nts in pakistan

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii ForewordMahin Karim

1 Nontraditional Security Threats in PakistanAli Tauqeer Sheikh

nbr special report #32 | october 2011

nontraditional security threats in pakistan

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FOREWORD

T his NBR Special Report on “Nontraditional Security Threats in Pakistan” is the second in a series of reports to be published in 2011–12, drawing on papers emerging from NBR’s project on “Nontraditional Regional Security Architecture for South Asia.” Funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative, this three-year

(2009–12) project examines opportunities for cooperation on shared nontraditional security concerns as potential building blocks toward developing a viable regional security architecture for South Asia. The project invites participation from a diverse group of experts from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives, China, and the United States for a series of regional workshops, the third and final of which will be held November 8–9, 2011, in partnership with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi.

This essay by Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, prepared for the project’s first phase (2009–10), examines critical challenges faced by Pakistan today related to climate change, increasing population and urbanization, and food and water security. Much of the recent press on Pakistan has focused on terrorism and other threats to political stability—both emerging from as well as besetting the country—and the complex conundrum of U.S.-Pakistan relations given the country’s strategic significance in the AfPak context. However, Sheikh’s essay draws needed attention to other challenges that, if not addressed in the near future, could contribute to conditions that further exacerbate Pakistan’s internal security situation, with potentially serious repercussions for broader regional stability and security. As Sheikh points out, the communities most adversely affected by climate change and increasing food and water insecurity are those “segments of society that are at or below the poverty line.” Coupled with burgeoning population growth and a significant youth bulge, Pakistan’s looming nontraditional security challenges offer a potential recipe for disaster by aggravating the country’s existing traditional security problems.

At the same time, the regional implications of the issues discussed by Sheikh, particularly vis-à-vis the impact of climate change on South Asia’s food and water security scenarios, provide countries with the critical impetus and, hopefully, opportunities to collaborate on addressing these challenges. In advocating that “South Asian countries work together to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that incorporate transboundary strategies,” Sheikh draws attention to an important dimension of the nontraditional security challenges faced by South Asia today. Such threats, because they will affect the region as a whole, will require that countries cooperate to find a regional solution.

Mahin KarimSenior Associate, Political and Security Affairs, NBRResearch Director for the NBR Nontraditional Security in South Asia project

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the national bureau of asian research

nbr special report #32 | october 2011

ALI TAUQEER SHEIKH is the founding CEO of Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) in Pakistan. Mr. Sheikh has written extensively on issues of environmental management in professional journals and contributed to leading newspapers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Pakistan. He has served as a consultant or advisor to the UN Development Programme; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UN Environment Programme; UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; Asia Foundation; Rockefeller Foundation; and Asian Development Bank. Mr. Sheikh has served on the boards of several organizations and is a member of various national and international committees and commissions dealing with the environment and sustainable development, including the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council, chaired by the prime minister of Pakistan. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.

Nontraditional Security Threats in Pakistan

Ali Tauqeer Sheikh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis essay examines Pakistan’s most significant nontraditional security challenges,

including climate change, increasing population and urbanization, food security, and water security.

MAIN FINDINGS

increasingly frequent extreme weather events and changes in temperature and precipitation. A rise in extreme weather has already led to an alarming increase in the number of people killed, injured, or made homeless.

economy, and the environment. Population growth creates and exacerbates vulnerabilities by endangering basic civic amenities, leading to a lack of clean water and space for housing and ultimately burdening society.

However, medium-term food security challenges will become far more daunting if immediate attention is not paid to managing water resources, both underground and in the Indus Basin river system.

the increasing pressure of population growth and urbanization, massive expansion of tube-well irrigation, reduced levels of precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated retreat of Himalayan glaciers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

technological advances in building and infrastructure construction, improved sanitation systems, increased disaster preparedness, and an organized health sector response.

as mapping vulnerabilities, trends in internal migration, and the incidence of disease, can help create adaptive measures for reducing the effects of climate change.

will require that South Asian countries work together to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that incorporate transboundary strategies.

Pancho Rebollo Bautista



















3NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN PAKISTAN � SHEIKH

South Asia faces numerous nontraditional security (NTS) threats that in most cases predate the conventional security problems in the region. NTS threats make many conventional security challenges intractable, as regional conflicts are frequently rooted in the division or management of natural resources, ethnic divides, or ecosystem bifurcations. The progress in

managing, let alone resolving, these NTS threats has been slow, primarily because the negotiating parties do not view them in the broader context of ecological civilization or ecosystem integrity.

South Asia as a region has been slow in developing regional approaches to address NTS issues. Modest beginnings by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) still require political will, resource allocation, and operational mechanisms. Recent efforts to develop shared positions on climate change have received a lukewarm response. Moreover, cracks in the

change. Each country seems to be struggling on its own to address its climate vulnerabilities, just the way they have earlier dealt with other specific threats.

This essay discusses Pakistan’s most significant NTS challenges. The first section discusses climate change and how it has begun to disturb dynamic equilibriums that exist in the natural systems of the region. The essay then draws attention to vulnerabilities linked to increasing population, urbanization, poverty, and ecosystem degradation. The third section places Pakistan’s food security challenge in historical context and presents some trends in food production. Finally, the essay concludes by highlighting structural constraints on water security.

Climate Change Security

average world surface temperature to increase from 1.4°C to 5.8°C over the course of the 21st century,1 it is evident that alterations in the planet’s ecological, biological, and geological system will not only continue but also intensify. The climate will continue to change even if countries dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Existing research indicates that climate change will have direct and immediate impacts, such as the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, as well as indirect and long-term impacts through changes in temperature and precipitation levels. These impacts will inevitably affect human activities and livelihoods. Assessments of global climate change are thus especially important for enabling a developing country such as Pakistan to deal effectively with both short-term climatic variability and long-term climatic conditions.

Extreme Weather Events in PakistanIn Pakistan, low-probability and high-impact events such as floods, droughts, storms, and

cyclones are now increasing in frequency. An analysis of data for the past 60 years, taken from the Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), shows that the number of natural

1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001










4 NBR SPECIAL REPORT � OCTOBER 2011

disasters per decade has increased considerably over the last two decades (see Table 1).2 This incidentally is the period during which average global temperatures have been the highest; in fact, the 1990s are considered to be the warmest decade since the mid-eighteenth century.

Rising average temperatures have also led to an alarming increase in the number of people killed, injured, or made homeless. To a large extent, this trend can also be attributed to changes in environmental conditions, such as deforestation (leading to heightened flood risk), population growth, and a greater concentration of people living in high-risk areas. For instance, impoverished and high-density populations in low-lying and environmentally degraded areas, such as coastal Sindh, are particularly vulnerable to tropical cyclones. Likewise, large shanty towns with flimsy

increasing migration to the country’s major cities, the land available to poor communities around major cities has fewer natural defenses against weather extremes.

Although the frequency and intensity of extreme climate events are expected to increase with accelerated global warming, Pakistan can avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters primarily through improved structural and nonstructural measures. These measures include advancements in early warning systems, technological advances in the construction of buildings and infrastructure, better sanitation systems, increased disaster preparedness, and an organized and planned response from the health sector.

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and technical disasters occurring in the South Asian and South East Asian countries from 1900 onward. The center classifies an event as a disaster when it fulfills one or more of the following criteria: (1) ten or more people are killed; (2) one hundred or more people are affected; (3) a state of emergency has been declared; or (4) a call for international assistance has been made. Information about such events

institutes, and press agencies based in that country.

T A B L E 1 Number of natural disasters in Pakistan over six decades

Year DisastersStorms Tropical cyclones Floods Droughts Total

1941–50 0 1 1 0 2

1951–60 0 0 5 0 51961–70 0 2 2 0 41971–80 1 0 6 0 71981–90 3 0 6 0 91991–2000 6 2 14 1 232001–10 4 1 31 0 36Total 14 6 65 1 86

S O U R C E : Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).

N O T E : CRED maintains a global database, called EM-DAT, of natural and technical disasters from 1900 onward.







Changes in Temperature and Precipitation and Consequences for PakistanThe increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrate derived from anthropogenic sources

has produced measurable changes in the global climate since preindustrial times. Rising global mean annual temperatures and reduced precipitation levels are two examples of changes attributed to anthropogenic emissions. After reviewing temperature changes in Pakistan over the last three decades (1961–90), the Pakistan Meteorological Department has arrived at climate change scenarios that illustrate the likely impact of greater warming in the entire region.

According to these observations, northern areas of Pakistan, western parts of Baluchistan, and coastal areas of Sindh and Baluchistan experienced greater temperature increases compared to other regions, in summer as well as winter. This basically means that these regions experienced warmer summers and less intense winters. This scenario is of particular concern in the northern areas where an increase in temperature means an increase in glacier melt.3 Further, the data

upper and central Punjab received more rainfall both in winter and during monsoon season. An increase in precipitation levels has also been observed during monsoon season in the coastal areas of Sindh and Baluchistan.

in the northern areas for the last century found that seasonal and annual temperatures have risen over the last century in Skardu.4 The mean annual temperature has increased by 1.4°C, with the

more than summer temperatures, with an increase of up to 0.51°C in winter maximums per decade since 1961. Such higher temperatures might cause an upward shift of almost four hundred meters in the frost line, affecting precipitation patterns and the snowpack, which is a major source

mountain glaciers in the Karakorams have been diminishing for the last 30 years. In addition, experts believe that water flow in rivers increased during the decade of 1990–2000 in comparison to 1975–90, which means more ice melted upstream. This finding is consistent with research indicating that some glaciers in Pakistan have retreated significantly in recent years.5

The climate change scenarios listed above point toward a future marked with increases in temperature, a general reduction in precipitation levels, and higher variability in rainfall distribution. Coastal areas will be at greater risk as cyclonic activity increases due to rising sea surface temperatures. The frequency and intensity of extreme events such as floods and droughts

glacier lake outburst floods will similarly increase due to rising temperatures in the country’s northern areas.

3 The given scenario is in line with the findings presented in Task Force on Climate Change, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Climate Change Policies and Actions (Islamabad, September 2009). This report highlights trends in annual patterns of temperature and precipitation over the last century (1900–2000) and in seasonal patterns of temperature and precipitation over the last 50 years (1951–2000).

4 David R. Archer, “The Climate and Hydrology of Northern Pakistan with Respect to Assessment of Flood Risks to Hydropower

(unpublished report, 2001). 5

of Precipitation in Mountain-Plain Areas of Upper Pakistan for Regional Climate Change Impact Studies,” Theoretical and Applied Climatology 99, no. 3-4 (January 2010): 239–53.









general knowledge base about climate change can strengthen the country’s long-term planning and coping abilities and also help us better understand the resulting challenges to food and water security. Mapping Pakistan’s vulnerabilities, internal migration trends, and new incidents of diseases such as malaria are also important areas of research that benefit from this type of data on climatic changes. This information has the potential to better inform the planning of adaptive measures directed toward reducing the adverse effects of climate change on both the human population and human activities.

Increasing Population and UrbanizationPakistan has a large population and a high growth rate that further contributes to high density,

the country’s youth bulge, and rapid urbanization. Pakistan’s population boom has adversely affected all aspects of social, economic, and environmental life. The population has grown by 350% since independence in 1947, and it is estimated that Pakistan will be the second-largest contributor to global population growth after China, with a contribution of 133 million people by 2025.6

Population growth in Pakistan creates and exacerbates vulnerabilities by endangering basic civic amenities, leading to a lack of clean water and proper housing, and ultimately resulting in

segments of society that are at or below the poverty line, survive in a subsistence economy, and live in fragile ecosystems or low-lying, hazard-prone areas. As is increasingly evident, Pakistan’s ecosystems are stretched to the limits of their carrying capacity, with several species having become either extinct or threatened. The diminished capacity of local ecosystems restricts the availability of natural resources, alters the patterns of people’s livelihoods, and reduces the ability of Pakistanis to cope with other NTS threats.

Additionally, as the National Disaster Management Authority reported, Increased population has pushed people to move and live in hazard prone locations, which were traditionally considered as un-inhabitable; e.g. flood plains, steep slopes and coastal areas. Population growth in upstream locations has increased the demand for fuel wood, fodder and timber, which leads to uncontrolled forest cutting, and causes intensified erosion and higher peak flows. This results in severe flooding in densely populated plains. Population density in hazard prone regions also means greater loss of life and property in case of disasters. If the population growth trends continue at current rates, a far greater number of people would be living in areas prone to earthquakes, floods and droughts in the coming years.7

Pakistan is the most urbanized country in South Asia, with its cities expanding at a faster rate than the overall population. The “National Disaster Management Framework for Pakistan” estimates that whereas the overall population increased by only four times from 1951 to 1998, the urban population rose by seven times during the same period, from 17.8% of the total population

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March 2007, 9. 7 Ibid., 9.










in 1951 to 33% in 1998.8 Nearly half the urban population is believed to be living in shanty towns or unplanned settlements, where city governments have mostly failed to provide amenities such as public transportation, hospitals, schools, drinking water, and sanitation. Not only is the overall vulnerability of urban settlements often as high as in rural areas, but the level of resilience in urban areas tends to be lower.

Numerous studies have documented that investments in education to achieve higher literacy levels and keep young girls in school help reduce the population growth rate. Likewise, broadening and strengthening livelihood options and opportunities in agricultural and rural economies help curtail the massive influx to major cities. High growth rates and the accompanying rapid urbanization are thus partially a consequence of poor investments in the education sector and the inequitable path of economic development pursued in Pakistan over the last five decades.

Food SecurityA household is considered food-secure when its occupants do not live in hunger or fear of

starvation. The numbers for Pakistan are dismal. Projections for the year 2030 begin with the alarming increase in Pakistan’s population growth from 170 million to 220 million. Such a rise will boost urbanization, further changing the ratio of urban to rural population from 35/65 to 51/49. Understandably, the incidence of poverty will become higher in urban areas than in rural, and urbanization will likely further reduce the availability of fertile land. The globalized world will also influence national food habits, consumption patterns, and lifestyles. Last, climate change will bring with it irregular rainfall patterns, further stressing agricultural yield and threatening food security. Famine conditions are expected in some agro-climatic zones as irrigation supplies decrease, leading to erratic supply and a steadily increasing shortage of water.

The concept of food security has changed significantly since the early 1970s. During the global food crisis of the 1970s, the focus was on supply-side issues of availability, volume, and price stability. A decade later, in the 1980s, the concept expanded to include the access of vulnerable groups to available supplies. This debate drew attention to the temporal dynamics of food security—chronic versus transient food insecurity. Transitory food insecurity is associated with inadequate access to or availability of food during the off-season, as well as in drought and inflationary years. In contrast, R. Radhakrishna and K. Venkata Reddy observe that “the problem of chronic food insecurity is primarily associated with poverty and arises due to continuously inadequate diet.”9 In the mid-1990s, the mainstream debate began to analyze the importance of food safety in the broader context of nutritional balance and the availability of food preferences. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has ambitiously defined food security as “exist[ing] when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”10

Consequently, there has been considerable reconstruction of the concept of food security as well as mainstream views of it over the past 30 years. Today food security has become a multifaceted and multidisciplinary concept that for a country like Pakistan must include four dimensions:

8 “National Disaster Risk Management Framework,” 10. 9

Background Paper, 1, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/bkpap2020/16_bg2020.pdf. 10 The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2001 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2001), 49.










availability, physical and economic access, stability of supplies and access, and safe and healthy food utilization. Vulnerability has also become a very important element of food security and refers to the full range of factors that place people at risk of becoming food-insecure. The FAO’s Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems group (FIVIMS) lists the four areas of potential vulnerability in Pakistan as socioeconomic and political environment, performance of the food economy, care and feeding practices, and health and sanitation.11

Pakistan’s present as well as future food security or vulnerability status will hinge on a number of factors, such as declining productivity and income from traditional crops, a high dependence on imported food, a growing incidence of food related diseases, an increase in poverty from 22% to 27%, a high percentage of income spent on food, and a global food price surge. The scope of this essay does not allow for an assessment of each of these factors, in that each is complex, dynamic, and linked to the other factors. For example, the decline in productivity in Pakistan is one of the major factors contributing to food insecurity and is in itself a product of several challenges:

� low water availability due to the lack of water-resource management and development� low water-use efficiency from field flooding and poor watercourse lining�weak management policy in terms of pricing, restrictions, smuggling, and storage losses�resource degradation, including the depletion of the water table, water logging, and increased salinity�weak factor productivity for fertilizer and seeds� insufficient diversification into high-value production or value addition �a weak extension system� low investment in R&D �the challenges posed by climate change, including droughts, drug-resistant pests and diseases, floods, storms, and shifts in cropping patterns

Pakistan’s Current Crop Production

growth and showed significant increases in major crops. The country’s two major crops—wheat (important for domestic consumption) and rice (important also for foreign exchange earning)—witnessed jumps of 699% and 1,010% respectively, and per hectare yields achieved impressive records. Yield improvements from 1948 to 2008 show maize and wheat topping the charts with

hectare (kg/ha) to 2,585 kg/ha, whereas maize grew from 986 to 3,610 kg/ha. Rice yields witnessed an increase of 268%, from 877 to 2,346 kg/ha, followed by sugarcane, with a 168% increase from 29,000 to 48,634 kg/ha.12

Focusing further on wheat production trends in Pakistan, the crop experienced three very important phases from 1947 to 2009. Starting in 1947 with the use of traditional varieties, wheat production grew steadily until 1967. From this year on, high-yielding varieties and improved water supply (because of the construction of the Tarbela Dam) further increased the yield from 4.3 to 9.1

11 “FAO and FIVIMS,” Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS), http://www.fivims.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7&Itemid=29.

12 Science Vision 15, no. 1 (January–June 2009): 15–23.
















million tonnes (mt) by 1977. A wheat rust epidemic hit Pakistan from 1977 to 1978, damaging the

implemented in 1978 has led to a steady increase in wheat yields, which in 2009 stood at 24 t/ha.13

On the basis of the balance between wheat supply and demand for the period May 2008–April 2009, a 2008 UN interagency mission stated that Pakistan’s domestic availability was 21 mt. Utilization, which includes food, feed, and seed usage, equaled 24 mt with significant losses of 1.4 mt. According to this data, both formal and informal exports lie at 2 mt, whereas imports exceed this amount by 0.75 mt. Thus, investments in reducing only 50% of waste could significantly reduce the need to import wheat.14

The Future of Agricultural ProductivityRecent trends show that the rate of growth in yields as well as agricultural productivity has

begun to slow down. Has Pakistan reached the level beyond which its food security will be in serious jeopardy and its food supply unable to keep pace with growing demand? This question can be viewed from two interrelated angles. The first is whether there is internal evidence of a substantial increase in productivity, and the second is whether there are any global benchmarks that can provide clues about future production levels.

Some studies show that progressive farmers in Pakistan are achieving far higher yields than the national average. During the past three years, their yields were nearly twice, and in the case of sugarcane four times, the average yield.15 In other words, if progressive practices were used as a benchmark, upscaled, and replicated, the future of food security may not be as bleak in the short-

of policy, management, and technology innovations would be necessary to do so are beyond the scope of this essay.

Likewise, Pakistan could respond to its food security challenge by benchmarking its agricultural policies and practices against those of countries growing similar crops. In 2007 the FAO published statistics comparing major crop yields in Pakistan with yields in several other countries. Pakistan’s rice, maize, and sugarcane yields—at 3.19, 3.24, and 53.2 t/ha, respectively—were below the world average. Neighboring India produced almost the same yields as Pakistan, with a difference in sugarcane yield. The yields in China were twice those in Pakistan, while Egypt held the highest position with yields of 9.97, 8.12, and 119.6 t/ha in rice, maize, and sugarcane, respectively. Countries such as the United States, Mexico, and France also achieved much higher yields than Pakistan for all three crops.

Compare, for example, Pakistan’s wheat production with that of provinces or countries with similar agricultural systems such as Indian Punjab, Egypt, and Mexico, as well as the United Kingdom and France. The province of Punjab in neighboring India produced wheat yields of 4.18 t/ha in 2007, almost twice as much as in Pakistani Punjab (2.78 t/ha). On the whole, the United Kingdom, France, and Egypt had wheat yields nearly three times that of Pakistan’s (7.34, 6.25, and 6.48 t/ha, respectively). Mexico had a yield of 4.98 t/ha the same year. In other words, benchmarks

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14 http://www.fao.org/giews/english/otherpub/PakistanImpactAssessment.pdf.

15 The average wheat and rice yields in Pakistan stand at 2.6 t/ha and 2.1 t/ha, respectively, whereas yields from progressive farming are 4.6 t/ha and 3.8 t/ha. This accounts for a yield gap of 44% for wheat and 46% for rice. Sugarcane has the highest yield gap of 73%, leaving significant room for improvement if better technologies are incorporated. Maize follows with a yield gap of 59%, with the yield from progressive farming being three times the average yield.








and technologies exist that can enable Pakistan to produce much higher yields in order to meet its food security challenges. More active exchange of information and systematic collaboration in agricultural research between Indian and Pakistani Punjab, for example, could contribute toward comparable yields in some crops. The prospects of regional and global collaboration and learning, therefore, offer an opportunity for Pakistan to leap forward and meet its growing food security challenges in the coming decades.

Even with major stresses such as reduced irrigation supplies and the loss of fertile land to nonagricultural uses, Pakistan may still have the potential to produce substantially higher quantities of agricultural commodities. Perhaps the first, if not the only, step toward improving food security will come from increased domestic production and substantially higher agriculturally led economic growth, reduced poverty, and an improved quality of life index for its population. For Pakistan to reach these milestones, though, it needs scientifically led agriculture with vastly improved management.

However, the coming changes in climate will pose a new set of challenges for food security, requiring altogether different responses. In order to comprehend the varying impact of climate change, the agro-climatic zones of Pakistan can be divided into two sections: northern Pakistan and southern Pakistan. Northern Pakistan can be further divided into mountainous (humid) and sub-mountainous (sub-humid) regions, whereas the southern section mainly comprises arid and semi-arid plains. Although there are no detailed studies of how climate change will affect various

that over a period of time climate change will have different effects over the regions delineated above. Results suggest that a rise in temperature will reduce the length of the wheat growing season in northern and southern Pakistan, although the wheat yield will be different according to the area in which it is grown.

To elaborate, the wheat growing season in northern Pakistan is 246 days in length for humid areas and 161 for sub-humid areas, whereas the plains in southern Pakistan have a shorter growing season of 146 days for semi-arid areas and 137 for arid areas. Hypothetically, if the temperature were to rise by 1°C, the growing season in northern Pakistan would fall from 246 to 232 days and from 161 to 155 days, respectively. Likewise, for southern Pakistan, the season would decline to 140 days for semi-arid areas and 132 days for arid areas. If the temperature were to increase by 5°C, the growing season would be further shortened by approximately 30 days for each area.16

On the other hand, a look at the effects of temperature increases on wheat yields in different agro-climatic zones presents a slightly different picture, provided other factors remain constant. Interestingly for the humid areas in northern Pakistan, an increase of 5°C will cause wheat yields to grow from 2,600 to 3,500 kg/ha. This step increase will begin to slow down or taper off once the increase in temperature is four degrees or more. For the sub-humid region however, the same increase will cause yields to fall from 3,000 to 2,100 kg/ha. Likewise, for southern Pakistan’s main wheat-growing areas in the semi-arid zone, wheat yields will fall from 4,000 to 3,200 kg/ha and from 4,400 to 3,400 kg/ha in arid areas.

Although the short- to medium-term accuracy of predictions based on long-range modeling is far from certain, the above discussion does point to acute vulnerability and food insecurity scenarios that could perhaps best be addressed by investing in R&D on heat- and carbon-resistant varieties of wheat.

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Water SecurityPakistan has rapidly transitioned from a water-surplus country to one of the most water-

scarce countries in South Asia. Per capita water availability plunged from 5,300 to 1,100 cubic meters per annum over little more than five decades. Assuming that current rates of decreasing water supply and increasing water consumption continue, a further decline to 1,000 cubic meters per capita is expected around 2010, officially degrading Pakistan to the category of a water-deficient country (see Table 2).

Several factors compound Pakistan’s water security challenges, particularly the increasing pressures of population and urbanization; the massive expansion of tube-well irrigation that has resulted in severe groundwater depletion, water logging, and salinity; and the adverse effects of climate change, including reduced levels of precipitation and the accelerated retreat of Himalayan glaciers.

Pakistan’s dependence on a single river system is another important threat to its water security. The Indus Basin, which is home to the Indus River system containing an estimated 180 billion cubic meters of water, depends heavily on the glaciers of the western Himalayas. These glaciers act as a reservoir as they capture water from snow and rain and then release it into the basin that feeds the Indus Basin downstream. These western glaciers are no exception to the global trend of melting snowcaps.17 Accounting for about 70% of the Indus’s water flow, they are believed to be receding at a pace of 10–15 meters per year and could be all but gone by 2050 according to some experts. The emptying of glacial reservoirs will in all probability worsen flooding and drainage problems in the short term. In the medium- to long-term, it is also expected to drastically reduce river flows, possibly by as much as 30%–40% in the Indus Basin.

A decrease in average river flows would seriously affect Pakistan’s agricultural production, given that 95% of the country’s fresh water is used for irrigated agriculture that supports the livelihoods of more than 70% of the population.18

water, a shortage of available water for irrigation is expected to create an estimated 12 mt deficit in grain production by 2013.19

Another issue is that Pakistan has very little water storage capacity, estimated at only 150 cubic meters, compared to over 5,000 cubic meters of storage capacity per inhabitant in the United States and Australia and 2,200 cubic meters in China.20 Similarly, neighboring India has twice the water storage capacity of Pakistan. Unfortunately, Pakistan has been able to build only two large reservoirs over the past several decades. To make matters worse, serious differences on water distribution and sharing persist among the various provinces. In addition, the Himalayas are relatively young and therefore discharge high silt loads. For Pakistan, this means high siltation in its waterways and reservoirs. Its two large reservoirs are silting rapidly, diminishing the existing storage capacity. Therefore, the long-term challenge of reservoir siltation is twofold: limited reservoir capacities and a shorter lifespan of capacities even when investments are made to augment them.

17 See John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dryhttp://environment.harvard.edu/docs/faculty_pubs/briscoe_pakistan.06.pdf.

18 http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/vol2.pdf.

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Siltation also causes further problems beyond those of reservoirs. As silt builds up, rivers seek lower lands and change their courses. As a result, silt-laden rivers like the Indus play havoc with human lives and settlements. Such rivers are confined by embankments to relatively narrow beds, but the beds keep getting higher and shallower due to silt build-up. Soon the river is above the level of the land, as is the case in the lower parts of Sindh. Over time, the likelihood of embankment breaching increases. No wonder the data shows that the incidence of such flooding and the damage caused by it have been increasingly high, including in big cities.

The existing water-management system has not been able to cope with the increasing population and water-intensive green revolution. Farmers have found one solution that involves extracting groundwater, and statistics suggest that the role of groundwater irrigation will continue to grow.21 In 1960, groundwater was used only for approximately 4 million acre feet per year (maf/y); canals were the major irrigation source at 50 maf/y. A steady increase in groundwater irrigation peaked in 1991 at 22 maf/y. Since then, canal irrigation has increased to approximately 65 maf/y. Current data is unavailable for groundwater harvesting, but some estimates place it at almost half the canal system’s 65 maf/y.

Nonetheless, the limits of groundwater irrigation are becoming evident. In Baluchistan and the Indus Basin, farmers are already pumping from depths of hundreds of meters and tens of thousands of additional wells are being put into service every year. For all practical purposes, a regulatory system does not exist. At such depths, farmers who are subsistence farming cannot afford or do not find it economically viable to dig wells, and thus turn to cities in search of livelihoods.

The National Disaster Management Authority reports that [the] fragility of [the] natural environment in upstream areas of [the] Indus river basin has also exacerbated conditions of vulnerability. Due to massive deforestation, the rate of soil erosion is quite high in the northern region. Pakistan has been left with only 4% forest and vegetative cover, in contrast to the required 25%, thereby experiencing an intense and uninterrupted discharge of water, especially during monsoon seasons. This coupled with increasing snowmelt in the Himalayan glaciers has intensified flood and landslide risks.22

21 Briscoe and Qamar, Pakistan’s Water Economy, 40–42. 22 “National Disaster Risk Management Framework,” 8.

T A B L E 2 Water shortages in Pakistan

Year Population (millions) Amount of water per capita (cubic meters)

1951 34 5,6502003 146 1,2002010 168 1,0002030 230–260 770–680

S O U R C E : Planning Commission of Pakistan, Perspective Plan 2005–30.






Looking at this alarming water availability situation and keeping in view the projections for population expansion, it is clear that water security is a serious NTS threat that, if not adequately addressed soon, could develop into an irreversible downward spiral of poverty, ecological destruction, and socioeconomic destabilization.23

ConclusionsPakistan, as well as South Asia as a whole, has numerous NTS challenges with respect to

climate change, population growth and urbanization, and food and water security. South Asian countries have not yet found effective mechanisms to start addressing these issues. If the region remains unwilling or unable to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that incorporate transboundary strategies, progress will remain slow.

Initial research findings on the impact of climate change in Pakistan indicate that adverse impacts have begun to increase. The country’s exponential population growth and rapid urbanization have a strong ecological footprint, testing the limits of the ecosystem and the services it can provide, given present rates of use and extraction. As the regenerative capacities of these ecosystems diminish, poverty and the associated vulnerability to climate change–related disasters are reinforced. Furthermore, as the frequency and ferocity of floods, storms, and droughts increase, large segments of the population living in fragile ecosystems and flood-prone areas become more vulnerable. Consequently, the cost of such extreme events is increasing for communities, infrastructure, and livelihoods.

That the growth in agricultural productivity has broadly kept pace with rising food demand offers some hope that these successes can be extended to meet Pakistan’s medium-term food security challenges. A window of opportunity exists to increase production in some major crops. These challenges will, however, become far more serious if immediate attention is not paid to managing water resources, both underground and in the Indus River system. As Pakistan becomes a water-scarce country in the coming decades, effective management will be the key to keeping ecosystems alive.

The challenges posed by climate change include permanent reductions in downstream flow, erratic rainfall and monsoon patterns, large-scale and frequent flooding, glacier lake outburst floods, and diminishing storage capacity. As vulnerabilities become acute, policymakers will need to find regional and ecosystem-wide approaches and adaptation measures.

23 “Pakistan–European Community Country Strategy Paper for 2007–2013,” European External Action Service, European Union, 4, http://eeas.europa.eu/pakistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf.









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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Overview

The United States and Asia’s Rising Giants� Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace and NBR

Special Study

International Order and the Rise of Asia: History and Theory� Kenneth B. Pyle, University of Washington

Country Studies

China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences� M. Taylor Fravel, Massachusetts

Institute ofTechnology

India Comes to Terms with a Rising China� Harsh V. Pant, King’s College London

Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China� Michael J. Green, Center for Strategic

and International Studies

Coping with Giants: South Korea’s Response to China’s and India’s Rise� Chung Min Lee, Yonsei University

Grand Stakes: Australia’s Future between China and India� Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute

Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India� Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Regional Studies

Great Games in Central Asia� S. Enders Wimbush, German

Marshall Fund

India Next Door, China Over the Horizon: The View from South Asia� Teresita C. Schaffer, Brookings Institution

The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia’s Autonomy?� Carlyle A. Thayer, Australian Defence

Force Academy

Strategic Asia 2010–11: Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued PurposeStrategic Asia 2009–10: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical StabilityStrategic Asia 2008–09: Challenges and ChoicesStrategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political Change and Grand StrategyStrategic Asia 2006–07: Trade, Interdependence, and SecurityStrategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of UncertaintyStrategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of PowerStrategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and CrisisStrategic Asia 2002–03: Asian AftershocksStrategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose

Previous Volumes

strategic asia 2011–12asia responds to its rising powers China and India

Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers—China and India explores how Asian states are responding to the rise of China and India and the strategies these states are pursuing to preserve their national interests. In each chapter, a leading expert investigates how a country or region perceives China’s and India’s growth based on geopolitical, economic, cultural, military, and historical interactions and draws implications for U.S. interests and leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

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Edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough

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