Notes

178

Introduction

1. For the case against expansion, see Michael MccGwire, ‘NATO Expansion: APolicy Error of Historic Importance’, Review of International Studies, 24(2), pp. 23–42; Michael Brown ‘The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion’, Survival,37(1); John Lewis Gaddis, ‘History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement’,Survival, 40(1), pp. 145–51. The case in favour can be found in ChristopherL. Ball, ‘Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be aGood Thing’, Review of International Studies, 24(2), pp. 43–67; Ronald D.Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Building a New NATO’,Foreign Affairs, 72(3). See also NATO’s publication, Study on NATO Enlarge-ment.

2. See ‘Why NATO Should Grow’, New York Review of Books, August 10, 1995.3. MccGwire, p. 25.4. Steve Weber, ‘Does NATO Have a Future?’, in Beverly Crawford (ed.), The

Future of European Security (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992);Charles Glaser, ‘Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements inEurope’, International Security, 18(1), pp. 5–50; Hugh de Santis, ‘The Grayingof NATO’, Washington Quarterly, 14(4), pp. 51–65; Barry Buzan, ‘New Patternsof Global Security’, International Affairs, 67(3). In fact, pessimism aboutNATO’s future is by no means a post-Cold War phenomenon. Paul Cornishnotes pithily that the Alliance has inspired ‘a whole cottage industry of jere-miahs’ during its long history. See Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe andthe Fall and Rise of NATO (London: RIIA, 1997), p. 2.

5. See Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas S. Szayna, NATO’s Metamorphosis andCentral European Politics: Effects of Alliance Transformation (Santa Monica, CA:RAND Corporation, 1997), p. 6.

6. For definitions of alliances, see Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond,When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 52. Their definition draws heavily on one developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. DavidSinger. Also Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 19.

7. Barry Buzan et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990).

8. Paul Cornish, The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO (London: RIIA,1997).

9. Beatrice Heuser, Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The YugoslavCase 1948–53 (London: Routledge, 1989), p. xiv.

10. Beatrice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideals and Costs (London: RIIS,1996), p. 26.

11. For the classic encapsulation of this concept, see Karl Deutsch et al., Politi-cal Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the

Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969). Note thetitle refers only to the North Atlantic Area, as opposed to Treaty Organisation.

1 The North Atlantic Treaty in context

1. John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO1942–9 (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 8–9, 17.

2. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding InternationalRelations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p. 87.

3. Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the InternationalOrder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 13. My own viewon the nature of the European security system is in Mark Smith, ‘NATOEnlargement and European Security’, in Adrian Hyde-Price and LisbethAggestam (eds), Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda(London: Macmillan, 2000).

4. Anton DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, 2nd edn(London: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 1–4.

5. DePorte, p. 3.6. Clark, p. 146; Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 10–11.7. See DePorte, p. 6.8. Clark, p. 134.9. DePorte, p. 3.

10. Clark, p. 146.11. See Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European–American Relations Since

1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980).12. The phrase ‘the curse of bipolarity’ is George Kennan’s, cited in Osgood,

NATO.13. The concept of ‘overlay’ is discussed in Barry Buzan et al., The European Secu-

rity Order Recant: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990),pp. 15–16. On the relationship between the break-up of European order andthe Cold War, see pp. 32–40; also DePorte, pp. 58–91; Clark, pp. 168–76.

14. Buzan et al., p. 16.15. William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (London: Pinter 1990),

p. 3516. DePorte, p. 3.17. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–7

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).18. See Clark, p. 110; Karl D. Bracher, The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political

Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 189.19. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–92, 7th edn (New

York: McGraw Hill, 1993), p. 13.20. DePorte argues that ‘nothing is as effective in orienting a country as an occu-

pying army’, and that as a consequence the political allegiances of Europeanstates after 1945 tended to follow those of their occupying power. SeeDePorte, p. 59.

21. The West European states had been sufficiently concerned about the emer-gence of a Marxist–Leninist Soviet to intervene directly in the aftermath of

Notes 179

the First World War, and the presence of Bolshevism remained a key secu-rity fear among Western states throughout the interwar years. See D. F.Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins 1917–1960, 1 (New York: Doubleday,1961), pp. 15–28, 38–9.

22. Ibid. p. 61.23. See Michael W. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1987), p. 152.24. See Cable 14 March 1946, FO 371/56763; John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Prag-

matism: Britain and the Formation of NATO 1942–49 (London: Macmillan,1993), pp. 41–2.

25. George Kennan (‘X’), ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25(4),p. 574.

26. Osgood, pp. 30, 34.27. Baylis, p. 127.28. Dan Reiter makes a useful distinction between direct and systemic threats.

Direct threats occur when ‘the threatening state is making a specific demandof a state with the implicit or explicit promise of military action if thedemand is not met’; a systemic threat pertains in ‘a situation in which alocal power appears to be posing a general threat to the nations of the region,such that it seems to have broad ambitions for greater political power and/orterritory’. Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances and World Wars(New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 49–50. On the relationshipsbetween alliances and threats, see Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (NewYork: Cornell University Press, 1987).

29. Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (London: Aldwych Press, 1981), p. 221; see alsoJohn R. Gillingham, ‘Introduction’, in John R. Gillingham and Francis Heller(eds), NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 1.

30. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950–1955 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 3; see also Lawrence Kaplan,‘The Cold War and European Revisionism’, Diplomatic History, 11(2), pp.147–56.

31. See, for example, Alan K. Henrikson, ‘The Creation of the North AtlanticAlliance 1948–1952’, Naval War College Review, 32(3), p. 7; Cees Wiebes andBert Zeeman, ‘The Pentagon Negotiations, March 1948: The Launching ofthe North Atlantic Treaty’, International Affairs, 59(3), p. 352.

32. Henrikson, ibid.33. For an examination of how the British view of the Soviet Union developed

during this period, see Baylis, pp. 37–8.34. Baylis, p. 65; Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (London:

Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), p. 1.35. See Baylis, pp. 64–6; Henderson, pp. 3–4.36. See, for example, Klaus Schwabe, ‘The Origins of the United States’ Engage-

ment in Europe 1946–1952’, in Gillingham and Heller (eds), NATO, pp.170–4; Ireland, pp. 57–8; Baylis, p. 65; Henderson, p. 1.

37. The development of Bevin’s early ideas on Western Union are examined in Sean Greenwood, ‘Ernest Bevin, France and Western Union: August1945–February 1946’, European History Quarterly, 14(3), pp. 319–38. See alsoJohn Kent and John Young, ‘The “Western Union” Concept and British

180 Notes

Defence Planning’, in Robert Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and theCold War 1945–1950 (London: Routledge, 1991).

38. See John Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–51 (Leicester:Leicester University Press, 1984), for the case that the Dunkirk Treaty’s rootsare to be found in the period 1944–7, when security hopes rested on theGrand Alliance, and fears centred largely on Germany. For the argument thatthe Treaty was actually a precursor of the anti-Soviet treaties which cameafter it, see John Baylis, ‘Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins ofNATO’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 5, pp. 236–47; Sean Greenwood, ‘Returnto Dunkirk: The Origins of the Anglo–French Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947’,Journal of Strategic Studies, 6, pp. 49–65.

39. See Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism, pp. 71–2; Wolfgang Krieger, ‘Foun-dation and History of the Treaty of Brussels’, in Norbert Wiggershaus andRoland G. Foerster (eds), The Western Security Community: Common Problemsand Conflicting National Interests During the Foundation Phase of the NorthAtlantic Alliance (Oxford: Berg, 1993), p. 232; Jan Van Der Harst, ‘From Neu-trality to Alignment: Dutch Defense Policy 1945–51’, in Gillingham andHeller, pp. 32–3. See Oral History: John D. Hickerson, HSTL.

40. Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, ‘The Origins of Western Defense: Belgian andDutch Perspectives 1940–1949’, in Ehnio Di Nolfo (ed.), The Atlantic PactForty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991),pp. 141–62; Jacques Frémeaux and André Martel, ‘French Defence Policy1947–1949’, in Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953 (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), pp. 92–106.

41. Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism, p. 68.42. Cable 16 August 1948, FO 371/73075/Z6632.43. FRUS 1948 (III), p. 14.44. Elisabeth Barker, The British Between the Superpowers 1945–50 (London:

Macmillan, 1983); Charles S. Maier, ‘Alliance and Autonomy: European Iden-tity and US Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years’, in Michael J.Lacey (ed.), The Truman Presidency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1989), pp. 273–98.

45. See Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism, pp. 73–5; Wiebes and Zeeman, pp. 355–6.

46. The best analysis of the Pentagon Talks is Wiebes and Zeeman, pp. 352–63.The text of the Pentagon Paper is in FRUS 1948 (III), p. 74.

47. Ibid.48. This idea of the North Atlantic Treaty is similar to the ‘dumb-bell’ con-

cept favoured by George Kennan. The vision of the Treaty at the Pentagondoes tend to back the argument put by John Kent and John Young that theBritish preference at this time was for ‘a US alliance . . . in order to make aEuropean-based system, the Brussels Treaty, effective’.

49. The omission of Spain was in the face of ‘the strongest possible pressure’ onthe part of the US military ‘to make provision for the admission of Spainhere and now in any community of Western nations’, according to Inver-chapel. See Wiebes and Zeeman, p. 361.

50. See Richard Woyke, ‘Foundation and History of NATO 1948–50’, in Wiggershaus and Foerster, The Western Security Community, p. 259.

51. Ironically, the presence of the British spy Donald McLean at the Pentagon

Notes 181

Talks meant that Stalin knew more about the planned pact than France andthe Benelux states put together. Wall notes French resentment at their exclu-sion from the talks, and the resultant feeling that France was ‘always knock-ing at the door of the Anglo–Saxon Club’. See Irwin Wall, ‘France and theNorth Atlantic Alliance’, in Gillingham and Francis Heller (eds), NATO, p. 51.

2 The membership question and neo-enlargement, 1948–9

1. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–50 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), p. 411.

2. FRUS 1948 (III), pp. 283–9.3. John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO

1942–49 (London: Macmillan, 1993); Ritchie Ovendale, The English-SpeakingAlliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1941–7(London: Macmillan, 1982).

4. Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), pp. 38–9; Massimo de Leonardis, ‘Defence or Liberation ofEurope: The Strategies of the West Against a Soviet Attack 1947–50’, in EnnioDi Nolfo (ed.), The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal (NewYork: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 190–1; Bruna Bagnato, ‘France and theOrigins of the Atlantic Pact’, in Di Nolfo (ed.), The Atlantic Pact, p. 101; CeesWiebes and Bert Zeeman ‘The Origins of Western Defense’, in Di Nolfo (ed.),The Atlantic Pact, p. 158.

5. The phrase ‘the NATO method’ is Lord Ismay’s: NATO: The First Five Years1949–54 (Paris: NATO, 1955).

6. Sydney R. Snyder, ‘The Role of the International Working Group in the Cre-ation of the North Atlantic Treaty December 1947–April 1949’ (PhD thesis,Kent State University, 1992).

7. See Lawrence S. Kaplan and Sydney R. Snyder (eds), Fingerprints on History:The NATO Memoirs of Theodore C. Achilles (Kent, OH: Kent State University,1992).

8. Alex Danchev, ‘Taking the Pledge: Oliver Franks and the Negotiation of theNorth Atlantic Treaty’, Diplomatic History 15(2), p. 204; Escott Reid, Time ofFear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949 (Toronto:McClelland & Stewart, 1977), p. 64.

9. Reid, pp. 167–84; Henderson, p. 79; Baylis p. 161; Reid pp. 211–12; FRUS1948 (III), p. 339; FO Minute 12 January 1949, FO 371/79220/Z246; FOMinute 2 February 1949, FO 371/Z1139/1074/72G.

10. 6 September 1948, FO 371/73076.11. FO Cable 17 August 1948, FO 371/72075/Z6636.12. DCER 1948, p. 641; FO Minute 17 August 1948, FO 371/73075/Z6680.13. FRUS 1948 (III), p. 17814. Reid, p. 200. This also contains a useful and illuminating analysis of the

membership issue, pp. 193–212.15. FRUS 1948 (III), pp. 339–41.16. Ibid., p. 340; E. Timothy Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion: The United States

and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty’, Diplomatic History,7(2), pp. 139–55.

182 Notes

17. Antonio Varsori, ‘Great Britain and Italy 1945–56: The Partnership Betweena Great Power and a Minor Power?’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 3(2), p. 206.

18. Martin H. Folly, ‘Britain and the Issue of Italian Membership of NATO1948–49’, Review of International Studies, 13, pp. 177–96.

19. Reid, p. 200; FO Minute 11 December 1948, FO 371/73082/Z10182.20. FRUS 1948 (III), p. 66.21. Washington’s fears over the elections, and over Italian Communism

in general, are described in E. Timothy Smith, ‘United States Security andthe Integration of Italy into the Western Bloc 1947–1949’, in John R. Gillingham and Francis Heller (eds), NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: St Martin’s Press,1992). pp. 73–98. For an examination of US intervention in support of theChristian Democrats, James E. Miller, ‘Taking the Gloves Off: The UnitedStates and the Italian Elections of 1948’, Diplomatic History, 7(1), pp. 35–55.

22. Folly, p. 183.23. Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, pp. 145–6.24. Smith, ‘United States’, p. 153; FRUS 1948 (III), p. 766.25. DCER 14 (1948), p. 723.26. Ibid. Kennan’s superior, Lovett, also stated that ‘The view the United States

would take of the importance of Italy for the North Atlantic Pact would prob-ably depend on the view of the signatories of the Brussels Pact towards Italy’sinclusion in that Pact’, FRUS 1948 (III), p. 330.

27. Folly, pp. 185–6; Smith, ‘US Security and Italy’, pp. 146–7. For an illumi-nating account of French policy in the WET negotiations, based on researchinto French archival sources, see Bagnato, ‘France and the Origins of theAtlantic Pact’, pp. 79–110.

28. Folly, pp. 185–7. On the subject of the French position, see also Smith, ‘TheFear of Subversion’, pp. 146–8; Reid, p. 200–4.

29. Cited in Bagnato, p. 103.30. Ibid.; Reid, p. 203.31. Bagnato, p. 103; Folly, p. 186; Chauvel’s ideal solution in the first half of

1948 was for two systems, a North Atlantic and Mediterranean, with Franceas a ‘hinge’ between the two, Bagnato, p. 97.

32. The Dutch support for France was itself instrumental in nature, being largelyin exchange for French support for Dutch policy in Indonesia. Cees Wiebesand Bert Zeeman, ‘The Origins of Western Defense: Belgian and Dutch Per-spectives 1940–1949’, in Di Nolfo (ed.), The Atlantic Pact, pp. 160–1.

33. Reid, pp. 206–7, 208.34. Reid, p. 204; Folly, p. 188; FO Minute 14 January 1948, FO 371/79221/Z364.

For the immediate reaction in the NATO Working Party, Cable 13 January1948, FO 371/79221/Z246.

35. Leopoldo Nulti, ‘The Italian Military and the Atlantic Pact’, in Di Nolfo (ed.),The Atlantic Pact, pp. 256–7.

36. FO Minute 14 January, FO 371/79221/Z352; Romain H. Rainero, ‘Italy1947–49: Military Integration and Neutralist Tendencies’, in Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster (eds), The Western Security Community:Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests During the FoundationPhase of the North Atlantic Alliance (Oxford: Berg, 1993), p. 177; NormanKogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956);

Notes 183

also, Kogan, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy (London: Pall Mall Press,1963).

37. Smith, ‘United States Security and Italy’, p. 149; Egidio Ortona, ‘Italy’s Entryinto the Atlantic Alliance: The Role of the Italian Embassy in Washington1948–1949’, NATO Review, 29(4), pp. 19–33. In August 1948, the US notedthat ‘a strong public sentiment for maintaining a position of neutrality’ stillexisted in Italy, and it was feared that De Gasperi’s election victory ‘did nomore than momentarily consolidate’ the pro-West constituency. Review ofthe World Situation 19 August 1948, Box 204, PSF-NSC Files, HSTL.

38. Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, p. 148.39. Ibid.; Memo of Conversation 11 February 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers,

HTSL.40. FRUS 1948 (III), p. 13. The basic conclusion of the US JCS – that Italy’s inclu-

sion would be less harmful than exclusion – seems to have been shared bythe other parties to the WET talks.

41. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 2 March 1949, AchesonPapers, HSTL.

42. The French view is discussed in Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Bargaining Power AmongPotential Allies: Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty 1948–9’, Review ofInternational Studies, 12(3), pp. 187–203.

43. The British position on Scandinavia is examined in Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Britain,Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty 1948–9’, Review of InternationalStudies, 8(2), pp. 251–68. For the US view, see Geir Lundestad, America, Scan-dinavia and the Cold War 1945–9 (New York: Columbia University Press,1980); NSC 28/1, ‘The Position of the United States With Respect to Scan-dinavia’, NSC Files, PSF Box 204, HSTL; see Lundestad, pp. 74–6 for the devel-oping US concern over the polar strategy.

44. Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, p. 251.45. Oral History: Halvard Lange, HSTL; NSC 28/1, p. 2.46. FRUS 1948 (III), p. 47. Bevin also informed Lange, in absolute secrecy, of the

planned talks on 15 March 1948. Lange replied that ‘a strong body ofopinion’ in Norway would be favourable, but was unsure about Denmarkand Sweden, where he felt that a ‘neutrality complex’ was still prevalent, 15March 1948, FO371/71485.

47. Lundestad, p. 87. In fact, the US had even speculated on the possibility ofbuying Greenland from Denmark; Lundestad, p. 178; also Baylis p. 92; Henderson, pp. 11–12; Kaplan, ‘NATO and the United States’, pp. 20–1; CeesWiebes and Bert Zeeman, ‘The Peutagon Negotiations, March 1948: TheLaunching of the North, Atlantic Treaty’, International Affairs, 59(3), p. 360.

48. Moreover, Norway, Sweden and Denmark had held talks on military coop-eration during 1946–7. One author has argued that these talks may havecontributed directly to later Scandinavian–Soviet tension and the inclusionof Finland into the Soviet bloc. Jukka Nevakivi, ‘Scandinavian Talks on Military Cooperation in 1946–1947: a Prelude to the Decisions of1948–1949’, Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics,19(3), pp. 165–76.

49. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd from Nikolaj Petersen,‘Danish and Norwegian Alliance Policies 1948–9: A Comparative Analysis’,

184 Notes

Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics, 14(4), p. 196,© Sage Publications, 1982.

50. Petersen, ‘Danish and Norwegian Alliance Policies’, pp. 193–210; Memoran-dum of Conversation 11 March 1949, Acheson Papers, HTSL.

51. Lundestad, p. 309. This was an accurate assumption: the Icelandic govern-ment made it plain to Acheson that Norwegian and Danish membership was‘a necessity’ if the North Atlantic Treaty was to be ‘politically palatable’ tothe Icelandic public, FRUS 1949 (IV), p. 22.

52. Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security: The Formative Years (Oslo: Norwegian Uni-versity Press, 1985), pp. 137–8; Reid, pp. 274–5.

53. Olav Riste, ‘The Reluctant European: Norway’s Attitude to Military Integra-tion 1948–50’ in Wiggershaus and Foerster, The Western Security Community,pp. 185–97; Cable 8 February 1948, FO 371/79229/Z1780; Lundestad, p. 353.In talks with the US in September 1948, Lange claimed that public opinionin Norway ‘might not be prepared to accept what would amount to a breakof traditional ties with Sweden until every avenue of cooperation [had been]painstakingly explored’. In other words, the SDU had to be seen to fail. FRUS1948 (III), p. 371.

54. General Marshall regarded the Danish defence problem as virtually insolu-ble, an opinion shared by British and US service chiefs: Lundestad, p. 346.Denmark’s exposed strategic position was one reason why the Brusselspowers were reluctant to extend a Brussels Treaty guarantee. Memo 3 Decem-ber 1948, PSF-NSC File, Box 220, HSTL.

55. Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Abandonment vs Entrapment: Denmark and Military Inte-gration in Europe 1948–1951’, Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of Inter-national Politics, 21(3), pp. 169–86; Reid, p. 198; Lundestad, pp. 214–20.

56. For an account of the Karlstad talks, see Lundestad, pp. 290–38.57. For details of the British plan, see Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the

North Atlantic Treaty’, pp. 260–2. Also FO 371/71458. The US JCS regardeda non-aligned SDU as ‘contrary to United States military interests’, since itwould be ‘ineffective in withstanding USSR efforts to overrun the peninsula’unless linked to the North Atlantic Treaty in some way, FRUS 1949 (IV), p. 101.

58. Ibid., p. 261.59. Cited in Reid, p. 195.60. Albano Nogueira, ‘Portugal’s Special Relationship: The Azores, the British

Connection and NATO’, in Lawrence Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DL:Scholarly Resources, 1985), pp. 80–5; Albano Nogueira, ‘The Making of the Alliance: A Portuguese Perspective’, NATO Review, 28(5), pp. 8–13. The Anglo–Portuguese alliance is examined in Glyn Stone, The Oldest Ally:Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 1936–1994 (London: Royal HistoricalSociety, 1994).

61. DCER 14 (1948), p. 436.62. Ibid., p. 649.63. Cited in Nogueira, ‘Portugal’s Special Relationship’, p. 8.64. Cable 28 April 1948, FO 371/73305; Alvaro Vasconcelos, ‘Portuguese Defence

Policy: Internal Politics and Defence Commitments’, in John Chipman (ed.),

Notes 185

NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Changes (London: Routledge,1988), pp. 93–4.

65. Cable 4 January 1949, FO 371/79218/Z19. For the similar assurances givento Portugal by the US, see FRUS 1949 (IV), p. 19.

66. ‘The Making of the Alliance’, p. 9.67. Anton W. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, 2nd

edn (London: Yale University Press, 1986); Josef Joffe, ‘Europe’s AmericanPacifier’, Foreign Affairs, 54, pp. 64–83.

3 The accession of Greece and Turkey, 1947–52

1. Bruce R. Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and NATO’, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson and Raimondo Luraghi (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 1985), pp. 215–37.

2. Thanos Veremis, ‘Greek Security: Issues and Prospects’, in Jonathan Alford(ed.), Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance (London: IISS, 1984), pp. 1–42,2.

3. Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assis-tance Program 1948–1951 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary ofDefense, 1980), pp. 7–8.

4. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great PowerConflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Guildford, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980), pp. 6–20; David Barchard, Turkey and the West(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the RIIA, 1985), p. 1; Ferenc A. Váli,Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 124–5; Barchard, p. 57.

5. Váli, p. 54; Kemal Karpat, ‘Political Developments in Turkey 1950–1970’,Middle East Studies, 8(3), pp. 349–75. For a summary of the six principles,Váli, pp. 55–6; Feroz, Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975(London: Hurst, 1977) pp. 3–6. Ferudin Erkin also notes that Turkish foreignpolicy is the product of history, geography and Atatürk, Erkin, ‘Turkey’sForeign Policy’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 24(4), pp.122–32. See also George C. McGhee, ‘Turkey Joins the West’, Foreign Affairs,32(4), pp. 617–30; Barchard, pp. 8–12; Barchard, pp. 41–3; Ahmad, p. 390;Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization(London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp. 226–48; George Harris, The TroubledAlliance: Turkish–American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945–71 (Washington, DC: AEI, 1972), p. 16.

6. Barchard, p. 12; Váli, p. 25; Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War, pp. 15–16.7. Váli, p. 115.8. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Recon-

struction and Security of Europe (Brookline, MA: Hellenic College Press, 1984),pp. 7–8; Barchard, p. 12; Váli, p. 115.

9. Theodore Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influ-ences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 15; Victor Papacosma,‘Greece and NATO’, in Kaplan et al. (eds), NATO and the Mediterranean, p.190; Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: The TroubledTriangle (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 10–11, 17–18; Veremis, p. 1.

186 Notes

10. Veremis, p. 23; Couloumbis, The United States, p. 15; Kaplan, A Communityof Interests, p. 8; David H. Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, 1943–1950: Studiesof Polarization (London: Routledge, 1993); Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction, p. 25, see pp. 27–32 for a discussion of Greece and the Truman Doctrine.

11. Couloumbis, The United States, pp. 28, 34–7.12. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman

Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1992), pp. 142–3; On US–Turkish relations prior to the Truman Doctrine, see David J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United Statesand Turkey 1943–1946 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980);Kuniholm, The Near East Connection, p. 16.

13. Melvyn Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States,Turkey and NATO 1945–52’, Journal of American History, 71(4), p. 815; Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, pp. 238–9, 286, 287.

14. Kuniholm, The Near East Connection, pp. 18–19.15. Memorandum of Conversation 12 April 1949, Box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL.16. Harris, p. 40. The Turkish troops played an important role in Korea: General

Walker later said that the US Eighth Army would have suffered ‘annihi-lation’ without the rearguard defensive action by the Turkish soldiers.McGhee, The US-Turkish-Mid. East Connection: How the Truman Doctrineand Turkeys NATO Entry Contained the Soviets (London: Macmillan, 1990)pp. 77–8; FRUS 1950 (III), p. 175; Harris, p. 40.

17. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-warAmerican National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 4; Paul Hammond, ‘NSC68: Prologue to Rearmament’, in Warner R.Schilling et al. (eds), Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1962), pp. 267–378; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power,pp. 355–60; Samuel F. Wells, ‘Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat’, International Security, 4(3), pp. 116–48.

18. Gaddis, Strategies, p. 98; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and theUnited States: An Interpretive History (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 205.

19. Gaddis, Strategies, p. 93; Scott L. Bills, ‘The United States, NATO, and theThird World: Dominoes, Imbroglios and Agonizing Appraisals’, in LawrenceS. Kaplan, Sictor V. Papacosma, Mark Rubin and Ruth. V. Young (eds), NATOAfter Forty Years (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 1990), p. 159.

20. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 449.21. Gaddis, Strategies, p. 102; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 366; Walter

LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–92, 7th edn, p. 97.22. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 332, 361.23. Review of the World Situation 16 August 1950, Box 208, PSF-NSC Files, HSTL.24. Wampler, Robert Allan, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain

and the Foundation of NATO Strategy 1948–1957’ (PhD thesis, Harvard Uni-versity, 1991), pp. 4–5.

25. Ibid, p. 14; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Atlantic Alliance: NATO’sRole in the Free World (London: RIIA, 1952), p. 25; Hamilton Fish Armstrong,‘Eisenhower’s Right Flank’, Foreign Affairs, 29(3), pp. 651–63; Hugh Faringdon, Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the WarsawPact (London: Routledge, 1986), pp. 151–95.

Notes 187

26. Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War’, p. 814.27. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 419.28. Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949–54 (Paris: NATO, 1955), p. 48;

The work of the Council of Deputies is also covered in Robert S. Jordan, TheNATO Staff/Secretariat 1952–7 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

29. For a detailed discussion of the development of NATO’s military commit-tess, and a sharp critique of the Standing Group, see Douglas L. Bland, TheMilitary Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strat-egy (New York: Praeger, 1991). The important role of SHAPE and SACEUR isnoted by John Duffield in Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s ConventionalForce Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

30. FRUS 1950 (I), p. 157.31. Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War’, pp. 818–9.32. FRUS 1951 (III), p. 574.33. The difficulties inherent in the alternative solutions are summarised in FRUS

1950 (III), p. 574.34. Kaplan, p. 119; Leffler, ‘Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War’, p. 821; FRUS

1950 (III), pp. 278–9.35. For an account of the Foreign Ministers meeting, FRUS 1950 (III), pp.

1218–23. The Council of Deputies meeting is covered on pp. 326–7.36. FRUS 1950 (III), p. 237.37. FRUS 1950 (III), pp. 257–61.38. FRUS 1950 (III), p. 283, pp. 279–84.39. McGhee, The US–Turkish–Middle East Connection, pp. 73, 105; Leffler, ‘Strat-

egy, Diplomacy and the Cold War’, pp. 822–3.40. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Life in the State Department

(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), p. 279; FO Minute, 9 April 1951, FO371/96539/WU11923; Cable 4 May 1951, FO 371/96540/WU11923/29. Thetext of the US aide-mémoire is in FRUS 1951 (III), pp. 520–2.

41. FO 371/96544/WU11923/109; FRUS 1951 (III), p. 425; Alan Henrikson, ‘TheCreation of the North Atlantic Alliance 1948–52’, Naval War College Review,37(1) p. 20.

42. Roger Hilsman, ‘NATO: The Developing Strategic Context’, in Klaus Knorr(ed.), NATO and American Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1959); also Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 420; Robert Hunter, Securityin Europe (London: Elek, 1969), p. 103.

43. Cable 18 May 1951, FO 371/96541/WU11923/42.44. FO 371/96540/WU11923/25G; FO 371/96541/WU11923/55G; 9 May 1951,

FO 371/96541/WU11923/37; FO 371/96540/WU11923/25G; Cable 16 May1951, FO 371/96540/WU11923/34.

45. FO 371/96540/WU11923/35.46. Cable 27 July 1951, FO 371/96549/WU11923/220G.47. Cable 29 June 1951, FO 371/96547/WU11923/158G. On the British aim of

involving the US in the Middle East, see Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the UnitedStates and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East 1945–1962 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1996). An FO briefing paper (23 May 1951) onGreek–Turkish membership noted that ‘an aloofness [by the USA] from theMiddle East has always been one of the serious holes in our defence arrange-ments’, FO 371/96542/WU11923/75G.

188 Notes

48. FO minute, 20 July 1951, FO 371/96548/WU11923/203.49. FRUS 1951 (V), pp. 561, 1262; FO Minute 16 July 1951, FO 371/96548/

WU11923/186; FO Minute, 29 June 1951, FO 371/96547/WU11923/158G; FRUS 1951 (III), pp. 592–3.

50. FRUS 1951 (III), p. 561.51. Cable 17 July 1951, FO 371/96548/WU11923/204G.52. Cable 31 August 1951, FO 371/96550/WU11923/246G; Cable 2 August 1951,

FO 371/96549/WU11923/229.53. FRUS 1951 (III), pp. 1250–7.54. FRUS 1951 (III), p. 1262. FO Brief, 31 August 1951, FO 371/WU11923/254.55. Cable 18 May 1951, FO 371/96541/WU11923/45.56. Cable 24 May 1951, FO 371/96542/WU11923/65.57. FRUS 1951 (III), pp. 713–14; FO brief, 20 February 1952, FO 371/

102474/WU11923/35G. FRUS 1951 (III), pp. 592–3.58. Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance

Norms and World Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,1989).

4 The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO, 1949–55

1. Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (London: Aldwych Press, 1981); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

2. Dirk Verheyen, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical and GeopoliticalExploration (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 2–3; Barry Buzan et al.,The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London:Pinter, 1990); Anne-Marie Burley, ‘The Once and Future German Question’,Foreign Affairs, 68(5), pp. 65–83.

3. Verheyen, p. 3.4. C. J. Bartlett, The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers

1880–1990, 2nd edn (London: Longman, 1994), pp. 107–13.5. Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent

(London: Vintage, 1994), p. 13.6. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers:

Mass Opinion, Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 19; Buzan et al., p. 114.

7. Deutsch and Edinger, p. 17.8. Christoph Bertram, ‘The German Question’, Foreign Affairs, 69(2); Verheyen,

p. 36.9. Herman-Josef Rupieper, ‘American Policy Toward German Unification

1949–1955’, in Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn and Herman-Josef Rupieper(eds), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945–1955(Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1993), p. 47.

10. Anton W. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance, 2ndedn (London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 149.

11. DePorte, p. 149; also Wolfram Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy1949–63: International Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford, CA: Stanford

Notes 189

University Press, 1967), pp. 33–77; V. R. Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society,Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1987), p. 184.

12. Garton Ash, p. 2; on Adenauer’s foreign policy, see Frank R. Pfetsch, WestGermany: Internal Structures and External Relations (New York: Praeger, 1988),pp. 178–87; Hans Jürgen Küsters, ‘West Germany’s Foreign Policy in WesternEurope 1949–1958: The Art of the Possible’, in Clemens Wurm (ed.), WesternEurope and Germany: The Beginning of European Integration 1945–1960 (Oxford:Berg Publishers, 1995), pp. 55–85.

13. Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer 1876–1967 (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), p.141; James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interactionof Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p.11. On the German opposition to rearmament, see Gordon A. Craig, ‘NATOand the New German Army’, in William Kaufman (ed.), Military Policy andNational Security (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), esp. pp. 198–204;FO Minute 6 November 1950, FO 371/85057/C7239.

14. Hanrieder, p. 39; Prittie, pp. 145–170; Deutsch and Edinger, pp. 29–30.15. Text of North Atlantic Treaty in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of

European Security: An Interim Assessment (Washington, DC: Brookings Insti-tution, 1995), p. 180.

16. FO Minute 11 May 1950, FO 371/85048/C3183.17. Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 72; Daniel Lerner, ‘Reflections on France in theWorld Arena’, in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds), France Defeats EDC(New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 213.

18. On the origins of the strategy, see James A. Blackwell Jr., ‘In the Laps of theGods: The Origins of NATO Forward Defense’, Parameters, 15(4), pp. 64–75.

19. Gustav Schmidt, ‘ “Tying” (West) Germany into the West – But To What?NATO? WEU? The European Community?’, in Wurm (ed.), p. 137; SteveWeber, ‘Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO’, inJohn Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of anInstitutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 233–94.

20. Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Admin-istration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992),pp. 322, 383–5, emphasis added; FRUS 1950 (III), p. 167; Kaplan, A Commu-nity of Interests, p. 261.

21. The rearmament issue had been the principal item on the agenda of theNATO Council of Deputies for most of the summer of 1950, FRUS 1950 (III),pp. 136–70. In July, a Standing Group report to the Deputies had recom-mended that they work to convince their governments of the need forincreased forces to implement North Atlantic defence, p. 162. The US pro-posal had only been put together as a package after a heated confrontationin Washington between the State and Defense Departments. Acheson, Presentat the Creation: My Life in the State Department (London: Hamish Hamilton,1970), pp. 437–40; Acheson and most of his Department had opposed thepackage deal, fearing (correctly) that it would create serious divisions withthe allies. Acheson, p. 440; also John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolutionof NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1995), pp. 38–47.

190 Notes

22. Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (London:Macmillan, 1980), p. 79; Dirk Stikker, Men of Responsibility: A Memoir (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 297–9.

23. Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Abandonment vs Entrapment: Denmark and Military Inte-gration in Europe 1948–51’, Cooperational Conflict: Nordic Journal of Interna-tional Politics 21(3), p. 178. Moreover, Montgomery had argued that ‘thedefence of Denmark is immensely important to our strategy in the North. IfDenmark is held, we can close the Baltic’. Note 14 July 1951, Bernard Mont-gomery Folder 3, Box 82, Name Series, Pre-Presidential File, DDEL. FO Cable15 July 1950, FO 371/85049/C4574. For a discussion of the interrelationshipbetween Korea, the forward strategy and German rearmament, see Ireland,pp. 185–95; Osgood, pp. 72–85.

24. Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assis-tance Program 1948–1951 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense,1980), pp. 111–2; FRUS 1950 (III), p. 265. Rumours that the US intended toset up a German Army had been circulating for more than a year, and hadhad to be refuted by Truman and Acheson. Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of Inter-national Affairs 1949–50 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 150–1;Jan Van Der Harst, ‘From Neutrality to Alignment: Dutch Defense Policy1945–51’, in John R. Gillingham and Francis Heller (eds), NATO: The Found-ing of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (New York: St Martin’sPress, 1992), p. 38; FRUS 1950 (III), p. 309; Ernst Van Der Beugel, From Mar-shall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of AmericanForeign Policy (London: Elsevier, 1966), p. 262.

25. Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years: 1949–54 (Paris: NATO, 1955), p. 32;Hajo Holborn, ‘Germany’s Role in the Defense of Western Europe’, Proceed-ings of the Academy of Political Science, 26, p. 156; Robert McGeehan, TheGerman Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense AfterWorld War Two (London: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 40; Ismay, p.186.

26. Kaplan, A Community of Interests, p. 115. Calvocoressi also notes Adenauer’sattempts to reassure France about Germany’s future behaviour, and pointsout that ‘the French did not distrust Dr Adenauer or his colleagues. Theyfeared what might happen if the Bonn government were some day sweptaway. Dr Adenauer’s assurances were therefore somewhat beside the point’,Calvocoressi, p. 163; FRUS 1950 (III), p. 353; FO 371/85055/C6002.

27. For an account of the negotiations, see FRUS 1950 (III), pp. 293–312; McGeehan, pp. 49–62.

28. Cable 16 September 1950, FO 371/85054/C5912; FRUS 1950 (III), pp. 406–10;Fursdon, p. 97.

29. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament 1950–1955 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 34; Cable 14 September 1950,FO 371/85053/C5865.

30. Osgood also implies this when he claims that the French put forward EDCas a postponement exercise. Dockrill, p. 41; Osgood, p. 55.

31. McGeehan, p. 11.32. FO Minute 25 September 1950, FO 371/85056/C6218.33. William I. Hitchcock, ‘France, the Western Alliance and the Origins of the

Schuman Plan’, Diplomatic History, 21(4), pp. 603–30.

Notes 191

34. FRUS 1950 (III), pp. 415–28. On the opposition to EDC, see McGeehan, pp.77–8.

35. FRUS 1950 (III), p. 436.36. Kaplan, NATO and the United States, p. 86.37. FRUS 1950 (III), pp. 505–6.38. For an examination of Washington’s change of heart, see Dockrill, pp. 68–73.

On US diplomacy during the EDC negotiations, see James G. Hershberg,‘“Explosion in the Offing”: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy1953–55’, Diplomatic History, 16(4), pp. 511–54. Letter 13 December 1951,Robert A. Lovett Folder 1, Box 72, Name Series, Pre-Presidential File, DDEL;Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect1890–1952 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 507–10. Ike’s supportwas also backed by that of the US High Commissioner for Germany, JohnMcCloy; McGeehan, p. 136; 25 November, PREM 8/1429.

39. For accounts, see Kaplan, pp. 149–53; Acheson, pp. 490–2; David R. Kepley,‘The Senate and the Great Debate of 1951’, Prologue, 14(4), pp. 213–26; TedGalen Carpenter, ‘United States Policy at the Crossroads: The Great Debateof 1950–1’, International History Review, 8(3), pp. 345–516.

40. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance(Boston, MA: Twayue, 1988), p. 48.

41. On the doubts, see Dockrill. Regarding the suspicions, see Geoffrey Warner,‘The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe’, in RitchieOvendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–51(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), p. 75, who notes Bevin’s view ofEDC as ‘a cancer in the Atlantic body’.

42. Stikker; also Fursdon, pp. 126–7; 130–1; McGeehan, pp. 162–3; Van DerHarst, p. 39.

43. FRUS 1951 (V), p. 581. Belgium voiced very similar concerns, pp. 582–3.44. For an examination of the British decision to support EDC, see Dockrill, pp.

73–9; John Young, ‘German Rearmament and the European Defence Com-munity’, in John W. Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s PeacetimeAdministration 1951–1955 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.81–108; Warner, pp. 61–82.

45. Dockrill, p. 97; McGeehan, p. 192. McGeehan describes the Lisbon NAC as‘the zenith of the EDC’s fortunes’.

46. Fursdon, p. 116. This was, of course, very much the prevalent reasoning inWashington as well.

47. Fursdon, p. 132.48. Dockrill, p. 136. An Anglo–American Study Group had briefly looked into

the question in July, but with little tangible result. The US was therefore com-pelled to think quickly after the EDC’s failure. For a clear statement of theiremerging position – which strongly favoured a NATO option – see FRUS1952–4 (V), pp. 1164–70. By the time of the Nine-Power Conference, the UShad finalised a position largely based on this, pp. 1268–71.

49. McGeehan, p. 236.50. Trachtenberg, p. 123.51. Dockrill, pp. 147–9; Cable 10 September 1954, Sept 54 Folder 2, Box 4,

Dulles–Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.

192 Notes

52. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1309.53. The Nine-Power Conference is examined in FRUS 1952–4 (V), pp. 1294–1364;

Dockrill, pp. 143–50.54. Norway and Portugal both argued that the failure of EDC had put the issue

back into the hands of the Alliance, but were overruled. DCER 1954, p. 642.55. DCER 1954, p. 624.56. Dockrill, p. 145.57. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1211; also p. 1154; DCER 1954, p. 624.58. DCER 1954, p. 624.59. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1153; DCER 1954, p. 639.60. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1154.61. FO Minute 8 September 1954, FO 371/113355/WU1198/427; Cable 15 Sep-

tember 1954, FO 371/113357/WU1198/478.62. FRUS 1952–4 (V), pp. 1305–6.63. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1165.64. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1215.65. FRUS, 1952–4 (V), pp. 1335–45.66. 1 October 1954, FO 371/109775/W10714/7.67. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1217.68. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1257.69. Cable 17 September 1954, FO 371/113359/WU1198/539.70. Cable 18 September 1954, FO 371/113359/WU1198/543.71. On Benelux support for the Brussels Treaty plan, Cable 12 September 1954,

FO 371/113359/WU1198/541.72. Cables 12 and 13 September 1954, both in FO 371/113355/WU1198/430.73. FO 371/113363/WU1198/666.74. Cable, 23 September 1954, FO 371/113361/WU1198/600.75. FO Minute 1 September 1954, FO 371/113351/WU1198/331.76. The text of the Treaty is in John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain

and the Formation of NATO 1942–49 (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 152–6.77. FRUS 1952–4 (V), pp. 1356–7.78. Stikker, p. 315; Cable 29 September 1954, Sept 54 Folder 1, Box 4,

Dulles–Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, DDEL.79. Ireland, p. 227.80. 30 January 1954, FO 371/113336/WU1197/68.81. Cable 3 September 1954, Sept 54 Folder 1, Box 4, Dulles–Herter Series, Ann

Whitman File, DDEL.82. The Saar had been an intractable issue. The region was a key industrial

centre, and wartime plans had been made to separate it from Germany.France lobbied unsuccessfully for the region to be incorporated into theFrench economy, and made resolution of the issue a precondition of windingup the Occupation Statute of Germany. Under the Paris Agreement, the Saarwas temporarily placed under a European statute in the WEU, but by 1957German political sovereignty was restored. FRUS 1952–4 (V), p. 1215;Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme Auton, The Foreign Policies of WestGermany, France and Britain (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp.119–22.

83. Michael Stürmer, cited in Ash, p. 21.

Notes 193

5 Spain joins the Alliance, 1982–6

1. Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (London: Elek, 1969).2. The term ‘quasi-alliance’ is from Arthur Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the

West: Ally and Liability (New York: Harper Bros, 1961).3. Federico S. Tulchin, ‘Epilogue’, and Joachín Abril Martorell, ‘Spain: A Sin-

gular Ally’, in Joseph S. Gil and Federico S. Tulchin (eds), Spain’s Entry IntoNATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder, CO: LynneReiner, 1988), p. 165. On Spain’s long-standing absence from the Europeansystem, see Charles T. Powell, ‘Spain’s External Relations 1898–75’, inRichard Gillespie, Ferdinand Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds), DemocraticSpain: Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World (London: Routledge,1995), pp. 11–29; William T. Salisbury, ‘Western Europe’, in J. Cortada, Spainin the Twentieth Century World, pp. 97–120; Paul Preston and Denis Smyth,Spain, the EEC and NATO, Chatham House Paper, 22 (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul for the RIIA, 1984), pp. 24–5.

4. P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London:Longman, 1986), esp. pp. 212–19.

5. Powell, pp. 18–19; Whitaker, p. 4.6. Charles R. Halstead ‘Spanish Foreign Policy 1936–1978,’ in Cortada (ed.),

Spain, pp. 41–96.7. 8 March 1948 in AN 1196/1195/45G, and 21 March 1948 in AN

1239/1195/45G, both in FO 371/68067. For the views of the military, FOMinute 22 September 1948, FO 371/73078/Z8060/2307/72G, FO Minute 8March 1949, FO 371/79235Z2311/1074.

8. FO 371/73075/Z6680/2307/72G.9. For an account of the Madrid Pacts and their significance, see Whitaker, pp.

45–9; Benny Pollack with Graham Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish ForeignPolicy: Spain’s International Relations From Franco to Democracy (London:Pinter, 1987), p. 26.

10. On the post-war isolation of Spain, see Whitaker, pp. 37–40; Pollack, pp.13–21.

11. Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1989).

12. Duke, p. 253.13. Pollack, p. 33. John Davis Lodge, US Ambassador to Spain from 1955 to 1961,

agreed that the Madrid Pacts were ‘predicated on the future stability of thepolitical situation in Spain’. The US therefore acquired an unavoidable inter-est in the stability of the Franco regime. Interview 3, Oral History, HSTL.

14. See, for example, Bilateral Position Paper, Spanish Membership in NATO, 3December 1957, Folder: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Box 47 SubjectSeries, Ann Whitman File, DDEL; FO Minute January 14 1960, in FO371/154154. On the possible effects of Spanish admission on domestic politics, Cable 29 January 1960, in FO 371/154155/WU1193/12.

15. Robert Allen Wampler, ‘Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britainand the Foundations of NATO Strategy 1948–1957’ (PhD thesis, Harvard Uni-versity, 1991), p. 5.

16. Telegram, Acting Secretary of State to Spanish Embassy, 6 March 1951, FRUS1951 (IV), p. 803.

194 Notes

17. Hal Klepak, Spain: NATO or Neutrality? (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s Univer-sity Centre for International Relations, 1980), pp. 65–7; Angel Viñas, ‘Spain,the United States and NATO’, in Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents (eds),Spain: Conditional Democracy (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

18. ‘Introduction’, in James Chace and Earl C. Ravenal, Atlantis Lost: US–European Relations After the Cold War (New York: New York University Press);Walter Laquer, Europe In Our Time: A History 1945–1992 (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1992), pp. 167–96, 415–35.

19. Stephen Gill, ‘Introduction’, in Stephen Gill (ed.), Atlantic Relations: Beyondthe Reagan Era (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. 11.

20. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance(Boston, MA: Twayne, 1988), p. 149, pp. 152–8.

21. Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1982), p.212.

22. Halliday, pp. 212–13.23. Pollack, p. 35; Juan J. Linz, ‘Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices’, in David

S. Landes (ed.), Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977).

24. Pollack, p. 35; also Linz, p. 237.25. Pollack, pp. 153–4.26. ‘Will Spain Deign to Join NATO?’, The Economist, 279, 13 June 1981, pp.

53–4.27. On the almost unanimous support for Spanish membership, see Preston and

Smyth, pp. 1–2, who point out that the situation was almost an exact mirrorof the Cold War position. Also ‘Coy Mistress’, The Economist, 264, 2 July1977, p. 53.

28. Duke, p. 257.29. The Alliance publicly acknowledged this: ‘What Role for Spain in NATO?’,

The Atlantic Community Quarterly, 20(2), pp. 139–42.30. Javier Tusell, ‘The Transition to Democracy and Spain’s Membership in

NATO’, in Gil and Tulchin (eds), Spain’s Entry into NATO, p. 11.31. Gregory Treverton, ‘Spain, the United States and NATO: Strategic Facts and

Political Realities’, in Gil and Tulchin (eds), Spain’s Entry into NATO, p. 136.32. On naval strategy and the European Central Front, see Robert Komer,

‘Maritime Strategy vs Coalition Defénse’, Foreign Affairs, 60(5), pp. 1124–1144.The question of the Sixth Fleet’s strategic configuration is addressed in KenBooth, ‘US Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability and Credibil-ity’, Naval College War Review, 31(1), Summer 1978, pp. 11–28.

33. Preston and Smyth note that in 1981 65 per cent of western oil supply wentvia the Canary Islands, pp. 16–17. For West European states, this figure was90 per cent: Robert S. Jordan, The NATO Staff/secretariat 1952–7 (London:Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 37. Antonio Zea, ‘Should Spain JoinNATO?’, Naval College War Review, 32 (November–December 1979), p. 82.

34. Klepak, p. 35.35. For example, Thomas Carothers argued in 1981 that Spain’s potential mili-

tary contribution to the Alliance was ‘overstated’, and Treverton also arguesthat Spanish participation in the Alliance military structure was basically anirrelevance: NATO’s requirements of Spain, he claims, were all served by theMadrid Pacts. Conversely, Jed Snyder argues that ‘Spain’s military contribu-

Notes 195

tion to NATO is not insignificant’, and that the forces supplied by Spainwould be of clear importance in the West Mediterranean and Canary Islands:Jed Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987). Also The Military Balance 1984–5(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984).

36. Salisbury, ‘Western Europe’, p. 110.37. Snyder, p. 66.38. For a brief account of the Spanish decision to join the Alliance, and Spain’s

wider European security policy, see Jonathan Story, ‘Spain in the EuropeanDiplomatic System’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2(1), pp. 54–78.

39. Martorell, p. 42.40. On Ceuta and Melilla, see Pollack, p. 159; Viñas, p. 46. On Spain’s attempts

to link them with its NATO application, see Viñas, pp. 50–2.41. See Pollack, pp. 137–46, on the difficulties with the EEC application.42. Emilio A. Rodríguez, ‘Atlanticism and Europeanism: NATO and Trends in

Spanish Foreign Policy’, in Gil and Tulchin (eds), Spain’s Entry into NATO, p.63. On the cross-party consensus on the EEC, see Pollack, p. 138, who notesthe ‘total agreement that no economically viable alternative to the EuropeanCommunity existed’.

43. Treverton, pp. 122–6; Rodríguez, p. 66.44. Linz, writing in 1976, comments that ‘One can expect that Spain’s first

democratic government will put high on its agenda radical renegotiation ofthe special relationship with the United States, particularly the agrement onmilitary bases’. Treverton, p. 126; Linz, p. 280.

45. Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘An Introduction to Southern European Transitionfrom Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey’, inGuillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds),Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1986), p. 4.

46. Preston and Smyth, p. 29; also Edward Malefakis ‘Spain and its Francoist Heritage’, in John H. Herz, From Dictatorship to Democrcay: Coping With theLegacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CN: GreenwoodPress, 1982), pp. 215–30; Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain:Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 49–78,79–134.

47. The Economist, 263, 2 April 1977, p. 29; Kenneth Medhurst, ‘The Militaryand Prospects for Spanish Democracy’, West European Politics, 1(1), p. 47. OnJuan Carlos’ reforms, see David C. Jordan, Spain, the Monarchy and the AtlanticCommunity (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979), p.78. Pedro Vilanova, ‘Spain: The Army and the Transition,’ in David S. Bell,Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics After Franco (London: Pinter,1983), p. 145.

48. José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría, ‘Political Change in Spain andthe Prospects for Democracy’, in O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds),Transitions, pp. 89–93; David Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain: FromFranco to the Constitutional Monarchy (London: Quartet, 1985), p. 230;Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, ‘Spain and the Atlantic Alliance’, Survival, 18(6), p.249.

49. Vilanova, p. 145; Sanchez-Gijon, p. 253.

196 Notes

50. Pollack, pp. 112–21; Klepak, pp. 50–62; Jordan pp. 13–15. There had alsobeen some opposition to NATO membership from the far Right. This wasdriven in part by residual resentment at Spain’s long exclusion from theAlliance, but also by concerns about democratisation of the Army and a con-sequent loss of its Francoist identity.

51. Paul Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen, 1986).52. Jonathan Story, ‘Spain’s External Relations Redefined, 1975–89’, in Gillespie,

Rodrigo and Story, Democratic Spain, p. 37. On the widespread assumptionthat Spain would join the military structure, ‘What Role for Spain in NATO?’,p. 140; ‘Spain becomes 16th member of the Alliance’, NATO Review, 30(3),pp. 1–3.

53. Story, p. 37. On the wider ideological development of the PSOE, see DonaldShare, ‘Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the SpanishLeft’, West European Politics, 8(1), pp. 82–103.

54. Story, p. 43.55. Emphasis added. Rodríguez, p. 55.56. The PSOE had three foreign policy pledges in its manifesto: abstention from

East–West polarisation, entry into the EEC and a referendum on NATO. A.Rodríguez, p. 63.

57. Treverton, p. 125.58. Gooch describes Gonzáles as ‘plucking victory from the very maw of adverse

opinion polls’, Anthony Gooch, ‘A Surrealistic Referendum: Spain andNATO’, Government and Opposition, 21(3), pp. 300–16.

59. Duke, p. 259.60. Peck, ‘Dialogue of the Deaf: Spanish Base Negotiations’, Defense News, 15

June 1987.61. Cited in Fernando Rodrigo, ‘Western Alignment: Spain’s Security Policy’, in

Gillespie, Rodrigo and Story (eds), Democratic Spain, p. 61.62. Ibid., p. 64.63. Raymond Aron, ‘Europe and the United States: The Relations Between

Europeans and Americans’, in Landes Western Europe, p. 27.64. Only Ireland, with its own individual security problems in the North, had

managed to divorce belonging to the EEC from NATO membership.

Conclusions

1. See Dana Allin, ‘Can Containment Work Again?’, Survival, 37(1), pp. 60–2.Vlacav Havel of the Czech Republic has alluded to the post-Cold War oppor-tunity for East European states to ‘return home’. See Catherine McArdleKelleher, The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment (Washington,DC: Brookings Institution), p. 86.

Notes 197

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198

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Index

204

Acheson, Dean 38–9, 72, 79Adenauer, Konrad 100, 101, 104,

111, 115, 116, 117, 124–5Atatürk, Kemal 64

Belgium 11, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34and German membership 105,

106and Italian membership 37–8

Bérard, Armand 35Bevin, Ernest 18, 19–20, 41, 53,

106Bohlen, Charles 26, 38, 47Britain 11, 17, 18, 24, 50, 54, 71–2,

75EDC and 109, 110–11 German membership and 102,

104–5, 106–7, 108, 112–13,114–15, 116, 118, 119

Greek/Turkish membership and68, 79, 80–1, 82, 83–4, 91, 92

Italian membership and 28, 30,31, 32, 34, 38–9

Portugal and 47, 49Scandinavia and 40–1, 44, 45–6Spanish membership and 130,

131, 133Brussels Treaty 18, 19–20, 21, 28,

30, 31, 34, 38, 46, 49, 51, 56,116, 117, 118, 163

Canada 21, 26, 34, 38, 54German membership and 106,

114Greek/Turkish membership and

80–1Italian membership and 29Portuguese membership and 48Spanish membership and 133

Clark, Ian 12Cold War 3, 4, 40, 55–6, 62, 64, 66,

69–70, 141end of 1origins 14, 17–18

and NATO membership 50–3,87–8, 88–90, 141–2, 157–9, 160,162–7, 173–4, 175–7

Second Cold War 137–9, 157Containment 16–17, 69–71, 76, 88,

89–90see also NSC-68

Council of Foreign Ministers 18, 75,77, 84, 106

Czech coup (1948) 51–2, 56

Danchev, Alex 25Denmark 11, 20, 21, 26, 27, 42, 53

and German membership 104and Greek/Turkish membership

79, 81, 83, 85Scandinavian Defence Union and

43signing North Atlantic Treaty

43–4, 44–5, 46, 164, 168strategic importance 40, 41–2,

46–7, 59 DePorte, Anton 15Dunkirk Treaty 18–19, 51

EDC 107–11, 112, 114, 116, 117,118, 121–3, 125

Eden, Anthony 115, 116, 117, 118EEC 136, 142, 146Eisenhower, Dwight D. 73, 109, 110,

112, 118ESCSC 107European security system 3–4,

17–18, 21, 63, 100, 127, 128,136, 156, 158, 163–4, 165–6

pre-1945 system 12–14, 128, 145

France 11, 18, 21, 24, 50, 54, 55, 58,75

EDC and 108–9German membership and 104,

105–6, 107, 113Greek/Turkish membership and

68, 83–4, 91

Italian membership and 28–9,34–6, 39

Spanish membership and 131,133

Franco, General Francisco 47, 48,127, 128–9, 131, 132, 133, 139,141, 146, 148, 150

see also Spain

Germany, Federal Republic of 18,19, 127, 128, 129, 130, 161

accession 1, 8, 74, 91, 163, 164,168

creation of 99–102EDC and 109, 110, 111, 115NATO strategy and 103–7, 122–3Paris Agreements 116–19rearmament of 103–7, 107–9,

112–13, 115–18Westernisation policy 100–1WEU and 116–18see also Adenauer, EDC, German

QuestionGerman Question 13, 17–18, 50–1,

96–9, 101, 120–1, 122–3, 125,165, 166

see also European security systemGibraltar 146, 149González, Felipe 146, 147, 153Greece 7, 18, 23, 27, 57, 63, 65–7,

138, 141, 147, 151accession of 1, 8, 85–6, 93, 165,

168, 170, 172and NATO strategy 73–4, 82–3,

84, 86–7, 94strategic importance of 67–8exclusion from NATO 31, 33, 62,

68, 77, 79–80, 81, 94–5

Heuser, Beatrice 6Hickerson, John D. 19, 28, 29, 32,

33, 38

IBERLANT 145, 151, 15Iceland 7, 11, 20, 26, 45

strategic importance 40Ireland 21, 26, 42, 129Ireland, Timothy D. 17, 96–7,

118–19

Italy 7, 11, 20, 21, 23, 27, 68, 141,169

German membership and 106requests membership 36–7, 58North Atlantic Treaty membership

of 28–39, 46–7, 52, 53, 54,57–8, 58–9, 60, 76, 130

Jebb, Gladwyn 117

Kennan, George 16, 23, 27, 33, 34,52, 99–100

Korean War 71–2, 104

Lange, Halvard 41, 46Lorca, Perez 132Luxembourg 11, 18, 21, 106

Marshall Aid 24Marshall, George 18Mediterranean

Pact 31, 35, 76, 92strategic issues in 30

Netherlands 11, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34,38

and German membership 104,105, 106, 110

and Greek/Turkish membership79, 81, 83, 85

and Spanish membership 133,140

NATOCouncil of Deputies in 74–5, 77,

80, 81–2, 84, 86, 106, 108, 109,111, 114, 167–8

NAC 74, 75, 84–5, 104, 106, 109,111–15

post-Cold War 1, 174–7role of US in 5, 54–5, 56, 72,

90–1, 92–3, 123–4, 163–4, 169–71

Second Cold War and 136–9,141–2, 156–9

SHAPE 75, 82, 83, 84, 86, 112Standing Group in 75, 82, 84,

91–2, 103, 109, 116strategy 68, 72–4, 79–80, 82–3,

86–7, 88, 90, 91–2, 102–7,

Index 205

112–13, 122–3, 123–4, 133–4,142–4

taxonomy of membership in 3,6–8, 58–61, 93–5, 123–6, 160–1,171–3

see also Cold War, North AtlanticTreaty

North Atlantic Treaty 11, 24, 28, 45,47, 50, 52, 62–3, 101–2, 103, 118

geographical limits 23, 30, 61ideology in 48, 49, 57, 59–60, 61,

62, 65limited membership of 26–8, 46,

48, 56, 76–8negotiation of 25–8, 53–4, 55–6origins of 18–22, 24–6, 62Washington paper 34, 42, 58Working Group 25

Norway 7, 11, 20, 21, 26, 27, 52, 53German membership and 104,

106, 114Greek/Turkish membership and

79, 81, 83, 85Scandinavian Defence Union and

43, 45–6signing North Atlantic Treaty 40,

42–3, 44, 45, 46, 164, 168Spanish membership and 133,

140strategic importance of 40, 41–2,

46–7, 59NSC-68 70–1, 72, 76, 89

see also containment, US

Osgood, Robert 17

Pentagon Talks (1948) 20–1, 24, 41,42, 48, 130

Pleven, René 107see also EDC

Portugal 7, 11, 18, 26, 27, 39, 42,47–8, 114, 129, 130, 138, 147,151, 168

NATO membership 21, 48–50, 53,60

Spanish membership and 133,134, 140, 145

strategic importance 46, 48, 49,53, 165

PSOE 152, 153, 154, 155

Reid, Escott 29

Salazar, António de Oliveira 47,48–50

Scandinaviastrategic importance 40–2, 52–3see also Denmark, Iceland, Norway,

SDUSchmidt, Helmut 138SDU 42–3, 44, 45–6, 52, 53Soviet Union 3–4, 14, 42, 49, 52,

69threat from 14–18, 41, 45, 64–5,

67–8, 70–1, 88–9, 137, 162, 163see also Cold War

Spaak, Henri 37Spain 7, 18, 47–8

accession decision of 139–40,145–56, 165, 168

alliance with US (Madrid Pacts)131–2, 134–5, 139, 142, 143,146–7, 154, 155–6, 158–9

democratisation in 147–51EEC and 142, 146, 153, 156exclusion from NATO 21, 53, 60,

127, 128, 129–36, 140–1, 165,166

NATO referendum in 151–6NATO strategy and 134, 135–6,

142–5, 151strategic importance of 129–30,

130–1, 143–4Spofford Plan 108–9Sweden 20, 21, 43, 44, 45–6, 164

Truman Doctrine 66, 67, 71Turkey 7, 23, 27, 31, 57, 63, 64–5,

130, 131, 141, 147accession of 1, 8, 62–3, 85–6, 164,

165, 168, 169, 170, 172desire for membership 64, 68–9,

76, 78–9, 90exclusion from NATO 31, 33, 62,

68, 77, 79–80, 81, 94–5

206 Index

NATO strategy and 73–4, 82–3,83–4, 85–7, 93–4

strategic importance of 67–8

United States 11, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26,27, 49, 54, 63, 66, 75, 100, 137,138

alliance with Spain (Madrid Pacts)129, 131–2, 134–5, 139, 142, 143,155–6

Cold War and 16–17, 69–72,88–90

EDC and 108, 109–10, 110German membership and 103–4,

105, 106, 108–9, 111, 114, 115,116, 118–19, 133

Greek/Turkish membership and67–8, 69, 71, 73–4, 75–7, 78–9,82, 84–5, 89–90, 133

Italian membership and 31, 32–4,36, 38–9

Portuguese membership and 47role in NATO 5, 54–5, 56, 72,

90–1, 92–3, 123–4, 163–4, 169–71Scandinavian membership and 40,

41–2, 43, 44, 45Spanish membership and 131,

133

Vandenburg Resolution 40

WEU 116–18see also Brussels Treaty

‘X’ article 16–17see also Kennan, George

Yugoslavia 127

Index 207