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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe B-7010 SHAPE Belgium

Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation Norfolk, Virginia 23551-2490

United States of America SH/J6/PLL/LEL/13-304031 SACT TSC FXX 0505/ TT-9587/NU0055 TO: See Distribution SUBJECT: NATO SPACE HANDBOOK DATE: 20 December 2013 REFERENCES: A. MCM 0108-2012, NATO’s Approach to Space, dated

21 November 2012. B. Letter from SACT to CMC dated 21 September 2012.

1. At Reference A, the Military Committee (MC) delivered a mandate on Space to the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs). 2. The mandate is being executed by the NATO Bi-SC Space Working Group (NBiSCSWG) that was established on 21 September 2012 (Reference B). 3. As part of these efforts, this group developed the NATO Space Handbook submitted at the enclosure. 4. Should you have any questions, our points of contact are at HQ SACT, COL Jean-Hervé L’Hénaff, NCN 555-4152 or CDR Steve Jacobs, NCN 555-3697 and at SHAPE, LTC (Gator) Willliam Ator, NCN 254-2491. FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS, EUROPE AND TRANSFORMATION: Werner Freers

Phil Jones CBE

General, DEU A Lieutenant General, GBR A

Chief of Staff Chief of Staff

ENCLOSURE: 1. NATO Space Handbook.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

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DISTRIBUTION: External: Information: SACTREP EUR SACEUREP DNOR NCIA HQ AIRCOM Internal: Information: SACT: DCOS CD ACOS C2DS DCOS JFT R&M R&M/NSIP SHAPE: SHAPE PLANS SHAPE PLANS JCAP SHAPE OPI J2 SHAPE OPI J3 SHAPE CCD J6 SHAPE PLANS J7

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO SH/J6/PLL/LEL/13-304031 SACT TSC FXX 0505/ TT-9587/NU0055 DATED: 20 DEC 13

NATO SPACE HANDBOOK

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR

SPACE SUPPORT TO

NATO OPERATIONS

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 5

2. Aim ....................................................................................................................... 5

3. Scope ................................................................................................................... 5

4. Principles .............................................................................................................. 6

5. Definitions ............................................................................................................. 6

6. Space Capabilities and Products .......................................................................... 7

7. How NATO requests Space support from Nations ............................................. 11

8. Capabilities and limitations of Space products ................................................... 11

9. Operational planning and incorporating Space effects ....................................... 12

10. Legal aspects on the use of Space ..................................................................... 13

11. Tasks and responsibilities of the Space SME ..................................................... 15

Annex A: A basic, non-technical explanation of several Space fundamentals. ............. 19

Annex B: Links to several complementary publications. ................................................ 21

Annex C: Considerations for the implementation of Space coordination. ...................... 23

Annex D: Points of contact. ........................................................................................... 28

Annex E: Template for developing mitigation measures. .............................................. 29

Annex F: Practical education considerations. ................................................................ 30

Annex G: Lessons identified & lessons learned. ........................................................... 31

Annex H: Operational planning considerations. ............................................................ 33

Appendix to Annex H: Operational planning annex template. ....................................... 37

References .................................................................................................................... 39

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Space effects and possible sources (not an all-inclusive list) ............................ 7 Table 2: examples of useful systems ............................................................................ 11 Table 3: managing expectations ................................................................................... 12 Table 4: four principles of the draft EU Code of Conduct for outer Space activities ...... 15 Table 5: sample prioritized Space effects list ................................................................ 34 Table 6: sample questions to aid solution identification................................................. 36 Figure 1: the coordination role of the Space SME ......................................................... 15 Figure 2: sample mitigation measures development template ...................................... 29

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In order to continuously improve this document, inputs are absolutely necessary. Please forward any comments, questions, concerns, recommendations (to include suggested additions) and critiques to the NATO BiSC Space Working Group (NBiSCSWG) through their webpage at http://www.act.nato.int/nato-Space via the “contact” link. Or provide inputs to any member of the NBiSCSWG.

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1. Introduction Lessons learned in recent NATO-led operations have helped us to realize how dependent the Alliance is on Space capabilities and the support provided by the professionals, agencies, and nations that manage and operate the related-systems. It is obvious that NATO commanders, staffs and forces must continue to gain knowledge and experience to better orchestrate Space support to operations. This handbook was initiated by the (ad hoc) NATO Space Integrated Project Team (Space IPT). Its goal was to improve NATO’s Space education, training, operations, and manning. The Space IPT has expanded its effort into the NATO BiSC Space Working Group (NBiSCSWG), formally established on 21 September 2012, led by the Strategic Commands and tasked by the Military Committee in November 2012 to conduct studies and elaborate proposals in order to improve Collaborative Space Support to NATO Operations. As part of its Work Plan for 2013-2015, the new NBiSCSWG has continued work on this document. A draft was provided to NATO personnel working Space matters in Afghanistan and garnered much appreciation.

2. Aim This handbook is intended to be a practical aid for the orchestration and exploitation of Space capabilities committed by member nations on a voluntary basis in support of NATO operations. It is meant for any newcomer to a Space-related post, but primarily for personnel tasked specifically to support the commander and staff with Space-related advice. As a living document based on deployment experiences, it aims to provide recommendations for Space support to operations.

3. Scope The handbook presents principles, considerations and definitions for individuals working on Space matters within a NATO command or mission headquarters. It describes how Space can be better integrated into operational planning and force packages. In addition, it discusses the USA Space Coordination Authority entity and explores it as a potential new NATO Space Coordinator concept. The handbook is not technical, not theatre specific and not a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Additionally, it is not authoritative or directive; it is simply meant to provide useful information. It complements Allied Joint Publication 3.3(A) – which includes some considerations on Space- and SOPs created for specific contingencies. Finally, Annex A provides a very basic explanation of some Space fundamentals that are worth mentioning in this handbook and Annex B provides some links to publications that can complement this handbook, should you need any specific information.

Orchestration, not subordination or integration, is the sine qua non of modern warfare.

-John A. Warden III; The Air Campaign

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4. Principles The following principles or fundamental considerations are intended to provide a baseline to understand the complexity of Space in NATO: • Nations retain Command and Control (C2) over their Space-related capabilities and

NATO will not be able to exert any kind of control over them1. • Nations will agree, on a voluntary basis, to offer Space products, intended to provide

the desired Space-effects in support of the mission. • War fighters rely on Space effects, such as detection and early warning,

communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), environmental monitoring, Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), independent of the platforms that provide them.

• In the Operational Planning Process commanders should consider Space to the same extent as the other domains (Air, Land, Maritime and Cyber). Therefore, Space should be an element of the Centre of Gravity analysis. However, the effectiveness of Space support can only be measured based on the war fighters’ ability to achieve the objectives.

• NATO nations will continue to increase their ability to deliver products through Space, which over time will lead to greater dependence on the related national capabilities.

• National Space-originated products expand the effectiveness of NATO operations, thus, adversaries will actively seek to deny NATO’s access to Space.

5. Definitions Space Capability2 – a Space Capability includes three main parts: a ground segment to conduct command and control of the satellite, a Space segment consisting of the satellite itself, electromagnetic uplinks/downlinks that carry commands, communication traffic, signals, telemetry, and mission data. Space Product – the output (data or services) from a Space capability. Satellite imagery is a good example of a Space product. Space Services – the ability of Space capabilities, supporting facilities and equipment on earth, to assist military commanders, staffs and forces in operations. Extending communications well beyond the horizon is a Space service. Space Effect – the operational result of Space products used in support of terrestrial, maritime, and air operations. From this perspective, a Space effect (e.g. accurate and up to date intelligence) is what the commander expects from a Space product (e.g. optical, and/or IR, and/or radar imagery). Space Coordinator or Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) – At the time of release of this document this function is still immature and conceptual within NATO and needs further investigation to fully delineate its attributes and limitations. The SCA is discussed further at Annex C.

1 NATO owns ground segments that are involved in commercial SATCOM support to its operations through the NCIA, but these stations do not exert any kind of control over the satellites involved in this support. They only receive information from the satellites. 2 At the time of release of this handbook, the NBiSCSWG is working on this definition in order to consolidate it.

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Space Subject Matter Expert (SME) – In this document, the term Space SME is used generically to describe an individual assigned specifically to provide the commander and staff with advice about Space in NATO commands and missions. It is the “YOU” seen in Figure 1 on page 13. It is not a J2 or J6 staff officer who happens to also understand and use Space capabilities and products. There is no agreement yet on whether the Space SME in NATO commands and missions should work inside the J3, J5 or in some other arrangement.

6. Space Capabilities and Products Table 1: Space effects and possible sources (not an all-inclusive list)

Space Services NATO Uses and Effects National and Commercial Systems

Position, Navigation, Timing (PNT)

• Precision strike • Force navigation • Support to PR/CSAR • Network timing

• Global Positioning System (US) • Galileo (EU)

Integrated Tactical Warning and Threat Assessment

• Force protection • Attribution • Missile defence

• Space Based Infrared System (US)

Environmental Monitoring • Mission planning • Munitions selection • Weather forecasting

• Defence Meteorological Satellite Program (US) • EUMETSAT (EU)

Communications • Command and Control • Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ops • Deployed communications

• GBS (US) • Syracuse (FRA) • EUTELSAT (FRA) • SICRAL (ITA) • SKYNET (UK) • INTELSAT (US)

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

• Coverage of operation execution (in the operations centre) • Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) • Intelligence • Targeting

• SAR Lupe (DEU) • COSMO SKYMED (ITA) • HELIOS (FRA) • IKONOS (?)(US)

Identification • Automated Identification • AIS

6.1. Space Capabilities versus Supporting Elements Located Elsewhere: The Space-based segment is usually considered the most important element of the capability because it holds the sensor or repeater. It is the main part of a military or civilian satellite located in an orbit at an altitude that best meets the requirement. However, not all elements of a Space capability are in orbit. Space capabilities also include ground sites such as operations centres, situational sensors, coordination centres, exploitation centres, etc. Another important element is all the personnel operating the systems to include liaison personnel often assigned directly to theatre either as individuals or as a team. For instance, the French and the Americans had

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deployed Space support teams in ISAF to support their forces in Afghanistan with Space expertise and products. Perhaps more valuable than knowing how many and what kind of satellites are in orbit is knowing who to get in contact with to get specific Space information. Pro-active networking and developing effective reference material is essential. The fact is that space knowledge is inherently fragmented. Only over time and by working together we will improve the coordination and management of Space effects in theatre. Annex D provides list of possible contacts to get started.

6.2. NATO NATO as an organization owns very few Space assets. It has some SATCOM ground stations/terminals and user interfaces, but no in-orbit-assets. However, Space provides mission critical support to NATO operations. This may come from commercial providers or national contributions, but regardless of the origin, it is important as a NATO Space SME to understand the Space mission areas used by NATO and the origins of the systems that could be used to deliver the required effects. Table 2 shows that the demand is vast, but so is the variety of possible service providers. Within NATO there are also entities that do not consider themselves specifically “Space” but they certainly are involved in the delivery of Space effects.

One example of this is the former NATO Consultation Command and Control Agency (NC3A), now part of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). NCIA manages NATO SATCOM Post 2000 (NSP2K). This is the primary mechanism by which NATO receives SATCOM until 2020. NSP2K uses bandwidth from the UK’s SKYNET, Italy’s SICRAL, and France’s Syracuse satellite systems.

Additionally, there are limited Space personnel within the NATO command structure. In the new command structure this includes positions at JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples. While there is also expertise at ACT, ACO and AIRCOM, tracking them down is difficult, as no formal posts exist within these organisations. See Annex D for potential points of contact.

6.3. Nations The US provides most of the Space support NATO currently uses. However, approximately 38 ‘military or government’ satellites owned by NATO Member States other than the US are providing Communication, Synthetic Aperture Radar, Imagery and Automatic Identification System detection3. The primary NATO Member States other than United States who own Space capabilities are France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Additionally, Turkey will most probably launch an optical satellite program in the near future. The actual availability of a Space capability in support of NATO operations will only be determined by the country that owns the satellite. Even if an asset is in orbit and listed in an open source satellite catalogue, its actual availability to support NATO operations

3 The aforementioned numbers come from unclassified internet sources.

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remains exclusively with the owning nation and/or company. See Annex B for sources which may help as a starting point to determine what satellites may be available. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US all have national centres that are able to provide support to NATO. Although at the time of release of this handbook some of these centres have specific contractual arrangements with NATO, there are no standardized procedures. Moreover, support to NATO operations in the past has always been through national channels, never directly. Therefore, your best starting point at this time is likely to be a national representative. Below are some examples of national entities operating Space assets who can provide information.

United States of America: The focal point for operational Space activities in the US is the Joint Space Operations Centre (JSpOC). The JSpOC operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; performing C2 over US military Space systems and providing Space support to US Combatant Commanders (e.g. USEUCOM, USCENTCOM). For questions on US Space capabilities, the USEUCOM Air and Space Operations Center’s Space Cell (603d AOC Space Cell) at Ramstein Air Base should be contacted. The 603d AOC Space Cell integrates Space operations into missions in the European and African Areas of Responsibility. The AOC does not have an official role in NATO, but as the AOC supporting US operations in Europe, and with a dual-hated commander (the Commander of US Air Forces in Europe is also Com AIRCOM), they assume partnerships with NATO organizations where appropriate. The Space cell in the 603d AOC has seven mission areas:

1. GPS monitoring and support 2. SATCOM monitoring and support 3. Missile Warning 4. PR/CSAR Support 5. Space Situational Awareness 6. Space Control 7. Battle Space characterization

France: The French Joint Space Command (Commandement interarmées de l’eSpace) is responsible for national Space policy. Additionally, it provides advice and coordination for the operational use of Space capabilities. It is the single French point of contact for military Space topics. Germany: The German Space Situational Awareness Centre – GSSAC – (Weltraumlagezentrum – WRLageZ) in Uedem provides Space Situational Awareness and related analysis. It is a joint venture between the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. The GSSAC is the single point of contact for all questions regarding German Space.

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UK: The UK Space Operations Coordination Centre (UKSpOCC) provides continuous, timely, accurate and unambiguous strategic warning and attack assessment for the UK and deployed forces as tasked. It also provides UK Space Situational Awareness including warning of satellite over-flight and Space object re-entry. The UKSpOCC is the primary point of contact for UK Space-related topics at the operational level.

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7. How NATO requests Space support from Nations NATO commanders could request Space support through the Force Generation process by including them in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). However, this process has not yet been formalized4. As no nation will transfer C2 authority over a particular satellite to an operational commander or to NATO in general, the CJSOR should therefore always list Space products and not specific Space capabilities. C2 of Space systems is certainly not required to get the Space products. In Space faring nations, the organizations that have C2 over Space systems routinely differ from those that regularly benefit from Space products.

For example, if the JOA has a heavy cloud-cover and Electro-Optical/InfraRed (EO/IR) reconnaissance is impossible, satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) coverage or imagery should be requested rather than C2 over a SAR satellite.

Table 2: examples of useful systems SATELLITE SENSOR BEST RESOLUTION*

SAR LUPE (5) RADAR <1 M

TERRASAR-X (1) RADAR 1 M

TANDEM-X (1) RADAR 1 M

COSMO- SKYMED (4) RADAR <1M

DEIMOS MULTI-SPECTRAL 22 M

UK DMC (2) OPTICAL 22 M

* Information on satellites resolution is available from open sources.

8. Capabilities and limitations of Space products The doctrinal attributes of Space capabilities are global access and persistence. Global access refers to the fact that Space systems can have global coverage when desired. Persistence refers to the fact that Space systems can cover any area on earth without gaps in coverage when deployed in the correct configuration. Limitations are listed as the inability to repair satellites in orbit, predictability of geographic coverage, vulnerability to threats and long lead times for replenishment of a lost satellite. Every satellite has different capabilities and limitations. Sometimes these are intentionally engineered.

For example, many of today’s most advanced communications satellites potentially have line of sight to 1/3rd of the earth (from Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)) but they are not used to provide communications over that entire area. This is because the satellites are specifically engineered to only receive and transmit in a beam pattern

4 It is part of the NBiSCSWG’s work plan to make proposals for this.

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that is often far narrower in order to cover specific geographic areas or to raise the signal power. Another example: A satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) only provides coverage for a short period of time per pass, normally single digit minutes. In order to mitigate this limitation you can lower the resolution to1 square meter or better. However, the quality of the imagery may reduce due to the increased angle of attack of the satellite (shadows). Additionally, the actual number of usable daily passes is always dependent on weather, on the capabilities of the ground-station to receive satellite imagery and on the actual capability of the specific satellite in question.

Table 3: managing expectations

9. Operational planning and incorporating Space effects The Space SME is most useful to the staff during the operational planning process. Combined Force Packaging (CFP) is commonly envisaged as the mechanism most likely to result in an effective capability. CFPs already include Space effects, but this is more or less transparent to the rest of the package and is often the result of engineering level integration instead of active planning. This is an opportunity for the NATO Space SME to help the planning staff to tailor the force package. The type of combined force package required always changes with the mission. Some considerations for force packaging: 1. What are you trying to accomplish? This is obviously the most important question to

answer. 2. How will the adversary attempt to interfere with what you are trying to accomplish? 3. Orbits are predictable. This may result in the adversary intentionally avoiding

detection during satellite over flight times. One way to determine if this is indeed happening could be to sequence an aerial asset to monitor a location pre-, trans- and post-pass.

The following are considerations on capabilities and limitations: • If persistent coverage of a single spot on the earth is required it is important to

work with Space system experts to find the most optimum Space system and fill in the remaining gaps with other capabilities.

• Do not focus on satellite tasking yourself but identify the Space product and pass the request to the most appropriate Space support and allow the experts to deliver the best product for you needs.

• Satellites may support multiple users on a given pass, which means priorities are assigned for support and that your priority might not be high enough to get what you ask for when you ask for it.

• Satellites may suffer weather impacts, both associated with the earth and the sun. • Satellites are not invulnerable to adversary action and other hazards. • C2 of a Space capability is normally retained outside the theatre or operations. • Space-based support brings an extra level of political sensitivity from nations,

which might affect your work.

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4. Satellite ISR will require processing and exploitation. The time and manpower associated with these tasks must be taken into account and must be coordinated with J2.

5. Combining sensor data produces a more complete picture. 6. What is the orbit of a certain capability? This will tell you how often and for how long

you will have the possibility to expect a particular effect. 7. What is the latitude you are concerned with? Different latitudes have different

operational considerations. For example, extreme northern latitudes are difficult to see from geosynchronous orbit because of the curve of the earth.

8. What is the terrestrial terrain like? Satellite coverage can be shielded by natural and manmade obstacles.

9. What is the solar environment like? 10. What is the terrestrial weather like? Rain and satellite signals in certain bands do

not mix well. Annex H further develops how you can best use your expertise to support the operational planning process.

10. Legal aspects on the use of Space Some of the most important provisions of international treaties and regulations governing the use of Space are as follows: Outer Space Treaty of 1967: Article IV: advocates for peaceful use of Space for the benefit of all mankind. The treaty does not specifically prohibit the use of Space assets for ISR, Space Situational Awareness (SSA including missile warning), Positioning Navigation, and Timing (PNT, including, for example, blue force tracker, GPS and use of Space services guiding terrestrial weapons), and SATCOM. Article VI: acknowledges an international responsibility of states for their national activities in Space if they are parties to the treaty. Article VII: if damages occur as a result of a state’s activities using Space, this state can be held liable. Liability Convention: This convention explicitly deals with the liability of states for damage to people or property caused by their Space activities, whether caused in Space or on earth. Generally, the launching state is responsible for any damage resulting from a launch carried out from or by that state. Limited Test Ban Treaty: This treaty bans nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in any environment, including Space. So far, not all Space-faring nations have signed it.

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The European Union (EU) draft Code of Conduct (CoC) for outer Space activities: The Code of Conduct (CoC) is an EU Draft, has not been approved so far and the impact/effects on NATO operations are not defined. This code of conduct is non-binding for subscribing states. However, subscribing states commit themselves to conduct their Space activities in accordance with international law and to abide to the four principles, shown in Table 4. Recently, the EU initiated a multilateral diplomatic process to discuss and negotiate an international CoC for activities in outer Space under the auspices of the United Nations.

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Table 4: four principles of the draft EU Code of Conduct for outer Space activities

11. Tasks and responsibilities of the Space SME The Space SME’s role is to assist the commander and staff to assess mission requirements and leverage Space products to meet those requirements. This includes support to the planning and execution of operations from a Space perspective from the strategic to the tactical level. The Tasks and Responsibilities of the Space SME are not yet clearly defined and there may be some overlap with other staff elements, especially in the J2, J3 and J6 as shown. There are functional responsibilities and domain responsibilities which remain to be defined5. Figure 1 illustrates the Space SME’s central role as a coordinator.

Figure 1: the coordination role of the Space SME

The following list contains a mix of possible tasks for the designated Space SME and considerations that will help them to perform that role. This list is neither exhaustive nor directive, and is presented in no particular order.

• Establish and cultivate reach-back support, which must be timely and operationally responsive. The Space products required to meet the objectives and the commander’s prioritization may help to decide which channels of reach-back are

5 The NBiSCSWG is working on this matter and will provide recommendations to the MC.

1. The freedom of access to, exploration and use of outer space and exploitation of space objects for peaceful purposes without interference, fully respecting the security, safety and integrity of space objects in orbit.

2. The inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

3. The responsibility of States to take all the appropriate measures and cooperate in good faith to prevent harmful interference in outer space activities.

4. The responsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, commercial and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and take all the adequate measures to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict.

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important. Reach-back contacts/centres for specific Space related questions are provided in Annex D.

• Understand command relationships for Space support requests. • Maintain situational awareness on the war fighter’s use of Space products within

the operation. • Assist the staff with incorporating practical Space-related elements into theatre

specific documents; for example, include GPS frequencies on the Joint Restricted Frequency List.

• Coordinate with Electronic Warfare (EW) planners to avoid negative impact on the friendly use of Space.

• Analyse/evaluate theatre Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) reporting procedures and investigate EMI impacts on Space products. Coordinate with J3 and J6.

• Coordinate information exchange regarding scheduled and non-scheduled Space products outages and the potential impact to operations (see Annex E on mitigation measures that are a natural follow on of this information exchange6).

• Keep the staff and forces updated on the status of Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) constellations such as GPS. Request accuracy predictions as needed, advise others when PNT performance is expected to fall below tolerance levels.

• Support Personnel Recovery/Combat Search and Rescue efforts by establishing contacts.

• Develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance related to the use of Space consistent with Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) requirements.

• Maintain an understanding of the adversary’s use of Space, potential threats to friendly capabilities and how to preserve your access to Space products.

• Identify the critical Space products required for mission execution. Develop plans to mitigate degradation or losses.

• Learn the battle staff rhythm and attend applicable staff meeting. Establish contact with J2, J3, J5 and J6. Educate staff on Space-related issues.

• Coordinate with meteorology personnel on the impact of Space/terrestrial weather to Space products.

• Work with the J6 to help establish satellite bandwidth prioritization for protection based on mission priority.

• Advise staff on any potential negative Space-related impacts to the use of Blue Force trackers.

• Ensure sufficient Space support manning and mechanisms for sustained operations.

• Develop/ enhance education7, training and exercises, as well as Standing Operating Procedures (SOP).

6 The NBiSCSWG is working on mitigation measures that can be implemented if space support is disrupted. 7 See Annex F for practical education considerations.

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• Establish and execute regular debriefing procedures on the effectiveness of Space products and on any problems encountered during the operation (including but not limited to possible disruptive activities of the adversary). This should feed the Lessons Identified / Lessons Learned process (see Annex G).

• Know the mission: The commander will convey his intent. Determine where and to what extent Space effects will enable him to achieve success and where there is an assumed risk.

• Support the development of strategy and plans. • Determine mission requirements. • Monitor current operations. • Know the adversary: How will the adversary react? What are their capabilities?

How can objectives be achieved? Are intelligence personnel thinking about how the adversary is using Space or how they might deny your use?

• Know the threat: The threat is anything that can prevent mission accomplishment. The threat could be environmental or manmade. Knowing the threat helps to understand the effects required. For example, if the fight will take place under heavy cloud cover, you should know the impact of that fact to forces attempting to meet objectives.

• Know the weapon system: The sheer numbers of possible systems makes this a daunting task. No one person will know everything about everything from a Space perspective. You also need insight into terrestrial forces and how they use Space. Be aware of operational constraints and know how to ask for capabilities. Learn how to weave Space capabilities into a combined force package.

The following is a list of things that a Space SME should avoid if other staff elements are already responsible and capable of performing them:

• Do not collect taskings for Space-based ISR, but support the Theatre Collection Manager regarding the availability and usefulness of Space-based platforms for specific service requests.

• Do not acquire more SATCOM bandwidth, but support the J6. Help the J6 to create a user prioritization matrix and a contingency plan in case of reduced bandwidth availability. Help the J6 also to evaluate the problem set from the perspective of an operator while J6 personnel will typically view the problem set from the perspective of communicators.

• Do not develop Space weather reports, but support staff meteorologists. Ensure that they are aware of their responsibility regarding Space weather reporting and forecast, and that they have the necessary resources. If you cannot get appropriate support locally, consider national entities (see Annex D).

For example, forces need to know in advance if Space weather potentially degrades UHF frequencies during mission execution. At a minimum, having this information can prevent unnecessary troubleshooting attempts for faulty hardware and save time. At the maximum, if Space products are considered to be crucial but unavailable for a scheduled mission, the commander might postpone it. It is crucial

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to accurately explain the predicted impact in terms that are relevant to the mission so informed decisions can be made.

• Do not coordinate navigation warfare (NAVWAR), including activities related to GPS jamming, if it is already being done by the EW planning and coordination staff.

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Annex A: A basic, non-technical explanation of several Space fundamentals. As noted in Annex B, there is a wide range of materials to select from when seeking education on Space fundamentals and we highly recommend you gain familiarity with them. It is highly recommended to read the UK and US Space Primer to get a basic understanding of the Space domain and implications on military operations. Orbit basics: These laws are relevant because they equate to how much time a satellite will be available for use during a given orbit, the frequency of satellite availability over the area of interest, and the physical requirement for the satellite to leave an operational area of interest on its constant path to and from the equator (excepting the special case of the Geosynchronous orbit described below). It also means that once the orbit of a satellite is known, it can be predicted with reasonable accuracy where it will be in the future. That means planners can predict when the satellite will provide the required coverage but also that a savvy adversary can hide from or deceive satellite observation. The Geosynchronous Case: Satellites in geosynchronous orbit move about the equator at the same pace as the earth rotates. In effect, they ‘fly formation’ with the earth. Therefore, they do not move out of view and provide persistence presence. However, geosynchronous satellites have an orbital altitude of approximately 36.000 Km which complicates detailed earth observation. From Geosynchronous orbit a satellite theoretically can cover 1/3 of the earth (excluding the poles due to the curvature of the earth). The actual footprint depends on the type of sensor. Satellite Basics: Satellites consist essentially of two interdependent portions: bus and payload. The bus provides the structure and other elements necessary to make the spacecraft work. The payload does the mission. Satellites may have multiple payloads if the bus can provide the physical space and other operational requirements such as power supply, heating and cooling. Operational users ordinarily focus on payload capabilities but need to understand that hardware limitations associated with the bus may prevent delivery of some desired products. Ground Site Considerations: Because satellites are constantly in motion, one fixed site location on the ground cannot provide continuous global access to low earth orbiting satellites. This can lead to the requirement for multiple global locations, deployable systems, and/or satellite memory storage for transmission once in view of a ground site. Because geosynchronous satellites maintain the same position relative to the earth, this caveat does not necessarily apply to them. This is significant because the operational scenario may require the use of products from such Space systems. For example, it is likely that a deployed force would include deployable SATCOM antennas to use with geosynchronous satellites. Users: The end-user is the customer of the payload products. However, another intervening level of ground support may be required. For example, the European Union Satellite Centre and the United States Air Force “Eagle Vision” system use existing contractual relationships with on-orbit commercial satellite imaging companies to deliver

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analysed information to users. Centres such as these convert the data collected by the satellites into information end-users can use in pursuit of objectives. The Radio Frequency Requirement: All elements are connected by electromagnetic links. While some minimal interruption from the satellite to the ground is anticipated and planned for, sustained interruption of the satellite transmission to the ground can result in mission failure if the forces that intended to make use of that signal cannot receive it and have no reliable contingency mechanism to replace it.

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Annex B: Links to several complementary publications. The NATO School at Oberammergau hosts a Space related course (Introduction to Space support to NATO operations, N3 01) twice per year. This course is highly recommended. The NBiSCSWG is working on a NATO Space Education and Training Plan, which aim is to unify and synchronize education and training within a university style approach and to establish and empower an enduring structure to respond to NATO’s changing needs in this domain. It should result in increased education opportunities that will be documented when they get firm. At present, there is no dedicated NATO Space doctrinal document. Allied Joint Publication 3.3 (A), published in November 2009, embeds considerations related to Space. A new draft is in development at the JAPCC in Kalkar, GE8. A copy of this document can be obtained through the NATO Standardization Agency Portal at: http://nsa.nato.int/nsa Two of the best military Space primers available can be accessed at the links below. Becoming familiar with the material in these primers is well worth the effort. UK Space Primer: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33691/SpacePrimerFinalWebVersion.pdf USAF Air University Space Primer: http://Space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/index.htm The UK published the “Space: Dependencies, Vulnerabilities and Threats” and “Protecting Access to Space” handbook for Multi-national Experiment Seven. These documents are also worth while reading. http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/79DFAC54-D002-4B10-AEB4-73305103120C/0/20120313mne7_Space_vulnerabilites.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-access-to-Space The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC; http://www.japcc.org) provides NATO with independent review, advice and recommendations on Air and Space Power. In 2009, the JAPCC published the NATO Space Operations Assessment: (http://www.japcc.org/108.html). NATO HQ SACT recently established a website for Space matters at: http://www.act.nato.int/nato-Space If you are trying to determine where and what satellites are available your best starting point is: 8 It was not ratified by all Nations and several Nations expressed reservations. Two Nations expressed specific reservations over the Space part of this document. AJP 3.3A was actually put under revision before it was even made available to the Nations for ratification.

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https://www.Space-track.org. This site is maintained by the US government. You will need to request a login (available on the page) and you will have to comply with certain restrictions as specified when you request your login. Other open source sites you can use for research are: http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/SpacecraftQuery.jsp http://celestrak.com/satcat/status.asp A good place to find information regarding NATO, but not necessarily Space, can be found at this link: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C5A00EE5-07A9A547/natolive/63349.htm

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Annex C: Considerations for the implementation of Space coordination.

Currently within NATO, the American concept of Space Coordination Authority (SCA) is not well understood, nor is it practical since the Space capabilities belong to nations and only they have authority. However, it will be further investigated by the NBiSCSWG. At present, Space authorities do not exist in NATO commands or missions and the coordinating function is immature. As a consequence, the following must be seen as provisional until something more formal can be agreed within the Alliance. According to the concept, the SCA is the ‘single authority within a joint force to coordinate joint Space operations and integrate Space capabilities.’ For a regional operation, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) would be granted authority to appoint an SCA to facilitate unity of effort with member-nation Space support. This would give the commander the ability to request NATO nations to provide services or data needed or desired for their operation, according to agreed procedures and within an established spectrum. Be aware, as mentioned already, NATO will not get C2 over national Space assets9. As a consequence, the SCA will integrate Space effects into NATO operations rather than Space capabilities. Conducting the tasks associated with SCA requires a repeatable process for successful execution. This might best be accomplished by organizing a regularly reoccurring working group. The working group would be fed by, and feed into, other boards, bureaus and working groups. 1. Determining, de-conflicting and prioritizing military Space requirements for the Joint Task Force (JTF). Space effects are just one more set of tools commanders can use to meet objectives. The key is to evaluate the objectives and the tasks and to understand where Space effects are required or assumed.

For example, if a commander plans to conduct dynamic targeting based on remotely piloted vehicles operated from beyond line of sight; the SCA should understand the Space effects required to enable that key aspect of operations.

In order to truly understand the Space requirements, involvement in the development of the task matrix is necessary or the ability to review it. Some tasks will be specified, others will be implied, but it is important to know when Space effects either are, or should be, part of the mix. De-confliction in this context could occur outside of theatre. For example, many satellites require maintenance that may make them unavailable for a short time. These activities could be compared to computer patches that are loaded from time to time to improve performance or security. Cyber professionals normally de-conflict by pushing patches during non-business hours, minimizing disruptions. When the communication to

9 See chapter 4 and 7 in the main body of this Handbook.

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the Space operator is good, pre-planned satellite maintenance can usually be de-conflicted so as not to impact the mission. When prioritizing military Space requirements ask the J3 or J5 to consider two key questions:

a. How important is the task to overall mission accomplishment? b. How important is the use of Space to the accomplishment of the task?

It may be that although the task is of great importance, the requirement for Space is low.

For example, there may be multiple and redundant mechanisms to achieve the task.

It may also be that although the task is of lesser importance, a Space based solution is the only one available to the JFC. Do not forget to make sure that theatre objectives are passed to Space products providers so that they understand the expectations and can scope their support accordingly. 2. Recommending appropriate relationships for Space to the JFC. A key consideration when requesting Space support is that Space assets usually are capable of supporting multiple users simultaneously. In addition, the JFC commander will not have C2 over any Space asset as those assets will remain under national control. The person with responsibility for Space effects will need to make certain they have pre-coordinated and established their request processes so that they can be delivered quickly when the effects are needed. 3. Helping to facilitate Space-related target nomination. NATO can conduct offensive operations on ground segments of Space capabilities used by an adversary.

For example, in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) NATO destroyed satellite television antennas that the Gadhafi regime were using “as an integral component of the regime apparatus designed to systematically oppress and threaten civilians and to incite attacks against them. Gadhafi’s increased practice of inflammatory broadcasts illustrated his regime’s policy to instil hatred amongst Libyans, to mobilize its supporters against civilians and to trigger bloodshed.”

This type of action contributes to what can be described as ensuring Space superiority, which equates to freedom of action at a time and place of our choosing while denying it to the adversary. Supporting to identify Space-related targets helps to achieve that objective. But always keep in mind that, unlike air superiority, NATO will not conduct operations in Space in order to ensure Space superiority. Intelligence personnel will be critical to making this happen. One way to specifically aid this task is to make certain that intelligence requirements pertaining to the adversary use of Space, and their ability to limit your use, are submitted.

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Targeting the ground segment of Space capabilities used by an adversary does not necessarily mean bombing or otherwise physically destroying something. For instance, if a neutral third-party provider is supplying Space services you don’t want the adversary to have you will have to find a legal and acceptable means to deny those services if required. For example, had the Gaddafi regime used satellite antennas in another country to communicate with their forces, bombing them, in most cases, would not have been acceptable. However, that country could possibly have been persuaded by diplomatic means to discontinue support to the regime by those means. 4. Maintaining Space Domain Awareness Within NATO there is no clear definition of what Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is, or should be. There is a definite need to harmonize amongst the Allies.

For example, the US definition of SSA is as follows: “the requisite current and predictive knowledge of Space events, threats, activities, conditions, and Space systems status, capabilities, constraints and employment to enable commanders, decision makers, planners and operators to gain and maintain freedom of action in Space through the spectrum of conflict.”

The definition above makes clear, that SSA is not simply sensor data from radar and optical sites. However, gaining SSA in the NATO environment is complicated by the sensitivity of Space activities and concerns of contributing nations to share certain information. Furthermore, there is no NATO clearing house for the compilation and dissemination of SSA. However, SSA remains essential because many Space services are integrated at the engineering level and are incorporated into equipment forces use every day. NATO should endeavour to incorporate the provision of Space product specific situational awareness at the same time as requesting for the provision of required Space products. Sometimes problems with hardware and/or software require at least an interim tactical solution.

For example, a software upgrade at the satellite might impact certain receivers possibly impacting the products promised to a NATO commander. Knowing and communicating this impact can be seen a subset of SSA that the NATO commander and his Space SME should be provided.

There are agencies from NATO nations, such as the United States Joint Space Operations Centre, the United Kingdom Space Operations Coordination Centre and the German Space Situational Awareness Centre who could potentially aid the gathering and dissemination of this specific awareness. Successfully accomplishing this task requires efforts both in and out of the theatre. Within the theatre, the SCA must understand what issues users are encountering and create the two-way communication with the Space provider to develop the insight required to diagnose problems. Outside the theatre the SCA must gain awareness of provider activities that might impact the delivery of Space products, and make sure the information needed is available to support operations. In addition, the need to understand adversary Space activities might result in specific tasking of the intelligence directorate to gain threat information at a higher classification level. All of that (awareness on “friendly products” and adversary

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capabilities) would shape what we would tentatively (so far) call Space Domain Awareness. 5. Requesting Space inputs from the JTF staff and components during planning. There are some fundamental assumptions embedded in this statement. The first is that the JTF and components know their Space requirements. This further assumes that someone on the staff is actively considering these aspects of operations. What that means is you cannot simply request products without helping them determine what actual products are available.

For example, there may be a task to conduct routine monitoring of reconstruction efforts. The components may naturally select to accomplish this task through an organic asset such as a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Leaving aside the Space dependencies of the RPA, using it in this fashion means it will not be available for another, perhaps more important, task. Space assets such as optical satellites could be used to perform the task.

There are grey areas with regards to Space, Communications and Intelligence. The above mentioned example is a good example of how lines can blur. The task described above could fall into the CJ2 responsibility, even though it really is not related to adversary activity. The goal is not to tell someone else how to do their job, but simply to make certain they have considered other options. The only way to really conduct this task is to be involved in the planning process and to evaluate the tasks from a Space perspective. That is, of course, easier said than done. But the considerations are the same as for any other tool that might be used to conduct a mission. The COPD lists important aspects to consider such as: How do geography, meteorological factors, demographics and the electromagnetic and cyberspace environments affect executing operations? How can the opponent affect the execution of operations? For example, what is the impact of terrain masking on GPS or SATCOM? If it is unknown, who can model the impacts? What is the impact to communications based on solar activity or heavy precipitation? Are other operations likely to be using the same frequencies and is there the potential for unintentional interference? Is it possible that the adversary has tried to discover these same facts for themselves and can use them against us? The key here is for non-Space personnel to recognize that Space services require planning just like any other aspect of military operations. Space assets can create the illusion that they are always available for operations. That can lead to faulty assumptions that in turn can lead to mission failure. Education and Training will help to understand the abilities and limitations of Space support to operations. As with most services that can be requested, the required effect and not the specific system should be requested. The way to get the best response to a request for support is to let the experts figure out how best to provide it based on the need. The better defined the requirement, the better able the Space operators will be to determine how and if they can help meet the need.

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6. Ensuring optimum synchronization of Space effects with allied/coalition forces Commanders do not like constraints, but orbital mechanics dictate certain rules they must follow if they want to make use of Space products. As a rule of thumb, synchronisation should start with understanding when Space assets are available. This is, by and large, because they are less flexible in terms of timing than their terrestrial counterparts.

For example, a commander could sequence an operation to take specific advantage of times that the Global Positioning System (GPS) is predicted to have its highest accuracy thus improving all aspects of the operation that require precision geospatial location information.

This offers opportunities and challenges and will require awareness of the specific situation so the best possible results can be achieved. The more Space domain awareness exists the better support to the task can be ensured. One key implied task associated with this is in knowing who is using what and for which purpose. The SCA needs to recognize what specific Space products and associated receivers forces will use along with their capabilities and limitations. It may be that the indigenous capabilities of one force package are better suited to particular areas of the JOA. It may be that the anticipated Space products available are known to be incompatible with the receivers forces have available. Communication should not be overlooked. Developing a briefing to ensure all parties are familiar with roles and responsibilities, communication protocols, and contingency plans is one proven way to enhance interoperability. Even plans which call for detailed coordination between multiple providers and users are more likely to be effectively executed when everyone understands their particular portion of the mission. Creating a mechanism to make sure there exists awareness of system degradations will help diagnose problems associated with Space products. A significant amount of Space products are provided by commercial providers or agencies outside of the chain of command, therefore this task can quickly expand outside of military channels.

For example, when an operational Iridium communications satellite collided with a defunct Russian satellite the result was an Iridium communications coverage gap. This gap had to be closed by the commercial operator. Although the military can ask for the problem to be resolved, it could not do it for them. From a military point of view, the key aspect was to understand the impact of the coverage gap on operations and determine how best to take advantage of the circumstances or minimize the shortfall.

7. Recommending JTF military Space requirement priorities to the JFC. The nature of many of today’s Space products means that often times component commanders will not need to compete for specific Space resources. When they do, prioritization using the criteria described above will help. The key from the JFC perspective ought to be whose use of Space best contributes to the mission at that time.

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Annex D: Points of contact. There is no centralized point to keep track of all the various Space-related personnel and initiatives within the Alliance. The NBiSCSWG tries to gather all relevant information and keep it up to date. Below a list of organizations is provided that have provided input to various NATO Space-related initiatives. ACT: www.act.nato.int Phone: +1 757 747 4152 ACO: www.aco.nato.int Phone: +32 (0)65-44-7111 NATO School: www.natoschool.nato.int Phone: +49 (0)8822 9481 2006 Joint Air Power Competence Centre: Phone: +49 (0) 2824 90 Ext: 2268, 2293 or 2238 E-mail: Space@japcc.de United States of America: USEUCOM, 603d AOC Space Cell Phone: +49(0)6371-405-4569 E-mail: 603aoccod.iamd@ramstein.af.mil France: Joint Space Command (Commandement interarmées de l’eSpace) Use of Space capabilities: +33 (0)1 45 52 40 52/40 55 Space policy – cooperation: +33 (0)1 45 52 41 29/41 34 Germany: The German Space Situational Awareness Centre (GSSAC, Weltraumlagezentrum - WRLageZ) Phone: +49 (0)2824 - 9774 /40 00 Fax: +49 (0)2824 - 9774 /40 99 E-mail: WRLageZ@bundeswehr.org United Kingdom: UK Space Operations Coordination Centre (UKSpOCC) Phone: +44 (0)1494 494095 NATO BiSC Space WG Who’s Who

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Annex E: Template for developing mitigation measures. Space systems provide a tremendous advantage to NATO and member nations and therefore are a high priority target for our adversaries. Whenever possible, plan for the secondary and tertiary backups of Space systems with the obvious possibility that backups may not be Space systems. Due to Space systems attractiveness as a target it may be needed to develop new procedures aimed at preserving Space support. The graphic below is meant as a helpful template.

Figure 2: sample mitigation measures development template

In the graphic above, the blue lines show measures an enemy might take in order to disrupt and deny our use of GPS services. The white lines stand for the mitigation measure friendly forces might employ to avoid disruption and denial of access. The key is to generate the desired effect, not the delivery mechanism. Options to mitigate the denial of Space-based services may not be more Space-based services but rather terrestrial options.

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Annex F: Practical education considerations. In NATO operations, Space assets play a large, but mostly transparent/unknown role to the war fighter. Incorporating the benefits of Space effects into the overall force structure without disrupting or overtly changing the procedures of the supported forces has enabled remarkable improvements without creating an undue burden on the terrestrial war fighter. However, often terrestrial (Air, Land, Maritime) war fighters (to include the command level) are not aware of their critical dependency on Space services when conducting operations. For this reason, one of your necessary tasks is to inform all levels of command on what Space products may be delivered, how to most effectively use these products, and what should be avoided to achieve the best possible effects. There are a number of references to help you, many of them referenced in Annex B. Before beginning an instructional program, analyse the audience and determine your objectives so that you can appropriately scope your material. Sometimes listening is the best thing to do in an instructional environment. Listen to the operational needs of the training audience. Some sample objectives for a senior ranking audience could be:

1. Understand the role of Space in society. 2. Understand Space domain fundamentals. 3. Understand the role of Space support in current operations. 4. Understand the legal ramifications of Space support to operations. 5. Understand threats to Space support. 6. Understand planning considerations for Space support to operations.

At the tactical level it would make sense to take a single objective from above, such as the role of Space support in current operations, and provide detailed information on that topic. For example:

1. Perform interference procedures for UHF SATCOM in support of OP JUST AN EXAMPLE

2. Understand Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to preserve Global Positioning System operation in a hostile electromagnetic environment in support of OP JUST AN EXAMPLE

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Annex G: Lessons identified & lessons learned. Lessons identified and learned are familiar terms in NATO. But, regarding the specific case of Space, what process needs to be followed to ensure that the lessons identified are properly recorded, assessed and fed back to the command group, J2, J3 and J5? The specific difficulty here is that most of the war fighters (at any level) are agnostic to Space, which has long been considered as the exclusive area of specialists. First of all, debriefing the relevant personnel on the relevant questions will identify lessons that are worth learning. This is how lessons identified will become lessons learned. Debriefing is simply reconstructing and evaluating an event to determine how to replicate success and avoid repeat mistakes. The success of a debriefing depends on the ability to critically analyse events and the willingness to recognize mistakes. The debrief process should encompass a review of events, identification of problems, determination of root causes, and development of lessons learned. Debriefing should be planned in advance. Determine which specific personnel or bodies will need to be incorporated in the process. All stakeholders should identify which information needs to be captured in order to properly conduct an event review. The aim is to faithfully recreate the event in order to point to problems encountered. Tools commonly available to aid in reconstruction could include screen captures, event logs, emails, and archived disk data. It might also be useful to develop a timeline with the events as they occurred chronologically. By paying special attention to those events that, at least initially, seem to be problem areas, it is important to begin to catalogue observations. The observations collected during the reconstruction are the means by which problems can be identified. Problems as defined here are “Areas or aspects of the event which impeded achievement of the desired outcome.”

For example, if reconstruction reveals a significant time lapse between initial indications of a problem and the initiation of a response, that would be a problem.

A thorough debriefing requires a careful and standardized phrasing of the questions to be asked. These should reflect all possible factors that might have affected the use of Space services and link them to an identified problem. This will help to identify what caused the problem. Useful questions in the example above could be:

Why did it take so long to initiate a proper response to the problem? → Because forces spend a long time trying to find a hardware failure. Why did forces assume that there was a hardware failure? → Because forces did not recognize the problem as Space-related. Why did troops not recognize the problem as Space-related? → Because I did not notify them in advance to expect a Space-related cause of the

problem.

A lesson identified is a statement identifying and explaining the root cause of a problem, while lessons learned aims at preventing the mistake to happen in the future by

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providing possible fix actions that lead to better job performance. A lesson learned should address four main points: when to enact the lesson, what specific actions to accomplish, how to accomplish those actions, and why to comply with the lesson learned. A lesson learned should strike a balance between applicability and specificity. In other words, it must encompass the problem without being as broad as to apply in every circumstance and so narrow that the event has little chance of repeating. For example, a lesson learned based on the example used above might be “When notified of a Space-related event that could cause a problem for forces, ensure to notify the possible impact in order to minimize the time between identifying problems and initiating response measures.” The lesson learned addresses when, what, how, and why to perform specific, repeatable actions to prevent a repeat of similar mistakes. The last step is to ensure that the lessons learned derived from the event are properly evaluated to determine if any checklist updates or procedural changes are required. Therefore, lessons learned that generate action items should find their way into mechanisms designed to evaluate their wider applicability. In the example above, perhaps a step could be added into subsequent situational awareness briefings which explicitly mention the possibility of impacts to operations as the result of Space-related events. Outside of the particular applicability of the lessons learned developed for a specific mission, other organizations may also greatly benefit from the experience so consider sharing lessons learned with entities such as the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre, ACT and ACO, the NATO School, JAPCC.

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Annex H: Operational planning considerations. Tailoring Space support to a theatre is a shared and active partnership between the consumer and providers requiring a common language. Operational planning for Space, and really the entire operational art for Space is just beginning to emerge. At the moment NATO does not have a clearly defined Space planning process to support operational planning. Imminent for planning considerations are a number of assumptions that underpin Space support to NATO operations:

1. Nations will retain operational control of all Space assets and personnel. 2. Nations will provide defence for their Space / Cyber systems. 3. Nations should report status changes to a predetermined central location to allow

for enhanced tracking of the impact to NATO provisioned Space products. 4. An organization, national or NATO, should serve the purpose of fusing reports to

create a recognized Space picture (if specifically requested to do so). 5. Nations should formally identify Space products available to support the operation. 6. Nations should evaluate and respond to requests (positively or negatively) for

additional Space services in a timely manner. 7. National coordination (global Space effects, additional resource requests) should

occur at the Strategic level. 8. Operational coordination of allocated products should happen at the JFC level.

These assumptions drive some minimum requirements such as: 1. Products available. 2. Status sharing from the national to component level. 3. Process to make specific requests for support. 4. A national process in place to decide whether or not, and how, to meet your

requests. 5. Reporting mechanisms.

Ultimately the aim should be to identify in advance the challenges to, and opportunities for, Space support to operations. This means that Space requirements must be determined, de-conflicted, and prioritized in coordination with J2, J3, J5 and J6. The output from this action could be a prioritized matrix which maps terrestrial operations to available or desired Space products. At a minimum, it must consider:

1. The commander’s priorities and weights of efforts for the covered timeframe. 2. Identify any new operations anticipated to commence during the covered

timeframe. 3. Identify operations in the planning phase. 4. Review the enemy, friendly, neutral and environmental factors influencing

operations from a Space perspective. 5. Collect inputs from the staff and components.

Subsequently, a prioritized Space product list can be generated that looks somewhat like the one below. All of the data in the table is provided only for illustrative purposes and does not in any way reflect any real world information or planned contingencies.

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Table 5: sample prioritized Space effects list Prioritized Space

Requirements Provider Desired Effect

OP PROVIDE CALORIES: Route Mapping and analysis < 2 days old

CAN Enhanced knowledge of the projected route to minimize enemy success if

attacked

OP PROVIDE CALORIES: Protected SATCOM

Comms Request via

J6

Secure and assured comms to permit calls for assistance as needed

Satellite Interference monitoring and Geolocation

SSR SA on the EM threat environment and jammer location for possible targeting

OP PROVIDE CALORIES: Advance warning of satellite over flights

GSSAC Enemy deprived of intelligence affording an opportunity to stage an attack

There are obviously a number of other possible operational planning aspects to be considered. Many of these will be specifically related to the scenario confronted with and the types of products you are trying to use.

For example, if task is to support counter-piracy operations cooperation with J2 is required to help evaluate the use of radar satellites to support the task. Radar satellites are very technical in their application and analysis and the J2 personnel might need support to better understand specific applications. Another example, Ms. Stine Skrune in her Master’s Thesis entitled “Marine Target Characteristics in Satellite SAR Imagery” published in February 2011 identified several findings regarding satellite radar detection of vessels at sea that you would need to consider from a planning perspective such as: 1. Satellite radar imagery can detect vessels but classifying them by type is difficult

and actually identifying them is currently unfeasible. 2. High winds increase the clutter caused by the ocean in the radar return and thus

decrease the contrast between the vessel and the surface. Therefore, even though radar satellites cam image through clouds, their output may still be affected by terrestrial weather.

3. Man-made targets tend to have numerous corners and edges which create a characteristic return known to radar imagery analysts.

4. Even though vessels in the visual spectrum may differ in size significantly, they may not appear substantially different in radar imagery due to factors such as orientation of the ship, construction material and radar factors.

5. The selected polarization of the energy emitted from and received at the satellite can improve ship detection or wake detection but the modes that enable better detection of ships are not as good for wake detection and vice versa.

This example highlights the numbers of variables and considerations that might arise for each possible scenario confronted. It is impossible to provide a detailed answer that

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helps to cover any and all problems or tasks encountered. However, it is recommended to start looking for the answers by asking some of the questions below.

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Table 6: sample questions to aid solution identification

Question Rationale What are you trying to accomplish?

This is obviously the most important question.

How will the adversary attempt to stop you from trying to accomplish what you want to accomplish?

Do not take the availability of Space products for granted. Your adversary may well anticipate your desire to use them and take actions to prevent you from doing so.

Where on the earth is the operation to take place?

Different latitudes have different operational considerations. For example, extreme northern latitudes are difficult to see from geosynchronous orbit because of the curve of the earth. Some orbits will never provide coverage to some areas of the earth. It may be up to you to figure out what Space products may actually be usable.

What is the terrestrial terrain like?

A user’s view to a satellite can be shielded by obstacles. A desert will offer different challenges and opportunities than a jungle.

How is the weather? What is the solar environment like? Are there predicted impacts to any of the products you are hoping to use? What about terrestrial weather? Will your equipment overheat? Will rain cause the signal to fade?

What is the orbit? Remember, orbits are predictable. How does that impact your operational timing? How can you exploit that predictability in your favour? How can the adversary exploit that predictability in their favour? Knowing the orbit tells you how long the satellite will be available and when it will be available again.

What is the time lag between when the satellite is available and the information from the satellite is available?

There may be a threshold when the information is too old to be of much relevance. This is scenario specific. You might not care if the information is years old in some cases. Can you work to have a capability deployed that will shorten the timeline if needed?

Can you find a way to combine the information from multiple systems?

If you had, for example, full motion video in the electro-optical and a satellite image of the same area in the radar spectrum, different aspects of the operational area might be revealed.

How will you assess the resilience of Space support?

Align metrics for Space resilience with the overall mission performance and accomplishment.

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Appendix to Annex H: Operational planning annex template. A task for a Space SME could be to support a Joint Operational Planning Group or Component Operations Planning Group from a Space perspective. In accordance with the COPD, there is a Space annex to the Operational Plan (Annex DD). A possible approach for the annex is listed below. While not specifically addressed in this template, if the development of mitigating measures is required as discussed in Annex E, this would be an appropriate place to document them. Also consider drafting appendixes to the annex that deal specifically with the Space products provided by each individual nation.

ANNEX DD – SPACE Support to NATO OPERATIONS 1. SITUATION. For political and strategic environment, see OPLAN main body.

a. Space Environment: (1) Enemy. (As needed, examples follow)

a. Satellite communications b. Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) and Velocity c. Space-based ISR d. Space Control (Jammers, lasers, anti-satellite weapons, etc.) e. Observed tactics

(2) Friendly. (As needed, examples follow) a. Space Support Teams b. Theatre Missile Warning (TMW) c. Environmental support d. Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT), and Velocity e. Satellite Communications (Realize there is another Annex for

communication) f. ISR (Realize there is another Annex for intelligence) g. Space Domain Awareness

(3) Neutral actors and factors affecting Space support. (As needed, examples follow)

a. The Space environment including the factor of orbital debris b. Various relevant non-aligned nations and commercial actors

orbital capabilities (Example: On-orbit resupply and management satellites)

c. Terrestrial development of relevant technologies of non-aligned nations (Example: Direct ascent anti-satellite missiles)

2. MISSION. The overall mission of the commander as stated in the base plan. 3. OPERATIONS DESIGN (Space): How the commander will use Space products.

a. Commander’s Intent (Specific to Space). b. Main Effort. (Overall effort to achieve mission in order to allow for prioritization).

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c. Operational objectives (specific to Space). For example: (1) Forces have adequate awareness of the Space environment to

mitigate forecast outages or degradations. (2) Forces have full utility of Space-based position, navigation and timing

services. (3) The adversary is not capable of hindering friendly operations via

Space-control operations. 4. EXECUTION. An overall description of how the JFC becomes aware of available Space support to the operation, collect and prioritize the needs for Space support, and communicates requirements to NATO and the Nations.

For example, you could define the requirement to review the commander’s priorities and weights of efforts within a given timeframe, collect Space inputs from the staff and components and generate a table identifying prioritized Space products, the potential provider(s), and the desired effects.

5. SERVICE SUPPORT: See OPLAN Main Body. 6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Describe how the various relevant agencies will communicate internally and externally.

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References Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Planning Directive V1.0, December 2010 AU-18 Space handbook DCDC UK Space Primer, available at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/Concepts/UkMilitarySpacePrimer.htm

Ehredt, Dave. ‘Command and Control-Exploring Alternatives: The Realities of Two C2 Models for Air Power Proponents’ The Journal of the JAPCC, Edition 14, available at www.JAPCC.org European Commission’s Space for Security Web Page “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” European Space Policy, 26 April 2007 Lynn, William J., Remarks on Space Policy, published in High Frontier: The Journal for Space and CyberSpace Professionals, Volume 7, Number 2 Maj. Gen. Mark Barrett, Dick Bedford, Elizabeth Skinner, Eva Vergles, “Assured Access to the Global Commons,” Supreme Allied Command Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Norfolk, Virginia USA, April 2011 National Space Policy of the United States of America, 28 June 2010 NATO News Channel - http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_76776.htm?selectedLocale=en Remuss, Nina-Louisa. “Fighting Pirates from Space: Using Space Resources in the Fight Against Piracy”, JAPCC Journal Edition 13, available at www.JAPCC.org Remuss, Nina-Louisa. “Space Applications as a Supporting Tool for Countering Piracy Outline for a European Approach”, European Space Policy Institute, October 2010, available at www.espi.or.at Single, Thomas, JAPCC Space Ops Assessment, Revised Jan 2009 Skrunes, Stine Skrunes, “Marine Target Characteristics in Satellite SAR Imagery;” Master’s Thesis, Feb 2011 Spyros Pagkratis, Space Policies, Issues and Trends in 2010/2011 European Space Policy Institute, June 2011 (Source: ESPI Report 35, all rights reserved), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/Space/esp/security/index_en.htm Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union that Benefits its Citizens, April 2011 Traffic Engineering for NATO Satellite Communications Services, Ramon Segura Warden, John A. III, The Air Campaign, Excel Press, 2000 Waltz, Edward, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations