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Non-territorial autonomy as a solution to a core tension in liberal nationalism

Goemans Piet

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

goemans.piet@gmail.com

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European

Consortium for Political Research, University of Mainz, 11-16 March 2012

Work in progress

Abstract:

Nationalism has always been a twofold phenomenon. On the one hand there is bottom-up nationalism

which intrinsically values the national community and on the other hand there is top-down nationalism

instigated by the political centre and aiming at the instrumentalization of the (majority) nation in

function of the state. The most consistent normative approach to the nationalities problem is an

approach that is also twofold and that treats top-down and bottom-up nationalism separately. This leads

to a twofold multinational federal model like non-territorial autonomy. Liberal nationalism, because of

its alliance with the nation-state paradigm doesn’t treat top-down and bottom-up nationalism separately

and therefore runs into troubles. Normatively speaking the most consistent way of treating nationalism

is such a separated approach. The reason why the opposite, a merged approach, resulting in the nation-

state model, is still plausible is due to historical contingencies. This is the correct way of interpreting

Bauer and this is also the strongest argument for non-territorial autonomy so far.

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Non-territorial autonomy as a solution to a core tension in

liberal nationalism

Introduction

From a certain perspective the nationalities problem doesn’t seem to be that problematic. The fact that

there are successful multinational federations relativizes the problem. Apparently the nationalities

problem is something that can be managed and appeased, if circumstances are right. Yet most

nationalist strive for a nation-state of their own rather than a place in an overarching multinational

federation and certain scholars are equally blinded by the nation-state paradigm. In this paper I will

argue that nationalism always was a twofold phenomenon that is more in line with a twofold model, like

a multinational federation as opposed to a unitary model like the nation-state.

The two types of nationalism are bottom-up and top-down nationalism. In the first section I will give a

brief account of the history of both types of nationalism. In the second section I will argue that the two

types of nationalism can and should be approached differently in normative theory and I will show how

liberal nationalism, which doesn’t recognize this tension, runs into troubles. Normative consistency

demands a separation of both types of nationalism but history isn’t always governed by the laws of

normative consistency. In the third section I will show, relying on Bauer’s work, how the historical

context determines our choice for the nation-state instead of the multinational federation.

I believe that I have thereby given an elaboration on Otto Bauer’s theory of nationalism that is consistent

with it and helpful to understand it. Bauer doesn’t make the distinction between top-down and bottom-

up nationalism himself. He was focussed on bottom-up nationalism and had a blind spot for top-down

nationalism. Top-down nationalism, for him, had simply little to do with nationalism. Distinguishing

between top-down and bottom-up nationalism is however a good way of understanding his theory. I will

say so explicitly when I am relying on Bauer, otherwise I am giving my own view.

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I. Bottom-up and top-down nationalism

Nationalism has always been a twofold phenomenon. On the one hand it is a bottom-up phenomenon,

on the other a top-down phenomenon. On the one hand, it starts from a community of people that

share ethno-cultural characteristics. On the other hand it is the result of the culturally homogenizing

effects and efforts of a political centre. Bottom-up nationalism starts from the actual national

community, whereas top-down nationalism consists of a process of nation-building initiated by the

political centre. As such both, bottom-up community and top-down process, give rise to a different type

of nationalism which doesn’t mean they can’t appear at the same time, inform and enforce the same

nationalist movement. The historical origins of both bottom-up and top-down nationalism are different

though and so should be our normative assessment. Let me first briefly paint the historical picture for

bottom-up nationalism, afterwards I will turn to top-down nationalism.

To my knowledge, the best description of bottom-up nationalism has, so far, been given by Otto Bauer in

his 1907 book The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy. Bauer defines the nation as “the totality

of human beings bound together by a community of fate into a community of character”. (2000: 117)

This definition corresponds to what I will call the bottom-up nation or ethno-cultural community. It is

different from the top-down nation because it doesn’t mention the link between a political centre and

the individuals it rules over: it doesn’t speak of citizens (belonging to a certain political centre) nor of a

territory (of which the inhabitants belong to a certain political centre). The nation is first of all a “totality

of human beings”, a group of human beings that share a national character, i.e. that are members of the

same “community of character”. In other words, this nation could and has come about independent of a

political centre. This definition of the nation as being independent of a political centre is the first

difference that sets Bauer apart from most definitions of the nation.

Human beings are bound into a community of character through the “community of fate”. The

community of fate is constituted by a “common experience of the same fate in the context of constant

relations, of continual interaction”. (QN 100) The community of fate is not a similarity of fate. An

example of a similarity of fate is the class position. People in the same class experience similar

circumstances all over the world. A community of fate is constituted by the sum of all important

circumstances, it encompasses more than one similarity. Bauer makes it clear that the national character

is not fixed but the precipitate of history although it is a real causal factor it is also constantly changing

(QN 113).

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Different elements decide on which people will form a community of fate. Economic elements are the

most important – Bauer remains after all a Marxist. Bauer describes how peasant communities, living

separately from other communities that had similar ancestors, would slowly become ethno-culturally too

different from one-another so that they wouldn’t form a nation when the modern economy puts them

into closer contact with each-other again. This happened with the Dutch tribes that split from the larger

German community and would eventually form a different Dutch nation (QN 103). Economic elements

can also play a different role: Bauer describes how Jews during the Middle Ages lived in an economic

niche of society, which kept them apart from the Christians and put them in a community of fate with

other Jews scattered across Europe rather than with the European peoples amongst whom they lived

intermixed. For this reason the Jews were a nation during the Middle Ages, they stopped being a nation

once the modern economy destroyed the niche that the Jews were occupying (QN 293-296). On a micro-

level the economic element is also predominant. Bauer’s famous thesis of the awakening of the non-

historical nations rests on the analysis that enclosed peasant communities would, when becoming

modern farmers, be sucked into the national community of fate, based on their regular visits to

provincial markets (QN 58-59). Interaction is mostly done in person and hence geographical elements

also play a role, although the Jewish case indicates the relativity of this element of geographical

proximity. Other elements like common language, common laws, common religion all play a role as well,

but mostly of a secondary order.

As such this ethno-cultural community or bottom-up nation provides the individual with a frame of

reference. Even the most emancipated individuals are embedded in the context of choice that is

provided to them by this ethno-cultural community. A mixture of inborn conservatism and chauvinism

that marks people of today as much as their predecessors ensures that people intrinsically value their

ethno-cultural community. People identify with their ethno-cultural community. This makes bottom-up

nationalism into a strong political force. Since the 1990’s the intrinsic value of the ethno-cultural

community has gained recognition in political theory and scholars have tried to make liberalism

compatible with this form of bottom-up nationalism (Margalit and Raz 1990, Kymlicka 1995).

Let us turn to top-down nationalism. Top-down nationalism consists of a series of deliberate policies, and

their side-effects, implemented by a political centre aiming at the creation of a well-functioning state.

Such policies were: the building of roads (Weber 1976: chapter 12), military service (Weber 1976:

chapter 17), schooling (Weber 1976: chapter 18), etc. They were all intended to create a well-functioning

state, sometimes they had the side-effect of homogenizing the culture (like in the case of military

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service) and sometimes they were also deliberately aimed at homogenizing the population (like in the

case of schooling). This paper is partly about the question whether top-down nationalism can be neutral,

hence the fact that most of those policies aimed at a well-functioning state is important.

France set the example for top-down nationalism and this example would be followed by the rest of

Europe. It would inspire national revolutions in 1820, 1830 and especially 1848 all over Europe and

beyond. Next to liberal revolutions inspired by the ideal of the Enlightenment, these were also national

revolutions, inspired by the new political model that France was experimenting with. What did top-down

nationalism consist of? During the French revolution the dialect of Ile de France was enforced upon the

rest of France. The people of France would also quite literally become the bearers of the ideals of the

intellectuals in the political centre of Paris, when the Levée en masse made every able-bodied

Frenchmen into a defender of the political centre. They were reimbursed for their sacrifice by all getting

the official status of citizen and later on they would all be represented by the political centre – at least in

name. Top-down nationalism creates a close link between the people and their political centre. The

modern state would have been incomplete without the element of top-down nationalism, invented by

the French. As such top-down nationalism instrumentalizes the majority nation in function of the state.

This instrumentalization of the ethno-cultural community, its language, its culture and its people, is

typical of top-down nationalism. The difference with the intrinsic valuing of the ethno-cultural

community that was at the core of bottom-up nationalism is striking.

The age of nationalism really only begins when both types of nationalism joined together. Top-down

nationalism began in highly centralized France, but it was also tried out in multinational empires. Only in

highly centralized countries like France, islands like Japan, former empires like Iran, former lingua franca

England, economic superpowers like Germany, was there a majority nation large enough to support a

viable nation-state. In most multinational federations that didn’t find the right balance between top-

down and bottom-up nationalism, the nationalities problem would appear. Partly because of top-down

nationalism, partly because interaction amongst people was increased in the Modern Age, national

minorities were gradually assimilated into the majority nation. Their ethno-cultural roots were still

present however and bottom-up nationalism was incited by the romanticist fear of disappearing national

minorities. Usually these national minorities would, after a period of nationalist struggle with the

political centre, demand independence. Independence meant that the national minority didn’t only see

itself as an ethno-cultural community, but also as a political community. The national minority started

having top-down nationalist aspirations of its own. That is how bottom-up nationalism got linked to top-

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down nationalism and that is how the nation-state paradigm was born. Country after country got its

independence and during the twentieth century the nation-state became the political paradigm.

In the literature the difference between top-down and bottom-up nationalism recurs at several points

but in different forms. Hans Kohn introduced a similar distinction between civic-territorial and ethno-

cultural nationalism in the descriptive historical literature (Kohn 1955: 29-30). Spitefully Kohn already

used the distinction as a counter concept aiming at separating good Western civic-territorial nationalism

from bad Eastern ethno-cultural nationalism. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the distinction

hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves in the normative literature. My interpretation of this distinction is

far from using it as a counter concept, as will become clear in the parts below. Different scholars have

defended different versions of this distinction. For Deutsch this distinction corresponds to the distinction

between patriotism and nationalism (Deutsch 1953: 232). Anthony Smith elaborates on Kohn’s original

distinction (1991: 81-84). In fact, most authors in the descriptive literature will make a similar distinction

if not explicitly than implicitly by limiting research on nationalism to the age of nationalist upheaval,

which in most cases means studying bottom-up nationalism against the unifying tendencies of a civic

statist nationalism. In that sense, what I am proposing in this article is limited to the normative

discussion and centred on the question: how should we normatively interpret this distinction?

Chaim Gans introduced this distinction in the normative debate in his The Limits of Nationalism. He

claims there is a statist and a cultural variant of nationalism and that they both have a different

normative bearing. Statist nationalism, which I called top-down nationalism, instrumentalizes the nation,

goes from state to nation. Cultural nationalism, which I called bottom-up nationalism, intrinsically values

the nation and goes from nation to state. Gans proceeds to construct a liberal theory of cultural

nationalism. I think that the distinction between both types of nationalism implies a deeper criticism of

liberal nationalism though.

II. Liberal nationalism and the tension between bottom-up and top-down nationalism

Liberal nationalism gives two types of arguments for nationalism (Miller 1995: 82-83 and Kymlicka 2001:

224-228). Both types of argument correspond nicely to what I called top-down and bottom-up

nationalism. To paraphrase Miller, there are arguments that go top-down from the state to the nation,

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these arguments I will call instrumental arguments because they instrumentalize the nation in function

of the state. Kymlicka argues for example that the nation is important for the state because it fosters

solidarity and trust amongst the citizens, needed for democracy and solidarity (Kymlicka 2001: 225-226).

There are also arguments that go bottom-up from the nation to the state, these arguments I will call

intrinsic arguments because they start from an intrinsic valuation of the nation. “Participation in a

national culture, [liberal nationalists] argue, far from inhibiting individual choice, is what makes

individual freedom meaningful”, Kymlicka states (2001: 227). Because the national culture makes our live

meaningful, we intrinsically value it. To summarize, the logic behind top-down nationalism is one of

instrumentalizing the (majority) nation in function of the state. The logic behind bottom-up nationalism

is one of intrinsically valuing the nation (usually the minority nation).

The strength of liberal nationalism depends on arguing for both types of nationalism at the same time

and applied to the same nation. The model one then becomes is the nation-state. The nation-state rests

on an instrumentalization and an intrinsic valuation of the same nation. The instrumental arguments for

the nation-state provide liberal nationalism with strong arguments for basing states on a nation. The

intrinsic argument provides liberal nationalism with a rationale for maintaining the current world-order

based on a patchwork of different sovereign (nationally delineated) states. As such liberal nationalism

has an alliance with the nation-state paradigm1. Liberal nationalism provides this paradigm with a

normative legitimation. The nation-state paradigm makes liberal nationalism realistic. This alliance only

lasts if liberal nationalism appeals to both arguments at the same time and applied to the same nation.

Both types of nationalism are in conflict though and it is prima facie more consistent to deal with them

separately by applying them to other nations. One nation, the majority nation, then is used as the basis

for top-down nationalism. Another nation, the minority nation, is intrinsically valued and given the

means for becoming autonomous. The model aligned with this separate treatment of both types of

nationalism is that of a multinational federation that takes the intrinsic value of minority nations

seriously, but also respects the need of territorial integrity of the state. The model that does so best, is in

my opinion the model of non-territorial autonomy.

1 Some variants of liberal nationalism are more open to the option of a multinational federation (Kymlicka 2001:

chapter 5) but liberal nationalism remains the ideology that tries to reinforce the link between bottom-up and top-down nationalism. Liberal nationalism grants minority nations, i.e. bottom-up nations, national self-determination, which is typically conceived in state-like terms. That is, minority nations have a right to their own territory and political center that may implement schemes of nationalization or plain nation-building (Margalit and Raz 1990).

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Let me in the next two subsections explain how the conflict between top-down and bottom-up

nationalism manifests itself and makes liberal nationalism normatively inconsistent. On the one hand,

the sensitivities of bottom-up nationalism are incompatible with the requirements of top-down

nationalism in several ways. On the other hand, top-down nationalism is hindered if it is to take into

account bottom-up nationalism. Treating top-down and bottom-up nationalism separately, seeing them

as two different principles and applying these principles in a pure way, is normatively more consistent. I

will first show how bottom-up nationalism is incompatible with top-down nationalism by focusing on

bottom-up nationalism, thereafter I will turn to top-down nationalism.

Bottom up nationalism and the smallest nations

Let us first assume that secession is out of the question. In a multinational federation the bottom-up

nationalism of the minority that aspires to become a top-down nationalism as well, problematizes the

living together of the nations. Demands for national autonomy by the minority become mixed with

political demands. The minority nation starts to ask a territory of its own, it politicizes the question of

schooling and cultural institutions, it defies the role of the language of the majority, etc. Bauer shows

how this type of nationalist power politics and nationalist struggles put the Austro-Hungarian empire

under pressure (QN 193-218). How can a multinational empire be freed of national struggles? This

question drove Bauer and Renner and their analysis is still insightful. Renner argues that the centralist-

atomist constitution that leaves national minorities an all or nothing choice, is the main reason why

nationalist power politics leads to a crippling of imperial politics. Such an centralist-atomist constitution

leaves the national minorities fighting over power in the imperial administration and gives them an

incentive to fight hard, for otherwise they would end up powerless (Renner 1902: chapter 1 and QN 218-

243). The solution Renner proposes is what he calls the organic constitution, which places intermediary

organization in between the political centre and the individual. These are the national corporations and I

would add that the rationale behind them is that of bottom-up nationalism. These corporations are still

embedded in an overarching state of which the rationale is that of top-down nationalism. In this way

separating top-down and bottom-up nationalism appeases the nationalist power politics that threatens

multinational federations.

The solution of liberal nationalism to the nationalist power politics that often threatens multinational

federations is to propose national self-determination and then to be vague about which nations have a

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right to national self-determination (because they don’t want to encourage a process of balkanization).

This strategy works counterproductive. The harder you shout as a national minority, the more chance of

becoming self-determining. The lesser minority nations make an effort at living together, the more the

multinational federation is crippled by national power politics, the bigger the likelihood of independent

statehood for the minority. Waving the flag of national self-determination gives an incentive to national

minorities to become politically active and to incite the nationalist power politics. What we need is a

theory that aims at appeasing nationalist struggles in a multinational federation. A strict separation of

top-down nationalism and bottom-up nationalism is promising in this regard, as was shown in the

previous paragraph.

The inconsistency pointed at here is not a normative one but rather an empirical one. The nation-state

model is still a normatively consistent solution. The more nations we recognize, the more the

multinational federation becomes inevitable however and this turns the argument into an argument

about normative consistency. If we look at the nation-state on its own, then it is a normatively consistent

model. If we look at the model for the world and see that it will necessarily always encompass many

multinational empires, then the nation-state cannot be the only solution we propose. Hence it is

normatively inconsistent to put forth only the nation-state as a solution.

Once we take into account the option of secession the discussion becomes different. We are now

thinking about a model that can inform the future split up of a country. The nation-state model that

appeals to top-down and bottom-up nationalism at the same time, has two disadvantages in this regard.

First, it will lead to closing our eyes to the minority problem – the problem that created the nationalities

question in the first place! There will always be individuals with different national affiliations living on

the territory of the newly created nation-states. Nation-states are necessarily territorial and they

necessarily create minorities. It is the requirements of top-down nationalism that make us turn to

territorial solutions like the nation-state. Bottom-up nationalism doesn’t necessarily imply territorial

accommodations for the minority and therefore it is compatible with a model, like non-territorial

autonomy, that grants a group of people, only limited in smallness by a ‘where numbers warrant’

criterion, to get some form of autonomy. Non-territorial autonomy, therefore is able to meet the needs

of even the smallest minorities. When it comes to the smallest minorities, bottom-up and top-down

nationalism contradict each-other.

Not only the smallest minorities but also the smallest nations will be the victim if we opt for the nation-

state model. If the national polities we want to end up with, have to be viable polities for top-down

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nationalism, we necessarily have to exclude certain nations. In this sense Carens’ analysis of Kymlicka’s

concept ‘societal culture’ is informative. In his own words: “Kymlicka intends the concept of societal

culture to provide a theoretical foundation for his analysis. In my view, however, this concept is an

abstraction that distorts his argument and appears persuasive only because he fails to think concretely

about its implications for particular cases, including many that he himself mentions”. (2000: 56)

Carens continues by giving five ways in which this concept is lacking, two of which are of interest to us

here. The first concerns traditional national minorities (Carens 2000: 61-64). Carens links the societal

culture with modernization (2000: 61) and asks what to do with national minorities that have not yet

modernized, for instance that have not codified their language yet. Those cultures are not fit to take up

government, but one could ask whether that is a criterion by which to judge if a culture has a right to

accommodation. The second and most important critique of ‘societal culture’ is the homogenization it

implies (Carens 2000: 64-69). Because Kymlicka believes national minorities are entitled to their own

territory, he himself waives the right of every individual that is part of the minority in the minority. In

many cases these individuals also have a fully competent societal culture, but they simply do not have

access to it, because the local societal culture has territorial sovereignty over its institutions.

Why wouldn’t nations that are territorially dispersed, haven’t been through an age of modernization, or

that are living as small immigrant communities, have less rights to self-determination than other

nations? The implicit reason is that liberal nationalism adheres to top-down nationalism when it actually

aims at satisfying a claim of bottom-up nationalism. There are no inherent reasons to bottom-up

nationalism for limiting the right of national self-determination only to nations that are eligible to

become the locus of top-down nationalism one day. Are these nations of lesser value because they are

not capable of forming their own state? Are the national affiliations that people of these nations have

different from those of nations that are territorially unified or modernized? The point is that a consistent

advocacy of the claims of bottom-up nationalism requires us to forfeit top-down nationalism, or at least

give up trying to implement top-down nationalism at the same time when we are thinking about

bottom-up nationalism. Again, here top-down and bottom-up nationalism are in sharp contrast.

Concepts like societal culture are interesting. Every liberal nationalist introduces a similar concept2. Most

of these concepts do not talk about nations, for that would be to exclusive a term for top-down

nationalism. Miller seems to solve the problem of exclusiveness of the nation by talking about ‘national

2 Margalit and Raz talk about encompassing groups, Poole talks about organizational cultures, Smith about

pervasive cultures, Miller about national identities (Kymlicka 1995: 80).

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identity’, of which he gives a subjective definition. All these concepts make a link with a culture that is to

some extent institutionalized, thereby excluding smaller nations, small groups, traditional cultures, etc.

My claim is here that, in order to make their theory normatively consistent, in order to bridge the gap

between two types of nationalism that are actually distinct, liberal nationalists talk about societal,

pervasive or organizational cultures, encompassing groups and national identities. If they would talk

about nations and states than the discrepancy between bottom-up and top-down nationalism would

become too apparent.

Top-down nationalism and the European Union

The contradiction between top-down and bottom-up nationalism also shows itself at the other end of

the spectrum, when we are talking about top-down nationalism. Liberal nationalism makes use of strong

instrumental arguments in favour of nationalism, but these instrumental arguments backfire. The point

about an instrumental argument is that it has no normative force on its own. It borrows its normative

force from the thing it is an instrument to. In the case of instrumental arguments for nationalism, they

borrow the normative force from the state, because the nation is instrumental to the state in top-down

nationalism. In the context of emerging transnational polities like the European Union, which can

themselves become the locus of top-down nationalism, the question can be asked whether it isn’t more

normatively consistent to implement top-down nationalism on the level of the European Union. The

liberal nationalist is however incapable of seeing the European Union as a locus for top-down

nationalism because he or she doesn’t separate top-down from bottom-up nationalism.

There can be good reasons to strengthen transnational polities – better reasons than those for

strengthening the nation-state level. Transnational polities are better equipped for dealing with the

challenges of our globalizing world. On top of that some of these transnational polities like the European

Union and the United Nations are well-established, and this fact alone has made their biggest counter-

argument, namely that they are utopian in nature, disappear. There are strong normative reasons for

such transnational polities as well. The all-affected principle states that everyone affected by a policy-

decision should have had a say in it. The best way of organizing this is by ensuring that these

transnational polities are democratic. If one takes nationalism out of the equation, then there are more

reasons to enforce these transnational polities than there are reasons for enforce the nation-state level.

The locus for applying top-down nationalism thus increasingly becomes the transnational polity because

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the normative weight of this polity, as opposed to the normative weight of the nation-state level,

increases. The point is that top-down nationalism is a neutral instrument that should be applied to the

level that warrants it most. Of course the practice of top-down nationalism has been far from neutral

throughout history. Top-down nationalism was often accompanied by racism (claiming that the people

you rule over are meant to be subjugated), imperialism (subjugating people for your own self-interests)

and chauvinism or messianic (claiming that your culture has a divine mission). I claim here that top-down

nationalism isn’t necessarily racist, imperialist, chauvinist or messianic.

Top-down nationalism should be seen as a culturally neutral set of mechanisms and policies aimed at

making a polity function well. The link with bottom-up nationalism, that nationalists, including liberal

nationalists, cannot cut, prohibits them from applying top-down nationalism as the neutral instrument it

really is. Habermas’ reply to Dieter Grimm is informative in this regard. Habermas asks whether it is

some obscure collective identity, that engenders the national bound, or whether it are mere functional

requirements like a mutually shared context of communication and education, a public sphere, with the

same newspapers, TV news, and above all the shared sphere created by democratic citizenship on its

own (Habermas: 1995). The bottom-up nation is an ‘obscure’ collective identity, with roots in ancient

history, that cannot be easily recreated, but top-down nationalism is a neutral set of policies that can be

applied to the current-day nation-states as easily as to transnational polities. The existence of stable

multinational federations proves this point.

When it comes to solving the democratic deficit, we should learn from the age of nationalism.

Nationalism made it possible to establish bounds of solidarity between anonymous people and put them

together in a well-functioning democracy. Seeing top-down and bottom-up nationalism as intrinsically

linked, doesn’t help in this regard. Of course many liberal nationalists will argue that the fact that one

needs an obscure collective identity for a democracy to work, is exactly the reason why transnational

democracies will never work. But this also means that they problematize multinational federations and

will never have a satisfying answer to the claims of cosmopolitans let alone to the ever-advancing

process of globalization. Those who do want to think about how to tackle the challenges of the future,

should learn from the age of nationalism. The point here is that seeing top-down nationalism not as a

neutral instrument but as necessarily linked to bottom-up nationalism, prohibits us from doing so.

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III. Non-territorial autonomy, the solution

The solution to the nationalities problem could be straightforward if it is in line with a strict separation

between top-down and bottom-up nationalism. The rationale behind top-down nationalism is one of

instrumentalizing the majority nation. To the extent that the well-functioning of the state warrants such

instrumentalization and the ensuing partial homogenization of the minority, it is legitimate. The rationale

behind bottom-up nationalism is one of intrinsically valuing the bottom-up national community.

Whatever is needed for the survival and autonomy of the bottom-up nation, should be granted. The

point is that there is no absolute contradiction between instrumentalizing the majority nation and

intrinsically valuing the minority nation. People are perfectly capable of mastering two languages. Having

to partake in a public sphere that speaks the lingua franca will ensure that most people become

proficient in this language. The rootedness in their own national community, with a public sphere,

cultural institutions, public administration and a system of education of its own and strengthened by

language rights, ensures the survival and autonomy of the minority nation. A territory doesn’t seem

prima facie necessary for the survival or autonomy of a nation. A unified territory is however a

requirement of a well-functioning state. Non-territorial autonomy, therefore prima facie seems to be the

best solution3. It is normatively consistent: there need not be a contradiction between the top-down

instrumentalization of the majority nation and intrinsically valuing the bottom-up minority nation. It is

also feasible because we need a model that can satisfy both types of nationalism at the same time (but

not applied to the same nation): top-down nationalism enables transnational democracies, bottom-up

nationalism safeguards national autonomy.

Why then is the nationalities problem immensely more complex than this analysis suggests? Why is a

strict separation between bottom-up and top-down nationalism like non-territorial autonomy does,

although normatively consistent, so far from being realized? Perhaps something that falls outside the

scope of usual normative thinking should be added to the equation. In this section I will argue with Bauer

that the nationality principle is historically contingent and that this fact explains why people don’t turn to

the normatively most consistent solution, i.e. non-territorial autonomy. As such this argument, the

normative consistent advocacy of non-territorial autonomy combined with the historical

3 Laponce’s law would have us believe otherwise (Van Parijs 2011: 143-145). But one needs to conduct the

empirical research that backs up this law in a non-positivist way, which is next to impossible. There are cases that allow us to believe that a non-territorial scheme of language rights is equally efficient in guaranteeing the survival of a language as territorial anchoring.

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contextualization of the nationality principle, is to my knowledge the strongest argument given for non-

territorial autonomy so far and this is also the correct way of interpreting Bauer’s work.

Bauer shows us that there are two ways of interpreting the nationality principle (QN 355-356). One can

interpret it as a principle of state formation, in which case every nation has a right to its own state, and

one can interpret it as a principle of state-constitution, that is as a principle that guides us in designing

the constitution of a multinational federation. Nationalists, liberal nationalists included, usually see the

nationality principle as a principle of state formation4. When Bauer was writing, in 1907, the choice

between these two interpretations of the nationality principle was a difficult one and the interpretation

of it as a principle of state formation was understandable. Allow me to quote Bauer at length:

[N]ational autonomy [i.e. the principle of nationality as a principle of state constitution] doesn’t

provide the nation with its own economic zone; rather, it retains the nation as a part of a larger

economy. It thus does not even provide the nation, to the extent that this is possible at all within

a social order based on the private ownership of the instruments of labor, with free reign over

the development of its economy, something that is, of course, the foundation of the

development of a national culture. It does not place the instruments of external power, the

power of the army, in the hands of the nation, and thus denies the nation the ultimate guarantee

of its existence as a nation. National autonomy within the multinational state thereby appears to

be an imperfect substitute for the nation-state.

However in another respect, national autonomy within the multinational state is superior to the

nation-state. The state is necessarily a territorial entity. It must incorporate a territory that lends

itself both to the constitution of a more or less independent, self-sufficient zone and, in strategic

terms, to being defended against an external enemy. The state can therefore never implement

the principle of nationality in its pure form. It must constantly force fragments of foreign peoples

to submit to its power and abandon parts of its own people to a foreign power. All these

considerations do not exist for the autonomous nation within a multinational state. It can delimit

its region of settlement without taking into consideration economic or strategic units; it can

incorporate the fragments of its people living as minorities in foreign regions of settlement by

means of the personality principle and can meet their cultural needs. The principle of nationality,

when applied as a principle of state constitution, can thus be realized in a much purer form than

when applied as the foundation of state formation. (QN 356)

4 Although Kymlicka pleas for a multinational federation (2001: chapter 5).He seems to be unaware of the fact that

the instrumental arguments for nationalism backfire in the case of multinational federations as explained above. For is top-down nationalism to be applied by the majority or by the minority in a multinational federation?

15

In the historical context in which Bauer was writing5, the reasons for interpreting the principle of

nationality as a principle of state formation or as a principle of state constitution outweigh each-other.

On the one hand the minority problem counts as a strong argument in favour of the state constitution

interpretation. On the other hand the fact that the nation can only really be sure of its existence and

autonomy if it has a state of its own is a strong argument in favour of the state formation interpretation.

A pure application of the nationality principle stands opposed to a nationality principle that takes

economic and military viability into consideration.

This historical context changes however. In the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century

international politics was played according to different rules than those of today and those of the future.

The balance of power that existed between the nation-states and multinational empires of Europe

constituted international politics. International organizations like we know them today (the United

Nations, the European Union, etc.) were still inexistent or weak. These empires or nation-states needed

to incorporate a territory that is both defensible and large enough to constitute an independent

economic zone and to have a say on the international scene. Small states either didn’t exist or were

powerless. The coming about of international organizations changes the very nature of the nationalities

problem, and I believe this is what Bauer was trying to tell us in an age where only the germs of these

organizations were present6.

How do these international organizations change the nature of the nationalities problem? They change

the nature of top-down nationalism because these international organizations take over the function of

the former empires and nation-states. The European Union encompasses an economic zone that most

former empires could only dream of. The nature of international defence politics has also changed

dramatically. Organizations like the United Nations and the European Union make it much easier for

small nations to emancipate from their big neighbours. In that sense these international organizations,

bringing peace, and forming large economic zones, are an important factor that makes the appearance

of minority nationalism possible.

5 In 1923, when Bauer wrote his second book on the nationalities question, Bauer himself is sympathetic to

Wilson’s Fourteen Points program, which implied an interpretation of the nationality principle as a principle of state formation and which led to a first wave of creation of nation-states. He disagreed on this point with Renner, whom he criticizes for being too naïve about German imperialism (Bauer 1923: chapter 4). 6 Bauer died in 1938, but he was a proponent of international organizations. He predicted the coming about of a

United States of Europe (QN 414) and he was one of the driving forces behind the 2½ international.

16

Thereby the legitimacy of top-down nationalism changes. The function of top-down nationalism, I am

arguing here, is gradually being taken over by transnational and regional organizations like the European

Union. There is nothing inherent in top-down nationalism, neither in its normative arguments or

rationale, nor in its historical roots, that impedes this. Top-down nationalism is an instrument and it is

equally applicable to the current level of the nation-state as to the future level of the region. At the level

of the transnational region, the nationalities problem becomes a problem of competing top-down

nationalisms. French German and English battled for the prestige of being the lingua franca of Europe.

The European Union spends enormous sums of money on translating. The only legitimate criterion to

settle the discussion on language rights in the European Union, like the only legitimate criterion in

deciding about any matters related to top-down nationalism, in my view, is instrumentality. Then the

choice for English is quickly made. Top-down nationalism of the nation-state therefore becomes less and

less legitimate.

The most important change of the problem of nationalities, however, takes place at the level of bottom-

up nationalism. Here the nationality principle becomes a principle of state constitution instead of state

formation. Because the international organizations provide small nations with large and secure economic

zones and because they take over the function of top-down nationalism from the former nation-states

and empires, these international organizations alter an essential part of the nationality principle. For

Bauer the basis of the nationality principle is the “principle of the adaptation of external power to the

internal community”. (QN 407-408) The internal community is the national community. The external

powers are the economic and military powers that made multinational empires and nation-states, with

large and defensible economic zones, into a necessity. Bauer saw that once international organizations

would take care of these external powers, the nationality principle itself would change. The core of the

nationality principle, the intuition that external power needs to be subjugated to the national

community, would remain but the form changes. A nation-state is no longer necessary to ensure the

subjugation of external powers. Hence the nationality principle changes from a principle of state

formation into a principle of state constitution.

As a principle of state-constitution it becomes a principle that is completely focused on bottom-up

nationalism and completely detached from top-down nationalism. The reason for merging top-down and

bottom-up nationalism was the fact that manifesting oneself as an autonomous nation opposed to

external powers required a nation-state. Once these external powers are subjugated by international

organizations, then there is no point in merging top-down and bottom-up nationalism. Because of the

17

minorities problem, the nationality principle as a principle of state constitution, i.e. non-territorial

autonomy, is the most consistent solution. It was only the historical context that confused this discussion

and led us to downsizing the minorities problem. The historical context determines how we should apply

the principle of nationality. In a historical context where international organizations take over the

function of safeguarding nations against external powers, a separate treatment of top-down and

bottom-up nationalism becomes preferable.

There is a further element added by Bauer.

Thus, for the individual in socialist society, no state frontier drawn for the purposes of a bygone

era will be sacred. Only now will the masses of all peoples be ready for the question that in the

nineteenth century concerned only the educated, the question of the relationship between

internal community and external power, which is manifested in the conflict between the nation

and the state. In that the power of the restricted local associations within the nation will be

reduced, whereas the national cultural community will closely embrace all members of the

people, the national community will become for them a definite and immutable fact; external

power on the other hand, will now be comprehended as a means that must serve and adapt

itself to human ends. The principle of the adaptation to the internal community, the basis of the

principle of nationality, will thus become something that lives within them.

In terms of its content, the principle of nationality expresses the rule that external power is to

bind together and serve the internal community. But in causal terms, as a motive, this principle

will attain efficacy only when the procedures and relations governing labor render the traditional

state structures, which do not correspond to this principle, unbearable. (QN 407-408)

The principle of nationality as a principle of state constitution together with an increased integration in

the national community will make the choice for non-territorial solutions even more pressing. Traditional

state frontiers will gradually lose their normative force. The more people become integrated in the

national community, the more they become nationally conscious and the more they themselves rather

than dubious state frontiers become the measure of all politics. The principle of nationality will then be

an efficacious motive living in the heads of all people.

The core of the nationality principle, “the principle of the adaptation of external power to the internal

community” (QN 407-408), is independent of historical circumstances. Whether this principle should be

interpreted as a principle of state formation or as a principle of state-constitution depends on the

historical circumstances. When external powers threaten the national autonomy, it should be

interpreted as a principle of state formation. When international organizations take over the function of

subjugating these external powers, it should be interpreted as a principle of state-constitution. In the

18

latter case, top-down nationalism is split from bottom-up nationalism and the pure application of the

nationality principle in line with bottom-up nationalism is preferable. It is the historical context that

makes us merge top-down and bottom-up nationalism. A principled normative approach to the

nationalities problem requires that we separate them.

Conclusion

We saw that nationalism is a twofold phenomenon that demands a twofold normative approach. In

section one I gave a historical account of bottom-up and top-down nationalism. In section two I showed

how liberal nationalism runs into troubles by not treating both types of nationalism differently. I also

argued that it does so because of an alliance with the nation-state paradigm. In section three I argued

that a principled normatively consistent approach would treat both types of nationalism separately and

that this leads to, not a nation-state model, but a multinational federal model, like non-territorial

autonomy. The reason why we interpreted the nationality principle as a principle in line with the nation-

state model, i.e. as a principle of state formation, was not of a normative nature. The reason why

nationalists opt for the nation-state has to do with the historical context. International organizations, by

providing small nations with large and secure economic zones are changing the nature of the debate on

nationalism and of the principle of nationality itself. The existence of these international organizations

tips the balance in favour of the model of non-territorial autonomy because it allows for a purer and

more principled interpretation of the nationality principle in line with that model. Hereby I belief I have

given an accurate interpretation of Bauer’s strongest argument in favor of non-territorial autonomy.

The age of nationalism was predicated on the practical possibility of treating top-down and bottom-up

nationalism as the same thing. The age in which the nation-state could fulfil the requirements of top-

down and bottom-up nationalism at the same time, is coming to an end, though. For bottom-up

nationalism the nation-state is too big, for top-down nationalism it is too small. It is time to leave the age

of nationalism behind and treat both types of nationalism as what they are and thus differently.

19

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