nsi discourse analysis case study south china sea...

January17 2016DiscourseIndicatorsofGray

ZoneActivitySub-Title:SouthChinaSeaCaseStudyPreparedfor:StrategicMulti-LayerAssessmentunderContractGS00Q09BGD0050

Organization:NSI,Inc.LawrenceA.Kuznar,[email protected],[email protected],[email protected] AdministrativePOCLawrenceA.Kuznar BryanRasmussen8FaneuilHall 8FaneuilHallBoston,MA,Zip Boston,MA,Zip260-582-9241 [email protected] [email protected]

DeeperAnalyses.ClarifyingInsights.BetterDecisions.

www.NSIteam.com

L e a d i n g D i s c u r s i v e I n d i c a t o r s o f G r a y Z o n e A c t i v i t y : S o u t h C h i n a S e a C a s e S t u d y

1

TABLES....................................................................................................................................................................3

FIGURES...................................................................................................................................................................4

EXECUTIVESUMMARY........................................................................................................................................5

INDICATORS&WARNINGS(I&W)..........................................................................................................................5PREDOMINANTCONCERNSOFREGIONALACTORS..................................................................................................5USEOFEMOTIONALLANGUAGE...............................................................................................................................5

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................................6

METHODOLOGICALTERMS...............................................................................................................................8

CODEBOOKTYPOLOGY..............................................................................................................................................8WHOISANALYZED?..................................................................................................................................................9KEYMETRIC:DENSITY...........................................................................................................................................10METRICSFORSENTIMENTANDTHEUSEOFEMOTIONALLANGUAGE.................................................................11TEMPORALUNITSANDANALYZINGI&W.............................................................................................................11

LEADINGINDICATORSOFGRAYZONEACTIVITY:SOUTHCHINASEACASESTUDY...................13

LEADINGINDICATORSOFGRAYZONEACTIVITY:CHINA.....................................................................................13LEADINGINDICATORSOFGRAYZONEACTIVITY:PHILIPPINES..........................................................................17LEADINGINDICATORSOFGRAYZONEACTIVITY:VIETNAM................................................................................21

PREDOMINANTCONCERNSOFREGIONALACTORS...............................................................................23

PREDOMINANTCONCERNS:CHINA........................................................................................................................23PREDOMINANTCONCERNS:PHILIPPINES.............................................................................................................24PREDOMINANTCONCERNS:VIETNAM...................................................................................................................26

USEOFEMOTIONALLANGUAGE...................................................................................................................27

CONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................................................................................28

INDICATORS&WARNINGS(I&W).......................................................................................................................28PREDOMINANTCONCERNSOFREGIONALACTORS...............................................................................................28EMOTIONALLANGUAGEANDDECISIONCALCULUSOFREGIONALACTORS........................................................28

APPENDIX:GRAPHICALREPRESENTATIONOFCHINESEINDICATORS&WARNINGS...............30

APPENDIX:KEYDATESANDEVENTS.........................................................................................................37

APPENDIX:NARRATIVEOFHISTORICALEVENTS..................................................................................41


2

NARRATIVE.............................................................................................................................................................42

APPENDIX:SOURCEDATA..............................................................................................................................58

APPENDIX:GRAYZONECODESYSTEM......................................................................................................62

REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................................................69


3

TablesTable1.ChineseSpeakersAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy...........................................................9

Table2.PhilippineandVietnameseLeadersAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy............................10

Table3.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:China..........................................................................13

Table4.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:Philippines..................................................................17

Table5.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:Vietnam......................................................................21

Table6.PredominantConcernsofChina.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.......................................................................................................................................24

Table7.PredominantConcernsofPhilippines.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.............................................................................................................................25

Table8.PredominantConcernsofVietnam.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.............................................................................................................................26

Table9.UseofEmotionalLanguage.........................................................................................................27

Table10.KeyDatesandEventsinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy................................................................37

Table11.ChineseGovernmentSpeechesAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy.................................58


4

FiguresFigure1.GrayZoneEventFrequenciesintheSouthChinaSea2002–2016...........................................12

Figure2.MeanDensityofEqualityandRightsThemeandFrequencyofGrayZoneEventsInitiatedbyChina.(Notethepeaksinthemeusebeforefirsthalfof2004,2006,2009,2012andlasthalfof2012,2014)........................................................................................................................................14


5

ExecutiveSummaryTheincreasinguseofemotivethemesandrhetoricaldevices(thatamplifyamessage’semotionaleffect)provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and VietnamesegovernmentofficialsduringpeaktimesofconflictintheSouthChinaSeafrom2002to2016.Theleadingindicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presentedseparately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant nationalconcerns.

Indicators&Warnings(I&W)The 16-year period examinedwas divided into six-month periods, andmeasures of theme use werecorrelatedwiththefrequencyofgrayzoneactivityinitiatedbyeachactorinthesubsequentperiod.Thisenabled identification of indicators and warnings approximately six months in advance of gray zoneactions.

• ThespecificthemesthatindicatedChinesegrayzoneactivityincludedConspiracy,Self-defense,EqualityandRights,GrayZoneActivities,andDomesticDevelopment.

• Criminal/Illegal,Borders/Territory,Crime,Oil/Gas,Materiel,Protests,Friendship,andChinaweretheprimaryindicatorsforthePhilippinegrayzoneactivity.

• Aggressor/Aggression, Legitimacy, Economy and Trade, UN, and Lexicalization indicatedVietnamesegrayactivity.

PredominantConcernsofRegionalActorsThe themes that occur statisticallymoreoften for each actor provide an indicator ofwhat issues aremostimportantforthatactor.

• Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments share a mutual concern for their borders,theirterritories,andtheirownnation’sprosperity.

• China also outwardly reveals their preoccupations with peace, stability, sovereignty,cooperation,andtheSouthChinaSea.

• The Philippines, like the Chinese, also display a strong concern about the South China Sea,cooperation, China, and sovereignty and also have a strong interest in conflict, equality andrights,theireconomyandtrade,andformalagreements.

• Vietnam,likethePhilippines,ispredominatelyconcernedwithconflictaswellaspeace,liketheChinese,andsecurity.

UseofEmotionalLanguageTheuseofemotionallanguage(themesthatevokeemotionsuchasPride,orrhetoricaldevicessuchasSarcasm)indicatestheimportanceofanissueforanactor.

• The Vietnamese used over twice as much moderate to extremely negative language as theChinese did when discussing South China Sea matters and the countries involved. This may


6

indicatethattheyfeelmostthreatenedbyChineseactionsintheSouthChinaSea.TherewerenostatisticallydiscernabledifferencesbetweentheChineseandPhilippineleaders.

http://ifair.eu/en/think/english-benign-or-bellicose-china-and-the-south-china-sea-the-ambiguities-of-the-peaceful-rise-paradigm/

IntroductionPeople both knowingly and unknowingly signal their values and intentions through theway they uselanguage(Beeman,2001;El-Badawy,Comerford,&Welby,2015;Fairclough,2001;Rahimi&Sahragard,2006;vanDijk,2005).Thematicanalysisfocusesonthemespeopleemploythatrevealwhatmatterstothem(Braun&Clarke,2006;Guest,MacQueen,&Namey,2012;Ryan&Bernard,2003),whilediscourseanalysis focuses on the linguistic tools people use to deploy and emphasize these themes (Farnell &Graham,1998;Schiffrin,2003;vanDijk,2005).Theapproachusedinthisstudycombinesboththematicanalysis anddiscourseanalysis to identifywhat issuesmattermost toa speaker and towhatdegree.Because people are often unaware of the extent to which they signal their values and intentions,identification of key themes can provide early indicators and warnings (I&W) in advance of politicalaction. The authors have employed this approach in studies of both state (Fenstermacher, Kuznar,&Yager,2012;Kuznar,2013,2014,2016b;Kuznar,Popp,&Peterson,2016;Kuznar,Suedfeld,Morrison,&


7

Spitaletta,2014;Kuznar&Yager,2013,2016;Kuznar,Yager,Clair,&Stephenson,2012)andnon-state(Kuznar,2016a;Kuznar&Hunt,2015;Kuznar&Moon,2014;Kuznar&Yager,2012)actors.

ThisstudyisbasedontheanalysisofkeyleaderspeechesandstatementsfromChina,Philippines,andVietnam spanning the period from 2002 to the first half of 2016. The corpus was composed of 45speeches (China:24,Philippines: 9,Vietnam:12) inwhich regional leadersdiscussedSouthChinaSeadisputes.

Theprimaryresultsofthisstudyaredetailedafterabriefdescriptionofsomekeymethodologicalterms.Supportinginformationisfoundinthefollowingappendices:


8

• Appendix:KeyDatesandEvents• Appendix:NarrativeofHistoricalEvents


9

• Appendix:SourceData• Appendix:GrayZoneCodeSystem


10

MethodologicalTerms

CodebookTypologyThecodebookisataxonomyofthemesandrhetoricaldevicesthatrepresenttopicsmentioned,persons,places,things,ideas,andwaysofusinglanguagethatamplifythesentimentassociatedwiththethemes.Thefollowingtermsdescribethehigher-levelcategoriesofthecodebooktaxonomy.1

• Theme – something that canbenominalized (named); canbe a person, place, thing, idea, oremotion

• Emotive Theme – themes that convey emotion (sentiment); their mere mention evokes anemotiveresponse

• RhetoricalDevice–awayofusinglanguagetoamplifyordampensentimento Includes repetition, sarcasm, intensifiers (very, huge), lexicalization (special word

choice),pejoratives(trashtalk),useofkinterms,etc.

ThePrimaryCategoriesofthetaxonomyinclude:

• Polities–countries,formalorganizations,regions,andsub-stategroups• CulturalEmotiveValues–themesthatevokeemotionsinaudiences

o Negative Extreme Emotive – a cultural theme that tends to evoke an extremelynegativeresponse

o NegativeNormalEmotive - a cultural theme that tends toevokeanegative responsethatisnotextremelynegative

o PositiveExtremeEmotive-aculturalthemethattendstoevokeanextremelypositiveresponse

o PositiveNegativeEmotive - a cultural theme that tends toevokeapositive responsethatisnotextremelypositive

• PoliticalFactorso Positive Cohesive Concerns – political concerns that tend to lead to notions of

cooperationo DisruptiveSecurityConcerns–politicalconcernsthattendtoleadtoconflicto OtherSecurityConcerns

• RhetoricalDevices–waysofusing languagethatamplifyordampenthesentimentassociatedwithatheme

Thesecodeswereappliedto8136segmentsoftext,providingthebasicstructureddatabaseuponwhichtheanalysesinthisreportarebased.

1Asaconvention,actualthemesandrhetoricaldeviceswillbecapitalizedanditalicizedthroughoutthetextinordertodifferentiatethemfrommoregenericusesoftheterms.Whenappropriate,footnotesdefiningthemeswillbegiven.


11

WhoisAnalyzed?StatementsandspeechesfromthefollowingkeyleadersinChina,Philippines,andVietnamwereanalyzed.

Table1.ChineseSpeakersAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

Group Speaker(s) Position(s)ChineseGovernment KongQuan MinisterofForeignAffairs

WuHongbo ChineseAmbassadortothePhilippinesLiuJianchao ChiefSpokespersonfortheMinistryof

ForeignAffairsZhangQiyue SpokespersonfortheForeignMinistryQinGang SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeign

AffairsLiJinjun ChineseAmbassadortothePhilippinesWenJiabao PremierWangYi ChineseAmbassadortoJapan,Directorofthe

TaiwanAffairsOffice,MinisterofForeignAffairs

JiangYu SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeignAffairs

MaZhaoxu SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeignAffairs

LiuXiaoming ChineseAmbassadortoNorthKoreaHongLei SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeign

AffairsTongXiaoling AmbassadorofChinatoASEANYangJiechi ForeignMinisterLiuWeimin SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeign

AffairsHuaChunying SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeign

AffairsXiJinping PresidentLiuZhenmin ViceMinisterofForeignAffairsYangYujun DefenseMinistrySpokesmanGengYansheng DefenseMinistrySpokespersonQuZhe ChineseAmbassadortoEstoniaFanChanglong ViceChairmanoftheCentralMilitary

CommissionSunJianguo DeputyChiefofStaffLuKang ForeignMinistrySpokespersonTianXuejun SpokespersonfortheMinistryofForeign

AffairsZhangPing ChairmanoftheNationalDevelopmentand

ReformCommission


12

Table2.PhilippineandVietnameseLeadersAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

KeyMetric:DensityThekeymetricformeasuringthemesisDensity:thenumberoftimesathemeoccurredinadocumentor speech,dividedby thenumberofwords in thatdocument.Thisprovidesanormalizedmeasureofhowoftenathemeisusedthatcanbecomparedacrossdocumentsandbetweenauthors,groups,etc.Comparison of densities between themes also places a theme in a broader context, guarding againstbiasinjudgingtherelativeimportanceofthemes.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatthemoredenselyathemeisused,themoreimportantitistotheauthor,andpotentially,toanaudience.

Themedensitieswerecalculatedforeachdocument,andthevariationsofthesedensitiesthroughtimewereusedto identifytrendsandpossible indicatorsandwarnings(I&W).Onlythosetrendsthatwerestatisticallysignificantatthe.05levelorlessarereported.

GroupPhilippineGovernment

Speaker(s) Position(s)BenignoAquinoIII PresidentAlbertdelRosario SecretaryofForeignAffairsRaulHernandez PhilippineAmbassadortoSouthKoreaEdwinLacierda PresidentialSpokespersonOfficialDepartmentofForeignAffairsStatements

DepartmentofForeignAffairs

VietnameseGovernment LeDung ForeignMinistrySpokespersonNguyenMinhTriet PresidentNguyenTanDung PrimeMinisterPhamGiaKhiem MinisterofForeignAffairsNguyenPhuongNga AmbassadorofVietnamtotheUNNguyenDuyChien ForeignMinistrySpokespersonTruongTanSang PresidentTranDuyHai DeputyChairmanoftheNationalBoundary

CommitteefortheMinistryofForeignAffairs

NguyenQuocThap PetroVietnamDeputyDirectorGeneralPhamBinhMinh MinisterofForeignAffairsNguyenXuanPhuc PrimeMinisterTranDaiQuang President


13

MetricsforSentimentandtheUseofEmotionalLanguageTheuseofrhetoricaldevicesandemotionallychargedthemesarewaystointerjectemotiveappealintoanargument.Whendoneunwittingly,thisisanindicatorthatthespeakerisinamoreemotivestate,asopposed to a more rational, deliberative state. Therefore, the ability to detect departures from arational state of mind can provide clues that the speaker’s decision calculus is departing from thedeliberative,cost/benefitcalculuswhichisattheheartoftraditionaldeterrencetheory(USSTRATCOM,2006).

In order tomeasure the use ofmore emotive language, themeswere classified as ExtremeNegativeEmotive, Negative Emotive, Extreme Positive Emotive, Positive Emotive, and Rhetorical Devices andwerecoded(Appendix:GrayZoneCodeSystem).Eachofthesecategorieswastalliedforeachdocumentand subsequently normalized as densities. In addition to these categories, the ExtremeNegative andNegative Emotive themeswere summed aswere the Extreme Positive and Positive Emotive themes.Thisprovidesninemeasuresoftheuseofemotivelanguageagainstwhichdifferentactorsorspeakerscanbecompared.

Themeandensitiesofthesemeasureswerecomparedbetweenallactorsinordertogaugewhetherornotdifferencesinrhetoricalstyleindicatedifferentlevelsofemotionalityintheirlanguage.

TemporalUnitsandAnalyzingI&WThe sheer quantity of both statements and gray zone actions in the South China Sea presents achallengeforanalysis.Therearenosignaturegrayzoneeventsbeforeandafterwhichonecanassesslanguageuse.Instead,thereisaconstantlevelofactivitythateruptsintograyzoneactionswithvariedfrequencies.We divided the time span into six-month periods. The frequency of gray zone activitiesrangedfromnonetoteninanyoneperiod,althoughtherehasbeenasteadyincreaseovertime(Figure1).


14

Figure1.GrayZoneEventFrequenciesintheSouthChinaSea2002–2016

Theregion’sleadersalsomakefrequentstatementsregardingdisputesintheSouthChinaSea,providinganalystswithanabundanceofmaterial thatcanbeanalyzed for indicatorsandwarnings.Therewereenoughspeechesthroughout thetimeperiodtoallowforaggregationofourdiscoursemetricswithineach timeperiod.Thispermitteda timeseriesanalysisbetweenprevious six-month timeperiodsandtheoverallfrequencyofgrayzoneactivitiesinthesubsequenttimeperiod.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatanindicatorwillincreaseintheperiodbeforetheactiontakesplace.Dependingonexactlywhenaspeechwasdeliveredandwhengrayzoneactivitiespeaked,anindicatororwarningcouldtakeplaceanywherefromaboutamonthuptoayearinadvance,withamedianofsixmonths.

Themesthatcorrelatewithlaggedgrayzoneeventfrequenciesareclearlyadvanceindicators.However,astrongertestofthestrengthofthesesignalsiswhetherornottheyuniquelycorrelatewithgrayzoneeventfrequencies. Inotherwords, ifathemecorrelatesonly inthepreviousperiodandnotduringoraftertheperiod,thenitwouldserveasaparticularlystrongindicator,andgivenitsuniquecorrelationwitheventsinasubsequentperiod,wouldbemoreeasilydetected.Therefore,theanalysiswillcomparethemedensities laggedwith the subsequent timeperiodwith thoseduring theperiodwhen thegrayzoneeventsoccurredinordertoidentifythestrongestindicatorsandwarnings.

Finally,inmostcases,thereisfairlyreliableinformationonwhoinitiated,orwastheaggressor,inagrayzone event for this case study (Appendix:Narrative ofHistorical Events). Therefore, the frequency ofgrayzoneeventsusedfortheanalysisisthefrequencyofeventsinwhichthegroupunderanalysiswastheactualaggressor.

R²=0.16529

012345678910

GrayZoneEvents


15

LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:SouthChinaSeaCaseStudyStatistically significant trends in the occurrence of themes and rhetorical devices identified leadingdiscursiveindicatorsofgrayzoneactivity.

LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:ChinaChineseleadersexhibitedindicatorsandwarningswithfivethemesandtworhetoricaldevices(Table3).Inallcases,theunlaggedcorrelationsweresmallandstatisticallyinsignificantwhencomparedtothe6month lagged correlations. Therefore, the themes and rhetorical devices identified as indicators andwarningspresentparticularlystrongsignalsthatshouldbeeasilydetected.

Table3.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:China

Code Statistics 6MonthLag

NotLagged

Conspiracy R 0.639 0.011sig. 0.001 0.959

Self-Defense R 0.435 0.040sig. 0.034 0.849

EqualityandRights R 0.397 0.291sig. 0.055 0.157

GrayZoneActivities R 0.418 -0.120sig. 0.042 0.568

DomesticDevelopment R 0.511 -0.007sig. 0.011 0.974

RhetoricalQuestion R 0.648 -0.034sig. 0.001 0.871

Sarcasm/Irony R 0.503 -0.059sig. 0.012 0.781

The actual density of a theme (ex. Equality and Rights) and the degree to which it increases beforeincreasesingrayzoneactivitiesisdepictedinFigure2.Whilethecorrelationisnotperfect,insixoftheperiods(beforefirsthalfof2004,2006,2009,2012andlasthalfof2012,2014),therearenotablepeaksin thedensitywithwhichthis themeoccurssixmonths inadvanceof thepeak ingrayzoneactivities.Graphs depicting the lead-time for all Chinese indicators are found in Appendix: GraphicalRepresentationofChineseIndicators&Warnings.


16

Figure2.MeanDensityofEqualityandRightsThemeandFrequencyofGrayZoneEventsInitiatedbyChina.(Notethepeaksinthemeusebeforefirsthalfof2004,2006,2009,2012andlasthalfof2012,2014)

ThespecificthemesthatindicatedChinesegrayzoneactivityincludedConspiracy,Self-Defense,EqualityandRights,GrayZoneActivities,andDomesticDevelopment.

Conspiracy

The Chinese frequently accuse foreign powers of conspiring against them, and these accusationsincreasebeforeChinaengagesingrayzoneactivities.ApotentialreasonforthistrendcouldbethattheChinesebecomemoredefensiveandon-edgewhentheyareawareofacontroversialactionthattheyareabouttoinitiate.

ConspiracyExample:

“The US spy plane flew close to the airspace of China’s Hainan Island for espionage.” (YangYujun,26May2016)


17

Self-Defense

The Chinese increase their assertion of their right to carry out actions or defend themselves beforeengagingingrayzoneactivities.ThiscouldbebecausetheChineseareawarethatothercountriesmaytrytoretaliateagainstthemaftertheirgrayactionor,alternatively,ifthegrayactioncanbearguedasanactofself-defense,theChinesemaywanttoemphasizetheideaofself-defensepriortotheevent.

Self-DefenseExample:

“What I want to point out is that China sticks to the path of peaceful development and anationaldefensepolicythatisdefensiveinnature.”(HongLei,10June2011)

EqualityandRights

TheChineseincreasetheassertionoftheirrightstodefendthemselvesbeforeagrayzoneactivity.TheChinesemaychoose toemphasize theirequalityamongotherAsiancountriesand theirargued rightsbeforeinitiatingagrayactivitytodefendthemselvesagainstforeignnations’accusations.

EqualityandRightsExample:

“Oil and gas exploration activities by any country or company in the waters under China'sjurisdiction without permission of the Chinese Government constitutes violation of China'ssovereignty,rightsandinterests,andthusareillegalandinvalid.”(JiangYu,25March2011)

GrayZoneActivities

TheChineseincreasinglymentionGrayZoneActivitiesthemselvesbeforeexecutingagrayzoneactivity.

GrayZoneActivitiesExample:

“Chinahasmadesolemnrepresentationswith thePhilippinesideover itswarshipsandpetrolboats' harassment of Chinese fishing boats and fishermen inwaters off theHuangyan Island.The Philippine side's so-called "law-enforcement" in thewaters off theHuangyang Island is aviolationofChina'ssovereignty.Itgoesagainstthetwocountries'consensustomaintainpeaceandstabilityoftheSouthChinaSeaandnottocomplicateormagnifythesituation.CompetentChinese authorities have sent ships on official duty to relevant waters. Currently, Chinesefishermenandfishingboatsaresafe.”(LiuWeimin,11April2012)

DomesticDevelopment

The Chinese discuss their Domestic Development and their need for it, especially with regards toeconomicdevelopment,beforeengaginginagrayzoneactivity.ThisisalsoanindicatorthateconomicmotivesmayunderlieoratleastbeconjoinedwithlargerpoliticalandstrategicmotivesthattheChinesehaveforexpandinginthePacific.

DomesticDevelopmentExample:


18

“Itsdevelopmentisuneven,asmanyareasremainbackward.ForChinatobefullydeveloped,itwill take the unremitting efforts of several generations, or even a dozen generations of theChinese people. China thus needs a durable and peaceful international environment thatenablesittoconcentrateoneconomicdevelopment.”(WenJiabao,12December2005)

Inadditiontothefivethemesthatindicatedgrayzoneactivity,theChineseincreasedtheiruseoftworhetoricaldevicesbeforeincreasingtakingpartingrayzoneactivities.

RhetoricalQuestion

TheChineseincreasedtheiruseofposingRhetoricalQuestionsinastrategytopresenttheirargumentsandtojustifyactionstheyweregoingtotakeinthefuture.

RhetoricalQuestionExample:

“Ifpeacefuldevelopment isthepathtowardprosperity,thenwhyshouldChinachangecourseandtakeariskierapproachonceitgetsstronger?”(QinGang,29September2011)

Sarcasm/Irony

TheChinesealsoincreasedtheiruseofSarcasminadvanceofincreasingtheirlevelofgrayzoneactivity.Thisuseofsarcasmindicatestheirfrustrationsandsortofpassive-aggressiveangertowardsthecurrentstateofSouthChinaSearelations;however,theydon’twanttoexpressthefeelingofblatantanger,sotheymayimplementsarcasminstead.

Sarcasm/IronyExample:

“Moreover,asforwitnessesapprovedbytheArbitralTribunal,onewitnessoncementionedinhiswritingsthat"atleast12oceanterrainscanbeclassifiedasislandsinNanshaQundao,so200nauticalmilesofexclusiveeconomiczonecanbeclaimed".However,whenstoodasthewitnessintheArbitralTribunal,hewithdrewhispreviousviewandsaidthat"noneofthemareislands".Whatanexpert!”(LiuZhenmin,13July2016)


19

LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:PhilippinesPhilippine leadersexhibited indicators andwarnings inadvanceof theirowngray zoneactivitieswitheight themes and in three metrics of emotional language (Table 4). In all cases, the unlaggedcorrelations were small and statistically insignificant when compared to the 6 month laggedcorrelations.Therefore,thethemesandrhetoricaldevicesidentifiedasindicatorsandwarningspresentparticularlystrongsignalsthatshouldbeeasilydetected.

Table4.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:Philippines


NotLagged

Criminal/Illegal r 0.833 0.194sig. 0.005 0.616

Borders/Territory r 0.645 -0.059sig. 0.060 0.881

Crime r 0.809 0.156sig. 0.008 0.688

Oil/Gas r 0.869 0.273sig. 0.002 0.478

Materiel r 0.783 0.135sig. 0.013 0.729

Protests r 0.803 0.144sig. 0.009 0.711

Friendship r 0.762 0.551sig. 0.017 0.124

China r 0.735 0.131sig. 0.024 0.737

ExtremelyPositiveThemes

r 0.832 -0.130sig. 0.005 0.738

PositiveThemes r 0.719 -0.286sig. 0.029 0.456

NetEmotionalLanguage

r 0.752 -0.147sig. 0.019 0.706

The specific themes that indicated Philippine gray zone activity included Criminal/Illegal,Borders/Territory,Crime,Oil/Gas,Materiel,Protests,Friendship,andChina.

Criminal/Illegal

Philippine government officials increasingly mention other countries’ criminal and/or illegal activitiesbeforeengaging in theirowngray zoneactivities.Their reasoningbehindmentioningothercountries’


20

activities intheSouthChinaSeaandreferringtothemas“criminal”and/or“illegal” is likelytodefendtheirquestionableactionsandmarkotheractorsastherealaggressors.

Criminal/IllegalExample:

“Noting that the two countries have active judicial and law-enforcement exchanges andcooperation through existing bilateral agreements, the two leaders agreed to fulfill the legalprocedures to expedite the entry into force of the Treaty between the Republic of thePhilippinesandthePeople’sRepublicofChinaConcerningMutualLegalAssistance inCriminalMatters, and begin negotiations at an early date for a bilateral agreement on Transfer ofSentenced Persons. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation incombatingtransnationalcrimes, includingdrugtraffickingandtrafficking inpersons.”(BenignoAquino,4March2011)

Borders/Territory

ThePhilippinegovernmentfrequentlydiscussesborderandterritoryissuespriortotheoccurrenceofagrayzoneactivitythatwillmostlikelyrelatetoborders/territoryonceagain.

Borders/TerritoryExample:

“However, I must emphasize that I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution and thesovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The extent of our territory andmaritimezonesareclearlydefinedbyPhilippine lawsandinternational law,specificallythe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea.”(BenignoAquino,13June2012)

Crime

The Philippine governmentwill also discuss other countries’ crimes prior to the occurrence of a grayzoneactivity,whichcanbeexplainedbythesamereasoningastheCriminal/Illegaltheme.

CrimeExample:

“They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation in combating transnationalcrimes, including drug trafficking and trafficking in persons.” (Benigno Aquino, 1 September2011)

Oil/Gas

Philippinegovernmentofficialsoftendiscussoiland/orgasbeforeagrayzoneeventoccurs.Thismaybeduetothefact thatoneof theunderlyingcausesofmanySouthChinaSeaconflicts isoil/gascontrol.Thus, thePhilippinegovernmentmayspeakaboutoil and/orgasbeforebecoming involved in furthergrayconflict.

Oil/GasExample:


21

“TheChinesewereallegedlyclaimingthattheoilexplorersfromtheDepartmentofEnergywereinside Chinese territory, according to Lt. Gen. Juancho Sabban, chief of the Armed Forces’WesternMindanaoCommand.”(BenignoAquino,4March2011)

Materiel

The Philippine government frequently mentions various types of materiel, often military, beforepartakinginagrayactivity.

MaterielExample:

“’TheCoastGuardshipwillensurethatourrightsareprotectedbymakingsurethatthissurveyshipwasgrantedauthoritybyourgovernmenttofinishitsjob,’Aquinosaid.”(BenignoAquino,4March2011)

Protests

Philippine government officials often protest China’s involvement in their internal affairs prior toconducting gray zone actions, which they could justify as acts of self-defense or reactions to thisinterferenceofinternalmatters.

ProtestsExample:

“President Benigno Aquino III himself told reporters in Bacolod City that, “The (Chinese)ambassadorisstillinBeijingandwehandedthemaprotestontheincident.’”(BenignoAquino,4March2011)

Friendship

The Philippine government frequently discusses their friendshipwith China amid gray zone activities.ThismaybethePhilippinegovernment’sattempttocalmtensionswithChinabeforeconflicterupts.

FriendshipExample:

“Now,where do I see the relationship going again,mymain premise is this: when you havecontinually improving living standards, then thewhole populacewill be geared towards evenfurther increasing standards of living and the only way to be able to achieve that is reallythrough trade, cross-culturalpollination, the interactionand ifweareableagain tomake therelationship more mature where we become not just friends but bosom friends or very oldfriends.”(BenignoAquino,26August2011)

China

The Philippine government frequently mentions China prior to participating in gray zone eventsinvolvingChinaintheSouthChinaSea.


22

ChinaExample:

“WiththeguidanceofsuchaframeworkandthroughthefacilitationofASEAN,thePhilippinescallsontheclaimantstates intheSouthChinaSea, includingChina,tomeetanddiscusstheseclaimsanddefinetheundisputedandthedisputedareasforthepurposeofestablishingaJointCooperationArea.”(AlbertdelRosario,15November2011)


23

LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:VietnamVietnameseleadersexhibitedindicatorsandwarningswithfourthemesandonerhetoricaldevice(Table5).Inallcases,theunlaggedcorrelationsweresmallandstatisticallyinsignificantwhencomparedtothesix-monthlaggedcorrelations.Therefore,thethemesandrhetoricaldevicesidentifiedasindicatorsandwarningspresentparticularlystrongsignalsthatshouldbeeasilydetected.

Table5.LeadingIndicatorsofGrayZoneActivity:Vietnam


NotLagged

Aggressor/Aggression r 0.998 -0.144sig. 0.000 0.655

Legitimacy r 0.889 -0.328sig. 0.000 0.299

EconomyandTrade r 0.770 -0.375sig. 0.006 0.230

UN r 0.900 -0.272sig. 0.000 0.392

Lexicalization r 0.825 -0.110sig. 0.002 0.734

The specific themes that indicated Vietnamese gray zone activity included Aggressor/Aggression,Legitimacy,EconomyandTrade,UN,andLexicalization.

Aggressor/Aggression

The Vietnamese government frequently discusses other countries’ (particularly China’s) aggressiontowards Vietnam in the midst of gray zone conflict. This trend is likely because Vietnam desires toportrayChinaasthesoleaggressorintheconflict.

Aggressor/AggressionExample:

“However,theresponsefromChinahasbeenanincreaseofforceandactsofintimidationandviolation,andrepeatedslanderstoblameonVietNam.”(NguyenTanDung,21May2014)

Legitimacy

Vietnamesegovernmentofficialsfrequentlydiscussmattersoflegitimacybeforeactinginthegrayzonetojustifyandreemphasizethevalidityoftheiractions.

LegitimacyExample:


24

“IwishtounderscorethatVietNamwillresolutelydefenditssovereigntyandlegitimateinterestbecause territorial sovereignty, including sovereignty on its maritime zones and islands issacred.”(NguyenTanDung,21May2014)

EconomyandTrade

TheVietnamesegovernmentoftendiscusseseconomicsand/ortradeactivitiesbeforepartakingingrayzone activities since the South China Sea encompasses various trade routes that are crucial to Asiancountries’economicsuccess.

EconomicsandTradeExample:

“Vietnamisalsoveryproudofsignificantprogressthathasbeenmadeinitsbilateralrelationswith other Asian and Europeanmemberswho are now strategic and leading partners of VietNam in the economic, trade, investment, development cooperation, educational and trainingareas.”(NguyenTanDung,25May2009)

UN

TheVietnamesegovernment frequentlymentions theUNandUN jurisdiction,especially the1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSea,beforeactinginthegrayzone.VietnamoftenusesthisjurisdictiontojustifytheirownershiptoterritoryandexclusiveeconomiczonesintheSouthChinaSea.

UNExample:

“China’s nine-dash line in the East Sea, aka ‘Bull tongue-shaped line’, is completely legallygroundlessandisincontrarytothe1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSeatowhichChinaisaparty.”(NguyenDuyChien,28May2011)

Lexicalization

Vietnamese government officials often are very particular about their word choice, especially duringtimesoffrequentgrayzoneevents.

LexicalizationExample:

“We are never the first to use military means and would never unilaterally start a militaryconfrontation unlessweare forced to take self-defense actions.” (NguyenTanDung, 21May2014)[keywordchoicesemphasized]


25

PredominantConcernsofRegionalActorsTheprimarygoalof this research is to identify leading indicatorsofadversarial intentwith respect togray zone activity and, therefore, the diachronic analyses presented in the previous sections are theprimary focus of this report. However, it is also useful to understand what issues a particular actorprioritizesandwhichusesoflanguagethatactorreliesonthemostinordertopersuadeanaudience.

Inthissection,thosethemesandrhetoricaldevicesthatwereusedmoreoftenforthatparticularactorstatisticallysignificantlyata≤0.10levelarecompared.

PredominantConcerns:ChinaThe predominant concerns expressed by Chinese officials included Peace, Stability, Borders andTerritory,Sovereignty,Cooperation,China,andtheSouthChinaSea.

AlthoughtheChinesefrequentlyengageinquestionableactivities,Chinesegovernmentofficialsalwaysreiterate how dedicated they are to maintaining “peace and stability” in the South China Sea. TheChinesemaybechoosingtoreemphasizethisthemebecausetheywantothernationstobelieveinthelegitimacyoftheiractions.IfothernationsbelievethatChinaisstrivingtomaintainpeaceandstabilityinthearea,thentheyarelesslikelytothinkthatChina’sactivitiesintheSouthChinaSeaareaggressiveinnature.

Chinese government officials also discussmatters of borders and territories duringpress conferencesandspeeches.This isapparentbecauseChina isconcernedaboutacquiringvarious islands,territories,andeconomiczoneswithintheSouthChinaSeaaswellasprotectingtheir“legitimate”sovereigntyoverthese areas. China is always concerned aboutmaintaining their sovereignty over certain areas in theSouthChinaSeatomaintaintheirinfluenceintheareaandtofurtherprovetheirstrength.

Similar toChina’s continuedemphasisofpeaceand stability,Chinaalso reemphasizes theirdesire forcontinuedcooperationintheSouthChinaSea.Chinesegovernmentofficialsalwaysmakeapointtosaythat theywant toworkwith other countries to pursue cooperation in the South China Sea and careabout settlingmatterswhileworking in conjunctionwithother countries rather than just doingwhattheywant.However,as isevidentby theamountofgrayactivities thatChinaengages in, it looks likecooperationmaynotbeasimportantasthemachievingtheirsovereigntygoals.Overall,China’sprimaryconcernappearstobeChinaitself.

Finally,oneofChina’smostpredominantconcernsistheSouthChinaSea.ChinacaresabouttheSouthChina Sea somuch because it contains vital trade routes aswell as islands and other territories thatChina seeks to control. Since the ownership of these waters and the territories within are disputed,Chinabelievesthatitcanseizetheseassetstostrengthentheirnation.

TheChinesealsousedintensifiersmorethanotherrhetoricaldevicesinordertoemphasizetheirpoints.


26

Table6.PredominantConcernsofChina.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.

PredominantConcerns:PhilippinesThe predominant concerns expressed by Philippine officials included Conflict, Equality and Rights,Borders and Territory, Sovereignty, Cooperation, Economy and Trade, Formal Agreement, China,Philippines,andtheSouthChinaSea.

Philippine government officials are especially concerned with conflicts, particularly South China Seadisputes.ThePhilippinegovernmentcaresabout its involvement inthisconflictandmuststayalerttonewdevelopmentsinitiatedbyChinaandotherAsiannations.

ThePhilippinesisalsoconcernedaboutmattersofequalityandrightsbecausetheywanttobeassuredequal treatment in theSouthChinaSea regionand tohave theirmaritime rightsprotected, includingtheirrightstoownershipofproperty intheSouthChinaSeaandtomaintaintheirexclusiveeconomiczones.

SimilarlytotheChinesegovernment,thePhilippinegovernmentisfocusedonbordersandterritoriesaswell as sovereignty. Again, the Philippines is concerned about protecting their sovereignty over theirproclaimed borders, territories, and areas of economic control. However, at the same time, thegovernment expresses its desire to cooperate with other countries involved in the South China Seaconflicttodraftmutualagreementsandeasetensions.Thegovernmenthopestocreatealastingformalagreement that will outline all territorial ownership in the South China Sea and will resolutely solve

GroupCode China Philippines VietnamConflict 0 1 1Equality_Rights 0 1 0Peace 1 0 1Stability 1 0 0Borders_Territory 1 1 1Sovereignty 1 1 0Security 0 0 1Cooperation 1 1 0Economy_and_Trade 0 1 0Formal_Agreement 0 1 0China 1 1 0Philippines 0 1 0South_China_Sea 1 1 0Vietnam 0 0 1Intensifier 1 1 1


27

border and territorial disputes. Government officials also prioritize upholding existing formalagreements and laws, especially the 1982UNConvention on the Law of the Sea,which they believevalidatestheirsovereigntyovervariousareasintheSouthChinaSea.

Furthermore,thePhilippinesisconcernedwithmaintainingtheireconomicfreedomintheSouthChinaSea as well as their right to exclusive economic zoneswithin the sea. They are further interested inensuringthattheireconomyandtraderelationsdonotsufferasaresultoftheconflict.

Ultimately, thePhilippinegovernment is predominately concernedabout its ownprosperity, its rockyrelationship with China, and the South China Sea, which is an area of valuable significance to thePhilippinesasitisforChina.

Philippine government officials also used intensifiers more than other rhetorical devices in order toemphasizetheirpoints.

Table7.PredominantConcernsofPhilippines.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.



28

PredominantConcerns:VietnamThe predominant concerns expressed by Vietnamese officials included Conflict, Peace, Borders andTerritory,Security,andVietnam.

TheVietnamesegovernmentismostlikelyconcernedwithconflict,peace,andbordersandterritoryforthesamereasonsastheChineseandPhilippinegovernments.

In addition, security is a predominant concern for theVietnamese government. Vietnamwants to beassured that theirbordersand territoriesbothon themainlandandon theSouthChina seaare safe,especiallyduringthesetimesofconflict.

However, ultimately, Vietnam is concerned about its own wellbeing above all other countries andterritories.

TheVietnameseusedintensifiersmorethanotherrhetoricaldevicesinordertoemphasizetheirpoints,asdidtheChineseandthePhilippines.

Table8.PredominantConcernsofVietnam.1=themestatisticallymoreoftenusedatalessthanorequalto0.05level.



29

UseofEmotionalLanguageTherewere statisticaldifferences in theuseofemotional languageonlybetweenChinaandVietnam.TheVietnameseusedmuchmorenegative language than theChinese.TheVietnameseusednegativelanguages (both moderately and extremely negative) over twice as much as the Chinese did. Thesedifferenceswereverystrongandstatisticallysignificant.

Emotionallanguagecorrelateswiththeimportanceofanissuetoanactorandso,itprovidesameasureof sentiment or affect that the actor has on that issue (Fenstermacher et al., 2012; Kuznar & Hunt,2015). Purely rational (including unemotional) decision-making is the foundation of U.S. governmentestablisheddeterrencetheory(USSTRATCOM,2006),anddeparturesfromthis(inthiscaseincreasinglyemotional decision calculus) indicate that more emotion-based heuristics ((Astorino-Courtois, 1998;Bowles, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2000; Heuer, 1999)) may influence what theVietnamesevalueandhowtheywouldprotectit.

Table9.UseofEmotionalLanguage

EmotiveLanguageMetric

ChinaMean

VietnamMean

MeanDifference t df(UnequalVar)

Sig(2-tailed)

NegativeLanguage 0.00477 0.01163 -0.00685 -2.223 25.199 0.035

Negative+ExtremelyNegativeLanguage 0.00726 0.01499 -0.00773 -2.172 27.068 0.039

Overall, the Chinese were much more restrained in their use of emotional language. Chinesegovernment officials seem to have rehearsed responses to questions related to the South China Seaconflict. Speakerswould repeat the same responses, includinghow their positionon the SouthChinaSeais“clearandconsistent,”howtheyareconstantlyworkingtowards“peaceandstability,”howtheywant to “enhance mutual trust” with other nations, and how they desire to increase cooperation,especially over South China Sea matters. However, their actions appear to have contradicted theseclaimsonvariousoccasionsinrecenthistory.

The Vietnamese, however, were less temperate in their word choice. Government officials woulddirectlychallengetheChinesefortheirinvolvementingrayzoneactivitiesandexpresstheirdisapprovaloftheiractions.UnliketheChinese,theVietnamesedidnothaveanyrehearsedresponsestoquestionsorphrasesthattheywouldrepeatwheneverdiscussingaparticularissue.

TheVietnameseemphasis,relativetotheChinese,onnegativeemotionintheirdiscussionsconcerningSouth China Sea matters may indicate that they would be more sensitive to losses (fear losing).Moderate levelsoffear leadtoriskminimizingstrategies(suchassubmittingtohigherauthorities liketheUN), althoughonce the consequences of loss supersede any gains from success, decisionmakerstypicallyembraceriskystrategies(Kuznar,2002,2007).Theirrelativelymuchhigherlevelofemotionalitymayindicatethattheywoulddepartfromthetraditionalpredictionsofrationalchoiceanddeterrencetheory.


30

ConclusionsAnalysis of key themesandusesof language (rhetorical devices) canprovide indicators andwarnings(I&W) of gray zone activity, reveal themost important concerns of actors, and provide insights intoemotionalfactorsthatcaninfluencetheirdecisioncalculus.InthecaseoftheSouthChinaSeaconflict,linguistic indicatorswouldhave indicated to analysts that Chinawasplanningon initiating a series ofgrayzoneeventswithinthenextfewmonths.ThisinsightwouldhaveenabledanalyststoforewarnUSandalliedofficialsofpotentialgrayzoneactionsandtoallowthemtoprepareforChineseaggressionintheSouthChinaSea.

Thematicanalysis,inwhichthedensityofthemesandrhetoricaldevicesarenormedagainstmeasuresof speech length, provide objectivemetrics that track the potential importanceof issues to speakers(andpotentiallytheiraudiences)andtheiractuallevelofemotionality,whichimpactsdecision-making.Thesemeasures discipline our own subjective readings of others’ discourse inwhichwe are likely toover-orunder-estimatetheimportanceofwhatpeopleexpress.

Indicators&Warnings(I&W)Variousthemesindicatedactors’grayzoneactivityintheSouthChinaSea;however,thisanalysisdidnotfindamutualindicatoramongallthreeactors.

ThespecificthemesthatindicatedChinesegrayzoneactivityincludedConspiracy,Self-defense,EqualityandRights,GrayZoneActivities,andDomesticDevelopment.

Ontheotherhand,Criminal/Illegal,Borders/Territory,Crime,Oil/Gas,Materiel,Protests,Friendship,andChinaweretheprimary indicatorsforthePhilippines,andAggressor/Aggression,Legitimacy,EconomyandTrade,UN,andLexicalizationindicatedVietnamesegrayactivity.

PredominantConcernsofRegionalActorsAfterassessingthepredominantconcernsofChina,thePhilippines,andVietnamindividually,itappearsas though the three actors share amutual concern for their borders, their territories, and their ownnation’sprosperity.

Chinaalsooutwardly reveals theirpreoccupationswithpeace, stability, sovereignty, cooperation, andthe SouthChina Sea. ThePhilippines, like theChinese, alsodisplay a strong concern about the SouthChinaSea,cooperation,China,andsovereigntyandalsohaveastronginterestinconflict,equalityandrights,theireconomyandtrade,andformalagreements.Vietnam,likethePhilippines,ispredominatelyconcernedwithconflictaswellaspeace,liketheChinese,andsecurity.

EmotionalLanguageandDecisionCalculusofRegionalActorsTherewere statisticaldifferences in theuseofemotional languageonlybetweenChinaandVietnam.TheVietnameseusedovertwiceasmuchmoderateandextremelynegativelanguageastheChinesedidwhendiscussingSouthChinaSeamattersandthecountriesinvolved.Thedifferenceswereconsequentlyverystrongandstatisticallysignificant.ThemuchhigherlevelofemotionalityoftheVietnameserelative


31

totheChinesemay indicatethattheywoulddepart fromthetraditionalpredictionsofrationalchoiceanddeterrencetheoryandtakeunexpectedchances.


32

Appendix:GraphicalRepresentationofChineseIndicators&Warnings

Graph 1. This graph indicates the mentions of conspiracy with relation to time periods and thefrequencyofgrayzoneactionsbyChina. Inparticular, the frequentChineseaccusationsofconspiracymayindicatethatalargevolumeofgrayzoneactionsmaybecominginthenearfuture.


33

Graph2.Theabovegraphdisplaysthepotentialrelationshipbetweendiscourserelatedtoself-defenseandthenumberofgrayzoneactionsovertime.Noticehowsignificantpeaksofmentionsofself-defensewilloccurimmediatelybeforeorduringatimeofmanyChinesegrayzoneactions.


34

Graph3.ThisgraphillustratesthepotentialrelationshipbetweenmentionsofequalityandrightswiththefrequencyofgrayzoneactionsinitiatedbyChina.Basedonthisgraph,itappearsthatoftentimes,whenequalityand/orrightsarementioned,a largeamountofgrayzoneeventswilloccuraroundthetime of the frequent mentioning or within the next few months. There may also be a statisticallysignificant correlation between the number of gray zone events that occur within a month and thenumberofmentionsofequalityand/orrights.


35

Graph4.ThisgraphdisplaystheamountoftimestheChinesementionedother“gray”zoneactivitiesincomparison to thenumberof Chinese gray zone actions that hadoccurred at the time. It appears asthoughduring timesof frequent discussionof gray zone activities andevents, China ismore likely toengageinfurthergrayzoneactivities.


36

Graph 5.The above graph displays the potential relationship betweenChinesementions of domesticdevelopment and gray zone actions during various time periods. According to the above graph, itappearsthat frequentdiscussionofdomesticdevelopmentmay indicatethe incomingprevalenceofaseriesofgrayzoneevents.


37

Graph6.ThisgraphdisplaystheamountoftimestheChineseposedrhetoricalquestionsduringpressconferences, speeches, etc. in comparison to the number of gray zone actions during various timeperiods. Basedon the above graph, China frequently posed rhetorical questions either a fewmonthspriortoorduringasix-monthtimeperiodwithseveralgrayzoneactions.


38

Graph7.ThisgraphdisplaysthepotentialrelationshipbetweentheChineseuseofsarcasmand/orironyasarhetoricaldeviceandthevolumeofgrayzoneactionsduringasix-monthtimeperiod.Basedontheevidencefromtheabovegraph,Chineseofficialsusedsarcasmand/orironyeitherafewmonthspriortoorduringasix-monthtimeframewithseveralgrayzoneactions.


39

Appendix:KeyDatesandEventsThefollowingtable(10)listskeydatesandeventsintheSouthChinaSeacasestudy.AfullnarrativeofeventsisfoundinAppendix:NarrativeofHistoricalEvents.

Table10.KeyDatesandEventsinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

Event Date Aggressor

JapandetectsChinesesubsailingthroughOsumiStraitbetweenJapan'sKyushuandTanegashimaislandsinEastChinaSea

12-Nov-03 China

JapanesevesseluseswatercanononChinesefishermeninwatersnearDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsinEastChinaSea

15-Jan-04 China&Japan

ChineseNavyintimidatesJapanesesurveyshipinEastChinaSeabyperformingmaneuverscloseby

1-Jun-04 China

Chinesesubspends2hourssubmergedinJapanesewatersintheEastChinaSea,eventuallyslippingbetweentheLiyakoandIshigakiislandsbeforereturningtoChinesewaters

11-Nov-04 China

Taiwanstartsbuilding1,200meterrunwayatItuAbaIslandintheSouthChinaSea

1-May-05 Taiwan

ChinesevesselsspottedoffDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsinEastChinaSea,remainfor9-hours

1-Sep-05 China

ChinesevesselsnearChunxiaogasfieldpointgunatJapaneseplaneinEastChinaSea

1-Sep-05 China

ChinesesubstalksUSSKittyHawk 26-Oct-06 China

ChinesefishingvesselturnsspotlightonUSNSVictoriousinYellowSea

4-Mar-09 China

AChinesemaritimesurveillanceaircraftfliesovertheUSNSVictoriousadozentimes,whileaChinesefrigatesailswithin100yardsoftheUSNSImpeccableafteranaircraftalsoflewoverthatvessel

5-Mar-09 China

AChineseshipwarnstheUSNSImpeccablebyradiothatitisconductingillegaloperationsandhastoleavethearea

7-Mar-09 China

ChinesevesselsharassUSNSImpeccable 8-Mar-09 China


40

MalaysiaandVietnamsubmitUNclaims,renewingfrictionovermaritimesovereigntyinSouthChinaSea

1-May-09 Malaysia&Vietnam

ChinaclaimssovereigntyovertheislandsintheSouthChinaSeaandadjacentwaters

1-May-09 China

ChinesesubcollideswithUSNSJohnS.McCain 11-Jun-09 China

ChineseandIndonesianmilitaryvesselsseizefishingboats May–Jul-10 China&Indonesia

IndonesianpatrolconfrontsescortedChinesefishingboats 23-Jun-10 Indonesia

ChinesefishingboatramsJapanesecoastguardvesselneartheDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsinEastChinaSea

7-Sep-10 China

ClashbetweenChinesefishingtrawlerandSouthKoreancoastguardoffSouthKorea'swestcoastkillstwo

18-Dec-10 SouthKorea

ChinesewarshipallegedlyfireswarningshotsatPhilippinevessel 25-Feb-11 China

TwoChinesepatrolboatsaggressivelyapproachandreportedlythreatentoram,asurveyshipconductingseismictestingnearReedBank

2-Mar-11 China

ThePhilippinesincreasesmilitarypatrolsfollowinganincidentwithtwoChineseboats

2-Mar-11 China

PhilippinePresidentwarnsvisitingChineseDefenseMinisterofapossiblearmsraceintheregioniftensionsworsenedoverdisputesintheSouthChinaSea

1-May-11 Philippines

ChinareportedlyunloadsbuildingmaterialsnearLikasandPatagislandsonthecontestedIroquoisReef-AmyDouglasBankclaimedbythePhilippines

21-24-May-11

China

ChinesevesselseversVietnamesevessel'sexplorationcables 26-May-11 China

ThePhilippinessummonsaChineseenvoytoexpressmountingconcernsovernavalincursionsinitsclaimedterritory

1-Jun-11 China

ChinesevesseldisablesVietnamesevessel'sexplorationcables 9-Jun-11 China

Vietnamannouncesliveammunitiondrills 10-Jun-11 Vietnam


41

ChinesesoldiersoustVietnamesefisherman 5-Jul-11 China

ThePhilippinegovernmentbeginsreferringtotheSouthChinaSeaastheWestPhilippineSeainallofficialcommunications

1-Oct-11 Philippines

U.S.SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonalsoreferstotheSouthChinaSeaastheWestPhilippineSea

1-Oct-11 US

PhilippinevesselramsChinesefishingboatindisputedwatersnearReedBank

18-Oct-11 Philippines

ChinaobjectstopresenceofoilexplorationvesselsindisputedwatersnearReedBank

28-Feb-12 China

TaiwanreaffirmsSouthChinaSeasovereigntyclaims 13-Mar-12 Taiwan

ChinadetainsVietnamesefishermanneartheParacelIslands 23-Mar-12 China

PhilippinesandChinaengageinnavalstandoffatScarboroughShoal.Twomonthstandoffensues

10-Apr-12 Philippines&China

VietnampassesamaritimelawassertingitsjurisdictionoverthedisputedSpratlyandParacelIslands

1-Jun-12 Vietnam

Chinalaunchesfirstaircraftcarrier 25-Sep-12 China

Hainanprovincepolicegainauthoritytosearchandboardterritory-violatingvessels

28-Nov-12 China

PhilippinesinitiatesUNarbitrationcaseoverChineseclaimsofsovereigntytotheSpratlyIslandsandScarboroughShoal

22-Jan-13 Philippines

ChinasaysithasstartedallowingtouriststovisitWoodyIslandintheParacels

1-Apr-13 China

JapanoffersmilitaryaidtoalliesintheEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSea

1-May-13 Japan

MalaysiasuggeststhatitmightworkwithChinaoverChineseSouthChinaSeaclaims

1-Aug-13 Malaysia

ChineseoilcompanymovesanoilexplorationrignearTritonIslandintheParacels

2-May-14–15-July-14

China

ChinesefighterjetharassesUSsurveillanceaircraft 1-Aug-14 China


42

SatelliteimagessuggestChinaisbuildinganislandatFieryCrossReefinSpratlys

1-Nov-14 China

SatelliteimageryshowsChinabuildingsignificantpresenceintheSpratlys

1-Feb-15 China

AUSsurveillanceplanefliesoverdisputedterritoriesintheSouthChinaSea

20-May-15 US

Chinacompletesa3,125meterrunwayonthenewlycreatedFieryCrossreef

1-Sep-15 China

USNavypatrolsailswithintwelvenauticalmilesofChinese-builtislandsindisputedwatersintheSouthChinaSea

26-Oct-15 US

TwoUSB-52bombersflyaroundtheSpratlyIslandsnearChinese-builtartificialislands

8-Nov-15 US

TwoUSB-52bombersgetwithin12nauticalmilesofChina’sman-madeislandsintheSouthChinaSea

10-Dec-15 US

ChinasaysithasconductedaciviliantestflighttoFieryCrossReef 2-Jan-16 China

ChinasaysithasconductedasecondtestflightstoFieryCrossReef

6-Jan-16 China

ChinesemediareportthatChinahasfinishedconstructiononasecond10,000-tonChinaCoastGuardcutterdestinedforpatrolsintheSouthChinaSea

11-Jan-16 China

Theguided-missiledestroyerCurtisWilbursailswithin12nauticalmilesofTritonIsland,claimedbyChinaandtwootherstatesintheSouthChinaSea

30-Jan-16 US

NewsatelliteimagesshowwhatappeartobeconstructionofChinesehelicopterlandingsitesatDuncanIslandintheParacelchain

13-Feb-16 China

ChinadeploysmissilesonWoodyIsland 14-Feb-16 China

ATaiwanesenavalshipaccidentallyfiresasupersonicmissileinthedirectionofChinaduringtrainingexercise,hittingaTaiwanesefishingboatandkillingthecaptainandinjuring3others

1-Jul-16 Taiwan

HaguecourtstrikesdownBeijing’sSouthChinaSeaclaims 12-Jul-16 HagueCourt


43

Appendix:NarrativeofHistoricalEvents

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_disputes_in_the_South_China_Sea


44

http://ifair.eu/en/think/english-benign-or-bellicose-china-and-the-south-china-sea-the-ambiguities-of-the-peaceful-rise-paradigm/

NarrativeChineseVesselsInfringeonJapaneseWatersintheEastChinaSea

TerritorialclaimsintheEastChinaSeahavehistoricallybeenapointofcontentionbetweenChinaandJapan,withterritorialdisputesandintrusionsonbehalfofbothsidessurfacingfromtimetotimesincethe1970s.Infact,someofthedisputeshaverootsinthe19thcentury.BothChinaandJapanareclearlyinterestedinprotecting,andseeminglymoreandmoreinpotentiallygrowing,theirterritorialwatersintheregion,anditappearsthatbothsidesareincreasinglytakingmorezealousactiontodoso.2

However, tensionsanddisputesover territorialwaters in this regionarenot limited to theEastChinaSea,andChinesemaritimedisputesstartarisingwithalmosteverystatewithmaritimeterritorialclaimsin the region. Maritime confrontations between China and its regional neighbors start becoming

2http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY


45

increasingly present in the waters of the South China Sea (particularly around the disputed Spratlyislands),thewatersaroundtheKoreanPeninsula,andtheSeaofOkhotskaswell.3

Theunrestanddisputesover territory in theEastChinaSeabetweenChinaand Japanseems to startflowing into the South China Sea in themid-2000s, with China remaining a constant inmuch of themaritimeconflict.

Inlate2003andthrough2004,anumberofinstancesariseinwhichChinesemaritimevesselsinfringeonJapanesewatersintheEastChinaSea.

On12November2003,aJapaneseself-defenseaircraftspotsaChineseattacksubmarinenearJapanesewatersintheEastChinaSea.TheChinesesubmarineheadswestonthesurfaceofinternationalwaters25-mileseastofSatamisakiandcontinuessailingthroughtheOsumiStraitbetweenJapan’sKyushuandTanegashimaislands.4 Interestingly,theChinesesubmarine issailingwest,which indicatesthat it isonitsreturntripfromanunknownmission.Thesubmarinealsodeliberatelydecidestofloattothesurface,thereforeincreasingitslikelihoodofdetection.5ThisdecisionbyChinatoapparentlydeliberatelychoosetosail itssubmarineonthesurfaceofwaterssoclosetoJapaneseterritorywhilealsoonareturntripfromcompletelyunknownwhereaboutsseemstorepresentaclearactofprovocationandbravadoonbehalfof theChinese towards the Japaneseover the long-disputed territorial rightsof theEastChinaSea.

On 15 January 2004, JapaneseMaritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) fire water cannons at Chinesefishing vessels inwatersnear thedisputedDiaoyu/Senkaku islands in theEastChina Sea, leavingoneChinesecitizeninjured.TheChinesefishingvesselsapproachtowithin10milesoftheDiaoyu/Senkakuislandsbeforeturningback.6Thisincident,inwhichJapaneseforcesusewatercannonsagainstChinesefisherman,highlightsthetensionsurroundingtheChina-JapandisputeovervaryingterritorialclaimsintheEastChinaSea.

Chineseprovocationcontinueswhen, in June2004,aPLANavyvesselperformsmaneuversclose toaJapanese survey ship in the East China Sea—a move that can be interpreted as an attempt by theChinese to intimidate Japan.7 Furthermore, on 11 November 2004, a Chinese submarine spends twohours submerged in Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea near Taiwan. The ChinesesubmarineentersthePacificOceanregionofJapan’sterritorialwatersabout400kilometerssouthwestofOkinawaislandandthenpassesbetweentheMiyakoandIshigakiislandsandintotheEastChinaSeabeforereturningbacktoChina.8WhiletheincursionoccursonthefringeofJapaneseterritorialwaters,itnonethelessseemstorepresentanattemptbyChinatostokethealreadyhightensionssurroundingterritorialclaimsintheEastChinaSeabetweenChinaandJapan.

3http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY4http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EK25Ad01.html5http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EK25Ad01.html6http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY7http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline8http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html


46

ChineseprovocationintheEastChinaSeacontinuesinto2005.InSeptember2005,twoChineseMarinesurveillance vessels (the 1,100-ton “Haijian” 46” and the 1,700-ton “Haijian 51”) are spotted sailingabout6-kilometerssoutheastoftheDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsinJapanese-claimedterritorialwaters.Thetwo vessels remain in Japanese-claimed territorialwaters for roughly nine hours.9 This is yet anotherillustrationofChinapushingtheboundariesinitsdisputewithJapanoverterritorialwaterclaimsintheEastChinaSea.

In an example of clearly increasing Chinese provocation and aggression in the East China Sea, inSeptember 2005 five Chinese naval vessels, including a guided missile destroyer, circle around thecontestedChunxiaogasfield.10OneoftheChinesevesselsgoessofarastopointitsgunataJapanesesurveillanceaircraftabove.11This incidentnotonlyhighlights thevalueChinaplaceson thecontestedChunxiaogasfieldanditsresourcesbutalsoillustrateshowsignificanttensionshavebecomebetweenChinaandJapanregardingtheirrespectiveterritorialclaimsintheEastChinaSea.

After the incident at the Chunxiao gas field, China follows its aggressive actions with an aggressiveannouncementinwhichitrevealsanewChinese“reservevesselsquadron”intheEastChinaSea.Chinaclaimsthatthereservevesselsquadronprovidesitwiththecapabilitytofightduringwarswithaforceequippedtoeliminateobstaclesatsea.12

In response to the Chinese provocation, Japan, which has witnessed steadily increasing ChineseaggressiontowardsJapaneseterritorialwaterclaimsintheEastChinaSea,officiallyidentifiesChinaasathreat. For the first time, the Japanese Self Defense Forces’ “Security and Guarding Plan” identifiesChina as a threat and suggests serval threat scenarios, including a brigade size invasion of theDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsintheEastChinaSea.13

TaiwanStartsBuildinganAirstripintheSouthChinaSea

InMay2005,Taiwanbeginsbuildinga1,200-meterrunwayonItuAbaislandintheSouthChinaSea.ItuAbaislandisthelargestnaturallyoccurringislandinthedisputedSpratlyislands,anditistheonlyislandintheSouthChinaSeathatTaiwancontrols.14Theeffort tobuildanairstriponan island intheSouthChinaSearepresentsatacticalmoveonbehalfofTaiwan,anditsendsastrongsignalregardingTaiwan’sinterests in and commitment to protecting its territorial claims in the heavily disputedwaters of theSouthChinaSea.

9http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline10http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf11http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf12http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf13http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf14http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/


47

ChineseSubmarineHarassesUSAircraftCarrierintheEastChinaSea

On26October2006,ChineseaggressionandprovocationcontinuesintheEastChinaSea,butthistime,it is directed at theUSwhen a PLANavy submarine stalks theUnited States’USS KittyHawk aircraftcarrierintheEastChinaSea.15China’swillingnesstostalkaUSmilitaryaircraftcarrierseemstohighlighthowimportantmaritimeterritorialsovereigntyinterestsaretoChinaandhowserioustheChineseareinensuringthoseinterests.

TheUSNSImpeccableIncidentintheSouthChinaSea

InanotherexampleofChineseaggression towardaUSvessel,on4March2009,aChineseBureauofFisheriesvesselshinesahigh-poweredspotlightontheUSNSVictorious,anunarmedsurveillanceshipsailingininternationalwatersintheYellowSea,forcingtheshiptocometoahalt.16IncontinuingwithaggressiveactionstargetedattheUSNSVictorious,thenextday,on5March2009,aChinesemaritimesurveillanceaircraftfliesovertheUSNSVictoriousadozentimes.17

BuildingonitsaggressionandprovocationtowardtheUSNSVictorious,ChinadoublesdownandtargetsanotherUSvessel,butthistimeintheSouthChinaSea.

5March2009turnsouttobeabusydayforChineseaggressionoverinternationalwaters,asChinaalsotargetstheUSNSImpeccableintheSouthChinaSea.TheUSNSImpeccable,anunarmedoceanographicsurveillancevesselconductingroutinesurveillanceoperationsininternationalwaters,isfirsttargetedbyaChineseaircraftflyoverandthenlatertargetedwhenaChinesefrigatesailswithin100yardsoftheUSvessel.18Afewdayslater,on7March2009,aChineseshipradiostotheUSNSImpeccablewarningtheUSshipthatitisconductingillegaloperationsandmustleavethearea.19

Thenextday,on8March2009, fiveChinese vessels (aNaval intelligence-gathering ship, aBureauofMaritime Fisheries Patrol vessel, a state oceanographic administration patrol vessel, and two smalltrawlers) surround and harass the USNS Impeccable as it is conducting routine operations ininternationalwaters, approximately75-miles southofHainan island in theSouthChinaSea.20Despiteattempts from the unarmed USNS Impeccable to radio-request a safe path to leave the area, theChineseshipsmaneuverinfrontofthevesselanddropwoodinitspath,forcingtheUSNSImpeccableto

15http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline16http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY17http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY18http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm19http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY20http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm;http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY


48

makeanemergencystop.21OncetheUSNSImpeccableisstopped,theChineseshipsattempttograbthesonararraybeingtowedbehindtheship.22

These incidents of Chinese aggression and provocation directed at the USNS Victorious and USNSImpeccable portray targeted aggressive tactics over multiple days by the Chinese toward US vesselsoperating inwhat isconsidered internationalwaters;however, thesearealsowatersthattheChineseappeartobelievearewithinChina’smaritimeterritorialsovereigntyclaims.ThelevelofaggressionandprovocationdirectedatunarmedUSvesselsalsoseeminglyunderlinesChina’sseriousnessregardingitsmaritimeterritorialclaims.

TheUSformallycondemnstheChineseaggressiontowardtheUSNSImpeccable,claimingChinaviolatedinternational lawonrespectingotherusersof thesea.23China,on theotherhand,doesnotdeny thedetails of the incident with the USNS Impeccable, but it instead characterizes the US surveillanceactivitiesasfundamentallyimproperandarrogant.24

SouthChinaSeaTerritorialSovereigntyClaimstotheUN

Tensionsovermaritime sovereignty in the SouthChina Seaonly continue to risewhen, inMay2009,MalaysiaandVietnamfileasubmissiontotheUNCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelfinwhichthetwocountriesrequestthattheircontinentalshelvesbeextendedbeyondthestandardtwo-hundrednauticalmilesfromtheircoastlines.25Byextendingtheircontinentalshelves,thetwocountriescanclaimtheeconomicrightstolargerareasoftheSouthChinaSea,includingtherightstoanyenergyresourcesdiscovered.26

As to be expected, China objects the Malaysian and Vietnamese submission, which it views as achallenge to its territorial claims in the South China Sea. China claims that the Malaysian andVietnamesesubmissionseriouslyinfringesonChina’sindisputablesovereigntyoverislandsandterritoryintheSouthChinaSea.27

FollowingtheleadofMalaysiaandVietnam,ChinafilesitsownterritorialsovereigntysubmissiontotheUNinMay2009.Initssubmission,ChinaclaimssovereigntyoveralloftheislandsintheSouthChinaSeaandadjacentwaters.Furthermore,theChinesesubmissionincludesthe“nine-dashline”map,inwhichChinausesnine-dashedlinestomarkoutandclaimterritorialwatersthatextendhundredsofmilesto

21http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm22http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY23http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm24http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY25http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849926http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849927http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/


49

the south and east of its island province of Hainan. Unsurprisingly,Malaysia and Vietnam object theChinesesubmissions.28

ChineseSubmarineHarassesAnotherUSVessel

On11 June2009,aPLANavy submarine follows theUSS JohnS.McCain in theSouthChinaSeanearSubicBayoffthecoastofthePhilippines.InadditiontostalkingtheUSvessel,thePLAsubmarineisalsosuspectedofcollidingwithanddamagingtheship’ssonarequipment.29TheincidentisanotherexampleofChineseaggressionandprovocationtowardUSvesselsoperatinginwhatareconsideredinternationalwaters but are alsowaters that the Chinese appear to believe arewithin China’smaritime territorialsovereigntyclaims.

AggressionfromChineseFishingVessels

BetweenMay and July 2010, Chinese and Indonesianmilitary vessels seize control of fishing vesselsfromeachother’scountriesthataresuspectedofillegallyfishingintheSouthChinaSea.Notably,duringseveral of the confrontations, Indonesian naval vessels encounter armed Chinese fishing vessels,includingaheavilyarmedChinesefishingmanagementvessel.30

The encounters with armed Chinese fishing vessels is particularly interesting, as the use of armedfisherman as proxies for pushing the boundaries of maritime territorial disputes could potentiallyrepresentaclevertacticonbehalfoftheChinese.

On 23 June 2010, the Indonesian Navy confronts ten Chinese fishing vessels operating withoutpermissionapproximately65-milesnorthwestof theNatuna islands in Indonesia’sexclusiveeconomiczone, and the confrontation eventually leads to the Indonesian Navy vessels temporarily seizing aChinesefishingvessel.TheconfrontationescalateswhenaheavilyarmedChinesefisherymanagementvessel points a large-calibermachine gun at the IndonesianNavy vessel and threatens to fire,whichquicklyforcestheIndonesianNavyvesselstofreetheseizedChinesefishingvessel.31

InanincidentwithJapanneartheDiaoyu/SenkakuislandsintheEastChinaSea,on7September2010aChinese fishing vessel rams a Japanese Coast Guard vessel after it attempts to interdict the Chinesefishingvessel.TheaggressiveactpromptsJapantoarresttheChinesecrew,whichthentriggersChinatoenforceanunofficialembargoagainst Japanandalsoarrest four Japanesebusinessmen inChina.TheChinese fisherman are later released following two weeks of escalating tension between China andJapan.32ThisincidenthighlightsthetensionssurroundingthemaritimeterritorialdisputebetweenChina

28http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/29http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/index.html;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline30http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline31http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/48943032http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline


50

and Japan in theEastChinaSeaandsparksdebateabout Japan’sability todefend its interests in thefaceofChina’srise.33

Inanotherincident,thistimeoffofSouthKorea’swestcoast,on18December2010,aChinesefishingvessel clashes with a South Korean Coast Guard vessel, leaving two Chinese fisherman dead. TheskirmishignitesastheSouthKoreanCoastGuardattemptstopreventtheChinesefishingvesselsfromillegally fishing inSouthKorea’smaritimeterritoryoffof itswestcoast.34While this incidentdoesnotoccur in the South China Sea or East China Sea, it does highlight significant tensions over maritimeterritorial claimsandassumed rights inallofChina’s surroundingwaters, including theYellowSea,asdemonstratedbythisincident.

Interestingly,these incidents indicateawillingnessonbehalfofChinatousefishingvesselsasaproxyforpushingaggressionandChinesemaritimeterritorialinterestsinthewaterssurroundingthecountry.

TensionsIncreaseBetweenChinaandthePhilippines

InstancesofaggressionandincreasedtensionbetweenChinaandthePhilippinesintheSouthChinaSeastartcroppingupin2011.

ChineseaggressionaroundthedisputedSpratlyislandsintheSouthChinaSeaisondisplaywhen,on25February 2011, a Chinese warship fires warning shots at Philippine fishing vessels after ordering thefisherman to leave the waters near Jackson Atoll in the Spratly islands, 140-nautical miles from thePalawanislandandPhilippineterritory.35

On2March2011,ChineseaggressiontowardsthePhilippinescontinueswhentwoChinesepatrolboatsaggressivelyapproachand reportedly threaten to ram36a survey ship conducting seismic testingnearReed Bank, which is located in waters to thewest of the Philippines’ Palawan island andwithin thePhilippines-declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ).37 “The incident underscores China’s continuedwillingnesstoapplylimitedcoercionindisputeswithSoutheastAsiancountriesovermaritimeresourcessuchenergyresourcesandfisheries.”38

With tensions clearly rising between China and the Philippines over maritime territorial sovereigntyconcerns in the waters surrounding Philippines-claimed territory, the Philippines hardens its stancetowards China following the Reed Bank incident. This hardened stance includes strengthening the

33http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134534http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline35http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/06/02/11/china-fired-Philippine-fishermen-jackson-atoll36http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline37http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpBTY;http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline38http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpBTY


51

presenceofPhilippinearmedforces inthedisputedSpratly islandsand launchingformalobjectionstoChina’sterritorialsovereigntyclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.39

Twomonthslater,inMay2011,PhilippinePresidentBenignoAquinoIIIwarnsvisitingChineseDefenseMinisterLiangGuanglieofthepossibilityofanarmsraceintheregioniftensionscontinuetoincreaseover disputes in the South China Sea.40 The warning underlines the seriousness of the Philippines’concernsregardingitsmaritimeterritorialsovereignty,andthecontinuedChineseinfringementonthatsovereignty,intheSouthChinaSea.

SeeminglyundeterredbythePhilippinethreats,between21-24May2011,Chinesemarinesurveillancevessels and PLA Navy vessels unload buildingmaterials in the South China Sea near Likas and PatagislandsonthecontestedAmyDouglasBank,territoryclaimedbythePhilippines.41

Clearly frustrated and amidst continuously increasing China-Philippine tensions, on 1 June 2011, thePhilippinessummonaChineseenvoytoexpressitsmountingconcernoverChinesemaritimeincursionsintoPhilippine-claimedwatersand territories in theSouthChinaSea.ThePhilippinesciteat least fiveincursions over the past year by Chinese vessels near the Spratly islands and Amy Douglas Bank,territoriesoffthecoastofPalawanislandandPhilippineterritory.42

TensionsIncreaseBetweenChinaandVietnam

With tensions already high between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, instances ofaggressionandincreasedtensionbetweenChinaandVietnambeginarisinginmid-2011.

On 26 May 2011, Vietnam accuses a Chinese marine surveillance vessel of severing the explorationcables of a Vietnamese-chartered seismic vessel as it is conducting a seismic survey along thecontinentalshelfinwatersoffVietnam.43Later,on9June2011,aChinesefishingvesselensnaresitselfintheexplorationcablesofaVietnamesesurveyvessel,disablingtheVietnamesevessel inthewater.Theincidentoccursabout1,000-kilometersoffChina’sHainanislandandwithinVietnam’s200-nauticalmilecontinentalshelfinwhichVietnamhasterritorialsovereigntyrights.44Vietnampubliclyobjectsthetwo incidentsof Chinese aggressionand territorial dispute, claiming theChinese areusing systematicactsofaggressiontodisputeundisputedterritoryasameansofattemptingtomaterializeChina’s“nine-dashline”claimoverSouthChinaSeawaters,aclaimthatisunacceptabletoVietnam.45

39http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpBTY40http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849941http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline42http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134543http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline44http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB645http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB6


52

Thenextday,on10June2011,Vietnamannouncesthatitwillconducttwonine-hourliveammunitiondrills.46 Vietnam’s announcement, which comes following Chinese incursions and acts of aggressiontowardsVietnamandinwatersthatVietnamclaimsasitsown,representsaprovocativeresponsethatilluminatesVietnam’sunderlyingfrustrationswiththeChineseintheSouthChinaSea.

Chineseaggressioncontinueswhen,on5July2011,armedChinesesoldierschasedownaVietnamesefishingvesselandeventuallyboardtheVietnamesevessel,wheretheChinesesoldiersproceedtobeataVietnamesefishermanandthreatenothersbeforeexpellingtheVietnameseshipfromthewaters.Theincident takes place in waters near the disputed Paracel islands in the South China Sea47 and is justanotherexampleofChineseaggressioninthewatersoftheSouthChinaSea.

ThePhilippinesRenamestheSouthChinaSea

With tensions and Chinese aggression steadily increasing in the South China Sea, the Philippinesresponds provocatively in a political sensewhen, inOctober 2011, the Philippine government beginsreferring to the South China Sea as theWest Philippine Sea in all official Philippine communications.Interestingly, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also refers to the South China Sea as the WestPhilippine Sea in a joint US-Philippines press conference in November 2011.48 The move by thePhilippinegovernmentclearlyunderlinesitsfrustrationwithChinaanditsaggressivenatureintheSouthChinaSea.

AnIncidentofPhilippineAggressionTowardtheChineseintheSouthChinaSea

ThePhilippinestakesontheroleoftheaggressorintheSouthChinaSeawhen,on18October2011,aPhilippineNavalvesselramsasmallChinesefishingvessel indisputedwatersnearReedBank.49Whilethe Philippines quickly apologizes to China for the incident, which it claims to be an accident, theincident is a notable example of a role reversal in which the Philippines plays the aggressor in anincidentwithChina.Tothispoint,mostofthemaritimeaggressionbetweenChinaandthePhilippinesinthewatersoftheSouthChinaSeahasbeeninitiatedbyChina.

ChinaObjectstoOilExplorationNearReedBank

On 28 February 2012, China publicly expresses its objection and disapproval of energy exploration indisputedwatersnearReedBank intheSouthChinaSea.50ThePhilippines,however,claimsthat ithassovereign rights to exploit resources in Reed Bank because the territory falls inwaterswithin a 200-nauticalmilePhilippineexclusiveeconomiczone.51ChinaandthePhilippineshadanumberofincidentsand disputes in waters surrounding the Reed Bank in 2011, and this public objection over resource46http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline47http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;http://globalnation.inquirer.net/5887/vietnam-chinese-soldiers-attack-fishermen48http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134549http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline50http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline51http://www.eurasiareview.com/09032012-china-philippines-dispute-in-south-china-sea-does-beijing-have-legitimate-claim-analysis/


53

exploitationmightprovidesomeinsightintothefactorsdrivingChina’saggressionoverterritorialclaimssurroundingReedbank.

TaiwanClaimsSovereigntyOverSouthChinaSea

Withuncertaintysurroundingmaritimeterritorialsovereigntyclaimsandrights intheSouthChinaSeacontinuingtoincrease,on13March2012,TaiwanclaimssovereigntyovertheentireSouthChinaSea.52Taiwan’s sovereignty claim further complicateswhat is already a complicated sovereignty situation intheSouthChinaSea.

ChinaDetainsVietnameseFisherman

On23March2012,Chinadetains21VietnamesefishermenneartheParacelislandsintheSouthChinaSea and demands $11,000 for the release of the fishermen.53 The Paracel islands are controlled byChina’s military but are also claimed by Vietnam as sovereign territory,54 and this incident certainlyhighlightsthetensionsthatexistoverterritorialrightsintheSouthChinaSea.

StandoffatScarboroughShoalintheSouthChinaSea

On10April2012,anavalstandoffbeginsbetweenChinaandthePhilippinesatScarboroughShoalintheSouthChinaSea.ThestandoffbeginswhenaPhilippinesurveillanceaircraftspotsChinesefishingvesselsatScarboroughShoal, territoryclaimedbybothChinaand thePhilippines. In response, thePhilippineNavythendeploysitslargestwarshiptothearea,inwhatcancertainlybeinterpretedasaprovocativeresponse from the Philippine side. The Philippines claim the Chinese fisherman are exploiting theresourcesofPhilippine-claimedmaritimeterritoryintheSouthChinaSea.Theaggressiveresponsefromthe Philippine side prompts response from China, which then sends surveillance ships to theScarboroughShoal towarn thePhilippineNavy to leave thearea.A two-monthstandoffbetweenthemaritimeforcesfromChinaandthePhilippinesensues.Eventually,on18June2012,amidstanticipationof the looming typhoon season, the Philippine vessels leave the Scarborough Shoal area, and theChinesefishingvesselsdepartshortlythereafter.55

Thetit-for-tatresponsesfromthePhilippinesandChinainthis incident,andparticularlythePhilippinedecisiontosendsuchastrongmessagebydeploying its largestwarshiptorespondtoChinese fishingvessels believed to be simply exploiting resources in Philippine-claimedwaters, showshow tense thesituation in theSouthChinaSeahasbecome.Furthermore, the two-month standoff that results fromthisinitialincidentillustrateshowquicklydisputesoverterritorialclaimsandrightscanescalateinthismaritimeregion.52http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849953http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/china-vietnamese-fishermen-detained.html?_r=0;http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline54http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/china-vietnamese-fishermen-detained.html?_r=055http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499


54

VietnamPassesMaritimeLawonDisputedTerritoryintheSouthChinaSea

InJune2012,VietnamannouncesitspassingofamaritimelawthatassertsVietnamesejurisdictionoverthe disputed Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea. As part of the new law, Vietnamdemandsnotification fromany foreignnavalvesselspassing through thearea.56ThisnewVietnamesemaritime law is seemingly an attempt by Vietnam to increase its control over disputed territories inwhichitbelievestobewithinVietnam’sterritorialsovereignty.

Not surprisingly, China strongly objects Vietnam’s announcement. Following the Vietnameseannouncement,ChinamakesitsownannouncementinwhichitclaimsthatChinahasestablishedacitynamed Sansha on the Paracel islands thatwill administer the territories andwaters surrounding theParacel islands, Spratly islands, andMacclesfield Bank.57 The Chinese announcement is a clear act ofprovocation,andseemstobeanattemptbytheChinesetoemphasizethatChina is in factcontroloftheseimportant,andlargelydisputed,territoriesintheSouthChinaSea.

ChinaLaunchesitsFirstAircraftCarrier

On25September2012,Chinaputs its firstaircraftcarrier, theLiaoning, intoservice.ChinanotesthattheLiaoningaircraftcarrierwillhelpprotectChinesenationalsovereignty.58Thedeploymentofitsfirstaircraft carrier isa largeadvancement forChinaandsomething thatwill certainlyhelp theChinese inprotectingtheirmaritimeterritorialsovereigntyinterestsintheSouthChinaSea.

NewChineseSearchandSeizureRegulations

On28November2012,ChinaannouncesnewregulationsthatprovidepoliceinitsHainanProvincetheauthority toboardandsearchvesselsdeemedtobeviolatingChineseterritorialwaters.Furthermore,thenewregulationswillallowtheHainanpolicetotakeoverforeignvesselsandtheircommunicationassets if theyaredeemedtobe inviolationofChineseterritorialmaritimerightsandclaims.Thenewregulationsaretobeputintoactionstartingon1January2013.59Theannouncementofthesenew,andclearlyprovocative, regulationsunderscoresChina’swillingness toutilizeaggressive tactics inorder toensureitsterritorialclaimsandrightsintheSouthChinaSea.

Astobeexpected,China’sneighborsintheSouthChinaSeareactnegativelytotheprovocativeChineseannouncement.60

ThePhilippinesFilesaUNCaseOverChineseSovereigntyClaimsintheSouthChinaSea

On22January2013,thePhilippinesfilesaninternationalarbitrationcaseundertheUNConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)toseekarulingonthePhilippines’righttoexploitSouthChinaSeawaters

56http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134557http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134558http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134559http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline60http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline


55

within its 200-nauticalmile exclusive economic zone61 and to alsodisputeChinese sovereignty claimsovertheSpratlyislandsandScarboroughShoalintheSouthChinaSea.62ThisisanotablemovefromthePhilippines,asthecasemarksthefirsttimeacountryhasbroughtaclaimagainstChinaunderUNCLOSregardingtheissue.63Notsurprisingly,Chinarefusestoparticipateinthecase.64

The move by the Philippines comes after what turns out to be a notable year of China-PhilippineaggressionanddisputeintheSouthChinaSeain2012.Shortlyafter,ChinainitiatesitsnewregulationsallowingHainanProvincepolicetosearchandseizevesselsinwatersthatChinaclaimsterritorialrightsover.

ChineseTourismonWoodyIslandinSouthChinaSea

InApril2013,ChinaannouncesthatithasstartedallowingtouriststovisitWoodyislandintheParacelsintheSouthChinaSeaaspartofacruiseexperience.65

Whilethemoveisnotviolentoroverlyaggressive,itdoesseemtopersonifyatacticalactionwithintheChinese strategy for the ongoing South China Sea regionalmaritime confrontation. China is bringingChinese tourists to disputed territories in the South China Sea, which makes the territory feel andappeartobeanextensionofChineselandandthereforewithinChinesesovereignty.ThisseemstobeaclevertacticinshiftingtheterritorydisputemoreinthefavorofthesideofChina.

JapanOffersMilitaryAid

ForthefirsttimesinceWorldWarII,inMay2013,JapanoffersmilitaryaidtosomeofitsregionalalliesthathavemaritimedisputeswithChina.ThemoveisviewedasaJapanesebidtobolsteritsSoutheastAsiaregionalalliancesvis-à-visChinaintheEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSea.66OfparticularinteresttoSouthChinaSeaobservers,aspartofthemove,JapanannouncesthatitwillprovidepatrolboatstothePhilippinestohelpboostthecountry’sabilitytocounterChina’sgrowingmaritimepresenceintheSouthChinaSea.67

Themove is a significant step for Japa, and seems to provide some insight into Japan’s strategy forcompetingwithChinesemaritimeeffortsintheregion.

61http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/62http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134563http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134564http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/;http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134565http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/66http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134567http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345


56

MalaysiaSuggestsItMightWorkwithChinaOverSouthChinaSeaClaims

In August 2013,Malaysia claims that it might work with China over Chinese territorial claims in theSouth China Sea and ignore other regional claimants. Furthermore, Malaysian Defense MinisterHishamuddinHusseinstatesthatMalaysiahasnoproblemwithChinapatrollingtheSouthChinaSea.68

ThisseemstobeaninterestingdevelopmentinthebattleforterritorialcontrolintheSouthChinaSea.Tothispoint,itseemsasthoughmostoftheincidentsandannouncementsfromotherregionalactorshave been directed against China and not towards working with China, as is the case in thisannouncementfromMalaysia.

OilRigStandoffNearTritonIslandintheSouthChinaSea

AdisputeandresultingstandoffbetweenChinaandVietnamsparkswhen,on2May2014,aChineseoilcompany,CNPC,movesanoilexplorationrignear theTriton island in theParacels in theSouthChinaSea.OtherChinesevesselssurroundtheoilrig,andinterferewithandpreventVietnamesevesselsfromapproaching.AChina-Vietnamstandoff ensues. The standoff eventually endsafter about two-monthswhen,on15July2014,Chinamovestheoilrig.69

ThestandoffbetweenChinaandVietnamaroundtheplacementofaChineseoilriginwatersneartheTriton island in the South China Sea highlights the sensitivity around territorial claims and resourcerightsinthelargelydisputed,resource-richwatersandterritoriesoftheSouthChinaSea.

ChineseAggressionintheAirspaceDomain

In August 2014, a US surveillance aircraft is harassed by a Chinese fighter jet over territorialwatersclaimedbyChina.Followingtheincident,theChineseNavycallsonChinesefighterjetstoflyevenclosertoUSsurveillanceaircraftoverChinese-claimedwaters.70

TheChineseaggression,whichhasnowclearlyspreadintotheairspacedomain, illustratesthelengthstowhichChina iswillingtogoacrossalldomainstoprotect its interestsregardingmaritimeterritorialrightsandclaims.

ChinaBuildsMan-MadeIslandsintheSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea

In a clear and clevermove to strengthenChinese territorial claimsand increase the reachofChinesesovereigntyintheSouthChinaSea,Chinastartseffortstobuildman-madeislandchainsintheSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea.

InNovember2014,satelliteimagesstarttosuggestthatChinaisbuildinganisland,whichappearstobelargeenoughforanairstrip,atFieryCrossReefintheSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea.71Afewmonths

68http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849969http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/70http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849971http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/


57

later,inFebruary2015,satelliteimagessuggestthatChinaisnotjustbuildingoneartificialislandintheSpratlys,butinsteadbuildingamuchmoresignificantpresence.ThesatelliteimagesgoontoshowthatChinaisreclaiminglandandapparentlybuildingairstripsatfivesitesintheSpratlys,anaggressivemovethat is described as a methodical and well-panned strategy to create a chain of air-and-sea-capableChinesefortresses.72

Chineseprovocationover theSpratlys continueswhen,on20May2015,aUSsurveillanceplanewithCNNcrewmembersflyingovertheSouthChinaSea iswarnedeighttimesbytheChineseNavyand isrepeatedly told toquickly leave thearea.73 The incidenthighlightsChinese interests inprotecting thesecrecy around its territorial claims and the work being done to develop man-made islands in theSpratlys. The incident also highlights the types of steps China iswilling to take, even in the airspacedomain,toprotectChineseinterests.

InamajordevelopmentfortheChinese,Chinacompletesconstructionofa1.93-milerunwayonFieryCrossReefintheSpratlysinSeptember2015.74

The completion of the runway on Fiery Cross Reef is a significant milestone in China’s attempts toexpanditsregionalterritorialcontrolandreachintheSouthChinaSea.Withonerunwaycompletedona man-made island, one would expect China to continue similar building efforts on other islandsthroughouttheSouthChinaSea.

TheUSTestsFreedomofNavigationintheSouthChinaSea

With the announcement of China successfully completing an airstrip on man-made islands in theSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea,theUSrespondsbyinitiatingeffortstotestandpushtheboundariesoffreedomofnavigationinthewatersoftheSouthChinaSea.

On26October2015,aUSNavywarship,theUSSLassen,sailswithin12-nauticalmilesofChina’sman-madeislandsontheFieryCrossReefintheSpratlys.75Followingtheincident,theUSclaimsthatitwillfly,sail,andoperatewhereverinternationallawpermitsandwheneveritsoperationalneedsrequire.76China,on theotherhand, stronglyopposes the incident, calling ita seriousprovocationandabuseoffreedomofnavigation.77

72http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/73http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/74http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849975http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/;http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-215849976http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html77http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345


58

Inanother incident, this time in theairspacedomain,on8November2015, twoUSB-52bombers flyaroundtheSpratlysneartheChinese-builtartificialislands.78Inasimilarincident,on10December2015,twoUSB-52bombersflywithin12-nauticalmilesoftheChineseman-madeislandsintheSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea.79BothincidentsillustrateexamplesoftheUSpushingtheterritorialboundariesintheSouthChinaSeathroughactionsinwhichtheChineseareveryfamiliarwithtakingthemselves.

ChineseTestFlightstoFieryCrossReefAirstrip

AfterannouncingthecompletionofanairstripontheartificialChineseislandontheFieryCrossReefintheSpratlysintheSouthChinaSea,Chineseprovocationcontinueswhenitannouncesthatitisgoingtostartmakingtestflightsonitsnewairstrip.

On2January2016,ChinaconductsitsfirstciviliantestflighttotheFieryCrossReefairstrip.Afewdayslater,on6January2016,Chinaconductsitssecondroundofciviliantestflightstotheairstrip.80

Vietnam,notsurprisingly,stronglyobjectstheChineseactionsregardingitsnewairstrip.81

The completed airstrip and ability to fly to and from the artificial island on the Fiery Cross Reef is asignificantdevelopmentfortheChineseandonethatwouldseeminglyhelptoensureChina’sinterestsinsafeguardingandexpanding itsterritorialsovereigntyclaims intheSouthChinaSea.Thetestflightsclearly illustrate the strategic value that the airstrip andman-made island provides to the Chinese inwhatnowrepresentsaChineseoutpostinthemiddleoflargelydisputedterritorialwatersintheSouthChinaSea.

Chinese“Monster”Ship

Chineseprovocationandbravadocontinueswhen,on11January2016,itannouncesthatithasfinishedconstructionona10,000-tonCoastGuardcuttertobeusedforpatrolsintheSouthChinaSea.Thelargesizeofthenewvesselresultsinitbeingcalled“themonster”byChinesemedia.82

Theannouncementofthenew,massivevesselisaseeminglyprovocativemovebytheChinesetoassertitsdominanceoveritsregionalwaters.

TheUSContinuestoTestFreedomofNavigation

In continuingwith its efforts from late 2015 to push freedom of navigation boundaries in the SouthChinaSea,on30January2016,aUSguided-missiledestroyerwarship,theUSSCurtisWilbur,sailswithin12-nautical miles of the disputed Triton island in the South China Sea.83 Notably, the Triton island

78http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html79http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html80http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/81http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/82http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html83http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html


59

territory is claimed by China, as well as two other states (Taiwan and Vietnam). China, as expected,condemns the incident, claiming the US actions are intentionally provocative, irresponsible, andextremelydangerous.84

SatelliteImagesSuggestMoreChineseConstructionintheSouthChinaSea

China’sconstructionofartificialislandsandmilitaryinfrastructureintheSouthChinaSeaappearstobean innovative, tactical strategy for ensuring and expanding Chinese maritime territorial sovereigntyclaimsandoverallChinesemilitarystrengthintheregionalwaters.Giventhis,itisreasonabletoexpectChinatocontinuewithitsartificialislandconstructioneffortsintheSouthChinaSea.

This is confirmed when, on 13 February 2016, satellite imagery shows what appears to be Chineseconstruction on Duncan island in the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The satellite imageryappearstodisplayconstructionofhelicopterlandingsites,85whichwouldillustrateanothermoveaspartoftheChinesestrategytoexpanditsinfluence,capability,andcontrolfurtheroutintotheSouthChinaSea.

ChinaDeploysMissilestoParacelIslandsinSouthChinaSea

InwhatrepresentsanothermovetoexpandChinesemilitary,andoverall,influenceandcontrolfurtherout into the South China Sea, on 14 February 2014, China deploys surface-to-air missiles onWoodyislandintheParacelislandsintheSouthChinaSea.86

Themovetodeploysurface-to-airmissilesondisputedterritoryindisputedSouthChinaSeawatersisaclearly provocative act of aggression on behalf of the Chinese in their attempts to ensure ChineseterritorialinterestsintheSouthChinaSea.

WhileChinaclaimsthattheinstallationofthemissilesisitsrightfordefenseonitssovereignterritory,theUSwarnsthatthemissiledeploymentmightsignalamilitarizationoftheSouthChinaSeamaritimedisputes.87

84http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html85http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html86http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/87http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345


60

Appendix:SourceData Table11.ChineseGovernmentSpeechesAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

Document_Name Date Period WordCount2002.08.06_China_ChineseGovernment02 8/6/02 1 14512004.02.25_China_KongQuan02 2/25/04 3 1862004.04.07_China_KongQuan01 4/7/04 3 232004.04.19_China_WuHongbo 4/19/04 3 10452004.04.20_China_KongQuan05 4/20/04 3 452004.05.20_China_LiuJianchao02 5/20/04 3 5272004.10.22_China_ZhangQiyue01 10/22/04 4 4482004.11.24_China_ZhangQiyue03 11/24/04 4 6802005.03.11_China_KongQuan07 3/11/05 5 4262005.03.16_China_LiuJianchao03 3/16/05 5 9282005.07.21_China_WuHongbo04 7/21/05 6 11302005.10.11_China_WuHongbo05 10/11/05 6 6982005.12.12_China_WenJiabao02 12/12/05 6 18472005.12.16_China_LiJinjun01 12/16/05 6 6002006.09.15_China_QinGang03 9/15/06 8 11012006.11.17_China_JiangYu01 11/17/06 8 6562007.04.01_China_WenJiabao01 4/1/07 9 522007.12.11_China_QinGang05 12/11/07 10 1322008.01.25_China_JiangYu03 1/25/08 11 3652008.02.05_China_LiuJianchao02 2/5/08 11 6382008.05.25_China_QinGang06 5/25/08 11 3192008.07.29_China_LiuJianchao04 7/29/08 12 292009.02.03_China_JiangYu04 2/3/09 13 802009.03.11_China_MaZhaoxu01 3/11/09 13 6252009.03.17_China_QinGang08 3/17/09 13 1432009.03.25_China_LiuJianchao05 3/25/09 13 7082009.04.28_China_LiuJianchao06 4/28/09 13 25082009.06.25_China_QinGang11 6/25/09 13 2172010.06.03_China_LiuJianchao08 6/3/10 15 1492010.10.14_China_MaZhaoxu06 10/14/10 16 3772011.01.26_China_HongLei03 1/26/11 17 572011.03.25_China_JiangYu11 3/25/11 17 2822011.05.31_China_JiangYu13 5/31/11 17 442011.06.07_China_HongLei08 6/7/11 17 165


61

2011.06.10_China_HongLei11 6/10/11 17 1272011.06.22_China_HongLei14 6/22/11 18 1542011.07.12_China_HongLei17 7/12/11 18 362011.07.24_China_YangJiechi03 7/24/11 18 12652011.09.07_China_HeYafei01 9/7/11 18 7922011.09.19_China_HongLei18 9/19/11 18 4232011.09.29_China_QinGang12 9/29/11 18 13002011.10.27_China_LiuXiaoming03 10/27/11 18 21892011.11.22_China_LiuWeimin02 11/22/11 18 6602012.02.13_China_LiuWeimin05 2/13/12 19 3062012.03.06_China_FuYing02 3/6/12 19 7702012.04.05_China_HongLei24 4/5/12 19 1482012.04.11_China_LiuWeimin07 4/11/12 19 2952012.04.23_China_LiuWeimin09 4/23/12 19 642012.05.14_China_HongLei25 5/14/12 19 1272012.06.04_China_LiuWeimin12 6/4/12 19 5592012.07.03_China_LiuWeimin13 7/3/12 20 1862012.09.03_China_HongLei29 9/3/12 20 8242012.09.13_China_HongLei30 9/13/12 20 1822012.11.29_China_HongLei32 11/29/12 20 3032012.12.24_China_HuaChunying02 12/24/12 20 3012013.01.07_China_HongLei35 1/7/13 21 682013.02.05_China_LiuXiaoming04 2/5/13 21 15372013.04.02_China_HongLei39 4/2/13 21 2852013.05.10_China_HuaChunying05 5/10/13 21 2442013.06.06_China_HongLei41 6/6/13 21 6392013.12.11_China_WangYi14 12/11/13 22 15212014.05.21_China_XiJinping03 5/21/14 23 24262014.07.15_China_HongLei02 7/15/14 24 2362015.03.08_China_WangYi04 3/8/15 25 1442015.03.26_China_GengYansheng01 3/26/15 25 16062015.04.13_China_QuZhe01 4/13/15 25 18562015.05.16_China_FanChanglong02 5/16/15 25 1972015.05.31_China_SunJianguo01 5/31/15 25 2962015.07.24_China_LuKang01 7/24/15 26 2332015.10.17_China_LiuZhenmin06 10/17/15 26 27522015.10.29_China_YangYujun01 10/29/15 26 894


62

2016.02.26_China_WangYi11 2/26/16 27 44522016.04.22_China_WangYi01 4/22/16 27 932016.05.26_China_YangYujun02 5/26/16 27 6192016.06.02_China_TianXuejun01 6/2/16 27 9202016.06.18_China_ZhangPing01 6/18/16 27 9862016.07.01_China_WangYi03 7/1/16 28 27472016.07.12_China_WangYi02 7/12/16 28 11872016.07.13_China_LiuZhenmin02 7/13/16 28 11202016.07.28_China_YangYujun03 7/28/16 28 2616

Table12.PhilippineGovernmentSpeechesAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

Document_Name Date Period WordCount2011.03.04_Phillippines_BenignoAquino_03b

3/4/11 17243

2011.08.26_Phillippines_BenignoAquino_04b

8/26/11 181535

2011.09.01_Phillippines_BenignoAquino_11

9/1/11 18962

2011.11.15_Phillippines_AlbertdelRosario_05

11/15/11 18796


6/13/12 19 1215

2012.09.06_Phillippines_DepartmentofForeignAffairs_02

9/6/12 20 261

2013.01.18_Phillippines_RaulHernandez_01b

1/18/13 21 142


6/12/13 21 1002

2013.10.09_Philippines_BenignoSAquinoIII02

10/9/13 22 944

2014.02.25_Phillippines_RaulHernandez_02b

2/25/14 23 229


3/30/14 23 602

2014.06.27_Philippines_EdwinLacierda01

6/27/14 23 196


6/5/15 25 1791


2/29/16 27 129

2016.05.30_Phillippines_DepartmentofForeignAffairs_01

5/30/16 27 168


63

Table13.VietnameseGovernmentSpeechesAnalyzedinSouthChinaSeaCaseStudy

Document_Name Date Period WordCount2004.04.07_Vietnam_LeDung01a 4/7/04 3 312009.03.19_Vietnam_NguyenMinhTriet_02andNguyenTanDung_03

4/28/09 13164

2009.04.23_Vietnam_NguyenTanDung_04

4/23/09 131411


5/25/09 131002

2009.12.29_Vietnam_NguyenPhuongNga_02

12/29/09 1451

2011.05.28_Vietnam_NguyenDuyChien_01

5/28/11 1775


12/22/11 18685


5/31/13 21258

2013.07.25_Vietnam_TruongTanSang_01 7/25/13 22 2492013.10.13_Vietnam_NguyenTanDung_09

10/13/13 22583


5/11/14 23 117


5/21/14 23 597


5/22/14 23 41


5/22/14 23 660

2014.06.05_Vietnam_TranDuyHai_01 6/5/14 23 660

2014.06.16_Vietnam_NguyenQuocThap_01

6/16/14 23 1058

2014.06.16_Vietnam_TranDuyHai_02 6/16/14 23 22842014.06.18_Vietnam_NguyenTanDung_13

6/18/14 23 93

2014.09.24_Vietnam_PhamBinhMinh_04 9/24/14 24 7642015.06.05_Vietnam_TruongTanSang_08 6/5/15 25 745

2016.02.26_Vietnam_PhamBinhMinh_01 2/26/16 27 242

2016.05.26_Vietnam_NguyenXuanPhuc_03

5/26/16 27 22

2016.06.14_Vietnam_PhamBinhMinh_06 6/14/16 27 276

2016.08.24_Vietnam_TranDaiQuang_01 8/24/16 28 73


64

Appendix:GrayZoneCodeSystemCodeSystem

Agreements G20 Minsk_Agreements Polities_Regions_Organizations Abkhazia Afghanistan Arctic_Far_North Armenia ASEAN Asia Austria Azerbaijan Balkans Baltics Belarus Brazil BRICS Britain_UK Bulgaria Caucasus CentralAsia Chechnya China Crimea Cyprus Czechoslovakia Czech_Republic Donbass Donetsk E_Ukraine Estonia EU Europe Finland France Georgia Germany Greece HongKong Hungary


65

India Iran Iraq ISAF Italy Japan Jordan Kalingrad Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Latin_America Latvia Lebanon Libya Lithuania Luhansk Malaysia MENA Moldova Mongolia Nagorno_Karabakh NATO NorthKorea OSCE Philippines Poland Romania Russia Russian_America_[Alaska] Siberia_Far_East Slovakia SouthChinaSea SouthKorea South_Ossetia Soviet_Union Spain Sweden Syria Tajikistan Taiwan Thailand Transnistria Turkey Ukraine UN


66

US Vietnam Western_World Yugoslavia Denmark Guam Norway Portugal Switzerland Cultural_Emotive_Values Negative_Extreme_Emotive Aggressor_Aggression Conspiracy Danger Enemy Humiliation Injustice Manichean_Evil Shame Threaten Threatened Victimization Xenophobia Negative_Normal_Emotive Anti-Western Competition Conflict Corruption Criminal_Illegal Denial Extreme_Radical Failure Grievance Imperialism Isolation Lying Outrage Weakness Women_Innocents Positive_Extreme_Emotive Dignity Duty_Obligation Heroism Homeland Honor


67

Independence Justice National_Identity Overcoming Preparedness Pride Protect Religion Resilience Sacrifice Self-defense Strength Superiority Victory Positive_Normal_Emotive Confidence Courage Democratic Equality_Rights Hope Legitimacy Peace Progress Respect Stability Success Tolerance Trust Unity Events CharlieHebdo ColdWar Color_Revolutions G20 Maidan_Square MH17 WWII Individuals Obama Poroshenko Putin Stalin Political_Factors Positive_Cohesive_Concerns Allies


68

Cooperation DomesticDevelopment Economy_and_Trade ForeginAid_Investment ForeignAid FormalAgreement Friendship Governance Humanitarian_Aid Political_Process Political_Reform Support Domestic_Development Foreign_Aid_Investment DisruptiveSecurityConcerns Annexation Atrocity Borders_Territory Conflict Gray_Zone_Activities Rebellion_Resistance Terrorism War Coup Crime Cyber_Attacks Economic_Problems Economic_Sanctions Energy Nuclear_Energy Oil_Gas_Other Extremism Violation_International IslandBuilding Media_Propaganda Military Materiel Miilitary_Operations Occupation_Invasion Troops_Fighters Regular_Troops Irregular_Fighters Weapons_Nuclear Nationalism NATO_Expansion


69

Nazism Prisoners Protests Refugees Separatism Sovereignty Other_Security_Concerns Article5 Ceasefire Civilians Infrastructure Novorossiya Oligarchs_Elites Reunification Russian_Minorities Security Rhetorical_Devices Accusation Counterargument_Comparison Dehumanization Ethos_Credibility Example Figurative_Language Graphic_Violence Grouping History Hyperbole If_Statements Intensifiers Intimacy Kinship Lexicalization List Logos Magnitude Misinformation Other_Outgroup Pathos Pejorative Poetry Quote Repetition Rhetorical_Question Sarcasm_Irony Title


70

Us_Ingroup Veiled_Threat


71

References Astorino-Courtois,A.(1998).ClarifyingDecisions:AssessingtheImpactofDecisionStructuresonForeign

PolicyChoicesduringthe1970JordanianCivilWar. InternationalStudiesQuarterly,42(4),733-754.

Beeman,W.O.(2001).EmotionandSincerityinPersianDiscourse:AccomplishingtheRepresentationofInnerStates.InternationalJournaloftheSociologyofLanguage,148,31-57.

Bowles, S. (2001). Individual Conflicts, and the Evolutionof Preferences. In S.N.Durlauf&H. PeytonYoung(Eds.),SocialDynamics(pp.155-190).Cambridge,Massachusetts:MITPress.

Boyd,R.,&Richerson,P.J.(2001).NormsandBoundedRationality.InG.Gigerenzer&R.Selten(Eds.),Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (pp. 281-296). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MITPress.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology. Qualitative Research inPsychology,3,77-101.

El-Badawy,E.,Comerford,M.,&Welby,P. (2015). InsidetheJihadiMind:Understanding IdeologyandPropaganda.London:TonyBlairFoundation.

Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and Power, Second Edition. Harlow, England: Pearson EducationLimited.

Farnell, B.,&Graham, L. R. (1998).Discourse-CenteredMethods. InH. R. Bernard (Ed.),HandbookofMethodsinCulturalAnthropology(pp.411-457).WalnutCreek,California:AltamiraPress.

Fenstermacher,L.,Kuznar,L.A.,&Yager,M.(2012).AnalysisofDiscourseforIndicationsandWarnings.InD.D.Schmorrow(Ed.),Advances inDesignforCross-CulturalActivitiesPart II (pp.230-240).BocaRaton,FL:CRCPress.

Gigerenzer,G. (2000).Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the RealWorld.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Guest,G.,MacQueen,K.M.,&Namey,E.(2012).AppliedThematicAnalysis.LosAngeles:Sage.Heuer, R. J. (1999). Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Langley, Virginia: United States Central

IntelligenceAgency,CenterfortheStudyofIntelligence.Kuznar, L.A. (2002). EvolutionaryApplicationsofRisk SensitivityModels to Socially Stratified Species:

Comparison of Sigmoid, Concave and Linear Functions.Evolution andHumanBehavior, 23(4),265-280.

Kuznar, L.A. (2007). RationalityWars and theWaronTerror: Explaining Terrorismand SocialUnrest.AmericanAnthropologist,109(2),318-329.

Kuznar,L.A.(2013).DiscourseandCognitiveComplexityAnalysisofKimJongUn’sSpeechesApril2012–March 2013, Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA), OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, Briefing 17April,2013.Arlington,VA.

Kuznar,L.A.(2014).ThematicAnalysisofBasharal-Assad’sSpeeches.InH.Cabayan&N.Wright(Eds.),A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach to leader assessment at a distance: The case ofBashar al-Assad Part II: Analytical Approaches (pp. 27-61). Arlington, VA: StrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO

Kuznar,L.A.(2016a).Da’eshDiscourseAnalysis: TheStrategicFrameworkofISIL’s“VirtualCaliphate”.SMA Reach-back Report to USCENTCOM, Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO,Arlington,Virginia.

Kuznar,L.A. (2016b). IndicatorsofChanges inRussianStrategic Interests:ThematicAnalysisofPutin’sDiscourse. SMA Reach-back Report to USCENTCOM, Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO,Arlington,Virginia.


72

Kuznar,L.A.,&Hunt,C.W.(2015).TheBlue-Green-RedMetaphorintheContextofCounterterrorism:ClarificationsandAnthropologicalEmendations.CTX,5(3),23-30.

Kuznar, L. A., &Moon,W. H. (2014). Thematic Analysis of ISILMessaging. In H. Cabayan& S. Canna(Eds.), Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL (pp. 47-54). Arlington, VA: Strategic MultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO

Kuznar,L.A.,Popp,G.,&Peterson,N.(2016).RussianCyberAttacksagainstEstonia2007:PreliminaryResults for ICONS Simulation. Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO,Arlington,Virginia.

Kuznar,L.A.,Suedfeld,P.,Morrison,B.H.,&Spitaletta,R.W.C.M.J.(2014).Amulti-disciplinary,multi-method approach to leader assessment at a distance: The case of Bashar al-Assad Part I:Preliminarysummary,comparisonofresultsandrecommendations.Arlington,VA.

Kuznar,L.A.,&Yager,M.(2012).AnalysisofPashtunNarratives:ReportonResultsWhatcuesdoPashtospeakersuseinunderstandinghowtodrawin-andout-groupdistinctions?.ReportpreparedforAirForceResearchLaboratorySAMOAProject(FA8650-10-C-6106),Dayton,OH.

Kuznar, L. A., & Yager, M. (2013). The Expression of Trust in the Persian Language (Farsi). ReportPrepared for the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) CONTRACT # FA8650-10-C-6106 ,Wright-PattersonAirForceBase,Dayton,OH.

Kuznar, L. A., & Yager,M. (2016). Identification of Security Issues and Their Importance to Russia, ItsNear-abroadandNATOAllies:AThematicAnalysisofLeadershipSpeeches.StrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication,OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO,Arlington,Virginia.

Kuznar, L. A., Yager, M., Clair, C. S., & Stephenson, A. (2012). Cognitive Complexity Assessment ofPakistan – India Regional Narratives. Dayton, OH: Report prepared for Air Force ResearchLaboratory SAMOA Project (FA8650-10-C-6106), Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA),OSD/ASD(R&E)/RSD/RRTO

Rahimi, A., & Sahragard, R. (2006). A Critical Discourse Analysis of Euphemization and Derogation inEmailsontheLatePope.TheLinguisticsJournal,1(2),29-87.

Ryan,G.W.,&Bernard,H.R.(2003).Techniquestoidentifythemes.FieldMethods,15(1),85-109.Schiffrin,D.(2003).DiscourseMarkers:Language,Meaning,andContext.InD.Schiffrin,D.Tannen,&H.

E. Hamilton (Eds.), The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (pp. 54-75). Malden, MA: BlackwellPublishers.

USSTRATCOM. (2006). Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept. Retrieved from Omaha,Nebraska:http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare

van Dijk, T. A. (2005). Politics, Ideology, and Discourse. In K. Brown (Ed.), Politics & Language,EncyclopediaofLanguageandLinguistics,2ndEdition(pp.728-740).Boston,MA:Elsevier.

nsi discourse analysis case study south china sea...

Documents