northern bangkok monorail

Template no. 100317811 Rev C

NORTHERN BANGKOK MONORAIL PINK LINE PROJECT

KHAE RAI – MIN BURI SECTION

SIGNALLING

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

This document and its contents are the property of Bombardier or its subsidiaries. This document contains confidential proprietary information. The reproduction, distribution, utilization or the communication of this document or any part thereof is only permitted to the Employer and MRTA for the execution of the Project. Offenders will be held liable for the payment of damages. © 2018 Bombardier. All rights reserved

Document ID Number

G0PK.SIG.51200.GAE.0001.B Submission No.

PK SIG 10000 B Internal Document Number Internal Revision

N/A N/A Effective Date:

01-08-2018 Language:

en

Document No: G0PK.SIG.51200.GAE.0001.B Confidential and Proprietary

DOCUMENT NAME: SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Page 2

Document Title SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Document ID Number G0PK.SIG.51200.GAE.0001.B Internal Document Number

Approvals

Name Position Signature Date

Prepared Norrasingh Kanivichaporn Senior System Engineer 05-07-2018

Verified Pichada Paritathai Senior System Engineer 05-07-2018

Approved Athapon Sivawut Project Engineer of

Signalling 05-07-2018



Revision Log

Revision Date of Release Description of Changes

A0.1 09-01-2018 First draft

A0.2 16-02-2018 Updated according to the reviewer comments

A0.3 28-03-2018 Updated according to the SI comments

A0.4 25-05-2018 Updated according to Project Engineering Director and Project Director comments

A 06-06-2018 Released to Customer

B0.1 05-07-2018 Updated according to the customer comments

B 01-08-2018 Released to Customer



Table of Contents Section Page

1 Introduction ...................................... ......................................................................................... 7

1.1 Purpose ........................................... ................................................................................... 7

1.2 Scope ............................................. ..................................................................................... 7

2 Abbreviations & Definitions ....................... .............................................................................. 7

3 References ........................................ ......................................................................................... 7

3.1 Project Documents ................................. ........................................................................... 7

3.2 Standards ......................................... .................................................................................. 8

4 General ........................................... ........................................................................................... 8

4.1 Project Overview .................................. .............................................................................. 8

4.2 Project Characteristics ........................... ........................................................................... 8

4.3 Operation Features ................................ ............................................................................ 8

4.4 Main Technical Features ........................... ........................................................................ 9

5 Signalling System Structure ....................... ............................................................................ 10

5.1 Overall Structure ................................. ............................................................................. 10

5.2 Overview CITYFLO 650 Architecture ................. ............................................................. 12

5.2.1 CF650 Internal Interface .......................... ............................................................................. 14

5.2.2 CF650 External Interface .......................... ............................................................................ 17

6 System Function ................................... .................................................................................. 18

6.1 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Subsystem ....... ..................................................... 18

6.1.1 Operation of the ATS Subsystem .................... ................................................................... 19

6.1.2 ATS Basic Functions ............................... ............................................................................. 19

6.1.3 ATS Advance Functions ............................. ......................................................................... 20

6.2 Object Controller Subsystem (OCS) ................. .............................................................. 20

6.3 Platform Screen Door Interface cabinet (PSDIC) .... ....................................................... 21

6.4 RATC Subsystem .................................... ......................................................................... 21

6.4.1 Operation of the RATC Subsystem.................... ................................................................. 21

6.4.2 RATO Functions .................................... ............................................................................... 21

6.4.3 Operations of the RATP Subsystem .................. ................................................................. 24

6.4.4 RATP Functions .................................... ................................................................................ 25

6.5 DCS Subsystem ..................................... .......................................................................... 28

6.5.1 DTS Overview ...................................... .................................................................................. 28

6.5.2 DTS Transmission Characteristics .................. ................................................................... 29

6.5.3 TWC Wayside Configuration ......................... ...................................................................... 30

6.5.4 CCTV Radio System ................................. ............................................................................ 31

6.5.5 Train borne Configuration of the ATC Radio Subsyste m ................................................ 31

6.6 VATC Subsystem .................................... ......................................................................... 32

6.6.1 Operation of the VATC Subsystem ................... .................................................................. 32

6.6.2 VATC Functions .................................... ................................................................................ 32



Section Page 7 System Performance................................. .............................................................................. 38

8 Train Operation modes ............................. .............................................................................. 38

8.1 Unattended Train Operation mode (UTO) ............. .......................................................... 39

8.2 Supervised Manual mode (SM) ....................... ................................................................ 40

8.3 Non-Restricted Manual mode (NRM) .................. ............................................................ 40

9 RATP Recovery Server (RRS) ........................ ........................................................................ 40

10 External Interfaces ............................... ................................................................................... 40



List of Tables Table 3-1: List of References ~ Contractual Documents ........................................................................................ 8

Table 3-2: List of References ~ Standards .............................................................................................................. 8

List of Figures Figure 5-1 Pink Line - Station layout and Region boundary .................................................................................. 10

Figure 5-2 Regional Station Layout ....................................................................................................................... 11

Figure 5-3 Non-Regional Station Layout ............................................................................................................... 12

Figure 5-4 CITYFLO 650 CBTC architecture for Pink Line ................................................................................... 13

Figure 6-1 Example of ATS system ....................................................................................................................... 19

Figure 6-2 Structure of Object Controllers and terminals ...................................................................................... 20

Figure 6-3 PSD Interface ....................................................................................................................................... 21

Figure 6-4 RATP System ....................................................................................................................................... 24

Figure 6-5 Traffic Zone and Gate .......................................................................................................................... 27

Figure 6-6 DTS System Overview ......................................................................................................................... 29

Figure 6-7 Wayside Radio Equipment Configuration ............................................................................................ 31

Figure 6-8 On-board Equipment associated with the ATC Radio System ............................................................ 32

Figure 6-9 Determination of Train Location ........................................................................................................... 33

Figure 6-10 Train Virtual Occupancy at Standstill ................................................................................................. 34

Figure 6-11 Speed Limit of Occupied Area ........................................................................................................... 35

Figure 6-12 Safe Approach Speed Calculation ..................................................................................................... 36



1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide an overview description of the CBTC signalling system (CITYFLO650) regarding the Pink Line Monorail Project.

This document provides limited information to the Employer to enable the Contractor to proceed the submission of major signalling material specification which are considered as long procurement lead time.

1.2 Scope The scope of this document is to describe the signalling system structure and the overview of the CITYFLO650 system architecture including the subsystems functions and a list of external interfaces.

2 Abbreviations & Definitions Definitions and abbreviations used in this document are as listed in the Project Glossary. Contrary to what is defined in the Project Glossary, when reference is made to the term “Project” in this document it refers to the Contractors scope of Works and when reference is made to the term “Contractor” it means the Consortium of Bombardier Transportation Signal (Thailand) Limited and Bombardier Transportation GmbH. References

3 References

3.1 Project Documents Document Number Document Title

G0PK.PMM.11160.AEE.0001 Project Glossary

G0PK.SIG.51200.GBE.0001 Pink Line Signalling System Architecture Description

G0PK.SIG.51100.FBE.0001 Pink Line Signalling System Requirement and Design Specification

G0PK.SIG.51100.HFE.0001 Pink Line Signalling System Performance Analysis

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0001 ICD01 Rolling Stock – Signalling

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0008 ICD08 SCADA-Signalling

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0016 ICD16 Signalling - Communication

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0017 ICD17 Signalling - Depot Equipment

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0018 ICD18 Signalling- Platform Screen Doors

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0019 ICD19 Signalling - Track switches

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0026 ICD26 Signalling – Civil Works at Stations

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0030 ICD30 Wayside Signalling Equipment - Civil work guide beam

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0036 ICD36 OCC and Technical Room - Civil Work in Depot

G0PK.SYS.19150.TAE.0041 ICD41 Conductor Rail – Signalling



Table 3-1: List of References ~ Contractual Documen ts

3.2 Standards Standard Document Title

EN 50126 Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)

EN 50128 Railway applications - Communication, Signalling and processing systems – Software for railway control and protection systems

EN 50129 Railway applications - Communication, Signalling and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems for Signalling

IEC 62290-1 Railway applications – Urban guided transport management and command/control systems – Part 1: System principles and fundamental concepts

IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) standard

Table 3-2: List of References ~ Standards

4 General

4.1 Project Overview

The Monorail system on the Pink Line Monorail Project, Khae Rai – Min Buri Section is the connection between Min Buri District (East) and Nonthaburi Province (West). The total length of the line is approximately 34.5 km with 30 elevated stations. The line will be served by one combined depot and stabling area, and one Park & Ride building. The depot has 7 maintenance lanes, 1 automatic washing track and 1 test track allowing UTO. There is one Central Control Room in the OCC building in the Depot and one backup CCR in the maintenance workshop building.

4.2 Project Characteristics

The Pink Line Monorail Project provide the following project characteristics: • Approximately 34.5km mainline length at initial stage.

• 30 elevated stations at initial stage.

• 42 trains (4-car per train) at initial stage.

• 1 central control.

• 1 depot and maintenance area.

• 1 test track (set up at depot).

• 1 training room (set up at depot using BCC).

4.3 Operation Features

The Pink Line Monorail Project provide the following operation features:



• At the initial stage, the system will operate with a 4-car train configuration. However, in the future the system will operate with a 6 or 7-car train configuration depending on the number of potential passengers in the future.

• Platform lengths will be able to accommodate a 7-car train.

• The maximum operation speed is 80km/h.

• The Signalling design headway is 90 secs and the minimum Operation headway is 120 secs., refer to GSSR, section 6.3 System Capacity.

• The average speed for a round trip is not less than 35 km/h.

• UTO is normal operation mode.

Please refer to Signalling System Performance Analysis (G0PK.SIG.12140.HFE.0001) for more details.

4.4 Main Technical Features

Bombardier Transportation’s latest generation of Signalling is called CITYFLO 650. Unlike traditional fixed block systems, CITYFLO 650 requires neither standard track circuits nor an on-board operator. Train-to-Wayside communication is not done through fixed track circuits, but through a "wireless" communication medium capable of bi-directional transmission. CITYFLO 650 is Bombardier’s “Moving Block” (MB), “Communications Based” Train Control System (CBTC). By “moving block” it is meant that the “occupancy” of the train moves along with the train in a continuous fashion. By “communications based” it is meant that train control information is transmitted between the train and Wayside computers through a wireless radio.

The train occupancy is generated by the train and sent back to the wayside control system. This train-generated occupancy is based upon the worst-case braking of the train.

A full set of communication-based moving block train control systems (CBTC) for the Pink Line Monorail Project will be provided which includes: Automatic Train Supervision subsystem (ATS), Automatic Train Protection subsystem (ATP), Automatic Train Operation subsystem (ATO), Object Controller Subsystem (OCS) and data communication system (DCS). The CITYFLO650 Signalling system has the following features and advantages:

• With the CBTC moving block train control system, it can guarantee safety, shorten headway and improve operation efficiency.

• It supports the full range of ATP and ATO automation levels in accordance with IEC 62290-1, which is classified as GoA 4 (Unattended Train Operation).

• It uses advanced control technology, computer technology, redundancy technology, network technology and communication technology, which conforms to development direction of rail transit.

• The CBTC system uses wireless communications, which uses the wireless standard IEEE 802.11, 5.8GHz frequency band; transmission media is LoS antenna, which together can effectively solve route defects and interference, thus realising continuous, stable and reliable train to Wayside communication transmissions.

• It has advanced safety design features, which can eliminate or minimise human error.The safety-involved subsystems shall conform to a safety integrity level requirement; and the ATP and interlocking systems shall reach a SIL4 safety certification standard.

• Its advanced reliable design; ATP and interlocking systems uses 2x2-out-of-2 redundancy structures; ATS subsystems and ATO subsystems use double-machine hot-standby redundancy structures, which can improve the system availability.

• It uses an area control method to reduce the separation equipment configuration and reduces repair time as well as equipment maintenance costs within the service life of the whole system. Instead of providing RATC equipment at every station, regional concept is used to group several stations as one control area (region).



• It has multiple driving modes, which can be adapted to multiple requirements from unmanned automatic driving modes to manned driving modes.

• The ATO subsystem uses smooth coordinated control technology and has pre-acceleration and deceleration functions and can realise train energy-saving operation and improve the driving comfort for passengers.

• It has advanced train station stopping accuracy, which is suitable for project operation requirements for the platform screen door/safety door system.

• The data transmission subsystem with hot-standby redundancy, has an automatic restoration function that prevents single point failure so that it will not generate an effect on the running system.

• For all the key subsystems, they use multiple redundancy fault-tolerant designs; in case of a fault, it supports a quick restoration.

5 Signalling System Structure

5.1 Overall Structure

To fulfil highly dense and uninterrupted operational features for the Pink Line Monorail Project, the Signalling system provided in this plan is safe, complete, advanced, highly efficient system with sound functions, strong availability, high reliability and maintainability. Following area control principle, the Pink Line Signalling system separates into 3 regions: 2 for Mainline and 1 region for Depot.

Figure 5-1 Pink Line - Station layout and Region bo undary



The regional stations have been set up according to the system features; these stations have RATC (Region Automatic Train Control) equipment located, which all meet the employer’s requirements; according to features of the CBTC system, the system sets up OCS equipment at every station to collect Wayside equipment information. The equipment provided for Reginal Station and Non-Regional Station are shown in Figure 5-2 and 5-3 respectively.

Figure 5-2 Regional Station Layout



Figure 5-3 Non-Regional Station Layout

Note: The details of each component will be described in each Material Specification.

5.2 Overview CITYFLO 650 Architecture

The CITYFLO 650 solution comprises several integrated subsystems in order to provide a safe, reliable and efficient signalling system with high availability. CITYFLO 650 for the Pink Line Monorail Project does not require a secondary train detection system. Figure 5-4 below illustrates the CITYFLO 650 System Architecture for Pink Line.



Figure 5-4 CITYFLO 650 CBTC architecture for Pink L ine

The CF650 CBTC system has three main system levels:

1) ATS subsystem ATS equipment includes ATS equipment at central control, and those at the station, depot/yard. ATS is responsible for Wayside equipment status monitoring, tracking and displaying train, automatic route setting and adjustment of train operation and so on.



2) ATP/ATO subsystem

• ATP ATP equipment includes Wayside RATP equipment and onboard VATP equipment. Wayside RATP equipment communicates with the onboard VATP controller through a DCS data communication subsystem, RATP and VATP use 2x2-out-of-2 safety redundancy structures. The Wayside RATP equipment is located at the regional station, dividing the whole line into several control areas, which can realise seamless handovers amongst the regions. The RATP capacity regarding each area shall meet the design requirements for the train and Wayside equipment and also provides certain margins within the required area. The Wayside RATP obtains train positions and speed information from the onboard VATP, and also receives control information from the central control (through the RATO); thus, generating movement authority based on the information provided. Onboard VATP equipment is located on each train; there is one set of VATP equipment installed in each end car on each train respectively, and as for redundancy. Onboard VATP includes the controller based on a microprocessor, relevant speed measurement sensors (Tachometers), position sensors (Norming Point Readers) and Compact Antenna Unit. Onboard VATP realises safe train speed measurements and positioning, then sends speed and position information to Wayside RATP and central control. Onboard VATP executes movement authority received from Wayside RATP and realizes safe train separation control through control interface with vehicles.

• ATO ATO equipment includes Wayside RATO equipment and onboard VATO equipment. Wayside RATO equipment is located at the regional station; each RATO unit corresponds with one of the RATP units; RATO uses hot-standby redundancy structure. Wayside RATO sends skip, hold command and vehicle door command etc. to VATO and obtains vehicle door status, event, fault and other information from VATO. Onboard VATO equipment is located on each train; there are two sets of VATO equipment for redundancy. Onboard VATO includes the controller based on microprocessor, relevant speed measurement and position sensors (sharing with VATP). Onboard VATO executes automatic train driving, platform accurate parking functions, etc.

3) Data communication subsystem Data communication system is made up of several redundant Gigabit Ethernet. This network is divided into several areas according to the lines, equipment, layout, mainline and sections.

• Uses advanced ring network technology.

• Manages redundancy connection using rapid spanning tree: after network fault is detected, activates redundancy link automatically.

• The internal safety of the network will be maintained through isolated VLAN, three-layer routing and access control list (four-layer).

• Uses commercially available and practical verified fire wall: isolates Wayside ATC equipment and central ATC equipment; limits and controls all external accesses except for existing customer networks; fire wall will be configured according to redundancy mode.

• Uses industrial level high performance network assembly.

4) External system Provide signalling related data to the CBTC system. The interfaces shown in Figure 5-4 are described in the following section.

5.2.1 CF650 Internal Interface The main data transferred across the internal interfaces are listed in the table below.



Interface Symbol Protocol Description

RATP – Radio System H Ethernet

This interface is used to transfer all data required between Wayside CBTC system and onboard CBTC system. This includes both vital and non-vital data encapsulated in different packets and protected by safety features.

For each region, the TRAs are connected by means of fibre optic cable to RATP system, allowing bidirectional communications with running trains.

RATP – CFMS I Ethernet

This interface allows CFMS tool to receive and store information provided by RATP system about the status and operation of the CBTC system. The stored information can be reproduced and analysed at a later stage with the same tool, allowing relevant functionality such as predictive maintenance.

VATP – Radio (MDR) Q Ethernet

This interface is used to transfer all data required between Wayside CBTC systems (RATP/RATO) and onboard CBTC systems (VATP/VATO). This includes both vital and non-vital data encapsulated in different packets and protected by safety features.

VATP – NPR R RS-485 over copper cable

By means of this interface, the onboard CBTC system (VATP) gets information stored in Norming Points placed along the line. This information is then used to calculate the absolute train location on the line.

NPR – Norming Point Tag T 2.4 GHz Radio

Norming Point Readers can read the current location from a data store in norming point tag. For more details, please see section 6.6.2.2.

VATP – Tachometers S

TTL pulses over copper cable

This interface allows detection of wheel rotation by onboard CBTC system (VATP). This information is used to calculate train speed, acceleration, travelling direction as well as travelled distance. Advance processing of this data also provides information on potential slip/slide events in case of axle blocking, braking capabilities, automatic wheel diameter calibration and vital zero speed detection.

VATP – VATO P Proprietary

This interface allows the exchange of operational information between these vital and non-vital systems that are part of the onboard CBTC systems (VATP and VATO).

This transmission medium also serves as the transparent communication path between VATP and train functions as well as between VATO and Wayside CBTC system (RATP/RATO).




VATP – Safety relays K

Vital digital outputs under a fail-safe design.

Interface with the train for vital function.

VATP – CAT J Ethernet

This interface is used to interact with onboard CBTC systems in real time and also log data for later analysis. It is intended primarily for testing, maintenance and diagnostic purposes.

ATS – Mimic Display F

Ethernet over Cat 5e copper cable

This interface allows communication for the ATS system with a projection system on a videowall or similar system (if existing). By means of this interface, a live representation of the signalling system and the running trains can be presented in a large screen system.

RATP – RATO U Ethernet

RATO subsystem communicates with RATP through an Ethernet link to send primarily information required for automatic train operation and receive status and alarm information. RATP system also acts as a communication path between RATO and onboard CBTC system (VATP/VATO) of running trains.

RATO - ATS O Ethernet

Send/reception of info to/from ATS: command, supervision and alarms; such as train alarms, or as Skip/Hold station, driving profiles to be transmitted to the trains, etc.

RATO – Local ATS E Ethernet

Send/receive of info to/from Local ATS: command, supervision and alarms; such as train alarms, or as Skip/Hold station, driving profiles to be transmitted to the trains, etc.

RATP – OCS V Ethernet

The connection with Wayside equipment is made from the RATP and also performed by means of OCS configured according to each Wayside equipment type.

OCS – Wayside equipment B

Discrete Signals over Copper

Connection with Wayside equipment is performed by means of OCS configuration according to each device type (Confirmation Button, ESP for each platform).

OCS – PSDIC C Discrete Signals over Copper

OCS send Vital “Door Enable” control to PSD and receive “Door Closed & Locked” and “Interlock override“ status from PSD via PSDIC.

RATO – PLC PSDIC D Ethernet

RATO sends door open and door close commands to Door PLC in PSDIC.




RATP – Adjacent RATP W Ethernet

Adjacent RATPs are connected through the DTS in order to exchange ATC related information, such as during the region hand-off process.

RATO – Adjacent RATO X Ethernet

When region ATO equipment is to be deployed, adjacent RATOs are connected through the DTS in order to exchange ATO related information.

RATP – RRS Y Ethernet The RATP is connected with RRS through the DTS. The RATP will query data from RRS upon cold start up for recovery process.

5.2.2 CF650 External Interface The following is a list of the external interfaces and their respective function. Note that only logical interfaces are shown in the table. For more detail of data exchanged between sub-systems, please refer to the External ICDs.


ATS – External central systems 1 Ethernet

Interface with the external systems are performed by means of a gateway PLC installed in the ATS cabinets in the Control Centre Stations. The Gateway acts as a firewall (to protect the signalling DTS) as well as acting as a data format / protocol converter.

ATS – Master Clock 1 Ethernet

Provides the railway system master clock to the signalling system for time synchronization.

ATS – PIS 1 Ethernet ATS provides platforms and trains operation information.

ATS – PA 1 Ethernet

ATS provides platforms and trains information for public address e.g. delay, dwell, estimated arrival time, etc.

ATS – Radio Com 1 Ethernet

ATS provides trains operation information and location.

ATS – Operators 2

Graphical User Interface, Keyboard, Mouse

This interface will be based upon a graphical user interface allowing interaction with the operator for command and supervision purposes. This interface makes extensive use of mouse functions to accelerate operator actions. In addition, keyboard shortcuts are also available to operate the system.




VATC – Train Interface Circuit 3

Free voltage contacts connected to train wires

Interface with the train devices for both vital and non-vital data.

VATO – TMS 4 CAN Bus This interface allows onboard CBTC equipment to interact with TMS via the train communication network using CAN Bus Controller.

VATO – Train traction/braking system

5 Analog Pulses By means of this interface, the onboard CBTC equipment communicates with train traction and braking system via PWM Generator.

Maintenance equipment – Operators

6 Through graphical interfaces

The user interfaces between diagnostic tools and maintenance personnel will be performed by means of graphical menus and options. Main equipment includes:

• CFMS tool

• CAT tool

PSDIC – PSD 7

Discrete Signals over Copper

PSDIC sends Vital “Door Enable” control and non-vital Door Open/Close command to PSD and receives “Door Closed & Locked” and “Interlock override “status from PSD.

OCS – Switch Beam

8 Hard wire The OCS interfaces to Switch Beam via Switch control box/panel.

OCS – TWP 9 Hard wire Interface with Train Wash Plant in depot to route and control the movement authority of the train, as well as activates the train wash operations based on inputs from the Train Wash Plant.

6 System Function This section gives an overview of the subsystem functions. For detailed functions of each subsystem, see the relevant subsystem functional description document, System Requirements and Design Specifications (G0PK.SIG.51100.FAE.0001). Below is a brief description of the main functions of each subsystem. The principle Subsystems are addressed in the following sequence:

• ATS – Automatic Train Supervision.

• OCS – Object Controller System.

• RATO – Regional Automatic Train Operation.

• RATP – Regional Automatic Train Protection.

• DCS – Data Communication System.

• VATC – Vehicle Automatic Train Control, combination of VATP and VATO.

6.1 Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) Subsystem

ATS is provided for the Pink Line Monorail Project for the efficient and economic traffic management.



6.1.1 Operation of the ATS Subsystem

Figure 6-1 Example of ATS system

ATS is a traffic control and diagnostic support system by means of which an operator can control train movements and receive information about events on the line. It is a completely computerised system which interfaces with humans using LCD/LED monitors, keyboards and a mouse. Each LCD/LED monitor sets can display different types of information such as, overview, detailed pictures, event and alarm lists. These graphic pictures are built using signal symbols, axle counter section symbols, texts with the required level of details. Symbols and texts can be designed to fit the requirements of the end user. Any faults occurring will be reported to the operator in the form of log able audio-visual alarms.

6.1.2 ATS Basic Functions The following list of attributes are the basic functions provided in ATS which are provided in both Local Control at regional stations and Central Control but are not limited to data recording and external interfaces.

• Image Management.

• Processing of Indications.

• Processing of Operator Commands.

• Event Logging.

• Alarm Handling.

• Authority Management.

• System Integrity Supervision.

• Database Management.



6.1.3 ATS Advance Functions The advance functions are provided at OCC workstations, such as those located in CCR (Central Control Room) and BCC (Backup Control Room). Such functions are not available in the Local Control level at regional stations.

• Train Describer Identification.

• Routing Automation or Automatic Route Setting.

• Time Table Management.

• Train Graph.

• Automatic Train Regulation (ATR).

• Reporting.

• Passenger Exchange Information by ATS.

• Playback. •

6.2 Object Controller Subsystem (OCS)

The OCS controls the Wayside objects, such as platform screen doors, Emergency Stop Plunger (ESP), switch beam. The OCS cabinets are distributed along the line, in each signalling equipment room (SER), close to Wayside objects. Object information and commands from the RATP are transmitted safely to the OCS via the DTS (Data Transmission System).

Figure 6-2 Structure of Object Controllers and term inals

The CCU (Communication Controller Unit) comprises of two COMs (Communication) Boards in hot standby configuration. The CCU receives orders from the RATP (via the DTS) and sends them to the Object Controller (OC). It receives status information from the OC and sends it back to the RATP (via the DTS). The OC (Object Controller) controls the Wayside objects. There are four OCs per subrack, which each OC containing a combination of the Interface Modules as illustrated above.



6.3 Platform Screen Door Interface cabinet (PSDIC)

The signalling system interfaces with PSD via Platform Screen Door Interface cabinet (PSDIC) for the door control and monitoring. The PSDIC are distributed along the line in each signalling equipment room (SER). Each PSDIC communicates with the Object Controller Subsystem (OCS) via the hard wire for vital signals and interfaces with RATO via DTS Ethernet network for non-vital signals. The PSD interface via PSDIC is summarised as follows:

• OCS sends Vital “Door Enable” control to PSD and receives “Door Closed & Locked” and “Interlock Override“ status from PSD via PSDIC.

• RATO sends door open and door close commands to PSD via PSDIC.

• VATC sends train door isolation status to PSD and receive the platform door isolation status from PSD via PSDIC (through RATO). So, both doors are open synchronize.

Figure 6-3 PSD Interface

6.4 RATC Subsystem

The RATC subsystem contains two main subsystems: 1) Region Automatic Train Protection (RATP) subsystem. 2) Region Automatic Train Operation (RATO) subsystem.

6.4.1 Operation of the RATC Subsystem The RATO interfaces with the RATP, the VATO, the ATS, the PSDIC and adjacent RATOs. The data transfer from RATO to VATO takes place through the RATP. Each RATO subsystem consists of a primary and standby system. Both the primary and standby RATO collect data from their own regions, but only the active system will issue commands and requests. The standby system is a hot standby ready to take control upon a detected failure of the active RATO. Separate from the RATO, a diagnostic PC in the RATC cabinet, running Windows is available for maintenance and troubleshooting the RATO. From this PC it is convenient to download software changes to the RATO(s) or get more detailed diagnostic information about the RATO. This RATO maintenance computer is an engineering tool intended for engineering personnel and is not used in the daily operations of the system.

6.4.2 RATO Functions

The following subsections describe each of the RATO functions.



6.4.2.1 Train Control and Status Information

Train control and status information is exchanged between the RATO and VATO. There are three main types of message:

• Normal Message.

• Software Version Message.

• Map Version Message.

The normal RATO->VATO message contains train control information such as next station stop, driving strategy, and dwell time at next station, time of arrival at next station, and remote reset command. The normal VATO-> RATO message contains the train status and alarm information such as VATC status, Door Status, Berth Status. The Software and Map version messages are used when a train is initialised to ensure that the RATO and VATO are using compatible versions.

6.4.2.2 Grand Route

Grand route is the route that assigned to CBTC train. This route will define to travel path of the train that been assigned. There are 4 main types of Grand route which are

• Revenue Routes: This is the normal passengers service route which can be either pinched loop or shuttle routes.

• Dispatch Routes: This will automatically route a train from a storage track into revenue service as well as bring the train from depot to mainline

• Storage Routes: This will automatically be routing the train from a transition station to the storage track as well as remove a train from revenue service

• Yard Routes: This will route the train within the depot CBTC controlled area.

6.4.2.3 Train Routing and Degraded Operation

Train routing can be assigned to the train via the ATS System. The ATS interacts with the RATO to deliver the Grand Route of each train within the system. The RATO is responsible for moving each train from station to station based on the Grand Route. The RATP ensures that the train travels safely. The Automatic Train Regulation (ATR) system within the ATS is responsible for the timetable management. The ATR is able to route the trains by either considering Headway or the Timetable. In either case, the ATR will be configured to prevent the bunching of trains at any location on the mainline. The ATR also has a degraded mode of operation where the TC can create routes that involve Short Turnbacks, Shuttle Routes, etc. Within these routes the train can turn around at any crossover location. The ATR will also support bi-directional movements on the track should the TC choose to create such a route.

6.4.2.4 Door Operations

The RATO is the master for Door operations. It controls the door operation by managing a command to VATO.



In normal operation the Vehicle Doors and Platform Doors can only be operated after the controlling VATP has enabled the door operation. Bypasses are provided such that the Vehicle Doors and Platform Doors can still be opened under failure scenarios. In UTO mode, the VATC will open the vehicle doors and the platform doors whenever the open doors command has been issued by the RATO and the train has stopped and accurately aligned in a station. When the dwell time has expired, the RATO will command doors to close. The vehicle and platform doors will close respectively and the train will be ready to depart the station.

6.4.2.5 Passenger Exchange Dwell Time

The passenger exchange dwell time is defined as the time when the doors are commanded to open, and when the doors are closed and locked. A train schedule with the expected arrival and departure times at a station is maintained by the ATS subsystem. The ATS subsystem continuously updates the RATO with the departure times of the train and as the train approaches a scheduled station stop, or any time prior to the passenger exchange dwell expiring. The RATO will use a default value for the passenger exchange dwell time if it is not updated by the ATS subsystem with another value to use. It is possible for the controller to issue a command via the ATS subsystem to modify the station dwell time regarding a single station or multiple stations at the same time.

6.4.2.6 Station Hold Command

The Station Hold Command is a non-vital means that allows the OCC operator to request a train to remain in a station.

6.4.2.7 Station Skip

The OCC can request a station to be in skip mode (also known as "bypass station" mode). While a station is in a bypass mode, trains do not stop at the station. RATO will send the skip command to the train which in turn will enforce a station run through. If a train is currently berthed at a station when the skip station command is activated for that station, the command will have no effect on the berthed train; but will remain in effect for subsequent trains.

6.4.2.8 Region Handoff

The adjacent RATP subsystems crucially coordinate train travel across region boundaries by exchanging data packets over the Wayside DTS. The RATO subsystem is informed by the trains RATP when entering and leaving its region of control.

6.4.2.9 Active and Standby RATO Communication

The primary/standby communication path between the primary and standby RATOs is via an Ethernet connection. This connection provides the means for the transfer of data necessary for the RATO to determine whether or not the standby RATO shall take over control of active RATO functions. As long as the active RATO is sending messages to the standby, the standby RATO will remain on standby. When the standby detects the active is off-line, it will then take control of the operation. The switching of the stand-by RATO to active and vice-versa is completely automated and does not require any human interaction. One of the switchover criteria features is its communication status with the other subsystems (such as RATP, ATS,). If the active computer detects that it is not properly communicating with another



subsystem, but the standby computer is communicating properly, a RATO switchover will automatically occur. The active RATO sends data messages to the other subsystems, while the standby RATO does not transmit messages to the other subsystems. Both RATO receive messages and each examines its own internal status by checking its communication links and the software tasks that are running. Operations of the RATP Subsystem The RATP computer system is a major subsystem of the ATC system, responsible for the vital safety functions. This unit is a wholly electronic ruggedized system based on programmable micro-processors which is designed to operate in industrial environments. Each RATP system is made up of two processing units called VPCs (Vital Platform Computers) which are identical, independent and communicate between themselves by an internal interface through which the redundancy functions of the system are managed. The set has a hot-standby redundant configuration in which any of the process units can function by themselves in the absence of the other one.

Figure 6-4 RATP System

Note: The communication network illustrated in the figure above is a redundant DTS. Each RATP will communicate with the vehicle ATC (VATC) via the DTS and TWC (radio) systems. This communication is handled by the RCP (Radio Communications Processor) which resides on the Service Processing Unit. Each RATP will communicate with the Adjacent RATP(s), primarily to manage the “handoff” of trains between regions, and the RATO to exchange train related messages. This communication is handled by the WCP (Wayside Communication Processor) which resides on the Service Processing Unit. The RATP will communicate with the OCS to receive Wayside object statuses. This is handled by the ICP (Interlocking Communication Processor) which resides on the Service Processing Unit. The RATP is a system that operates with dual redundancy for the “online/hot-standby” type in both the process units (besides being independently power supplied) and in the interfaces it has



concerning other systems. As already mentioned, the design of the RATP system is safety-orientated in accordance with the CENELEC EN 50126, EN 50128 and EN 50129 standards, and it meets the conditions required in order to guarantee the SIL4 safety integrity level.

6.4.3 RATP Functions

6.4.3.1 Train Initialisation

Communications between the RATP and VATP will commence automatically after a train is localised. VATP will localise after train being driven manually over and successfully reading any two sequential Norming Point tags. The train does not require stopping during Initialisation. The RATP contains a site map which includes a list of VATC identifiers. The RATP periodically queries the VATPs that are not currently initialised and if a VATP responds then a short Initialisation sequence will commence. The Initialisation sequence confirms that the site maps contained in the RATP and VATP match, and thus avoids any safety or operational problems. Additionally, the communication links to both of the redundant VATP cradles are checked. In case of failure scenarios such as outage of power, communication failures which made VATP loss communication with Wayside. After Power and communication are returned then the VATP will automatically attempt a re-Initialisation after it is successfully re-localised by manually driven a train passing two sequential NPs.

6.4.3.2 Train Removal

Trains will no longer be under ATC control if they are leaving signalled territory. In normal system operations, trains will only be removed at the section located at the boundary between the CBTC controlled area and the depot. In very rare circumstances where the train-to-Wayside communication has completely failed, or both redundant VATPs are not able to determine the train location, a Recovery Route procedure involving manual intervention will be necessary. To avoid the build-up of traffic, the train can be routed to a different location using a Manual Recovery Route. When the Manual Recovery Route has been established such that it covers the SVO of the train that lost the communication, the ATS Operator can manually remove the train from the signalling system control.

6.4.3.3 Train Tracking

CBTC trains transmit their location to the Wayside via the train-to-Wayside communication network. The VATP determines both footprint virtual locations. The VATP uses the norming point reader and tachometer inputs to determine its position on the system map. The VATP compensates for errors induced by the slipping or sliding of wheels, and corrects the errors caused by variation in wheel size due to wear and tear, truing or replacement. The footprint defines the location of both ends of the physical train and includes the worst-case scenario. The virtual occupancy (VO) is calculated by the VATP and includes the footprint of the train and extends out to calculated worst case stopping locations at the head and tail ends of the train. The train locations are then passed on to VATO and RATP. The RATP calculates a superset of the VATP virtual occupancy called the CBTC Super VO (SVO), which includes the furthest safe movement authority to the front train. The train footprint location and SVO are then passed on to RATO and ATS computers. The RATP protects a CBTC train by placing conflict points at the ends of the SVO. The train conflict points are used to limit the movement authority of the following CBTC train to the tail end of a leading train SVO.



If the RATP stops receiving valid train location updates for a specified time period, the RATP alarms the communication loss event to RATO and ATS and freezes the train conflict points.

6.4.3.4 Train Movement Authority

The limit of a train’s movement authority is re-calculated and transmitted to the train, each processing cycle of the RATP. The movement authority is calculated by searching ahead of the train in the current traffic direction for the next active conflict point. The search starts at the tail virtual occupancy and thus will include any active conflict point beneath the train. A conflict point can be the tail end of a preceding train, a misaligned or unlocked switch, an end of line, an opposing traffic direction, or an adjacent region entry point. If no conflict point is found, the train’s movement authority will be limited by a predefined maximum number of segments or a maximum distance. The current speed limit of each segment in the train’s movement authority is sent along with the nearest conflict point. Generally, the speed will be the civil speed as defined in the RATP system map database. However, if one or more speed restrictions are applied to a section, RATP will send the most restrictive speed.

6.4.3.5 Safe Train Separation

When one communicating train is following another, the following train’s movement authority will be limited by the preceding train’s tail SVO. When the leading train provides an updated tail VO, the RATP then updates the train’s SVO and is then able to extend the following train’s movement authority up to that point.

6.4.3.6 Speed Restriction

A speed restriction is a reduction in the speed limit of a section relative to the civil speed. Speed restrictions are implemented on a segment basis and thus cannot be placed on a smaller portion of a segment. An active speed restriction applies to all trains that pass through the section. Types of speed restrictions are:

• Station door restrictions: vital zero speed restrictions placed on a station segment when a station door is open.

• OCC requested restrictions: non-vital speed restrictions that is selected via the Central ATS console.

• RATO restrictions: non-vital speed restrictions requested by RATO for train routing purposes. The RATP ensures the most restrictive speed restrictions are active on a per segment basis. When one speed restriction is removed, the RATP then activates the next most restrictive speed restriction. The current speed of each segment in a train's route is passed from the RATP to the VATP via the TWC system. The VATP then transfers the segment speeds to the VATO which regulates train speed. The ATS console provides a unique display for each type of speed restriction.

6.4.3.7 Region Hand-off

The system is broken down into multiple regions, each under the control of an RATP. The RATPs of two adjacent regions communicate via the DTS network to safely and seamlessly move trains across the region boundary. A typical region hand-off sequence proceeds as follows. Initially, the train is communicating with the outbound RATP region (RATP whose region the train will be leaving). The inbound RATP region (RATP whose region the train will be entering) does not yet have the train in its database. As the train approaches the inbound region, the outbound RATP sends information of the approaching train to the



inbound RATP. The inbound RATP adds the train to its database. The inbound RATP then prepares a special movement authority called a region entry point that begins at the region boundary and extends into the inbound region up to the nearest conflict point. The region entry point is sent to the outbound RATP. In this way, the outbound RATP is able to crucially provide a movement authority to the train which extends across the region boundary and into the inbound region. The entry point within the inbound region is limited by safety conditions that exist in the inbound regions. By this design, trains are able to proceed at full speed across regional boundaries.

6.4.3.8 Switch control and Status

The RATP will perform the Switch locking and movement. The RATP will also keep track of the switch status and control the movements of the CBTC trains through the switches accordingly. Switch position state data is determined according to the real state of the considered object. No processing logic is needed for this data. Possible switch position states are: Normal, Reverse, and Undefined (in process of moving or out of control). Switch lock state data is determined according to the real state of the considered object. No processing logic is needed on this data. Possible switch lock states are: Locked (route is established on switch) and Not Locked.

6.4.3.9 Gate Control

Gates are established around interlockings to allow the passage of trains only when conditions are safe. Valid states of gates are open (clear), closed (stop condition), or closing (stop). The RATP will manage the gate status, The RATP calculates the movement authority therefore the RATP monitors the gate status. The movement authority calculated by the RATP shall not pass the closed or closing gate.

6.4.3.10 Traffic Direction Control

Traffic Zones (TZs) are software objects defined to include a set of segments. The track map specifies the TZ attributes. Each segment inherits the direction state from the TZ. A Traffic Zone may be defined between two switch points, between station segments, or may be defined by a single station segment as shown:

Figure 6-5 Traffic Zone and Gate

A traffic direction state is determined for each TZ. Traffic zone state may be either normal or reverse. Initial state is normal. The RATO requests traffic direction for the purpose of routing trains. The RATP receives these requests and implements them in a safe way. Some traffic zones are non-requestable, which implies they are exclusively under the control of the RATP.



6.4.3.11 Backup RATP Switchover and Remote Reset

The standby’s database and cycle timing are synchronised with the active system, to accomplish hot standby switchover capability. A failure of the active RATP will cause an immediate switchover to the standby RATP. The switchover event will be transparent to the system operation. The full database state of the active RATP is sent to the standby RATP via the internal Ethernet network, regarding each 312-millisecond processing cycle and is written by the standby. The active and standby databases are thus synchronised. Therefore, in the event of an active system failure, the standby will become active and continue processing where the active RATP stopped. The standby will begin generating outputs immediately after its active relay is energised. The standby will begin generating outputs within one second after the failure happens.

RATP remote reset can be done via ATS and will reset the current active RATP which will cause a switchover to the standby to occur.

6.4.3.12 Diagnostic Tool Interface

The CITYFLO 650 Monitoring System (CFMS) is a diagnostic tool of the CITYFLO 650 that logs RATP data. The CFMS has no control over any part of the system and only acts as a passive viewer that logs data for future viewing. It also contains a playback function that helps technicians to diagnose the cause of failures very effectively.

6.5 DCS Subsystem

The Data Communication System (DCS) mainly provides a safe and reliable transparent transmission channel amongst each the Signalling system’s equipment and ensures accurate and real-time data transmissions. Wired network (DTS): The DTS data transmission subsystem mainly provides a communication interface between the central control ATS, station, Wayside to Wayside subsystem, and it connects internal and external systems regarding the CITYFLO 650. The DTS uses fully redundant structures and has an automatic restoration function, so that when there is fault at a single point, it will not affect the system operation. Wireless network (TWC): The TWC train to Wayside communication subsystem uses a fully redundant design and has a quick data transmission speed, with its single-point fault not affecting the system functionality; it can realise data communication between the onboard equipment and Wayside equipment. The TWC subsystem has its own data network and is connected to all Wayside distributed data wireless devices. The TWC subsystem includes Trackside Radio Assembly (TRA), LoS antenna, onboard antenna and a 5.8GHz radio.

6.5.1 DTS Overview The Signalling DTS transmission network provides a core communications link for all Wayside & ATC system data that is required to be transmitted between Wayside & ATC components. The DTS provides a redundant, fault-tolerant communications path between the Central Control, the station platforms, the station equipment rooms, and the guideway. This includes Wayside ATC equipment, Central Control equipment, TWC equipment, and non-ATC system equipment interfacing to the Wayside Signalling system equipment. This network is only used for the Wayside Signalling-related communications. In order to maintain the system safety and reliability requirements, the DTS network is not used for any other services. The DTS consists of multiple redundant gigabit Ethernet networks. These networks contain distributed switches interconnected by a combination of divergent single mode fibre optic cabling and data



category grade copper cabling. Each ATC equipment location will have two (2) gigabit Ethernet switches of the store-and-forward type into which Wayside Signalling equipment will connect. These switches are of a modular industrial design, supporting hot swappable components. The network is isolated into areas based on the track and equipment layout and is isolated by line and yard. The network consists of multiple physical network areas. These areas include mainline, the core transmission system, Central Control, and Wayside equipment rooms. These different network areas are interconnected by redundant Layer 3 gigabit Ethernet links (to limit broadcast domains and spanning tree size). The redundant firewalls will be provided by and configured. A physical connection (Layer 3, fast or gigabit Ethernet) connection shall be used for interconnecting the ATC System. These firewalls also separate the Wayside ATC equipment from the Central Control ATC equipment. Details of network security will be defined during the detailed design phase of a Project. Internal security of the network is maintained by utilisation of isolated VLANs, Layer 3 Routing, and Access Control Lists (Layer 4). Ethernet addressing is consistent with IPv4 and includes all rules for subnet masks and Layer 3 routing. Data is transmitted between devices using the unique Ethernet Address assigned to each component.

Figure 6-6 DTS System Overview

6.5.2 DTS Transmission Characteristics The Signalling DTS network is designed for the transmission of the Wayside Signalling system data between the following subsystems:



• RATO.

• RATP.

• ATS servers.

• Central Control workstations.

• Local control consoles.

• Network monitoring system for the DTS.

• Wayside portion of the TWC.

The data flow between the various subsystems are multiple times per second (typically at a periodic interval). Communications are based on IPv4 addressing, utilising unicasts, multicasts and broadcasts. Socket communications utilise (but are not limited to) TCP and UDP protocols. The VLANs are implemented to provide for the separation of subsystem data by breaking the network into multiple logical broadcast domains. This increases network security, and simultaneously decreases network complexity. Point-to-point Level 3 links are used to connect logical network segments for providing fully limiting broadcast domains regarding true physical segments.

6.5.3 TWC Wayside Configuration The Train to Wayside Communications (TWC) system can be viewed as a “black box” where a data message of a specific format is passed in both directions, with expected throughput and error rates. The TWC Radio for the CBTC operates at a 5.8GHz frequency band and uses Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) technology. The TWC Radio System uses individual Trackside Radio Assemblies (TRAs) distributed along the trackside. These TRAs are connected via an Ethernet network to the region ATP. The distance between the TRAs depends on the how well a clear line-of-sight is maintained between the vehicle’s rooftop antenna and the pole-mounted antenna. If the path is clear of obstructions and relatively straight, the system is designed to allow the train to travel as far as 300 meters from the Wayside antenna before switching over to the next radio zone. The TRAs are arranged along the fully redundant fibre optic ring as shown in the figure below, to create radio zones for Line-of-sight train to Wayside communications between the MDRs aboard the vehicle and the Wayside radios. As the train moves from radio zone to radio zone it automatically selects the optimum communication channel to ensure communication reliability.



Figure 6-7 Wayside Radio Equipment Configuration

6.5.4 CCTV Radio System A separate Ethernet radio (2.4GHz) will be provided for transmission of train-based CCTV data to the DTS Network. On the Wayside, the CCTV Radios will be located in the same Trackside Radio Assembly (TRA) sharing the same enclosed switch but different Radio module. Therefore, the same Ethernet Switch can be used but it will route the different service packages to the different destinations. At the OCC, a separate CCTV controller will be provided, with a user workstation. Thereby, the User will be able to select the train and camera identification for display on the Mimic Panel Display.

6.5.5 Train borne Configuration of the ATC Radio Subsystem The block diagram for the Onboard Radio Assembly is shown in the figure below. Two (2) antennas are used on each ATC-equipped vehicle for line-of-sight operation in elevated operation. The MDR selection is performed under vehicle ATC control. The Coaxial cable between the antenna and radio is typically kept to under 13 meters in length to limit the loss of signal. The selection of vehicle antenna and mobile frequencies is determined by the vehicle ATC based on parameters in the on-board map.



Figure 6-8 On-board Equipment associated with the A TC Radio System

6.6 VATC Subsystem

6.6.1 Operation of the VATC Subsystem The VATC subsystem contains two main subsystems:

1) Vehicle Automatic Train Protection (VATP) subsystem 2) Vehicle Automatic Train Operation (VATO) subsystem

The active VATC takes control of the trainlines whenever the operating mode is set to SM or UTO. The selected operating mode dictates which outputs are controlled by the ATC, and which are controlled by the Manual Controller. The on-board ATC is disengaged from the trainlines whenever the ATC is bypassed. The on-board ATC functions are comprised of both vital and non-vital functions. The on-board ATP (VATP) performs the vital functions of determining the location of the train, speed limit enforcement, maintaining the train within its movement authority, and vital door enabling. The on-board ATO (VATO) performs the non-vital functions of speed regulation, accurate station position stopping, door opening and closing, controlling passenger information devices, and fault and data logging.

6.6.2 VATC Functions

Train to Wayside Communication

The VATP receives route and speed limit restrictions from the RATP. The VATP transmits location and various other statuses to the RATP. The Mobile Data Radio (MDR) is a part of the TWC which is located on the vehicle and is used to facilitate communication between train and Wayside. The radio system is a non-vital system that passes message packets between the Signalling systems. The TWC uses built-in data integrity techniques, but these techniques are not used in the safety analysis of the Signalling system. To ensure the vitality and integrity of messages being exchanged over the TWC, the Signalling computers employ the following data integrity mechanisms when sending and receiving messages over the radio systems:

• Data integrity check.

• Authenticity check.

• Data cross-checking.

• Message sequencing and Out of Order checks.

• Time stamping.



Train Location Determination

Train position location determination is a vital VATP function. The VATP determines the train location using information gathered from sensor equipment mounted on the vehicle. These sensors include tachometers and norming point readers. The VATP contains a database representation (track database) of the geographical topology of the system. The position sensors (Norming Point Reader) in combination with the physical map (Norming Point) provide the VATP with all the information necessary to accurately determine the train's location. The VATP uses these sensors to determine the location of the train within the system per the processing description in the figure below.

Figure 6-9 Determination of Train Location

The train location determination begins by processing the outputs from the tachometers to produce an accurate representation of the distance travelled (displacement), speed and direction. Poor adhesion and curvature of the Guideway can cause the tachometers to produce a slightly inaccurate representation of displacement. To account for these errors, the VATP accumulates a percentage of error in the location processing over the distance travelled by the train. To enable an accurate distance travelled to be calculated from the tachometers, the VATP automatically calibrates the wheel diameter when the train travels past a certain norming point. These norming points are located along the Guideway throughout the system. This eliminates the need for manual input of wheel diameter which can be erroneous. The norming points are also used to prevent a large build-up of the location error due to using the tachometers alone. Strategically located along the track, each norming point has a unique identity which identifies the geographic location of the tag. The train is equipped with a norming point reader that reads the identity of the norming point tag as the train encounters them. The geographical location of the norming point tag is stored as part of the norming point’s identity within the MAP software. Whenever a norming point tag is encountered, the VATP verifies that the location coordinates of the norming point tag are within the allowed location error of the currently calculated geographical vehicle location before updating the vehicle location and resetting the location error. The VATP will apply the emergency brakes if the updated coordinates are outside of the current calculated location (± the location error), or if the norming point tag was erroneously programmed with coordinates which do not exist with the map database. In this way the VATP continuously verifies the location of the train and maintains and reports an accurate position for the train as it moves through the system.

Speed

Processor

Norming Point Reader

Position Processing

Displacement

Direction

Vehicle Location Train Length

Processing

Train Location

Tachometers

Track Database

Distance

Track Database



The VATC stores the location of the last norming point encountered, and then accumulates the displacement and position error of the train since its previous norming point. By adding the length of the vehicles on each side and the position error at each end of the train, the VATC determines the train footprint end locations which is the envelope in which the entire train is guaranteed to be within. Figure 6-10 schematically explains the train occupancy calculation at standstill conditions; the safe margin is provided even when a train is at standstill.

Figure 6-10 Train Virtual Occupancy at Standstill

The hyper distance is the total distance during the time that the VATC starts detecting the safety violation (and then applies the emergency brake) until the train propulsion has been cut-off (assuming the train continues at full acceleration until the propulsion is disabled). In consequence, after the propulsion has been cut-off, the train will coast at the top speed achieved due to the acceleration. There will be a time when the train is coasting, and the Emergency Brake pressure is being built up until the emergency brake has been fully applied, the coasting distance is the distance that the train is travelling during the coasting time. When the train is at standstill, all safety margins will be reduced to the minimum safe default value.

Safe Train Spacing

The Wayside RATP will send a permitted movement authority to the on-board VATP to enable the train to move through the system. This permitted movement authority includes conflict points or limit of authority (rear of another train, switch, end of line buffer), travel direction, and speed limits.

The safe train spacing is achieved by the on-board VATP ensuring that the train’s safe braking distance or virtual occupancy (as described earlier) does not exceed the conflict point locations sent by the Wayside RATP. If at any time, this safe braking distance is violated, or given current operating conditions that the VATP believes will be violated unless emergency brakes are applied, the VATP will disable the propulsion and apply the emergency brakes. Also, the on-board VATP enforces proper travel direction to protect against rollbacks and travel against the direction specified in the route.

The VATC calculates the location and occupancy of the train as previously described. In addition, the VATC is programmed with the performance parameters of the propulsion and braking systems and uses these parameters to calculate the virtual occupancy. The VATP ensures that the virtual occupancy of the train does not exceed the conflict point or limit of movement authority granted to the train by the RATP.



Over speed Protection

To protect the train from overspeed, the VATP must ensure that the speed of the train is always below the line speed limits of the occupied track (including any speed restrictions imposed by the RATP) and that the speed of the train will be below the line speed limit of the approaching section of track when the train enters that section. The maximum speed limit for a train is determined by several factors. The train's speed limit will never be greater than the lowest speed limit of all the speed limits of the occupied segments. As the example in Figure 6-11, a train is occupying 2 segments with different speed limits. If the train is traveling from left to right, the VATP will ensure that as the train enters Segment 2; its speed is not greater than 40km/h and also that the train's speed does not exceed 40km/h until the train has completely exited Segment 2.

Figure 6-11 Speed Limit of Occupied Area

Whenever the train is approaching a section of track with a lower speed limit than the current speed limit, the on-board VATP will ensure that the trains speed will not be greater than the speed limit of the approaching section of track when the train enters that section of track. This speed calculation is shown in Figure 6-12. This calculation is the same as the hyper condition described previously, except that the final speed is not zero but the speed limit of the section of track ahead.



Figure 6-12 Safe Approach Speed Calculation

Train Motion Control

The on-board VATC generates acceleration and jerk limited speed control ramp which is the target speed or command speed of the train as it decelerates to enter a station or as it approaches a segment with a lower speed limit. The speed control ramp is updated 32 times a second by the VATC using a very precise control loop. The algorithm begins by determining the target maximum speed. The target maximum speed is initially set to three km/h below the lowest line speed limit of the segments occupied by the train footprint. When the train is approaching a segment with a lower line speed limit than the lowest occupied segment speed limit, the reference velocity will be set to three km/h below this line speed limit at a distance far enough ahead of the segment such that the control ramp can be decelerated lower to the next target speed before the train footprint reaches the next segment. This distance is also adjusted for the hyper case emergency brake profile to prevent an overspeed condition. Whenever the target maximum speed changes, the control algorithm ramps up (accelerates) or ramps down (decelerates) the speed control ramp at the programmed acceleration and jerk rates until the speed control ramp reaches the target maximum speed. When approaching a station where the train is scheduled to stop, the speed control ramp will merge into and follow the station stopping profile into the station stopping location as described in the next section. The on-board VATC configures the propulsion system for the proper travel direction. An acceleration request to control the motion of the train is generated from the on-board VATC and the interface with Propulsion is on-going, the conclusion will be described in the ICD01 Rolling Stock – Signalling. The control algorithm regulates the acceleration request based on the difference between the commanded speed and the actual speed and updates the acceleration request via the MVB interface. Delays in equipment response are taken into account in the calculations of the VATP regarding the application of the emergency brakes. In addition, delays are taken into account for an application of the service brakes, so as to not affect the total service brake stopping profile.



Door Control

The on-board VATO controls the open and close signals that are used to operate the doors in the ATO operating mode. The vehicle doors can be operated only after the on-board VATP has enabled the door operation. In automatic operating mode, the on-board VATO will open and close the vehicle doors and platform doors whenever the command is issued by the RATO, thus allowing the Wayside RATO to control the length of the station dwell. In all other operating modes, the train operator controls the vehicle doors from the manual controller at either end of the train.

Rollback Protection

The VATP continuously monitors the travel direction of the train to ensure proper movement. When a train is starting up from zero speed, the VATP permits the travel direction of the train to be in the incorrect (rollback) direction to allow by a slight rollback that occurs when starting up on a grade. The VATP permits the rollback to continue until a maximum defined speed, or maximum defined distance. When any of these limits are reached, the VATP applies the emergency brakes. The rollback speed, distance is configurable to meet the system requirements.

Passenger Exchange Protection by VATP

The VATP ensures a safe passenger exchange by enabling the door operation only when conditions are safe. Before enabling the door operation, the VATP vitally verifies that the train is at zero speed, propulsion system is disabled, brakes are applied, and the train is properly aligned with a station platform and PSD. Once these safety conditions are satisfied, the VATP will enable the door operation only on the correct side(s) of the train that face a station platform and only when the train is properly docked and the train has stopped within the maximum platform location offset, a study will be established during the definitive design process. A proper station alignment is achieved when the entire train footprint is within the station and the entire train is aligned with the platform according to configurable tolerances. The VATP monitors the vehicle door closed/locked indications and will not permit the train to move until all of the saloon doors and PSD are closed and locked.

Parted Train Protection

The parted train protection is provided. Each car is equipped with an emergency brake trainline and a train consist integrity trainline that are electrically connected through the train consist. A parted consist condition exists when the train integrity circuit unexpectedly changes. Unplanned couple and uncouple events will be detected by VATP via coupler electrical inputs. A parted consist condition will disable vehicle propulsion and the emergency brakes will be applied. These actions are performed independent from the RATP. The parted consist status is sent to the RATP and VATO, which then relay the status to RATO and ATS where a parted consist alarm is generated. Automatic train operation may be restored only after the parted consist condition clears. The train SVO is frozen at the moment the parted consist condition is reported to RATP.

Hot Standby Switchover

At any given time, only one on-board VATC works as the active or controlling VATC. The controlling VATC energises and de-energises trainline signals.



The non-controlling VATC performs the same functions that the controlling VATC performs, except that its outputs which drive trainline signals are de-energized. When the train is initialised a default VATC is chosen based on a pre-set criteria. In the case where there is a service affecting failure within the controlling VATC equipment or when a VATC has been controlling for a 24-hour period, a switchover between sets of the VATC equipment occurs automatically once the train is at a stop. The controlling ATC can also be designated from the ATS, once the train is stopped (after emergency brake application or at the next scheduled stop).

Brake Applications

The following sections describe a brake application that will be provided by the on-board VATP. There are two forms of brake application: Enforced Service Brake and Emergency Brake.

Service Brake

The service brake is used to decelerate the train at the pre-programmed jerk-limited deceleration rate. Once the train reaches zero speed, enough pressure is applied to the friction brakes to prevent the train from moving. If the train does not decelerate at the pre-programmed rate, the on-board VATP will engage the emergency brakes.

Emergency Brake

Emergency brakes are applied by the VATP for safety reasons. After an EB application, automatic operation will not resume until the emergency brakes have been reset. The EB reset can be done remotely via ATS or locally on a train after the EB application cause is clear.

7 System Performance The station stopping accuracy of within ±300mm is designed to achieve 99.99% for normal station stops when controlled from the ATO system. The Signalling system shall provide a minimum signalling headway of 90 seconds and an operational headway of 120 seconds on the mainline, including turnback operation at the terminal stations, pocket tracks and intermediate stations with crossover, however achieving the headway at the turnback locations mostly depend on the track layout which is limited by the civil work design constraints. The achievable Signalled Headway shall be determined by including the response time and delay required for train equipment, safe braking, station dwells, civil speed limit, journey time and other physical parameters.

8 Train Operation modes The signalling system provides three train operation modes:

1) UTO mode: Unattended Train Operations mode (normal operation mode). 2) SM mode: Supervised Manual mode (degraded operation mode). 3) NRM mode: Non-Restricted Manual mode (degraded operation mode).



8.1 Unattended Train Operation mode (UTO)

The ATC system drives the train automatically without a need for a driver or an onboard attendant. This mode guarantees a smooth jerk limited ride, respects all ATS speed regulation commands, automatically performs precise station stopping at platforms, and provides station stop management including automatic door lock/unlock, door open/close, train departure. All VATO functions are under full supervision by the VATP system. The VATO drives the train in full automatic mode under direct control from the ATS. In this mode, the following functions are automatically performed by the system without human intervention:

• Take trains out of overnight/off-peak standby status and initialize stabled trains (located in the yards).

• Perform departure tests (static EB tests and door tests) and report the test results to the ATS system.

• Receive and confirm the train identification (train ID, needed for ATS automatic route setting and regulation purposes) from the ATS.

• Dispatch trains into revenue service on the mainline. The dispatch process can also be done according to pre-set timetables.

• Operate the train automatically taking into account the safety related restrictions and the regulation requests.

• Perform specially requested train movements (routings) on the mainline and automatic turn-backs at terminus stations.

• Execute precise and safe stop at stations, safely manage train doors (locking/unlocking, opening/closing sequences), manage dwell and train departure times from station platforms.

• Perform emergency functions such as handling emergency evacuation (automated announcements, releasing of emergency doors).

• Data logging and event reporting for ongoing day to day operations with system alarms, performance and maintenance data sent to ATS.

• Receive, validate and react to the central ATS remote requests and special commands.

• Carry out train regulation functions automatically and/or by special requests initiated from the ATS regulation subsystem.

• Remove trains from mainline revenue service and direct them to specific track sections in the yard area according to central ATS initiated requests or pre-set time tables.

• Interface with train PIS system to trigger the operational messages and announcement at the appropriate time and location.

• Automatically aligning train stop to the correct position if the train stops outside the stopping window.

In UTO the ATP systems process and deliver all the safety-related authorisations. In addition, the ATP checks to ensure safe operation at all times. Central ATS requests must always be validated for consistency and safety before the request is accepted and acted upon. The VATP ensures that the train can always be stopped safely, with the emergency brake application, at a required point taking into account the train and track worst case stopping characteristics. The RATP ensures that each train has a safe movement authority and that ATS requests can be safely carried out before processing them.



8.2 Supervised Manual mode (SM)

This mode allows manual operation under the protection of the VATP system, also known as Manual with ATP (MATP) mode. It requires fully functional communication with the RATP. The VATP restricts the train’s movement to the current Movement Authority imposed upon the train by the RATP. In this mode, the train driver is responsible for manually performing functions such as speed regulation, station stops, station dwell and door opening/closing. The system will only enable door opening if the train is properly berthed within platform limits and only on the side where a platform exists (left, right or both). The train driver controls the speed of the train manually, whilst being monitored and protected by the onboard ATP system.

8.3 Non-Restricted Manual mode (NRM)

In this mode, The VATC system will be disconnected from the train control system. The overspeed protection will be provided by the train control system. Emergency brake will be applied by the train control system if the speed exceeds the set limit. The train operation is the responsible of the train driver under line of sight. The train driver is also responsible for opening and closing the doors. In this mode, there will be no communication from VATC to the platform screen doors system.

9 RATP Recovery Server (RRS) In normal operation, the RATP sends a list of trains present in the region, implemented safety-critical protections and other critical conditions to the RRS for archiving. The RRS stores the data in a volatile memory and returns it to the RATP in case the RATP would need to restart. With the help of the data, the RATP can restore the conditions before shutdown and allow the traffic to resume. The RRS will be located at Central Equipment Room (CER).

10 External Interfaces The Signalling System shall be interfaced with following external subsystems:

• Master Clock.

• Public Address (PA).



• PIS (Passenger Information System).

• Radio Communication.

• Switch Control Panel.

• Platform Screen Door (PSD).

• Rolling Stock.

• Train Management System (TMS).

• SCADA.

• Train Wash Plant.

• Civil work (CW) – Guidebeam

Please refer to Signalling System Architecture Description (G0PK.SIG.51200.GAE.0001) and External ICD documents for more details.

End of Document



Document Title SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

Document ID Number G0PK.SIG.51200.GAE.0001.B

Internal Document Number N/A

Approvals

Name Position Signature Date

Prepared Athapon Sivawut Project Engineer of

Signalling 01-08-2018

Verified Norachai Yaowakarn System Integration Manager

01-08-2018

Approved Abdel, B Awawdeh Project Engineering

Director 01-08-2018