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Exploring Misfit

Submitted for the Master in Social-

Ecological Resilience for

Sustainable Development

STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY

STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE

CENTRE

Supervisor: Wiebren Boonstra

Co-supervisors:

Jonas Hentati-Sundberg

Andrew Merrie

Presented by

Jessica SPIJKERS

2014-2015

A case study of the northeast Atlantic mackerel

ii

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Wiebren Boonstra, my supervisor,

for his guidance and useful critiques. The time he dedicated to giving me advice, assistance and

constructive recommendations has been very much appreciated.

Secondly, I thank Andrew Merrie and Jonas Hentati-Sundberg, my co-supervisors, for the valuable

and insightful suggestions they made throughout the development of my thesis. They have been

essential to its progression.

Thirdly, I want to articulate my thankfulness for the funding made available by the Nordic Centre

for Research on Marine Ecosystems and Resources under Climate Change (NorMER), without

which this thesis would not have been possible.

Furthermore, I would like to voice my appreciation for the time and expertise the interviewees

were willing to dedicate to me.

Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their support and encouragement throughout my studies.

iii

Abstract

The pressure of a growing and developing global human society creates environmental stresses

that require collaborative management. Sudden and dramatic ecological changes can, however,

impede such management by making social arrangements out of alignment with the ecosystem

they were designed to manage. In sustainability science that failure is often referred to as a ‘misfit’.

This thesis aims to add to our understanding of misfit by investigating what sparks misfits, and

which causal mechanisms cause them to persist. To do that, a case study is used in which the

geographical distribution shift of a marine species has produced a misfit, and a long-standing

international conflict between stakeholders: the mackerel case. Since 2007 the northeast Atlantic

mackerel stock started migrating and spawning towards more northern and western regions of the

Nordic Seas, progressively going as far as Icelandic and south Greenlandic waters in the west. A

misfit developed and endured because Iceland has not been included in the de facto management

of the stock until this day. ‘Process-tracing’ is used to explain this outcome, i.e. to uncover the

causal mechanisms behind the endurance of the misfit. The results show that the misfit persisted

despite stakeholders recognizing its existence and making efforts to resolve it. The case study

shows that an interaction of barriers to re-fitting, such as ‘absence of authority’, ‘politicization of

scientific results’, ‘lack of trust’ etc., came into play at different points in time. Moreover, the

results also demonstrate that misfit is dynamical, as it can enlarge or reduce through time. Some

of the causal mechanisms that this study uncovered resonate with the literature on social-ecological

misfit focusing on local and regional scales. Other causal mechanisms that were identified so far

remained under-theorized in the literature. These mechanisms contributing to its endurance seem

to be typical for misfits on international scales, i.e. absence of authority, interstate politics and

influence of power imbalances (where powerful (coalitions of) actors are able to resist changes).

iv

Table of Contents Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................................. ii

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ iii

Table of contents .................................................................................................................................. iv

List of figures ........................................................................................................................................ v

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1

2. The concept of social-ecological misfit ......................................................................................... 2

3. Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 4

3.1 Methodological approach ....................................................................................................... 4

3.2 Data sources ........................................................................................................................... 5

4. Misfit within the studied SES ...................................................................................................... 5

4.1 Background description of the studied SES ............................................................................ 5

4.2 Defining misfit within the studied SES .................................................................................. 8

5. Case study results: the origin and persistence of the mackerel misfit .................................... 10

5.1 The process of reaching level one of re-fitting the SES (2008) ........................................... 14

5.2 The process of reaching level two of ‘re-fitting’ (2010) ....................................................... 15

5.3 Enlarged misfit: Faroe Islands steps out of the Coastal States’ agreements (2014) .............. 16

5.4 Struggle towards level 3 of ‘re-fitting’ .................................................................................. 17

5.5 Failed opportunity towards complete re-fitting of the SES ................................................... 22

5.6 Lost momentum after the opportunity and near-future prospects ........................................ 24

6. Discussion .................................................................................................................................... 24

6.1 Analysis of the results: understanding the persistence of social-ecological misfit ............... 24

6.1.1 Weak international institutional framework: lack of legitimacy and absence of

authority ........................................................................................................................... 25

6.1.2 Complexities of a dramatically changed ecosystem: scientific uncertainties allow

for polarization and politicization .................................................................................... 26

6.1.3 International (historical) relations: resistant regimes, social legacies and lack of

trust ................................................................................................................................... 28

6.2 Contribution of the case study ............................................................................................. 30

6.3 Limitations of the study ........................................................................................................ 32

7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 33

8. References .................................................................................................................................... 35

9. Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 41

v

List of figures

FIGURE 1: STRUCTURE FOR DECIDING ON MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND ALLOCATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO STRADDLING STOCKS 6

FIGURE 2: INTERNATIONAL NEAFC WATERS IN ORANGE, COASTAL STATE WATERS IN BLUE 7

FIGURE 3: LEVELS OF INTEGRATION IN THE INSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE SES,

RELEVANT TO STATES WITH THE RESOURCE IN THEIR EEZ 9

FIGURE 4: RE-FITTING PROCESS THROUGHOUT TIME WITH RESPECT TO THE LEVELS OF

INTEGRATION WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 10

FIGURE 5: TIMELINE WITH DYNAMICS, OUTCOMES AND TRIGGERS 11

FIGURE 6: OVEREXPLOITATION OF THE STOCK WITH RESPECT TO ICES ADVICE, 2007-2015 14

FIGURE 7: GENERAL BARRIERS TO RE-FITTING AND THEIR CAUSES 25

1

1. Introduction

In the current geological epoch, the Anthropocene, our planet is fundamentally shaped by human

activities (Rockström et al. 2009). The pressure of a growing and developing global human society

creates environmental stresses that due to their complexity are difficult to anticipate and govern

(Galaz 2014). The complexity of governing Social-Ecological Systems (SES) gets exacerbated

when dealing with extreme uncertainty and rapid change to the point where it can hamper a

collaboration between stakeholders (Ostrom 2008). Collaborative management of natural

resources gets particularly impeded when ecological changes occur that make social institutions

out of alignment with the changed structural and dynamic ecologies of those resources (Galaz et

al. 2008). In sustainability science this incapacity is often referred to as a ‘misfit’ or ‘problem of

fit’ (Folke et al. 1998; Olsson et al. 2007; Galaz et al. 2008).

In the existing literature misfit is mostly a qualitative concept describing a static condition. There

is a need to complement that existing literature with, firstly, in-depth case studies going beyond

treating misfit as a static condition by providing knowledge of the causal mechanisms that cause

misfit to persist (Galaz et al. 2008; Cumming 2006), and, secondly, with case studies on misfits

occurring on an international scale (Galaz et al. 2008; Young 2013). The general aim of this thesis

is to address those knowledge gaps by investigating, on an international scale, how misfits come

about and why they persist.

The general theoretical research question of this thesis then becomes:

How can the existence and persistence of misfit be explained?

To achieve this general aim this investigation follows a case study design. The choice for a case

study resonates with the effort to uncover causal mechanisms of the origin and persistence of

social-ecological misfit. The intensive study of a single case can contribute to a better

understanding of the complex causality underlying misfits generally. The case selected for this

purpose is the abrupt and rapid change in the distribution of the northeast Atlantic mackerel stock

after 2007. The stock shifted its area of distribution into Icelandic waters, which was not included

in the management of the stock, and the stock became overexploited. Moreover, there has been an

absence of an internationally agreed management plan until the time of writing.

2

There are two reasons for selecting the mackerel case. Firstly, distribution shifts of marine species

are prime examples of global ecological changes that have produced misfits in recent years.

Secondly, it is expected that shifting distributions of marine species (and the conflict it can

generate) will become more plentiful in the future due to processes of climate changes (EFARO

2012; Jansen et al. 2012).

The case study specific research questions then become:

How did misfit come about within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

Why did misfit endure within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

Next to its general aim, this thesis also has the empirical aim to gain insights into the problem areas

specific to the dispute over the mackerel stock. This knowledge can be useful in developing

strategies for resolving this dispute, in order to deliver stability and long-term access to the stock.

2. The concept of social-ecological misfit

In the thesis, I draw on concepts provided by the analytical framework of Adaptive Governance

(AG). AG is an interdisciplinary field of research with the goal of developing new governance

concepts that can handle the complexity and unpredictability of dynamic SES (Carl Folke et al.

2005b; Termeer, Dewulf, and van Lieshout 2010; Olsson et al. 2007). The thesis is structured

around and aims to add to the concept of ‘misfit’ as employed in AG literature and uses AG as an

analytical framework to analyze the persistence of misfit.

AG has used the notion of scales to analyze the linkages between social and ecological systems.

A concept used to draw attention to cross-scale issues is ‘misfit’. Within the literature on AG, then,

misfit (also referred to as ‘mismatch’ or the ‘problem of fit’) is a concept that addresses the

governance dimension of ecosystem management and the social factors that enable such

management (Olsson et al. 2007). In the literature, misfit in time and/or space is discussed most,

yet other types of misfits between scales are identified as well (e.g. between the scales at which

knowledge is produced) (Termeer, Dewulf, and van Lieshout 2010).

In essence, the concept draws attention to the degree of compatibility between ecosystems and

institutional arrangements created to manage human activities affecting these systems (Young

2002). When that compatibility is lacking, the “institutional jurisdiction [is] unable to cope with

actors or drivers external or internal and important for maintaining the ecosystem(s) or process(es)

3

affected by the institution” (Galaz et al. 2008, pp. 150). Galaz et al. (2008) further explored the

concept by suggesting different forms and effects of misfit (Table 1).

Table 1: Types of misfits and definitions. Source: Galaz et al. 2008, pp. 150 – 153.

Type Definition Spatial Institutional jurisdiction too small or too large to cover or affect the areal extent

of the ecosystem(s) subject to the institution.

Institutional jurisdiction unable to cope with actors or drivers external or

internal and important for maintaining the ecosystem(s) or process(es) affected

by the institution; e.g., institutional arrangements can be ‘‘too large’’ when

providing centrally defined ‘‘blueprints’’ that ignore existing local biophysical

circumstances.

Temporal Institution formed too early or too late to cause desired ecosystem effect(s).

Institution (and possibly the actor interaction it entails) produces decisions that

assume a shorter or longer time span than those embedded in the biophysical

system(s) affected; and/or social response is too fast, too slow, too short, or too

long compared to the time taken for biophysical processes involved.

Threshold

behavior

Institution does not recognize, leads to, or is unable to avoid abrupt shift(s) in

biophysical systems.

Institution provides for inadequate response to contingencies (e.g., lack of rules

for action in extreme conditions) or reduces variation in biophysical systems

(e.g., by removing response diversity, whole functional groups of species, or

trophic levels; and/or by adding anthropogenic stress such as pollution).

Institutions fails to respond adequately or at all to disturbances that could have

been buffered or that helped to revitalize the system before. Leads to practically

irreversible biophysical shifts.

Cascading

effects

Institution is unable to buffer, or trigger further effects between or among

biophysical and/or social and economic systems.

Institutional response is misdirected, nonexistent, inadequate, or wrongly timed

so as to propagate or allow the propagation of biophysical change(s) that

entail(s) further causative changes along temporal and/or spatial scales.

Within the field of AG, literature on misfit has focused mainly on theoretical contributions

pertaining to processes causing misfits, consequences of misfits or further theoretical typologies

of misfits (Galaz et al. 2008; Cumming 2006; Cumming et al. 2013). Apart from those

contributions, there are also case studies that address how we can detect misfits, or how we can

analyze or improve the degree of functional fit between a set of institutions and an ecosystem

(Bergsten, Galafassi, and Bodin 2014; Ekstrom and Young 2009; Ernstson et al. 2010; Olsson et

al. 2007).

Although many valuable contributions have thus been made to the concept of misfit, numerous

researchers argue that case studies on how misfits are dealt with and how they are able to endure

4

remain a research frontier (Cumming 2006; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Galaz et al. 2008).

Although some explorative work has been done, more case studies are required studying how

people respond to misfits and what challenges they face when trying to resolve misfits. Moreover,

much of the existing in-depth case studies focus on misfits on local (urban) to regional

management scales, whilst case studies on misfits on an international playing field remain

untouched (though more theoretical contributions have been made in (Young (2008)). It is those

research gaps this thesis aims to contribute to.

The contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of how misfits come about and why they

persist, takes form in two steps. In the result section, I describe how misfit came about, how

stakeholders responded to it and which dynamics helped or inhibited its resolution in the case study

(descriptive section). In the discussion section, I further analyze the identified dynamics and

categorize them into more general barriers to ‘re-fitting’ that can be relevant in other case studies

on misfit as well (analytical section). In order to do that, I again draw on the analytical framework

provided by AG by using governance concepts applied in AG (Galaz et al. 2008; Olsson et al.

2007; Gupta et al. 2010).

3. Methodology

3.1 Methodological approach

The main method for my case study research is ‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’. Process-

tracing is a tool used when one wants to gain more understanding of the nature of causal

relationships as it attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.

Process-tracing seeks to make within-case inferences about the presence/absence of causal

mechanisms in single case studies (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Explaining-outcome process-

tracing is a type of process-tracing with the primary ambition to explain particular historical

outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak of other potential cases of the

phenomenon (Beach and Pedersen 2013). This type of process-tracing performs a heuristic

function, where it generates new variables or hypotheses on the basis of sequences of events

observed inductively in case studies (George and Bennett 2005). In practical terms this inductive

reasoning means working backward from the outcome by sifting through the evidence in an

5

attempt to uncover a plausible sufficient causal mechanism that produced the outcome (Beach and

Pedersen 2013).

In the thesis, I use the approach both to develop interview questions as well as to analyze the data.

For the interviews, the tool is used to design questions inquiring about the causal mechanisms at

play during the mackerel dispute which explain the persistence of misfit. In the analysis of the data,

the tool is used to create a timeline in which I trace the causal mechanisms producing the observed

outcomes of the misfit.

3.2 Data sources

To execute the explaining-outcome process-tracing, I carry out semi-structured interviews with

experts from the Coastal States (i.e. Norway, Faroe Islands, Iceland and the European Union (EU))

and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The pool of interviewed

experts consists of politicians, civil servants, scientists and stakeholders within the industry from

all the Coastal States. In total, the utilized data sources from 26 interviews, ranging in length from

30 minutes to 3 hours. The interview questions were adapted to each interviewee according to their

field of expertise, but generally aimed at understanding the social, political and ecological factors

sustaining the misfit. Those interviews represent the core data of this thesis, as they have provided

me with critical insights into the difficulties that marked the decision-making process as well as

the ecological dynamics of the mackerel stock.

Additionally, I perform an in-depth review of the literature to get an understanding of the historical

and current developments within the case. The analyzed literature includes a varying set of

publications: books, peer-reviewed academic journals, articles, dissertations, Coastal States’

agreements, ICES reports, and relevant websites.

4. Misfit within the studied SES

4.1 Background description of the studied SES

The stocks that straddle in the international waters of the Northeast Atlantic are multi-laterally

managed by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), where the contracting

parties - the EU, Norway, Iceland, Russia and Denmark (on behalf of the Faroe Islands and

Greenland) - negotiate the division of fishing resources in international waters. When a resource

is found in the national waters of a contracting party (defined as a 200 mile Exclusive Economic

6

Zone (EEZ)), the party is a ‘Coastal State’ for that resource and has the right to harvest it in their

EEZ. The management of the straddling stocks in the Northeast Atlantic is therefore a two-tier

process: Coastal States agree on shares and management plans before bringing the matter to

NEAFC to cover fisheries in waters outside national jurisdiction (Figure 1) (Vanderzwaag 2010).

Figure 1: Structure for deciding on management measures and allocations with respect to straddling stocks

The institutional framework that stipulates obligations for Coastal States is made up of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement

(UNFSA) of 1995 (Cox 2009). The framework imposes cooperation to ensure proper conservation

management and prevention of over-exploitation of living marine resources. Some guidance as to

how Coastal States should allocate fishing quotas is also provided by that framework.

The regulatory area of NEAFC consists of the North-East Atlantic Ocean, the Barents and

Norwegian Seas and the Arctic Ocean (Figure 2).

7

Figure 2: International NEAFC waters in orange, Coastal State waters in blue. Source: NEAFC website

In this thesis, I focus on the management of the northeast Atlantic mackerel (scomber scombrus,

Linnaeus 1758), a highly migratory, dynamic and widely distributed pelagic fish species. The

northeast Atlantic mackerel stock has attracted international attention due the conflict it induced

between the EU, Norway, Faroe Islands and Iceland, who are the responsible Coastal States for

the management of the stock. The conflict started after the stock migrated and spawned farther

towards northern and western regions of the Nordic Seas and surrounding coastal and oceanic

waters in 2007 (Nøttestad, Utne, et al., 2014). The area of migration has progressively gone as far

as Icelandic and south Greenlandic waters in the west and as far north as Spitzbergen (Nøttestad,

Utne, et al. 2014). The observed distributional changes may reflect changes in food availability

and may be linked to increased water temperature, and/or increased stock size; yet the precise

relationships remain unclear. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether these distribution

changes are permanent or temporary (ICES 2014a).

8

4.2 Defining misfit within the studied SES

The distribution changes described induced a spatial misfit within the SES of northeast Atlantic

mackerel fishery (spatial misfit as defined by Galaz et al. 2008). Because the mackerel had never

been recorded as abundantly in Icelandic (and later Greenlandic) waters before 2007, it was not

included in the institutional jurisdiction of the stock. Due to the sudden presence of a large amount

of mackerel in Icelandic waters it became paramount, however, to include them.

This spatial misfit can only be solved by having all states in the existing institutional jurisdiction

which have the mackerel in their EEZ. Only then would the jurisdiction cover the areal extent of

the resource subject to the institution (Galaz et al. 2008). The process of a de facto integration of

states into the management of the stock has three steps (Figure 3):

1. Awarding the state in question observer status to the Coastal State meetings within

NEAFC;

2. Recognizing the state in question as being a Coastal State within NEAFC;

3. Including the state in question in the Coastal States’ agreements in which they can take part

in decision-making on the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota allocations.

9

Figure 3: Levels of integration in the institutional jurisdiction of the SES, relevant to states with the resource

in their EEZ

Thus, if all states with the mackerel in their EEZ reach level 3 of institutional integration, the

governance scale would fit with the ecological scale. As the mackerel shifted its distribution into

Icelandic waters in 2007, this in practice meant integrating Iceland within the existing institution.

Until the time of writing, Iceland has not been fully integrated and, consequently, there still

remains a spatial misfit. Nonetheless, the Coastal States have attempted to integrate Iceland.

The result section is structured according to the States’ progress in reaching the three levels

indicated in figure 3 (and indicated with the large brackets in figure 5):

- 5.1.1: The process of reaching level one of re-fitting the SES (2008)

- 5.1.2: The process of reaching level two of ‘re-fitting’ (2010)

- 5.1.3: Enlarged misfit: the Faroe Islands steps out of the Coastal States’ agreements (2010)

10

- 5.1.4: Struggle towards level 3 of ‘re-fitting’ (2010-2014)

- 5.1.5: Failed opportunity towards complete re-fitting of the SES (March 2014)

- 5.1.6: Lost momentum after the opportunity and near-future prospects

A visual summary of that ‘re-fitting process’ can be found in figure 4.

5. Case study results: the origin and persistence of the mackerel misfit

To understand how the mackerel misfit came into existence and why it endured we need to look

at the socio-political and ecological dynamics that have influenced the states inclination to

cooperate (Bergsten et al. 2014). Those dynamics are presented on a timeline (Figure 5). The

dynamics are indicated in the form of bars. Yellow bars are dynamics with a predominantly

negative influence on cooperation; purple bars have a predominantly positive influence on

Figure 4: Re-fitting process throughout time with respect to the levels of integration within the institutional jurisdiction. NO: Norway;

EU: European Union; FO: Faroe Islands; IS: Iceland; Gr: Greenland.

11

cooperation. The opaqueness of the bar indicates their level of influence (more opaque is higher

influence). Also represented on that timeline are the socio-political and ecological outcomes of the

misfit. They are indicated through red teardrops and are either social, ecological, or both. Lastly,

I indicate ecological triggers that caused the shift in the ecosystem and that bring about certain

identified dynamics on the timeline with green arrows. The description of all those components is

to be found in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Timeline with dynamics, outcomes and triggers. Yellow bars: dynamics against cooperation; purple

bars: dynamics towards cooperation; green arrows: triggers; red teardrops: outcomes.

12

Table 2: Description of the components of the timeline

Category Label Approx.

time

period

Explanation

Dynamic 1

Socio-political

Differing

views on

UNCLOS &

UNFSA

guidelines

Constant UNCLOS and UNFSA provide the legal framework for the management of

the SES (e.g. when one is a Coastal State), and guidance as to how one

should allocate fishing quotas, e.g. Article 7 and Article 11 of UNFSA (see

appendix 1).

Dynamic 2

Socio-political

Faroe Islands

feels sidelined

in CS

agreements

1999-

2010

General feeling that had been building since the start of the mackerel

agreements in 1999, which was that the Faroe Islands was seen as a

negligible player within the Coastal State setup.

Dynamic 3

Socio-political

Icelandic

request to

become

Coastal State

not accepted

1999-

2010

Iceland requested to become Coastal State for the mackerel since 1999, yet

was not accepted until 2010.

Dynamic 4

Socio-political

Southern

component

dispute

Unsure of

start -

2010

EU declared that the Coastal States’ agreement only applies to the Northern

area of the stock, and established an additional TAC for the Southern

component (see appendix 2). This was solved with the ten-year agreement.

Dynamic 5

Socio-political

EU sanction

threats

2010-

2013

EU threatened to sanction Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The EU adopted a

Regulation whereby the Commission may take restrictive measures against

a country allowing ‘non-sustainable fishing’ in 2012.

Outcome 8

Socio-political

EU sanctions

Faroe Islands

2013,

August

EU sanctions the Faroese on the quota they set for the Atlanto-Scandian

herring stock, which also targeted mackerel (see appendix 3). The EU lifted

the ban in August 2014. (Council of the EU and European Parliament 2012)

Dynamic 6

Socio-political

EU/Iceland

accession talks

2010-

2015

Iceland applied as a candidate for accession to the EU in July 2009, and the

talks formally opened on the 27th of July 2010. In September 2013 Iceland

suspends the accession talks and in March 2015 Iceland formally withdraws

its application.

Dynamic 7

Socio-political

Commissioner

Damanaki

2010-

2014

Maria Damanaki becomes European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs

and Fisheries. Her term ended in November 2014.

Dynamic 8

Socio-political

Interests in

Greenlandic

fishery

End 2013

– now

Especially Iceland had expressed great interest in the new Greenlandic

mackerel fishery, catching a large amount of the Greenlandic mackerel

quota as part of an international agreement amongst both countries.

Source of later

uncertainty

Ecological

Black landings 2002 -

2005

From approximately January 2002 until March 2005, a total of 17 Scottish

fishermen were involved in illegally landing nearly £63 million worth of

atlanto Scandian herring and northeast Atlantic mackerel, in excess of their

EU quota (see appendix 4) (BBC News 2012)

Trigger 1

Ecological

Shift into

Icelandic

waters

2006 -

now

Since around 2007 the mackerel extended its summer feeding distribution

and spawning towards north and west, including the Icelandic area. There

has also been an extension of the spawning season, with an earlier start of

the spawning activity (see appendix 5) (ICES 2014a)

Outcomes 1 & 2

Ecological

2007 &

2008

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Dynamic 9

Ecological

Contrasting

responses 1

2007 -

now

After trigger 1, uncertainty pertaining to the longevity of the observed

changes came about, as the question remains as to whether or not these

distribution changes are permanent or temporary (ICES 2014a).

13

Dynamic 10

Ecological

Contrasting

responses 2

2009 -

now

From approximately 2009, scientists increasingly realized that the

abundance of the stock was underestimated, yet to which extent is

contended. The sources for this uncertainty were the black landings and the

outcomes of surveys designed to estimate the abundance of the stock (see

appendix 7).

As a result, ICES did a benchmark exercise (February 2014) where they

altered the assessment model used for giving advice on the stock (see

appendix 8).

Dynamic 11

Ecological

Contrasting

responses 3

2011 -

now

From approximately early 2011 more conclusive data indicated that the

abundance of the stock and its distribution into new waters could have an

effect on other (marine) species. The precise effects are uncertain.

Iceland: the mackerel gains around 43% of their body weight in Icelandic

waters and that it can thus be expected to have measurable impacts on the

ecosystem (Óskarsson et al., 2012).

Norway: possibility that mackerel exerts a competition pressure on herring

in years of delayed peak in production, causing herring to shift diet and/or

distribution area (Langøy et al., 2012).

Dynamic 12

Ecological

Contrasting

responses 4

2013 -

now

Surveys showed that mackerel weight-at-age was decreasing (see appendix

9). Some scientists argued that this was a result of density-dependent effects

(Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). That hypothesis entails that there are too

many mackerel for the amount of food available. ICES reported that it is a

plausible explanatory hypothesis, yet that other possibilities should not be

excluded (ICES WKPELA 2014).

Trigger 2

Ecological

Shift into

Greenlandic

waters

2011 Westward expansion in the summer distribution of mackerel progressively

went as far west as southeast Greenlandic waters.

In 2011, catches were first reported in Greenlandic waters (ICES 2013a)

Outcome 3

Socio-political

Ecological

2009 Iceland sets a unilateral quota

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Outcome 4

Socio-political

Ecological

2010 No agreement

Faroe Islands pulls out of the agreement

Unilateral quotas (Iceland and the Faroe Islands)

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Outcomes 5,6,7

Socio-political

Ecological

2011

2012

2013

No agreement

Unilateral quotas (Iceland and the Faroe Islands)

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Outcome 9

Socio-political

Ecological

2014 No agreement

three party deal between Norway, the EU and the Faroe Islands

Unilateral quota (Iceland)

Stock is overexploited (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

Outcome 10

Socio-political

Ecological

2015 No agreement

Unilateral quota (Iceland)

Expected overexploitation of the stock (Figure 4) (see appendix 6)

14

Figure 6: Overexploitation of the stock with respect to ICES advice, 2007-2015

*: Preliminary estimation by ICES for 2014;

**: Intended catch set by Coastal States in the agreement for 2015;

***: Updated advice after benchmark

See appendix 6 for more information & ICES data sources

5.1 The process of reaching level one of re-fitting the SES: Iceland becomes

observer (2008)

The starting point of the timeline presented in figure 5 is chosen as 1999 because it was in that

year we see the first dynamics arising that influenced cooperation levels between the nation states.

That year was also the year that the management of mackerel fishing started within NEAFC, when

it was agreed that the EU, Norway and Faroe Islands would be Coastal States for the stock (EU

and Norway had bilateral agreements with other parties from 1997-1999) (Hoydal 2014).

The misfit between the governance and ecological scale of the mackerel started in approximately

2007 (see appendix 5). This can be observed in the statistics of Icelandic mackerel catches. In 2006,

Iceland caught 4.222 tons of mackerel from a total actual catch of 481 276 tons. In 2007 they fished

36 706 tons (out of 586.206 tons) and in 2008 that increased to 112 286 tons (out of 623 165 tons)

(ICES 2010a). The stock started to become overexploited in 2007 (Figure 6). The increase in

509000 456000578000 572000

646000 639000542000

1011000***906000

586206 623165

737969875515

946661 892353 931732

1400000*

1054000**

TO

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ES O

F M

ACKEREL

2007-2015

OVEREXPLOITATION WITH RESPECT TO ICES ADVICE

ICES advice Actual catch

15

Icelandic catches incited the Coastal States to take action in 2008, and they granted Iceland

observer status at the negotiation meetings (level 1 of re-fitting). This is indicated with the blue

bracket in figure 5.

Having observer status meant that Iceland could not make agreements with other Coastal States.

The Icelanders were highly dissatisfied with that position because they had requested to become a

Coastal State since 1999 (Table 2, dynamic 3). That dissatisfaction is illustrated in the quote

below:

“So we were invited as an observer. And we had discussed here at home “okay as an

observer, we are not recognized as a Coastal State”; but we decided we will go and

we will discuss (…) We were not allowed to be at the heads’ meeting. In the beginning

I remember they decided not to let us have an opening statement. And we said “we

leave if we are not allowed to do that”” (Icelandic civil servant).

5.2 The process of reaching level two of ‘re-fitting’: Iceland awarded Coastal

State status (2010)

Iceland was awarded Coastal State status in March 2010, thus the second level in ‘re-fitting’ the

institutional jurisdiction to the ecological area of the mackerel was reached. This is indicated with

a pink bracket in figure 5. The process for Iceland to become an accepted Coastal State was long,

to the frustration of Iceland. The process was troublesome due to several dynamics.

The first dynamic that made reaching level 2 hard was the institutional framework (Table 2,

dynamic 1). The guidelines provided by the framework in which the Coastal States operate to

make decisions on who is eligible to become a Coastal State are vague. Neither UNCLOS nor the

UNFSA give clear instructions on when a state is allowed to obtain Coastal State status (see

appendix 1). As is illustrated by the quote, the vague guidelines led to differing views between the

Coastal States on whether or not Iceland could obtain Coastal State status:

“The EU is the one who’s said it’s nonsense not to acknowledge that they’re a Soastal

State. We said that very early on. And it took ages to convince the other two” (EU civil

servant).

There were several reasons why some Coastal States hesitated to give Iceland Coastal State status,

such as for example the limited experience of the Icelandic mackerel fishery; the absence of their

16

participation in research; and even the general doubt whether there was actual mackerel in

Icelandic waters or if it was herring that they had misreported.

Besides the differing views on the guidelines, the second dynamic that made reaching level 2

difficult was the uncertainty pertaining to the longevity of the mackerel migration (Table 2,

dynamic 9). Although there is no scientist that can indicate with certainty whether the shift is

permanent or transient, some Coastal States based their decisions more on the possibility that the

stock might shift back to its original core area. Therefore they hesitated in awarding Iceland

Coastal State status:

“They [Norway] have been quite open about their view that this is only a temporary

thing and I guess that’s one of the things that’s driving their policy that they’re not

going to give in and give us a piece of something that we won’t have a piece of in the

future” (Representative of the Icelandic fishing industry).

A third dynamic that complicated the obtainment of level 2 was the disagreement over the southern

component (table 2, dynamic 4). Disagreement over the southern component culminated when

Norway and the Faroe Islands decided to take action against the EU by establishing corresponding

quotas within the northern component of the stock in 2009. This dynamic negatively influenced

the attainment of level two because it, especially for Norway, drew political attention away from

the Icelandic requests to become a Coastal State. That is illustrated in the following quote:

“[In] the beginning, we did not have time for Iceland. Norway and the EU were in the

middle of a big fight, one of our many fights, it was too much for us (…) Not being a

Coastal State, Norway wasn’t interested in that at all” (Norwegian civil servant).

5.3 Enlarged misfit: the Faroe Islands steps out of the Coastal States’

agreements (2010)

With Iceland granted Coastal State status in 2010, it had the responsibility together with the other

Coastal States of making an agreement on the sharing of the mackerel stock. That has until the

time of writing never materialized. Contrarily, from 2009 until March 2014, the Faroe Islands

stepped out of the Coastal States’ agreements. That action enlarged the spatial misfit: with both

Iceland and the Faroe Islands setting unilateral quota (i.e. catch limitations set without prior

negotiation with other states), the fit between the institutional and ecological scale was even worse.

17

The fact that the Faroese stepped out in 2010 and set their own quota was partially the outcome of

the dynamic that had been building since the start of the mackerel agreements in 1999. As depicted

in the following quote, the Faroe Islands felt as a negligible player within the agreements, being

somewhat squeezed into an arrangement dominated by the EU and Norway (Table 2, dynamic 2):

“There had long been a dissatisfaction with the way in which that three party

arrangement worked in practice. Basically it started as a bilateral thing between

Norway and the EU and the sense was that we were kind of there as an irritation on

the side, a ‘throw them some crumbs and keep them happy’ kind of thing” (Faroese

civil servant).

The feeling that the Faroe Islands was deserved a bigger share was intensified due to the

distribution shift of the stock, as there was much more mackerel in their EEZ than before. The

sentiment then was that their share did not reflect that change:

“When we pulled out it was much more fundamental. It was the fact that there was just

so much more mackerel in our waters and our share was way too small” (Faroese civil

servant).

The decision of the Faroe Islands to set a unilateral quota was also indirectly spurred on by the

unilateral quotas set by Iceland:

“[Icelandic fishing] had been going on a few years and it was obvious that this was

going to eventually lead to the necessity to bring Iceland into the equation (…) Would

this not be an opportunity for us to obviously say “well we have to redesign this

allocation from the beginning”?” (Faroese civil servant).

5.4 Struggle towards level 3 of ‘re-fitting’: trying to make an agreement with

all Coastal States (2010-2014)

From 2010 onwards, the Coastal States negotiated with one another to come to an agreement on

how to manage and share the mackerel stock. Until March 2014, all negotiations were unsuccessful

in their outcomes. This is demonstrated by the unilateral quotas set by Iceland and the Faroe Islands

during that time (Table 2, outcomes 4, 5, 6, 7).

The first dynamic obstructing an agreement amongst all parties was the threat of the EU to take

sanctions against Iceland and the Faroe Islands because of their unilateral quota-approach (Table

18

2, dynamic 5). In 2013, the EU sanctioned the Faroese on the quota they set for the Atlanto-

Scandian herring stock. Because of the way the Regulation functioned, the sanction on herring

targeted the mackerel as well. The threat of sanctions towards the Faroe Islands and Iceland had a

negative influence on the cooperation between the two countries, with the Faroe Islands

condemning the EU’s actions to be “inappropriate conduct in international cooperation”

(Undercurrentnews 2014).

Besides the threat of sanctions, there were other dynamics that made it troublesome to reach an

agreement. Firstly, there were differing views on the allocation principles stipulated in UNCLOS

& UNFSA (table 2, dynamic 1). Neither UNCLOS nor UNFSA provide clear guidance on

allocation principles (see appendix 1). In practice, the result is that Coastal States can argue as they

wish for any principle to be the most important one. As can be anticipated, that is whatever

principle the Coastal State deems as most fair or plays most to its benefit. I derived from the

interviews that Norway is of the opinion that mackerel allocations should mainly be based on zonal

attachment (share in the overall quota should be equal to the share of the stock in a State’s EEZ).

Other principles were considered to be legitimate only up to a certain extent. The other Coastal

States, however, seemed to hold that it is important to consider other factors to a greater extent

(such as ‘dependency on the fishery’), though which principles and to which extent still differed

among them. The fact that the States can argue for different principles to be the base of the sharing

arrangement makes it problematic to agree.

Besides the sanction threats and the differing views on allocation principles, there were three

ecological dynamics that undermined cooperation. All three are instances in which Coastal States

disagreed on what line of action to take in the management of the stock, because they had

‘contrasting responses’ to scientific observations. The first dynamic was that, from approximately

2009, scientists increasingly realized that they underestimated the abundance of the stock (Table

2, dynamic 10). However, beliefs differed as to the extent to which it was being underestimated.

The reason for that were the diverging outcomes of surveys designed to estimate the abundance of

the stock, i.e. the egg survey and the trawl survey (Table 3). The trawl surveys, performed by

Norway and since 2009 by Iceland and the Faroe Islands, indicated a larger SSB than the egg

surveys. The egg surveys were performed by Norway and the EU, but from 2014 onwards are

performed only by the EU as Norway stepped out.

19

Table 3: Difference in SSB estimation between the egg and trawl survey and the SSB reported by ICES; pre-

and post- benchmark assessment. Magnitude of numbers = million tonnes. Data sources: Nøttestad, Utne, et

al., 2014; Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al., 2014; ICES, 2014d. More detailed information in appendix 7

2004 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Trawl survey SSB estimates 2

Not included in assessment

1.25 4.52 2.45 4.56 7.87 8.98

Egg survey SSB estimates 1 before benchmark

2.75 3.65 4.29 / / 5.57 /

Egg survey estimates after benchmark

3.17 3.97 4.84 / / 5.03 /

1 Egg survey only done triennially (North Sea component one year later). Here: combined western and southern components

2 “Swept area biomass was not estimated for the years 2008 and 2009 due to poor horizontal coverage in 2008, sub-optimal pelagic

trawling aimed at Atlantic salmon in 2008 and 2009,and too varying and poorly coordinated survey for the different vessels in

2009” (Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al. 2014).

Even though there was agreement amongst the Coastal States after the updated ICES advice (see

appendix 8) that the stock size had indeed been underestimated, the extent to which it was

underestimated remained a matter of contention due to the different outcomes of the surveys. The

validity and rigorousness of the surveys as a whole became a disputed matter. As illustrated by the

following quote, the Coastal States leaning more towards the outcomes of the egg survey (mainly

the EU) point out the flaws within the trawl survey and its outcomes, and vice versa:

“So what these people have done is that they have developed an approach, which has

a certain legitimacy, but can never replace true science (…) Which is the egg survey

(…) So the northern trawl survey has been used by these people in a political manner

which has nothing to do with science” (EU civil servant).

The influence of the disputed stock abundance on the Coastal State negotiations is that those

Coastal State relying more on the results of the trawl survey (Norway) believe there is a much

bigger stock and thus want a higher TAC. The other Coastal States, mainly Iceland, do not agree

with a TAC as high as Norway suggested during the Coastal State meetings of 2014 (see appendix

10).

The second ecological dynamic that impeded an agreement came into play from approximately

early 2011. More conclusive data indicated that the high abundance of the stock and its distribution

20

into new waters could have effects on other (marine) species within some of the Coastal States’

ecosystems (Table 2, dynamic 11) (see appendix 11). In 2012, Icelandic scientists reported on the

high amount of energy the stock was taking up from the marine ecosystem and the effects of that.

That became one of the reasons behind Iceland asking for a specific share of the stock in the

Coastal State meetings. The EU and Norway, however, were sceptic about the legitimacy behind

this argument and are not of the opinion that this affects the sharing arrangements:

“Iceland made their own version about weight gain, it’s quite interesting, but it’s only

Iceland who’s doing it. And I remembered we looked at it and it’s interesting but it

doesn’t change the relative sharing at all because Iceland seems to think that the only

place where fish gain weight is Icelandic waters” (Norwegian civil servant).

About a year later, research grew on the possibility of the Atlanto-Scandian herring being

outcompeted for food by the mackerel within Norwegian waters (Norway owns about 60 percent

of the herring quota). Many interviewees pinpointed this as an additional reason why Norway

asked for a higher TAC during the meetings: with herring being scarce, and recovery for the stock

not yet in sight, the Norwegian processing industry allegedly needs raw material:

“The pressure from the fishing industry that is actually fishing much less than they

need for the time. I mean they have 57 percent of the Norwegian spring spawning

herring and the quota has been going down on average during the last ten years by

twenty percent a year, due to bad recruitment (…) But they will not continue to sustain

any fishery when, when it, if it continues like this (…) They need mackerel, they need

blue whiting, they need whatever else” (Icelandic marine scientist).

A third ecological dynamic over which management responses differ is the ‘density-dependent

growth hypothesis’ (Table 2, dynamic 12). ICES recognizes the plausibility of that hypothesis,

but does not exclude other possibilities. The scientists from different Coastal States, however, have

diverging views on the validity of the hypothesis. Some Norwegian scientists are convinced of its

strength and therefore endorse a higher fishing pressure than what ICES is recommending:

“So there’s too much mackerel compared to the food available in their waters

[=density-dependent growth hypothesis]. That’s our starting point. And when you

have such a position, then it’s the opposite medicine of what ICES is recommending.

ICES is recommending that (…) we have to be more conservative, and fish less because

21

the fish is growing less (…) The medicine is actually the opposite, we should fish more

to compensate” (Norwegian marine scientist).

The belief in this hypothesis provided another incentive for Norway to request a higher TAC in

the meetings.

In sum, we can say that the three ecological dynamics (Table 2, dynamic 10, 11, 12) hindered the

Coastal States in agreeing on the collective management of the stock. This was largely due to those

dynamics causing scientific contention (e.g. over the surveys and their outcomes) and because the

States differed in managerial responses. As illustrated in the quote, Norway wanted a higher TAC

which the other States do not agree with to the same extent (and even see it as a dangerous

approach):

“So based on all those different inputs, we make our bets, and I think our bet will be

that we want a higher F [fishing mortality, leads to higher TAC]” (Norwegian civil

servant).

The last reason why the Coastal States struggled to reach level 3 of re-fitting the SES was due to

the ‘Greenlandic issue’ (Table 2, dynamic 8). This issue came into play around mid-2013 and

concerns the deal that had been made between Greenland and Iceland. As the mackerel catches in

Greenlandic waters surged, some other Coastal States wanted to take part in its fishery. It was

mainly Icelandic interests in the fishery that would pose a problem from the perspective of Norway

and the EU, who would not accept that Iceland caught a Greenlandic quota on top of their own.

Iceland, however, was unwilling to give up their participation in the fishery, so the ‘Greenlandic

issue’ is ongoing.

Besides the ecological and socio-political dynamics hindering cooperation amongst the States,

there were two socio-political dynamics that pushed towards cooperation. Firstly, an important

driving force for the EU to get Iceland into an agreement were the accession negotiations between

Iceland and the EU (table 2, dynamic 6) (see appendix 12). The mackerel dispute was seen from

the EU perspective as a hindering block to the accession talks. The dispute polluted the accession

negotiations up to such an extent that the ‘fisheries chapter’ of the accession negotiations was

never opened. For that reason, the EU made great efforts to resolve the mackerel dispute, as

illustrated by the following quote:

22

“For Damanaki [EU Commissioner] back then this was a highly political thing and

for Damanaki it was the most politically useful to have the mackerel issue resolved

before the start of negotiations (…) And why was that? There were a lot of Member

States who were totally steadfast against this approach of opening the chapter while

we had a problem with the Icelanders (…) They saw the accession negations as an

opportunity to offer an incentive to the Iceland side to an agreement with us”

(Representative of EU Commission, DG Mare).

Notably, although this dynamic predominantly pushed towards cooperation, my interviews have

shown that it also partially worked against cooperation within Iceland and possibly even Norway,

although the validity and extent of that claim is hard to assess.

The second socio-political driving force towards cooperation was the determination of Maria

Damanaki (table 2, dynamic 7). Damanaki became heavily involved in the mackerel negotiations,

which is an unusual occurrence on its own, as the discussions are usually conducted solely by the

negotiation teams. Damanaki has been identified by many interviewees as a main driving force

towards a deal between all Coastal States:

“Damanaki was very, and DG MARE was very open after many years of a different

kind of approach (…) Damanaki’s stance was quite transformative, because until then

there was not a strong push from EU side to put them on board (…) I think the EU’s

thinking was quite reactive and slow. The game changer was Damanaki’s approach”

(Representative of EU Commission, DG Mare).

It was largely due to these two push factors, in combination with the updated ICES advice that

allowed for a higher catch, that in March 2014 an opportunity for an agreement among all Coastal

States arised. Almost all interviewees agreed that this time period offered all the elements for the

Coastal States to come to an international agreement, yet the opportunity was not taken, and

momentum was lost.

5.5 Failed opportunity towards complete re-fitting of the SES (March 2014)

The opportunity towards level 3 of re-fitting is indicated by the dotted yellow bracket in figure 5.

It was in the Coastal State meeting of March 2014 (Edinburgh) that an agreement including all

Coastal States seemed in reach. The EU and Iceland had agreed to the informal deal a few months

23

earlier that Iceland would get 11.9 percent of the mackerel stock and, even though Norway was

not informed of this percentage, that arrangement seemed (at least to the Icelanders) like a ‘done

deal’. Nonetheless, the deal would never materialize. In fact, Iceland was not taken on board in

any form within an agreement amongst all Coastal States. There were three overarching reasons

for why that happened. Two of those reasons I have discussed previously, i.e. the Greenlandic

issue and the three instances of contrasting responses to what is happening in the ecosystem.

Besides those reasons, many interviewees indicated the importance of a third reason: Norway’s

outrage over the informal deal the EU struck with Iceland.

The reason for Iceland believing that they would be able to attain this 11.9 percent was because

Damanaki allegedly assured them that she would be able to get Norway on board for this

arrangement. That is however not how it played out, as Norway was taken aback and not pleased

with this deal being brokered without their involvement:

“In Edinburgh (…) it’s fair to say we were really close to reaching an agreement.

Before Iceland and EU had bilaterally reached an understanding (…) the famous 11.9

(…) then things played out very differently, not only very differently, the Norwegians

came very upset how then Iceland and not least the EU approached the issue and how

they played it. Eventually I think the Norwegian position almost became so that they

said “11.9, never! Maybe 12!”. My point is, 11.9, it is never going to happen. Because

of the exact way the figure came about” (Icelandic civil servant).

The near outrage Norway felt when learning about the deal made between Iceland and the EU, is

illustrated by the following quote:

“Damanaki or EU commission chose to stab Norway in the back. It’s as simple as that

(…) But the way how [the EU] did it, probably annoyed people at every level; from the

industry representatives, civil service and politicians (…) The strategy was discussed

at high political levels (Norwegian civil servant).

Eventually it seemed that the difference between the 11.9 and the percentage Norway could agree

upon was a difference of only a few decimal points. Nonetheless, the deal made without Norway’s

involvement strongly contributing to an atmosphere of distrust. Thus, in the end, the Coastal States

were not able to come to an agreement on an Icelandic share of the stock. From the interviews I

can derive that the Coastal States blame one another for being too inflexible at that stage.

24

Iceland was not taken along into an agreement, but the other Coastal States did make an agreement

in March on the long-term management of the stock (2015-2018). The agreement is an interesting

one, due to the strong Norwegian imprint on it (Norway was able to push for a higher TAC, allow

the Faroe Islands a bigger share and ‘fence in’ Iceland) (see appendix 13). That agreement thus

means that the Coastal States did manage to diminish the enlarged misfit that existed from 2009

to 2014.

5.6 Lost momentum after the opportunity and near-future prospects

With Damanaki’s term officially ending in November 2014, and Iceland formally withdrawing its

application to become a Member State of the EU in March 2015, many interviewees argue that

there is currently a lack of drive to include Iceland in the Coastal States’ sharing arrangements.

Moreover, the contrasting responses States have to what is going on in the ecosystem continue to

pose problems between the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands in the negotiations. The current

problems stem from advice ICES gave on the long term management of the stock in February 2015,

which became and still is a source of contention between the Coastal States. This contention is the

result of diverging opinions on which scenario should be chosen as the base for the advice: the

‘permanent’ versus the ‘temporary’ scenario (see appendix 14). In practice that means that Norway

is again pushing for a higher TAC than the other States are willing to accept. For this reason, the

States failed to come to an agreement for the management of the stock in March 2015, with new

negotiations to continue in October 2015.

6. Discussion

6.1 Analysis of the results: understanding the persistence of social-ecological

misfit

From the results of the case study, we can conclude that the endurance of the spatial misfit the

result of both social and ecological dynamics that negatively influence the Coastal States’ ability

to cooperate and come to agreement over the management of the stock. In a next step, then, I

present more general barriers to re-fitting based on the dynamics found in the case study that could

be relevant to other case studies as well. Those barriers can enhance one another, and the sum of

their existence and interactions create the non-cooperative outcomes observed in the case study

(i.e. no agreements with all Coastal States) (Figure 7).

25

Figure 7: General barriers to re-fitting and their causes. Blue arrow: barrier enhances another barrier

6.1.1 Weak international institutional framework: lack of legitimacy and absence of

authority

The first general explanation for the persistence of misfit is the weak institutional framework in

place for management measures and allocation of fishing opportunities (dynamic 1). Neither

UNCLOS nor the UNFSA provide any clear guidance on allocation principles or processes.

Consequently, there are differing views among the Coastal States on how the principles should be

weighed against one another for the mackerel stock. Moreover, there is no agreement on how to

calculate specific principles either. Furthermore, it is noticeable that Coastal States shift their

perception on how the principles should be weighted according to their own interests in the stock

under consideration, as is illustrated by the following quote:

“We have criteria for sharing, we have it in the UN agreement, but people don’t follow

it, people only adhere to it when it suits them. For instance zonal attachment, only

when it’s interesting (…) EU couldn’t care less about zonal attachment when it comes

to mackerel” (Norwegian civil servant).

26

Due to the lack of clearly defined guidelines, Coastal States somewhat ‘pick and choose’ their own

criteria for sharing, oftentimes lacking legitimacy from the perspective of other Coastal States. The

vague nature of the institutional framework thus causes a ‘legitimacy deficit’ where, due to the

lack of objective sharing principles, agreed allocations are the result of incessant bargaining. As

visualized in figure 7, the legitimacy deficit also contributes to distrust, as Coastal States suspect

each other of picking certain principles subjectively to promote self-interest instead of objectively

to promote fair-sharing.

Besides the vague nature of the institutional framework, it is the lack of authority within the

governing structure of the SES that makes re-fitting the scales difficult. Of course, this is an issue

quite particular to misfits on an international scale, as in international society there is no central

government capable of making binding decisions about the common good (Young 2002). As

visualized in figure 7, the absence of authority allows for dominant actor-networks to form

(regimes). It also contributes to distrust and allows more for politicization of science as there is no

authority to settle disputes.

Gupta et al. (2010) have also discussed the importance of the AG concepts of ‘authority’ and

‘legitimacy’ in collaborative governance.

6.1.2 Complexities of a dramatically changed ecosystem: scientific uncertainties allow

for polarization and politicization

In the case study, there were a number of dynamics that pushed against an agreement due to

contrasting responses to what is going on in the ecosystem (dynamics 9, 10, 11, 12). Those

contrasting responses were able to form due to the absence of scientific certainty on the observed

ecosystem dynamics. Uncertainty always characterizes SES and is therefore not necessarily an

unexpected factor to scientists informing policy-makers. However, the shift of the mackerel was

so abrupt and of such a magnitude that science inevitably lagged behind on several fronts, i.e. with

respect to: a) the effect of the changed distribution pattern and higher abundance of the mackerel

on other species; b) the specific drivers and longevity of the shift; and c) the abundance of the

stock. All these instances of scientific uncertainty due to the abruptness and magnitude of the

ecological shift allowed for decision-makers to delegitimize, misuse, or ignore ecological

information (Polasky et al. 2011).

27

Especially the uncertainty pertaining to the abundance of the mackerel stock came out of the

interviews as a politicized matter in which Coastal States formed their own interpretation based on

differing survey results. Although ICES is the scientific body that gives advice on the stock (advice

which all Coastal States claim to adhere to) the validity of its methods and advice were questioned

by some Coastal States. That is partly based on what they presume to be ‘the truth’ about the

scientific uncertainty at hand, and surely partly based on which ‘truth’ fits best with their own

political agendas (e.g. the decision of Norway to push for a higher TAC as explained in 5.1.4). The

policy-makers and even scientists became polarized on abundance levels, and consequently what

level of fishing pressure would be appropriate. That polarization can also be detected in their views

on which surveying method brings about the most well-founded results: those who favor the view

of a higher stock abundance believe most strongly in the survey that gives them that higher

abundance, i.e. the trawl survey; and those who do not believe in such a high stock abundance

favor the egg survey. It is predominantly Norway that favors the trawl survey and allegedly takes

its abundance estimation as an absolute number, and it is mainly the EU who favors the egg survey.

During the interviews some interviewees accused other Coastal states of politicizing the science

(e.g. the advice from ICES) as is illustrated by the following quotes:

“When it [trawl survey] doesn’t get accepted by ICES, then they [those who favor the

trawl survey] say it’s politicized. Our scientists do not work under any political

direction whatsoever. We have our doubts about the other parties (…) The other

parties only undermine ICES when the ICES advice doesn’t really suit them” (EU civil

servant).

“One of the scientists from one of the parties who’s very high profile on the mackerel,

he went to ICES recently and made a big speech on how the northern trawl survey

gave them this that and the other (…) he was torn apart by the scientists. The comments

of the other scientists were based on scientific facts, not on what the view of their

industry or the view of their administration might be” (EU civil servant).

In sum, the contrasting responses resulting from scientific uncertainty made leeway for misuse of

scientific outcomes to aid political motives (or at least raised the collective suspicion of the other

parties having malicious intents). All Coastal States make rationalizations of what they believe is

happening in the ecosystem and choose whatever fits their agendas best. As policy-makers from

28

different countries have very contrasting national agendas, the potential of coming to one

‘scientific truth’, one management direction, amongst all Coastal States became impossible. As

visualized in figure 7, polarization within the science and politicization of the science inevitably

contributes to an atmosphere of distrust.

‘Polarization’ and ‘politicization of the science’ within Atlantic fisheries management have also

been discussed in Webster (2009) in the context of AG (Webster 2009).

6.1.3 International (historical) relations: resistant regimes, social legacies and lack of

trust

The (historical) relations between the Coastal States also played a significant role in restraining

the SES from being re-fitted.

The management structure that existed before the shift in 2007 (i.e. the Coastal States’ arrangement

between the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands) was one that provided stability, although the Faroe

Islands had the feeling of being disregarded in that arrangement. There was a balance of power

that gave stability to the management of the mackerel stock as the ‘original’ Coastal States had

always come to agreement with one another. There was especially a historically strong alliance

between the EU and Norway, as they had always made bilateral arrangements on the stock even

before 1999 and have a lot of common fishery interests in general (Ørebech 2013). The EU-

Norway alliance can be conceptualized in the AG concept of ‘regime’, defined by Young (1989)

as agreements among some specified groups of actors that spell out rules of power and authority,

rights and liabilities, and behavioral obligations (Young 1989).

As argued by Young (1989), those existing regimes or institutional arrangements often prove

highly resistant to newcomers, as “existing arrangements have vigorous defenders who stand to

lose as a result of institutional change, even if the existing arrangements are unattractive from the

point of view of certain conceptions of the common good” (Young 1989, pp. 66). The resistance

of the existing regime is also demonstrated in this case study: the ‘original Coastal States’,

especially the EU and Norway, withstand altering sharing arrangements, despite changes in the

ecosystem. That is because they feel more entitled to the stock having fished it historically, and

also because they would have to give up a percentage of their share and thus loose out from

accepting newcomers. The resistance of the original regime is manifested in dynamics 2 and 3,

where the EU and Norway were able to resist changes in fishing allocations for the Faroe Islands

29

and ignore Iceland’s requests to become a Coastal State for the stock (Cox 2009). Nonetheless, the

EU and Norway cannot continue to resist a shift in power as “the strong catches in Greenland (…)

are further tilting the balance of power to the side of the Faroe Islands and Iceland”

(Undercurrentnews 2013).

Aside from the existing regime structure, also social legacies were mentioned to undermine

cooperation by several interviewees. In AG literature, it has been discussed (yet seldom) as

influential on local or regional scales as well (Evans et al. 2011). The main negative social legacy

is the historically built antagonism between the Norwegian and Icelandic fishing industries. As

illustrated by the following quotes, Iceland is known by the Norwegians as a fisheries nation that

is able to force its way into any agreement, and Iceland sees Norway as a very tough negotiation

partner that resists them due to competing fishing industries:

“We have fought so many fishing conflicts with the Norwegians, it’s part of the love

relationship between the nations (…) If there’s anything that the Icelanders know it is

how to force their way into a fishing stock” (Icelandic politician).

“There’s a historical thing to it, there’s an antagonism between their industry and the

Icelandic industry” (EU civil servant).

Perhaps the most prominent barrier to successful participation was the lack of trust between the

States. Trust has been identified in AG as an important component to collaborative governance

(Olsson et al. 2007; Olsson et al. 2006; Bergsten et al. 2014). The lack of trust in the case study is

exacerbated by many of the other discussed barriers (Figure 7). The absence of trust is noticeable

in how the States generally perceive one another: as competitors for a shared resource who try and

get a share using arguments oftentimes lacking legitimacy. Moreover, they find one another

inflexible and have suspicions about certain Coastal States having a political agenda. Due to the

lack of trust, the general attitude in the Coastal State meetings (although all participants are on

good terms outside of the meetings) is focused on devising winning tactics instead of solving a

common problem. The Coastal States try to exert their bargaining power on one another, to

pressure one another into an agreement of their liking, which is accompanied by a great deal of

political sparring (example: see appendix 13). The lack of trust is exemplified by the following

quotes:

30

“And I can tell you with hundred percent confidence that the whole calculation has

been carefully made in Norway by academic and government officials where they find

out that if they were to reduce the herring stock in order to let it [grow] (…) then they

would have to reduce it [the mackerel] to such a level that it would damage the

economic interests of Norway” (Icelandic civil servant).

“They [some scientists within ICES] think this is the best model they but have not

giving any reasoning or rational behind their choice and (…) when it comes to

mackerel they have an agenda, some of the people have an agenda” (Norwegian civil

servant).

“It was payback time right. I used exactly the same tactic [as the EU, which was

putting other agreements on the line to pressure the other into an agreement]”

(Norwegian civil servant).

6.2 Contribution of the case study

The main aim of the thesis is to make a theoretical contribution to the concept of misfit by adding

understanding to the gaps identified in section 2.

The first gap this thesis aims to contribute to is the absence of case-based knowledge on how

people deal with misfits, and why some misfits persist. Not many contributions have been made

to those questions, as Galaz et al. (2008) point out: “how people and societies respond to periods

of abrupt change and reorganize in the aftermath is not well understood in relation to the problem

of fit” (Galaz et al. 2008, pp. 170). The case study firstly demonstrates that misfits can persist

despite efforts to resolve them. The ‘original’ Coastal States have made efforts to integrate Iceland

into the institution, a process in which the first two levels were reached (Figure 4). They also

attempted to reach the third level of integration by having Iceland in a Coastal States’ agreement,

yet this failed. Thus, despite the efforts of the Coastal States, the spatial misfit has persisted.

Secondly, the case study demonstrates that this failure is due to an interplay of barriers to re-fitting

(Figure 7), which come into play at different points in time. Some barriers have characterized the

governance of the SES since its inception (i.e. weak international institutional framework). Other

barriers developed as a direct result of the uncertainty triggered by the abruptness and magnitude

of the shift (i.e. politicization and polarization). Lastly, some barriers characterized the governance

31

of the SES before the shift, but were strongly intensified due to the shift and the presence of a

potential new actor (i.e. resistant regimes, social legacies and distrust).

Thirdly, the results demonstrate that not only can misfit persist, the persistence was not a static

condition, as it can be enlarged or reduced through time. It can thus also be dynamic. In the case

study, the spatial misfit that started in approximately 2007 was enlarged once due to socio-political

dynamics (i.e. the Faroe Islands stepping out), and is currently enlarged once more due to

ecological dynamics (i.e. shift into Greenland).

The second research gap the thesis aims to contribute to is the absence of case-based research on

misfits on an international scale. Some of the identified barriers to re-fitting are indirectly

discussed in literature on AG focused on ways to enhance the fit of SES, such as ‘lack of trust’ or

‘inability to deal with abrupt change and uncertainty’ (Carl Folke et al. 2005b; Olsson et al. 2007;

Olsson et al. 2006; Carl Folke et al. 2005a; Gupta et al. 2010). However, the existing literature has

used empirical evidence from case studies focused on the local and regional scales, while misfits

occurring on an international scale have not been explored. The case study shows that some of the

barriers indirectly dealt with in the existing misfit literature on local/regional scales can also be

barriers to re-fitting on an international scale (e.g. distrust or extreme uncertainty).

Nonetheless, other barriers identified in this thesis have not been dealt with (explicitly) in that

literature, thus seem more specific to misfits occurring on the international scale.

Firstly, the total absence of authority is a barrier more exclusive to misfits on this level as there is

simply no central government capable of making binding decisions, which does not hold true for

other scales. As indicated in the previous section, the absence of authority adds to other barriers,

such as politicization and regime-formation.

Secondly, also the potentially strong influence of interstate politics on the process of re-fitting an

SES is exclusive to the international scale. In this case study, the EU’s motives of smoothing the

process of the accession talks with Iceland was a big push factor towards integrating Iceland into

the institutional jurisdiction. However, there were indications that other instances of interstate

politics formed a potential barrier to re-fitting (e.g. government changes).

Thirdly, although the negative effects of power imbalances have been considered in the misfit

literature (Olsson et al. 2007; Galaz et al. 2008), the importance of addressing power issues to

32

promote re-fitting becomes all the more crucial on the international scale. That is due to the

absence of authority and legitimacy of the international institutional framework. Due to that

absence, a complex mixture between conventional bargaining and coercion by powerful actors is

able to arise (Young 1989). Here, the most powerful actors are the ‘original users of the resource’,

i.e. the EU and Norway (Ørebech 2013), who, as conceptualized in the barrier ‘resistant regimes’,

are able to resist any changes that could potentially disfavor them (Galaz et al. 2008). The

importance of power in the persistence of misfit in the case study is exemplified by the missed

opportunity for re-fitting: predominantly one Coastal State (Norway) was able to resist Iceland

coming into the Coastal State agreements, while the other Coastal States favored Iceland’s

entrance. Moreover, without much support from the other Coastal States, Norway was able to push

for a higher TAC, allow the Faroe Islands a bigger share, and ‘fence in’ Iceland (see appendix 13).

6.3 Limitations of the study

There are potential limitations to this study. Firstly, I have not fully considered the effects of other

stock negotiations (herring & and blue-whiting) on the mackerel negotiations. While I was

performing my interviews, it became clear that those negotiations are interlinked. Coastal States

tend to adapt their negotiation strategies based on experiences they had within other negotiations.

Thus, within those negotiations there could have been dynamics that push or pull towards resolving

the misfit. Secondly, I have not thoroughly considered the influence of the fishing industries on

the stance of the Coastal States within the negotiation meetings. That is because I have interviewed

a relatively low number of stakeholders from the fishing industry. Nonetheless, the data I do have

shows that there is a potentially strong influence of the industry on the position of certain Coastal

States. Having more conclusive data on these issues could add or alter certain dynamics. Thirdly,

some interviewees have pointed towards the influence of other highly political elements (besides

the EU-Iceland accession talks) on the mackerel negotiations, such as changes in government.

However, I had too little data to either confirm or refute the influence of such elements, which

requires more interviews with ministers and Commissioners. Lastly, it would be useful to continue

with this case study, as the mackerel misfit is still ongoing. Moreover, a deeper misfit has marked

the SES in current years as Greenland has increased its catches (although it is still only setting an

experimental quota). It would be useful to then compare how this later state of misfit is handled in

comparison to that of Iceland. Preliminary data suggests that Greenland will have a much easier

33

time than Iceland in becoming accepted as a Coastal State. This hints towards a certain degree of

social learning within the SES, which could be explored more. Moreover, some interviewees now

even expressed regret in not getting Iceland on board earlier, arguing that reaching an agreement

would have been easier.

7. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to make a theoretical contribution to the AG literature on the concept of ‘misfit’.

That contribution was made through a case-study of the so-called international mackerel conflict,

to shed light on how misfits come about and why they persist.

The method I applied was ‘process-tracing’. The purpose of that method is to gain an

understanding of the nature of causal relationships as it attempts to trace the links between possible

causes and observed outcomes. I gathered data by carrying out semi-structured interviews with

experts from the Coastal States involved in the conflict and experts from ICES, and by performing

an in-depth literature review. In the data gathering-process, process-tracing was used to design

questions targeting the causal mechanisms at play that explain the origin and persistence of misfit.

I subsequently used the method to analyze and code the interview and to create a timeline in which

I trace the causal mechanisms producing the observed outcomes of the misfit.

The case study specific research questions were:

How did misfit come about within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

Why did misfit endure within the SES of the northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery?

The results show that the spatial misfit was triggered by an ecological shift, i.e. the abrupt and

extensive spatial extension of the distribution of the mackerel stock. As Icelandic mackerel catches

rapidly surged there was a growing pressure on the Coastal States to include Iceland in the

institutional jurisdiction. Despite their efforts, the Coastal States have not been able to fully re-fit

the management scale to the new areal extent of the mackerel stock. They have, nonetheless, been

able to attain the first two levels in the process of re-fitting, i.e. awarding Iceland observer and

subsequently Coastal State status. Nonetheless, level three, including Iceland in an international

management plan, has thus far not materialized. To the contrary, the spatial misfit enlarged from

2010-2014 with the Faroe Islands opting out from the international management plans. The results

demonstrate that the persistence and temporary enlargement of the misfit is the result of a causally

34

complex process that negatively influenced the ability of the Coastal States to agree over the

management of the stock. The complexity is of both a socio-political and ecological nature and

develops through time. The failure to re-fit has led to the yearly overexploitation of the stock since

2007, and the absence of an internationally agreed management plan since 2009.

The general theoretical research question was:

How can the existence and persistence of misfit be explained?

In summary, the case study demonstrates that:

Misfit can persist despite stakeholders recognizing its existence and making efforts to

resolve it;

Misfit can persist due to a dynamic interplay of barriers to re-fitting which come into play

at different points in time; such as absence of authority, politicization of the science, lack

of trust etc.;

Misfit is dynamic as it can be enlarged or reduced through time due to the causally complex

interaction between ecological and social dynamics.

Comparing the identified barriers to re-fitting relevant for the case with the existing literature on

misfit within the field of AG leads to the following findings:

Some of the barriers remaining implicit in the existing misfit literature on local/regional

scales can also be barriers to re-fitting on an international scale (e.g. distrust or extreme

uncertainty);

Some of the barriers identified in this case have not been explored (as explicitly) in the

existing literature and thus seem more specific to misfit on the international scale, i.e.

absence of authority, interstate politics (where high-political motives affect the intent to

cooperate) and influence of power imbalances (where powerful (coalitions of) actors are

able to resist changes).

These conclusions imply that more information is needed on how decision-makers can design

effective responses to abrupt misfits occurring on an international scale, where authority is

lacking and coercion by powerful actors plays a more substantial part in shaping governance

processes and outcomes.

35

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9. Appendices

Appendix 1: Dynamic 1: Differing views on guidelines of UNCLOS (1982) and

UNFSA (1995)

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the UN Fish Stocks

Agreement (UNFSA) provide the legal framework for ocean issues and a basis for the management,

conservation and utilization of international marine areas. Articles 63(2) and 64 of UNCLOS

require cooperation, directly or through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs),

between Coastal States and states who fish in the region (Cox 2009). This is to ensure both the

conservation of stocks that occur in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Coastal States and the

area beyond or adjacent to the EEZ, as well as promote the optimum utilization of highly migratory

stocks (Cox 2009).

The UNFSA strengthened the position of RFMOs as the primary institutional mechanism for the

adoption of conservation and management measures for international fisheries (Cox 2009). The

agreement sparked new life into NEAFC, which was subjected to a performance review. One of

the important features was that Article 8 of UNFSA imposed a duty to cooperate through RFMOs

by providing that only members of RFMOs or non-Members which agree to apply the conservation

and management measures adopted by RFMOS can have access to the fishery concerned (Cox

2009).

What is of importance in order to grasp the dynamics within the mackerel dispute is that neither

UNCLOS nor the UNFSA provide any clear guidance on allocation principles or processes. There

are, however, some key principles that are of relevance to the sharing of the northeast Atlantic

mackerel, which been stipulated in Article 7 and Article 11 of UNFSA:

Article 7: Compatibility of conservation and management measures

1. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,

conserving and managing the living marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction as

provided for in the Convention, and the right of all States for their nationals to engage in fishing on the

high seas in accordance with the Convention:

(a) with respect to straddling fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and the States whose nationals

fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas area shall seek, either directly or through the appropriate

mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, to agree upon the measures necessary for the

conservation of these stocks in the adjacent high seas area;

(b) with respect to highly migratory fish stocks, the relevant coastal States and other States whose

nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate, either directly or through the appropriate

42

mechanisms for cooperation provided for in Part III, with a view to ensuring conservation and

promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such stocks throughout the region, both within and

beyond the areas under national jurisdiction.

2. Conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas

under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the

straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal States and

States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible

measures in respect of such stocks. In determining compatible conservation and management measures,

States shall:

(a) take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied in accordance

with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by coastal States within areas under

national jurisdiction and ensure that measures established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do

not undermine the effectiveness of such measures;

(b) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied for the high seas in

accordance with the Convention in respect of the same stocks by relevant coastal States and States

fishing on the high seas;

(c) take into account previously agreed measures established and applied in accordance with the

Convention in respect of the same stocks by a subregional or regional fisheries management

organization or arrangement;

(d) take into account the biological unity and other biological characteristics of the stocks and the

relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and the geographical particularities of

the region concerned, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under

national jurisdiction;

(e) take into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the high

seas on the stocks concerned; and

(f) ensure that such measures do not result in harmful impact on the living marine resources as a

whole.

3. In giving effect to their duty to cooperate, States shall make every effort to agree on compatible

conservation and management measures within a reasonable period of time.

4. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States concerned may

invoke the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII.

5. Pending agreement on compatible conservation and management measures, the States concerned, in

a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements

of a practical nature. In the event that they are unable to agree on such arrangements, any of the States

concerned may, for the purpose of obtaining provisional measures, submit the dispute to a court or

tribunal in accordance with the procedures for the settlement of disputes provided for in Part VIII.

6. Provisional arrangements or measures entered into or prescribed pursuant to paragraph 5 shall take

into account the provisions of this Part, shall have due regard to the rights and obligations of all States

concerned, shall not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of final agreement on compatible conservation

and management measures and shall be without prejudice to the final outcome of any dispute settlement

procedure.

7. Coastal States shall regularly inform States fishing on the high seas in the subregion or region, either

directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or

arrangements, or through other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for straddling

fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under their national jurisdiction.

8. States fishing on the high seas shall regularly inform other interested States, either directly or through

appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, or through

other appropriate means, of the measures they have adopted for regulating the activities of vessels flying

their flag which fish for such stocks on the high seas.

Article 11: New members or participants

43

In determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members of a subregional or

regional fisheries management organization, or for new participants in a subregional or regional

fisheries management arrangement, States shall take into account, inter alia:

(a) the status of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the existing level of

fishing effort in the fishery;

(b) the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing members or

participants;

(c) the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to conservation and

management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate data and to the conduct of

scientific research on the stocks;

(d) the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks;

(e) the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of

living marine resources; and

(f) the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of national

jurisdiction the stocks also occur.

Out of those articles, the Coastal States use a handful of criteria that have been taken into account

when deciding on the allocation of mackerel quotas: historical catches, zonal attachment,

economic dependency, participation in research and accessibility.

Two important observations are to be made here.

Firstly, there is no international agreement among the Coastal States on how those principles

should be weighed against one another for the mackerel stock (or any other straddling pelagic

stock for that matter). I derived from the interviews that Norway is of the opinion that mackerel

allocations should mainly be based on zonal attachment, although other principles were considered

to be legitimate up to a certain extent. The EU, however, holds that it is important to consider those

other factors to a greater extent: “(…) fishing, dependency, socio economic indicators, traditional

level of fisheries (…) they all have to be put in the mix” (EU civil servant). Iceland has even argued

in more recent years that the sharing arrangements should also take into account that the mackerel

takes up considerable levels of energy from Icelandic waters (in the form of feed), and that the

stock has a noticeable effect on the ecosystem within the country. Those arguments, however, were

rarely considered relevant by interviewees from other Coastal States: “Iceland made their own

version about weight gain, it’s quite interesting, but it’s only Iceland who’s doing it. And I

remembered we looked at it and it’s interesting but it doesn’t change the relative sharings at all

because Iceland seems to think that the only place where fish gain weight is Icelandic waters”

(Norwegian civil servant); “So they’re trying to pretend that they’re fishing high levels of mackerel

44

to protect the other species? (…) We don’t pay too much attention” (EU civil servant). Moreover,

it is noticeable that Coastal States shift their perception on how the principles should be weighted

according to their own interests in the stock under consideration, resulting in a loss of credibility

in the legitimacy of their original arguments from the perspective of other Coastal States. “(…) we

have criteria for sharing, we have it in the UN agreement, but people don’t follow it, people only

adhere to it when it suits them. For instance zonal attachment, only when it’s interesting (…) EU

couldn’t care less about zonal attachment when it comes to mackerel” (Norwegian civil servant);

“But the Norwegians stick very much to the zonal attachment as they calculate. They want that

calculation also to work for the herring, but I’m told that when it comes to the blue whiting they’re

not as keen on the zonal attachment!” (Icelandic civil servant).

Secondly, there is no international agreement on how to calculate specific principles either. There

seemed to be particular controversy on how to calculate zonal attachment, as Norway for example

adheres to the calculation of zonal attachment as developed by Johannes Hamre: “(…) objectively

speaking the Hamre model is the most fair and the most transparent (…) So Norway thinks that

this is a, the best approach to find out the sharing allocation from a biological point of view”

(Norwegian marine scientist). By some other interviewees, the model was seen as a too narrow

way of calculating it, or even impossible to calculate due to lack of data. Although there was

agreement on the lack of data to calculate the zonal attachment, this point was largely dismissed

by the Norwegian camp: “But overall I think it’s possible, even though it is right that we don’t

have true kind of control of where the mackerel is in all the different quarters in all the different

economic zones et cetera. Of course. We don’t have that in any species in the world! So if you use

that argument you can’t use any zonal attachment criteria” (Norwegian marine scientist). However,

besides the controversy around the zonal attachment calculation, for the calculation of factors such

as dependency and historical catches there is also no set formula, triggering endless debates. For

example, how far back should one look to determine historical catches of a Coastal State? Should

you base dependency on a per capita figure, or on the dependency of fishing industry?

Appendix 2: Dynamic 4: the southern component dispute & ten-year agreement

According to some interviewees tensions between the Coastal States were growing since

approximately 2005 as a result of the position the EU took concerning the sharing of the mackerel

45

stock. Since a few years, the EU had declared in Coastal State meetings that the Coastal States’

agreement only applies to the Northern area of the stock as defined by ICES, and established and

additional TAC for ICES divisions VIIIc and IXa (the Southern component of the Stock)

(European Community, Faroe Islands, and Norway 2003). According to a few interviewees, this

frustrated Norway and the Faroe Islands: “(…) there was a southern stock that the EU claimed that

they owned and that we shouldn’t interfere with, and they took it on top of the agreement between

Norway and EU and the Faroese (…) we think that the stock should be managed as a whole, all

portions. And that’s a fair statement, but EU didn’t want to do that” (Faroese marine scientist). In

the Coastal State agreement for 2006, Norway and the Faroe Islands stipulated the following: “The

Delegation of the Faroe Islands and the Delegation of Norway declared that all fisheries of North-

East Atlantic mackerel conducted within the zones under the fisheries jurisdiction of the Parties

should be jointly managed and consequently be covered within the total catch limitation stipulated

under point 1 of Annex I. The Delegation of the Faroe Islands and the Delegation of Norway

declared that the present situation is not acceptable, and prevents the parties from agreeing upon a

permanent management regime and sharing of the North East Atlantic mackerel stock. Norway

and the Faroe Islands expect to be compensated as a result of this unreasonable sharing of the stock”

(European Community, Faroe Islands, and Norway 2005).

In 2008, the disagreement over the southern component culminated. Norway and the Faroe Islands

decided to take action against the EU’s decision to keep the southern component outside of the

agreement and announced that they would establish corresponding quota’s within the northern

component of the stock, which was 30.000 tonnes each: “(…) we created a similar stock the same

size as the southern proportion and kept that outside the total agreement. And that’s a language

EU understood (…), because there never was a northern stock, it was just a tactical way to get EU

to pull out from the southern stock” (Faroese marine scientist); “There was always the issue of

the southern component that the EU tried to argue that they should have an extra allotment because

there was this so called southern component, that’s something that Norway and the Faroese never

agreed to so we always had comment in the agreed record every time the agreement was done on

a yearly basis just noting that we didn’t agree with the way the EU dealt with the so called southern

component which basically gave them more than they should have had. It was probably the year

before we pulled out of the agreement all together, we challenged this southern component together

with Norway in a more concrete way by I don’t really remember the details but we came up with

46

a northern component anyway! Which caused a lot of grief. It was obvious that that was incredibly

provocative to do that (Kate Sanderson)” (European Community et al., 2008; ICES, 2009).

In 2010 the ten-year agreement made between the EU and Norway in January (Brussels). In this

agreement, the EU and Norway agreed to incorporate the allocations they had awarded themselves

in the southern and respectively northern component of the stock into the overall TAC of the

mackerel fishery. This is stipulated under section 3.2 of the agreement: “The Delegations agreed

that all fisheries of North East Atlantic mackerel should be jointly managed and consequently be

covered within a total catch limitation covering all fisheries” (European Union and Norway 2010).

Additionally, section 4.2 and 4.3 of the agreement read as follows: “The southern component

fishery (ICES Divisions VIIIc and IXa) will be integrated over no more than three years into the

mackerel sharing arrangements. Any part that is integrated will be allocated to the EU and Norway

in proportion to their relative shares mentioned in point 4.1”; “The Delegations agreed that the

integration of the southern component fishery would commence in 2011 and would coincide with

a corresponding proportionate phasing out of the corresponding quota that Norway has established”

(European Union and Norway 2010). In this agreement then, the EU and Norway put the conflict

over the self-awarded quotas in the southern and northern component to bed by phasing them out

over a period of three years, starting from 2011.

Appendix 3: Dynamic 5: EU threats sanctions

The Faroe Islands stepped out of the Coastal States’ agreement and set a unilateral quota for 2010,

which was 85.000 tonnes, of which they effectively caught 70.987 tonnes (ICES 2014a). Iceland

also set a unilateral quota for 2010, 130.000 tonnes, of which 121.008 tonnes were effectively

caught. One of the results of the unilateral quotas was the anger evoked among the European

industry stakeholders, resulting in the Member States asking the Commission to “take immediate

action and use all possible means to convince Iceland and the Faroe Islands so they should abandon

their perceived extreme and unsustainable positions during the consultations on mackerel

management” (European Commission 2011).

Over the course of 2011, anger within the European fishing industry grew over the unilateral quotas

set by Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and calls for action, for example in the form of landing bans,

progressively increased. However, despite the pressure the industry put on the EU commission,

47

sanctions never materialized against Iceland nor the Faroe Islands in 2011. The possibility of

sanctions was nonetheless mentioned to the Faroe Islands and Iceland, in the hopes of compelling

them into lowering their demanded shares: “[The trade sanctions were first mentioned in] 2011.

All my year in 2012 as a foreign minister (…) this was basically under the radar (…): I was trying

to stave off the trade sanctions, which would have been devastating” (Icelandic politician). It was

also in 2011 that the Scottish industry successfully pressed the Scottish government to block the

Faroese application to having their mackerel fishery independently certified as sustainable under

the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification scheme (Scottish Pelagic 2011).

The unilateral quotas set by Iceland and the Faroe Islands further intensified the call for trade

sanctions among European industry stakeholders during 2012. In October 2012, then, the European

Parliament and the European Council adopted a Regulation whereby the European Commission

may take restrictive measures against a country allowing ‘non-sustainable fishing’ (Council of the

European Union and European Parliament 2012). For the future developments of the conflict, it is

important to know that not only could the Commission impose “quantitative restrictions on

importations of fish from the stock of common interest that have been caught under the control of

that country and on importations of fishery products made of or containing such fish”, it could also

impose “quantitative restrictions on importations of fish of any associated species, and fishery

products made of or containing such fish” (Council of the European Union and European

Parliament 2012).

The call for trade sanctions against Iceland and the Faroe Islands reached a high-point in 2013,

resulting in the EU sanctioning the Faroese on the quota they set for the Atlanto-Scandian herring

stock that year. Two interesting things are to be noted here. Firstly, as I have explained earlier on,

the legislation that was developed implied that sanctions could also target associated species of the

stock under question. This means that, although the trade sanctions were applied to the herring

stock, most interviewees seemed to agree that the sanctions were also meant to target the mackerel:

“I mean the main concern within the EU about, I mean it was the mackerel issue that generated

this legislation I would say, not so much the herring. But the fact that we set a herring quota that

was much, much higher than what we had in the herring agreement. I mean we also pulled out of

the herring agreement the year after. And set a quota that was considerably higher than what we

had in the old arrangement (…) It was our decision on the herring that gave the commission an

excuse if you like or a reason to implement the measures. And the measures also affected the

48

mackerel because the mackerel was seen as an associated species, because it’s difficult to, certain

times of the year, to fish herring without getting mackerel. So the measures targeted also mackerel

products. It was the mackerel agreement or lack of mackerel agreement and our unilateral quotas

and Iceland’s fishing that was always the thing that was keeping everybody very angry and that

kept the discussion very heated (…) it was the mackerel that was keeping it so emotional and

heated (…) I think also politically the commission, because it was under so much pressure to do

something and all these angry voices from the industry and the politicians, part of it is obviously

that they needed to show that they were willing to do something” (Faroese civil servant); “The

target was the Atlanto-Scandian herring. That’s where they fixed the unsustainable level and then

we had to put, because it was a mixture in the fishery, you couldn’t fish the herring without taking

mackerel, then of course it had to apply to mackerel as well” (EU civil servant). Secondly, the

absence of sanctions on Iceland were deemed quite remarkable by some interviewees. This

absence would have been linked to the importance of the accession talks between Iceland and the

EU: “Because again EU commission behaves strangely because Iceland were I mean look at the

behavior of Iceland and Faroe Islands. Iceland behaved more audaciously in many ways (…) but

then Faroe Islands, little Faroe Islands got sanctioned for herring (…) It was so obvious, the

difference. They probably feel pressured to do something but why sanction Faroe Islands for

herring and not Iceland? We thought it was so, I mean what we politically said and what we… we

thought it was very strange, the logic was not understandable. So the only way it can explained is

the EU, if they wanted the accession, you don’t really start with trade sanctions do you?”

(Norwegian civil servant). From the EU perspective, however, it was noted that they would have

possibly applied sanctions if they did not have this informal arrangement with Iceland: “The

answer is very simple: if the Icelanders had not engaged with us on the mackerel front as I told

you (…) in the way that we reached a common understanding on the bilateral level as I said. If we

hadn’t reached that understanding, I suppose that we might have considered applying the

regulation” (EU civil servant).

Appendix 4: Unreported fishing by Scottish fishermen (approx. January 2002 –

March 2005)

From approximately January 2002 until March 2005, a total of 17 Scottish fishermen were

involved in illegally landing nearly £63 million worth of atlanto Scandian herring and northeast

49

Atlantic mackerel, in excess of their EU quota (BBC News 2012). Three processing plants, one in

Shetland (Shetland Catch Ltd), and two in Peterhead (Fresh Catch Ltd and Alexander Buchan Ltd)

assisted the skippers in making the unreported landings. This was done by falsifying logbooks,

rigging digital weighing scales to underestimate the weight of the landed fish, and pumping fish

ashore via secret underground pipelines (BBC News 2012). The scam came to light in 2005, when

two of the processing plants involved were raided by the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency,

and it would take another 7 years for those responsible to be prosecuted and fined (BBC News

2012).

The main problem this scam caused is related to the estimation of the mackerel stock abundance,

as the assessment is strongly dependent on the catch information. From approximately 2005, then,

there was a growing awareness among ICES scientists that the SSB of the mackerel stock was

being substantially underestimated, and the unreported catches became a major uncertainty

affecting the reliability of the assessment (ICES 2004; ICES 2007). In their advice for 2007, this

is what ICES disclosed with relation to uncertainties in the assessment:

“Preliminary studies of the total levels of fishing mortality and natural mortality using egg surveys

and tag mortality have provided a clear indication of substantial levels of unaccounted removals.

It is furthermore shown to be unlikely that natural mortality is underestimated and that there is a

substantial unaccounted fishing mortality, implying a 95% probability of catches being

underestimated by at least 60%. There is a broad perception that there are substantial undeclared

landings in this fishery. The assessment is strongly dependent on the catch information, both

recently and in the past. Managers are encouraged to obtain reliable catch information (…) The

preliminary analyses carried out by ICES suggest an underestimation of catch by 60% or more

compared to the ACFM catches that included discarding and additions for known misreporting.

Such an underestimation of the catches by 60% or more is not taken into consideration in the

estimates of SSB as well as the predicted landings” (ICES 2006).

The scam thus played a substantial role in clouding the stock assessment; especially in combination

with slippage, discards and high-grading; and contributed to scientific uncertainty pertaining to the

SSB of the stock. This uncertainty would become a key element of the dispute in later years.

50

Appendix 5: Warming sea temperature, distribution shift and start of misfit

The waters around Iceland have experienced a marked warming since 1996 (Astthorsson et al.

2012). Icelandic waters have been relatively warm since that period, yielding a temperature

increase of about 1–2°C in the upper 50m off the south and west coasts of the country (Astthorsson

et al. 2012). In the north and around the coasts in the northeast, temperature increased particularly

in winter (Astthorsson et al. 2012). As shown by Astthorsson et al. (2012), records of the sea

surface temperature show that there have been several warming periods in Icelandic waters, with

maxima around 1972–1974, 1981, and 1984–1987, and a slight increase in 1989 (Astthorsson et

al. 2012). Important to know is that, although the sea surface temperature has been increasing

steadily since 1996, the mackerel did not start to enter Icelandic waters in great numbers until

around 2007. This means that, although the occurrence of mackerel in Icelandic waters appears to

be confined mainly to warm periods in the North Atlantic Ocean and around Iceland, the mackerel

expansion seems to be reliant on more environmental drivers than warmer sea temperature.

Surveys in more recent years indicated substantial interannual variation in the mackerel summer

distribution, and provides hypothesis on relations to temperature and food (ICES WKPELA 2014).

In 2006, the Icelandic catches were still relatively low: Iceland effectively caught 4.222 tonnes of

mackerel from a total actual catch as estimated by ICES of 481.276 tonnes (ICES 2005; ICES

2014a). In 2007, Iceland effectively caught 36.706 tonnes of mackerel of a total of 586.206 tonnes,

a big increase with respect to the previous year (ICES 2006; ICES 2014a). In 2008 the total catch

was 623.165 tonnes, from which Iceland effectively caught a substantial 112.286 tonnes of

mackerel (ICES 2007; ICES 2014a). Although the Icelandic fishery within their EEZ was not

regulated for this year, they did set a limit of 20.000 tonnes outside their EEZ, for the NEAFC area.

The absence of a limit within their EEZ for 2008, however, did annoy the other Coastal States:

“They had an open fishery, they had no TAC level so of course we were critical of that (…) they

fixed no limit and they were fishing on the basis that if we fished on we’d have no mackerel left

in our waters” (EU civil servant). Some interviewees linked the absence of regulation on the

mackerel fishery to the banking crisis that hit Iceland in 2008, suggesting that Iceland wanted to

maximize the revenue acquired from the mackerel in order to combat the crisis: “But you know

the big bank collapse [in 2008], the mackerel entered the Icelandic waters at the perfect time. The

timing was incredible actually” (Icelandic marine scientist). Others speculated that Iceland did not

51

restrict their mackerel fishery within their EEZ to build up historical fishing rights: “I think in the

beginning the first two years when the mackerel entered they just tried to fish as much as they

could to just make some kind of stand in the negotiation” (Icelandic marine scientist). “(…) but of

course, it may be short term interest for countries not to come to an agreement. For instance, for

Greenland now they’re not keen to make an agreement, they want to build up the fish experience

because they’re negotiation position today is very weak, as our negotiation position was at the

beginning” (Icelandic civil servant).

Appendix 6: Overexploitation of the stock throughout the years in the outcomes

Table 4: Overexploitation of the stock throughout the years in the manifestations

Outcome 1

Ecological

Stock is

overexploited

2007 First year the stock was overexploited. The advice from ICES for

2007 implied landings between 390 000 and 509 000 tonnes, and

the actual catch as estimated by ICES for that year was 586 206

tonnes; from that total catch, Iceland effectively caught 36 706

tonnes of mackerel (ICES 2006; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 2

Ecological

Stock is

overexploited

2008 The advice from ICES for 2008 implied landings between 349

000 and 456 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES

for that year was 623 165 tonnes (ICES 2007; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 3

Socio-political

Ecological

Unilateral

quota for 2009

(Iceland)

Stock is

overexploited

2009 Iceland regulated the mackerel fishery within their EEZ for the

first time in 2009 by setting a unilateral TAC of 112.000 tonnes

(ICES 2009)

The advice from ICES for 2009 implied landings between 443 000

and 578 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES for

that year was 737 969 tonnes (ICES 2008; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 4

Socio-political

Ecological

No agreement

for 2010

Unilateral

quotas for 2010

(Iceland and

the Faroe

Islands)

Stock is

overexploited

2010 The Coastal States did not manage to come to an agreement on the

sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings, which

resulted in the Faroe Islands pulling out of the agreement

Iceland set a unilateral quota for 2010 of 130 000 tonnes;

The Faroe Islands set a unilateral quota for 2010 of 85 000 tonnes

(ICES 2010b)

The advice from ICES for 2010 implied landings between 527 000

and 572 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES for

that year was 875 515 tonnes (ICES 2009; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 5

Socio-political

Ecological

No agreement

for 2011

2011 The Coastal States, now including Iceland who got awarded

Coastal State status, did not manage to come to an agreement on

the sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings

52

Unilateral

quotas for 2011

(Iceland and

the Faroe

Islands)

Stock is

overexploited

Iceland set a unilateral quota for 2011 of 146 818 tonnes;

The Faroe Islands set a unilateral quota for 2011 of 150 000 tonnes

(ICES 2011)

The advice from ICES for 2011 implied landings between 592 000

and 646 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES for

that year was 946 661 tonnes (ICES 2010b; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 6

Socio-political

Ecological

No agreement

for 2012

Unilateral

quotas for 2012

(Iceland and

the Faroe

Islands)

Stock is

overexploited

2012 The Coastal States did not manage to come to an agreement on the

sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings

Iceland set a unilateral quota for 2012 of 145 000 tonnes;

The Faroe Islands set a unilateral quota for 2012 of 148 375 tonnes

(ICES 2012)

The advice from ICES for 2012 implied landings between 586 000

and 639 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES for

that year was 892 353 tonnes (ICES 2011; ICES 2014a)

Outcome 7

Socio-political

Ecological

No agreement

for 2013

Unilateral

quotas for 2013

(Iceland and

the Faroe

Islands)

Stock is

overexploited

2013 The Coastal States did not manage to come to an agreement on the

sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings

Iceland set a unilateral quota for 2013 of 123 182 tonnes;

The Faroe Islands set a unilateral quota for 2013 of 125 852 tonnes

(ICES 2013a)

The advice from ICES for 2013 implied landings between 497 000

and 542 000 tonnes, and the actual catch as estimated by ICES for

that year was 931 732 tonnes (ICES 2012)

Outcome 9

Socio-political

Ecological

No agreement

for 2014

Unilateral

quotas for 2014

(Iceland)

Stock is

overexploited

2014 The Coastal States did not manage to come to an agreement on the

sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings but there

was a three party deal between Norway, the EU and the Faroe

Islands made in March 2014 (London) for 2014-2018

Iceland set a unilateral quota for 2014 of 147 721 tonnes (ICES

2014a)

The advice from ICES for 2014 in October implied landings no

higher than 889 886 tonnes, but after the benchmark the advice

was updated in May to catches between 927 000 tonnes and 1 011

000 tonnes; (ICES 2013a; ICES 2014b)

There is no exact number for the actual catch but ICES estimated

the catch for 2014 to reach 1,4 million tonnes (ICES 2014a)

Outcome

Socio-political

No agreement

for 2015

2015 The Coastal States did not manage to come to an agreement on the

sharing of the stock during the Coastal State meetings but there

53

Ecological

Unilateral

quotas for 2015

(Iceland)

was a three party deal between Norway, the EU and the Faroe

Islands made in November 2014 (Bergen). Interesting to note

about that agreement is that the total catch those three parties

agreed on already exceeds the advice given by ICES (while in

previous years it was simply the total catch exceeding the advice)

Unilateral quota of Iceland not yet released

The advice from ICES for 2015 implied landings between 831 000

and 906 000 tonnes (ICES 2014a)

There is no total catch yet, but the agreement between Norway,

the EU and the Faroe Islands set the total catch at 1 054 000 tonnes

(European Union, Faroe Islands, and Norway 2014a)

Appendix 7: Outcomes of the egg versus the trawl surveys throughout the years

In March 2007, the triannual egg survey for 2007 started, followed in July by the international

coordinated ecosystem survey in the Norwegian Sea and adjacent areas (IESSNS), which is called

the ‘trawl survey’ henceforth. The egg survey has been performed since 1977 (but the first used

data point in the assessment model is from 1992) by Norway and the EU to estimate the SSB of

the mackerel stock by sampling the mackerel spawning area (Hea 2007). The egg survey thus

provides data that is used as input into the ‘ICA-stock assessment model’ used by ICES which

then delivers advice on the stock. The ICA model uses catch data and is tuned only by the egg

survey (used as a relative SSB index). The trawl survey, then, is performed in the Nordic Seas and

one of the main objectives is to provide age-disaggregated abundance indices of the stock

(Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al. 2014). It is important to keep in mind that data coming out of the trawl

survey is not used in the ICA model. However, the trawl survey performed in 2007 would later

become the first trawl survey to be used in the assessment of the mackerel stock (in 2014), but for

the upcoming ICES stock assessments it is only the relative index for SSB from the egg survey

that is used, not that from the trawl survey.

Discussing the results from both surveys is nonetheless important because their respective SSB

estimates diverge greatly, a divergence that would later become a big element of scientific

contention. For 2007, the egg survey indicated that the SSB for the combined western and southern

components is 3.65 million tonnes (the northern spawning component is surveyed a year later, but

due to overexploitation during the 1970s, SSB in that component remains low) (ICES 2014c; ICES

54

2014a). The trawl survey indicated that the SSB of the mackerel stock was 1.25 million tonnes,

though this relatively low number (in comparison to the trawl surveys that are conducted in later

years) is due to the limited spatial coverage as the 2007 trawl survey was conducted by two

Norwegian vessels only (Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al. 2014) (see table 6). The SSB as reported by

ICES for 2007 was 2.488322 million tonnes (ICES 2012). The differences between the estimated

stock from the ICES assessment and that resulting from the trawl survey would only increase from

2007 onwards, becoming an important factor within the dispute.

Table 5: Difference in SSB estimation between the egg and trawl survey and the SSB reported by ICES; pre-

and post- benchmark assessment, sources: (Nøttestad, Utne, et al., 2014) (Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al., 2014)

(ICES, 2014d)

2004 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Trawl

survey SSB

estimates 2

Not

included in

assessment

1.25

million

tonnes

4.52

million

tonnes

2.45 million

tonnes

(limited

geographical

coverage)

4.56

million

tonnes

7.87

million

tonnes

8.98 million

tonnes

Egg survey

SSB

estimates 1

before 2014

May

2.75

million

tonnes

3.65

million

tonnes

4.29

million

tonnes

/ / 5.57

million

tonnes

/

Egg survey

estimates

after 2014

May

3.17

million

tonnes

3.97

million

tonnes

4.84

million

tonnes

/ / 5.03

million

tonnes

/

SSB as

reported by

ICES before

2014 May

1.721746

million

tonnes

2.488322 2.973399 3.040108 2.677000 ? /

SSB as

reported by

ICES after

2014 May

2.361954

million

tonnes

2.450984

million

tonnes

3.968902

million

tonnes

4.515380

million

tonnes

4.180745

million

tonnes

4.299460

million

tonnes

3 Egg survey only done triennially (North Sea component one year later). Here: combined western and southern components

4 “Swept area biomass was not estimated for the years 2008 and 2009 due to poor horizontal coverage in 2008, sub-optimal pelagic

trawling aimed at Atlantic salmon in 2008 and 2009,and too varying and poorly coordinated survey for the different vessels in

2009” (Nøttestad, Salthaug, et al. 2014).

2008/2009

55

In the summers of 2008 and 2009, trawl surveys were performed but would not end up being used

to calculate the biomass, “due to poor horizontal coverage in 2008, sub-optimal pelagic trawling

aimed at Atlantic salmon in 2008 and 2009, and too varying and poorly coordinated survey for the

different vessels in 2009” (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014).

It is important to note, however, that from 2009 onwards the Faroe Islands and Iceland participated

in the trawl survey, expanding the coverage of the surveyed area. A point of contention then

became the absence of the EU in the trawl survey, which to a certain extend downgrades the value

of the trawl survey: “We have not been able to cover the full stock. We don’t know what life

proportion of the stock we have covered (…) another issue that’s the case that we don’t know

actually what’s south of 62 or 60. Because we don’t cover that area. We don’t cover North Sea,

we don’t cover the area west of Scotland, Ireland, and Portugal, Spain. If that proportion varies in

relation to what we see in the north then you don’t really know what portion you are looking at in

the north even if you cover the whole area north. So there are a lot of problems with this mackerel

survey. You could of course say that you could anticipate that there’s a fixed proportion south of

62 or 60. So the coverage in the north you have just the same fraction that is the same every year

in the south. You don’t know it, but then you can consider this as an index. And that would be

perfectly okay. But an index is biased if you don’t know that you’ve covered let’s say the portion

north of 60 completely” (Faroese marine scientist).

There are ecological and socio-political arguments from the EU-side to not participate in this trawl

survey. On the ecological side, it is argued that the trawl survey is not a suited method to execute

in the south, as the mackerel are located deeper in the water column and they would therefore not

be picked up by the survey, leading to an underestimation of the biomass: “(…) the behavior of

the fish is different. And ICES itself has said that that kind of trawl survey simply is not appropriate

in the south” (EU civil servant); “(…) they claim that the mackerel in the for example the North

Sea, it is not in the upper water column only. Because our survey is only fishing up to thirty meters

and they say that it’s feeding all through the water column and there will always be an

underestimation” (Icelandic marine scientist). On the socio-political side, the reasons for not

participating in it are financial cutbacks as well as a general feeling of the survey being of no use

to them: “It’s not because we’re not interested in surveys as such, and in what they might give us

as information but we have to prioritize in a situation where all the governments are cutting back

on financing, you cannot have a situation where you have a time series, you’re not gonna just

56

abandon it and divert money to finance something which will give us very little” (EU civil servant);

“They’ve also claimed they don’t have the vessels to do this, they don’t have the money” (Icelandic

marine scientist).

Even though the EU has valid arguments for not participating in this survey, reasons which are

generally accepted by both scientists and politicians from the other Coastal States, the interviews

I have performed have sent very mixed signals where some interviewees from other Coastal States

were quite convinced that the EU will participate in the very near future (which was even

mentioned by some of the EU interviewees), yet other EU interviewees were very vocal in denying

their intent to participate, sometimes seemingly dismissing the trawl survey as a legitimate method

all together. From the interviews I can conclude that whether or not the EU will participate in the

trawl survey in the near future is unsure, and there the interviewees have provided me with

contradictory information. Moreover, it seems that the matter of participation has a political aspect

to it, where for example some EU interviewees expressed that they would have joined if Norway

would have stepped into the egg survey again.

2010: egg and trawl survey

In January 2010, the triannual egg survey for 2010 started, followed in July by the trawl survey.

The year 2010 was also the first year Iceland participated in the egg survey, expanding its coverage

in the north. For 2010, the egg survey indicated that the SSB for the combined western and

southern components was 4.29 million tonnes (ICES 2014c). The trawl survey indicated that the

SSB of the mackerel stock was 4.52 million tonnes (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). This means that

the 2010 biomass estimate was about three times higher than the 2009 estimate (ICES 2010a).

ICES noted in its report of the Working Group on Widely Distributed Stock (WGWIDE) that the

biomass estimates from this survey are not regarded as reliable, because the methods applied

(acoustics and trawl swept area) vary with a factor of 2-3 (ICES 2010a). The SSB as reported by

ICES for 2010 was 2.973399 million tonnes (see table 6) (ICES 2012).

There was other interesting data that came out of the 2010 surveys. The egg survey showed that

the start of mackerel spawning in the southern area was 30th January, which was almost one week

earlier than in 2007 (ICES 2010a). This thus provides an indication that spawning in 2010 took

place earlier than 2007, which could mean the egg survey ‘missed’ the onset of the spawning

period. However, ICES decided that the egg production estimates of 2010 of the western and

57

southern area were used to calculate the biomass (ICES 2010a). The trawl survey showed that

mackerel was distributed over larger areas than previously documented in the Norwegian Sea in

July and August (ICES 2010a). Moreover, they found, although marginal, mackerel spawning in

the north (the covered area was between 62° and 67°N and between 0° E/W and the Norwegian

coast) (ICES 2010a). However, this is the first time it has been documented because it was the first

time Iceland participated in the survey, so this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that

there was mackerel spawning prior to 2010 that far north.

2011: trawl survey

From July until August 2011 the trawl survey took place, the participating countries being Norway,

Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The SSB estimated from the survey was 2.45 million tonnes, which

was actually much lower than the SSB estimated for previous years by the trawl survey (see table

6) (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). The reason for that, however, was that the results on estimated

biomass were based on too limited geographical coverage, as they had only three rather than four

research vessels available (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014).

It was also in 2011 that Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag recapture method started, which

is likely to become an important method in estimating (amongst other factors) the SSB of the

mackerel stock. The Institute of Marine Research in Bergen has conducted tagging experiments

with internal steel tags on mackerel since 1969 during the spawning season (steel tag and

recapture) (ICES WKPELA 2014). The data coming from those modern tagging experiments are

identified as being able to provide quantitative and valuable data on migration patterns, estimate

natural mortality, and for abundance estimation (AGDMM 2013). The tags used until 2011,

however, were made of steel and the process of recovering them was time-consuming and

expensive (AGDMM 2013). The RDIF tagging, a technology that uses radio waves to transfer data

from an electronic tag, is slowly replacing this traditional method of tagging with one that could

potentially lead to very good data for tracking migrations in addition to reducing uncertainty in the

SSB-estimate (AGDMM 2013). Increasingly more factories within all Coastal States are equipping

their factories so they can join and carry out this RFID method. The tagging surveys have also

been pointing towards a higher SSB than the egg survey and official ICES SSB estimates have

done (Tenningen, Slotte, and Skagen 2011).

2012: trawl survey

58

From July until August, four vessels from Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands participated in

the trawl survey of 2012. The SSB that came out of this trawl survey was 4.56 million tonnes,

significantly higher than the SSB reported on by ICES that year which was 2.677 million tonnes

(ICES 2014c; Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014). This outcome added to the already existing uncertainty

surrounding the size of the stock, and especially those Coastal States participating in the trawl

survey (Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland) would come to argue that the stock size was most

likely being underestimated by ICES. However, the extent to which it was being underestimated

was a new source of scientific debate amongst the Coastal States.

2013: trawl and egg survey

In January 2013, the triannual egg survey for 2013 started, followed in July by the trawl survey.

The egg survey for that year indicated that the SSB for the combined western and southern

components was 5.57 million tonnes (ICES 2014c). The values coming out of this egg survey were

thus a 30% increase from 2010 to 2013. The trawl survey indicated that the SSB of the mackerel

stock was 7.87 million tonnes, however, adding to the existing belief that the SSB as indicated by

the egg survey (and the ICES estimation) was an underestimation (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014).

The trawl survey was done by four vessels from Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands, with an

increased geographical coverage when compared to previous years. However, it is noted in the

cruise report that “even if the geographical coverage and survey effort in 2013 was larger compared

to previous years, the mackerel stock was not fully covered. Thus despite the increase in the swept

area abundance estimate, it is still considered to be underestimation of the mackerel stock”

(Nøttestad et al. 2013).

Besides more data on the possibility of an underestimated stock size, there was other interesting

data that came out of the 2013 surveys. The egg survey showed that the peak of spawning in the

south, more precisely in the Cantabrian Sea, was later than in both 2007 and 2010 (ICES 2013b).

This thus provides an indication that spawning in 2013 took place even earlier than in 2010, which

could mean the egg survey again ‘missed’ the onset of the spawning period. The possibility that

the egg survey was again not catching the onset of the spawning period, added additional sources

of uncertainty to the stock assessment due to “incomplete temporal and/or spatial coverage,

consideration of stage 1 eggs only, and assumptions about the starting and end point of mackerel

spawning” (ICES 2013b). ICES therefore also reported in the WGWIDE report (2013) that

59

“estimates of uncertainty from egg surveys are therefore likely to be under-represented” (ICES

2013b). This would become a factor in ICES rejecting the stock assessment for the 2014 advice,

and also provided other Coastal States with ammunition to criticize the egg survey as a whole.

Appendix 8: Indications of higher stock abundance and unreported catches lead to

benchmark assessment and updated advice

1. Benchmark exercise: new assessment model (SAM)

The benchmark exercise for the assessment of the mackerel stock (and also the herring stock) took

place from 17-21 February 2014 in Copenhagen, though data compilation for this exercise had

started already in October 2013 (ICES WKPELA, 2014). It was during this benchmark exercise

that a new assessment model, the SAM-model (age-based assessment model), was adopted for the

mackerel stock. The previous assessment of mackerel was the ICA-stock assessment model, which

used statistical catch-at-age data and was tuned only by the egg survey (used as a relative SSB

index) (ICES WKPELA 2014). Because of the problems described above (the strong indication

that the stock was bigger than shown by the model due to unreported catches and the problems

surrounding the data coming out of the surveys) the ICA model was rejected.

The biggest changes from the ICA model to the SAM model was summarized in the benchmark

report as follows:

“• It was decided to incorporate the tagging data which proved to be very informative for the

assessment

• The inclusion of recent tagging data (recaptures after 2007) resulted in a deterioration of the

model fit. Therefore the final model uses tags recaptured until 2006. The inclusion of the new

RFID tags using a separate post release survival rate estimate should be re-evaluated in future

when more data on RFID tagging becomes available with time.

• Down-weighting the catches for the years before 2000 was an effective way to reduce the

influence of the unaccounted removals in the historic period. The resulting large confidence

intervals on the abundance estimates for the early years in the assessment are considered to reflect

well our current lack of knowledge of the size of the stock in the historic period.

60

• Despite the short length of the time-series and the persisting debate about the survey methodology,

the IESSNS, as an age-structured, area- normalized index for age 6+ only, is used in the final

assessment. It was argued that since the data seem to be adequately fitted in the model (low

observation variance), and despite a strong year effect in 2007, this survey provided useful

information for the assessment. Furthermore, given the concerns with the accuracy of the egg

survey (early spawning not adequately covered in 2010 and 2013), it was decided not to give more

credibility to either of these two surveys, even if their perception of the amplitude of the recent

increase in the stock differed” (ICES WKPELA 2014).

The most interesting change for the purpose of understanding the mackerel dispute is the change

in the tuning data used for the mackerel stock assessment (Figure 8).

Figure 8: tuning data for the SAM-model

We can see that ICES decided to use both the tagging data and data coming from the trawl surveys

as tuning indices, whereas only the egg survey data was used before. This is interesting because

especially the validity of the trawl survey was a contested matter among scientists from the

different Coastal States, and now it became an accepted tuning index within ICES for the mackerel

stock. It has to be noted, however, that the data used, the age-disaggregated time-series, was

restricted to years 2007 and 2010-2013 (because of the reasons explained in the trawl survey

segments, such as insufficient coverage) and restricted to adult mackerel at age 6 years and older

(because groups below age 6 were not fully recruited to the survey) (ICES WKPELA 2014).

2. Updated advice for 2014 (May)

61

The benchmark exercise and the new SAM assessment model led to a revised perception of the

stock and ICES updated its advice for 2014 in May, which implied catches between 927.000 tonnes

and 1 011 000 tonnes (ICES 2014b).

The original advice from ICES for 2014 came in October 2013, implying landings no higher than

889.886 tonnes (ICES 2013a). This advice was not provided in the traditional way, as the

assessment used by ICES, the age-based analytical (ICA) assessment type with input data from

the triannual egg survey SSB estimate and catch data, was rejected due to high levels of uncertainty

pertaining to several factors (explained below). Even though the uncertainty had been recognized

for a few years, the Coastal State request of November 2012 to assess the level of uncertainty

propelled ICES to go into depth, uncovering all the issues linked to the assessment, causing them

to ultimately reject it. This is what the ICES advice report said about the uncertainty in the

assessment:

“This year ICES was requested to examine the effect of uncertainty in the catch. No specific

guidance on the levels of uncertainty were given by the client, however a published study

(Simmonds, 2010) had indicated that there was unaccounted mortality which could be explained

by errors in reporting historical catches between factors of 1.6 and 3.6 times the reported catches.

This range of uncertainty was chosen as the basis for a sensitivity analysis for unaccounted catches

prior to 2005. This analysis showed that the assessment model used until 2012 would

underestimate stock size if catches have been correctly reported since 2005. Overall the

consideration of catch uncertainty was based both on this published evidence of unaccounted

mortality and also on anecdotal evidence of the accuracy of the catch information from the fishing

industry. This uncertainty was restricted to the period before 2005. After this date more effective

catch reporting was instituted. Based on this sensitivity analysis and the perception of uncertainty

in historical catches ICES concluded that potential catch for this stock had been underestimated in

the recent past and that the previous stock assessment method was no longer an appropriate basis

for providing catch advice for this stock. Continued use of this modelling approach would have

given landings of approximately 790 000 t.

ICES also has available a triennial egg survey, which might be used as a relative index of spawning

stock size, and combined with recent average landings to give advice under the ICES approach to

data-limited stocks, DLS category 3.2. The 2013 surveys have only just been completed and only

62

a preliminary point estimate of egg production and biomass is available. A final value for the 2013

survey and estimates of precision will be available in 2014. Until the necessary analyses are

finalized it is not possible to use the survey in this DLS method because without information on

precision it is not possible to determine whether the precautionary buffer should be applied or not.

This index is unaffected by the uncertainty in the catch and has been used in the past as an index

of SSB within the assessment model.

The survey results, taken together with estimates of mortality based on catch, give strong

indications that there has been an increase in stock size and that current levels of catch and landings

do not pose a threat to the stock. Advice is based on landings from the three most recent years, but

this advice is seen as an interim measure. ICES will attempt to incorporate more stock size

information in an appropriate assessment model at the benchmark in 2014. Should this approach

be unsuccessful a DLS approach will be developed based specifically on the triennial regime of

survey data” (ICES 2013a).

ICES thus planned a benchmark exercise that would take place February 2014 in order to obtain a

more appropriate assessment model for the advice on the mackerel. The assessment behind the

advice of 889.886 tonnes (which was an increase from previous advice, despite overfishing) was

not informed by the ICA model, ICES came up with the advice using the following parameters:

“• Mackerel SSB appears to be increasing consistently despite high catches taken from the stock;

• The stock has continuously expanded its geographical distribution during the summer (feeding)

period since the mid-2000s (AGDMM, IESSNS Report 2013), potentially a sign of a large stock;

• Mean weight-at-age for adult fish is decreasing; although no direct causes have been determined,

this would be likely related to both intra/interspecific competition on account the carrying capacity

of the ecosystem

• Estimates from the IESSNS surveys [trawl surveys] of 2012 and 2013 indicate potentially strong

year classes for both 2010 and 2011” (ICES 2013b).

The changed perception of the stock also meant a changed perception of the SSB of the stock (see

table 6). After the benchmark exercise, SSB was estimated to have varied between 2 million tonnes

in the late 1990s and early 2000s and 4.5 million tonnes in 2011; this compares to 1.6 and 3 million

tonnes over the same period in the previous assessment (ICES 2014c).

63

Appendix 9: Decreasing weight-at-age of the mackerel stock

Appendix 10: Unsure stock abundance leads to differing management responses

One of the reasons why the meetings in 2014 did not end up in international agreement, was

because Norway asked for a higher fishing mortality (F) (thus meaning being able to fish more of

the stock) than the EU and especially Iceland were willing to agree upon (Norway wanted to fish

at Flim). The other States did not want to agree upon this: “So they want to catch much. They well

that was one of the breaking points in the negotiations in Edinburgh for instance that they wanted

to catch up to 1.300.000 tonnes when the advice at the moment was 900.000 tonnes” (Icelandic

civil servant). The reason for Norway requesting a higher fishing mortality is linked with the

uncertainty and contestation surrounding the biomass of the stock. As I described previously, the

trawl surveys indicated a larger SSB than the egg surveys and ICES estimates had indicated for

several years. Even though there was agreement amongst Coastal States that the stock size was

indeed being underestimated, and even though ICES had just accepted to use the trawl survey as

an abundance index during the benchmark exercise, the extent to which the stock was

underestimated remained a matter of contention among the Coastal States. Norway allegedly takes

the trawl survey estimates as an absolute abundance figure, while the other Coastal States do not:

“And I think that’s where there’s one flaw in the Norwegian guys. They think the trawl survey

produces an absolute abundance. But it’s not” (Faroese marine scientist). Those from other

Coastal States do not share the same view on the ability of the trawl survey to give an absolute

Table 9: Decreasing mean weight-at-age; source: (Nøttestad, Utne, et al. 2014)

64

abundance estimation due to flaws in the surveying method: “It’s a very simple calculation actually.

But with a lot of assumptions. An assumption is that you know the width of the trawl, or you know

the width where the fish are caught. I mean if the trawl herd the fish, a trawl is made so the trawl

herds the fish in the path of the trawl and, if that’s the case, you might have twice as much fish in

the trawl as fish just in front of the path of the width of the trawl (…) Because we believe that the

vessels scare the fish to the side and if you have the trawl just behind the vessels there might be

no fish, we might underestimate the true abundance. That’s why we make a slight turn, so the trawl

is to one side, but that might actually also herd fish into the trawl. And then the opposite would

happen that the fish is scared of the trawl through the meshes. If ten percent escapes you have too

little. And if fish are diving beneath the trawl then you also have too little. And this can happen

sometimes and sometimes not. Depending on day or night, or depending on even temperature.

Temperature is very warm they can go deeper and so on. All these issues make the calculation of

the number of the trawl that it cannot be used as an absolute index, absolute abundance (…) And

until you have settled how much is herded, how much escapes, how much goes beneath, you cannot

use this as anything else than an index. Even if it gives you 12 million tonnes, and the egg survey

gives you three, you cannot say that the stock is 12 million tonnes. And that’s I believe some of

the reasons the Norwegians think there is more mackerel than there exists” (Faroese marine

scientist); “Now they assume many, many things in this approach. One is that the fish that come

in are the fish that are in that direct line but of course the net is not directly back like that, the net

moves in the water. So they don’t know. And if the net is open or if the net is slightly closed, the

effect on the amount of fish coming in s huge. So what these people have done is that they have

developed an approach, which has a certain legitimacy, but can never replace true science (…)

Which is the egg survey” (EU civil servant); “So the Norwegians are convinced the stock is bigger

than ICES. ICES is saying it’s not a good, reliable way of estimating it. Because there can be a

herding effect for example. And the Norwegians are using some net opening to calculate the

biomass. So they say well this is the width of the net, that’s the amount of fish going in, but they’re

not taking into account the width of the trawler, and also ICES or some scientists in ICES have

pointed out that when you’re trawling a (…) the trawls often a bit to the side so the herding could

be from the ship to the open trawl north. And that’s not taken into account. So it’s a bit inaccurate

(…) It’s on very shaky grounds but Norway is convinced” (EU civil servant). Some scientists in

Norway, on the other hand, seem much more convinced of the validity of this method than the egg

65

survey: “But I don’t see the flaws. The trawl survey is a very direct method, you go straight out,

and you catch the adult mackerel, not only adult also juvenile mackerel, so this is compared to the

eggs survey it’s a very direct method (…) The other thing, okay, if you compare the egg survey.

Egg survey is a very indirect method! Because what are you doing in the eggs survey? You count

eggs. But you don’t have any idea, then you have to make a lot of assumptions about how much

eggs have been produced per female in the population. So what you do is you’re backtracking from

age to number of eggs to number of spawners to the (( )) of spawners, that’s all to say how large

should the stock be to produce such an amount of eggs. So I would say this is a very indirect

method, and there are possibilities to, also to be, the assumptions that could be violated, and you

can’t really tell if this method is good or not because you’ll never find out how many eggs the true

numbers of mackerel, female mackerel have been spawning. You can never. So it’s a methodology

that’s not possible to really prove in a scientific manner (…) But with our common sense and with

our scientific approach, they are not, the eggs survey is not logical from our point of view. And

this is not only based on the SSB but also on the development of the stock, both the development

of the SSB but also the development of the distribution of the stock” (Norwegian marine scientist).

To sum up, one can discern that although all Coastal States do believe in the validity of the trawl

survey to a certain extent (especially when it comes to for example supplying age-structured data),

there is contention among the scientists as to how one should interpret the abundance estimates

coming out of the trawl surveys, with some Norwegian scientists interpreting the abundance

measures as an absolute index. That means in practice that Norway would believe the stock is

about twice as big as egg survey indications, which would allow for a higher fishing pressure. Over

the course of the years this became, and still is to this day, a matter of contention especially

between the EU and Norway, with the EU being accused of being too protective of the egg survey:

“I think most people like the methods they have developed themselves; that’s number one. Also,

most people (…) like the methods that are being executed in their own waters. So you have two

kind of obvious reasons why EU scientists in particular favor the egg survey: one, they developed

it, two, they have it in their own waters (…) and three, it could also gain strength in the discussion

of the zonal attachment question” (Norwegian marine scientist); “Yes for mackerel that has been

regrettable and then we come back to the surveys we have been talking about: there seems to be a

lot of politics involved and emotions and people have invested a lot in this eggs surveys”

(Norwegian civil servant); “It does, not so much now, but in the earlier meetings for example the

66

egg survey with people trying to defend the egg survey. Because that was the only survey they had.

And they needed like a good reputation of the egg survey to get money for that to continue that

kind of surveys. So criticism was not welcome” (Faroese marine scientist). It is also interesting to

note that Norway decided to step out of the egg survey in 2014 which, according to the Norwegians,

was due to the surveys being too costly: “The cost benefit analysis of it. And I think EU for them

it’s very political, we got a letter from miss Evans, asking us to join again, which was strange and

we tried to explain why we thought this was better but if we had unlimited resources we’d been

there, this was not a provocation, it was not decided by us by the way, that’s decided by IMR (…)

The cost benefit analysis of it was very clear” (Norwegian civil servant); “First of all, Norway

have developed two new methods for abundance estimation of the mackerel so. This is the trawl

survey. Which is a very expensive trawl survey, we are spending lot of time a lot of efforts and a

lot of equipment and money on that and another thing is we have develop a new tagging method

also on mackerel all right? So even if Norway has half of the share of EU, we have developed two

new brand new innovative methods that we’re actually using and using a lot of scientists, and

spending a lot of money, a lot of people, a lot of scientists, engineers et cetera. So if we should

keep up also to participate in the eggs survey which is also very expensive and very time

consuming, it’s a lot of effort, and then we’d spend so much money on mackerel research, much

more than EU and other countries do. That would not be fair if you look at the sharing of the

mackerel” (Norwegian marine scientist). From my talks with interviewees from the EU, I could

discern that they do not trust for budgetary reasons to be the only explanation behind Norway

pulling out of the egg survey: “So now the, the result of politicizing the science is that the

Norwegians are now pulling out of the egg survey which they have supported for donkeys years.

On alleged financial reasons, which is nonsense. And then moving to finance this northern trawl

survey. So the northern trawl survey has been used by these people in a political manner which

has nothing to do with science” (EU civil servant). A possible consequence of Norway pulling out

of the egg survey that has been mentioned is that any possible intention the EU had to join the

other Coastal States in performing the trawl survey have, for now, dissipated. Moreover, the

bickering over scientific methodologies has had, and still has, a negative effect on the negotiations

as a whole, with both the EU and Norway suspecting one another of undermining ICES and

politicizing the science.

67

Appendix 11: Dynamic 11: Contrasting management responses to the influence of

the mackerel stock on other (marine) species

Iceland

In the Coastal State meetings that went on over the course of 2011 (Oslo, London, and Clonakilty),

Iceland introduced a new argument that to them at least partially legitimizes the share they were

asking for in the meetings. This argument was formulated based on a paper that was being written

(and published a year later) by Oskarsson et al. (2012), in which it is shown that the invasion of

mackerel in Icelandic waters is expected to have measurable impacts on the ecosystem:

“Abundance estimates indicate that significant part of the stock is entering the Icelandic waters,

around 1 million tons in 2010 and 2011, so the objective here was to quantify the ecological

impacts of this invasion and to verify if associated affects on the ecosystem are evident when

considering potential feeding competition with two native herring stocks. In relation to the former

objective, the results show that NEAM feeding in Icelandic waters are gaining around 43% of their

body weight during the summer months and to do so the abundance estimates and the assumption

of food conversion efficiency of 15% (Iverson, 1990) indicate that NEAM required 2.2 million

tonns of diet in 2010 and 2011. These numbers clearly indicate that the presence of feeding NEAM

in Icelandic waters can be expected to have measurable impacts on the ecosystem” (Óskarsson,

Sveinbjörnsson, and Guðmundsdóttir 2012). The amount of weight that is gained in Icelandic

waters through summer feeding and subsequent effects on the Icelandic ecosystem have been used

as an additional argument (besides those that can be derived from UNCLOS & UNFSA, such as

‘dependency’) for fishing a more substantial share of the stock: “On the other hand we say: “this

is an invasion into our ecosystem here! We have around 1.5 million tonnes of mackerel as it has

been estimated in our waters over the last now 4, 5 years. It is estimated that this amount is eating

some 3 million tonnes. It is taking that from other fish. And other creatures (…) So we say “this is

an unusual invasion and we must take a fair share”. It is estimate that this 1.5 million is increasing

in weight for some 600-700.000 tonnes while in our waters. So why shouldn’t we take 150.000

tonnes or one part of that?” (Icelandic civil servant). “You see and this is something this is a

resource that they take out of our economic zone and they take it away, fair enough, but it means

in an ecosystem where everything is interdependent, it only means that something else has to pay

for it (…) The mackerel comes as a tourist, but it has to pay its fare” (Icelandic politician). The

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EU and Norway seemed to accept the scientific legitimacy behind this argument, yet, as previously

described, were not of the opinion that this would alter the sharing arrangements: “They were

skeptical regarding the results but they didn’t have any scientific arguments against it” (Icelandic

marine scientist); “Iceland made their own version about weight gain, it’s quite interesting, but

it’s only Iceland who’s doing it. And I remembered we looked at it and it’s interesting but it doesn’t

change the relative sharings at all because Iceland seems to think that the only place where fish

gain weight is Icelandic waters” (Norwegian civil servant); “So they’re trying to pretend that

they’re fishing high levels of mackerel to protect the other species? (…) We don’t pay too much

attention” (EU civil servant).

Norway

The trawl survey done by Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands provided additional information

for a scientific reasoning that has existed since a few years among primarily Norwegian scientists,

which is that the by them presumed highly abundant mackerel stock is negatively correlated with

the abundance of the Atlanto-Scandian (or Norwegian spring-spawning, NSS) herring stock.

Because the trawl survey is not only used to quantify abundance but also to assess spatio-temporal

distribution, aggregation and feeding ecology of the mackerel in relation to distribution of other

pelagic fish species such as the Atlanto-Scandian herring, the survey gave them additional data on

potential competition between the two stocks: “The overlap between mackerel and NSS herring

was highest in the south-western part of the Norwegian Sea (Faroe and east Icelandic area). A high

overlap between the species might increase the inter-specific competition between the species for

food in the area, especially in a period with low abundance of zooplankton, as observed in recent

years. According to Langøy et al. (2012), Debes et al. (2012), and Oskarsson et al. (2012) the

herring may suffer in this competition, the mackerel had higher stomach fullness index than herring

and the herring stomach composition is different from previous periods. Langøy et al (2012) and

Debes et al. (2012) also found that mackerel target more prey species compared to herring and

mackerel may thus be a stronger competitor and more robust in periods with low zooplankton

abundance” (Nøttestad et al. 2012). Those ideas culminated in a paper published in 2012 by

Langøy et al.: “Mackerel and herring are clearly potential competitors in the Norwegian Sea, both

being opportunistic feeders with overlapping distribution (Prokopchuk & Sentyabov 2006). Our

results showed that there were no clear trends in spatial and diet overlap between the species in

2004, a year when the data indicated that herring were reaching the end of the feeding season with

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low feeding incidence and selective feeding. In 2006, however, there seemed to have been a delay

in the production peak in the Norwegian Sea compared to 2004 and our results show that the

species are associated with different environmental variables and that diet overlap was low in

Atlantic waters. The pattern certainly reflects preferences for different temperatures and water

masses, but does not exclude that mackerel exerts a competition pressure on herring in years of

delayed peak in production causing herring to shift diet and/or distribution area” (Langøy et al.

2012). These ideas have been confirmed in the interviews as well: “Yes that’s a possible hypothesis

that we have worked on. We have both data from 2012 surveys or publications of 2012 (…) that

the mackerel is, could contribute to the decrease of herring stock. Also in the other surveys we’ve

seen that, the other manuscript we’ve seen that the mackerel stock might negatively influence the

herring stock. Also we’ve done studies trying to quantify how much herring larvae the adult

mackerel is eating and we’ve seen for instance where we have quite a large overlap between adult

mackerel and herring larva that the mackerel can eat a lot of herring larvae if they overlap in space

and time. So if the mackerel comes over an area with a lot of herring larvae, they can more or less

vacuum clean the area. So we have more and more indications that the mackerel stock has a

negative influence of the growth and development of the herring stock. Of course this is a situation

that’s particularly kind of critical to Norway because we have most of the herring stock within our

waters within this period of overlapping with mackerel so that’s what, if we got a too high mackerel

stock and this is both negative for the mackerel stock itself because of the reduced growth, but also

negative because of the herring stock, then we have a double negative, possible double negative

effect from such a large mackerel stock being out there in the ocean” (Norwegian marine scientist).

It is safe to conclude, then, that there was a growing reasoning among the Norwegians that the

abundant mackerel stock was having a possible negative influence on the Atlanto-Scandian herring

stock, for which they own the bulk of the quota (about 60% of the herring quota is allocated to

Norway, with the EU, Russia and Iceland being the remaining Coastal States) (European Union et

al. 2014). This has been pinpointed by several interviewees as having influenced the Norwegian

stance within the mackerel negotiations: “Of course this is a situation that’s particularly kind of

critical to Norway because we have most of the herring stock within our waters within this period

of overlapping with mackerel so that’s what, if we got a too high mackerel stock and this is both

negative for the mackerel stock itself because of the reduced growth, but also negative because of

the herring stock, then we have a double negative, possible double negative effect from such a

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large mackerel stock being out there in the ocean” (Norwegian marine scientist). However, the

reasoning that Norway would want to fish more on the mackerel stock to allow for the herring

stock to become more abundant was dismissed by the Norwegian interviewees: “Mackerel is very

important for us because of the high prices so doing something that in any way would

jeopardize…we wouldn’t, that would be really stupid. So it’s not fishing down the species (…) for

instance to give more room for herring, it’s difficult to manipulate an ecosystem in that way

anyway. It’s more complex usually. And secondly from an economic point of view it’s not a smart

move because the prices for mackerel are so much higher than for herring” (Norwegian civil

servant).

Appendix 12: Dynamic 6: the EU-Iceland accession talks

In April of 2009, the Social-Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement won the elections in

Iceland. This is a politically relevant event for the mackerel dispute, as the Social-Democratic

Alliance, with Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir as Prime Minister, was very much in favor of Iceland joining

the EU; a political aspect that would become tangled with the mackerel dispute in the years to

follow. In July of 2009, Iceland formally applied as a candidate for accession to the EU. The

accession negotiations between Iceland and the EU formally opened on the 27th of July 2010. The

mackerel dispute was seen from the EU perspective both as a hindering block to the accession

talks, as well as a dispute for which they could use the accession talks as a leverage in order to get

Iceland to lower their fished portion of the mackerel stock. It became “one of the very few

international fisheries negations on the radar screen of the president of the commission” (EU civil

servant). Here are some excerpts from which I took the information: “For Damanaki back then

this was a highly political thing and for Damanaki it was the most politically useful would be to

have the mackerel issue resolved before the start of negotiations (…) To open the negations on the

fisheries chapter once the mackerel... And why was that? There were a lot of member states who

were totally steadfast against this approach of opening the chapter while we had a problem with

the Icelanders (…) They saw the accession negations as an opportunity to offer an incentive to the

Iceland side to an agreement with us” (EU civil servant); “I think it was the EU accession that was

slowed down very much because of the mackerel issue. She more or less said, Maria Damanaki

more or less said to the Icelandic ministers (…) that it would not be possible to conclude the

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fisheries negotiations and not even start them, we never started that one, because of the mackerel.

That’s how important it was” (Icelandic politician).

Also within Iceland the mackerel dispute and the accession talks became somewhat tangled. There

were a number of politicians who were steadfast against Iceland joining the EU, and, due to the

importance of fisheries in Iceland, the mackerel dispute was a handy tool for them to gain political

support: “With the new government and some that were against the EU accession. Obviously they

pointed to the fact “look how the EU is treating us on the mackerel issue and you are saying we

would get a fair deal!” (…) So it was used within the country, as a stake to beat the accession

process with” (Icelandic politician); “I think this mackerel debate has had a negative impact for

those who want to join and a positive impact for those who want to stop the process so…” (MSC

certification consultant); “it was clear to everyone that the fisheries chapter was the one major

chapter in the negotiations (…) at the time I think it’s fair to say that the conclusion on the fisheries

chapter would really influence the overall outcome of the negotiations and that would of course

affect the view, the people eventually would take on the conclusion or on the negotiations if they

then would vote. Because it was just a major interest. So we always stated and we meant it that

these were two separate issues, we did so. but again having a difficult dispute on this important

stock, that obviously is an important stock on the EU side, it was tempting for at least some of the

member states to say “Hey guys there’s no way were going to start negotiations with Iceland on

the fisheries chapter with this issue unresolved”” (Icelandic civil servant); “So I think actually the

mackerel negotiations before then were an obstacle to some extent to the accession negotiations

because it didn’t help the atmosphere in Iceland towards the European Union that we should have

this, and particularly since the threat of sanctions started coming” (Icelandic civil servant).

Although difficult to assess, the political climate surrounding the accession talks also seemed to

have an influence on the way in which the mackerel negotiations were handled: “The Icelanders

were very difficult at the beginning, at the outset of this political approach to the negotiations

because for them it was first of all a very important issue, it’s very important for their industry, I

also think it was politically important, ahead of the accession negotiations they didn’t want to be

perceived in Reykjavik domestically I mean as giving in on a very important stock in order to pave

the way for negations with the EU. So the take off period of the negotiations were very difficult”

(EU civil servant); “But then the last fisheries minister in that government at the start he was very

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much against the EU and I think he was not; he was perfectly happy to not make an agreement and

he was not responding to anything from the EU” (MSC certification consultant).

Lastly, my interviews have shown that there is also an indication that the accession talks between

Iceland and the EU could have influenced the Norwegian stance within the mackerel dispute,

although the validity and extent of that claim is hard to assess. The excerpt of the ten-year

agreement between the EU and Norway shows at least that Norway was strategically

contemplating the consequences of Iceland acceding the EU for their allocation, yet opinions on

how much the accession talks played a part in Norwegian decision-making vary across the

interviewees: “The second political explanation, prior to this, we were at the time applying for

membership of the European Union. Was quite obvious for me that the, you know I had intimate

talks of course with my colleagues in other countries and with Jonas Gahr Støre who was the

foreign minister and it was very obvious that they were horrified by the possibility that we would

join the EU; for several reasons. They felt that it might be an increasing pressure on the Norwegian

to join, secondly they thought it would give us marketing advantage on them which it of course

would have done, but thirdly they feared it would spoil their relationship with the EU. Which you

know now is found in the European economic area, it’s a kind of associate membership to the EU

but with its own institutional structures, now there are only 3 EFTA countries there: Iceland,

Norway and Lichtenstein. They feared it would collapse as a structure. And fourth they feared that

perhaps if we joined the EU would also sort of start to neglect the EEA, not upgrading agreements,

becoming difficult because the structure, the complex structure of the EEA is disappearing from

the institutional memories in Brussels and they feared they would be squeezed. So they did

everything that they could in a civilized manner not to assist us in joining the EU (…) And the

mackerel issue was the best you know the mackerel issue was their best weapon so they stoke their

fires in the EU (…) The Norwegians are of course very important partners of the EU (…) So they

have a lot of power. And they sort of gave Damanaki the spine, they obviously demanded that she

stuck with them, in pushing down what we were allowed (…) And I said this quite openly in big

meetings that they were being used by the Norwegians and to spoil the EU accession” (Icelandic

politician); “I’m sure that Norway would be taken this into account but not in such a clear-cut way.

I think it’s just the high political background but I don’t see any direct links” (EU civil servant);

“I think the Norwegians were never really expecting Iceland to join the EU, but still of course that

was a possibility and we were in this faze, so obviously it must have been one of the elements for

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the Norwegians to, you know, “why should we be agreeing on a share to Iceland that we feel is

too big? And eventually the EU will get this?” (Icelandic civil servant); “I don’t know to what

extent an eventual Icelandic accession to the Union would impact on Norwegian thinking. Certain

Norwegians may well feel that it would be in their interest to keep Iceland out, so as not to be

isolated outside the Union but then again it’s very difficult to judge that” (EU civil servant).

It can be stated, then, that the start of the accession talks between Iceland and the EU in

combination with commissioner Damanaki driving the mackerel negotiations provided incentives

for the EU and those in favor of EU accession within Iceland to come to an agreement on mackerel;

while at the same time possibly influencing the Norwegian stance within the mackerel negotiations.

In the ten-year agreement we can see an implicit reference to the accession talks occurring between

the EU and Iceland. This reference is made in section 4.5 of the agreement: “In the event that a

Party to a Coastal State agreement, other than Norway, accedes to the EU, the Delegations agreed

that the quota share of that Party would be added to the EU share. This will mean a corresponding

adjustment to the relative shares of the EU and Norway set out in point 4.1” (European Union and

Norway 2010). Norway thus wanted to make sure that, in case Iceland would accede to the EU,

the Icelandic quota share would not simply be added on top of the EU’s share but incorporated in

it. From this excerpt, it can be deduced that Norway was strategically contemplating the

consequences of Iceland acceding the EU for their allocation. However, to which extent this played

a part in the future decision-making of Norway when it comes to allowing Iceland to take a share

of the mackrel quota and the magnitude of such a share is hard to assess and the reactions from

interviewees varied.

Appendix 13: Long-term management plan (2014-2018) agreed between EU,

Norway & Faroe Islands in March 2014

After the failed talks with Iceland in Edinburgh, the other Coastal states, i.e. Norway, the EU and

the Faroe Islands, came to an agreement on the 12th March (London) on the long-term management

of the stock (2015-2018). According to some interviewees, this agreement was almost exclusively

written by Norway and the imprint of that can be seen in the agreement: “And then we went and

talked a lot and then the Faroese and Norway wrote the agreement (…) Actually, Norway wrote

it” (Norwegian civil servant). There are a few interesting elements in this agreement to analyze.

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Firstly, Norway, the EU and the Faroe Islands agreed to have a TAC of 1.24 million tonnes for

2014, much higher than the TAC recommended by ICES, 889.886 tonnes (these quotas were all

set prior to the availability of the updated ICES advice). The Coastal states reserved 1 046 560

tonnes for themselves, Greenland declared a catch limit of 100.000 tonnes, and Iceland (who was

left outside of a deal) declared a catch limit of 147.721 tonnes for its fisheries, and Russia can be

expected to catch a significant amount (ICES 2014b). This means that, if the Coastal States

alongside Iceland and Greenland all meet their announced quotas, catches could reach this year a

staggering 1.3 million tonnes in 2014, and their advice report for 2015, ICES even estimated the

catch for 2014 to be 1.4 million tonnes (ICES 2014a). It was mentioned by some that Norway

pushed for this higher TAC, and the EU agreed largely to simply have an agreement in place: “We

didn’t like it, we wanted to stay within scientific advice. But we thought that it would be the price

to pay to get an agreement to keep things down for the next year. So in the mackerel agreement it

is written that from 2015 we stick with scientific advice” (EU civil servant).

Secondly, the Faroe Islands managed to get a much higher share then they historically got for

mackerel, as they were allowed to fish 156.240 tonnes for 2014 (European Union, Faroe Islands,

and Norway 2014b). This was allegedly largely due to Norwegian pressure, as they were much

more in favor of giving the Faroe Islands a bigger part of the quota (as explained in Error!

Reference source not found.). This development vexed several players within the European

industry a great deal: “I wouldn’t say the industry was against an agreement with the Faroe islands

at a fair level and we think they really hit the jackpot in a fairly major way not only with the quota

share but also the bilateral arrangements they struck with Norway and the EU in terms of getting

access to our waters to catch the fish when they’re at a very high quality (…) They really did strike

a jackpot in terms of that and we feel it’s definitely, there’s been I suppose given a huge reward,

too big a reward” (Representative of the EU fishing industry). Moreover, the EU lifted its ban on

herring from the Faroe Islands in August of that year as well, a year after the sanctions came into

effect.

Thirdly, it is stipulated in the agreement that “The Parties shall refrain from allowing vessels flying

their flag to participate in any fishing activities regarding mackerel in third party waters, unless

these activities are exclusively for experimental fisheries purposes with a limit of 4,000 tonnes”

(European Union, Faroe Islands, and Norway 2014b). This is a reference to the Greenlandic issue

and again carries the trademark of the Norwegians who were steadfast against other States adding

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a quota on top of their share. Because of this clause, fishing activity in Greenland had to be limited

to a maximum of 4.000 tonnes.

Fourthly, Norway managed to prevent Iceland from fishing in any other waters but their own, by

demanding of the Faroe Islands that they would not let Iceland fish mackerel in their waters: “And

Norway was putting pressure on the Faroese not to give access to Iceland; they wanted to have

written in the agreement that Faroese would never give access to Iceland. And Iceland and Faroese

said: “this would be a bilateral agreement between us! Norway you can stay out of it, it has nothing

to do with you!” (EU civil servant). Nonetheless, Norway was successful in putting this

arrangement in place, which was met with indignation from the Icelandic side: “But they were

very angry with Norway when we secured that they couldn’t fish mackerel in Faroese waters either

(…) We have an agreement with Faroe Islands for the entire that Iceland cannot fish in their waters

(…) It’s for the entire period, until 2018 Norway we have this agreement that Iceland cannot fish

in Faroese waters (…) Yes if they should have such a high quota and the quota was so much above

the zonal attachment then we made all kinds of fences around Iceland. If they accepted let’s say 5

or 6 percent they could have fished everything in Norwegians waters (…) So we tried to fence

Iceland in every way… it was damage control from our part” (Norwegian civil servant).

One can deduce from all of the above that indeed Norway managed to push through quite a bit of

its demands, and the EU and the Faroe Islands largely gave in. From the EU’s perspective,

Damanaki agreed to this deal as to not leave a chaotic situation behind when she would leave her

position as commissioner a few months later: “But Damanaki in order to ensure the sustainability

of the stock, not to leave a big mess behind she went for a deal with the Norwegians and the Faroe

Islands” (EU civil servant).

Appendix 14: Contention over the permanent versus the reversible scenario

In February 2015, the advice requested by the Coastal States on the long term management of the

stock was released. The advice they released was, and still is at the time of writing, a source of

great contention between Norway and the other Coastal States in the agreement.

This contention is the result of diverging opinions on which scenario was chosen as the base for

the long-term management advice: the ‘permanent’ versus the ‘temporary’ scenario.

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Table 6: Performance of management options as specify in the request (Btrigger = 2.2 mt, for Ftarget values of

[FMSY: 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35], with a 20% TAC variation constraint and a 10% maximum deviation from

Ftarget but with no interannual quota flexibility)

Source: Special Request Advice ICES (2015)

As elaborated upon earlier, the mackerel stock is currently characterized by low weight-at-age,

late maturity, and early spawning compared to the historical mean (ICES 2015). There is, however,

no scientific basis to indicate whether this situation should be considered permanent or transient

(i.e. reversing to the previous state) (ICES 2015). This is where the two scenarios originate out of:

the permanent scenario assumes that the current situation will continue, i.e. low weight-at-age,

earlier spawning, low growth rate and later maturation; while in the reversible scenario it is

assumed that these biological variables will progressively return back to average situation. In the

permanent scenario, recent stock dynamics are used as a basis (i.e. the means over last three year

period are used, 2011-2013), while in the reversible scenario a 10-years average is applied. The

differences in outcome when picking one of the two scenarios are to be seen in the risk, yield and

SSB in the shortterm, mediumterm and longterm developments of the stock (table 8). Importantly,

then, the choice between the two scenarios changes the advice given to the Coastal States, where

the reversible scenario would entail the allowance of a higher F, closer to 0.25, and consequently

a higher TAC. That is the scenario that Norway endorses (for reasons previously explained, section

26), while scientists from other Coastal States endorse the permanent scenario, which entails

F=0.22. It was the latter that was eventually presented by ACOM and used as a basis for the advice

on the long-term management plan:

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“ICES advises on revised reference points for Northeast Atlantic (NEA) mackerel (point 1 in the

request): Blim should remain unchanged at 1.84 million t, FMSY should be revised to 0.22, MSY

Btrigger and Bpa revised to 3.0 million t, Flim revised to 0.36, and Fpa revised to 0.25.

ICES also advises that the proposed management plan is considered precautionary (points 2 and 3

in the request) if Ftarget is equal to or less than 0.22, assuming a Btrigger of 2.2 million t. This

would also ensure high long-term yield. Other options with higher target Fs and a higher trigger

biomass are considered precautionary and would maximize short-term yields, ensure high long-

term yields, but would also increase the interannual variations of the TACs and result in a smaller

stock” (ICES 2015).

Some Norwegian scientists operating within ICES were displeased with the choice of scenario,

and with the fact that the reversible scenario was not presented by ACOM, whereas both scenarios

were presented in the ICES working group: “At least from the Norwegian point of view, we would

like both of the scenarios to be equally presented in the advice but for one reason or the other only

one of these two equally likely scenarios have been presented in the advice” (Norwegian marine

scientist); “There was no strict scientific argumentation for the decision made by ACOM for only

presenting the permanent model and not the reversible model for the mackerel stock in their advice.

This was stated during the Coastal States negotiations in Faroe Islands 4-5 March. John Simmonds

had a presentation on the suggested new management plan and the answer from him after a direct

question from Norway about this issue was that they felt so. So ACOM did not have a scientific

rationale for their decision” (Norwegian marine scientist). The Norwegian scientists thus do not

endorse using the permanent model as a basis for the advice: “It’s clearly the most conservative.

The most precautionary. But I would not say that the situation we have had only the last three years

should be the situation that we will have the next five years, that seems not very reasonable to me.

Also taking into account that all fish stocks, especially pelagic fish stocks, they show ups and

downs and cyclical variation in abundance and distribution etc. so it’s very unlikely that we have

a permanent shift in this situation (…) if you use the reversible scenario, then you, in the short

term you can fish 8 percent more mackerel than the permanent and this is substantial, were talking

about hundreds of millions of euros in kind of a difference between the different options so based

on the value of the fishery and the revenue from the fishery this has large importance also for the

managers” (Norwegian marine scientist). The divide in opinion on which scenario to use for advice

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ties in with the other reasons Norway has for wanting a higher fishing mortality, especially with

the density-dependency hypothesis discussed in that section.

Scientists from the other Coastal States, however, state that the choice of the permanent scenario

as a basis for the advice is the normal procedure within ICES and the most reasonable: “ACOM

considered that the permanent scenario was the most appropriate in the absence of other

information. It is the middle ground. However, in their long-term simulations they did include

some variation that assumed weights at age that both reverted to and further deviated from the

previously observed values. So the possibility of each of the scenarios was implicitly taken into

account to arrive at the advice (…) ACOM gives us an estimate based in the current dynamics,

which seems entirely reasonable. The Fmsy is the value we should be fishing at to maximize yield

and remain precautionary given the current characteristics of the stock. The idea that Norway has

now introduced is that because the stock is well above Bpa and that fishing at a very high rate over

the next two years would not bring the stock below Bpa, then we could do that and still be

precautionary. But that would be a complete misrepresentation of both Fmsy and the precautionary

approach (and is based entirely on the unjustified conviction that we should fish the mackerel stock

harder because of density dependence). What ACOM has told us is that, based on the best available

knowledge about the stock, we will maximize long term yield and be precautionary if we fish at

their estimate of Fmsy. We see no reason to reject this advice” (EU civil servant); “I think that the

question should maybe be, why did the ICES working group come up with this "reversible"

scenario, and not only what is included in "permanent"? As I said, the latter is a more reasonable

scenario when dealing with the next years, and it is more in line with standard procedure of ICES”

(Icelandic marine scientist).