NORTH AMERICADIP FINANCING REPORT: 1H 2017

Joshua FriedmanLegal Analyst212.574.7867Joshua.Friedman@Debtwire.com

Rong RenAnalyst646.412.5318Rong.Ren@Debtwire.com

Jack M. Tracy IISenior Legal Analyst646.378.3177Jack.Tracy@Debtwire.com

Tim HynesHead of Research212.574.7878Timothy.Hynes@Debtwire.com

Brian DarsowCovenant Analyst212.390.7810BDarsow@xtractreseach.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Page 3 Introduction

Page 5 DIP Financing by Sector/Type

Page 6 DIP Financing by Venue

Page 7 Interest Rates/Fees

Page 8 DIP Lender Types

Page 9 DIP Agents/Maturities

Page 10 DIP Roll-Ups

Page 12 DIP Collateral / Priming Liens

Page 13 Adequate Protection

Page 14 DIP Budget / Liquidity Constraints

Page 15 UCC Concerns

Page 16 DIP Financing Professionals

Page 18 Disclaimer

INTRODUCTION

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Debtwire’s annual DIP Financing Report tracks debtor-in-possession loans that wereprovided and approved on a final basis during 1H2017.

The DIP Financing Report tracks all DIPs provided in 1H2017 to bankrupt companies inDebtwire’s coverage universe.

In this report, we analyze DIP financings for the following data points:

Sector and venue information;

Interest rates, fees and all-in costs;

DIP roll-ups and maturities;

Lender types (ie, defensive vs. third party);

Agents and counsel (for both DIP agents and lenders); and

UCC concerns (ie, investigation budgets/deadlines and professional fee carve-outs).

In addition, we also include analysis on:

Adequate protection;

DIP collateral and lien priority; and

DIP budget, covenant and liquidity issues.

INTRODUCTION

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This edition identifies an aggregate of over USD 12bn of DIP lending provided to 66 companies in 1H2017 (23Debtwire prime and 43 mid-market companies).* The DIP loans include 52 term loans and 19 revolvers, plus ahandful of other facility types.**

There were five companies that obtained DIP financing packages exceeding USD 500m in 1H2017 and 11companies with DIPs exceeding USD 100m.

Much like in 2016, Energy Future Holdings (EFH) and SunEdison dominated the DIP conversation. EFH’s USD6.3bn replacement DIP facility exceeded all other DIPs combined (USD 5.7bn), while SunEdison’s USD 640mreplacement DIP loan, combined with a final roll-up of USD 300m of pre-petition debt, brought it towards thetop of the leaderboard.

Westinghouse’s USD 800m DIP was the largest pure “new money” DIP for a 2017 bankruptcy filer, slightlybeating out Avaya’s USD 725m DIP facility.

As expected, debtors in the retail and energy sectors lead the report, setting aside EFH’s DIP; 25 of the 66companies that obtained final approval for DIP financing were in those sectors, totaling USD 2.8bn.

Nonetheless, the technology, alternative energy and construction sector mega-bankruptcies (Avaya, SunEdisonand ModSpace, respectively) rounded out the sector DIP leaderboard by amount.

The Delaware bankruptcy court saw the most DIPs in the first half of 2017 (27 of 66, or 41%), while 13 debtorsobtained DIPs across all New York bankruptcy courts (20%) and 12 across Texas (18%).

*Debtwire prime companies have at least USD 150m of funded debt commitments. Revolvers must total USD 150m at a minimum to count towards the funded debt commitment. Debtwire middle market companies have less than USD 150m of funded debt. **Note that we have generally treated DIP term loans and revolvers to the same debtor as separate DIPs, even if obtained by a debtor under a single credit agreement, due to the different terms that often accompany such facilities (including interest rates, fees, lenders, agents, etc.). So while 66 companies obtained DIPs in 2016, the number of DIP facilities was higher (ie, 76).

DIP FINANCING BY SECTOR/TYPE

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Sector Number*Prime / Middle

MarketAmount(USD m)

Energy 14 7/7 1,145

Retail 11 4/7 1,650

Technology 7 2/5 803

Alternative Energy 4 1/3 678

Healthcare 4 2/2 156

Medical 4 0/4 12

Education 2 0/2 5

Financial Services 2 1/1 66

Industrial Products & Services

2 1/1 70

Pharmaceuticals 2 0/2 13

Restaurants 2 0/2 1

Services 2 0/2 75

Utilities 2 2/0 6,315

Aerospace 1 0/1 2

Agriculture 1 1/0 20

Construction 1 1/0 794

Manufacturing 1 0/1 8

Media 1 0/1 6

Mining 1 0/1 3

Steel 1 1/0 212

Transportation 1 0/1 35

Total 66 23/43 12,069

TypeAmount(USD m)

Number*

Term Loan 9,799 52

Revolver 2,234 19

Others 36 5

Total 12,069 76

0

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3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

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Amount Number

DIP FINANCING BY VENUE

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Court NumberPrime / Middle

MarketAmount(USD m)

Delaware 27 8/19 7,732

SDNY 12 8/4 2,576

SD Texas 6 3/3 245

ND Illinois 3 0/3 214

ND Texas 3 1/2 46

Minnesota 2 1/1 454

WD Texas 2 0/2 1

ED Louisiana 1 0/1 4

ED Missouri 1 1/0 385

ED Pennsylvania 1 0/1 3

ED Texas 1 0/1 13

EDNY 1 0/1 5

Kansas 1 0/1 0.4

Massachusetts 1 0/1 1

New Mexico 1 0/1 33

SD Indiana 1 0/1 80

Utah 1 0/1 3

WD Pennsylvania 1 1/0 275

Total 66 23/43 12,069

Delaware, 27

New York, 13

Texas, 12

Illinois, 3

Others, 13

Number of DIPs by Venue

Delaware, 7,732

New York, 2,581

Minnesota, 454

Missouri, 385

Others, 917

Amount of DIPs by Venues (USD m)

INTEREST RATES/FEES

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Interest Rates Number Prime / Middle Market

<3% 0 0/0

≥3% and <6% 8 5/3

≥6% and <9% 30 9/21

≥9% and <12% 23 9/14

≥12% 15 5/10

Total 76 28/48

Fees Number Prime / Middle Market

<3% 43 17/26

≥3% and <6% 9 4/5

≥6% and <9% 8 3/5

≥9% and <12% 5 2/3

≥12% 11 2/9

Total 76 28/48

All-in Cost: Interest + Fees Number Prime / Middle Market

<5% 3 2/1

≥5% and <10% 28 12/16

≥10% and <15% 20 6/14

≥15% and <20% 8 1/7

≥20% 17 7/10

Total 76 28/48

INTEREST RATES. DIPs to middle market companies carried thelargest interest rates, with six companies obtaining DIPs withinterest rates of 15% or higher. Chinacast’s 20% rate toppedthe list, while Adams Resources Exploration, United RoadTowing and rue21 brought up the rear with DIP interest ratesbelow 4%.

The DIP interest sweet spot was between 6%-12%, with 53 outof 76 DIPs falling in that range (ie, over 70% of 1H2017 DIPs),including EFH, ModSpace, SunEdison and Westinghouse.Approximately 20% of the DIPs had interest rates above 12%,while eight DIPs (10%) included interest rates below 6%.

FEES. There were seven DIPs with annualized fees greater thanor equal to 15%. Scout Media and Sungevity had annualizedfees exceeding 30%, while Northstar Offshore’s DIP lenderswere able to extract an even higher price for new money afterdeclaring a default on the original DIP. The vast majority of DIPfacilities (80%) included annualized fees of less than 10%,while over 40 DIP facilities had fees below 3% (though notethat we have treated undisclosed fees as costing 0%).

ALL-IN COST. There were 25 DIPs in which all-in costs exceeded15%, with 17 of those having all-in costs totaling 20% andgreater. Six DIPs had all-in costs equal to or greater than 30%,with Nuverra’s term loan serving as the only DIP to a Debtwireprime debtor carrying such a high cost. A number of thehigher-profile retail debtors carried high all-in costs, withBCBG Max Azria, Payless ShoeSource and hhgregg obtainingDIPs with annualized all-in costs exceeding 20%.

Notes: We have included the interest rates and fees for each of the various DIP facilities and assumed that DIPs were fully drawn for illustrative purposes (ie, unused commitment fees are not included in fee calculations). In addition, we annualized DIP fees and made certain assumptions for the relevant Libor Rate, Prime Rate and Base Rates for comparative purposes. The all-in DIP cost, therefore, includes the annual interest rate plus annualized fees. We used 1% for the Libor Rate, and 4% for the Prime and Base Rates (based on the average rates for 1H 2017) .

DIP LENDER TYPES

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LENDER TYPES. The vast majority of DIP lenders were interested parties, generally seeking either to protecttheir pre-petition debt position or to fund the Chapter 11 cases of affiliated companies (ie, non-debtoraffiliates). Only 16 DIPs came from true third-party lenders (totaling USD 1.1bn), half of which wereaccompanied by a stalking horse bid for company assets.

Westinghouse’s USD 800m DIP was by far the largest third-party DIP, totaling close to 80% of all third-party DIPfunds loaned to date in 2017. All eight stalking horse bidder-related DIPs, totaling USD 130m, were to Debtwiremiddle market companies.

Pre-petition lenders and creditors provided over 90% of the DIP market in the first half of 2017, including EFH,SunEdison, Avaya, ModSpace and Payless ShoeSource. Non-debtor affiliates also provided DIPs in a numberof high-profile scenarios, including Gulfmark Offshore and China Fishery.

Lender Type Number Prime / Middle MarketAmount(USD m)

Defensive Lender 60 26/34 10,994

Pre-petition Lender/Creditor 52 24/28 10,899

Non-debtor Affiliate / Management 8 2/6 95

Third-party Lender 16 2/14 1,076

True Third Party 8 2/6 945.5

Stalking Horse Bidder 8 0/8 130.1

Total 76 28/48 12,069

DIP AGENTS / MATURITIES

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Agents NumberPrime / Middle

MarketAmount(USD m)

Wells Fargo 6 3/3 945

Bank of America 4 4/0 997

Citibank 4 4/0 7,875

Wilmington Savings Fund Society

3 3/0 178

Cerberus Business Finance 2 1/1 65

Cortland 2 2/0 292

Deutsche Bank 2 2/0 710

AGENTS. We also tracked the agents of the various DIPfacilities. Wells Fargo led the way, like in 2016, as agentof six DIPs. Wells Fargo served as agent for DIPs totalingUSD 945m across three Debtwire prime and threemiddle-market companies.

Bank of America and Citibank were agents on four DIPseach. Citi-agented DIP loans totaled USD 7.9bn (largelydue to EFH), easily exceeding Bank of America’s USD997m of DIP loans, which itself beat Wells Fargo’s USD945m of DIP facilities.

MATURITIES. The vast majority of DIPs had amaturity date of less than one year, though 15 had amaturity date of at least one year, including many ofthe largest and most significant DIPs of 2017. In fact,Avaya, China Fishery, EFH, SunEdison andWestinghouse, among others, had DIP maturities ofprecisely 12 months.

Lightning Dock had the longest outside maturitydate (~20 months), while CIBER, GroupAero,Sungevity, KLD Energy Technologies and MontcoOffshore all had DIPs with maturities of less thantwo months.

Length of Time NumberPrime / Middle Market

Amount(USD m)

<3 Months 14 2/12 883

≥3 Months and <6 Months 26 11/15 887

≥6 Months and <9 Months 17 5/12 903

≥9 Months and <12 Months 4 3/1 287

≥12 Months 15 7/8 9,110

Total 76 28/48 12,069

DIP ROLL-UPS

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Roll-ups* Number Prime/Middle Market

Roll-up DIPs 22 14/15

No Roll-up 44 14/33

Total 66 28/48

Notes: We have grouped DIP facilities together by company to show the percentage of roll-up as compared to the entire DIP package a company received (i.e., if a company had both revolver and TL DIP, it will be reflected in the charts as one DIP).(1) Roll-up of pre-petition debt into post-petition DIP. (2) Roll-up of pre-petition debt through repayment of debt from DIP proceeds. (3) Creeping roll-up of pre-petition debt through the application of collateral and related proceeds(4) We have treated the payment of the 1L makewhole amounts to EFH pre-petition creditors as a “roll-up,” though we have not treated the repayment of the prior DIP facility as a roll-up. (5) The SunEdison DIP included a final roll-up of USD 300m of 2L debt that was rolled as part of the prior DIP, repayment of the remaining USD 50m of 2L roll-up debt, plus additional repayments of amounts outstanding under the prior new money DIP (USD

239), USD 240m of prior roll-ups and amounts outstanding under other L/C facilities.

ROLL-UPS. Piggybacking on 2016, the broad takeaway from 1H2017 DIPs is that roll-ups are here to stay. While there might not bean all roll-up USD 600m DIP like Sports Authority or a DIP facilitythat includes approximately USD 1bn of roll-ups like SunEdison’sinitial DIP, 1H 2017 had its fair share of roll-ups.

In fact, approximately one third of all DIPs in 1H 2017 containedroll-up components (similar to 2016)—whether it was through (1)the actual “roll” of pre-petition debt into post-petition obligations,(2) the repayment or refinancing of pre-petition debt using DIPproceeds, or (3) a creeping roll-up via a gradual paydown usingcollateral (proceeds).

On top of the traditional roll-ups, we saw a number of DIPs thatprovided for repayment of prior DIP facilities, including EFH,SunEdison, Maxus Energy, Montco Offshore and PrestigeIndustries.

ModSpace’s USD 794m of DIP facilities included the mostsubstantial roll-up of the year (USD 636m), representing close to80% of the DIP—though note that ModSpace’s DIP providers werepre-petition creditors that supported a pre-arranged Chapter 11bankruptcy.

The retail sector was once again heavily represented, with DIP roll-ups in Gander Mountain (85% of the USD 452m DIP), CentralGrocers, Payless, Rue21, hhgregg, Eastern Outfitters and BCBGMax Azria.

Interestingly, Montco Offshore proposed its DIP with a USD 15mroll-up, but withdrew the roll-up component prior to entry of thefinal DIP order.

Company*Roll-upAmount (USD m)

New Money Amount (USD m)

Total Amount(USD m)

% Rolled-up

ModSpace(1)(2)(3) 635.5 158.8 794.3 79.3%

Energy Future Holdings(2)(4) 574 5,726 6,300 9.1%

Gander Mountain(2) 386.0 66.0 452.0 85.4%

SunEdison(1)(2)(5) * 640 640 *

Central Grocers(3) 200.0 5.0 205.0 97.6%

Payless ShoeSource(1) 187.0 198 385 61.3%

Rue21(1)(2) 172.0 103 270 63.7%

Optima Specialty Steel(1) 161.7 50.0 211.7 76.4%

hhgregg(2) 66.9 14.1 80.0 83.6%

Angelica(3) 50.5 14.5 65.0 77.7%

DIP ROLL-UPS (cont’d)

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CompanyRoll-up Amount

(USD m)New Money Amount

(USD m)Total Amount

(USD m)% Rolled-up

Eastern Outfitters(2) 41.0 44.0 85.0 48.2%

SquareTwo Financial(2) 37.0 21.5 58.5 63.2%

BCBG Max Azria(1) 35.0 87.5 112.5 28.6%

Ciber(2) 28.5 13.5 41.0 69.5%

Nuverra Environmental Solutions(2) 24.5 19.5 44.0 55.7%

California Proton Treatment Center(1) 16.0 16.0 32.0 50.0%

United Road Towing(2) 13.8 21.5 35.3 39.1%

Chellino Crane(3)(6) * 7.0 7.0 *

Prestige Industries(2) 3.3 1.9 5.2 62.8%

Lensar(1) 1.6 2.8 4.4 35.9%

Answers Holdings(1) 1.3 23.7 25.0 5.2%

North Philadelphia Health System(2) 0.9 2.1 3.0 30.0%

(6) The Chellino Crane DIP calls for a creeping roll-up to pay pre-petition debt, which totals USD 51.6m.

DIP COLLATERAL / PRIMING LIENS

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PRIMING LIENS. Typically, DIP liens will prime all of the liensof all pre-petition general corporate debt. Occasionally,however, the liens of certain pre-petition lenders will not beprimed, and particularly in Texas, where many energycompanies file for bankruptcy, liens from tax authorities orother government regulatory bodies may not be primed bythe DIP liens.

In the chart above, “yes” indicates that DIP liens prime allother liens.

In an unusual case for this period, the intercompany loan inChina Fishery’s bankruptcy cases is unsecured and containsno DIP liens at all.

Priming Liens NumberPrime / Middle

MarketAmount (USD m)

Yes (prime all liens) 53 25/28 10,896

No 22 2/20 1,153

N/A 1 1/0 20

DIP Collateral NumberPrime /

Middle MarketAmount (USD m)

All Assets 57 20/37 9,699

Not All Assets 18 7/11 2,350

N/A 1 1/0 20

DIP COLLATERAL. DIP Collateral packages typically do notinclude assets such as commercial tort claims, certainintellectual property, certain types of leases or more than65% of the equity securities of foreign subsidiaries, andwe categorize collateral packages with these and othertypical exclusions as including “all assets” of the debtor.

In approximately 25% of cases, however, we noted thatDIP collateral packages did not include material assets ofthe type that would normally constitute loan collateral,such as certain production facilities, assets of certaindomestic subsidiaries or vehicles.

To the extent DIP collateral packages are not an “allassets” grant, assets excluded from the collateral packagetend to be ad-hoc, depending on the specifics of thedebtor’s business operations and the varying collateralpackages of pre-petition secured lenders.

ADEQUATE PROTECTION

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ADEQUATE PROTECTION. Courts grant a widerange of protections to pre-petition creditorsunder the heading of “adequate protection,”including protections not easy to extrapolate fromthe statutory definition, such as information rightsand the rights of pre-petition creditors not partyto the DIP agreement to enforce certain DIPagreement terms. The data presented herecaptures the most common protections the courthas specifically granted as “adequate protection.”

The three most typical elements of an adequateprotection package are (1) replacement liensand/or super-priority claim status for diminutionin value, (2) the payment of certain fees andexpenses, and (3) the payment of principal and/orinterest.

Of the DIPs tracked, 16 DIPs provided replacementliens, seven packages added the payment offee/expense payments and 21 packages alsoincluded the current payment of interest onprepetition debt, while four more added thepayment of outstanding principal.

Some lenders, however, are granted a litany ofprotections, including all of the above plusenforcement rights relating to access toinformation, cash reserves, milestones and DIPcovenants (as in EFH and Gander Mountain).

Adequate Protection: Most Frequent Provisions

Adequate Protection: Most Frequent Packages NumberPrime / Middle Market

Liens; Fees and Expenses; Interest 21 14/7

Liens only 16 2/14

Liens; Fees and Expenses 7 1/6

Liens; Fees and Expenses; Interest; Principal 4 3/1

Others 11 4/7

Lien, 58

Principal, 6

Interest, 24

Finanical Information, 9

Fees and Expenses, 39

DIP BUDGET / LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS

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MINIMUM LIQUIDITY COVENANT. In a small minority of the reviewed DIP agreements, a specific covenant requiredthe debtor to maintain a certain level of liquidity (Avaya, EFH and Payless ShoeSource). In cases where a liquiditycovenant is absent, the budget variance covenant might have served the same function by requiring the debtor tomaintain a cash balance within a certain range.

DIP BUDGET VARIANCE. Permitted budget variances ranged from a strict 5%, typically in smaller DIPs, to 20%. In rareoccasions, a more relaxed variance requirement required only that the debtor explain and justify material budgetvariances – this is most often seen in the largest and most complicated DIP agreements, such as Avaya, EFH andWestinghouse. Figures presented here represent permitted budget variance at its narrowest range – often, certain lineitems are permitted to vary within a wider band if the budget as a whole remains within a narrower range.

DIP BUDGET PROFESSIONAL FEES. This information comes mostly from the standard 13-week DIP budget filed alongwith the financing motion. In cases in which a full 13-week DIP budget was not available from public filings, weadjusted or averaged the professional fee figures presented in the initial budget to reflect a 13-week period forpurposes of comparison and categorization. As one would expect, typically the larger the DIP loan amount, the greaterthe amount of budgeted professional fees.

Minimum Liquidity Covenant

NumberPrime /

Middle Market

Yes 9 8/1

No 67 20/47

DIP Budget Variance

NumberPrime /

Middle Market

0% - 5% 5 1/4

5% - 10% 38 11/27

10% - 15% 16 8/8

>15% 2 2/0

N/A 15 6/9

DIP Budget (13 wk): Professional Fees

NumberPrime /

Middle Market

<1m 17 1/16

>=1m and <2m 11 1/10

>=2m and <3m 8 4/4

>=3m and <4m 4 2/2

>=4m and <5m 3 1/2

>=5m and <10m 8 4/4

>10m 9 8/1

UCC CONCERNS

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Investigation Budget Number Prime / Middle Market

<50,000 16 1/15

≥50,000 and <100,000 17 7/10

≥100,000 and <150,000 7 6/1

≥150,000 6 5/1

N/A 30 9/21

Total 76 28/48

Carve-out Number Prime / Middle Market

<500,000 39 4/35

≥500,000 and <1,500,000 11 5/6

≥1,500,000 and <3,000,000 13 11/2

≥3,000,000 7 6/1

N/A 6 2/4

Total 76 28/48

INVESTIGATION BUDGET. There were 13 debtorswhose final DIP orders provided investigationbudgets of USD 100,000 or greater. PaylessShoeSource’s USD 300,000 budget was the largest,followed by USD 175,000 investigation budgets for21st Century Oncology and Sungevity.

On the low end, two investigation budgets came inat a mere USD 10,000: North Philadelphia HealthSystem and Prestige Industries.

INVESTIGATION DEADLINE. 60-75 days continuedto be the sweet spot for investigation deadlinesapproved in final DIP orders. Only eight DIPsreceived investigation deadlines under 60 days(with a low of 30 days in Suniva and United RoadTowing), while five DIPs had deadlines of at least90 days (including 21st Century Oncology andOptima Specialty Steel).

CARVE-OUT. The professional fee carve-outsprovided in final DIP orders ranged from highs ofUSD 25m for EFH and USD 20m for Avaya to a lowof USD 10,000 (in ChinaCast).

Westinghouse’s DIP had the next largest carve-out(USD 8m), while a number of the high-profileretailers had USD 2m carve-outs, including BCBGMax Azria, Payless ShoeSource and rue21.

Investigation Deadline Number Prime / Middle Market

<60 days 8 2/6

≥60 days 46 20/26

N/A 22 6/16

Total 76 28/48

DIP FINANCING PROFESSIONALS: LEAD COUNSEL

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Lead Counsel NumberPrime /

Middle MarketAmount(USD m)

White & Case 5 4/1 843

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 3 3/0 1,577

Choate Hall & Stewart 3 2/1 807

Holland & Knight 3 2/1 223

Goldberg Kohn 3 1/2 278

Jones Day 3 3/0 245

Norton Rose Fulbright 3 1/2 53

Schulte Roth & Zabel 3 2/1 364

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan 3 3/0 815

LEAD COUNSEL. White & Case topped the DIP financing lead counsel table with five mandates, two more thanthe rest of the field—eight of whom totaled three representations each. White & Case’s most significant DIPsinclude SunEdison, Ameriforge and EMAS Chiyoda.

Akin Gump and Jones Day followed with only Debtwire Prime mandates. Akin represented agents/lenders inAvaya, SunEdison and Optima Specialty Steel (with DIPs totaling USD 1.6bn), while Jones Day advised on USD245m of DIPs in Answers, Ameriforge and rue21.

Choate Hall & Stewart had a retail-centric focus in 1H 2017, representing DIP parties only in three retailChapter 11s (Gander Mountain, hhgregg and Payless ShoeSource).

DIP FINANCING PROFESSIONALS: LOCAL COUNSEL

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Local Counsel Number Prime / Middle MarketAmount(USD m)

Ashby & Geddes 4 1/3 812

Richards, Layton & Finger 4 1/3 263

Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor 3 1/2 25

Faegre Baker Daniels 2 0/2 80

Gellert Scali Busenkell & Brown 2 0/2 10

Morris James 2 1/1 17

LOCAL COUNSEL. As with 2016, 2017 was a good year to be local counsel. Delaware Chapter 11s dominated the DIP spaceand Texas courts proved a friendly home for the influx of energy restructurings—venues requiring local counsel for yourtypical bankruptcy case.

Ashby & Geddes and Richards, Layton & Finger were among the top local counsel in 2016 in terms of number of DIPs.Ashby & Geddes’s four DIPs were split between Adams Resources Exploration, Lily Robotics, ModSpace and Suniva, whileRichards Layton & Finger was local counsel in California Proton Treatment Center, Chieftain Sand and Proppant, MaxusEnergy and Optima Specialty Steel.

Young Conaway rode its representations in Lensar, Limited Stores and Panda Temple Power to third place, while threefirms followed with two representations each.

DISCLAIMER

We have obtained the information provided in this report in good faith from publicly available data as well as Debtwire data and intelligence, which we consider to be reliable. This information is not intended to provide tax, legal or investment advice, including, but not limited to, investment advice as defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940. You should seek independent tax, legal and/or investment advice before acting on information obtained from this report. We shall not be liable for any mistakes, errors, inaccuracies or omissions in, or incompleteness of, any information contained in this report, and not for any delays in updating the information.

We make no representations or warranties in regard to the contents of and materials provided on this report and exclude all representations, conditions, and warranties, express or implied arising by operation of law or otherwise, to the fullest extent permitted by law. We shall not be liable under any circumstances for any trading, investment, or other losses which may be incurred as a result of use of or reliance on information provided by this report. All such liability is excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law.

Any opinions expressed herein are statements of our judgment at the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. Reproduction without written permission is prohibited. For additional information, call Debtwire at (212) 686-5374.

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