norms and institutions. origins, change and effects prof. dr. karl-dieter opp universität leipzig,...

Norms and Institutions.Origins, Change and Effects

Prof. Dr. Karl-Dieter OppUniversität Leipzig, Institut für Soziologie (Emeritus)

University of Washington (Seattle), Dept. of Sociology (Affiliate Professor)[email protected] / [email protected]

http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~sozio/mitarbeiter/m29/content/dokumente/527/OppVorlesungNormen.ppt

Basic articles can be downloaded from dropbox.com(You will get an email that allows you to download the articlesand book chapters from a seminar about norms and institutionsheld at the University of Washington (Seattle). The folder includes the power point presentation.

Power point presentation can be downloaded from:

Opp, Norms and Institutions 3

Overview of Goals and Contents

This lecture is not intended as an inventory or description of existing norms or institutions.

The goal is explanation:

explanation of the formation (or origins) of norms and institutions,

explanation of the stability and change of norms and institutions, and

(only briefly) explanation of the effects of norms and institutions.

Further, this is an introduction to, critical analysis and extension of the most important extant theories .

Karl-Dieter Opp

Conditions for formation and stability might be different: see QWERTY keyboard.


Content I. Introduction II. Basic Concepts III. The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions IV. Are Explanations of Norms and Institutions Theories? V. The Problem of Social Order: The Classical Explanation

of Norm Setting (Hobbes) VI. Peaceful Cooperation without a State: Spontaneous

Norm Emergence in the State of Nature and beyond (Axelrod)

VII. Resolving Disputes in Shasta County: Robert C. Ellickson‘s Theory of Spontaneous Norm Emergence

VIII. Resolving Coordination Problems: The Origins of Conventions

IX. Externalities and Second-Order Public Goods: Norms as Solutions of Collective Action Problems (Coleman)

X. Private-Interest Sanctioning and the Emergence of Norms (Opp)


XI. Other Mechanisms: Some Suggestions XII. The Origin of Norms by Design: Collective Norm Making XIII. The Effects of Norms and Institutions XIV. A Toolkit for Institutional Analysis XV. Summary: An Inventory of the Mechanisms of Norm

Emergence XVI. How to Get a Grade – Requirements for Papers

Problem: not clear how far we will come – I will probably drop some themes!


A Note: The Curse of Forgetting

Prediction: 90% of what you will have learned until Thursday will be forgotten after – say – half a year!

Time passed

Stored inmemory

Curve with repetition

Time oflearning

Nothing

Everything Computer memory -- not possible for humans!

Curve without repetition

Here is the curve of forgetting (Hermann Ebbinghaus):

Opp, Norms and Institutions7

What can you do to achieve a higher curve – forget less?

Repeat what you have learned in the afternoon. Repeat everything next week – maybe everyday part of the

slides. Read the basic readings about the theories presented! Read more about norms! Write a paper!

Why might this lecture be didactically less useful than a seminar?

Time between the different topics is short, so there is no time for repetition – in contrast to weekly seminars (???).


I.1. Norms in Everyday Life

Examples in everyday life – what are norms in this lecture?

Some examples for “spectacular” norms?

I. Introduction

Are there norms about sanctions?

What is not regulated in this room?

How would you define the concept of norm?

Are there norms about what reward are acceptable?

Karl-Dieter Opp

Footbinding, female genital mutilation, dueling, vendetta (Blutrache)


I.2. Some Facts about Norms

Norms change over time – examples? Norms differ across societies – examples? Norms are conditional – examples? (One must not lie – correct?) There are relationships between norms – e.g.: constitutional law

and specific laws. The specificity of what norms prescribe (= normative content)

varies across norms. E.g. the role of a father does not specify every detail of what a father has to do. Compare this with the detailed prescription of fines for the violation of traffic laws.

The precision of norms varies across norms. See paragraphs of the constitutional law.

The following facts should be explained by the theories (ormechanisms) to be discussed:


I.3. Questions about Norms

Descriptive questions – see the previous slide (what are "facts" about norms). These are descriptive statements about norms.

Explanatory questions about origins stability and change, and effects of norms.

Normative questions: "validity" ("Geltung") of norms – what "is" justice, how should/must or should not/must not one behave? Can such judgments be true?


I.4. What Social Science Deals with Norms – and how (Empirically or Normatively)?

Sociology, political science (e.g. norms about international

relations), anthropology, economics (property rights, law and economics …) social psychology (internalization …), jurisprudence, philosophy.


I.5. Institutions How would you define the term “institution”? Examples for institutions? Some basic facts about institutions – similar to those of norms:

Institutions change over time – examples? institutions differ across societies and cultures – examples? institutions (i.e. the norms constitutions are made up of) are

conditional, there are relationships between the norms of an institution –

again: constitutional law ...; the specificity (normative content) of the norms of an institution

differ across institutions; the precision of the norms of an institution differ across

institutions.


Descriptive questions Explanatory questions

Origins stability and change, and effects of norms.

Normative questions.

I.6. Questions about Institutions

These are the same questions as about norms:


I.7. What Social Science Deals with Institutions – and how (Empirically or Normatively)?

Sociology, political science (e.g. norms about international

relations), anthropology, economics (property rights, law and economics …) social psychology (internalization …), jurisprudence, philosophy.

Same answer as for norms:


II. Basic Concepts

II.1. Norms

The following list consists of some definitions from theliterature. There are many more definitions!

Question: What are the criteria used in the definitions?(Perhaps make notes when we go through the definitions.)


(1) "A norm will be defined as an expectation about how one ought to act, enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of reward" (Kerr 1995: 33).

(2) "In this model … social norm … is a term for behavioral regularities that emerge as people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests" (Posner 2000: 26).

(3) “ … a social norm is (i) a behavioural regularity that is (ii) based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which triggers (III) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviours by informal social sanctions" (Gächter and Fehr 1997: 276 – italics in the paper).

(4) R. H. McAdams (1997) summarizes the definitions of an extensive literature (see the quotations on pp. 339-340): "Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both" (340).


expectations of third parties that an action ought to be performed (1); (NOTE: this is not a "cognitive" expectation = prediction);

shared normative expectations (“oughtnes”) of third parties (3); sanctioning (positive or negative) of norm violation (1)(3); regularity of a behavior (2)(3) – no reference to beliefs…; internalization of norm (“feel obligated”) (4); felt obligation of the performance of an action (= internalization)

that is not formally prescribed (4); fear of sanctioning (4) and – one could add – expectation of

rewards (positive sanctioning). PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH “SANCTIONING” (see before)?

The definitional characteristics are:

Some definitions consist of several criteria (4).


(1) Is a simple or complex definition (one consisting of several criteria) preferable?

Two questions arise:

(2) What is the most useful dimension (property) or what are the most useful dimensions to be included in a definition?

NOTE: no author provides any reason why he or she choosesthe definition he or she suggests!

NOTE: some definitions include causal statements (2, 3, 4). Or are these separate empirical propositions (2)?


I. Stipulating complex definitions

Acceptanceand

Causes sanctioningand

regularity

II. Explaining the dimensions of norms

Extent towhich anexpectationis shared

CausesProbability ofsanctioning

Behavioralregularity

From: Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2001. "How Do Norms Emerge? AnOutline of a Theory." Mind and Society 2:101-128.


What dimensions are most useful for a definition of norms?

Suggestion: oughtness should be the central criterion. Reason: This is rarely addressed in the literature, as we will see, and itsexplanation is of interest.

A norm could (and should!) be defined as a statement that one should behave in certain situations in a certain way or that one should have certain attitudes, preferences or cognitive beliefs.

Acceptance of a norm means the extent to which a statementdescribing a norm (see definition before) is approved of. (“Internalization” refers to a relatively strong acceptance.)

Thus:


All other definitional characteristics could be dependent or independent variables.

Conditionality is taken account of in the definition. The norm does not only refer to behavior. Also cognitive

beliefs or attitudes or preferences may be subject to oughtness – see religious beliefs.

Some implications:


II.2. Institutions

(1) "We define institutions as a system of human-made, nonphysical elements – norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules – exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences that generates behavioral regularities." (Greif and Laitin 2004: 635)

(2) "In general, historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that include both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct." (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2).

(3) "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990: 3).

Some examples for definitions:


Note that

the definitions are very broad – see the first definition: “institutions” refers to almost everything!

It is not clear why the definitions are so broad. Organizations and norms are denoted as “institutions” –

why? Is this theoretically meaningful?

We understand by institution phenomena for which there are so far few convincing theories: these are “institutions” as “rules of the game” (Definition 3 by D. North). Thus:

“Institutions” are, by definition, systems of norms.

Suggestion:


Examples for institutions:

Constitution of Germany, the US, and other “basic” laws

Inheritance laws of a country

Voting rights

Institution of the market

Health care system

Institutions for regulating common pool resources

System of rules for getting a Ph.D. or, in general, a doctorate


II.3. Values

There are different definitions as well. A frequent definition reads: values are relatively general norms such as human rights.

Why do we need a concept that denotes relatively general norms – if it is not clear how general a norm must be in order to be called a value?

Thus: we don’t need the concept of value! However, using itin the above sense does not hurt either.

Why not distinguish simply between more or less general norms?

Sometimes “values” are defined as attitudes (evaluations) – here the term attitude/evaluation is clearer!


II.4. Sanctions

(1) "Sanctions refer to any kind of reactions to a behavior, positive or negative, that attempt to alter the behavior, or decrease or increase its frequency" (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1973: 284).

(2) "... people receive physical or psychological rewards and punishments for their behavior, which encourages or discourages them to conduct themselves in a similar way in the future" (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1973: 284).

(3) "The terms 'sanction' and 'effective sanction' will be used interchangeably, indicating ... an action on the part of a norm beneficiary that has some effect in moving the focal action in the direction intended by the sanctioner" (Coleman 1990: 40).

There are different definitions as well, e.g.:

Karl-Dieter Opp

letzter Teilsatz bezieht sich auf Effektivität.


Reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence future behavior (1) – intention of the sanctioner relevant;

reward/punishment from the perspective of the sanctionee – the person who is the target of the sanction – for following a norm or for refraining from norm violation (2);

reaction to norm violation that changes the sanctioned behavior in the future (3 – also second part of definition 1) – effect of the reaction relevant.

The definitional criteria are:


Which definition is to be preferred?

We can thus distinguish the following definitions:

intention definition (first definition before), reward-punishment definition (second definition before), effect definition (third definition before), combination of the definitions.

One question social scientists are concerned with is to explain when and how individuals react to norm violations. This speaks in favor of the intention definition.


Another interesting question is the extent to which behaviors intended to change behavior actually reach their goal, i.e.:when are sanctions effective? See questions of deterrence or effectiveness of laws.

This speaks in favor of the effect definition and the reward defi-nition (rewards are conditions for effectiveness).

Conclusion:

Each of the three definitions refers to theoretically interestingphenomena: either their origins or effects or both are the subjectof explanations…

Important: when one speaks of “sanctions” one should always tell what concept is used!


Note the following implication of the definitions:reactions to a norm violations that are only intended tohurt the norm violator (“revenge”) are not sanctions! Useful?(Example: instructor gives low grade!)

Perhaps the intention definition could be extended:

Sanctions = df. reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence future behavior or to hurt the violator (i.e. to impose costs on the norm violator).


Question: Does our theme – explaining the origin and effects of norms – violate the postulate of a value-free socialscience?

Question: Do the definitions imply that a sanctioner may be Interested in influencing the behavior of non-violators (generaldeterrence)?

Definitions seem to refer only to the target of the sanctions.Whether there is general deterrence has to be determinedempirically. Alternative: extend definitions …


II.5. Cited Literature in II:

Coleman, James S. 1990. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects, edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr. 1997. "Social Norms as a Social Exchange." Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 133:275-292.

Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." American Political Science Review 98:633-652.

Kerr, Norbert L. 1995. "Norms in Social Dilemmas." in Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individual Groups, edited by David A. Schroeder. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Kuran, Timur. 1998. "Moral Overload and Its Alleviation." Pp. 231-266 in Economics, Values, and Organization, edited by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Labovitz, Sanford, and Robert Hagedorn. 1973. "Measuring Social Norms." Pacific Sociological Review 16:283-303.


McAdams, Richard H. 1997. "The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms." Michigan Law Review 96:338-433.

North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2000. "Die Entstehung sozialer Normen als geplanter und spontaner Prozeß." Pp. 35-64 in Normen und Institutionen: Ursachen und Wirkungen, edited by Regina Metze, Kurt Mühler, and Karl-Dieter Opp. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.

Posner, Eric A. 2000. Law and Social Norms. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.


III. The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions

Question: Can norms be measured at all? Interactionists claim that norms form in the process of interaction. For example, whether a defendant has committed a crime such as theft (§242 in the German StGB – see next slide), i.e. has violated a norm, is negotiated in the court.Is the argument correct? What is negotiated in the court?

In order to test hypotheses about norms (or institutions) one needs to measure norms and institutions.

How are decisions made if norms are vague – such as: oneshould not harm others? Assume, you mention this norm if somebody lights a cigarette next to you, and the smoker thinks that this norm does not apply in this situation!


§ 242 Diebstahl (1) Wer eine fremde bewegliche Sache einem anderen in der Absicht wegnimmt, die Sache sich oder einem Dritten rechtswidrig zuzueignen, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.

(2) Der Versuch ist strafbar.


In order to measure norms, the following phenomena are to be measured – all are components or dimensions of the existing norms definitions:

behaviors: regular behavior and sanctions as reactions to norm violations and, thus, behaviors;

attitudes and motives: internalization = norm conformity is an intrinsic motive (= acceptance of a norm);

kinds of oughtness (should/must/is allowed to) and degree of oughtness;

cognitive beliefs about the conditions for a norm to hold (conditionality) and about the probability of sanctioning;

intention to punish or reward behavior.

Thus, the measurement refers to phenomena external to an individual (behavior) or internal (all the rest).


Which methods are most appropriate to measure the norms dimensions mentioned before and what are the problems of these methods for measuring norms?

Interview? Problems?

Observation (participant or non-participant)? Problems? (E.g. measurement of sanctions or attitudes? SEE SLIDE

39.) Analysis of documents?

Problems? (What do people include in documents: always the truth? Important: possibility of access to events of the distant past! SEE NEXT SLIDE.)

Qualitative or quantitative methods?

Thus: each method has its problems. In measuring norms, each method should be checked in regard to its usefulness.


Question: What are the problems of measuring norms if documents are analyzed – such as diaries or minutes of a parliamentary session where norms are reported?

Hint: writing a text is a behavior (or a sequence of behaviors). What could be the motives or incentives to write a text in a certain way? Is it always a goal of the writer(s) to tell the truth? What about errors (misperception) – perhaps actors want to tell the truth but they don’t know it!


Question: To what extent can sanctions be measured by observation?

If sanctions are defined as actions with the intention to punish a norm violation, then subjective phenomena must be ascertained which cannot be directly observed.

This holds also for sanctions which are defined as behaviors that are rewarding for the targets of a sanction.

If sanctions are simply defined as reactions to norm violation then causality must be determined. For this one needs a theory or experimental design!


Question: Are there possibilities to avoid the measurement of the norms dimensions because measuring subjective phenomena is difficult? (Think of “revealed preferences”!)

Taking a certain route to the bus every morning, taking the businstead of a tram, buying regularly the same yoghurt

One possibility might be to infer the existence of norms from behavior. The assumption could be: the more frequent a behavior is performed by the members of a group, the more likely it is that the behavior is normatively demanded. Correct? Are there examples for regularly performed behavior where no oughtness is involved?


Discussion of some “conventional” measurement, illustrated with the procedure of J.M. Jackson: Jackson, Jay M. 1966. "Structural Characteristics of Norms." Pp. 113-

125 in Role Theory. Concepts and Research, edited by Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas. New York: Wiley.

Some examples from existing research. Discussion of the factorial survey, based on:

Beck, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. "Der faktorielle Survey und die Messung von Normen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 53:283-306,

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002b. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design and When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The Example of the No-Smoking Norm." Rationality & Society 14:131-158 (see also Opp 2000).

Contents of the rest of this section:


III.1. The Procedure of J.M. Jackson

Jackson measures

behaviors that are performed more or less frequently, and evaluations of the behaviors: approval, attitudes, normative

expectations (= oughtness).

Those dimensions can be measured in a two-dimensional coordinate-system:


O

1

2

3

4

-1

-2

-3

-4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Highlyapprove

Highlydisapprove

Indiffe-rent

Evaluationdimension

Behaviordimension

Returnpotentialcurve

Range of tolerable orapproved behavior

Das "Return Potential Model" Von Jay M. Jackson (1966: 114)

Example: frequency of raising your hand per session in this lecture (or: hours per week reading).

e.g. frequency of hand raising of a student (mayrange from 0 to 8 persession = empirical maximum value)

E.g. evaluationof one other student or average of evaluation ofclass

overachiever(Streber)

slug(Faulpelz)

What are other possiblecurves – e.g. curveof a „deviant“?

Karl-Dieter Opp

0 = high approval; everything else is strong disapproval.


Questions:

What does the curve mean? (Only oughtness?) Which dimensions could be represented on the y-axis

and the x-axis? Could the curve also describe the norm of groups?

(Example: students of this class evaluate different frequencies of attendance and the average is computed. What different forms of curves could exist?)

Is it possible to construct measures which describe different properties of a norm?

Is there always a value of y for each value of x? Can conditionality be represented in the coordinate

system?


Can the change of norms over time be depicted in the diagram? Jackson constructs group properties, i.e. a group norm, on the

basis of individual properties. Could a group norm be defined independently of an individual distribution of norms? IMPORTANT: such measures are based on individual properties!!!

Can the coordinate system be used for theoretical purposes? (What hypotheses could be formulated? E.g. could network density in a class affect the shape of the curve?)

How could these properties be measured in a questionnaire?


Critique?

There is no theory so far!But Jackson formulates some hypotheses, such as:

“… the greater the consequence behavior has for a group and its central concerns, the narrower will be the range of tolerable behavior” (p. 115).

The hypotheses are often not very clear (how can the “consequence” and “the central concern” for a group be measured?), not very informative, and they are formulated ad hoc, i.e. without applying a theory!

Thus: this is an example for a classification and measurement, that may be used for descriptive purposes. But the theoretical relevance is so far not clear.

There is so far no systematic attempt to use these measuresin a theory.


III.2. Some Examples from Research

From the DFG-project on the East German revolution – for details see

Opp, Karl-Dieter, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern. 1995. The Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution. East Germany 1989. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. This is a translation from German: „Die volkseigene Revolution“ (1993).

Politics should be left to the elected representatives of the people.

A citizen should become politically active only if he or she believes that he or she can achieve something.

Violence against persons to achieve political goals can be morally justified.

If a state oppresses free expression and other basic rights of the citizens then also violence of the citizens is justified.

Five answer categories, from “fully disagree” to “fully agree.”

Items for the measurement of the acceptance of a protest norm:


“I think that violence against objects is morally justified. Does this hold never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time or always?”

If some highway is constructed near your apartment.

If the right to demonstrate will be restricted.

If the police uses firearms against demonstrators.

…. Answer categories “yes” or “no”

What are the situations when yourself would be willing to use violence against objects:

CONTINUATION

What do you think about the following statement(s):


If I wouldn’t do anything against nuclear power plants I would have a bad conscience.

Five answer categories: fully agree, agree, indifferent, disagree, fully disagree.

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM: Opp, K.-D., K. Burow-Auffarth, P. Hartmann, Th. von Witzleben, V. Pöhls, and Th. Spitzley. 1984. Soziale Probleme und Protestverhalten. Eine empirische Konfrontierung des Modells rationalen Verhaltens mit soziologischen Hypothesen am Beispiel von Atomkraftgegnern. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag (124-127):

If I do something against the construction of nuclear power plants I sometimes feel that I do something that I actually should not do.


III.3. The Factorial Survey

The measurement procedures discussed so far are not appropriate to capture the complex conditions under which norms hold (i.e. their conditionality). This is the strength of the factorial survey – also called vignette analysis.

Basic idea: possible situations are described where a norm could hold. Respondents are then asked to tell to what extent a certain behavior should be performed or to what extent an attitude or cognitive belief should exist in the respective situation (evaluation dimension).


Example: you want to find out when it is allowed to smokein a restaurant. (Note: the research was conducted before thereexisted a ban on smoking in Germany by law.)

First step: specify under what circumstances this norm may hold (these are hypotheses), e.g.:

1. Class of the restaurant: pub, other;2. number of persons in the restaurant who smoke.

Thus, two dimensions (= variables) may be important. These are situational characteristics which could be relevant for the norm to hold.

Each of these dimensions has certain values. E.g. class of restaurant may consist of: pub/other = 0/1 (two values); number of persons who smoke – possible values: none, few, many, almost all, (four values).


To describe all possible situations, the values of each dimension (variable) are combined. That is to say, the Cartesian product could be computed. In this case:

2 x 4 = 8

Thus, there are eight possible situations. Examples:

There is a pub where nobody smokes.

There is a restaurant where few people smoke.

These descriptions of situations are called vignettes.


Here are the dimensions and their values from the researchreported in Opp 2002 (reference see below):

Situation 1: RestaurantEach vignette begins with: Mr. Müller (or Mrs. Meier) goes to a restaurant.Dimension 1: Gender of the actor in the vignette: (1) male, (2) female.Dimension 2: Class of the restaurants: (1) top class restaurant; (2) ordinary restaurant; (3) pub.Dimension 3: Smoking rule: (1) There is no indication whether smoking is allowed or prohibited. (2)There is a sign saying that it would be nice if people refrain from smoking. (3) There is a signindicating that smoking is prohibited.Dimension 4: Number of people in the restaurant who smoke: (1) No smoker; (2) one smoker;

(3) several smokers; (4) most people smoke.Dimension 5: Duration of stay in the restaurant: (1) . .. stays only for a short time to drink a beer.

(2) . .. stays for some time to have a meal.Dimension 6: Properties of the actor of the vignette: (1) . .. smokes most of the time more than a

package of cigarettes per day; (2) . .. smokes most of the time less than a package of cigarettes perday; (3) . .. is occasional smoker.


Mr. Müller goes to a restaurant. This is a top class restaurant, in which smoking is prohibited. There is no one in the restaurant who smokes. Mr. Müller stays only for a short time in the restaurant in order to have a beer. He smokes most of the time more than a package of cigarettes per day.

Here is an example of a vignette from the study:


To what extent does a non-smoking norm hold in these situations?

To answer these questions respondents are presented with the following scale for each vignette on which they could mark a value:

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3

It is not at allallowed tosmoke

It is in any caseallowed tosmoke.

It is not allowed to smoke It is allowed to smoke

Second step: the rating scale (evaluation dimension) has to bespecified which answers the question:


Thus: in applying the factorial survey to measure norms the first step is to devise descriptions of situations (= vignettes) – combinations of values of the dimensions. These are the norm-relevant situations.

Third, a certain number of the possible (and meaningful – see later) situational descriptions are assigned to each respondent by chance. Each respondent thus gets a set of vignettes.

Second, for each vignette a rating scale is presented in order to find out to what extent a norm holds.

The size of the sets depends, among other things, on the difficulty of answering the vignettes and on the length of the questionnaire.


Practical problems:

How many vignettes should a respondent be presented with?

How many dimensions are appropriate in a vignette?

How many values should each dimension have?

Example: number of persons. One could present percentages from 0 to 100 with a distance of 1 (1, 2, 3...) – this would result in a great number of vignettes – see next slide. Do respondents discriminate between these values?

In any event: the dimensions and their values must be theoretically useful!


Statistical analysisHow is a factorial survey analyzed statistically? Here is the data matrix for the non-smoking norm (Opp 2002):

Are all combinations of the values of the dimensions meaningful?

Example: dimensions are age and occupation. Let one occupation be university professor, and let the age range from 16 to 65. One possible vignette would include a professor with age 16. Meaningful?


Acceptance of the non-smoking norm is the average of thejudgments for the two situations per respondent.t

The data set has the following structure:

-------------------------------------------------------------No. of Class Ban on No.of Judgm. No.of respond. rest. smok. smok. sit.1 friends------------------------------------------------------------- 1 3,00 1,00 4,00 1,00 4,0 1 3,00 1,00 3,00 1,00 4,0 1 3,00 2,00 1,00 -2,00 4,0 1 3,00 3,00 2,00 -3,00 4,0 1 1,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 4,0 1 1,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,0 1 1,00 2,00 2,00 -2,00 4,0 1 3,00 3,00 3,00 -3,00 4,0 1 2,00 1,00 2,00 2,00 4,0 1 3,00 2,00 2,00 -2,00 4,0-------------------------------------------------------------

(For the meaning of the codes see slide 54.)


Other examples for norms that could be measured by a factorial survey?

Conditions for self-defence (Notwehr), conditions for lying or telling the truth – white lie (Notlüge) ..., when should one keep promises? When is it allowed to break a law or when should or must a law be broken

– such as participating in an illegal demonstration, blocking streets, occupying buildings (like university offices)?

When do people think they should get a divorce? (See Diefenbach and Opp 2007 – reference next page)

What is “sexual harassment”? What sanctions are allowed for a given behavior?

Possibility for term paper!


What are the strengths and weaknesses of the factorial survey to measure norms?

Problem: the situations are hypothetical. Often answers may not be very reliable. Pretest is important. Among other things, one should explore to what extent the situations in the vignette resemble real situations for the respondents.

Strength 1: the factorial survey allows the detailed measurement of the conditionality of norms.

Strength 2: it is possible to determine the weight of the dimensions, i.e. how strong their effect is on the rating of the “oughtness.”

Other problems or strengths?


References for the Measurement of Norms with the Factorial Survey

Beck, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. "Der faktorielle Survey und die Messung von Normen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 53:283-306.

Jasso, Guillermina. 2006. "Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and Judgments." Sociological Methods & Research 34:334-423.

Diefenbach, Heike, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2007. "When and Why Do People Think There Should Be a Divorce? An Application of the Factorial Survey." Rationality & Society 19:485-517.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design and When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The Example of the No-Smoking Norm." Rationality & Society 14:131-158.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2003. "Die Evolution sozialer Normen." S. 139-205 inEvolution in den Natur-, Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften, hrsgg. VonAndreas Diekmann and Rupert Moser. Bern: Paul Haupt. (Ausführlichere Fassung von Opp 2002 – siehe vorangegangenen Literaturhinweis.)


Recent contribution on the factorial survey in general –with further references:

Auspurg, Katrin, Thomas Hinz, and Stefan Liebig. 2009. "Komplexität von Vignetten, Lerneffekte und Plausibilität im Faktoriellen Survey." Methoden - Daten - Analysen 3:59-96.


IV. Are Explanations of Norms and Institutions Theories?

We will discuss the major theories about the emergence of norms and institutions.

Question: What is the relationship between these theories? Do they contradict each other? Are some derivable from others?

Thesis: The “theories” describe different processes of norm emergence (= mechanisms). In other words, the “theories” describe different constellations of conditions under which different processes of norm emergence arise.


In order to explain the different processes a general theory of action must be applied. This ensures that causal statements are not ad hoc.

Most existing explanations of norms and institutions apply – often implicitly – a wide version of the theory of rational action.

We should ask for each “theory” of norm emergence to be discussed what the background theory is that is applied!

An important question that we will address throughoutthis lecture is under what conditions which processes obtain. This is not discussed in the literature!!!


In general, what are the theories that could be applied in explaining processes of norm emergence?

Rational choice theory – includes game theory important: distinguish wide and narrow version;

functionalism, power theories, marxist hypotheses ...

For a discussion of some of the theories see: Mahoney, James,and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysisin the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


V. The Problem of Social Order: The Classical Explanation of Norm Setting

A good starting point for an introduction to the explanation of norms and institution is a general question: What are the origins of social order?

If this question is answered and if (!) “social order” refers to a system of norms, then all questions about the emergence of norms are answered!


V.1. The Solution of the Problem of Social Order by Thomas Hobbes

The most famous answer to the question of the origin(s) of social order or “how social order is possible” is by Thomas Hobbes (1588 to 1679):

Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, first 1651.

See in particular chapters 13 and 17.


The consequence is a war of all against all (“whereevery man is enemy to every man”). Hobbes characterizes the effects of this situation in the following way:

The initial situation is a state of nature which is characterized in the following way:

there are no internalized norms, all individuals are pure egoists, individuals are in a conflict situation, i.e. there is competition for

goods; this leads to hostility and the attempt to subjugate others; there is no organization or state that prevents violence or issues

laws; individuals behave “rationally,” i.e. they try to maximize their

utility by enhancing their material welfare.


„In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short“ (chapter 13).

The last part after the (last) semicolon is a famous text and not printed in bold in the original!

Question: why is there no infrastructure, culture etc.? (For details see later.) Think of “function” of property rights!

Karl-Dieter Opp

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How does “social order” originate in such a situation?

(1) Men love (their own) liberty and dominion over others (which is a condition for the war of all against all); (= motive 1)

(2) men want their own “preservation” and a “more contented life”; (= motive 2)

(3) there is a belief ("foresight") that (only?) "restraint“ (= state) leads to realizing the second motive by imposing fear of punishment for pursuing the first motive;

(4) individuals are willing to transfer rights to a central authority (= motive 3).

The basic idea is that a “Leviathan” (translation is "sea monster"), i.e. a state, is created. How does the state originate? Hobbes’s argument can be reconstructed in the following way:

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Bewahrung, Erhaltung, heißt wohl Überleben


(5) establishing order is not possible by covenants without a sword (why?), by "the joining together of a small number of men," (why?) and being "governed, and directed by one judgment, for a limited

time“ (why? think of stability.) (6) Consequence: A “Leviathan” originates.

Assumption seems to be that the second motive is strongerthan the first one – otherwise people would not be willing to sacrifice power in order to gain a “more contented life”!


The causal structure of the argument thus is:

Preference fordomination

Preference for peace

Belief that establishinga state is most effectivefor realizing preference for peace

Readiness (preference) to transfer rights to authority

Creation ofa state (central authority)

-

+

+

+

(weak)

Alternative meansfor “order” not promising

+

(strong)


Nothing – the state of war remains stable; small groups form who loot and kill others; the physically

strongest – gain power (similar to alternative 2 by Hobbes); small groups unite to form a sort of authoritarian organi-zation like

a Mafia (similar to alternative 2 by Hobbes) etc. neighborhoods form an association to protect each other (like

neighborhood watch in the US); "spontaneous" cooperation: e.g. somebody begins to "cooperate" in

the sense that he or she builds up a peaceful relationship with his neighbor who reciprocate etc. (like the Axelrod model – see later);

What could happen, if conditions 1 and 2 – motives 1 and 2 – (and perhaps other conditions?) are given? Could there be other “solutions” than the origin or creation of a state?

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individuals hire others and pay them for protection – see countries with a high crime rate where guards are hired;

Hobbes’s solution: individuals transfer rights to a central authority. THIS IS THUS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION!


What are the central problems of Hobbes’s solution? It is not clear what the "mechanism,“ i.e. the process, of the

emergence of a state is. Assume there is a large group. Who initiates state foundation? Who gets which position in a government etc.?

Under what conditions will people be willing to transfer rights, and act to found a state? Think of the problem of collective action (free rider problem). Common interest of the members of a large group does not suffice to realize the goals (Olson). It is not clear under what conditions certain “passions” (motives) and “reason” (beliefs) lead to peace.

Who controls the state?

Hobbes’s argument implies that there are no stateless societies. Empirical research does not confirm this implication.


It is assumed that the state realizes the common good. See “common good fiction” in public choice theory.

Is only external punishment for order relevant? Think of internalization of social norms.

Hobbes’s model includes beliefs. Can beliefs be biased (= wrong)? For example, citizens may believe that others will reciprocate cooperation (see later Axelrod). Or they may not believe in the “common good fiction” (i.e. they do not believe that the state acts in the interest of the citizens). This might lead to unwillingness to transfer rights to a "Leviathan."


What is meant by “social order”?

“Social order” may refer to cooperation in a “prisoner’s dilemma” – will be discussed later. Intuitively: refraining from behavior that hurts others like fraud, stealing, using violence. Thus, order means a certain class of regular behaviors.

Taylor 1982, Community …, p. 44: “In the most restrictive of its common usage, ‘social order’ refers to an absence, more or less complete, of violence, a state of affairs in which people are relatively safe from physical attack. On a somewhat broader view, “social order” is security of property (against theft and damage at the hands of other individuals) as well as of persons. This is the order Hobbes was concerned with and he called it Peace.” (emphasis not in the original) = refraining from certain behaviors.


What is the PROBLEM of social order?

(1) It could mean in general: how does “social order” originate?

(2) In regard to the state of nature (war of all against all) it could mean:

How does “order” emerge in such a state of nature? (This is an explanatory question)

How could a “war of all against all” be avoided? (This is a technological question – not identical with explanation of order)

Implication: order in the above sense is a quantitative variable that is dichotomized. Why not distinguish degrees of order – more or less orderliness?


Does Hobbes address the EXPLANATION of norms and institutions?

Transfer of (or assignment of) rights to a central authority is addressed: this is a change of norms (rights = kind of norms). Thus: Citizens are no longer allowed to do certain things such as taking the law in one’s own hand – the state sets “restraints.” Not clear what exactly these norms are.

Thus: explaining of the emergence of a state is equivalent to explaining norms. But what these norms are is not specified.

A central authority exists, and there are norms specifying what the members of this authority are allowed and not allowed to do. But these norms are not addressed in detail!


If cooperation emerges then a regular behavior is explained.This is one meaning of “norm.”

Sanctioning (of the state – only?) is included in Hobbes’s modelas well – this is another dimension of the norm concept.

Question: Is it possible to explain the kind of norms – does Hobbes’s model imply certain propositions?

Hobbes would probably predict that those norms will be issued that are expected to solve the problem of social order. Question: what happens if there are different expectations – how are they reconciled?

Thus, Hobbes addresses several dimensions of the norms concept, but he does not provide detailed, informative propositions.


What can we learn from Hobbes about the emergence of norms and institutions?

The “state of nature” is a situation with strong externalities. This suggests that a central condition for the origin of norms and institutions might be externalities. As we will see later, this is a central variable in all theories of norm emergence.

However, if there are externalities, there could be different reactions by those affected. It is not clear what exactly happens if there are externalities. Thus, the question is: if there are externalities, what are the conditions for the emergence of which kind of norms?

Hobbes applies a general background theory: individual preferences like egoism, constraints like the behavior of others and maximization of utility are conditions for the emergence of norms. This theory could be applied to explain the origin and effects of norms in general.


V.2. The Normative Solution: Talcott Parsons

The so-called normative solution is advanced especially byTalcott Parsons. Here are some quotations:

“Essentially that men ‘being reasonable’ ought to, and in general will in pursuit of their ends subordinate their actions, whatever these may be, to certain rules. The essential content of these rules is to respect the natural rights of others, to refrain from injuring them” (Structure, 96).

“… the basic condition on which an interaction system can be stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound to conformity with a shared system of value orientation standards” (The Social System, 38)

“… without the attachment to the constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve” (The Social System, 41)


Question: What are the major problems of this “solution”?

There is no theory that explains when the required norms will emerge. The normative solution could be interpreted as a technological

statement: if there are norms then there will be “peace.” BUT: is this technological statement correct?

In general, norms are not sufficient to guarantee that the regulated behavior is performed.

Not clear what the other conditions for conformity are. The free rider problem is not addressed: it is well known (at least

since M. Olson’s theory of collective action) that especially in a large group “reasonable” behavior is not carried out (i.e. doing something to realize goals cannot simply be taken for granted). See as an example environmental pollution.


V.3. The General Mechanism of Norm Emergence in Hobbes’s “Leviathan”: the Transfer and Centralization of Rights

Foundation of clubs (e.g. a chess or tennis club), associations etc. (see the “Vereinsrecht” – law of associations);

informal groups: friends may develop a division of labor so that certain tasks and rights – organizing weekend trips or dinners in restaurants – are transferred and centralized;

formal organizations like firms: employees transfer rights to the firm (i.e. to managers, the board etc.).

We can describe the process (or “mechanism”) outlined by Hobbes that leads to social order in a general way: individuals transfer rights to a collectivity (or to a group of other individuals). These individuals then make rules and enforce them.

This happens not only in a state of nature but in real societies as well. Examples?


Question: Under what conditions will this mechanism be chosen? Some brainstorming ..

Transfer of rights may occur spontaneously – step by step:a member of a friendship group offers to organize the next visitto a restaurant. The other friends like the choice and assign the task alternately. Again, this works well and is repeated.


Conditions for voluntary transmission to a central authority(spontaneously or by design):

There exists a central authority (a group or an individual) rights may be transferred to.

The “central authority” fulfills the needs of the members, and it is expected that this will happen in the future.

Expected costs of failure are relatively low, compared to the benefits of the transfer of rights.

Perceived alternatives to transferring rights are regarded as more costly, such as voting on restaurant proposals or voting on every decision in a sports club. These are transaction costs.

Note: perception of alternative institutions or norms isimportant – see the creation of constitutions such as the US constitution: not all alternatives were known.


There are political entrepreneurs – individuals who bear the costs of setting up the organization and run it. This is a condition for founding a central authority if there is none and for initiatives to transfer rights.

Those kinds of rights will be transferred that are least likely to hurt members – e.g. one will usually not transfer the right to use all of one’s assets! However, this happens sometimes:

Parliaments sometimes renounce their constitutional rights. See the enabling law („Ermächtigungsgesetz“) under Hitler-Germany in 1933. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enabling_act and thearticle in the German version).See in particular: Ivan Ermakoff. 2008: Ruling Oneself Out. A Theory ofCollective Abdications. Durham: Duke University Press.


This is the first time we ask the general question:

We will ask this question for each mechanism!

Concluding note

What are the conditions for a given mechanism of norm emergence? The different theories or mechanisms – like the one by Hobbes – outline mechanisms but they never state the conditions that are relevant for the origin of this and not of alternative processes!

Another question will be: what exactly are the differences between the different mechanisms?


VI. Peaceful Cooperation Without a State: Spontaneous Norm Emergence in the State of

Nature and Beyond

An important extension of Hobbes‘s approach is Robert Axelrod‘s „The Evolution of Cooperation.“

The starting point is that the state of nature is a prisoner’s dilemma.

I will first explain what this means and then turn to Axelrod’s theory.


VI.1. The State of Nature as a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)

What is a prisoner’s dilemma? Here is the original story:

Behavioral alternatives of prisoner A

Behavioral alternatives of prisoner B

Not confess Confess

Not confess 1 year prison /

1 year prison

10 years prison /

Free

Confess Free /

10 years prison

8 years prison /

8 years prison

First entry is “payoff” for A, second is payoff for B


Behavioral alternatives of person A

Behavioral alternatives of person B

Cooperate ( C ) Defect (D)

Cooperate (not confess) 3, 3 1, 4

Defect (confess) 4, 1 2, 2

The general structure of the situation is the following:

A graph that again depicts the structure of the payoffs:

Highestpayoff 4

Lowerpayoff 3

Lowestpayoff 1

Lowerpayoff 2


What has all this to do with Hobbes’s problem of social order?

Here is the PD matrix again:



Cooperate (C) Defect (D)



Defect = war Cooperate = peace (any kind of making a contract, trust

etc.) Warfare is the dominant alternative for everybody


Let’s look again at the PD:



Cooperate (C) Defect (D)



Assume now the game is not played once, it is repeated(iterated). Does this change the situation?Example: You need daily a yoghurt, and a shop owner puts the yoghurt at a certain place in front of your door; you promise to bring the money to the shop after work. Questions: (1) There is a one-time purchase, (2) you buy every day. Would it “pay” to cheat?


Assume there is cooperation for some days – both get 3.

Then you defect at day 10, whereas the shop owner givesyou the yoghurt (i.e. he cooperates): You earn 1 additional point (4 instead of 3).

But then the shop owner will defect as well and your payoff is 2.

Does it pay to cooperate? If you cooperate – say – 5 days,you get five times 3 = 15.

If you defect immediately – you get 4 (the first defection on day 1)+ (4 x 2) (defection for four days), i.e. a payoff of 12.

Thus, in repeated PDs defection is not always profitable.


Question: Can you imagine situations where even in aniterated PD defection pays?

(1) The payoff for defection is huge, compared to cooperation (not 4, but – say – 4000). AND you need the money:

Thus, in repeated PDs cooperation is not always profitable.

2, 2 0, 40004000, 0 1, 1

(2) The play is repeated only a finite number of times, i.e. it isa finite game.

(3) You think that the partner is not trustworthy (he will notsustain cooperation – you heard bad rumours about him).


The basic idea in Robert Axelrod’s theory (for referencessee at the end of this section) is: if the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated, cooperation will be likely – under certain conditions.

Note how Axelrod formulates the problem at the beginning ofhis book “The Evolution of Cooperation” (1984: 3):

“Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a worldof egoists without central authority?”

What is the difference to Hobbes’ problem?

VI.2. How Can Cooperation Emerge in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Situation? The Theory of Robert Axelrod


There is no “Nirwana approach” – who is interested in a utopian situation as Hobbes describes it? Axelrod assumesegoistic actors, there are no internalized norms and there is no enforcement agency. This is the case in many real situations so that Axelrod’s theory can be applied.

Axelrod’s procedure

The question of how cooperation can emerge in a world ofegoists can be formulated in the following way:

What strategy of the actors is best to generatecooperation in the long run?

For example: one strategy could be: if you meet somebody, choose C and D by chance. Other possibilities:


Play always C. Play always D. Begin with C and then by chance choose C and D. Begin always with C and then do what the other player did on the

previous move. This is TIT FOR TAT. Begin with C; if the opponent defects twice then defect as well: TIT

FOR TWO TATs. Play C as long as the other player plays C. Then play always D.

The payoffs of each of the two players can be computed,based on the game matrix, e.g.:

3, 3 1, 44, 1 2, 2


To answer the question of what strategy yields the best resultsAxelrod invited game theorists to a computer tournament and tosubmit programs.

The program that won was submitted by Anatol Rapoport:TIT FOR TAT:

choose C on the first move, imitate the player on the previous move. Thus, as long as the other

player chooses C, play C. If he/she chooses D, choose D etc.

Then a second tournament was organized. Again, TIT FOR TATmade it: it was the strategy that in general was most success-ful, i.e. it yielded the best results in many different situations (i.e.when it meets many different strategies).


Be NICE, i.e. never defect before an opponent does. This implies: always begin with C.

Be FORGIVING, i.e. defect only once and never “hold a grudge once you have vented your anger.” Thus, be not too harsh.

Be PROVOCABLE, i.e. one should get “mad” immediately after the defection of an opponent and not, e.g., continue with C several times.

Be CLEAR, i.e. your opponent should recognize that you play C or D (clarity is often absent in situations with many players – e.g. if you save energy nobody will probably notice it.)

Based on the results of the tournament, Axelrod formulates someprinciples for a successful strategy, i.e. a strategy that yields cooperation with a high probability.

Axelrod’s “principles” and theory

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Cooperation is possible without a central authority!!!

Implication:


Axelrod refers to pairs of players, i.e. dyads (two-person game theory). The theory could thus be formulated more generally:

if a player never defects first (“nice”), if a player defects only once after the defection of the

opponent (“forgiving”), if a player defects immediately after the defection of the

opponent (“provocable”), if the opponent perceives the reaction of a player,

then cooperation emerges between the players.

If there are two players who interact:

Consequence: if cooperation is to be predicted in a large group,the overall cooperation rate depends on what happens amongdyads. (This is actually how Axelrod proceeds!)


Some illustrations – always examine whether the following illustrations are consistent with the theory – PERHAPS SKIP AND LEAVE AS HOMEWORK.As a memory aid: relevant is beingNICE, FORGIVING, PROVOCABLE, CLEAR.

Firms who want a long-lasting relationship with customers – but if the market is very large (globalization, EU): does crime pay? Exit option is given?

Customer (you) and a firm: you buy books (Amazon could defect). Axelrod: trench warfare during World War I. “Spontaneous” disarmament. Defection of player A occurs due to an error which A does not notice

(e.g., A does not pay a bill …). Other player B defects. A thinks B is a cheater … (but here verbal communication could help – which is not included in Axelrod’s model!).

Other examples? (IS EBAY AN ILLUSTRATION?)


Questions

Isn’t the whole theory a purely logical exercise, a “tautology”? Can a computer tournament really generate a valid theory of cooperation? The procedure is to “make assumptions about individuals and deduce

consequences for the behavior of the entire system” (1984: 6). This is not a test but a derivation of a model (or of theorems). Of course, the model has to be tested empirically.

The background theory used to make predictions is a wide version of rational choice theory (18: no “rationality” assumed!)

If this theory is accepted as valid then, under the assumptions, the outcome of the process is compatible with a theory and, thus, not only a logical exercise!


Axelrod makes several assumptions (1984: 11-19): there are interactions only between two players; each player “is also assumed to recognize another player and to

remember how the two of them have interacted so far” (thus: there is no change of names, and it does not happen that the same people set up new firms to cheat or dress up (sich verkleiden));

it is not possible to make enforceable threats or commitments;

CONTINUED NEXT SLIDE


there is no way to change the other players payoffs;

there is no verbal communication, the players can communicate only “through the sequence of their own behavior”;

the players may meet again (i.e. choices made today may influence choices of tomorrow);

there is no way to know what the other player will do on a given move, i.e. no reputation can develop;

there is no exit option (run away from the interaction);

the future maybe discounted (future is less important than the present: “the discount parameter must be large enough to make the future loom large”…15).

There are no norms (this is implicit in the formulation of the problem: only egoism is relevant). BUT: in his example of trench warfare Axelrod mentions “ethics” that is “new to the theory” ( 84) Thus, norms of cooperation enhance the likelihood of C.


How can these (too restrictive?) assumptions – or at least some of them – be integrated into a theory?

The “assumptions” are conditions that increase or decrease cooperation. Thus, we could set up a causal model that includes at least some of these variables.

Weakness of a causal model: processes are not modeled.This would be the next step – based on the variablesof the model. However, a causal model is a useful first step for a dynamic model!

The conditions are scope conditions (“Geltungsbedingun-gen”) – such as that the model is restricted to two players (two-person PD).


Here is a preliminary list of factors that have a positive or negative effect on cooperation (indicated by a + or – sign after the factor). Let’s briefly browse through the list – you may improve it at home:

Use of a nice strategy … + Number of past contacts remembered that resulted in cooperation (=

frequency of interaction in the past) + Possibility to enforce contracts and promises + Possibility of verbal communication + Number of expected encounters in the future + Size of discount factor (“shadow of the future”) + Internalized fairness/cooperation norm + External negative sanctioning of peers in case of defection + Preexisting beliefs in regard to trust (“pessimism”/”optimism”) Interest in longstanding relationships + High likelihood and low costs of finding other “attractive” partner -


Does Axelrod’s theory explain norms and institutions?

There is no explanation of oughtness. Mechanism could be:what is becomes ought – see later.

Yes, cooperation or defection are regular behaviors in the iterated PD.

Let’s check the different dimensions of the definition of norms/Institutions:

Norms are sometimes defined as regular behavior. Is there an explanation of regular behavior?

Is oughtness explained – does cooperation become a norm or is cooperation a norm?

There may be causal relationships between the independentvariables – example: trust may increase if the number ofsuccessful encounters in the past is high.


In TIT FOR TAT the choice of D after the partner’s D is apunishment of the partner – the expression “TIT FOR TAT”already suggests this: it means

“repayment in kind, as for an injury; retaliation” (http://www.answers.com/topic/tit-for-tat.

C/D is thus a regular behavior and in certain situations a sanction.If C/D is explained, then this implies the explanation of sanctioning.

Is sanctioning explained?

In what sense is sanctioning explained – remember the intention definition, reward definition, effects definition?


No!This question is addressed in the theory of externalities that will be discussed later!

Under certain conditions widespread defection leads to institutions (systems of norms) that prevent defection. Example: Ebay, laws against pollution. Is the emergence of such institutions explained?


VI.3. The General Mechanism of Spontaneous NormEmergence in Axelrod’s Theory

The mechanism of norm emergence, based on Hobbes’s work was called transfer and centralization of rights (section V.3, slide 84).

How could the process Axelrod outlines be described in a general way?

Under what conditions does this process obtain?

Two questions should be discussed in regard to Axelrod’s theory:


Cooperation through decentralized private interest (mutual) sanctioning

decentralized sanctioning to pursue private interest

Perhaps the mechanism could be called:

(Is there a better expression?)

Question: What are the differences and commonalities between the two processes – transfer and centralization of rights and decentralized sanctioning? Which dimensions or properties do they have in common and which ones are different?

or


Are there other differences and commonalities?

Possible differences Transfer and centralization of rights (Hobbes)

Decentralized sanctioning …(Axelrod)

Transfer of rights and creation of central authority most beneficial

+ -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization/institution (including interest groups) …

+ -

Private sanctioning +Not clear: Who is

sanctioned by whom?

+

There is only a private interest in preventing defection of one's partner

- +

Externalities + +

NOTE: the suggested causal model on slide 112 is not includedbecause this is not explicitly Axelrod’s theory!


VI.4. References

Hofstadter, Douglas R. 1983. "Metamagical Themas. ComputerTournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma Suggest How CooperationEvolves." Scientific American:14-20. (A very good summary of Axel-rod’s project.)

Taylor, Michael. 1976. Anarchy and Cooperation. London & New York: Wiley. (He was the first who has shown that in in iteratedPD cooperation is possible.)

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York:Basic Books.

This is a free software for the simulation of the Axelrod’s models(iterated PDs) which can be downloaded from:http://www.eckhartarnold.de/apppages/coopsim.html. See alsoNETLOGO!

There is meanwhile a vast literature on cooperation!


VII. Resolving Disputes in Shasta County: Robert C. Ellickson‘s Theory of Spontaneous

Norm EmergenceA widely discussed attempt to explain spontaneous norm emergence is Robert C. Ellickson‘s explanation of how farmers in Shasta County (California) deal with the problem of trespassing livestock.

Ellickson’s work is interesting because he uses the literature of several disciplines (jurisprudence,

sociology, economics), he provides an empirical case to illustrate (test? generate?)

his explanatory hypotheses, and he suggests a general hypothesis about norm emergence.

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VII.1. The Setting of the Study: Shasta County

Introduction

Where is Shasta County?

See the “A” in the following two maps: from maps.google.com

First map: California with Shasta County

Second map: a section of the first map

The study was conducted in Shasta County (California) with extensive cattle industry.

The problem Ellickson addresses is the trespassing of cattle to adjacent land.

Karl-Dieter Opp

county = Landkreis oder District


Shasta County and its cattle industry

Physical Environment

Location at northern end of the four-hundred-mile-long Central Valley of California (see first map).

Sacramento river divides the area (runs from Redding to Stockton, via Sacramento, along the main highway – on map).

Redding is largest city. Mountain peaks lie around the valley. There is rain in the winter season, it is dry and hot in summer,

the surrounding mountains block cooling wind.

Short description in Ellickson 1998 – see references later.

The following is based on this article.


16 % of the county is “land in farms,” no significant agriculture is possible (poor quality of land). The bulk of the agricultural land is unirrigated and used only as seasonal pasture for livestock – principally cattle, the county’s major agricultural product.

Social Environment

Most of the grassy plains and lower foothills remains divided into ranches.

Half of the ranches are owned by families over several generations.

Many recent settlers live on the cooler foothills and are retirees. There are further some ranchette owners who keep an animal or two as a hobby as neighbors.


Modes of cattle ranching

Ellickson distinguishes two types of ranchers: the Traditionalists

and the Modernists.

let their cattle roam in unfenced mountain areas during the summer (severity of dry season requires large areas of land),

lease large tracts of mountain forest in summer; in winter (after October) animals are returned to a base ranch at a lower elevation and feeded with hay.

To reduce risk of livestock trespassing on contiguous lands leasehold boundaries are drawn to follow natural barriers.

Traditionalists let their cattle roam in the mountains.

Traditionalists


keep their livestock behind fences at all times and install ditches and sprinklers to irrigate base ranch pastures.

“Members of both groups believe that the life of the

cattleman is the best possible in western America” (55).

Modernists

Important: There were “open range” areas where a cattlemanis not liable for trespass damages – in contrast to “closed-range” areas.

Karl-Dieter Opp

Gräben, Rinnen


The problem of trespassing

“Every landowner interviewed, including all thirteen ranchette owners, reported at least one instance in which his lands had been invaded by someone elses’s livestock.”

“A victim’s vegetation is always at risk”; victim’s fences are damaged; "cattle sometimes wander onto rural highways and ravage hay”; "rural residents fear trespasses by bulls" (56): they are heavy

and they leave deep hoof marks and they are sometimes dangerous (56).

In general: "Trespass incidents are minor irritations" (47).

Nonetheless, trespassing was a problem and the question Ellickson addresses is: How was this problem solved in Shasta County?

max

verwüsten, plündern


Fencing

And there would be beneficial effects of fencing for owners of livestock: predators, rustlers, winter snows, and poisonous plants all pose potentially lethal threats to cattle roaming unfenced countryside” (54).

Further, “a wandering cow will be impregnated by a bull of worthless pedigree” (54).

Why not fence land? This would prevent trespassing and thus would avoid the costs of trespassing for the victims (owners of the land that is trespassed).

Karl-Dieter Opp

Viehdiebe

Karl-Dieter Opp

Raubtiere


Costs of constructing and maintaining fences and rentingfenced land

“Barbed-wire fence has been the standard” – costs money! “In 1982, fenced land in the Northeastern Sector rented for

about ten dollar per animal unit month, whereas unfenced land rented for about three dollars.”

Periodic maintenance is necessary and costly because of trespassing hunters or deers that damage fences.

Thus, fencing is not a general solution of the problems of trespassing because it is rather costly.


VII.2. The Resolution of Trespassing Disputes in Shasta County

Do nothing! Ask those whose cattle trespass to take measures to avoid

future incidents. If cattle continues to trespass you could sue the owners. Build fence. Kill animal, slaughter it, keep it and sell it ... + other illegal

measures (damage owner’s house ...) – similar to Axelrod’s punishment by defection.

Possible solutions

Question: Assume your land is trespassed several times. What could and what would you do?


Even in closed-range areas the law was in general not applied! In addition, the law was largely unknown!

Ellickson’s explanation is that there was an “overarching norm of cooperation among neighbors” (56). This was apparently inconsistent with appealing to authorities and applying the law.

There are costs of going through the formal claims process.

If suing is not a normal option there is no incentive to learn the law! (“Rational ignorance” – see Anthony Downs about information of voters about party programs).

Norm against and aversion to hiring an attorney.

“’Pride’ of being able to resolve their problems on their own.” (Is this a norm?)

How disputes were NOT settled in Shasta County and why


When is the law invoked in everyday conflicts?

Thus: formal law is only invoked in particular situations. What are these situations?

Other Examples for refraining from appealing to the law:

Example: there are numerous lawsuits between neighbors. (Perhaps this is only a last resort after long “negotiation”?)

Macaulay, Stewart. 1963. "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study." American Sociological Review 28:55-69.—. 1977. "Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract." Law and Society Review 11:507-528.

Firms whose aim is to collect debts ...

Theme for terms paper!


How disputes WERE settled in Shasta County: informal

norms and sanctions

Disputes are solved by applying informal norms:

Ellickson describes these norms of “neighborliness” in great

detail, along with the sanctions applied if norms are violated.

Again: “Most rural residents are consciously committed to an overarching norm of cooperation among neighbors" (59).

This implies: an owner of livestock is responsible for the acts of his animals, i.e. has to avoid trespassing.


The norm of “neighborliness” and applied sanctions imply, among other things:

a rural resident should “lump” (schlucken) minor damage from isolated trespass incidents; the residents keep track of those minor losses in a mental account. “Eventually, the norms entitle him to act to remedy any imbalance” (see below). There thus seems to be a tolerance threshold.

The response to such incidents is an “exchange of civilities”: one should notify the animal owner and help him in retrieving the stray stock. This is regarded as a service and not as a complaint.


There are few “deviants” who cause incidents that do not balance the informal accounts. There are four types of countermeasures to discipline deviants, that can be ordered according to seriousness (61): self help retaliation, reports to county authorities, claims for compensation informally submitted without the

help of attorneys, formal legal claims to recover damages – as a last resort.


VII.3. What Could Be a General Explanation of the Dispute Solutions in Shasta County?

What is to be explained or what could be explained?

The “dispute solutions” are regular behaviors – one dimension of current norms definition.

There are norms of how one should behave toward owners of trespassing animals (oughtness).

There are sanctions that are typically applied and norms about sanctions: certain sanctions are adequate in certain situations.

Thus, the “dispute solution” can be called an institution = system of norms.


It seems that this institution emerged spontaneously.

How can the emergence of this institution be explained?

Ellickson suggests “A Hypothesis of Welfare Maximizing Norms” (1991: chapter 10),

“that members of a close-knit group develop and maintainnorms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairswith one another” (1991: 167).

Problem?


Let us be more specific and formulate the conditions thatexist in Shasta County and that could in general be causesfor the institution of settling disputes.

Close-knitgroups

Aggregate welfare-maximizing norm

Micro-levelcauses??

Micro-leveleffects??

? ?

The hypothesis is a macro proposition. Unclear, how the norm originates (similarly Hobbes).

Correlation?Causal effect?


Animal trespassing is an externality, i.e. costly for those whose land is trespassed and for the cattle owners.

The costs of the externality are low and symmetric: in general, trespass incidents “are minor irritations” (47). most residents have animals (including dogs) and are

causing as well as suffering damages through animals (= symmetric damages).

Reduction of the externalities (= „internalization“) is not too costly.

There is a general rule about the severity of sanctioning: sanctions should match the perceived seriousness of the sanctioned behavior. E.g., killing a straying animal would be “inadequate.”

Relevant features of the initial situation


There is an “overarching norm of cooperation” (56) – i.e. a pre-existing norm of cooperation.

There are intense and multiplex relationships between neighbors: “They interact on water supply, controlled burns, fence repairs, social events, staffing the volunteer fire department and so on” (60).

Why are such relationships relevant?

In such a social structure there are extensive possibilities of sanctioning. E.g., a “deviant” will be sanctioned in different social contexts – which adds up to a relatively high total cost of sanctioning for the “deviant.”

There is a strong “shadow of the future”: “most residents expect those interactions to continue far into the future” (60). There is thus also an interest in long-standing smooth interactions. These would be jeopardized for “deviants.”

142

Low costs of externalities and of internalization

Preexisting normsof cooperation andsanctioning

Close social relationships(with interest in future inter-actions) available sanctions

Norm of “neigbor-liness”

Kind of sanctioning(“exchange of civilities”)

Reconstruction of the – implicit – model:

(Institution of)Informal settlingof disputes

Plausible?Are other “arrows” or variables plausible?Are norms (oughtness) really explained? Perhaps externalities and close relationships suffice?Is there a general background theory applied?

Opp, Norms and Institutions 143Opp, Norms and Institutions 143

To ponder:

How can this model be reformulated as amicro-macro model – see slide 141?

Term paper?


VII.4. Some Notes on the Model

What is the role of a central authority?

Perhaps the role of the central authority is a looming sword incase of extreme deviance!

What would happen if a central authority would not exist? In most cases law is not invoked so the disputes are resolved spontaneously.

OR the ranchers would use agreed-upon retaliatory measures against extreme deviants – in case of a missing state?

Thus, even if institutions emerge and work spontaneously, acentral authority as a possible sanctioner might be a (necessary?) condition for the stability of a spontaneous order.


What is the difference to the Axelrod model?

Could we extend the previous table: new column for Ellickson,new lines? What is the relevance of “old” properties?

Possible differences Transfer and centralization of rights (Hobbes)

Decentralized sanctioning … (Axelrod)


+ -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization/institution (including interest groups)

+ -

Private sanctioning +Who is sanctioned by

whom?

+


- +

Externalities + +


Here is a suggestion. Problems?Possible differences Hobbes Axelrod Ellickson


+ - -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization/institution (including interest groups)

+ - - (?)

Private sanctioning * + + +


- + -(?)

Externalities + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning

- - +

Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the future –> sanctioning possibilities)

- - +

Verbal communication possible + - +

* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? / ? means: variable is not in the model, but might be relevant OR it is not clear whether the variable is part of the model.


Could the model be applied to other types of settling

disputes?

BUT think of the many lawsuits about conflicts between neighbors!

What about conflicts between neighbors in an apartment house or neighbors in neighborhoods with single-family homes? SEE VARIABLES IN PREVIOUS TABLE!


The mechanism described by Axelrod was called:

This is actually the process in the Ellickson model as well, butother variables play a role as well such as internalized norms.

Decentralized sanctioning to pursue private interests


VII.5. References

Ellickson, Robert C. 1986. "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County." Stanford Law Review 38:623-687.

— . 1989. "A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Waling Industry." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5:83-97.

—. 1991. Order without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 1998. "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County." Pp. 46-76 in The New Institutionalism in Sociology, edited by Mary Brinton and Victor Nee. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

—. 2001. "The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective From the Legal Academy." Pp. 35-75 in Social Norms, edited by Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.


VIII. Resolving Coordination Problems: The Origins of Conventions

There is one type of norm that can be characterized in thefollowing way – take as an example driving on the right:

There is no internalization, i.e. it is not morally important to do what the norm demands. Thus, the norm is only useful.

Other norms would work as well (or almost as well), i.e. another norm may be a little better or worse (such as driving on the left.)

Whatever the norm is: it is only useful to a group if all group members adhere to the norm (like driving on the right).

There are cognitive expectations that everybody follows the norm. Individual members who violate the norm incur costs (try to drive on

the right in Great Britain!). The norm is thus self-enforcing, i.e. no central authority or internalization necessary to enforce a norm.

VIII.1. Introduction

Karl-Dieter Opp

selbst-verstärkend


This situation can be presented as a game – take “driving on the right” as an example: What could a matrix look like?

Person A

Person B (or: all others)

Driving on the right Driving on the left

Driving on the right 3, 3 0, 0

Driving on the left 0, 0 3, 3

There are two equilibria; There are only two options – there may be many more in other examples

(e.g.: driving in the middle of a road! – why is this never taken as a third alternative in the standard example?).

Note:


Other examples?

Measurement units (meter vs. inches/feet/yards) – meters are easier to use and, thus, there are higher payoffs than using inches/... ?;

DIN norms, kind of language one uses (“cultural value” – foreigners should speak

language ...). Are there norms and intrinsic values involved? (For a model explaining language emergence see Nowak and Krakauer 1999.)

Numeral systems, e.g. Arabic or Roman, keyboards, e.g. QWERTY or MALTRON keyboards (see

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QWERTY), street signs may be different (for one-way streets, stop signs etc.).

Here are the characteristics of the norm again:

No internalization, other norms work (almost) as well, generalconformity important for usefulness of the norm, expectations of general conformity, self-enforcement.

More examples in Lewis 1969: 5-8, Schelling 1978: 119-124.


VIII.2. What “is” a Convention?

There are different definitions in the literature.

Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 78: “Coordination problems are ... situations involving two or more persons, in which each has to choose one from among several alternative actions, and in which the outcome of any person’s action depends upon the action chosen by each of the others. So that the best choice for each depends upon what he expects the others to do, knowing that each of the others is trying to guess what he is likely to do.” A choice of one alternative would thus be a convention. (Question: Is the PD a convention?)

Young 1996: 105: “... we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium.”


Mackie 1996: 1007: “Any game with two or more proper coordination equilibria represents a coordination problem.” A convention is thus the equilibrium option chosen.

Lewis 1969: 42: “Our first, rough, definition is: A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if, in any instance of S among members of P,(1) everyone conforms to R;(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S is a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a proper coordination equilibrium in S.

Question (for home work): which of the following games describecoordination problems (i.e. games with two equilibria): battle of thesexes? Chicken game? Assurance game? Other games?


What is the “best” definition?

No author gives detailed reasons why he or she chooses the definition that is chosen!

It seems that the authors have the examples mentioned in mind and try to find a definition that describes these examples.

Consequence of the definition: explaining conventions would mean to explain a complex set of phenomena – see, e.g. the definition by Lewis – with one stroke!

It would be preferable to have a simple definition – such as one dimension and use the others as dependent or independent variables – see our previous discussion of the norms concept.


Suggestion – similar to Mackie’s definition:

A coordination problem is defined as a situation in which at least two actors have at least two options and where at least two equilibria exist. A convention is the equilibrium that is chosen by the actors.

Other characteristics in the previous definition could then be explained, e.g.:

When do cognitive and normative expectations emerge that every one chooses behavior B?

When is a behavior self-enforcing? When does a convention spread, i.e. is more or less

frequently accepted by the members of a group?

It seems more fruitful and interesting to explain thesephenomena than including them in a definition!


VIII.3. Are Conventions Norms?

Criterion “behavioral regularity”? Conventions are norms.

Criterion “sanctioning”? Costs in case of deviation from regularity = sanctioning according to the rewards definition.

Criterion “oughtness”: to what extent is there internalization – bad conscience in case of violation?

Example of footbinding or infibulation? Language (“cultural heritage” that should be spoken?)

E.g., assume there is no traffic, no police, no other person at a pedestrian crossing: do people have a bad conscience if they jaywalk?

Criterion “normative expectations”? If they exist – do they? – then conventions are norms.

Thus, some conventions have „intrinsic values“!!!


Sugden (1989: 95) argues that a convention (in the sense of an established pattern of behavior) “can” become a norm: “people can come to believe that they ought to act in ways that maintain these patterns: conventions can become norms.”

Thus, some conventions are and some are not norms –depending on what dimensions of the norms concept.

Implication: „our“ definition of conventions implies that conventions may have properties (like intrinsic value) that are not consistent with the description of „basic“ characteristics at the beginning!


VIII.4. Examples for the Origin of Conventions:Evolution or Design?

Example 1: The Invention of the QWERTY keyboard

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QWERTY:

“The QWERTY keyboard layout was devised and created inthe early 1870s by Christopher Sholes, a newspaper editorand printer who lived in Milwaukee. ... In 1873 Sholes' backer,James Densmore, succeeded in selling manufacturing rights forthe Sholes-Glidden "Type Writer" with E. Remington and Sons,and within a few months the keyboard layout was finalised byRemington's mechanics” (bold print not in the original).= “Normative entrepreneurs” relevant?

Note: there is a debate about whether QWERTY is most efficient.


Example 2: Driving on the Right or Left Side by Decreeor Spontaneous Emergence

France: “Following the French Revolution ... it was decreed that horse-drawn carriages in Paris should keep to the right. The previous custom had been for carriages to keep left and for pedestrians to keep right, facing the oncoming traffic. Changing the custom was symbolic of the new order: going on the left had become politically incorrect because it was identified with the privileged classes; going on the right was the habit of the common man and therefore more ‘democratic’” (Young 1996: 106, bold print not in the original).

Britain: “In Britain, by contrast, there seems to have been no single defining event that gave rise to the dominant convention of left-hand driving. Rather, it grew up by local custom, spreading from one region to another” (Young 1996: 106, bold print not in the original).


Sweden: In continental Europe only Sweden was driving on the left. In 1967, Sweden changed to driving on the right by law, i.e. by government decision.

See the section “Rules of the Road” in Young 1996, andhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-_and_left-hand_traffic


Example 3: MoneyMoney may originate spontaneously (see cigarette currencyafter World War II).Currency reform on June 20, 1948, was a central decision.

ConclusionConventions may originate spontaneously or by design.


(1) There is repeated interaction and a coordination problem; (2) by chance (see next slide!), one alternative action becomes more

often practiced; (3) the more often an alternative is chosen, relative to others, the

stronger are the incentives to practice it (positive feedback loop); (4) a cumulative process emerges that finally leads to a wide-spread

behavior; (5) there are no incentives to deviate from this practice, i.e. the

practice is self-enforcing.

Vanberg (1986. 92-93) describes such a process in the followingway (see also Young 1996):

VIII.5. How Can Conventions Emerge Spontaneously?

The mechanism could be called “gradual accretion by precedent” (Young 1996: 106) or dispersion of norms by precedent or by imitation.

User

Präzedenzfall^oder vielleicht "Vorbild"?

164

Questions to Step 2

Step 2: (= by chance, one alternative is practiced more often): do actors really decide by chance – do they throw a coin?

Example 1: “two horse-drawn carriages are rapidly approaching one another from opposite direction” (Young 1996: 107). Assume there is no rule of driving on the right or left. What will happen? (See also Sen and Airiau 2007.)

Signaling (hand sign or call) – what will be accepted? (Is there a “cultural basis” for kinds of signals etc.?)

Both stop, talk to each other and collectively decide: what will be the outcome? Perhaps the alternative that is first suggested will be accepted?

Do the actors throw a coin?


Example 2: Assume there is no tape measure and you want to buy fabric of a certain length and width at a shop. What will happen?

Example 3: Language change: American abbreviations: 4you,Xing, gender-neutral style (she/he or only she), University ofWashington becomes YouDub for UW (in German: JuDab).

User

Bandmaß


existing resources (knowledge of local language if carriages meet), pre-existing norms (path dependence – see later): existing rules of

language in abbreviations, in general: culture relevant. Example: kind of money depends on

“saleability” (Absatzfähigkeit) of a good (Menger 1982).

First step seems to be that someone makes a suggestion that is accepted immediately (low-cost situation) – sort of first come first served!

Such suggestions are activities and thus depend on incentives.Possible incentives are:


Other Questions

Could inventions (QWERTY) or the activities of normative entrepreneurs be integrated into the model?

They could enter in step 2 – “by chance, one alternativebecomes more often practiced”: inventions or mobilizingactivities lead to a spread of information about a convention.

Is it possible that DIFFERENT behaviors (conventions?) in a given group emerge and remain stable?

See VHS and BETA, but APPLE and MICROSOFT, CDs and memory sticks, Internet BROWSERS (Explorer, Firefox, Chrome). See further: local dialects, local foods, different manners ..., WordPerfect ...


Are these conventions? Two equilibria ... (perhaps for different groups of people ...?)

How can these differences be explained? Some brainstorming! Costs ...

Are externalities relevant for the emergence of conventions?

A coordination problem is an externality. E.g., if one drives onthe right the other on the left, an externality emerges.


Are all conventions (according to our definition) self-enforcing – like driving on the right – or are there degrees of self-enforcement?

Language (to some extent one can understand different dialects)

Internet browsers – Mozilla, Chrome, Internet Explorer etc. Local foods (conventions?) Traffic signs like stop signs (see the huge number of traffic

accidents).

Thus, it is of interest to explain the extent of self-enforcement.


VIII.6. The Emergence of Conventions by HumanDesign and by Spontaneous Action

A convention is said to arise by “human design” if it is decreed by law or similar devices of a central authority. See the example of driving on the right in France and Sweden.

When will a state (or politicians) intervene and take initiative to issue a law?

There are relatively costly (how much?) externalities (driving on the left in Sweden was costly...),

there is no spontaneous emergence of a convention (or of a “desirable” convention);

a central authority can gain political support by imposing a convention.


VIII.7. Mixed mechanisms

Young 1996: 106: Often there are informal processes of accretion, and codification into law follows later.

Examples?

Language: Orthography reform in Germany: Language developsspontaneously. But then the state issues a “reform” whichchanges the “spontaneous order.” Why? (See the conditions onprevious slide!)

E.g. “Inconsistencies” (Aufwand – aufwendig, nun aufwändig) were regarded as a problem – by whom? I.e. spontaneous emergence was regarded as unsatisfactory.

There could be a term paper on the Germanorthography „reform.“


Are there situations where there is a need for coordinationbut no convention (or norm) originates?

Assume, there is a narrow door and only one personcan pass, but two persons want to pass – a very frequentsituation. Who gives way?

Why is there no convention?

VIII.8. Are there Coordination Problems without Coordination?

Other examples? Perhaps EU? Is there a need for „coordi-nation“ – or „homogenization“?


VIII.9. What Is the Difference between the Process of Norm Dispersion by Precedent and the Other Mechanisms?

Let us extend the “master table” by one column for this spontaneous process (not for the decree of conventions) and check how to complement the table.


Possible differences Hobbes Axelrod Ellickson Conven-tions


+ - -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an institution (including interest groups)

+ - - (?)

Private sanctioning + + +


- + - (?)

Externalities + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning - - +

Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the future –> sanction possibilities)

? ? +

Verbal communication possible + - +

175

Possible differences Hobbes Axelrod Ellickson Conven-tions

Transfer of rights and creation of central authority is most beneficial

+ - - - (?)

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an institution…(including, e.g., "normative" entrepreneurs for conventions)

+ - - (?) +?

Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for conventions

+* + + +


- + - (?) -

Externalities + + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning

- - + ?

Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the future –> sanction possibilities) / repeated interactions for conventions

? ? + ?

Verbal communication possible + - + +

* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? / ? … see previous table

Here is my table:


Helbing, Dirk. See http://www.soms.ethz.ch/research/gametheory, point 2. The references there refer to the coordination of the behavior of pedestrians.

Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mackie, Gerry. 1996. "Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account." American Sociological Review 61:999-1017.

Nowak, Martin A. and David C. Krakauer. 1999. "The Evolution of Language." Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 96:8028-8033.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York & London: W.W. Morton and Company.

Sen, Sandip and Stéphane Airiau. 2007. "Emergence of Norms Through Social Learning." International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence:1507-1512.

VIII.10. References


Sugden, Robert. 1989. "Spontaneous Order." Jorunal of Economic Perspectives 3:85-97.

Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1977. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 74-133.

Vanberg , Viktor. 1986. "Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules. A Critical Examination of F.A. Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution." Economics and Philosophy 2:75-100.

Young, H. Peyton. 1996. "The Economics of Convention." Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:105-122.


IX. Externalities and Second-Order Public Goods: Norms as Solutions of Collective

Action Problems

In all situations discussed so far externalities were a condition for the emergence of norms.

There are two theories that explicitly address the question of when externalities generate norms: the theories by

Harold Demsetz (1967) andJames S. Coleman (1990a, 1990b)

Both theories will be presented and discussed in this section.


IX.1. The Theory of Harold Demsetz

Demsetz defines property rights in the following way:

They “are an instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society. An owner of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights. ... property rights specify how persons may be benefitted and harmed and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons” (347 – emphases not in the original).

Basic concepts

Perhaps skip thissection. Continue 186.

User

gesporchen "moors" oder "mores".


“’Property rights’ are understood as the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of goods and pertain to their use. These relations specify the norms of the behavior with respect to goods that each and every person must observe in his daily interaction with other persons, or bear the cost of non-observance. The term ‘good’ is used here for anything that yields utility or satisfaction to a person” (emphases in the original, except blue print).

In other words, “property rights” are norms in the sense of oughtness and sanctioning, which refer to the use of goods. As the authors state, “property rights” include “rights over material things (to sell my typewriter) as well as ‘human’ rights (the right to vote, to publish, etc.).”

Furubotn and Pejovich suggest the following definition (1974: 3):


Two other concepts:

Externalities are behaviors of (individual or collective) actors that are costly or beneficial to other actors and do not bear on the decisions of the former actors.

Examples: firm pollutes river without paying for this; theft, noise, shopping center that is built next to a building and increases prices of property and there is no compensation to the shopping center; bees of a neighbor fertilize his or her flowers and there is no compensation to the bee owner.

Thus, there are positive and negative externalities.

Important: externalities in this definition presuppose that the costs and benefits are not borne by the actors.

For example, firm A’s pollution impedes fishing of actors B. This is costly for B. If A does not bear the costs (compensate B), an externality exists according to the previous definition.


Internalization of an externality means that the costs of an action are borne by those who cause them and the benefits accrue to those who cause them. Thus, costs and benefits become “internal” to those who cause them.

Note: do not confuse this concept with the sociological concept of internalization (following a norm becomes an intrinsic motive).


The Theory

Actors who cause positive externalities have an interest to be compensated.

The victims of soot from smoke are interested to stop pollution

Actors affected by negative externalities have an interest to reduce or eliminate them.

The TV station whose talk masters get much money from advertising is interested to get some portion of the money because they made the talk master attractive.

There is thus an interest in internalizing external effects.

NOTE: Those who profit from a positive externality have an interest that it remains, without paying for it! But this interest is not addressed by the theory!

max

Ruß


“A primary function of property rights is that of guidingincentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities” (348 – emphasis not in the original) .

E.g., if the residents living close to a factory have the rightto be free of smoke they could prevent the firm from pollutingand the externality would be internalized (the firm would bearthe costs of pollution).

If the TV station had a right to force the talkmaster to transfer some of his/her earnings from advertisements to the station, the positive externality would be internalized.

Question: What is a major problem with this proposition?(Think of the critique of functionalism!) Is this really anexplanation of property rights?

One of Demsetz‘s hypotheses reads:


From the critique of functionalism we know: a positive ornegative function of a norm (or some other phenomenon) does not mean that the norm emerges.

The question thus is:When do property rights emerge that reduce externalities?

Example: The „function“ of a ban on smoking is to preventlung cancer. Nonetheless, laws prohibiting smoking inGermany exist only since 2007 in the different states.

186

Demsetz theory reads:

“ ... property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization” (350).

Not clear: what means “... to internalize ...”? Suggestion:

Actors create property rights with the goal to internalize externalities if the gains of internalization are larger than the costs of internalization.

Examples – according to Demsetz – that support his hypothesis: the development of air rights, renters’ rights, rules for liability in automobile accidents, the development of private property rights in the land among American Indians (based on Leacock 1954). In all these cases – Demsetz argues – externalities were internalized.


The latter example refers to the Indians of the Labrador Peninsula (Canada) at the beginning of the 18th century.

Here is the example of Leacock – as a causal diagram (from Opp 1983, Die Entstehung sozialer Normen, S. 65)

It is an intuitively plausible illustration of the theory (for a discussion see Eggertsson 1990: 250-280.)


No private property ingame and land

Large stock of game

Little hunting (only for private use)

Low value of an animal

No internalization

Gains of internalization low

Commercialfur tradearises

Increase of valueof animals

Increaseof hunting

Higher externaleffects

Gains of internalizationhigher than costs

Propertyrights in land

Initial situation:


Problems of the Theory

How do new property rights emerge: spontaneously (e.g. by negotiation, marking land as the Labrador Indians did) or by design (who sets the rules in what way)? What is the mechanism of emergence? Note: The externality proposition is a macro proposition. Micro foundation is missing!

What kinds of property rights emerge? Common property, individual property – see the great variety of rules about the use of natural resources in Ostrom 1990. Idea: expected (and not real) payoffs are relevant – that

may lead to “inefficient” norms! Does the theory hold for norms in general: table manners,

non-smoking norm?


Is oughtness explained? Empirical evidence in regard to Leacock’s example: Eggertsson

mentions historians claiming that the beaver populations were sharply reduced after introduction of the fur trade. According to Demsetz, the beaver population should have stabilized or increased due to the introduction of property rights (correct?).

Free-riding is not considered (see later). Perhaps this is included in the costs of internalization (example: many residents of a city are affected by the pollution of many factories ...).

The political process (influence of interest groups etc.) is not modeled. (See previous point: the mechanism of norm emergence is not described.)

Eggertsson (1990: 249-280) calls the theory the “naive” theory of property rights that can nonetheless be applied to certain situations – he mentions the three previous points.


Note: the differences between Demsetz’s theory and theTheories discussed before are discussed after Coleman– which is an extension of Demsetz’s theory.


IX.2. James S. Coleman’s Theory

See Coleman 1990a and 1990b (references at the end of section 10). The following references refer to Coleman 1990a.

Coleman intends to explain social norms: “They specify what actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct, or what actions are improper or incorrect” (37).

NOTE: This is the oughtness-definition.

Coleman uses the following explanatory strategy. The first question he addresses is the explanation of the demand for norms. In a second step he tries to explain the realization of norms.


What is the meaning of the basic terms?

Demand: does it mean that each member of a group WANTS all (or only a percentage of) members to accept the norm? Or do they want a joint decision, i.e. an explicit commitment of all members of the group, that one should engage in certain behaviors? The demand could thus vary in a group!

Realization could mean, accordingly, that others accept thenorm OR that a joint decision has been made.

Realization does NOT mean that the demanded behavioris carried out, this would be then the provision of the first-order public good.

Example: Pollution. There could be a demand of a norm to refrainfrom pollution,and the realization of this norm. Demand and realization may vary – a different number of members coulddemand and realize the norm.


Conditions for the demand for norms

Coleman’s first “principle” reads:

“... interests in a norm arise when an action has similar externalities for a set of others, when markets in rights of control of the action cannot easily be established, and when no single actor can profitably engage in an exchange to gain such rights” (42, emphases not in the original).

In case of negative externalities (example: a non-smoker sits next to a smoker), the social problem is “how to limit the action (and how much to limit it) that is harming others” (41).

Question: Illustrate this with a „right“ to ban smoking.(Can there be exchanges … ? Can I offer you money to stopsmoking?)


In case of positive externalities (example: passers-by who benefit from the householder’s cleaning snow from his sidewalk), the problem is “how to encourage and increase the action” (41). In addition, from the perspective of the householder, the interest is to get some compensation for his effort (41).

Coleman emphasizes: externalities “create a basis, a demand for a norm on the part of those experiencing externalities” (42). There is thus no guarantee that a norm really emerges.


Comments

Why is it necessary for the demand of a norm that there are SIMILAR externalities for a set of others?

Perhaps the idea is that only if many persons are affected the joint interest generates processes (such as sanctioning) that lead to a joint interest?

What is the meaning of “when markets in rights of controlof the action cannot easily be established ...”? It is possible that actors reduce externalities by “wholly individualistic means” (41): an actor who suffers from externalities may offer something to eliminate the externality. Thus, “rights of control” may be purchased. But this is not possible (=high transaction costs) if the externalities are widespread. (Illustrate with smoking example.)

The concept “externalities” is not defined. The examples suggest that externalities are actions that cause costs or benefits to third parties (regardless of internalization!).


Question

Do these conditions really suffice for generating a demandfor (or interest in) a norm?

In case of externalities that are regarded as minor, there is no interest in a norm. Examples: sometimes noise of a neighbor, noisy people in a train compartment, crying children, ringing cellphones in trains, ... this is tolerated!

Idea: only if externalities exceed a certain threshold, aninterest in (or demand for) a norm arises.


Conditions for the realization of norms

Coleman’s “second principle” explaining the realization of norms is based on the theory of collective action (basic reference: Olson 1965).

This theory addresses the question under what conditions a group acts in order to achieve its common goals. E.g. a community wishes to reduce pollution by a group of factories. When will the residents act to achieve this common goal?

The common goal is a preference for a public good. This isdefined as any good that, if it is provided, can be consumedby every member of a group. (There is thus no possibilityof exclusion.)


Examples: the householder’s cleaning of the sidewalk provides a public good (as Coleman notes). Other examples: pollution, noise, overgrazing of the commons (Coleman 41) provide public goods with negative utility and are called public bads. Question: What are public goods in a shared apartment?

The problem of providing a public good is that nobody can be excluded from its consumption. Therefore, there is an incentive to wait until others provide the good because, if it is provided, everyone can consume it. This is the free rider problem.

As Olson argues, this problem is particularly salient in largegroups if the single individual does not have an influence onproviding the good. Example: participation in elections.

Question: Are norms and laws public goods (or bads)?Yes! ...


Question: What has all this to do with externalities?

Coleman’s answer is that externalities are public goods or public bads. Therefore, the theory of collective action can be applied.

Question: is this always the case, i.e. are there externalitieswhich are not public goods?

Pollution, noise, the householder’s cleaning the sidewalk are public goods.Effects in dyadic interactions: two persons sit at a tableand one lights a cigarette – this is an externality that is not a public good! (There is no joint interest ...)

However, the major externalities are public goods or bads.For those kinds of externalities the theory can be applied.


Question: What has the realization of norms to do with externalities?

Here is Coleman’s argument (in particular 52-53):

A major condition for a contribution to the provision of a public good is to sanction contributors and non-contributors, i.e. to reward contributors and punish non-contributors.

For example, if there is no incentive to do something againstpollution (e.g. in a large group), then encouraging others toprotest or to approach legislators and punish non-contributorswill increase the likelihood of contributions.

Sanctioning thus generates a public good: If A sanctions B,then an effective (!) sanction benefits all (52), it leads to a norm.

NOTE: sanctioning is a dimension of a norm.


The second-order public good is instrumental to provide the first-order public good.

There are thus two types of public goods:

first-order public goods (such as pollution or cleaning the sidewalk) and

second-order public good (norms, generated through sanctioning).

Implication: the free rider problem holds for first-order as well as second-order public goods!

If the second-order free rider problem can be solved, then this makes the solution of the first-order free rider problem more likely (but does not guarantee it – if the sanctions are not effective!).


Coleman suggests a solution to the second-order public goods problem – this is his “second principle” (53):

Sanctioning becomes likely if there are close socialrelationships between the members of a group.

Why? Idea: if – say – two persons are members of different groups, there are many possibilities to sanction. E.g., they (the potential beneficiaries of a norm) may decide to sanction jointly a third person to contribute. If A does not contribute, B and C may sanction A as a member of different groups. (see Ellickson – but here the sanctioning was likely to be effective!)

“If there is a social relationship between actors, ... then thisovercomes the second-order free rider problem” (53).

Let us first look at the relationships between first and second-order public goods:

204

Relationships between sanctioning and contributing to first- andsecond-order public goods (Coleman 1990, see in particular pp. 52-53)

Public good(first-order public good)(e.g. clean air)

Contribution to first-order public good(e.g. refrain from polluting, protest)

Sanctioning= second-order public good

Social relationships

Dotted arrows: indirect effectsQuestion: Where are the norms that Coleman intends to explain?Question marks: under what conditions will these effects hold? Always?

NIVorlesungENG_Leipzig_First*.wpgSeatNI_ExternalitiesFirstSecondOrderPG_new.wpg

First-orderpublic goodsproblem(how toprovide thepublic good)

Second-orderpublic goodsproblem(how to bringaboutsanctioning)

?

?


A Modification of Coleman’s solution of the second-order publicgoods problem (Coleman1990): Adding NORMS

Public good(first-order public good)(e.g. clean air)

Contribution to first-order public good(e.g. refrain from polluting, protest)

Norm to contribute(second order public good)

Sanctioning - contributionto second-order public good

Dotted arrows: indirect effects.Question marks: under what conditions will these effect shold? Always?

First-orderpublic goodsproblem

Second-orderpublic goodsproblem

Social networks (= solution of both public goods problems)

?

?

?

?

?

NIVorlesungENG_Leipzig_First*.wpgSeatNI_ExternalitiesFirstSecondOrderPG.wpg


Coleman’s causal model can be reconstructed in the followingway (based on 1990a):


Similar externalitiesfor members of agroup G

No market forcontrol rights/noindividual actorcan eliminateexternality

Social relationshipsbetween normbeneficiaries, andbetween them andnorm addressees(targets)

Sanctioningof normaddressee

Demandfor norm

Realizationof norm

+

+ +

+

+

? +

From: seatNI_ExternaliCOLEMAN3.wpg

Note: beneficiaries are those who profit from the “internalization” of an externality, whereas addressees (or targets) are those whose behavior is to be regulated(example pollution).


There are other plausible relationships between the variables,e.g.: all exogenous variables affect “realization of a norm”:

Similar externalitiesfor members of agroup G

No market forcontrol rights/noindividual actorcan eliminateexternality

Social relationshipsbetween normbeneficiaries, andbetween them andnorm addressees

Sanctioningof normaddressee

Demandfor norm

Realizationof norm

+

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

+


Problems of the theory

Does the theory explain norms – in the sense defined by Coleman (=oughtness, see slide 183)? Only if the empirical assumption is made that sanctioning

leads to a norm to participate. Can this be assumed? Relevance of Networks: Do I sanction a friend (or a close

acquaintance) more severely than somebody I do not know so well? What about “tolerance”? (Or does “sympathy” not exist in close social networks?) Thus, relationships provide the opportunity to sanction, but perhaps lowers frequency and intensity of sanctioning!

Under what conditions do social relationships lead to more sanctioning?


Thus, B would be expected to invest time and money for an absolutely hopeless and futile cause!

This would probably be the end of the friendship or of any relationship between the two persons.

This will be particularly the case if the sanctioner A does not participate himself (hypocritical sanctioning – Heckathorn).

Conclusion: Especially if sanctioning is badly needed for contributions to a public good – if the other incentives to contribute are very low – it seems that sanctioning is unlikely, it will provoke strong counter-reactions.

Assume there is no chance that joint action of a group willprovide the public good – e.g. students want a fixed incomeof 2000 € for every student per month. Would a personA encourage his friend B to become active for this cause?


Nonetheless, sanctioning is common in many situations where it is actually costly. It seems that there is some evolutionary basis of sanctioning. (Nasty note: if you do not have an explanation for a behavior, try to find the explanation in the evolution!)

The basic idea is that in earlier times groups were small. In this situation, sanctioning and sanctioning norms (!) werelikely to increase “fitness” or, in modern terms, were likelyto contribute to the provision of the desired public goodsfor the group. Such a sanctioning trait may thus have becomepart of our genes and is transmitted to present day homo sapiens. And – perhaps – sanctioning is even accepted in situations where directly participating in the provision of a public good is not very promising.


For the contribution to the provision of public goods there are many other incentives, such as (for a summary see Opp 2009):

intensity of public goods preferences AND perceived influence (which is often overestimated!), participation norms, status gain in group by participating, sanctioning of cooperation (often measured by membership in

social networks that encourage contributions) .

Sanctioning is thus only one incentive for contributing!

213

Do norms emerge if there exist neither positive nor negativeexternalities? Did table manners, rules of politeness, normsof fashion, and language emerge due to externalities?

Table manners: lower classes imitate higher classes.Rules of politeness (take the smaller part of a pie…)Language rules: groups create special words to be different (= creation of positive externalities for the group?).Norms of fashion: firms create fashion to earn money! Or could one say there were externalities? (Lower classes suffered from not dressing or eating like the upper classes? The latter thus causes externalities?) Are these behaviors that cause costs and benefits?

Perhaps: groups often want to create new positive (or negative?) externalities for themselves or others.

This would be an extension of the theory!


What is the mechanism of norm emergence: if norms are realized, does this happen spontaneously or by design?Since the theory of collective action is applied it seems that there is some joint decision.

General conclusion: Coleman’s “solution” is hardly convincingas a general explanation of social norms!


IX.3. How Are the Demsetz/Coleman Models Related to the Previous Models?

Possible differences Ho. Ax. Ell. Con-vent.

Dem-setz

Col.


+ - - - - -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization… (including interest groups) / "normative" entrepreneurs for conventions and for public goods provision

+ - - ? ? ? +

Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for conventions

+* + + ? + +


- + -? - ? -

Externalities + + + + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning - - + ? + ?


per-haps

per-haps

+ ? - +

Verbal communication possible + - + + + +* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? ? means: variable is not in the model, but might be relevant


IX.4. References

Coleman, James S. 1990a. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects, edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Coleman, James S. 1990.b Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass., and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Demsetz, Harold. 1967. "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review 57:347-359.

Eggertsson, Thráinn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Furubotn, Eirik G., and Svetozar Pejovich. 1974. The Economics of Property Rights. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.


Horne, Christine. 2009. The Rewards of Punishment. A Relational Theory of Norm Enforcement. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Leacock, Eleanor. 1954. "The Montagnais "Hunting Territory" and the Fur Trade." American Anthropologist 56, No. 2, part 2, Memoir 78.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1983. Die Entstehung sozialer Normen. Ein Integrationsversuch soziologischer, sozialpsychologischer und ökonomischer Erklärungen. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2009. Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique and Synthesis. London and New York: Routledge

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


X. Private-Interest Sanctioning and the Emergence of Norms

There are two types of situations.

In the Coleman model there was sanctioning in order to provide a first-order

public good (= reduction of externalities) and a joint coordinated effort – see Coleman’s ideas about the importance of social networks.

There was thus a collective interest (i.e. not only a private interest) in norm formation.

Are there situations where there is sanctioning but NO joint, coordinated effort to

bring about a norm that reduces the externalities, and there is only a private interest in being free of

externalities?


establishing a norm against pollution from several factories – Coleman model can be applied (but: think of spontaneous boycott, if, e.g., the polluting firms are food factories?);

establishing a non-smoking norm – Coleman model might not hold.

Look at these examples:

Characteristics of the situation Situation in Coleman model

Alternative situation

Sanctioning + +

Joint effort to provide the second-order public good

+ -

Collective interest to remove externalities

+ -

What could be the mechanism of norm emergence in this alter-native situation – take the example of the non-smoking norm.


This section is based on:

Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002b. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Designand When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The Example of the No-Smoking Norm.“ Rationality & Society 14:131-158.


There are externalities in interaction situations, and the externality is caused by the partner in the interaction.

Those affected by the externalities do not intend to create a general norm that reduces the externalities, but only wish to reduce the externality in the interaction situation.

Individuals are able to control the externality at low costs. There are positive incentives to sanctioning (sanctioning

smokers in order to avoid the harassment is often less costly than being exposed to the smoke).

The mechanism applies to situations of the following type – let the example be exposure of non-smokers to smokers:

X.1. Theory


The mechanism could be:

Individuals who are exposed to an externality (such as smoke) utter statements demanding that the “perpetrator” should refrain from the behavior (negative verbal sanctions).

The stronger the externality is, the more likely normative statements are uttered (oughtness is expressed).

If this happens often to a perpetrator, the costs of continuing to impose externalities on others increase (stimulus generalization).

Assumption: increased frequency of sanctioning raises the costs of performing the action disproportionally (logistic relationship), but this assumption is not needed (although it seems plausible):


The behavior (smoking) will be performed less frequently. Smokers will acquire a negative attitude towards

smoking (Fishbein-Ajzen Theory).

Frequency ofsanctioning (ofsmoking)

Costs of per-forming thesanctioned behavior(smoking) Which curve

is plausible?


A positive attitude toward a non-smoking norm emerges as well, i.e. it is accepted that smoking in the presence of others is “not right” (again: Fishbein-Ajzen theory implies this – positive effects of following the norm...).

Implication: the norm will be conditional – it will hold for the situations where it is sanctioned (discrimination learning).

If the externality is strong, there is a demand for regulation.

IMPORTANT: this implies that a strong informal norm will lead to incentives for politicians to engage in law-making – see later.


Role of social networks: Sanctioning smokers is not a “heroic” action, and

smoking is not like a serious deviant behavior. Thus, sanctioning will not be a topic in everyday conversations, and one will not expect status if one reports sanctioning of smokers. Therefore, social networks will not be of major importance for sanctioning.

Effect of the externality on choosing networks: one will choose networks with non-smokers.

IMPLICATION: The norm is an unintended by-product of individual action that aims at achieving private goals.


Based on this mechanism I tested the following causal model:

Externalitythrough smoking

Informal Demand to Sanctioningnon-smoking prohibit of smokersnorm smoking

Number of friendswho do not smoke

+

+

+

+strong

weakweak

weak

strong

strong

+

++

+

++


Sample: 366 undergraduate students filled out a writtenquestionnaire in introductory seminars (details in Opp 2002).

X.2. A test of the theory

Questionnaire items (examples):

Number of friends who do not smoke: "Think of those peoplewho are particularly important to you. How many of these peoplesmoke?” (almost all, many, about half, few, nobody)

Demand to prohibit smoking: Additive scale from the followingitems: (a) Smoking in the presence of nonsmokers should beprohibited; (b) it should be prohibited to smoke in publicbuildings. Possible answers from "fully disagree" (1) to "fully agree" (4).


Sanctioning of smokers: Additive scale from the following items:(a) I have ostentatiously cleared my throat and coughed;(b) I have talked to others about the disturbance so that thesmoker could hear it; (3) I told smokers that they disturbed me;(4) I urged smokers to refrain from smoking.Answer categories: never (1), once (2), several times (3).

Private non-smoking norm: Measurement by the factorial survey: SEE THE PREVIOUS SECTION ON MEASUREMENT.In two types of situations (restaurant, student party) it isascertained to what extent smoking is more or less regardedas allowed or forbidden for different aspects of each type of the two situations. The acceptance of a private non-smoking norm is the average of all judgments of a given respondent.

Here is again the slide we saw already (section “Factorial Survey”).


Restaurant example: the following dimensions (i.e. variables) might be important for a no-smoking norm to hold in a restaurant (the values of the dimensions are put in parentheses) for a person P - the protagonist of the situation:

Gender of P in a restaurant ((1) male, (2) female);Class of the restaurants ((1) Top class restaurant, (2) ordinary restaurant, (3) pub); Smoking rule ((1) no indication ..., (2) .. sign that it would be nice to refrain from smoking ..., (3) sign that smoking is not allowed);Number of people in the restaurant who smoke ((1) No smoker; (2) one smoker; (3) several smokers; (4) most people smoke);Duration of stay in the restaurant ((1) ... stays only for a short time to drink a beer. (2) ... stays for some time to have a meal);Addiction of the person P in the restaurant: ((1) ... smokes most of the time more than a package of cigarettes per day; (2) ... smokes most of the time less than a package of cigarettes per day; (3) ... is occasional smoker).


Example for a vignette:

Mr. Müller goes to a restaurant. This is a top class restaurant in which smoking is prohibited. There is nobody in the restaurant who smokes. Mr. Müller stays only for a short time to drink a beer. He smokes most of the time more than a package of cigarettes per day.

The respondents are presented with a rating scale with twoextremes: they indicate to what extent it is not at all allowed to smoke (-3) and it is in any case allowed to smoke (+3). The other values were: -2, -1, +1, +2.


-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3

It is not at allallowed to smoke

It is in any caseallowed to smoke

It is not allowed to smoke It is allowed to smoke

Rating scale: Respondents are asked to rate each vignette on the following scale:


Table 2: Sanctioning Behavior: How Smokers and Non-Smokers Sanction Smokers

Kinds of sanctions Percentage of those who sanctioned at least once (in parentheses: average frequency of sanctioning)1

Non-smokers Occasional smokers

Less than 1 package daily

More than 1 package daily

All respondents

(1) I have ostentatiously cleared my throat and coughed

53.5%(1.92)

36.2%(1.60)

19.4%(1.25)

4.0%(1.04)

40.6%(1.67)

(2) I have talked to others about the disturbance so that the smoker could hear it

36.8%(1.59)

15.5%(1.21)

14.7%(1.18)

0.0%(1.00)

26.4%(1.41)

(3) I told smokers that they disturbed me

79.3%(2.43)

56.9%(1.97)

46.2%(1.78)

28.0%(1.48)

65.7%(2.16)

(4) I urged smokers to refrain from smoking

52.7%(1.91)

27.6%(1.50)

25.4%(1.45)

20.0%(1.36)

41.0%(1.72)

N2 200 58 67 25 351

1 Answer categories: never (1), once (2), several times (3).2 N refers to the minimal number of respondents in the respective column.The means per item for non-smokers are significantly different from the value 1 (signifying no sanctioning) at least on the .0001 level.


)

Independent Variables(Vignette dimensions)

Dependent variable: Acceptance of a non-smoking norm1

Restaurant Student party

All Non-smokers

Smokers1 All Non-smokers

Smokers2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Gender (female) .02 .03 .01 -.02 -.01 -.02

Class of the restaurant -.04** -.06** -.01

No smoking in restaurant .55** .54** .63**

No smoking at student party3:

hosts request not to smoke .63** .59** .73**

hosts tell they don't care about smoking

.07** .09** .02

no statement by hosts, but it is known that they don't smoke

.50** .53** .47**

no statement by hosts, but it is known that they are smokers

.04* .02 .04*

no statement .16** .20** .11**

Number of smokers -.21** -.18** -.27** -.22** -.24** -.22**

Duration of stay -.02 -.01 -.04 -.05** -.02 -.07**

Actor in the vignette is occasional smoker .03** .05** .04 .04** .01 .10**

Adjusted R2 .35** .33** .43** .48** .44** .62**

Table 4: The Effects of the Vignette Dimensions on the Acceptance of a Non-Smoking Norm (Standardized Regression Coefficients)

Notes on next slide.


* Significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level, one-tailed tests.

1 The original rating scale (with high positive values indicating that smoking was allowed--see Table 3) was recoded so that high positive values indicate that smoking is not allowed, i.e. that a no-smoking norm is accepted.

2 Smokers are respondents who smoke at least one package of cigarettes per day.

3 The reference category is: the hosts tell that smoking is allowed.

N, the number of judgments, is at least 3626 for all judgments, 2056 for non-smokers and 981 for smokers.

Conditions for the Sanctioning of Smokers (Bivariate Correlations and Standardized Regression Coefficients)

Independent Variables Dependent variable: Extent of Sanctioning

r Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Externality through smoking

Smoking is disturbing .48** .23** .31**

Smoking is no pleasure in life .36** .04

Passive smoking is not harmless, compared to other health risks .34** .11* .14**

Passive smoking unhealthy .20** .02

Low intensity of smoking .43** .11

Composite scale .52** .38** .40**

Number of friends who do not smoke

.27** .007 .02

Informal non-smoking norm .33** .009 .03

Demand to prohibit smoking .44** .13* .16** .15* .17**

Adjusted R2.27** .26** .28** .28**


The test of the model

Externalitythrough smoking

Informal Demand to Sanctioningnon-smoking prohibit of smokersnorm smoking

Number of friendswho do not smoke

.03

.02

.15*.49** .38**

R2=.28**.14**

.26**

.10*

R2=.36**

.51**.53**

R2=.54**.10*


What could be the process of the emergence of a generalnon-smoking norm?

In a period 1 smoking is accepted and non-smokers don’t care if they are exposed to smokers. This is the situation in the 1950s and 1960s.

Scientific research and media reports spread the view that active and passive smoking is dangerous for health.

The costs of being exposed to smokers increase. The incentives of sanctioning smokers in interaction

situations (including normative utterances that smoking is “bad”) as an instrumental act to stop the smoker and, thus sanctioning increase.

The costs of smoking in interactions with smokers increase disproportionally.

X.3. The process of norm emergence


Smoking decreases. Acceptance of a non-smoking norm increases (on the

smokers’ side: dissonance of being sanctioned ...). BUT smoking will not disappear – why?

NOTE: This is a micro-macro model – here is the sketch:

Scientific research

Incentives forsanctioning etc. Sanctioning

SocialNormCorrelation

239

X.4. What is the Difference to the Previous Models?

Possible differences Ho. Ax. Ell. Con De Col SM


+ - - - - - -

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization … (including interest groups) / "normative" entrepreneurs for conventions and for public goods provision

+ - -? ? ? + -

Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for conventions /at low costs (smoking – only?)

+* + + ? + + +


- + -? - ? - +

Externalities + + + + + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning - - + ? + ? +


per-haps

per-haps

+ ? - + +

Verbal communication possible + - + + + + +

LAST COLUMN: SM for smoking norm. * Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? means: variable is not in the model, but might be relevant.


Does the process described hold for other norms – and not only the non-smoking norm?

Noise of neighbors, if it is not too loud? Table manners? Is there a “critical event” such as research on cancer?

General question – for all the mechanisms dealt with before: can systems of norms be explained – like a constitution or a law?

X.4. Questions

Another row could be “externalities affect the choice ofnetworks” – this is another difference to all other models.

Why are there anti-smoking movements in the US?(http://www2.tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2503001914-1927.html)

Should there be a row with „informal norms lead to demandfor regulation“ – this is a difference to all other models.


XI. Other Mechanisms: Some Suggestions

I will sketch some mechanisms that will not be discussed – forlimitation of time. This is for your term paper!

XI.1. The Is-Becomes-Ought Mechanism

Example customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht): assume person P has crossed the land of his neighbor to catch the bus to work for several years. All of a sudden the neighbor’s new wife wants to forbid P to cross the premises. But P has acquired the right to cross the land. (see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gewohnheitsrecht). Question: when does a behavioral regularity lead to a norm that one has a right or is entitled to perform the respective behavior?


The mechanism is:

a behavior has been performed for some time; a norm develops that one should (or is allowed to) perform this

behavior; if somebody wants to prevent the behavior he or she is sanctioned.

A husband brings his wife regularly flowers – in general: somebody always gives a (big) present and then suddenly stops this (or gives smaller presents);

a father takes his child regularly to the zoo and then stops it; a man regularly steals something if he buys in a shop, and then

stops this; a person takes regularly route A to a bus and not route B, and then

changes routes. High social welfare payments are cut (in general: state benefits are

reduced).

Examples:


Idea: might externalities be relevant? Stopping activities that generate positive externalities lead first to cognitive, then to normative expectations to continue providing the benefits.

Perhaps one of the previous models could be applied?


XI.2. Subversive Attenuation of Norms

Assume there is a norm that has been followed for a long time. Then there is a slow erosion of the conformity to the norm, then the norm continuously attenuates until it disappears.

Examples from Germany:

Engagement (Verlobung): presents could be claimed back in case the couple splits up.

Unfaithfulness of a married partner (adultery) was punished if reported to the police.

Pocket money paragraph: wife could only spend little amounts of money without permission of the husband. Otherwise the purchase was invalid.

Other “outdated” norms: manners (children stand up for adults ...)


At some point in time a norm is generally accepted (i.e. there is oughtness and sanctioning).

Then an increasing number of people do not adhere to the norm, i.e. norm-conforming behavior decreases.

The norm attenuates and, finally, is no longer accepted and adhered to.

The mechanism is:

Why does non-conformity diminish oughtness?


Imitation, e.g. norms of the upper class are adopted by the lower class (table manners, fashion);

internalization (norms become motives of their own – especially when children learn norms).

There are two other mechanisms that focus on the spread of norms (the norms thus exist already):

Note: in the transmission process norms may change – see the norms of children and their parents.

When are norms imitated and internalized, and to what extentdo they change? When do actors invest to internalize normsin others (like parents)?

XI.3. How Norms May Spread


Businessmen make explicit contracts.

In everyday life there are many implicit contracts (mutual promises).

The contracting parties generate a norm that holds only for the parties.

Sometimes norms are “generalized,” i.e. adopted by the same partners for different contracts or by other parties. (See general business conditions – Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen.) See commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch). WHY?

What are the conditions for what kinds of contracts?

See the vast literature in “law and economics.”

XI.4. Norms by Contract

Examples:


XII. The Origin of Norms by Design: Collective Norm Making

Many norms and systems of norms (institutions) emerge by design, i.e. by collective decisions: a group of individuals (a parliament, a government, the board or the member assembly of a sports club) vote on some issue, according some decision rule like a simple majority rule, a qualified majority or unanimity. This decision is then implemented.

How can such collective decisions about norms or institutionsbe explained? (I.e. when does “the group” choose rule A or B?)

I will present some propositions. As an illustration I use:

Riker, William H. 1995. "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution." Pp. 121-144 in Explaining Social Institutions, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


XII.1. Some Facts About the Creation of the American Constitution

July 4, 1776: declaration of independence of the United Statesof America.

“On September 17, 1787, the Constitution was completed in Philadelphia at the Federal Convention ... The Convention submitted the Constitution to the Congress of the Confederation, where it received approval according to Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation.

In March 4, 1789, the government under the Constitution began operations.” I.e. the US constitution went into effect. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Constitution)

Riker explains the voting of the Federal Convention in 1787.

User

Bundesversammlung

User

Staatenbund


XII.2. The Actors’ Goals

The members of a group who want to make a collective decisionhave goals they want to achieve.

The higher the intensity (or importance) of the goals, the more likely they determine the outcome of a vote.

The lower the intensity of goals the more likely they are changed in negotiations.

E.g., the goal that each single state in the US has a say in the decisions of the government, the goal of “checks and balances” were determinants of the votes of the members of the assembly.

Karl-Dieter Opp

What about the homogeneity of goals of a group?

max

Checks and balances: Erstmals schriftlich angewandt wurde das Prinzip in der amerikanischen Verfassung von 1787. Hier kontrollieren sich gegenseitig der Kongress, der Präsident und der Supreme Court (oberstes amerikanisches Gericht). Deshalb werden C. u B. oft mit dem Begriff des amerikanischen Verfassungsprinzips bezeichnet.


To what extent are externalities relevant for the votes?

Actors’ goals could be to remove or internalize existing orexpected negative or positive externalities in the populationor of the president (if he becomes too powerful).

Actors’ goals could be to create positive externalities for the population or groups (financial support for young families).


This distribution of the goal intensities allows logrolling.

Another condition for the outcome of a vote is the possibility of logrolling (Stimmentausch): is there a chance for “trade-offs” – I give up a less important goal if you vote for a more important goal of mine. If this is is possible it is likely that goals of lower importance to the actors are given up so that a collective decision becomes more likely.

Vertical lines: evaluationfrom low (below) to high(above)

Arrows: valuation of rulesby Person A and Person B

Thus, person A could ask B to vote on 1, and promise to vote on 2, inreturn. (Will both believe each other?)

Person A

Rule 1 Rule 2

Person A

Rule 1 Rule 2

Person B

Rule 1 Rule 2


The outcome of a vote further depends on ideas about newrules that satisfy all (or the required number of) parties, i.e. on finding compromises.

Compromises are often difficult to find. Often somebody has anidea after a long negotiation that is immediately accepted!

This indicates that it is difficult to predict collective decisions!


XII.3. Beliefs About the Empirical Effects of Norms

Actors will choose those norms that in their opinion realizetheir goals to the highest extent.

There are thus beliefs about what kind of norms will have which empirical effects.

Example: a decentralization of the school and university system in Germany (i.e. schools and universities are a matter of the “Länder”) was supposed to lead to competition between the states for “better” schools and universities.This was the belief after the Nazi rule. What happened?

Thus, a vote for a norm will be likely if the norm is supposedto have relatively positive consequences (= externalities).


Among the empirical effects of creating a norm are also theeffects on the support of those who make the norms.

See political decisions before an election!

Thus, two kinds of consequences can be distinguished:

consequences for those for whom the norm is costly or beneficial (see scrap premium – Abwrackprämie – in Germany; pollution: there are those who benefit from a law diminishing pollution and those who have to bear costs);

consequences for the support of the norm makers (extent to which the voters like the rule and to which the rule leads to higher support such as a higher number of votes for the party).

What are the primary goals? Public choice theory: common-good fiction! Politicians want support and re-election! See “neue Energiepolitik” in Germany!


XII.4. Decision Rules as Major Constraints for Decision Outcomes

The decision rule with the highest cost is unanimity (or a lowblocking minority). Depending on the distribution of goalsand their intensity only extensive bargaining leads to a joint decision, and perhaps no unanimity is ever achieved.

A simple majority rule (the rule that receives most of the votes ispassed) is less costly.

Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1965. The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Thus, the higher the required unanimity of a rule, the lesslikely a collective outcome will come about or the longernegotiations will last.


XII.5. The Influence of Predecessor-Institutions: the Role of Path-Dependence

“ ... no institution is created de novo. Consequently, in any new institution one should expect to see hangovers from the past” (121).

There is a vast number of constitutions that preceded the American one, such as those from the colonial governments or the Dutch Republic (from 1570 and still existing in 1787).

What are the factors that influence the impact of pre-existingnorms and institutions?


Those institutions influence a new institution that one had experienced personally (123),

institutions that are “significant” for the framing (123), i.e. relevant for achieving the goals of the actors,

accessibility (“no framer could read Dutch” – 124).

In general: The actors’ goals and the accessibility of pre-existing constitutions determine which constitution is considered and which single rules are used.

Question: which constitution would the framers of the Germanconstitution of 1949 (“Grundgesetz”) consider?

What about the Nazi laws?

These are questions for a possible term paper!

Conditions for Collective Norm Making: A Preliminary Summary

Intensity of goalsrealized by rule (R)

Likelihood of negotia-tion about goals

Positive evaluation ofconsequences forlawmakers through R

Likelihood of finding an acceptable compro-mise

Constraints imposed by decision rule

Heterogeneity of goals(NEW)

Collective decision aboutaccepting rules R

-+

+

+

+

-

-

259

How can pathdependence beincluded?Perhaps a cause of Independent variables

260

XII.6. What is the Difference to the Previous Models?Possible differences Ho Ax Ell. Con-

vent.Dem-setz

Coleman

Smo-king

Colldec

Transfer of rights and creation of central authority most beneficial / collective dec. change rights

+ - - - - - - +

Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an organization…/ "normative" entrepreneurs for conventions and for public goods provision / politicians for collective decisions

+ - - ? ? + - +

Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for conventions / at low costs (smoking) / not sufficient for collective decisions

+* + + ? + + + -?


- + - - ? - + -

Externalities (or beliefs about consequences of norm – collective decision making)

+ + + + + + + +

Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning, including path dependence

- - + ? + ? + +


perhap

s

perhaps

+ ? - + + -?

Verbal communication possible + - + + + + + +


Path dependence: was that included in previous theories? (Vast literature – see last section)

Beliefs about the consequences of norms are relevant – to be included under “externalities” – see big table.

Important for all processes of norm emergence:

Does centralized norm making suggest how in general systemsof norms (= institutions) can be explained by the other “theories”?Will be discussed later.

XII.7. Questions and Comments on the Table

NOTE: collective decisions are explained by explaining individualbehavior!


XIII. The Effects of Norms and Institutions

So far the origin of norms was addressed.

Most of the literature deals with the effects of norms. Thus, norms or institutions are regarded as given.

This is the topic of this section.

I will present some general propositions and some illustrations.

Perhaps only generalmodel 272


Behavior conformity to or violation of the norm side effects (e.g. discriminatory effects of anti-discrimination

laws – e.g. dismissal of handicapped); preferences or attitudes (e.g. toward the regulated behavior or

toward the norm makers); cognitive beliefs (e.g. expectations about the regularity of the

demanded or prohibited behavior); other norms/institutions (path dependence – see US

constitution); change of the respective norm itself at a later time (feedback

effects – e.g. if a norm does not work it may be changed).

Norms and institutions may have effects on:

XIII.1. The Possible Effects of Norms and Institutions


A necessary condition for norms to have any effect is thatindividuals recognize that a norm holds in a certain situation.It does not always happen that the norm is activated.

See, with further references: Stroebe, Wolfgang. 2008. "Warum und wiebeeinflussen Normen das Verhalten: Eine sozial-kognitive Analyse.“Pp. 101-118 in Rational Choice: Theoretische Analysen und empirische Resultate. Festschrift für Karl-Dieter Opp zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by Andreas Diekman, Klaus Eichner, Peter Schmidt, and Thomas Voss.Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Intuitive example: it often happens in everyday life that one asksoneself: shouldn’t one have behaved in another way in a certainsituation (e.g. apologized for a behavior – one should havesent a Christmas card ...)

In what follows I will concentrate on behavior which is most often addressed in the literature as well.


XIII.2. Which Theory Could and Should Be Applied to Explain the Effects of Norms or Institutions?

Sociological role theory

Biddle, Bruce J. 1986. "Recent Developments in Role Theory." Annual Review of Sociology 12:67-92.

Biddle, Bruce J., and Edwin J. Thomas (Eds.). 1966. Role Theory: Concepts and Research. New York: Wiley.

Symbolic interactionism

Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American Sociological Review 51:272-286.

Methodological assumption: it is useful to apply a theory and nottry ad hoc to explain effects of norms.

Question then is: what theory could an should be applied?


Rational choice theory (RCT)

Most of the literature applies this theory – difference betweennarrow and wide version.

Basic problem: can norms/institutions be included as indepen-dent variables in RCT? This is controversial.

Elster, Jon. 1989b. "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:99-117.

Opp, K.-D. (2013). "Norms and Rationality. Is Moral Behavior a Form of Rational Action?" Theory & Decision 74(3): 383-409.


How do norms fit into rational choice theory?

Internalized norms / acceptance of norms: these are preferen-ces for following a norm, i.e. following a norm is intrinsically rewarding, deviation is costly (bad conscience, shame).

Existing normative expectations of others: they are not costs or benefits per se, but only if others are reference persons (then they diminish the realization of goals such as having a good reputation in the opinion of the reference persons).

Sanctions are reactions to norm conformity or deviations. They need not be costs or benefits – only if they reduce the realization of goals (then they are constraints).

Do the norms dimensions refer to costs and benefits and, thus, can explain behavior?


Why could norms not fit into rational choice theory?

Elster, Jon. 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:99.

“Rational action is concerned with outcomes. Rationality says: If you want to achieve Y, do X. By contrast, I define social norms by the feature that they are not outcome-oriented. The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don´t X. More complex norms say: If you do Y, then do X ... Rationality is essentially conditional and future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditional, are not future-oriented” (underlining not in the original).

Thus, there are two types of action: rational and normative action.

Question: What do you think about this argument?


Critique of the argument:

1. Why define “rationality” in this way? What has this to do with rational choice theory? There are numerous other definitions of rationality.

2. Why are norms defined as not outcome-oriented? Instead of simply defining something, it should be analyzed whether a normative statement “if you do Y, then do X” is outcome- oriented.

Of course, people follow or violate norms because this is beneficial or costly. In other words: following or violating norms has consequences – either in terms of external sanctions or in terms of internal sanctions (shame etc.) orin terms of side effects (see before).


If an actor behaves in order to avoid internal sanctions, he/she wishes to avoid certain consequences that are expected to occur in the future. Thus, the costs and benefits of following or violating norms occur in the future.

In fact, ELSTER supports this analysis when he acknowledges that norms are “sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospects of violating them. A person obeying a norm may also be propelled by positive emotions, like anger and indignation” (1989: 99-100). In other words, the “prospect” of norm violation is relevant for the decision to conform to or to violate a norm.

3. Is normative behavior not future-oriented?

Thus, norms can be included as possible costs and benefitsin a rational choice explanation!


XIII.3.The Basic Model for Explaining the Effectsof Norms on Behavior

See figure on next page.

See in more detailOpp, K.-D. (2011). Wie kann man die Wirkungen von Normenund Werten erklären? Werte in der Begegnung.Wertgrundlagen und Wertperspektiven ausgewählter Lebensbereiche. H. T. Krobath. Würzburg, Königshausen und Neumann: 293-318.

Internalizednorms/institu-tions (e.g. owner-ship rights)

Behavior – followingnorm(s) N (e. g.exchange, production)(Attitudes? Beliefs?)

Collective normor institution

Externalnormativeexpectations

Likelihood/severity ofsanctions

Perception of norm N,expectations, expectedsanctions of N

Acceptance or internali-zation of norm N /legitimacy ofnorm senders or of the normmaking procedure

Other costs/benefits forcompliance/deviance (e.g.benefits of polluting)

effects on at least one of the following factors (= there areincentive effects)

Costs/benefits of following orbreaking external norm N

S o c i a l c o n t e x t

Example: rule of turninglights on all day in ChechRepublic.

SeatNI_EffectsInstitut ions1.wpg


Comments

The basic theoretical idea is that a change of norms and institutions affects incentives for individual action – but only under certain conditions, namely if norms are accepted or enforced.

Norms/institutions are only one set of incentives that influencebehavior – see the “other costs and benefits.”

Depending on the situation norms may be more or less important. Example: exceeding speed limits if you are in a hurry and if you wish to enjoy the surroundings.

The arrows to the independent variables indicate that otherfactors are relevant. I.e. there may be pre-existing internalized normative phenomena.


In contrast to the sociological role model the rational choicemodel can explain very detailed kinds of action, and can take into account not only norms as determinants of behavior.

Norms or expectations may be misperceived (e.g. percen-tage of crimes detected).

Only if external norm factors are incentives they will have any effect (e.g. the law may sometimes unknown, knownlaws are not adhered to – speed limits, if there are no flashes; parking rules if they are not enforced).


XIII.4. Examples for the Effects of Norms

The tragedy of the commons – private vs. common property

Assume there is one large meadow and, say, 20 farmers. Themeadow is common property.

Effects: over-consumption (and destruction of the meadow),under-investment.

Compare this with private property: each farmer gets a piece of land = private property.

Effects: each has an incentive not to consume too much becausehe or she bears the costs if no grass grows.Investment pays: one can exclude third parties from consumption.


See Demsetz 1967.

There are other possibilities to remove the problems of commonproperty. E. Ostrom shows various ways of how groups dealt withcommon pool resources.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The example illustrates: changes of property rights that are enforced change the incentives for various kinds of activities.


norms of language table manners rules of politeness traffic rules patents employment protection markets vs. central planning: incentives for producing according to consumer preferences,

incentives for behavior of managers (act according to plan ...), incentives for innovations ...

Numerous other examples show that norms provide incentives that affect behavior – more or less:

Themes for term paper!

278

XIV. A Toolkit for Institutional Analysis

Task is to explain the emergence, stability or change of certain norms or institutions. Question: what is an adequate procedure?

In what follows I will suggest “rules” of how to proceed.

Note: the “rules” are not moral imperatives but technologicalstatements: if you wish to achieve good explanations, do X.

In what follows the phenomena to be explained are statementsabout what ought to be the case and their acceptance, sanctioning behavior (in the sense of a behavior that is intended to punish or reward conformity to or violation of a norm (= ought statement)), and behavior that conforms to or violates a norm (accords with normative statements).

XIV.1. Explaining the ORIGIN of Norms and Institutions


The first step should be:

Rule 1: Specify what you want to explain.

In terms of “norms,” this could be

a new statement of a norm – e.g. a new law is suggested; change of acceptance of a statement that something ought

or ought not to be the case; change of sanctioning behavior change of norm-related behavior – conformity to or violation

of a norm.


Rule 2: Apply a theory referring to individual actors that is capable of accounting for the explanandum.

Those who accept a norm or sanction or perform a norm-related behavior are individual actors. If collective norm making is the explanatory problem, one should look at the decisions of the individuals who make up the collective – see lawmaking and the section about collective norm making.

Rule 2 thus seems useful.

Possible candidates for such a theory are a wide version of rational choice theory and other social psychological theories such as the Fishbein-Ajzen theory.


For an alternative qualitative approach see Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.“ American Sociological Review 51:272-286. Problem: low explanatory power!

Explaining norm-related phenomena often involves two steps:

How did the incentives of the actors change? example of the non-smoking norm: costs of being exposed

to smoking increased; or someone joins a new social network by moving to another place.

Why did the incentives change? example non-smoking norm: macro factors changed such

as spread of scientific findings. In general: macro events are the relevant factors (see also Demsetz 1967: technological developments etc.)


Thus, explaining norms often means that there are some macroevents that change incentives which lead to norm-relatedbehavior. Consequently:

Rule 3: Try to set up a micro-macro model.

seatNI_HowToDoInstitutionalAnalysis.wpd

Macro Norm/insti-changes tution

Change ofnorm-relatedincentives

Individualbehavior

correlation


The models in the previous sections include a list of factors thatmay be relevant for explaining the emergence and effects of norms and institutions.See the “big tables” and the causal model in the section aboutAxelrod. Accordingly, a useful rule is:

Rule 4: Check the relevance of the factors listed in the previous table.

This includes “path dependence” – which is emphasized as a major factor in the recent literature.


Basic idea in regard to norms and institutions:

past norms and institutions may determine what later norms and institutions look like.

This is an orienting statement: we may use it as a heuristic rule:

Rule 4a: If you explain norms and institutions, look at the effects of previous norms and institutions.

Examples: QWERTY keyboard, US constitution (see before),language, table manners (general use of chopsticks unlikely in Germany).

Notes on path dependence


Why could past norms/institutions affect later norms/institutions?

Answer from a rational choice perspective: earlier norms/institutions impose certain costs/benefits on the acceptance oradoption of later norms/institutions.

There is a vast literature where these costs and benefits are spelled out for specific kinds of institutions that are to be explained.

Rule 4b: If you explain norms and institutions, look at the costs and benefits that previous norms and institutions have on the norms and institutions to be explained.


NOTE 1: the extensive literature on path dependence is nota unified theory but a set of case studies with many orientingstatements!

NOTE 2: the idea of path dependence implies that norms/institutions need not be “efficient” (from a subjective or objective perspective): see QWERTY. Reason: costs of change to an “efficient” norm may be too high.


Some references on path dependence

Arthur, Brian W. 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events." The Economic Journal 99:116-131.

—. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Basic references are:

Mahoney, James. 2000. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology." Theory and Society 29:507-548.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Political Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

See further:


Critical junctures

“Critical junctures are characterized by the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are ‘critical’ because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2000: 513).

This is again an orienting hypothesis which may be reformulated as a heuristic rule:

Rule 4c: If you explain why norms and institutions do not change, examine whether the costs and benefits of change depend on previous changes of the norm/institutions.

Example: change of the welfare state! Qwerty keyboard.


Rule 5: Try to model a process of norm emergence

Explanations of institutions often follow a simple two-timecause and effect pattern. E.g.: what are the causes for thedecline of smoking after the introduction of a non-smoking law?

Many scholars are not satisfied with such short-term explanations. If there is a process where a norm or institution assumes the present shape after a longer time, it is useful to take a longer period into account:

This may also include hypotheses about the effects of norms: a new law – lowering costs of health care – may lead to a strong demand for health services, which leads to a change of the law.


It was said before that institutions are systems of norms. Example: inheritance laws.

Can such a system of norms be explained as a unified entity, i.e. is it possible to explain “the” institution as a whole, or is it necessary to explain the single norms an “institution” consists of?

At one extreme, it is possible that a whole system of rules is preferred by a group of actors to a whole system of other rules.In this case “the” institution can be explained.

Another extreme is that each single rule must be explained:each rule emerges separately due to different incentives.

Explaining institutions as unified entities


Example: inheritance rights

Beckert, Jens. 2004. Unverdientes Vermögen. Soziologie des Erbrechts. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.—. 2008. Inherited Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beckert investigates the development of inheritance rights in Germany, France and the US.

He does not explain “the” inheritance rights, but discusses four conflictual areas (“Konfliktfelder”): (1) the rights of a person to determine what happens with his wealth after his death, (2) the rights of the relatives of a bequeather (especially of the spouse and the children), (3) the goods that must remain in the family (“Fideikommisse”) and cannot be divided, and (4) the taxation of the heritage.


The following rule seems useful:

Rule 6: In explaining institutions try to begin simple: check how each rule can be explained. Whether explaining an institution as a whole is useful must be decided during the explanation.

These are again four complex sub-institutions (like taxation).

The question arises, whether they have to be further brokendown. This question can only be answered by looking at thecase in detail. See, as another example, the explanation of the US constitution.


XIV.2. Explaining the EFFECTS of Norms andInstitutions

The “rules” are similar to those of explaining the origin of norms and institutions:

Rule 1: Specify what the norms or institutions are whose effects are to be explained.

Rule 2: Apply a theory referring to individual actors and specify which actors might be affected in what way by the norms or institutions.


Rule 3: Try to set up a micro-macro model – see the generalmodel of the effects of norms before.

Rule 4: Decide which dimensions of the norm concept areto be addressed – oughtness, sanctions, regular behavior.

Rule 5: Try to model a process of the effects of norms andinstitutions.


XV. Summary: An Inventory of the Mechanisms of Norm Emergence

In explaining norms or institutions one might make use ofthe mechanisms described before. The question could be to what extent these mechanisms can be applied.

Further research is needed to specify the conditions when eachof these mechanisms apply.


Here is a list of the mechanisms addressed before:

transfer of rights to a central authority (Hobbes – 76); cooperation through decentralized private interest (mutual)

sanctioning 102, 129 (Axelrod, Ellickson); cumulative dispersion of norms by precedent (conventions) 146; the creation of norms by collective action (Demsetz, Coleman) 149

ff.; norm emergence by private interest sanctioning (Opp) 195; the is-becomes-ought mechanism (212); subversive attenuation of norms (213); imitation (215); internalization (215) norms by contract collective norm making.


Questions:

Are there more mechanisms?

Are there other differences between these mechanisms?

XVI. How to Get a Grade – Requirements for Papers

Scheine können durch Verfassen einer Hausarbeit erworben werden. Themen: Einzige Bedingung für die Wahl eines Themas ist, dass es sich mit der Entstehung und/oder den Wirkungen von Normen befasst. „Normen“ umfassen hier auch Gesetze.

Dabei kann z.B. eine konkrete Norm herausgegriffen und erklärt werden – etwa die Entstehung der Nicht-Rauchergesetze. Es können auch die Wirkungen bestimmter Normen erklärt werden. Weiter können Theorien diskutiert werden.

Wichtig: Eine rein deskriptive Arbeit reicht nicht. Es muss sich um ein Erklärungsproblem handeln.

284

Wenn Sie ein Thema gewählt haben: bitte schreiben Sie mir eine Email, die ich sofort beantworten werde:[email protected]. Ich werde sofort antworten!

Theorien oder Sachverhalte, die in der Vorlesung behandelt wurden, brauchen nicht im Einzelnen dargestellt zu werden.

Umfang: bei einem Verfasser bzw. einer Verfasserin der Hausarbeit lautet die Daumenregel: ca. 15 Seiten. Hausarbeiten mit bis zu 3 Personen – mit entsprechend größerem Umfang – werden akzeptiert.

Englischsprachige Literatur. Leider kommt es immer wieder vor, dass Hausarbeiten nur oder überwiegend deutschsprachige Literatur enthalten. Normalerweise liegt zu jedem Thema eine umfangreiche englischsprachige Literatur vor, die selbstverständlich zu benutzen ist.

285

Rechtschreibung und Zeichensetzung. Arbeiten mit vielen Fehlern nehme ich nicht an.Abgabe der Arbeit: Bitte geben Sie eine gedruckte Fassung Ihrer Arbeit bei Frau Apelt (meine ehemalige Sekretärin) ab, sie schickt sie mir (mit dem zugehörigen Schein) zu. Bitte vermerken Sie ihre Email-Adresse auf der Arbeit, ich werde Ihnen zur Bewertung schreiben.Es gibt keinen festen Abgabetermin!Zeitraum für Korrektur: drei Wochen.Fragen?

286

Zitieren aus zweiter Hand: Es kommt leider immer wieder vor, dass eine Theorie dargestellt wird, und dass dabei nicht das ursprüngliche Werk, sondern eine andere Quelle wie z.B. ein Lehrbuch zitiert wird. Es versteht sich eigentlich von selbst, dass Zitieren aus zweiter Hand nicht akzeptable ist.

This is the end!

Thanks for your patience!

norms and institutions. origins, change and effects prof. dr. karl-dieter opp universität leipzig,...

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