclusters consisting of two or more states (seeDickowet al. 2013). While Nordic cooperation isamong the most active of these clusters,

NORDEFCO is not considered to form analternative to the activities of the EU or NATO.Instead, representatives of Nordic governmentsand military establishments are quick to pointout that NORDEFCO can and should comple-ment the efforts made by the EU and NATO. Toemphasise the complementarity, they often refer

to Nordic cooperation as Nordic smartdefence (NORDEFCO 2012, Tuomioja 2012). Aconcrete example of pooling and sharing in theNordic context is provided by the advancingcooperation on Tactical Air Transport(NORTART), which would cover the areas ofoperational use, maintenance, training andexercises (NOREFCO 2012). Sweden andNorway also agreed to jointly procure Archerartillery systems and have cooperated intraining, ammunition storage as well asmaintenance (Gotkowska and Osica 2012: 22).

In addition, the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedishair wings regularly conduct joint exercises inNorthern Scandinavia, and similar exercisesbetween the Swedish and Danish air wings in theSouthern part of the region are going to beginsoon. The Nordic states have also recently drawnup a Combined Joint Nordic Exercise Programfor the years 2014-2017 in order to furtherdevelop their cooperation in the area of trainingand exercises. Furthermore, long-term economicgains are sought by comparing national deve-lopment plans and identifying capabilities thatcould be commonly developed and maintainedfrom the very beginning (NORDEFCO 2012).

Future prospects of Nordic defencecooperationIn view of the historical track record of Nordicdefence cooperation, one is entitled to askwhether the current momentum can and will bemaintained in the long run. Will the driversidentified above push the Nordic states for closercooperation? And where are the limits to whatcan be achieved in the Nordic framework? Inother words, how far are the Nordic states likelyto go in their efforts?

While some of the changes in the Europeansecurity environment, such as developments inthe Arctic and the true extent of Russiasrearmament, are still somewhat prospective innature, alone the shift of the US focus to the Asia-Pacific region will continue to highlight theneed for all European states to retain anddevelop their military capabilities in the coming

years. Whether this will take place in a Nordic,EU or NATO framework depends largely on thedevelopments within the latter two. In the shortterm, neither the EU nor NATO is likely to be

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able to coordinate the activities of the individualdefence clusters in Europe, meaning that theseclusters, such as NORDEFCO, will maintaintheir importance for defence cooperation inEurope (Dickowet al. 2013).

With regard to future developments within theEU, it is interesting to see whether the EuropeanCouncil meeting on defence in December 2013will give fresh impetus to the Unions poolingand sharing activities. Relatedly, the Nordics areinterested in the meetings ability to addressquestions related to the European defencemarkets. While pooling and sharing is hoped toprovide some economic benefits, Finland andSweden have called for more straight forwardand harmonised regulation for Europeandefence industry High hopes are also vested inthe meetings ability to re-energise the CSDP ingeneral. Implementation and clarification of theLisbon Treaty reforms, for instance, have beenunderlined in Finland and Sweden. Bothcountries have also invested significantly in theEUs battle group, and concerns about thepotential lack of political will to use this force, ifthe need arise, have been voiced in Helsinki andStockholm. Generally, the Nordic countries seethe possible upturn in CSDP as a positivedevelopment, yet there exist some doubts aboutrapid development in this field in crisis-torn EU.

The biggest question concerning NATO is

whether and how the alliance will define its roleafter its Afghanistan operation comes to an endin 2014. It is, nevertheless, important to notethat all the Nordic statesincluding non-members Finland and Swedenconsider NATOas having a primary role in guaranteeingregional security in Northern Europe also in thefuture (Gotowska and Osica 2012: 10). For thetime being, Nordic defence cooperation is aninteresting development for both the EU andNATO to follow. In addition to its recentdynamism, it provides a unique example of

cooperation between NATO and non-NATOmembers as well as EU and non-EU members.Nordic defence cooperation is also the modelpreferred by the electorate in Finland andSweden (Forsberg 2010: 133), where popularsupport for formal NATO membership remainslow.

The apparent strength of current Nordiccooperation is its flexibility. Whereas someearlier Nordic endeavours have suffered fromthe fact that one or several of the Nordic stateshave lacked interest in them, NORDEFCO allowsfor any form of cooperation, be it bilateral,trilateral or multilateral. At the same time,existing forms of cooperation are open for theNordic other states to join at any point. The

obvious weakness of this la carte model is thatit allows for permanent differentiation (seeCini 2007: 399). In other words, it enables theNordic states to concentrate only on the mosteasily achievable and least controversial objec-tives instead of creating incentives to cooperateacross the board. Currently, the problems of

cooperation based on ad hoc and bottom-upprocesses as well as pick and choose mentalityare addressed within NORDEFCO. The aim is toenhance top-down screening processes in orderto ensure that political and military leadershipsfocus on priority projects. These issues notwith-standing, the level of activities already takingplace is a significant factor facilitating closercooperation between the Nordic states in thefuture. For example, joint procurement canandis plannedto spill-over to joint training andmaintenance activities as has happened in the

case of the Archer artillery systems (see above).The future of the Nordic cooperation will cru-cially depend on its ability to offer successstories and create tangible benefitsabove all interms of economy but also in terms of opera-tional efficiencyfor the participating states.There are, however, several caveats and challen-ges. First of all, some of the differences that havehampered Nordic cooperation in the past stillremain. While the Nordic states now employweapon systems that are more similar to each

other than the ones they used during the ColdWar, each country still tends to operate a diffe-rent version in order to ensure that the system issuited to the tasks it is supposed to perform.Also the force structures of the Nordic militariesare still quite different from each other. TheFinnish military, in particular, has a forcestructure that greatly differs from those of itsNordic counterparts (Saxi 2011: 51-52). Thesedifferences reflect a persistent divergence in thegeneral security policy outlooks and threatscenarios of the Nordic states. Finlands main

security policy concern continues to be Russia.Also Norway, and to some extent, Sweden sharethis concern. However, the main emphasis ofNorwegian security policy is on the High North,whereas Sweden concentrates simultaneously onglobal threats. Denmarks focus is also above allon global developments, but the country is animportant player in the Arctic region as well.Finally, Icelands situation is very different fromthe other states due to its lack of armed forces(Archer 2010: 69-70, Saxi 2011: 32-35). Of course,even such fundamental security outlooks may

change in the future (see Forsberg 2010: 136).For instance, amidst growing internationalinterest in the Artic, also Finland has grownmore aware of the region as exemplified by the

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decision of the Finnish government to publish anArctic Strategy in 2010. Similarly, the on-goingdiscussion in Sweden about the ability of theSwedish military to defend the countrysterritory has intensified as a result of Russiantraining flights close to Swedish airspace, andthe latest Swedish white paper on security and

defence expresses deep concerns about recentdevelopments in Russia (Regeringskansliet2013). Finally, practical cooperation in theauspices of NORDEFCO is also likely to contri-bute to the development of a shared Nordicsecurity outlook even if this is a long termscenario.

Importantly, closer defence cooperation isbound to increase the military dependency of theNordic countries from each other (Saxi 2011:44). This will be one of the most challengingaspects in view of the future of Nordic defencecooperation. Currently binding military securityguarantees do not feature high on the politicalagenda of Nordic defence cooperation. In fact,the most recent Swedish white paper on securityand defence states that Sweden sees no limits toNordic cooperation as long as it does notinvolvemutual security guarantees (Regeringskansliet2013: 219). The Nordic governments must,nevertheless, address questions related to theaccess to, and supply of, potentially pooled andshared military capabilities. A certain level of

military dependency should be less of a problemfor NATO members Denmark, Iceland andNorway. Also the unilateral declaration of soli-darity issued by Sweden built on the expectationthat EU member states and the other Nordicstates would assist Sweden if it was attacked.Against this background, Finland seems to be asomewhat special case. While Finland considersthe prospect of receiving assistance from otherstates, above all EU member states, to lower therisk of becoming victim of an armed attack, thecountry still considers external assurances

insufficient and emphasises the importance ofbeing able to repel military threats withoutoutside assistance (Prime Ministers Office2013: 15; see Saxi 2011: 33). Insistence on mili-tary autonomy will thus surely play a role whenFinland considers its participation in differentaspects of Nordic defence cooperation. It couldalso be one of the reasons for the nature of theNordic declaration of solidarity, which makes noreference to traditional military threats, empha-sising instead natural and man-made disastersas well as cyber and terrorist attacks. At the

same time, the Finnish concerns about main-taining military autonomy also explain the lackof political support for the suggested Finnish-Swedish defence pact.

Yet even the Finnish government, and impor-tantly also the parliament, seem to be adaptingto the on-going developments. After scrutinisingthe governments latest white paper on Finnishsecurity and defence, the Foreign AffairsCommittee of the Finnish parliament urged thegovernment to assess whether continuing Nordic

defence cooperation would require contractualarrangements between the participating states(Ulkoasiainvaliokunta 2013). This seems tosuggest a readiness to enter into a phase ofdeeper cooperation with the Nordic neighboursin the area of pooling and sharing. On the otherhand, the committee also noted that a movefrom defence cooperation to military inte-gration involving shared tasks and specia-lisation would demand a higher degree of mutualtrust among the Nordic states as well as signi-ficant political decisions at the national level

(ibid.). The coming years will show whether theNordic states, and Finland in particular, areready to take such steps.

a a a a

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The opinions expressed in this text are the responsaibility

of the author alone

swedish_defense_pact_issue_raised/6449010

YLE 2013b, Katainen: Puolustusliitosta puhuminenei ole ajankohtaista, YLE14 January 2013, retrieved4 June 2013 http://yle . f i/uutiset/katainen_puolustusliitosta_puhuminen_ei_ole_ajankohtaista/6450157

Authors

Juha Jokela, Programme Director in theEuropean Union research programme, FinnishInstitute of International Affairs .

Tuomas Iso-Markku, Researcher, FinnishInstitute of International Affairs.

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