norm enforcement, dependence networks and the international criminal court jay goodliffe brigham...
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![Page 1: Norm Enforcement, Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court Jay Goodliffe Brigham Young University Darren Hawkins Brigham Young University](https://reader035.vdocument.in/reader035/viewer/2022062320/56649d445503460f94a2175b/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Norm Enforcement, Dependence Networks and the International
Criminal Court
Jay GoodliffeBrigham Young University
Darren HawkinsBrigham Young University
Christine HorneWashington State University
Daniel NielsonBrigham Young University
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Research Puzzle
• Why would any state commit to enforce international human rights norms?
• Signing and Ratifying Statute of the International Criminal Court is a Commitment
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International Criminal Court Commitments
• Delegate Authority to an Independent Prosecutor
• Accept Court’s Binding Jurisdiction upon Ratification
• Allow Court to Act in Relatively Permissive Conditions: Territorial State or State of the Nationality of Accused has Accepted Court’s Jurisdiction
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Norms
• Our definition: Rules that are socially enforced
• In IR, enforcement of norms is generally decentralized
• ICC: Centralized norm enforcement mechanism
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Why Commit to the ICC?
• Dependence Networks• Benefits:
– Cutting Transaction Costs– Lock-in
• Costs:– Policy– Unintended Consequences– Flexibility
• Imitation and Principles:– Regional and Global Trends– Principled Commitments
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Dependence
• Sociology Network Literature: Horne (2001, 2004)
• Dependence: the value that states place on goods (can be anything) available from an exchange partner and the number of alternative sources they have available.
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Dependence Networks
• Well-known forms of dependence in IR:– Bilateral/Dyadic Interdependence (relying on
a particular partner)– Global Dependence (relying on all)
• Dependence within a Network:– A set of partners on whom a state relies for
goods
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Consequences of Dependence Networks
• The more dependent A is on B, the more power (ability to reward and punish) B has over A.
• Dependence increases the extent to which actors engage in behavior that is pleasing to their network partners.
• One such behavior is norm enforcement.
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Diffuse Reciprocity
• Actors want to please their network partners
• Rewards and punishments from those network partners are not explicitly contingent or equivalent
• Actors undertake behavior anticipating some payoff down the road (or fearing punishment for failure to do so)
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Dependence Network Hypothesis
The more dependent a state is on states who sign or ratify (do not sign or ratify) the ICC, the more (less) likely that state will also sign or ratify the ICC
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Measuring Dependence Networks
• States value many types of goods
• Some providers are more important than others
• Dependence Index– Trade Partners weighted by value of trade– Alliance Partners weighted by capabilities– IO Partners with shared memberships in
significant IOs
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Important Clarification• Not Arguing that states will cut off trade,
security or IO ties due to a state’s position on the ICC
• Rather, they will use those relationships to reward or punish states appropriately– Example: greater or lesser cooperation on
alliance policies or on bilateral trade issues
• States anticipate such rewards and punishments whether they occur or not: Rarely explicit or equivalent
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Benefits: Reduced Transaction Costs
• Theoretically well-established
• Conventional Wisdom in ICC case
• Security Council created Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals
• Became increasingly costly over 1990s
• Measure: UN-mandated contribution to budgets of these tribunals
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Benefits: Lock-in
• Moravcsik (2000)
• New and unstable democracies create human rights regimes to “lock in” democratic principles in the face of domestic uncertainty (backsliding).
• Established democracies and autocracies do not.
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Measuring Lock-in
• New Democracy – New Democracy if Polity ≥ 7 & <10 yrs
• Unstable Democracy × Polity Score– Unstable if Polity > 0 & drops 3 points
• Regime Volatility × Polity Score– Regime Volatility = standard deviation of
Polity Score (1975-2003)
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Costs
• Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006): Convention Against Torture
• Policy Change: How hard is compliance?
• Unintended Consequences: How likely will this be used in an unintended way?
• Flexibility: When would human rights abuse be helpful?
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Measuring Costs: Policy ChangeHow hard is compliance?
• Polity Score– −10 to +10, where +10 is the most democratic
• Empowerment Rights Index (lagged)– 0-10 scale, with 10 as the most respectful
• Physical Integrity Rights Index (lagged)– 0-8 scale, with 8 as the least abusive
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Measuring Costs: Unintended Consequences
How likely will this be used in an unintended way?
• Legal System– Common Law
• Power– ln(GDP)
• Exposure: Forces abroad
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Measuring Costs: FlexibilityWhen would human rights abuse be helpful?
• Military Disputes (external)• 0-5, 5 = war
• Threat of Violence (World Bank’s “Political Stability”)• ~N(0,1)
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Imitation and Principle
• Imitation: Regional or Global Trends– More countries who support a strong ICC in
your region or globally
• Principled Commitments– Voluntary contributions to the international
tribunals established by the Security Council
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Method
• Duration Model (discrete-time in months)– No restrictions on hazard shape
• Missing Data multiply imputed via Amelia
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Dependent Variable
• Examine Signing and Ratifying/Acceding Separately
• Duration begins in July 1998– (or when country comes into existence)
• Censoring date – December 2000 for Signing– December 2004 for Ratifying
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Network Dependence Variable
Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variable
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Network Dependence Variable Dependence Network Index (3-month lag) 2.066 (0.999) 0.039
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variable
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Network Dependence Variable Dependence Network Index (6-month lag) 3.398 (1.626) 0.037
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Benefits VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Reduced Transaction Costs Variable ln(Tribunal Costs) −0.115 (0.268) 0.667 Lock-in Variables New Democracy 0.174 (0.302) 0.564 Unstable Democracy × Polity Score −0.021 (0.063) 0.733 Regime Volatility × Polity Score −0.020 (0.009) 0.025
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Reduced Transaction Costs Variable ln(Tribunal Costs) 0.017 (0.318) 0.956 Lock-in Variables New Democracy −0.541 (0.427) 0.205 Unstable Democracy × Polity Score 0.151 (0.107) 0.160 Regime Volatility × Polity Score −0.038 (0.015) 0.014
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Cost: Policy Change VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Cost: Policy Change Variables Polity Score 0.057 (0.032) 0.073 Empowerment Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.110 (0.052) 0.035 Physical Integrity Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.053 (0.088) 0.548
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Cost: Policy Change Variables Polity Score 0.163 (0.058) 0.005 Empowerment Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.077 (0.087) 0.378 Physical Integrity Rights Index (12-month lag) 0.119 (0.094) 0.206
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Cost: Unintended Consequences
Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Cost: Unintended Consequences Variables Common Law Legal System −0.238 (0.229) 0.297 ln(GDP) −0.153 (0.088) 0.081 ln(Forces Abroad) 0.110 (0.037) 0.003
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Cost: Unintended Consequences Variables Common Law Legal System −0.211 (0.286) 0.462 ln(GDP) −0.076 (0.112) 0.495 ln(Forces Abroad) 0.048 (0.053) 0.374
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Cost: Flexibility VariablesDependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Costs: Flexibility Variables Military Disputes −0.019 (0.067) 0.781 Threat of Violence −0.058 (0.216) 0.789
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Costs: Flexibility Variables Military Disputes −0.162 (0.103) 0.118 Threat of Violence −0.256 (0.233) 0.273
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Imitation and Principle
Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Imitation Variable Regional Trends (3-month lag) −0.151 (0.716) 0.834 Principled Commitment Variable ln(Voluntary Contributions) 0.045 (0.060) 0.454
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Independent Variables
Robust Coefficient s.e. p-value
Imitation Variable Regional Trends (6-month lag) 0.301 (0.829) 0.717 Principled Commitment Variable ln(Voluntary Contributions) 0.112 (0.095) 0.240
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Analysis Statistics
Dependent Variable: Signing ICC Number of Observations 2724 Number of Failures (Signatures) 119 Number of Countries 158 Log-likelihood (χ2) p > χ2 −415.9 (154.9) 0.000
Dependent Variable: Ratifying/Acceding ICC Number of Observations 9359 Number of Failures (Ratifications) 82 Number of Countries 159 Log-likelihood (χ2) p > χ2 −390.5 (147.0) 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is signing or ratifying/acceding to the International Criminal Court statute. Coefficients are complementary log-log regression estimates with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; p-values are for two tails. Missing values filled in via multiple imputation.
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What Influences ICC Commitment?
• Network Dependence
• Level of Democracy (Policy Cost)
• Not Lock-in
• Not Region
• Not Principled Commitments
• Not Transaction Costs
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Limitations
• Dependence cannot explain initial committers, only subsequent committers
• Measurement of independent variables
• Generalizability to other treaties, other international commitments