Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation:Choices for the Wo r l d

Report of the Thirty-First United Nations Issues Conference

Sponsored by

The Stanley Fo u n d a t i o n

Fe b ruary 25-27, 2 000

Convened at Arden Conference Center, Harriman, New York

Policy Bulletin

Nuclear Disarmament and

N o n p ro l i fe ra t i o n : Choices for the Wo rl d

Overview

Why is there a sense of urgency, even crisis, that the nuclear arms control regime isfaltering and may be on the verge of collapse? Why, among the nonnuclear weaponstates (NNWS), is there distrust that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) are sincereabout nuclear disarmament? Why is the United States shunning multilateral agree-ments and increasingly favoring unilateral approaches? These questions werediscussed at the Stanley Foundation’s thirty-first UN Issues Conference at ArdenConference Center in Harriman, New York, February 25-27, 2000.

Participants representing missions to the United Nations, the UN Department ofDisarmament Affairs, the US government, and the International Atomic EnergyAgency, as well as policy experts from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) andacademic institutions, explored the status of the nuclear arms control regime andwhether there exists a continued commitment for nuclear disarmament andnonproliferation.

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A Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?

Today, the goal of nuclear disarmament is at risk. START has become bogged downin US and Russian domestic politics. The nuclear regime is further complicated by USefforts to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and renegotiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The viability of the NPT has been brought intoquestion by nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan and by covert nuclearprograms of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Israel. Finally, the CTBT was rejected by theUS Senate in October 1999.

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Policy Recommendations

The following policy recommendations were supported by nearly allparticipants.

• Parties at the NPT Review Conference should strongly reaffirm theircommitment to fulfilling all aspects of the Treaty on theNonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the goal ofnuclear disarmament.

• UN capacity to promote and support nuclear arms control and disarma-ment should be strengthened. The UN secretary-general should use hismoral authority at the NPT Review Conference and the MillenniumAssembly to invigorate a dialogue between the NWS and the NNWSand outline a plan for nuclear disarmament. The United Nations shouldpublish an independently produced annual report, similar in concept tothe Humanitarian Development Report, on the status of progresstoward nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

• NGOs and the United Nations should collaborate to build a pragmaticpolitical center that reinforces international norms of nonproliferationand nuclear disarmament and the role of international organizations inmonitoring and encouraging progress.

• The United States and Russia should ratify the Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty (START) II and continue bilateral negotiations toward START III.In collaboration with others, they should establish a framework for mul-tilateral negotiations.

• NPT member states should exert pressure on India, Pakistan, Cuba, andIsrael to join the NPT and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT).

• The NWS should reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in their nation-al security doctrines. ■

Pessimists point to a number of reasons why the arms control regime is on the vergeof collapse. Chief among these reasons are actions by the United States, a conflictbetween concepts of arms control and disarmament, and incremental nuclearproliferation.

US behavior, particularly the rejection of the CTBT, is a major source of concern.These actions are symptomatic of growing US unilateralism and exceptionalism onmany issues, including arms control. Increasingly, the United States seeks to satisfyits own domestic and/or national security needs without concern for the impact onmultilateral arms control mechanisms or the security perceptions of other states. TheUnited States questions cooperative approaches to global problems, displays a lack offaith in multilateral approaches to arms control, and has less confidence ininternational organizations and their ability to handle these issues. • Pessimism has arisen from differing perceptions of arms control and disarma-

ment. The NWS, especially the United States, tend to focus on arms control as atool to manage and reduce nuclear weapons to mutually agreed upon levels. TheNNWS, however, tend to favor disarmament. They see reductions to zero nuclearweapons as an achievable and appropriate goal.

• Pessimists also point to the lack of a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War.Many expected the end of the Cold War to result in a reallocation of resourcesaway from military capabilities and toward development and social issues. Whilemany states have reduced defense spending, the United States has increased itsmilitary spending, particularly in high-cost "smart" weapons. This could poten-tially create an incentive for some states to pursue low-cost weapons of massdestruction.

• Finally, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have reinforced the view amongsome states of the prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

Optimists argue that although the arms control regime may have problems, it hassuccessfully reduced the threat posed by nuclear weapons.• States join the NPT because it furthers their security interests. Although the

United States rejected the CTBT, optimists argue that it will still abide by thespirit of the treaty. Furthermore, the ABM Treaty has been modified in the pastand NMD is much more limited than its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)ancestor.

• Despite obstacles to further reductions, the START process has succeeded inreducing deployed strategic nuclear warheads on both sides from around 12,000to just over 3,000, and the potential exists to go even lower. Belarus, Kazakhstan,and Ukraine have joined the NPT. Unilateral decisions were made to eliminatetheater and tactical nuclear weapons as well as nuclear weapons on surface ships.Also, there has been incremental progress in controlling fissile materials and largequantities of Russian plutonium and highly enriched uranium throughverification and control.

A third perspective—the “leaking glass” view—argues that past accomplishments inarms control and disarmament are in jeopardy. The NWS, particularly the UnitedStates, and new nuclear powers—India and Pakistan—seem to be backing away fromtheir historical commitment to nuclear disarmament. Instead, these countries are

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. . . t h earms c o n t r o lregime ison theverge ofcollapse.

moving toward security doctrines that include holding onto nuclear weapons for thelong term. Strict disarmament advocates say that, without a commitment to elimi-nating nuclear weapons, there will be less arms control, more proliferation, andperhaps the total collapse of the NPT. For others, this is a false dichotomy; armscontrol and disarmament are seen as part of the same process.• Disarmament advocates say arms control is a limited concept that was developed

during the Cold War. It does not commit negotiating parties to reach zero nuclearweapons.

• Others argue that excessive focus on zero weapons slows progress on achievableagreements that would reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons. For example,the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament are stalled over ideolog-ical issues and cannot make progress on more limited negotiations.

The United Nations’ Role

The United Nations and other international organizations have prominent roles inthe arms control and disarmament regime. Specifically, the United Nations has a rolein verification, monitoring, compliance, and norm-setting. But the United Nations’role should be enhanced. The United Nations should educate member states on theuniversality of agreements and on how to construct their domestic laws and institu-tions to support them. Furthermore, it should work to strengthen international lawsand norms and provide a forum for like-minded states to issue resolutions and callsfor action.• Member states should reform the Security Council by moving away from c o n s e n-

s u s decision making, making it more representative and including states withinthe nonaligned movement, and allowing greater access to NGOs.

• The Security Council should review arms control compliance periodically.• The United Nations should issue an annual report that reviews proliferation

issues and reports the status of arms control and disarmament. The report shouldbe written by sources outside the United Nations so that it can be more objectiveabout states that are failing to comply.

• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be strengthened to helpwith verification and compliance programs. In particular, the IAEA should devel-op protocols for accelerating the process for state agreements on decisions, andfor states to meet their funding and access commitments.

• Finally, the United Nations needs more resources to effectively deal with allaspects of arms control and disarmament. Specifically, the Department ofDisarmament Affairs needs more funding for education and research.

Realistic Goals for the Next Twenty Years

The NWS, especially the United States, should take a leading role in working towardarms control and disarmament. Specifically, they should break out of Cold Warthinking and embrace the changed concepts of national security and new ways tonegotiate reductions of nuclear weapons.• Meaningful arms control has largely been limited to US-Russia bilateral arrange-

ments. Instead, multilateral discussions between the NWS, and the NNWS, areneeded.

• The NWS should work to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and nucleardeterrence. The United States and Russia should de-alert their nuclear weaponsand de-mate missiles from warheads.

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T h eU n i t e d

N a t i o n s’r o l e

should bee n h a n c e d .

• Neither the United States nor Russia should rely on nuclear weapons as theirultimate security guarantee. Doing so risks resurrecting dangerous MutuallyAssured Destruction (MAD) strategies.

• The United States and Russia should create a joint commission of civilian andmilitary leaders to discuss what stable nuclear force postures should look like in2025, rather than focusing on the number of nuclear weapons.

• NGOs should work to rebuild the pragmatic political center in the United States.In particular, they should work to differentiate nuclear weapons from support ofa strong national security posture. This would enable members of Congress toargue for a strong defense that is decoupled from nuclear weapons. Bipartisansupport is needed on a national security strategy that will allow the United Statesto accept the lowest number of nuclear weapons proposed by the Russians.

Next Steps

The nuclear disarmament process is stalled and in danger of reversal. Increasing UStendencies toward exceptionalism and unilateral action are reducing the effectivenessof multilateral organizations. This is reinforced by rhetoric among US leaders aboutNMD and US failure to ratify the CTBT. The United States and the other four nuclearweapons states have not lived up to their commitments to pursue disarmamentunder Article VI of the NPT. This has created a crisis of confidence between the NWSand the NNWS, and is encouraging potential proliferants. It has discouraged thosewho thought they were negotiating for disarmament in good faith.

The UN secretary-general can help break the impasse by using his moral authority atthe upcoming NPT Review Conference and Millennium Assembly to obtain unequiv-ocal commitments to disarmament from all states. The United Nations should sponsoran annual report that analyses pro g ress toward disarmament by states with nuclearweapons and programs to build them. The United Nations should work toward inter-mediate goals, including the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the CTBT, and shouldbegin serious negotiations for the control of biological and chemical weapons. Itshould also encourage and assist the United States and Russia in reaching ana g reement on STA RT III and help design a framework for multilateral negotiations. ■

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This Policy Bulletin reports the primary findings of the conference as interpreted by the chair and rap-porteur. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this bulletin. Therefore, it should not be assumedthat every participant subscribes to all of its recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Participant ListChairRichard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation

RapporteurSharon K. We i n e r, Research Associate, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies,Princeton University

Participant ListVictor Elliot Alessi, President and Chief Executive Off i c e r, United States IndustryCoalition, Inc.

Ian Anthony, Project Leader on European Export Controls, Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute

Jonathan Dean, Adviser on International Security Issues, Union of ConcernedS c i e n t i s t s

Jayantha Dhanapala, Under- S e c retary-General for Disarmament A ffairs, UnitedNations

Lewis A. Dunn, Corporate Vice President and Deputy Group Manager, StrategiesG roup, Science Applications International Corporation

Jean P. du Preez, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa to theUnited Nations

Richard L. Garwin, Phillip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Te c h n o l o g y, Councilon Foreign Relations

Thomas W. Graham, Vice President, Second Chance Foundation

Sally K. Horn, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Office of Strategy and Thre a tReduction, US Department of Defense

Jo L. Husbands, Dire c t o r, Committee on International Security and Arms Contro l ,National Academy of Sciences

Shafqat Ali Khan, Second Secretary and Delegate to the First Committee, PermanentMission of Pakistan to the United Nations

J e ffrey Laurenti, Executive Director for Policy Studies, United Nations Association ofthe United States of America

Edward C. Luck, Executive Dire c t o r, Center for the Study of InternationalO rganization, New York University School of Law

Andrew Mack, Director of Strategic Planning Unit, United Nations

David M. Malone, President, International Peace A c a d e m y

J e ff Martin, Vice President and Director of Programs, The Stanley Foundation

Matthew S. Martin, Legislative Assistant for Defense, Office of Senator J. RobertK e r re y

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Victor I. Mizin, Political Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation tothe United Nations

Douglas J. Roche, Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative

Lawrence Scheinman, Former Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and RegionalArms Control, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Distinguished Pro f e s s o r,M o n t e rey Institute for International Studies;

Thomas Edward Shea, Head of Project on Verification of Weapon-Origin FissileMaterial, Safeguards Department, International Atomic Energy A g e n c y, A u s t r i a

Stanley Foundation StaffJames Henderson, Program Off i c e rKristin McHugh, Pro d u c e r, Common Gro u n dSusan R. Moore, International Programs A s s o c i a t eKeith Porter, Manager, Media Pro g r a m s

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather thanas representatives of their governments or organizations.

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Opening Remarks

Introduction

Welcome to the Stanley Foundation’s thirty-firstconference on United Nations Issues. Each year formore than thirty years, we have gathered experts toexplore timely issues related to world challengesand global governance. Our objective has been tocontribute to a secure peace with freedom and jus-tice. This conference continues that pattern.

We are here to talk about the prospects of nucleardisarmament and nonproliferation in the worldtoday. This is a subject of increasing discussion innational capitals and international forums, andamong the knowledgeable public. While disarma-ment concerns apply to all weapons of massd e s t ruction—chemical, biological, and nuclear—this conference will focus on nuclear weapons. Theyhave the most advanced treaty regime, and this regime is the one most in jeopardy atthis time. Many feel there is a sense of urgency, even crisis, that the nuclear arms con-trol regime that has stood for so long is faltering and may be on the verge of collapse.How has this come to pass? Why, among some states, is there doubt, bordering ondistrust, that the arms control regime is the best way to achieve a state’s security?Why are these states considering abandoning multilateral agreements in favor ofgoing it alone?

The nuclear arms control regime was developed piece by piece over many years. Itcan be compared to a three-legged stool, with each leg vital to the stability of thestool. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) each comprise a leg ofthat stool which has managed to promote stability and ensure the strength of thearms control regime. Moreover, all stools need rungs to tie the legs together and giveit strength. The rungs are the norms that the use or threatened use of nuclear weaponscannot be condoned. Furthermore, these norms have also established that nuclearn o n p roliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually agreed objectives. Thenuclear arms control regime is an interdependent structure. If one part is weakened,the whole structure suffers. And, like all structures, it needs to be maintained in orderto be effective.

Former US President Ronald Reagan summarized the objective of this regime in hissecond inaugural address on January 21, 1985. He said:

There is only one way safely and legitimately to reduce the cost ofnational security, and that is to reduce the need for it. And this we aretrying to do in negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not just dis-cussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons. We seek,instead, to reduce their number. We seek the total elimination one dayof nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

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Richard Stanley, president, the Stanley Foundation

Successes of the Arms Control RegimeB e f o re we delve into what threatens the regime, it is important to assess itsaccomplishments.

Strategic Arms ReductionSTART has been effective in limiting the vertical proliferation of US and Russiannuclear arsenals. The START I treaty will reduce the level of deployed strategicnuclear warheads to six thousand on each side. START II, ratified by the US Senateand still awaiting ratification by the Russian Duma, would further reduce these levelsto thirty-five hundred each. START III, as outlined by President Clinton and formerRussian President Boris Yeltsin, would reduce these levels even more to between twothousand and twenty-five hundred deployed strategic warheads. Overall, the num-ber of nuclear weapons held by the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) has fallen fromsixty-eight thousand in 1987 to thirty-six thousand in 1997.

In a real sense, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a part of the strategic armsreduction effort. By agreeing not to deploy defensive ABM systems, the United Statesand Russia removed this unproven and unpredictable factor from negotiations onnumbers of nuclear weapons. Following the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) phi-losophy, this facilitates agreement on lower numbers of weapons.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)The NPT has been successful in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclearweapons with 187 countries as signatories to the treaty. The signatories have pledgedto work against proliferation of nuclear weapons, while the NWS have affirmed theircommitment to work toward nuclear disarmament. Additional success has beenachieved through the actions of South Africa and the former Soviet republics ofKazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus who have relinquished their nuclear arsenals.Finally, we have achieved one of the key objectives of the NPT under Article III. Thisarticle affirms the goal that "nuclear disarmament, in all its aspects…" be placedunder "…strict and effective international control."

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)The CTBT has helped to limit qualitative proliferation—the development, produc-tion, and testing of more powerful and deadly nuclear weapons. To date, 155countries have signed the treaty, and 51 countries have ratified it. France and theUnited Kingdom have ratified the treaty, and Russia and China have pledged theywill do so.

Other SuccessesIn addition to the three legs of the arms control regime, the United Nations’ ability topromote disarmament has been strengthened. The year 1998 saw the reestablishmentof the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs under the leadership of an under-secretary-general. The role of the department is to gather and analyze data; shareinformation with governments, NGOs, and the public; and advocate disarmament.There has been progress toward nuclear disarmament with the establishment ofn u c l e a r- w e a p o n - f ree zones in Africa, the South Pacific, and Southeast A s i a .Furthermore, a potentially harmful nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazilwas averted with the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Finally, the rungs of our stool, the agreednorms that nonproliferation and disarmament are worthy goals, have given strength

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and stability to the regime. These norms did not emerge overnight. Rather, they tookyears of hard work through the dedication of many people working toward acommon purpose.

Emerging Threats to the Regime

To many, the Cold War represented the worst case scenario for nuclear weapons. TheUnited States and the Soviet Union poured huge amounts of financial and intellectu-al resources into building enormous numbers of nuclear weapons in a game ofbrinkmanship. Through the doctrine of MAD, the United States and the Soviet Unionstared at each other across the nuclear abyss, each believing that their vast array ofnuclear weapons would guarantee peace and security. It seems unfathomable thatnuclear danger could be any worse than during the Cold War. However, the worldnow stands at a juncture where nuclear dangers could indeed be much worse.

The strongest emerging threat to the nuclear arms control regime is the belief by somethat their national security could better be served through self-reliance rather thanthrough an internationally agreed weapons regime. This can be seen in US efforts todevelop and deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The decision to moveforward with NMD development and possible deployment has had spillover effectson the work of START. The Russian Duma has still not ratified START II, and STARTIII talks have been put on hold. Some Russian politicians have argued that furtherwork on START depends on the US decision on NMD deployment and the potentialrenegotiation of the ABM treaty. In addition, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, mis-sile tests by North Korea, and Israeli refusal to sign the NPT have had a corrosiveeffect on nonproliferation. Finally, the United States’ failure to support and ratify theCTBT has eroded confidence in the United States to work with the international com-munity toward disarmament nonproliferation. Finally, the desire to "go it alone" hascaused an erosion of the normative structure that holds the nuclear arms controlregime together. If this philosophy continues, it could weaken the regime to the pointwhere it is no longer stable or viable.

Why a Sense of Distrust?

At the beginning of my remarks, I listed some impressive accomplishments the worldhas made toward reducing nuclear dangers. Why is there a growing sense in thiscountry, and in others, that the better way to ensure one’s security is to "go it alone,"shunning the multilateral arms control regime in favor of a unilateral approach? Why,after all that has been achieved, is there a feeling of distrust about the arms controlregime among the NWS and nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS)?

The US development and possible deployment of NMD is a good example. Why isthere a belief among some politicians that NMD is a more effective way of achievingUS security rather than through multilateral institutions? In Russia there is a feelingtheir traditional doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons is no longer adequate. As aresult, Russia has lowered its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Why havethey done this? Furthermore, the NNWS have a growing sense of unease. They fearthat NWS are not committed to disarmament. What has caused this belief? I hope thatone of the outcomes of this meeting is a reinvigoration of commitment to continuingdevelopment of the nuclear arms control regime as the best vehicle for achievingpeace and security.

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ConclusionAs you can see, the most striking aspects of the arms control regime is how interde-pendent each leg is with the others for stability. The United States’ NMD programthreatens not only the START process, but also other countries’ commitment to theNPT and the CTBT. In addition, NWS’ commitment to pursuing disarmament affectswhether countries will continue to adhere to NPT and ratify CTBT. If the NWS do notfollow through with their commitment toward disarmament, there is a very realchance that NNWS will abandon their nonnuclear stance and begin nuclear weapondevelopment.

Over the next two days we will discuss and debate the arms control regime in detail.However, I think it is important we keep four questions in our minds:

• Are we committed to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects?• What’s the best way of achieving this goal, and why?• Are we committed to using a multilateral nuclear weapon regime?• Do we have the political will to achieve the desired result?

It is only by asking and finding the answers to these questions that we will be able todecide whether the world will pursue a path toward disarmament or chart a coursefor a new, expanded nuclear arms race.

I look forward to our discussions.

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Conference Report

The Status of the Arms Control Regime

There are numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements that attempt toinfluence the possession, development, and spread of nuclear weapons. Arguably,key treaties in this regime are: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START),through which the United States and Russia have agreed to reduce their strategicnuclear forces to specified levels; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT), which obligates the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states(NWS) not to transfer nuclear weapons or their technology to nonnuclear weaponstates (NNWS) and for the NNWS not to acquire nuclear weapons; and theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose signatories promise not to undertakeany nuclear testing whether for weapons or peaceful purposes. Together, thesetreaties reinforce a normative framework, or system of values, intended to governinternational behavior with respect to nuclear weapons.

Today there are numerous existing and emerging threats to this treaty regime. STA RTreductions have become bogged down in US and Russian domestic politics. Furthercomplicating this situation is the US attempt to deploy a National Missile Defense(NMD) system and to renegotiate commitments under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

Tre a t y. The importance of the NPT has beenb rought into question by nuclear weapontests in India and Pakistan and by the covertnuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, Iraq,and Israel. Finally, the US Senate rejected theCTBT in October of 1999.

How significant are these threats to the inter-national arms control regime? Should we beconcerned about the status of these agree-ments or the normative framework uponwhich they are based? Although conferenceparticipants were in near universal agree-ment about the importance of this regime,and heartily endorsed its goal of reducingnuclear weapons, their concerns about itsstatus varied considerably.

A Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?Nearly half of the conference participantsw e re extremely pessimistic about the futureof the nuclear arms control regime. In oneway or another, the source of their gloomcould be traced to the behavior of the UnitedStates. The most straightforward connectionwas the US rejection of the CTBT, which wasseen by some participants as symptomatic ofg rowing US feelings of unilateralism and

To d a ythere are

n u m e r o u se x i s t i n g

a n de m e r g i n gthreats tothis treaty

r e g i m e .

Sharon K. Weiner, rapporteur

The rapporteur prepared this report followingthe conference. It contains her interpretationof the proceedings and is not merely a descriptive, chronological account.Participants neither reviewed nor approvedthe report. Therefore, it should not beassumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, andconclusions.

exceptionalism. Incre a s i n g l y, they argued, the United States seeks to satisfy its owndomestic and/or national security needs without concern for how these actions willimpact the perceptions of others about the future of multilateral arms control mecha-nisms or the security perceptions of other states. The United States, it was arg u e d ,questions cooperative approaches to global problems, displays a lack of faith in mul-tilateral approaches to arms control, and has less confidence in international org a n i-zations and their ability to handle these issues. Some participants added the UnitedStates especially distrusts international organizations whose membership includes al a rge number of developing countries. As a result, multilateral approaches are mar-ginalized and, in a dire prediction, many participants agreed that the NPT regime is ind a n g e r.

Another source of pessimism was a disconnect between arms control and disarma-ment. The NWS, especially the United States, tend to focus on arms control; that is,their goal is to manage and reduce nuclear weapons to mutually agreed upon levels.The majority of states, however, favor disarmament. They see reductions to zeronuclear weapons as an achievable and appropriate goal. Article VI of the NPT com-mits all parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating tocessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, andon a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-tional control." The pessimists argued the NWS have shown no commitment toArticle VI of the NPT. As a result, the credibility of the NPT is undermined, andNNWS see nuclear weapons as a permanent feature of international relations. Thisencourages proliferation not just of nuclear weapons but of biological and chemicalweapons. "The day of reckoning is coming," one participant warned. Unless the NWSbegin the process of living up to their promises to pursue disarmament, there will bewidespread proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and thus reducedsecurity for all states.

Yet a third argument of the pessimists was the lack of a peace dividend at the end ofthe Cold War. Many expected the end of the Cold War to result in a reallocation ofresources away from military capabilities and toward economic development andsocial issues. Although many states have indeed reduced their defense budgets, theUnited States has recently increased its military spending in real terms. As a result,some states may fear high-cost US conventional force capabilities and may pursuelow-cost weapons of mass destruction for their security needs. An additional sourceof concern was US efforts to re-rationalize its nuclear weapon force in the post-ColdWar world. In their minds, US nuclear capability would be used to deter biologicaland chemical weapons, punish terrorist actions, and/or counter proliferation.

Finally, the pessimists were particularly concerned about developments in SouthAsia. Generally, it was agreed that India views nuclear weapons as a path towardgreater prestige and recognition in the international community, and this view iscaused by the failure of the NWS to pursue disarmament. Both Pakistan and India arerelying on nuclear weapons for deterrence, while at the same time threatening warwith each other. Given the history of animosity between the two countries, the risk isquite high that there will be future crises, any one of which could quickly escalate toa nuclear exchange either by intent or accident.

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...NNWS seen u c l e a rweapons as a p e r m a n e n tfeature ofi n t e r n a t i o n a lr e l a t i o n s .

Countering the pessimists were a nearly equal number of optimistic viewpoints. Likethe pessimists, they too wanted further reductions in nuclear weapons and faultedthe Clinton administration for its lack of attention to arms control and progress.However, they found reason for hope in several developments.

First, with respect to the NPT, some optimists noted the treaty’s salience had beencalled into question by nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. This, however, had alwaysbeen the case. Before India and Pakistan, the nuclear programs of A rgentina and Brazilraised similar concerns, but they eventually relinquished their programs and joinedthe NPT. They argued states join the NPT because it furthers their security intere s t s .As for the CTBT, the optimists lamented its rejection by the US Senate. But, theyadded, the United States was still pre p a red to abide by the spirit of that treaty and wasnot preparing to test, produce, or develop new weapons. As for talk about altering UScommitments under the ABM Tre a t y, participants were reminded that the treaty hadbeen modified in the past to respond to new strategic situations and that today’sversion of NMD was much more limited than its Strategic Defense Initiative ancestor.

Second, the participants also found a source of hope in US-Russian bilateral pro-grams. Despite obstacles to further reductions, the START process has succeeded inreducing deployed strategic nuclear warheads on both sides from around 12,000 tojust over 3,000, with potential for deeper reductions. Furthermore, following thebreakup of the Soviet Union, all of its nuclear weapons were removed from Belarus,Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and these states joined the NPT. Separate unilateral deci-sions by the United States and Russia have also resulted in the elimination of theaterand tactical nuclear weapons as well as nuclear weapons from surface ships. Also,there has been incremental progress in controlling fissile materials, large quantities ofRussian plutonium, and highly enriched uranium that are now under verificationand control. The United States and Russia currently have a cooperative dialogue onarms control issues and are engaged in useful related activities including non-weapons-related employment for Russian nuclear weapon scientists and engineers.

F i n a l l y, the participants acknowledged that there is a lack of political will that impedesp ro g ress on arms control. They added this was compounded by a deeper antipathyt o w a rd arms reductions in general. That said, there is no shortage of ideas for futurep ro g ress and arms control deals, and this is one additional source of optimism.

A third perspective—the "leaking-glass" view—holds that the accomplishments inarms control and disarmament to date is in jeopardy. The NWS—particularly theUnited States—and new nuclear powers—India and Pakistan—seem to be backingaway from their historical commitment to nuclear disarmament. Instead, these coun-tries are moving toward security doctrines that include holding onto nuclearweapons for the long term. Strict disarmament advocates say that without acommitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, there will be less arms control, moreproliferation, and perhaps the total collapse of the NPT. For others, this is a falsedichotomy; arms control and disarmament are seen as part of the same process.

Realistic Goals for the Next Twenty Years

What should be done to further disarmament, and what are realistic goals for the next

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...there isa lack ofp o l i t i c a lwill thati m p e d e sp r o g r e s son armsc o n t r o l .

twenty years? To answer these questions, conference participants once again turnedto a debate about arms control versus abolition and disarmament. They also high-lighted the need to purge Cold War assumptions and rhetoric from not only nuclearweapon doctrine and policy but from discussions of arms control in general. Toooften arms control has been limited to US-Russia bilateral arrangements when whatis needed are multilateral discussions among the NWS and also between the NWSand the NNWS. Participants also debated the merits of a management versus legalapproach to arms control, how to tone down the harmful rhetoric of US domesticpolitics, and whether or not the United States would make progress toward reducingits nuclear arsenal in the short or long term.

The Salience of Nuclear Weapons Conference participants were committed to the idea that there should be fewernuclear weapons in the world and that progress toward disarmament was veryimportant. They disagreed, however, on whether the ultimate goal should be fewernuclear weapons or complete abolition. Some argued there is a general expectation inthe world today that nuclear weapons should go away. Others, however, counteredthere is no responsible official in any nuclear weapon state that shares this view. Itwas also argued that "abolition" is a politically damaging word that actually impedesdisarmament by alienating those who favor "fewer" nuclear weapons but not zero.Disarmament, it was suggested, would be more readily achieved if it were discussedin terms of the "dangers" posed by nuclear weapons and by increasing public aware-ness on the need to reduce these dangers. The words "zero" and "abolition" should beavoided because these are long-term goals that neither governments nor the publicare ready to embrace.

Regardless of whether the ultimate goal is zero or a few, conference participantsagreed that it is important to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and nucleardeterrence. Whether or not these were appropriate for the Cold War, the United Statesand Russia should stop brandishing nuclear weapons at each other as if they werestill enemies. Both countries should take their nuclear weapons off alert and perhapseven de-mate missiles from warheads. Redefining the salience of nuclear weapons,however, is stalled by a bureaucracy that is a product of the Cold War. This bureau-cracy still sees nuclear weapons as legitimate, still thinks in terms of numbers andmutually assured destruction, and still has a large influence on the nuclear posture ofthe United States. Increasingly, however, this bureaucracy is being challenged. Todaymembers of the "nuclear priesthood" are themselves calling for deep reductions andarguing that 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons is on the verge of becoming respectable.Unfortunately, the Clinton administration has done little to encourage this new think-ing. Instead of setting new parameters for rethinking deterrence and the role ofnuclear weapons, the administration produced a Nuclear Posture Review that avoid-ed these issues entirely. As a result, the United States has nuclear forces that are alegacy of the Cold War and not appropriate for the current security situation.

The concept of deterrence also needs to be revisited. Certainly the United States nolonger needs to rely on deterrence or nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor ofits security. As was demonstrated in the war with Iraq, superiority in conventionalforces is more than adequate to enable the United States to pursue its national

15

...it isi m p o rt a n tto reducet h esalience ofn u c l e a rw e a p o n sa n dn u c l e a rd e t e rr e n c e .

security goals. Other participants cautioned that US conventional superiority actuallycreates security concerns for other states. Unable to match the United States inconventional forces, nuclear weapons become an equalizer. Therefore, a prerequisitefor disarmament by countries such as China, Russia, and India may well be radicalconventional disarmament by the United States.

New Approaches to Arms Control The process of arms control also suffers from the legacy of the Cold War. To be effec-tive in the post-Cold War world, arms control must move beyond negotiations aboutnumbers of nuclear weapons. Certainly, ratification of START II would be welcomed,but it will not help arms control overcome its failures of vision and analysis. Moreimportant than the numbers of weapons is designing policies to meet future securityneeds and then determining how many weapons are needed to achieve those goals.For example, the United States and Russia should create a joint commission of civil-ian and military leaders to discuss what stable nuclear force postures should look likein 2025. With respect to NMD, there should be a dialogue on the relationship betweenoffensive and defensive systems. US and Russian cooperative efforts to dismantleRussian silos, disable Russian bombers, close the test site in Kazakhstan, and re-employ Russian nuclear weapon scientists are also useful and creative measures.However, conference participants cautioned that these programs do nothing toreduce the number of nuclear weapons and do not increase confidence among theNNWS that we are moving in that direction.

Arms control must also move beyond a bilateral framework. Where possible, changescan be made unilaterally, such as President George Bush’s 1991 announcement thatthe United States would withdraw all ground and sea-based tactical nuclearweapons. But a multilateral dialogue among the five NWS is also necessary. Chinaneeds to be engaged and included in discourse on both numbers of nuclear weaponsand their role in national security. Including India in similar discussions might pro-vide much wanted international recognition and actually encourage India’s leadersnot to weaponize their nuclear capabilities. Also, China, India, Pakistan, and Israelcould jointly offer to place their nuclear weapons under international control if theUnited States and Russia will make deep cuts beyond START III.

Finally, there must be multilateral negotiations between the NWS and NNWS. TheCold War norm was confrontation rather than cooperation, and the NPT has retainedits "us-versus-them" negotiating style. The UN Conference on Disarmament has beenunable to secure an agreement to control fissile materials because individual coun-tries, most recently China, change their positions or insist on quid pro quo.International discussions are victimized by rhetorical exchanges that are rooted indomestic politics. And, perhaps most seriously, the NNWS are no longer convincedthat the five NWS can be trusted to make good on their promises to pursue disarma-ment. This crisis of confidence is a product of several factors. One is the continuedreliance by NWS on national security strategies that reaffirm the use of nuclearweapons: this includes China’s modernization of its nuclear weapons, Russia’s newsecurity doctrine which reaffirms their use, the retention of its Trident submarines bythe United Kingdom, US ambiguity about using nuclear weapons in response tobiological and chemical weapons, the US debate over the CTBT which seemed to

16

. . . t h eN N W Sare nol o n g e r

c o nv i n c e dthat the

f iv en u c l e a r

w e a p o n sstates

can bet r u s t e d

...to p u rsue

d i s a r m a-m e n t .

suggest that it might want to resume testing nuclear weapons, and US willingness tounilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Yet another factor is a seeming reluc-tance by the NWS to oppose proliferation. The United States and other Western pow-ers have used intimidation to block disarmament efforts in the United Nations, to haltNATO’s review of nuclear doctrine, and even to press Canada to stop its disarma-ment efforts.

Although the primary responsibility for disarmament lies with the NWS, the obliga-tion to work toward this goal is shared by all. One possible path forward is that thosestates without nuclear weapons should reaffirm their unequivocal commitment notto develop them or to contribute to their development in other states. This wouldinclude stricter export control measures, especially with respect to missile technolo-gy. Pakistan and India should sign the NPT, as should nuclear-capable states such asIsrael and North Korea. Regional nonproliferation accords also hold some promisebecause states have a greater interest in what their immediate neighbors are doing.Geographic areas without nuclear weapons should create nuclear-weapon-free zonesand "neighborhood watch" services to monitor development. The neighbors of NWScan apply pressure to at least discuss disarmament. For example, the foreign minis-ters of Canada and Mexico could invite the United States to discuss these issues andbe prepared to meet even if the United States refuses to attend. These measureswould send a strong message that the nonproliferation regime is growing strongerand that calls for disarmament cannot be ignored. Other participants cautioned thatregional organizations are already overloaded with problems they cannot solve.

Other promising multilateral approaches are the New Agenda Coalition and theMiddle Powers Initiative. The first is a state-level effort to encourage progress on dis-armament issues where there is widespread agreement, such as support for theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), universality of the NPT, and signing afissile material cutoff treaty. By bringing states together to take moderate, mutuallyagreeable steps toward disarmament, the coalition hopes to build cooperation andsupport for more radical progress in the future. The Middle Powers Initiative is acampaign by NGOs to pressure NWS to take similar steps.

Conference participants could not reach agreement on whether it was more promis-ing to negotiate international laws to deal with disarmament and nonproliferationconcerns or to manage problems on an informal basis. Most favored a mix of the two.Many said the United States tends to prefer a management approach and recentlyseems to have adopted a dismissive attitude toward treaty obligations. This is partlydue to the failure of legal efforts. For example, nuclear weapon programs in Iraq andNorth Korea have undercut US faith in the NPT. In addition, there is a tendency ofUN bodies to polarize issues by making them North-South debates. This split com-plicates and politicizes negotiations, perceptions, and understandings. As a result,the United States has decided to opt out of these fora; without US leadership or par-ticipation, little real progress can be made. Other conference participants cautionedthat legal agreements are important because they provide a means for the interna-tional community to evaluate a state’s commitment to disarmament. Furthermore,the NPT’s Article VI commitment to disarmament is very important to the NNWS.The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed this commitment, and downplayingit will only be harmful.

17

. . . n u c l e a rw e a p o np r o g r a m sin Iraqand Nort hKo r e ah a v eu n d e r c u tUS faithin theN P T.

Domestic Politics and Nuclear Disarmament Conference participants agreed that one of the most important arenas for progresswas domestic politics in the United States. Arms control and disarmament are miredin partisan politics, thereby polarizing national security debate. Furthermore, therhetorical style of these confrontations is damaging outside of the United Statesbecause it perpetuates distrust, limits expectations, and is offensive. Most countriescan do little to pressure the United States to change its domestic political discourse.There is a greater role for trusted allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany.For example, Germany did raise the issue of revising NATO’s no-first-use doctrine.The United States blocked these efforts, but at least Germany was able to prompt dis-cussion. Furthermore, NATO allies are a valuable avenue for breaking into theWashington political debate on these issues, and they should be encouraged to applymore pressure. With respect to NMD, NATO allies should pressure the United Statesto moderate its plans and, perhaps during the upcoming NPT review process, theycould raise the idea of postponing a decision on NMD at least until possibilities abouta global warning system are investigated.

Within the United States, lobbying is much more effective when done on an individ-ual basis. Thus, the focus should be on individual members of Congress and statedelegations. Here there is also room for action by coalitions of NGOs. Also, congres-sional staffs, which are often too partisan and unprofessional, should be educated ondisarmament issues. For example, it might be helpful to have weekly staff meetingson key matters. Lamenting a lack of grassroots activists for abolition or interest in thisissue, one conference participant noted that at the end of the Cold War, the UnitedStates kept its nuclear weapons but dismantled the networks of citizens who wereagainst them.

Conference participants disagreed sharply about the prospects for US domestic dis-armament agreements in the immediate future. It was argued that there is a deal tobe made in the next three to six months. Russia has been proposing reductions to1,000-1,500 nuclear weapons. China has communicated off the record that it is will-ing to engage in discussions. A similar approach could be made with North Koreaand Iran. The key is to get rid of domestic political objections to these activities byrebuilding the pragmatic center. Here there is a US domestic consensus on threepoints. First, Americans do not want increases in either nuclear weapons or nuclearweapon states, and the United States does not need to resume nuclear testing.Second, the US military is reluctant to support nuclear weapons because this takesbudgetary resources away from their needs in other areas and because the militaryhas serious doubts about their war-fighting utility. Third, Americans, however, wanta strong defense, and they favor increases in spending for conventional forces andintelligence resources. The "deal," therefore, is to separate nuclear weapons fromarguments that support a strong national security posture. This would enable mem-bers of Congress to argue for a strong defense that is decoupled from nuclearweapons. When the issue is framed in this manner, Republicans will buy into theproposition that the United States can accept the lowest number the Russians put onthe table because it is above what is needed for US national security. Furthermore,Republicans should be allowed to take the lead on this issue and be given credit for

18

. . . t h eU n i t e d

States ke p tits nuclear

w e a p o n sbut

d i s m a n t l e dthe

networks of citize n swho were

a ga i n s tthem.

19

any progress made. This deal could be made in this calendar year, but it will requirea bipartisan approach. Civil society and foundations are key because these issueshave to be raised at the local level before they get the attention of those higher up.Unfortunately, arms control is perceived as a liberal and democratic issue, andcurrent NGOs reinforce this view, making many of their efforts counterproductive.

Several parts of this proposed deal met with sharp criticism. Many questioned thepolitical will or ability of the Clinton administration to move ahead with such anagenda. To date, Clinton has invested little effort in moving the government torethink nuclear weapon issues. Also, he has been increasingly thwarted on all frontsby the congressional leadership. Finally, the history of lame duck administrations andelection years suggests that major initiatives are seldom undertaken or achieved.Many participants were far more optimistic about getting a "deal" with the nextadministration, but they cautioned that it would take some time before the nextpresidential administration finds its feet and is ready for such a major effort. Alsoquestioned was the proposition that the US military dislikes nuclear weapons forbudgetary reasons given the United States can afford to pursue modernization with-out an internal redistribution of the defense budget. Other participants argued the USpublic shows little interest in reducing nuclear weapons and, with serious doubtsabout the stockpile stewardship program, the US nuclear laboratories are likely topush for renewed testing. The United States also seems to think that proliferation ismanageable within the existing framework of arms control agreements. Without USleadership, where is the pressure for change going to come from? Even morepessimistically, history suggests it will take a catastrophic event, like nuclear war ora terrorist act, to energize the public and force the administration to provide leader-ship on these issues. Finally, the idea of a new "deal" itself was rejected. "We want theold deal," one conference participant explained. Under Article VI of the NPT, theUnited States agreed to give up its nuclear weapons. The "deal" is zero, not a fewhundred or a few thousand nuclear weapons.

Conference participants seemed resigned to the idea the United States would deploya national missile defense. This deployment would occur even though an effectivesystem is not technologically possible and, as currently proposed, it would do little tostop cruise missiles or other means of delivering weapons of mass destruction otherthan a limited ballistic missile strike. A few argued NMD was a domestic politicalissue that would be largely accepted as such by other countries. Most participants,however, saw NMD as poisoning the future of disarmament and one even arguedNMD is the "abortion issue" of the proliferation business. NMD threatens the retalia-tory capabilities of both Russia and China; therefore, it may be seen as an offensivedevelopment. To counter NMD, China may increase or modernize its nuclear arsenal,and Russia may add more independently targeted warheads to its missiles. NMDmay, in effect, establish a floor for nuclear weapons that is much higher than theRussians would otherwise negotiate. Further, NMD may encourage a missile race inSouth Asia. For example, Russia and India are about to finalize a deal on the S300Vanti-theater ballistic missile system. Even if this system is ineffective, it still givesPakistan an incentive to increase its nuclear weapons.

With respect to NMD, the United States has taken a position that it can tell others

NMD is the" a b o rt i o nissue" of thep r o l i f e r a t i o nb u s i n e s s .

what to do. There is little incentive for Russia to renegotiate the ABM Treaty if theUnited States repeatedly insists it will deploy NMD regardless of Russia’s reaction. Itwas suggested there are two ways to limit the political damage caused by any NMDdeployment. One would be to deploy a global warning system; the second would beto limit NMD to a boost-phase intercept system that covers North Korea and isdeployed jointly with Russia in Vladivostok. Stating that "Washington has attentiondeficient disorder with respect to Russia," one participant explained that it is ridicu-lous to simultaneously encourage democratization in Russia, bully the Russiansabout NMD, and then expect the Russian public to forego support for increaseddefense spending.

Domestic politics and discourse in the other NWS is also important and a cause forconcern. Russia sees nuclear weapons as a prominent legacy from its communist pastand the ultimate guarantor of its international status. Russia is alarmed by US talk ofIran, Iraq, and North Korea as "proliferation threats" and rogue states. These countriesa re all former Soviet clients, and the Russian military does not see them as thre a t e n-ing. Instead, Russia focuses on countering threats from a "Southern underbelly" thatincludes Pakistan and India. Similar to Russia, France also defines itself and its inter-national status through nuclear weapons. France, the United Kingdom, and Germanya re all distracted by domestic matters. Their attention to defense has so far concen-trated on a common European defense policy and military capability, and theE u ropean Union has shown no willingness to push the disarmament agenda. Thesecountries will only move on these issues if the United States and Russia do so as well.

What Can the United Nations and Other International Organizations do

to Help?

Participants were in agreement that multilateral organizations play important roles inverification, monitoring, compliance, and norm-setting. However, conference partic-ipants did not paint a rosy picture of the prospects for action on disarmament by theUnited Nations. The Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee are bothbogged down in partisan bickering and have been unable to make real progress ondisarmament issues for some time. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs issmall and underfunded, and the secretary-general’s office pays attention to nuclearissues only when there is a crisis. Officials agree disarmament is important, but theydo not have time to deal with it. Add in US inaction and unilateralism, and theseproblems are compounded.

Participants were reminded, however, of the valuable roles played by the UnitedNations. One of its tasks is to educate member states on the universality of agree-ments and on how to construct their domestic laws and institutions to support them.Another is to help develop international laws and norms. Yet a third is to provide aforum for like-minded states to issue resolutions and call for action. In this regard, theUnited Nations has been very useful because it provides a place for NNWS to repeat-edly issue calls for disarmament and to amplify world opinion on this issue.Furthermore, by definition, the United Nations cannot act unless its members agree.Because there is no agreement on what the current international agenda on disarma-ment should be, the role for the United Nations is limited.

20

Because there is no a g r e e m e n t

o n . . .d i s a r m a-

m e n t...the role

for theU n i t e d

Nations isl i m i t e d .

Enhancing the United Nations’ Role C o n f e rence participants suggested several ideas for improving the United Nationsand its re c o rd on disarmament in particular. At the top of the list was reform of theSecurity Council. Confidence in the Security Council would increase if it wereengaged regularly in periodic reviews of arms control compliance rather than waitingfor a referral for action. This would make it clear that the council’s mandate is toe n f o rce the current arms control regime, not simply punish violators. As with otherUN organizations, the Security Council should place less emphasis on consensus deci-sion making. This tends to water down agreements. Deliberative decision making mayresult in compromise and delay, but it also tends to produce more meaningful ru l emaking. The undemocratic nature of the Security Council is also a problem. Thenonaligned countries, it was argued, have a strong perception the Security Councildoes not re p resent all states and has no mandate to express itself on disarmament.Others countered there is a "Security Council phobia," and while it may not be appro-priate for the council to set norms, it is fine for it to write reports and be proactive.

NGOs should also play a larger role, including greater access to the Security Counciland the General Assembly. NGOs provide valuable expertise that member states donot have, and the United Nations does not have the staff to acquire expertise on itsown. In the past twenty years, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund havehad agreements with NGOs to pursue goals of mutual interest. With respect todisarmament and security issues, however, NGOs have not found a way to becomeintegrated into the UN system. A working group was to provide mechanisms forNGO access to the General Assembly, but its proposals died when countries insistedthis access should also apply to the Security Council and other UN institutions. NGOinfluence varies according to country and subject. For example, nonaligned statestend to favor NGO involvement on issues of nuclear weapons but not small armstrade. Informally, NGOs have more access to Security Council members than to theGeneral Assembly. As long as issues are not forced, the NGOs are, in general, respect-ed for their knowledge. NGOs also lobby UN missions. Unfortunately, some NGOshave become an instrument of patronage and get foreign aid; thus often they are seenas government agents. Also, many NGOs promote human rights and social issuesthat are seen as part of a globalization of Western values, and this is not welcomed.

In addition, NGOs should work with the United Nations in the creation of norms.While public interest in disarmament is low, it would be even lower in the absence ofcontinued pressure for action from NGOs. Thus, NGOs can catalyze public pressureto work toward nuclear disarmament.

The United Nations should also look to outside experts for support. The UN staff iscurrently overloaded with work. Because sunset clauses on new initiatives have beenresisted, this is likely to worsen. It may be necessary to hire outside experts either ona routine basis or for special projects. For example, there has been a proposal for aconflict prevention network. International experts would be identified in advanceand, in times of crisis, they could be brought in for extensive briefings for a shortperiod of time and then made available on-line or on-call for some time after.

21

N G O sp r ov i d ev a l u a b l ee x p e rt i s ethat m e m b e rstates don o th a v e . . . .

Conference participants heartily endorsed the idea the United Nations should issuean annual report that reviews proliferation issues and the status of disarmamente fforts. Similar to the human development report by the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), this disarmament report would be put togetherby an organization outside the United Nations, but it would be seen as an official UNdocument. If written outside the United Nations, the report could be more critical ofmember states and would not depend upon the agreement of member states for itspublication. Even if the report were sanitized, the process of getting governments totalk together about these issues would be invaluable. The task of writing the reportwould be given to a full-time editor in charge of a team. Some people would write thesame sections every year, but there would also be an overall theme that would changeeach year. Participants favored hiring an outside team because UN agencies wouldlikely resent the additional workload and may consider it an interference in theirstatutory relationship with the Security Council. The key is for the report to be wellresearched and balanced, otherwise it will not be seen as legitimate.

Finally, participants acknowledged that funding is a big part of the effectiveness ofany organization. The United Nations and international organizations typically donot have a lot of resources. Therefore, they are especially vulnerable to cuts in fund-ing, such as the refusal by the United States to pay its UN dues. If given more money,the United Nations and its organizations could hire additional staff. Or it could devel-op mechanisms for contracting with outside suppliers. Telecommunications anddistance interactions should also be leveraged, and additional resources would alsobe useful for increasing outreach activities including educating diplomats and theirstaffs about disarmament issues. Comparing the US defense budget to funding formany international organizations, one participant suggested that not only does ithave the money but the US defense department has an interest in questions ofdisarmament, and perhaps it should fund some studies on its own.

Improving VerificationTurning to verification, participants referenced a number of international treaties thatprovide for verification of arms control and nonproliferation commitments. As oneparticipant pointed out, however, "If you were disappointed by these activities, youwent into them misinformed." Verification agreements have never promised free andopen access because they must balance issues of sovereignty with intrusiveness. Nordo they build trust because they are based upon the idea that you do not cheat, butothers might. This is especially true of the US attitude. Verification also requiressustained financial support to be effective. For these reasons, nations have construct-ed an imperfect verification regime, and it is unrealistic to expect this regime tosuddenly work perfectly when, for example, it is applied to Iraq. Because of the waythe system is constructed, we have to settle for "greater information" rather thanperfect knowledge. Participants were reminded, however, that verification need notbe one hundred percent effective to be useful. Because of the chance that you mightbe caught cheating, verification performs a valuable deterrent function. Finally, mem-bers of any verification effort also have to resist the temptation to use internationalmonitoring and verification processes for their own domestic intelligence gathering.The US use of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) as a tool for

22

...nations have

constructed an imperfect

v e r i f i c a t i o nr e g i m e . . . .

spying put the mission’s credibility in jeopardy permanently. Further, UNSCOM wasa victim of events in New York and Washington. The new body created to monitorIraq has not yet been so politicized.

The IAEA’s track record on verification is very good, and this is due to its wider polit-ical context. About fifteen years ago, the United States tried to give intelligenceinformation to the IAEA, but this was rejected. Today IAEA does receive intelligencefrom states, but it is prohibited from providing information in return. Currently,IAEA needs to develop protocols for accelerating the process for state agreement ondecisions and for states to meet their funding and access commitments. There hasbeen talk of bolstering these and other international monitoring organizations withad hoc mechanisms. The United States, however, feels these organizations wouldwork better if placed outside of the United Nations. Another option, proposed by theFrench, is to have an international satellite-monitoring agency to increase confidencein verification.

Besides verification, another key component to any nonproliferation regime iscompliance. What happens when you detect violations? In general, the internationalorganizations that deal with arms control do quite well in dealing with minor non-compliance issues. What happens, however, when a major violation is detected? Isthe international community prepared to take tough action? For example, there is adistaste for sanctions, as witnessed with respect to Iraq. But other than removingsanctions, the United Nations does not have many rewards for good behavior.

Legal Versus Voluntary Regimes Conference participants also discussed the merits of legal versus voluntary regimessuch as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group.These are groups of like-minded countries that voluntarily engage in agreements forlimited purposes. For example, the MTCR is an agreement between a group ofsupplier countries with ballistic missile technology who have argued not to exportmissiles, components, or know-how. These agreements, by and large, work well fortheir specific purposes, but they have not solved the larger problem of proliferation.Furthermore, today’s proliferation problem is due more to the development ofindigenous capabilities than to the sales of specific components between states. Butvoluntary regimes might be useful in the case of some agreements, like control offissile materials. If international organizations are unable to agree, then like-mindedstates can conduct their own agreements separately. Of course, this means the verystates you are trying to draw into your agreement are then left outside.

Participants briefly discussed the idea of criminalizing work on biological and chem-ical weapons. Individuals could then be prosecuted for work on these programs, ascould the political leaders who authorized the work. Because these weapons are acrime against humanity, work on them should be treated as such. Participants didnot, however, discuss extending this effort to nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

Most conference participants were in general agreement that the process of disarma-ment is stalled, and the number one cause of this roadblock is the United States.

23

To d a y ’s p r o l i f e r a t i o nproblem isdue more to the d e v e l o p-ment of i n d i g e n o u sc a p a b i l i-t i e s . . . .

24

Increasing tendencies toward exceptionalism and unilateral action by the UnitedStates have reduced the effectiveness of multilateral organizations. This is reinforcedby the rhetoric US leaders use in general, and particularly in the case of NMD. Mostimportantly, the United States and the four other major NWS have been slow to abideby their commitments to pursue disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. This hascreated a crisis of confidence among other states; it has encouraged potential prolif-erants and discouraged those who thought they were negotiating for disarmament ingood faith.

The most well-received suggestions for breaking this impasse involved using the moralauthority of the current secretary-general at the upcoming NPT Review Conference toobtain an unequivocal commitment to disarmament from all states. To encouragep ro g ress toward disarmament, the United Nations should sponsor an annual re p o r tthat analyses pro g ress toward disarmament by states with nuclear weapons andp rograms to build them. Furthermore, NGOs should assist the United Nations byp roviding expertise and work with the United Nations to build public opinion.

Rather than insist on complete disarmament, the United Nations should work towardintermediate goals, including FMCT and CTBT, and should begin serious negotiationsfor the control of biological and chemical weapons. It should also encourage and assistthe United States and Russia in reaching an agreement on STA RT III.

Although conference participants seemed to agree the NWS could safely and easilyreduce their arsenals to a few hundred weapons, they were not in agreement aboutwhether the abolition of nuclear weapons was possible or desirable. Furthermore,although most participants lamented NMD as technologically unfeasible, strategical-ly unnecessary, and quite possibly leading to increases in nuclear weapons, mostthought that it was inevitable that the United States would deploy a system.

Chairman’s Observations

Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are back on the international agenda, andproperly so. After a decade of comparative inattention, the international communityis awakening to the fact that the disarmament process is stalled and proliferation iscontinuing. Nuclear risks are increasing, and the urgency of reinvigorating progressto reduce them is compelling.

Participants at this conference, while differing on matters of priority and progress,displayed a strong consensus that the nuclear arms control regime should be main-tained and strengthened. In addition, there should be sharp and continuing reduc-tions in nuclear weapons and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states should behalted and ultimately reversed. Finally, nuclear weapon states and nonnuclearweapon states should collaborate to improve rather than erode the regime, therebymaking it more robust and effective.

Debate over whether the ultimate goal should be sharp reductions in the number ofnuclear weapons or complete nuclear disarmament is diversionary at this stage of theprocess. No matter how the goal is defined, the first step is to reduce the number ofweapons into the hundreds. Once that goal has been approached, the feasibility ofgoing to zero can be more reasonably evaluated. However, as we approach zero, anyinadequacies in verification and mutual confidence become more critical, as do thedefinition and coordination of steps in the process. We should undertake the sharpreductions that are possible and manageable now and then press on the issuesinvolved in total elimination.

With this in mind, priority should be given to ratification and implementation ofSTART II, followed by reductions in the number of weapons held by Russia and theUnited States through a new beginning in START III. Furthermore, nuclear armsreduction discussions should be extended to include tactical weapons and expandedto include other interested nuclear weapon states. Finally, multilateral energy is need-ed to extend and expand the nuclear arms control regime.

Conference participants also endorsed the production of an annual report on disar-mament and nonproliferation, similar in concept to the Human Development Report,which is published by the United Nations Development Programme. This reportshould be extended to include all weapons of mass destruction and, eventually,include conventional weapons as well. The report should also focus world attentionon disarmament issues, encourage progress, and foster rethinking of national securi-ty policies toward recognition that nuclear weapons are more of a threat to peace thana source of security. The United Nations should implement such a report, find an ableindependent party to produce it, and seek outside funding for it as needed.

With respect to the US National Missile Defense program, any plan for nuclear mis-sile defense systems should be approached very cautiously. Unilateral actions risktoppling the painstakingly developed nuclear arms control regime and inciting arenewed nuclear arms race.

It is past time for renewed attention and energy toward nuclear disarmament andnonproliferation. Let us hope that the awakened awareness displayed at this confer-ence will be translated into meaningful action.

25

. . . t h en u c l e a rarms c o n t r o lr e g i m eshould bem a i n t a i n e da n ds t r e n g t h-e n e d .

26

The Stanley FoundationThe Stanley Foundation, a private operating foundation, seeks a secure peace withfreedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. Thefoundation advances this vision by creating opportunities to improve internationalunderstanding through media and educational programs and through forumsencouraging open dialogue among policy professionals, educators, students, andcitizens interested in world affairs.

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