notice of appeal case fixing j e steele s p c fraud res
TRANSCRIPT
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDAFORT MYERS DIVISION
DR. JORG BUSSE, et al Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29[JES]-SPC
vs.
APPEAL FROM JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants[Appellees].________________________________________________________/
NOTICE OF APPEAL, FROM CASE-FIXING/BRIBERY, CORRUPTION, CONSPIRACY
UNDER FALSE PRETENSES OFEMINENT DOMAINFRAUD-SCHEME O.R.569/875
IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT
NOTICE OF FRAUD, FALSE PRETENSES, DELIBERATE DEPRIVATIONS, AND
CONCOCTION THAT FORGERY O.R.569/875 IS A LEGISLATIVE ACT
BY JOHN EDWIN STEELE AND S. POLSTER-CHAPPELL
NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM CRIMES BY STEELE AND POLSTER-CHAPPELL
1. The Appellant(s) again appeal from John Edwin Steeles [Steele] and S. Polster-
Chappells [Polster-Chappell] crimes of, e.g., false pretenses, fraud, extortion, and
deliberate deprivations of Appellants well-proven fundamental Constitutionally-protected
rights directly under the 1st, 7
th, 14
th, 4
th, 5
th, and 11
thAmendments. Steele and Polster-
Chappel tampered with self-authenticating public record evidence and witnesses to
Federal and State crimes. Steele conspired to pervert binding precedent, and obstruct
justice and adjudication of Appellants ripe independent Federal and State claims under,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1988, 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, and the 1st, 14
th, 5
th, 11
th, 7
th, and
4th
Amendments.
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MANDATORY RECUSAL OF CRIMINALS STEELE AND POLSTER-CHAPPELL
2. Appellants were entitled to the mandatory recusal ofcase-fixing and corrupt Steele and
Poster-Chappell, because said Judges accepted Appellees bribes in order to obstruct
justice under false pretenses of, e.g., eminent domain fraud and extortion-scheme
O.R.569/875, fraudulent claim of un-platted lot A0 [PID 12-44-20-01-00000.00A0]
and block 1. Steele concealed that Defendant-Appellees Polster-Chappell had been
affiliated with both Defendants State of Florida and Defendants Lee County. Steele
conspired with Polster-Chappell and the other Appellees to conceal the fraud and extortion
underfalse pretenses of lot A0, block 1, eminent domainfraud-scheme O.R.569/875.
See also Transcript of November 2007 Federal Court Hearing before Defendant-Appellee
Polster-Chappell, who concealed the fraud of lot A0 and block 1.
STEELE KNEW NO UNIDENTIFIED/UNDESIGNATED AREASEVER EXISTED
3. In his 05/05/2008 sham Opinion and Order [Doc. # 338, p. 2], Steele stated:
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo Costa Subdivisioncontained certain designated lot and block areas and other undesignated areas. The
Resolution further noted that the plat contained certain un-numbered and unletteredareas lying East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying West of theWesterly tier of blocks in the subdivision.
Here, Steele knew that no undesignated/unidentified areas existed on the west side of
undedicated private Cayo Costa but a platted designated 60 wide street. Steele
conspired to conceal said platted designated 60 wide street. Steele concealed
Appellant(s) perfectfee simple ownership of said adjoining designated 60 wide street as
platted on the 1912 Plat of Survey of the private undedicated residential Cayo Costa
Subdivision. See Plat Book 3, p. 25; www.leeclerk.org.
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JOHN EDWIN STEELE IS A PSYCHO-PATH OLOGICAL LIAR
4. John Edwin Steele is a psycho-path ological liar, who concocted a legislative act/passed
resolution absent any evidence in the public record.
The Countys action in passing the Resolution constituted a legislative act, and
thereforeplaintiff cannot state a procedural due process claim.
Here, Steele and Polster-Chappell concealed that admittedly unsigned and unexecuted
forgery O.R.569/875 could not have possibly been a legislative act, because no
identifiable legislator ever passed, executed, and/or adopted said fraudulent land claim
absent any legal description and boundaries. See forged O.R.569/875.
5. Steele concealed that fake O.R.569/875 could not have possibly applied to anyone absent
any legal description, boundary, execution, etc. The fraudulently claimed
undesignated/unidentified un-numbered areas never existed but a platted designated 60
wide street. Objectivelyunfit and partial Steele unintelligently and irrationally wrote in
Doc. # 338, p. 11:
This is sufficient to constitute a legislative act. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.State Bd. Of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445(1915)(noting that it is impractical to
give every one a voice when a legislative actapplies to more than a few people).
STEELE KNEW NO RECORD OF FICTITIOUSLEGISLATIVE ACTEXISTED
6. No recordorentry of any such fictitiouslegislative actcould be found to exist in the public
records pursuant to Floridas Sunshine Laws and F.R.C.P. 44.
7. Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal that Appellants are the exclusive record
titleholders and owners of their lands, accretions, and said street pursuant to the public
record. Said corrupt Judges concealed that Appellants are the successors-in-title and
interest to the Federal Land Patent conveyance from Defendant-Appellees United States to
A. C. Roesch as publicly recorded in Lee County Book C, p. 110. See Cayo Costa Lot 15A.
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8. Steele and Polster-Chappell removed Appellants action in Lee County Circuit Court, Case #
2006-CA-3185, from State Court to Federal Court. Steele and Polster Chappell conspired to
obstructinquiry, discovery, and responses in order to cover up theircrimes.
STEELE AND POLSTER-CHAPPELL CONCOCTED CONDEMNATION
9. For Appellees bribes, Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal that absent a legal
description and boundaries, inverse condemnation and/or any type of condemnation were
legally and factually impossible. Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to concoctfrivolity
and ripeness requirements in order to obstruct Appellants court access.
STEELE & POLSTER-CHAPPELL CONCEALED WEST PENINSULAR PRECEDENT
10. In West Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach Cty., 41 F.3d 1490(11th
Cir. 1995)1, 11
thCircuit
Chief Judge Edmondson co-wrote:
And, plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious due process claim is ripe. Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action ... Plaintiffs
claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance See Eide v. SarasotaCounty, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.13(11
thCir. 1990).
But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing Murrellv. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5
thCir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33 Acres.
Here for Appellees bribes, corrupt Steele and Polster-Chappell perverted binding
precedent of West Peninsular, Murrell, 16.33 Acres, and Eide, supra. Furthermore, Lee
County itself had cited 16.33 Acres in its Appellate Brief on pp. ii, and 7. With particularity,
Murrell cited Caples v. Taliaferro. 197 So 861(Fla. 1940). The Florida Supreme Court held in
Caples v. Taliaferro, that title to the entire street vests in the owner of the abutting lots
within the subdivision. Here, Appellant abutting Cayo Costa lot owners held perfect title to
said entire designated 60 wide street.
1http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-4449.93-4104.htmlVolume 41, The Federal Reporter, 3d Ed. [Nov., 1994 Jan., 1995]
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STEELE CONCEALED PLATTED DESIGNATED STREET TO DEFRAUD
11. Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal, that in the First Case; Doc. # 5, Lee
County conceded the fraud and absence ofundesignatedareas:
The [Appellant(s)] lot is clearly outlined on the plat map as a 50 x 130 lot
bounded by a street In order for for one to have riparian rights, there must be
an actual water boundary of the land in connection with which such rights are
claimed. Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 310, 17 So. 411, 412(1895).
Here, Appellants had the equal riparian rights of Alice M. S. Robinson, because they
perfectly own their upland, adjoining platted designated street, and accretions thereto
pursuant to the public record on file. Furthermore, Lee County had removed the cloud of
forgery O.R.569/875 in 1998. Steele concealed said removal. Therefore, Appellants title
was free and clear and unencumbered by said fraud-scheme.
THE COURT PERVERTED THE PUBLIC RECORD AND PLAT
12. Here Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal that there was a designated street
and an actual water boundary. In particular, Lee County conceded:
Florida law states: The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the
ordinary high water markof the navigable water in order that rights may attach.
Here, the Federal Courts conspired to conceal that Appellants own the platted
adjoining designated 60 wide street and the accretions thereto, which extend to the
ordinary high water mark of the platted natural boundary of the Gulf of Mexico.
13. Here, the District Court criminallyconcealed that the Appellants own riparian Gulf-front lot
15A, which extends to the ordinary high water markof the Gulf of Mexico. The 11th
Circuit conceded that Appellants are the owners ofriparianGulf-front Lot 15A.
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STEELE PERVERTED AUTHORITIES CITED BY FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL
14. Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal the binding precedent cited by Floridas
Attorney General in, e.g., AGO ## 78-118, and 78-125 regarding platted designated streets
in subdivisions.
STEELE UNLAWFULLY SANCTIONED THE APPELLANTS TO SILENCE THEM
15. Steele unlawfully sanctioned the Appellant(s) in order to obstruct justice and the exclusive
remedy of invalidation of said forgery. Steele conspired with the Appellees and law
enforcement to threaten and intimidate the Appellant whistle-blowers and witnesses to
Steeles crimes of, e.g., false pretenses, deliberate deprivations, fraud, and extortion.
Under public policy, Steele and Polster-Chappell have nojudicial immunity for theircrimes.
STEELE SLANDERED APPELLANTS AS FRIVOLOUSTO GAG THEM
16. Steele conspired to slander the Appellants as, e.g.,frivolous, litigious, and/orvexatious even
though Steele knew that O.R.569/875 was an eminent domainextortion and fraud-scheme.
Appellants were entitled to redress their grievances and to own said lands, private
easements, causes of action, and to exclude Defendant-Appellee governments from the
undedicatedprivate Cayo Costa Subdivision.
STEELE CONSPIRED TO OBSTRUCT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FROM ARSON
17. Under false pretenses ofextortion-scheme O.R.569/875, lot A0, block 1, and frivolity,
Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to obstruct injunctive relief from Appellees life-
threatening fires/arson in and criminal trespass onto residential undedicated Cayo Costa.
STEELE/CHAPPELL FIXED APPELLANTS CASES FOR APPELLEES BRIBES
18. In exchange for Appellees bribes, Steele and Polster-Chappell extended said extortion and
fraud-scheme and fixed Appellants cases. The U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th
Circuit, and
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Steele and Chappell conspired to fabricate unidentified/undesignated areas, which Lee
County had identified as a designated 60 wide street in, e.g., Doc. # 5 and Lee Countys
08-14-2008 Appellate Answer Brief. Said Defendant Judges conspired to fabricateripeness
requirements, which they knew could have never possibly existed under, e.g., Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406(1879); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514,
1517(11th
Cir.1987); Anthony v. Franklin County, 799 F.2d 681, 684(11th
Cir.1986).
STEELE CONCEALED FEDERAL SUBJECT-MATTER-JURISDICTION
19. Steele concealed that Defendant Appellees claims of 11th
Amendment sovereign immunity
alone had invoked Federal subject-matter-jurisdiction. Steele concealed Federal subject-
matter-jurisdiction directly under the 11th
, 1st, 4
th, 14
th, 5
th, and 7
thAmendments. Steele is a
common criminal, who deceives the public about the prima facie nullity and illegality of
eminent domainextortion-scheme O.R.569/875.
STEELE CONSPIRED TO BLOCK COURT ACCESS AND SILENCE APPELLANTS
20. Steele fabricated execution and signatures by Lee County and then disallowed the
Appellants to assertthe illegality and invalidity of said forgery. See Doc. # 338, p. 12:
The copy of the Resolution attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes
that it wassigned, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, andplaintiff willnot be allowed to assert otherwise.
Here, Steele was controverted by the self-authenticating public record evidence, which
proved the absence of any execution/signatures by Lee County, Florida.
21. Steele conspired with the Appellees to conceal Appellant(s) pursuit of State remedies in
Lee County Circuit Court, Case # 06-CA-3185 even though Steele himself removed said
State action to Federal Court. Defendant-Appellees Lee County fabricated in their Appellate
Brief on p. 8:
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Not having alleged any pursuit of state claims in state courts, Busses claim is not
ripe for federal jurisdiction.
22. Here, the Appellees conspired to extort, defraud, and deliberately deprive the Appellant(s)
even though they knew that the Appellants hadpursued the exclusive remedy ofinvalidation
of fraud-scheme O.R.569/875 and damages for Appellees unconstitutional temporary
takings in State Court for years.
23. Steele conspired to conceal that the exclusive remedy was invalidation of said fraud-
scheme and damages for Appellants validly and adequately pleaded
unconstitutional temporary takings and otherripeindependent Federal claims in both
State and Federal Courts.
24. Steele concealed that absent anyLee Countyexecution,signatures, vote count,seal, notarial
acknowledgment, legal description, boundaries, extortion-scheme O.R.569/875 could not
have possibly effected any permanent taking. Steele and Polster-Chappell knew that said
fake land claim concededly effected an unconstitutional temporary taking. Here,
Steele and Polster-Chappell perverted the express prohibitions of the Florida and Federal
Constitutions against any confiscation except for public use in order to defraud and
deliberately deprive the Appellants in exchange for Appellees bribes.
STEELE/CHAPPELL CONCEALED REMOVAL OF CLOUD AND CLEAR TITLE
25. Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal that in 1998 Lee County had removed and
eliminated the cloud of sham unconstitutional land claim O.R.569/875 pursuant to
O.R.2967/1084-1090 and Blue Sheet 980206. Corrupt Steele was a Co-Defendant-Appellee
together with disgraced and corrupt Donald D. Stilwell. Steele and the Appellees conspired
to abuse and treat the Appellants disparately from, e.g., Alice M. S. Robinson, A. C.
Roesch, Janet Lay, and John Lay in order to defraud and deliberately deprive the
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U.S.C. 1983 as a jurisdictional basis for Appellant(s) suit(s). In his sham 05/05/2008
Opinion and Order, on p. 6, Steele stated:
The [Busses] Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction based
on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1983), 28 U.S.C. 1343, Articles 3 and 4 of theUnited States Constitution, and Amendments 4 and 5 of the United States
Constitution (Doc. #288, 7)
Here, Steele defrauded Appellant(s) of their causes of action under false pretenses of a
concocted legislative act and extortion-scheme O.R.569/875. Steele concealed that no
ripeness requirements could havepossibly attached to Appellants FourthAmendment and
Fifth Amendment claims under the indisputable public record evidence in this case.
Steele knew that public use was impossible absent any legal desccription, boundaries,public
purpose/use, and necessity in said forgery O.R.569/875.
STEELE CONCEALED PATENTLY CLEAR JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1331
29. Here, Steele and Polster-Chappell conspired to conceal that Plaintiff-Appellants also had a
direct cause of action under the just compensation clause, and that the District Court had
Federal question jurisdiction under28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court had jurisdiction over
Appellants said claims pursuant to the general Federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331,
for it was evident that their claims involved substantial Federal disputes. Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Coastal Petroleum Corp., 671 F.2d 419, 422-23(11th
Cir. 1982). Appellees Lee County had
also cited Mobil Oil in their Appellate Brief on pp. ii, 7.
WHEREFORE, Appellants demand under mandatory public policy
1. An Order automatically vacating/staying all orders in these sham judicial proceedings,
which were corrupted by said crimes perpetrated by Steele and Polster-Chappell in
exchange for Appellees bribes and forde novo proceedings before an impartialcourt;
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2. An Orderdirecting the Clerk to forward any and all to law pleadings and papers in these
proceedings to law enforcement and Federal and State prosecutors forcriminal prosecution
of corrupt Federal Judges John Edwin Steele and S. Poster-Chappell for deliberate
deprivations under false pretenses that prima facie forgery and eminent domainextortion
and fraud-scheme O.R.569/875 was a legislative act;
3. An Order recusing Defendant-Appellees Steele and Polster-Chappell, because they
conspired to conceal that no unidentified/undesignated areas ever existed on the 1912 Plat
of Survey of the undedicatedprivateresidential Cayo Costa Subdivision;
4. An Orderinitiatingimpeachment proceedings against Steele and Polster-Chappell;
5. An Order for sanctions against all Defendant-Appellees under F.R.C.P. 11 and Section
57.105 for conspiring to conceal the invalidity and illegality of eminent domain
extortion/fraud-scheme O.R.569/875, which all parties knew was a forgery to extort,
defraud, and deliberately deprive the Appellants;
6. An Order for said sanctions, because said Defendant-Appellees conspired to conceal the
interested personsharmed by said fraud-scheme and unexecuted forgery;
7. An Order invalidating O.R.569/875 as an eminent domain fraud-scheme and admittedly
unsigned and executed forgery and enjoining any enforcement thereof;
8. An Orderejecting the public out ofundedicatedprivateresidential Cayo Costa pursuant to
said 1912 Plat of Survey and the self-authenticating public record evidence on file.
____________________________________
/S/DR. JORG BUSSE, Appellant,pro seP.O. Box 7561, Naples, FL 34101-7561
T: 239-595-7074; E-mail: [email protected]
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CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
American Bar Association
Naples Police Department
Lee County Sheriff
Pacific Legal Foundation
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Washington Legal Foundation
Florida Bar
Collier County Sheriff
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David Souter
U.S. Supreme Court Justice
RE: Lee County [FL] O.R.569/875 An eminent domainscam of giant proportions
Case-fixing in the U.S. Court of Appeals
We are writing to you in the matter of the corruption and case-fixing in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th
Circuit.
Common intelligence dictates that residents use designated streets to get to their lots.
Unintelligently, the 11th
Circuit cannot tell the difference between a designated street and
unidentified areas. See Plat Book 3, p. 25 at www.leeclerk.org.
In West Peninsular Title Co.1, corrupt Chief Circuit Judge Edmondson co-wrote:
And, plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious due process claim is ripe. Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action ..Plaintiffs claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance See Eide v.
Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.13(11th
Cir. 1990).
But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citingMurrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33Acres.
For Appellees bribes, Edmondson now changed his mind and conspired to pervert a platteddesignated street into an unidentified area in order to fix Appellants Cases. Here forbribes,ripeness vanished, andjustice is for sale in the 11
thCircuit.
The Appellant(s) also own property in N.H. and wish you the best for your retirement.
/s/ Jennifer Franklin Prescott /s/Dr. Jorg Busse
1http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/41/41.F3d.1490.93-4449.93-4104.htmlVolume 41, The Federal Reporter, 3d Ed. [Nov., 1994 Jan., 1995]
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FILED
U.S. COURT OFAPPEALSELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 5, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 08-13170
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC
JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
KENNETH M. ROESCH, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
versus
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER,
STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND,
KENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 5, 2009)
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Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorg Busse, proceeding pro se, appeals the district courts dismissal of his
third amended complaint in his civil rights action against various state and local
governmental entities and officials in Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and
1985. The district court dismissed Busses federal claims because he had either
failed to adequately plead them or had not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction. In the absence of any viable federal claims, the court declined to
retain jurisdiction over Busses state law claims. Based on our review of the
record and the parties briefs, we AFFIRM the dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida
(the Board) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the Cayo Costa
subdivision as public lands (the Resolution). R10-288 at 9. In the Resolution,
the Board identified the relevant lands by reference to a map of the subdivision
which showed that, along with a number of designated land parcels in the
subdivision, there were also a number of unidentified areas on the eastern and
western edges of the subdivision. Id. The Board laid claim to all of these non-
designated parcels and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for
public purposes. Id.
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Busse asserts that he currently owns Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa subdivision
along with all accretions thereto and that the Resolution violates his property rights
under both federal and state law. Id. at 1. To vindicate his rights, he brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against an
array of state and local parties, including the Lee County Board of Commissioners,
the county property appraiser, and the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection. Id. In his third amended complaint, Busse made six claims:1
unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. 1983; unconstitutional temporary
takings; trespass; conspiracy, fraud, and malfeasance regarding the designation of
certain unplatted lots; conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud; and
oppression or slander of title. Id. at 38. He asserted that an array of statutory and
constitutional provisions supported the exercise of jurisdiction: two civil rights acts
42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343; Articles Three and Four and the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution; the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33
U.S.C. 403); the 1862 Homestead Act, the federal common law doctrine of
The full list of defendants includes: Lee County, Florida; the Board of Lee County1
Commissioners, in their official and private capacities; Kenneth M. Wilkinson, the Lee County
property appraiser, in his official and private capacity; the State of Florida Board of Trustees ofthe Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida, in their official and private
capacities; the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Florida Division of
Recreation and Parks, and the Cayo Costa State Park staff, in their individual and privatecapacities; and Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorney, in his official and private capacity. Id.
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accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. 33313351; and the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. 2201). Id. at 23.
The defendants subsequently filed separate motions to dismiss Busses third
amended complaint, primarily based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim. R10-285, 291, 303, 304. The district court granted these
motions and dismissed Busses third amended complaint. R11-338. In so doing,
the court first found that Busse had made out a valid takings claim but that it had
no jurisdiction over that claim since he had failed to show that he had pursued all
available state remedies before bringing suit. Id. at 710. The court then
concluded that Busse had not made out a valid claim under any of his other alleged
federal bases. Id. at 1015. Given that the court did not have jurisdiction over any
of Busses federal claims, it chose to dismiss his state law claims. Id. at 15. Busse
now appeals the dismissal of all of the claims in his third amended complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district courts legal conclusions regarding subject
matter jurisdiction, including the determinations that a claim is not ripe or that the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc.,
536 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204
(11th Cir. 2006). We also review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
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a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d
823, 826 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).
Since Busse is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008).
On appeal, Busse argues that the district court erred in dismissing his federal
claims. He asserts that his Takings Clause claim was ripe for review and that he
had properly stated claims involving violations of his procedural due process,
equal protection, and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Additionally, we read Busses brief liberally to argue that the2
district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his state law claims. We address these arguments in turn.
A. Takings Clause Claims
Busses brief on appeal does not discuss the other jurisdictional bases cited in his third2
amended complaint Articles Three and Four of the United States Constitution; the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act; the 1862 Homestead Act; the federal common law
doctrine of accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards ofProfessional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. 33313351; and the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act. Generally arguments not raised in a brief on appeal are deemed abandoned. See
Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we agree with thedistrict courts analysis of these provisions and find that none of them could serve as a potential
jurisdictional basis for Busses claims. See, e.g., Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302, 1303 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts can and should sua sponte inquire intosubject matter jurisdiction whenever it appears to be lacking).
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Busse contends that the Resolution constituted an unconstitutional taking of
his property rights in Lot 15A. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of
private property for public use, without just compensation a condition made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V;
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001)
(noting that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Takings Clause applicable to the
States). A plaintiff can bring a federal takings claim only if he can show that he
did not receive just compensation in return for the taking of his property. See Eide
v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720 (11th Cir. 1990). As a result, for a takings
claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he unsuccessfully pursued the
available state procedures to obtain just compensation before bringing his federal
claim. Id. at 721.
In this case, Busses claim would not be ripe because he has not shown that
he attempted to obtain or secure relief under established Florida procedures. Since
at least 1990, Florida courts have recognized that an inverse-condemnation remedy
is available for alleged takings violations. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Busse contends that his claim would still be ripe
since that remedy was unavailable in 1969 when the Board of Commissioners
enacted the Resolution. However, our past circuit precedent dictates that a
Florida property owner must pursue a reverse condemnation remedy in state court
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before his federal takings claim will be ripe, even where that remedy was
recognized after the alleged taking occurred. Id. Accordingly, regardless of
whether Busse has a valid property interest in Lot 15A, because he has not alleged
that he sought and was denied compensation through available state procedures, his
Takings Clause claim would not be ripe for review. We thus conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Busses Takings Clause claim.
B. Procedural Due Process Claims
Busse asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated since Lee
County had no authority to take his land nor jurisdiction over it and because the
Resolution was improperly executed. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. A plaintiff could make a procedural due
process claim by challenging the procedures by which a regulation was adopted,
including the failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing. See Villas of
Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th Cir. 1997); Zipperer
v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). For such a claim to be
valid, however, the plaintiff would have to allege that state law failed to provide
him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378,
382 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
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Based on these standards, we find that Busse has failed to state a valid
procedural due process claim. Florida provides him an adequate post-deprivation
remedy, inverse condemnation, and he makes no argument that this procedure is
inadequate. Even if it was inadequate, though, Busse still would not have a valid
procedural due process claim. The Resolution constituted a legislative act since it
was a general provision that affected a large number of persons and area, 200 acres
in all, rather than being specifically targeted at Busse or his immediate neighbors.
See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir.
2003). Since alleged problems with the adoption of such acts cannot serve as the
basis for a procedural due process claim, Busse could not cite them as the basis for
his claim. See id. (noting that if government action is viewed as legislative in
nature, property owners generally are not entitled to procedural due process).
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Busses
procedural due process claims.
C. Equal Protection Claims
Busse also argues that his equal protection rights were violated because the
Board, in adopting the Resolution, treated differently privately-owned property and
state-owned property. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from deny[ing]3
In his brief on appeal, Busse argues that he experienced different treatment than other3
landowners in Lee County. However, we need not address this argument since he did not
mention this in his third amended complaint and we find that none of the exceptions that wouldallow us to consider an issue not raised before the district court would apply here. See Narey v.
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to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, 1. [T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need
only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated
disparately. Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000)
abrogated on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
Under Florida law, counties can exercise eminent domain over any land that
is not owned by the state or federal government. See Fla. Stat. 127.01(1)(a)
(2006). Since a state landowner would not be subject to the eminent domain power
but Busse, as a private landowner, would be, Busse could not be similarly situated
to a state landowner. Busse therefore cannot rely on his disparate eminent domain
treatment vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim.
Since Busse made no other allegations of disparity in his third amended complaint,
we find that he has failed to plead a valid equal protection claim and that the
district court correctly dismissed this claim.
D. Substantive Due Process Claim
Busse also appears to allege that the Resolution denied him his substantive
due process property rights. Substantive due process protects only those rights that
are fundamental, a description that applies only to those rights created by the
Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing the exceptions to this general rule).
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United States Constitution. See Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook,
City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Property rights would
not be fundamental rights since they are based on state law. See id. Busse thus
could not bring a viable substantive due process claim based on the alleged denial
of a state-defined property right. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district
court properly dismissed his substantive due process claims.4
E. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Busse also contends that the court abused its discretion in not hearing his
pendent state law claims. The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
pendent state claims rests within the discretion of the district court. Raney v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 108889 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Since the
district court had dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it
therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Busses
state law claims. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage
district courts to take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed pre-
trial. See Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
The district court, in addressing Busses substantive due process claim, mentions that4
assertions of irrational and arbitrary government action could not serve as the basis for such a
claim. Even under a liberal reading of Busses complaint, though, we do not think he made suchallegations. In the third amended complaint, he discusses takings violations and procedural
problems with the enactment of the Resolution but never questions the rationale for its passage.
Accordingly, we need not address whether he has a valid substantive due process claim based onarbitrary and capricious government action.
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its discretion when it chose not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Busses
state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Busse contends that the district court incorrectly dismissed his federal claims
regarding alleged takings and deprivations of property rights. Since Busses
takings claim was not ripe because he had not pursued available state remedies and
he failed to adequately plead his other federal claims, the district court correctly
dismissed all of these claims. As a result, despite Busses objections to the
contrary, the district court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in not
exercising jurisdiction over his state law claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
district courts dismissal of Busses third amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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41 F.3d 1490
WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.Cooper,
for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board ofCounty Commissioners of Palm Beach County,
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.
Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.
Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.
Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.
Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendantsraise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court inthe joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.
1
The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and OtherUnexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to localOrdinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the
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"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests inproperty originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," theCounty issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferredownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the Countyattempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that,according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County.
Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as anunconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of theirproperty.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted thededication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that theCounty had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. Thedistrict court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simpleowners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying theOrdinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.Defendants appeal.
3
The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could notpossibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But givenplaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the recordsupports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this casebecause the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the districtcourt. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs weresuccessors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to adecision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is theirproperty.
4
But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citingMurrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33
Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is thatplaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguingthat it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because thedistrict court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, hadthe better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court'sorder. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss thiscase for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had theburden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5AWright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County'scitation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoininglandowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).
5
And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (assertingownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions whichtransferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the Countyapplied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundableapplication fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).
6
The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in
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district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrialstipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, itshould not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in thestipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims fordeclaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.
The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulationas a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right tomake several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed ofmotions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury'sconclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement ofpretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11thCir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of thestipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County'spost-verdict motions.
8
Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
9
Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District ofFlorida, sitting by designation
*
Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' titlebecause title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee.Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued
to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
1
"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County'sargument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing couldnot possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of thisclaim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case ofUnited States v.16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the governmentexpressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
2
Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. Wedo note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requestedif plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
3
Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11thCir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction wasstipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that
4
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the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County arguesfrivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain oftitle; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors ininterest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
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