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newsletter10

Number 10 • February1998 RE L I E F A N D RE H A B I L I T A T I O N NE T W O R K

RRN

All RRN materials are published in French and English.

In this issue...

ISSN: 1353 8713

© Overseas Development Institute, 1998.

Articles .............................. 3

Sierra Leone: an attack onhumanitarianism ......................... 3Conflict resolution training inanother culture: lessons fromAngola ........................................ 5Challenges to humanitarianagencies in the field .................... 7The recruitment of emergencypersonnel: different agencyperspectives ................................ 9

News ............................... 11

Policy & practice: developmentsaround aid agency security ........11Assistance strategy for Afghanistan:UN ‘business as usual’? ............. 13The Ottawa Convention & theNobel Prize: two victories in thefight against landmines.............. 15The European Platform on ConflictPrevention and Transformation.. 16Project for a humanitariansecurity network ........................ 17The SPHERE Project .................. 18

Regional focus .................... 23

Training courses ............... 28

Conferences ..................... 30

Publications ..................... 34

Humanitarianism isincreasingly under threat.This was the conclusion of

two recent meetings held in London(February 1998), which will formthe backdrop to a forthcoming RRNNetwork Paper (no. 25), due out inMay 1998, and Paris (October1997), reported by Action Contre laFaim, France, in this Newsletter (seepage 30).

The threat seems to be twofold. TheParis meeting, organised by ActionAgainst Hunger, examined thechallenges to aid agencies ofworking in conflict zones, wherefood is increasingly being used as aweapon of war and where thepolitical climate of sanctions andparallel economies combine tocreate disasters and jeopardise theevolution of effective reliefoperations. In these contexts, aidagencies face profound dilemmas.Can they continue to respect theprinciples enshrined in the GenevaConventions and human rights lawor is it inevitable that they will bemanipulated by warring parties? Inthe face of abuse and belligerenceshould agencies withdraw or simplybe pragmatic and do what they can,perhaps in a more coordinated way?

The second meeting, organised bythe UK Disasters EmergencyCommittee, took a slightly differentperspective. It sought to respond tothe attack on humanitarian valuesand principles not only by warringparties, but the growing critiqueemerging from the western media,African governments, and parts ofthe development and foreign policy

community in donor countries.Those present at the meeting werenot uncritical of the state of theexisting international relief system,but argued that the values andprinciples it strove for werefundamental and should beprotected. A principal conclusionemerging from the debate was thatthe humanitarian community iscurrently being used as thescapegoat for wider failings ofnational governments andinternational political bodies, andthat NGOs and others should bemore pro-active in defining thevalues for which it stands.

That these two meetings should takeplace in such a short space of timeis no coincidence. The sense offrustration felt is now palpablewithin sections of the humanitariancommunity following successivedebacles in Zaire, continuingtragedy in Sudan, Afghanistan,Somalia, and the latest political andhumanitarian confusion in SierraLeone, to name but a few. In thecoming months, it will be interestingto see whether by articulating moreclearly common concerns regardingthe future of humanitarian action inwartime, relief agencies will be ableto mount a stronger defence of theirvalues and enhance the coherence oftheir political advocacy.

There is still time to returnyour completed questionnaire

before the 29th March.Please take the time to fill it in

– your views make adifference.

An additional copy is enclosedwith this mailing.

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http://www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/website

Regional InitiativePhilippa Atkinson, the RRN’s part-time Regional Representative for West Africa, has recently spent two weekspromoting the work of the RRN in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. Newsletters have been widely distributedand the feedback seems positive: those who are already RRN readers find our publications highly interestingand informative and many are interested in joining – if only they would complete and return their registrationforms! Philippa concentrated particularly on encouraging members to contribute to RRN publications throughcomment and feedback and particularly by writing up their experiences for potential inclusion in the Newsletter.Philippa is the author of this edition’s article on Sierra Leone (see article opposite) and of the Liberian RegionalUpdate (on page 25). Should you wish to comment on these, or other aspects of the RRN’s regional work,please contact Philippa via the RRN at rrn@odi.org.uk or directly on p-atkinson@msn.com.

RE L I E F A N D RE H A B I L I T A T I O N N E T W O R K

RRN Network Paper No. 24 ISBN: 0-85003-368-3

‘Reproductive health for displaced populations’ by Celia Palmer

The provision of reproductive health (RH) services by humanitarian agencies to displaced populations isrelatively new. Until recently, the needs of displaced people in emergency settings were often ignored. Duringthe eighties, attempts were made to address the problem, and in the last few years increasing attention hasbeen paid to these needs in emergency contexts. In particular, recognition of the major threat posed by STDsand AIDS and growing media attention to sexual violence among displaced populations has highlighted theimportance of the RH agenda in emergency settings. Alongside changes in RH provision in stable settings,the move to implement RH services for displaced populations was accelerated after the International Conferenceon Population and Development in 1994. The Conference set reproductive health within a rights frameworkand highlighted the needs of displaced populations.

However, despite the increased recognition of RH concerns in emergencies, in reality the agenda has proveddifficult to implement. Some aspects raise ethical and moral concerns to which humanitarian agencies havedifferent attitudes. Bilateral agencies, non-governmental organisations and donors are grappling with difficultdecisions as to what services they should provide and how to ensure services are safe and effective. This isalso happening in stable settings. In the absence of good data on both the needs and impact of RH serviceprovision in emergencies, much of the emphasis on safe provision falls to the judgement of field-basedpractitioners, with important implications for training and appropriate resourcing at that level. In this paperavailable information about reproductive health among displaced populations is presented. Policies of anumber of actors are also described and examples of current RH programmes and the issues facing thoseattempting to implement them are explored.

Abstracts

The RRN website has recently been updated and improved:now available on-line are back copies of all our Newsletters. We have also increased the

number of newsletter articles that are available.

We will continue to work to improve our website and if you have any suggestions that youwould like to make in order to assist us in this task, please contact the RRN Coordinator, or

tell us your thoughts via the ‘feedback’ page on the website.

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articles

ArticlesSierra Leone:an attack onhumanitarianismby Philippa Atkinson, RRN’s part-timeRegional Representative for West Africa

Western policy makers are ostensiblyincreasingly committed to intervening inAfrican conflicts in a responsible and ethical

manner. The protection and support of democratic andother human rights have become, at least in terms ofrhetoric, the main objective of much foreign and aidpolicy, particularly in non-strategic areas. This has beendemonstrated in Sierra Leone where the internationalcommunity has acted in concert in orderto promote the restoration of thedemocratically elected government,deposed in a coup last May. Thecomplexities of the situation have,however, provided a serious challengeto the implementation of these newprotection-oriented policies. The internationalcommunity has found itself facing a real moral dilemmain Sierra Leone, concerning the efficacy of includinghumanitarian aid in a general embargo against theillegitimate junta. Aid agencies are worried that politicalconsiderations have been allowed to override thehumanitarian needs of the civilian population and arenow calling for an examination of the justification forthe policy and a reaffirmation of basic humanitarianvalues.

Direct intervention in the conflict was delegated toECOWAS, the regional grouping of West African states,and has been focused on an embargo against the juntawhich took power following the coup. Military actionled by the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG was attemptedearly on without success, although the recent offensivemay finally achieve the desired result ofdislodging the junta. Efforts atnegotiations between the parties have sofar produced only the ineffectualConakry Accords, and for six months theembargo has been the weapon of choice.

UN authorisation of the sanctions was sought, and theSecurity Council approved a limited version on arms,fuel and travel by members of the junta. ECOMOG have,however, enforced an embargo on all goods enteringthe country, by sea at least, and the civilian militias onthe ground have attempted to limit the passage of goodsinternally.

In practice, humanitarian aid became part of thesanctions. The cancellation by DfID of the majority ofits funding to British NGOs, the restriction of UNoperations by a top security rating, and the holding upof cross-border deliveries of relief goods due to‘administrative’ difficulties, demonstrate the unitedstance of the international community on this issue. Theinclusion of relief goods in the general embargo is thuswidely perceived as a deliberate component of theattempt to dislodge the junta. While it violates both theUN resolution as well as international law more

generally, this de facto embargo has beenjustified on the arguable grounds thatfood aid in particular could have animportant impact on the conflict throughstrengthening the control or morale ofthe junta.

This view derives from analyses of other conflictsituations including Liberia and Rwanda, where reliefaid has been shown to have fuelled conflict by providingpolitical and economic resources to factions. Criticismof earlier failed interventions as prioritisinghumanitarian concerns to make up for lack of politicalefforts, is also offered as justification for the policychoice in Sierra Leone, which appears as a completereversal of earlier trends towards militarisedhumanitarianism, as seen in Bosnia, Somalia andNorthern Iraq. Agencies are worried that lessons learnedfrom other operations are being misinterpreted to suggestthat there are problems inherent in humanitarianism,rather than in its implementation and in the coherenceof other policy objectives. The short-sightedness of thehumanitarian embargo, which may serve to underminelonger-term work focused on tackling the roots of the

conflict, is a further contentious issue.

The humanitarian community involvedin Sierra Leone has attempted to addressthe concerns of funders and diplomats.A guiding protocol for humanitarianoperations has been developed covering

...the internationalcommunity has found

itself facing a real moraldilemma in Sierra Leone.

Political considerationshave been allowed to

override thehumanitarian needs ofthe civilian population.

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both principles and operations. Shared informationsystems, good technical and operational coordination,and relatively ‘smart’ and innovative programming, inpart propelled by the high levels of local involvementin relief work, have all contributed to a potentially modelhumanitarian community. The neutralityof the purely humanitarian agenda of theagencies involved in Sierra Leone isunquestioned. Although it is difficult foragencies to provide actual guarantees asto the safety of their resources in such avolatile situation, it has been shownelsewhere that abuse of aid by warringfactions can be minimised throughcareful and coordinated programming. Policies tried inLiberia such as restricting capital inputs and bulk foodaid can be effective, and techniques to deal with factionson the ground have been developed in many countries.

Thus it is by no means certain that careful and neutralhumanitarianism would have any major negative impacton the dynamics of the conflict, in terms of feeding thesoldiers or legitimising the junta. Some observers believethat restricting the flow of resources itself contributesto the power of those in control, and embargoes havenot been shown in other cases to be effective in topplingillegitimate regimes. Whatever the practical impact ofthe policy, however, the basic issue at stake is thecalculated denial of the rights of civilians in Sierra Leoneto receive humanitarian assistance. As the embargo hascontinued, conditions inside the country, even in areasaccessible to remaining NGOs and assessment missions,have visibly deteriorated, with signs that even theresilient Sierra Leoneans may be reaching breakingpoint. The deadlock over the embargo begs the questionas to whether there is some point of trade-off that mightbe reached, where the suffering of the civilian populationwould outweigh the political benefits of includinghumanitarian aid in the embargo against the junta.

Some agencies have attempted to lobby donors, withNGOs, UNICEF and WFP making public statementsand representations, and continuing to work with limitedfunding and in-country resources. Following the recentECOMOG and kamajor offensive and the intensifyingemergency, agencies have released joint statementscalling for immediate clearance for cross-borderdeliveries to be allowed to enter the country. Effectiveconcerted action to promote the humanitarian agendahas however been constrained by institutional factors.The policy appears to have been sustained by a

combination of diplomatic activity involving the UN inNew York, and British and US diplomats. The directprecedence over UNDHA by UNDP, where deposedPresident Kabbah spent much of his career, at both fieldlevel and in New York, has effectively prevented DHA

from playing a role as an advocate forhumanitarianism. NGOs have beenlimited in their lobbying of DfID by theirgeneral reliance on the department forfunding, and by the perceived lack oftransparency, or willingness of thegovernment to enter into dialogue on thisissue.

The fundamental basis ofhumanitarianism, the rights of those in need to receivehelp regardless of political factors, as enshrined in theGeneva Conventions, appears to be under attack in SierraLeone, and must be defended by those in thehumanitarian field. As this article goes to press, thepolicy is in the balance. As ECOMOG and the civilmilitias gain control of Freetown and areas upcountry,deliveries of food and other relief goods are likely to beresumed. Agencies are worried that this will reinforcethe precedent already set, of making relief conditionalon political factors, and thus further undermine theirindependence from the donors. As well as lobbyingvigorously for the separation of humanitarian aid frompolitical agendas, agencies, both NGO and UN, mustpush for an examination of the impact of the policy,and of policy-makers’ justifications, in order to avoidthe setting of a dangerous precedent.

It is by no means certainthat careful and neutralhumanitarianism wouldhave any major negativeimpact on the dynamics

of the conflict.

Conflict resolutiontraining in anotherculture: lessons fromAngolaby David Brubaker of Conflict ManagementServices, and Tara Verdonk, programmecoordinator for the Michigan SupremeCourt.

The setting

The November 1994 signing of the LusakaProtocol began a long and tortuous peaceprocess that continues today. Significant progress

was made in April of 1997 when a government ofnational reconciliation and unity was formed aftermonths of delay. Thousands of UNITA troops have now

...the rights of those in need to receive helpregardless of political factors appear to be under

attack in Sierra Leone...

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articles

been quartered and weapons turned in. The nationalarmed forces now include over 10,000 former UNITAtroops. Peace, however, still remains elusive. Large-scale fighting has stopped, but fear, mistrust, and thespread of rumours prevent the free movement of goodsand people. Physically and emotionally, Angola remainsa deeply divided nation.

In January 1997, the Centre for Common Ground (CCG),the Angola office of Search for Common Ground, beganto organise two consecutive week-long introductoryconflict resolution training sessions to take place in June.The goal of these sessions was to initiate thedevelopment of a network of Angolan mediators andtrainers, that would eventually implement their ownreconciliation projects.

Getting political agreement

One seminar was to be held in the capital, Luanda, andone in the relatively stable province of Kwanza Sul,where CCG had made some exploratory visits. In March1997, CCG held a planning meeting for potential Luandaparticipants. Sixteen people attended, fourteen of whomwent on to participate in the training. During the meeting,CCG discussed topics to be included in the sessions,gathered feedback from the participants on theirexpectations, and collected ideas for role plays and otherexercises. CCG also showed a video it had co-producedabout building bridges2. One of theparticipants associated with UNITAmade some statements about UNITA’sportrayal in parts of the video and a fewdays later CCG received a visit from twoparticipants from the CommunicationsDepartment of Luanda’s provincialgovernment. Enthusiastic about the training, they wereconcerned about its ‘political nature’ because of theinclusion of ‘vocal’ participants from UNITA. CCG staffexplained that in order to conduct meaningful trainingabout conflict and reconciliation, several viewpointswould have to be included. Organisers highlighted theopportunity to discuss sensitive issues in a diverse group,allowing participants to use the skills they were learningand the government officials seemed satisfied, returningin June to participate in the training.

There were two significant difficulties with therecruitment of participants in Kwanza Sul; the firstinvolved recruitment of female participants and thesecond was in obtaining permission from UNITA for

...there could be nosuspicion that we wereundertaking anything

subversive...

‘We can de-mine ourland, but it is even more

important to de-mineour minds’1.

participants from areas under their control to travel tothe government-held provincial capital of Sumbe toattend the training. Most of the organisations sent malerepresentatives and in the end only three femalesparticipated. In contrast, the gender breakdown wasalmost even in Luanda, where women are more activein NGOs and public life than in the provinces. Althoughin Luanda several members of UNITA live and work inthe national government or with the peace process andpermission to travel was not an issue, several meetingswith UNITA officials in Luanda had to occur in orderto convince them of the value of the training in Sumbeand the value of them attending. Despite last minuteefforts to convince the UNITA leadership in Quibala toattend, the Sumbe training went ahead without UNITArepresentation.

The sensitive nature of relations between the two sidesin Angola dictated that CCG be in constant contact withofficials from both sides and the UN about its actions.There could be no suspicion that we were undertakinganything subversive or we would risk ruining ourchances of holding the training and carrying out otheractivities. CCG carefully explained training plans andother project ideas to appropriate officials before takingaction. CCG also informed UN officials in the provinceto alert them to the possibility of travel by UNITAparticipants, and to ask them for possible assistance withsecurity.

Learning in and from the training course

The Luanda session attracted 35 participants and theone in Sumbe 26 participants. One of the themes

addressed was the difference betweenconflict and violence and, given the 30-year history of violence in the area,understandably some participants didnot immediately make a distinctionbetween the two. The participants wereasked to design two scenes, onerepresenting conflict and the second

violence, which then became the object of groupdiscussion. This led to a consensus about the importanceof dealing with conflict before it escalates into violence.

A more difficult discussion for both groups, butespecially for the Kwanza Sul participants who werecloser to the fighting, was that of forgiveness andreconciliation. One participant asked pointedly if thetrainers’ agenda was to force forgiveness on Angolans.The trainers responded that their aim was to seekclarification of what the terms meant to the participantsbefore using them during the week. After discussion,the participants seemed to agree that to forgive does notmean to forget, and that reconciliation is a processrequiring at least two willing parties.

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Participants were also asked to practise cooperativecommunication through a group discussion of ‘the roleof women in Angolan society’. Before giving theiropinion on the subject, each speaker had to summarisethe opinion of the previous one. Participants performedwell in the paraphrasingexercise, particularly given theimpressive diversity of views.

A prejudice reduction exercisewas conducted by identifying thefour major ethnic groupsrepresented by participants, andasking those not of a given ethnicgroup to identify ‘preconceitos’(prejudices) they had (or hadheard expressed) about a group.For the sake of equity the trainersadded ‘Americans’ as a group tothe exercise. Each list ofprejudices for the five groupsfilled a large flipchart (newsprintsheet), and were predominantlynegative. The concludingsuggestions for ‘reducingprejudices’ were excellent inboth sessions.

One of the most interesting discussionswas around Angolan models of conflictresolution. Despite their urban status, theLuanda group included manyparticipants who clearly remembertraditional models and shared themeagerly, resulting in an outline of steps in the traditionaldispute-handling mechanism and of specific componentsof a decision-making process. Two importantcomponents identified were ritual and the significanceof elders. The first emerged from a mediationdemonstration in Luanda, where participants added the‘porta-voz do sobra’ (chief’s spokesperson) whobasically cared for protocol during the process, whilethe second arose spontaneously in Sumbe, as themediators decided to consult with the village elders afterreaching an impasse in the role play mediation session.Such a ‘mediation/fact-finding’ process would beunorthodox in western models (at least for the mediatorsto fill both roles) but was deemed appropriate andnecessary by participants in Sumbe. The Angolan modelhad fascinating parallels with the classic five-stepwestern mediation model – the introduction, story-telling, issue-identification, problem-solving andagreement stages. Various outlines were presented bythe Angolan participants, but the basic five-step processto resolve interpersonal conflict in a rural communityconsisted of dialogue, mediation by the parents,mediation/arbitration by e.g. maternal uncles or the

village chief, fines, forgiveness and reconciliation orpunishment. The village chief would be the first tointervene as decision-maker where informal and neutralmediation had failed. Where one party had wrongedanother, a fine could be imposed by the chief and only

if the offending party refused topay the fine would punishmentbe imposed. Eliciting knowledgearound conflict resolutionpractices and processes releasedgreater energy and creativityfrom participants than manyother learning exercises.

Follow-up

The sessions were followed upwith a number of activities,while gradually also beingextended to new participants.The training was quicklysucceeded by two-day seminarson consensus-building andparticipants were laterinterviewed about how they hadbeen able to apply their newskills. The report summarising

these interviews contains ideas for futureprojects and training seminars, such asadvanced mediation training, training oftrainers and a seminar on developingpeace education projects. One specificoutcome is an Angolan manual onconflict resolution which is now being

drafted under the leadership of a UNICEF staffer whoparticipated in the Luanda training. The manual willgather proverbs, stories, songs, and ceremonies, thatinclude themes of reconciliation and cooperation, as wellas describing the traditional mechanisms to resolveconflict. Revealingly, many books on Angolan folkloreand traditional culture were found in museums anduniversity libraries in the USA, and sent to the group inAngola.

Notes1. quote from Mulato Pedro, participant in the Luanda training2. co-produced with Ubuntu Productions of Capetown, and funded

by USAID

A longer report of the Angolan experience can beobtained from Dave Brubaker, Conflict ManagementServices, 916 N. Cameron Ave., Case Grande,Arizona 85222, USA; fax: 00 1 520 421 2134 oremail brubaker@casagrande.com. For information onSearch for Common Ground in Angola contact SCG,1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 200, WashingtonD.C. 20009, USA or email scgangola@igc.apc.org

Lessons learned

• there is no substitute for relationships– relationship-building takes time –trust and enthusiasm must be createdas a basis for successful training

•follow-up is as important aspreparation – someone must beresponsible for the continuation of thegroup.

• of the many models available for suchtraining, the most effective seemedto be a modified elicitive model – apresentation of basic Westernconcepts of negotiation, withstructured opportunities to identifyand apply conflict resolution modelsfrom local culture.

...revealingly, manybooks on Angolan

folklore and traditionalculture were found in

museums and universitylibraries in the USA...

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articles

Challenges tohumanitarianagencies in the field:considering theoptionsSylvie Brunel, Strategic Adviser with ActionContre la Faim, France, and lecturer at thePolitical Studies Institute, Paris

A recent international meeting hosted by ActionAgainst Hunger in Paris looked at someof the challenges facing humanitarian agencies

working in conflict, in particular the strategic use offamine as a weapon of war.

At this high-level meeting, a number of Action AgainstHunger’s field and HQ managers put forward their viewsalongside representatives of the UN, francophone NGOs,academics and politicians in a bid to emphasise theimportance of cooperation and joint action in respondingto the new and diverse challenges facing them in theirhumanitarian work.

Background

The crisis in the Great Lakes region has increasinglybeen used as a model to illustrate the ambiguitiesinherent in, and obstacles to humanitarian action facedby today’s aid agencies. Examples of such ambiguitiesinclude the systematic abuse of the system by Hutuextremists in the refugee camps in the former Zaire,causing Rwanda to intervene in emptying the camps andthe forcible grouping of populations in Rwanda andBurundi. Likewise, more recently humanitarian agencieshave faced major obstacles to intervention on behalf ofrefugees in the forests of Eastern Zaire; Roberto Garetton(UN Special Envoy), hindered by both Mobutu andKabila from freely carrying out his duties, commentedthat “no detailed survey on the human rights situationin the country is possible”.

A ‘new’ type of conflict

The first signs of food shortages are now well knownand humanitarian organisations have the technicalknowledge and capacity to enable them to respondappropriately and in time to an identified need. In theorytherefore, famine need no longer exist. Yet organisationscontinue to tackle such severe humanitarian crises withdisastrous consequences for the most vulnerablepopulations in Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leoneand Burundi, amongst others.

What distinguishes these countries is the continuedexistence of conflict in forms which have evolved overthe past decade, resulting in a situation where hunger isnow no longer the result of conflict but one of its tools –one of the favoured methods employed by warringfactions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, described byPhilippe Peccatier (Action Contre la Faim, France’sDirector of Communications and Development),includes the destruction of crops, the forceddisplacement of civilian populations held hostage intowns where they are unable to gain access to food, andthe widespread diversion and misappropriation ofhumanitarian aid. Worryingly, these methods seem togo unpunished and in some cases, even to meet withsome success... one of the perpetrators of such tactics inLiberia, Charles Taylor, was elected President in 1997,

with 70% of the vote. For fear of returning to civil warand famine, Liberians chose officially and‘democratically’ to re-elect him. The view expressedby the Executive Secretary of the Global Coalition forAfrica and Special Representative of the United Nationsin Burundi, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, was that “we nowlive in an age of new autocratic rulers who starve theirpeople to death with complete impunity”. On the samesubject, Jean-Christophe Rufin (Institute of Internationaland Stategic Research, IRIS) stressed that “famines arenow no longer a question of tactics, but of strategy”.

The ‘old’ type of famine, whether it was the occupationof towns and cities or the burning of land, was aimed ateliminating the enemy (a method still being used inSudan). Following the end of the Cold War, countlessfactions lost the sources of income from which they hadreaped much of their power, as well as support fromone or other superpower. These groups have since hadto look elsewhere for resources to continue to controlwhole areas or fulfill their dreams of expansion. In manyof today’s conflicts, it is now a country’s own populationwhich is taken hostage by its warlords to help themachieve their goals.

Other sources of income and power include drug-trafficking in some of the poorest parts of the world andthe ‘plundering’ of resource-rich mining or forestingregions. But it is the artificial creation of famine that isseen to be the most evil method of all. It allows factionsor even armed groups to loot the belongings of particulargroups whilst forcing them into a state of under-nutrition,which in turn arouses compassion among theinternational community and leads to an increase in thesupply of humanitarian aid. That aid is then turned to

Hunger is now no longer the result of conflictbut one of its tools.

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the agressors advantage, helping them to attain a highprofile on the international stage as they inevitablybecome the donors’ interlocutors – the first step towardsdiplomatic recognition and, consequently, new-foundlegitimacy.

Embargo

Within the context of the situation in Iraq, BernardGranjon (Honorary President of the French organisationMédecins du Monde) offered comment on the disastrouseffects of the embargo imposed on the civilianpopulation by the UN, pointing out that this embargowas all the more devastating as the dictator deliberatelymade the population suffer by refusingto implement the “oil for food”resolution.

Mario Bettati, Lecturer in InternationalLaw and often considered as the‘founder’ of the principle of intervention,also stressed the failure of the embargo– a catastrophe for the civilianpopulation, but a ‘godsend’ to the governments targetedby the embargo as well as the countless traffickers whosebusinesses flourished within the black economies createdby the embargo. One of the worst consequences of theembargo was that the Iraqi government could play thevictim and demand the lifting of sanctions whilst at thesame time strengthening its domestic legitimacy.

What should be the internationalcommunity’s response in this minefield?

The question facing all NGOs now working in thesesituations is – does their intervention and implicittolerance of such actions help legitimise criminalregimes? Their scope for action is seen as ‘walking atightrope’: bringing aid to those in need withoutdenouncing the true causes of their situation means thathumanitarian organisations unwillingly becomeaccomplices of the ‘famine-makers’, thus enabling themto continue their manipulation, yet standing up to theirexcessive demands means jeopardising the security oftheir staff or running the risk of beingexpelled from the country altogether andabandoning those they set out to assist.Jean-Luc Bodin, the new GeneralDirector of Action Contre la Faim,France, described the experience ofworking in South Sudan whereuncovering the real cause of persistent malnutrition inthe camps, despite food distributions, led to theorganisation being immediately thrown out of thecountry.

How, then, can humanitarian organisations continue tobe efficient without being manipulated by aggressors.

A number of key points emerged:

• the importance for NGOs to take a joint position, asinconsistent negotiations make any attempt at takinga firm stance virtually impossible. Although stressedby Christian Captier, Director of Operations ofAction Contre la Faim, France, many NGOs are inagreement on the same humanitarian principles –impartiality, freedom of access to victims,independence, integrity and the appropriateness ofaid to correctly assessed needs, but their jointimplementation in the field and the cohesion andcooperation of field-based humanitarian workers still

need improvement. Despite theexistence of the 1994 Code of Conduct(see RRN Network Paper 7, ODI 1994),it has not been signed by all NGOs, norcan it alone provide a satisfactoryresponse to the strategy of those whodeliberately starve their populations todeath, or even at times to the possible‘hidden’ interests of donors.

• although the right to life, and therefore the right tofood and life-saving assistance, is enshrined in ArticleI of the supplementary protocols (1977) of theGeneva Conventions as well as all the Human RightsConventions, without an international police forceresponsible for safeguarding these rights,international law remains almost meaningless in theface of malign intent on the part of certain regimesand warring factions.

• political or strategic interests also pose obstacles tothe application of the law which helps to explain thereluctance of the UN Security Council to act inresponse to clear violations of the law as in Rwanda(a view expressed by Michel Rocard (President ofthe European Parliament Commission forDevelopment) and former French Prime Minister.In this context, the creation of ‘safe havens’ inRwanda, while ostensibly providing security for thevictims, also sheltered the perpetrators of thegenocide during the French operation ‘Turquoise’.

• the need for an InternationalCriminal Tribunal, a permanent andindependent criminal court, to help toput an end to such impunity bytranslating this form of crime into law,

and minimising delays caused by the cumbersomesetting up of ad hoc Tribunals, was also discussed(see next RRN Newsletter (May 1998) for moreextensive coverage of this issue).

In the absence of such a body, and in light of currentinadequacies in the law, the commitment ofhumanitarian organisations, their duty to intervene and

“We now live in an ageof new autocratic rulerswho starve their peopleto death with complete

impunity.”

“Famines are now nolonger a question of

tactics, but of strategy.”

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articles

The recruitment ofemergencypersonnel: differentagency perspectivesby Francesca Taylor, freelance researchconsultant

Research conducted amongst a world-wide sampleof organisations involved in emergency reliefindicates that there has been, and will continue

to be, an expansion in the numbers of locally basednationals employed in emergency operations and araising of the field and management level at which theyare being recruited. However, there are significantvariations in current agency policy and practice inrelation to the employment of local staff.

Fewer expatriates and more locallyrecruited staff working in emergencies

Findings from research presented at the InteragencySeminar on Emergency Personnel in Dublin, November1997 (see RRN Newsletter 10, November 1997), suggestthat overall there has been a decline in the numbers ofpeople employed in humanitarian assistance. The

testify against human rights abuses and ‘mandate to act’are now more important than ever, even if theythemselves do not always act without fault and cannotalways deny being influenced by the deliberations oftheir own donors. As Olivier Longué, Director of AcciónContra el Hambre, Madrid, pointed out, NGOs thereforehave to ‘apply an ever stricter code of ethics to preventself-indulgence and, above all being blinded by theirown activities. This implies that they have to accept theidea that “it is not because it is some kind ofhumanitarian intervention that it is automatically a goodintervention”.

NotesAction Against Hunger is comprised of Action Contre la Faim,France , Action Against Hunger, UK, Action Against Hunger, USA,

Acción Contra el Hambre, Spain.

For more information on the Symposium hosted byAction Against Hunger, Paris, at the Sorbonne on 15thOctober 1997, please contact: Sophie Noonan, ActionAgainst Hunger, UK on +44 171 831 5858, email:aahuk@gn.apc.org or Annie Blaise, Action Contrela Faim, France on +33 1 53808842, email:ab@acf.imaginet.fr

“If we are not using southern nationals we aremissing out on most of the talent at our disposal.I wouldn’t say it’s an ideological thing, it’s more a

question of effectiveness.”

research sample was composed of NGOs, the Red Crossand government and UN agencies involved inemergency operations, the majority of which are alsoinvolved in longer-term rehabilitation and developmentwork. In 1994, over two-fifths (43%) of these agenciesemployed more than 100 people in emergency relief,but by 1996 this figure had fallen to just over a third(37%). Over the same time period, the proportion ofagencies said to employ between 26 and 100 people inemergency relief increased from a little over a fifth(22%) to above a quarter (26%). And the number ofagencies employing under 25 people remained at about35%. This decline has been most pronounced amongstexpatriate relief workers, whilst conversely the numberof relief staff recruited locally has increased. In 1994,about a quarter (26%) of agencies employed over 100expatriates in emergency relief and a third (33%)employed over 100 locally recruited staff. Theequivalent figures in 1996 were 22% and 35%respectively.

Marked variations in agency policy

Also noticeable from the data is the sharp difference inagency profile as regards recruitment of local staff. In1996, the majority of agencies (45%) employed less than10 locally recruited relief workers, but about a third oforganisations (35%) employed over 100 local staff. Thedifference in recruitment practice appears to mirrorfindings from in-depth interviews with agencyrepresentatives, which suggest that there are markedvariations in agency policy and thinking concerning theemployment of local staff. At one end of the spectrumare agencies which have put in place plans to activelyincrease the numbers of local staff they employ inemergency relief programmes or are intending to do soin the near future. However, the rationale behind theintroduction of these policies differs quite markedly. Themain reason expounded is that it enhances theeffectiveness of an organisation’s response toemergencies. There is an increasing body of qualified,knowledgeable and experienced southern-based stafflocated in the regions where disasters arise and whospeak the local languages. In many ways it is argued, itis more effective to use these personnel than to employexpatriates. Others admit that the attraction of employinggreater numbers of southern nationals is their relativecheapness. Some claim there is an ethical dimension totheir agency’s strategy on this issue, in particular that it

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“We haven’t hired Zaireans to work in Zaire,you’re just setting yourself up for problems of

neutrality and objectivity. But we have had casesof Zaireans working in Burundi. There is a

geographical distance, but there also may be anadvantage because they know Swahili, the terrain

and how to get things done.”

is a means of enhancing local capacity. A furtherargument put forward is that, given current difficultiesin recruiting appropriately skilled and availableexpatriate personnel, broadening the potential pool ofrecruits to southern-based nationals, increases thelikelihood of being able to fill all vacant posts.

Arguments against employing local staff

At the other end of the spectrum are agencies which arereluctant to employ locally recruited staff to work inemergencies. The rationale most frequently expressedto explain this view is that recruitment of southernnationals may compromise the independence of anorganisation, particularly if it is working in conflictsituations or is involved in advocacy. It is felt it canalso potentially endanger the safety of locally hired staffand others working on an emergency programme.

Most of the agencies actively recruiting southern-basednationals also share the view that employing local staffto work in their home country can sometimes pose athreat to the independence and safety of a reliefprogramme, but believe you have to be aware of thecultural context in which you are working and makesensible and sensitive individual judgements in relationto each particular programme. Many circumvent theproblem of security and neutrality by recruiting localstaff to work in projects in countries other than theirown.

An argument frequently used against employing locallyrecruited staff in country programmes other than theirown is that the process involves taking a valuable humanresource from one country and placing it somewhereelse. Consequently a country is deprived of some of itsbest-quality personnel. Some would argue that thisresource then returns to the home country at a later periodwith more knowledge and experience, but this is disputedby those who say that in practice what usually happensis that, attracted by the expatriate terms and conditions,these employees end up working for one of the largeinternational organisations such as the UN.

Role of donors

Donors are also thought to play an active role in relationto the increased locally based recruitment of reliefpersonnel. Some are said to be putting pressure onorganisations to become more actively involved in both

working with local NGOs in emergency relief andemploying more local staff. Conversely, others have apolicy of only funding expatriates from their owncountry in order to ensure they effectively monitor howa programme is being run and funding spent, or to benefitfrom the good PR attached to their nationals beinginvolved in a relief programme.

Problems experienced where expatriatesreport to local staff

Nonetheless, it is apparent that those agenciesincreasingly employing locally recruited staff are also,for many of the same reasons, more frequently recruitingthese staff to higher-level positions includingmanagement roles. This has usually been done bytransferring a local manager to run a relief project outsidetheir home country, in order not to restrict theirindependence and modus operandi. Unfortunately, someagencies claim that they have had problems in situationswhere expatriates report to locally recruited managers.The expatriates appear to have been unable or ill-prepared to accept their own position and workconstructively in this context.

The implication is that there should be improvementsto pre-departure training within agencies employingmore locally recruited staff in management positions.In particular, it is felt more could be done tomultinationalise and multiculturalise training throughinvolving both northern- and southern-recruited stafftogether in training programmes.

Emergency Personnel Seminar initiatives

The potential for interagency collaboration in terms ofthe recruitment and training of local staff was one ofthe issues explored by participants at the InteragencySeminar on Emergency Personnel. Several speakersdescribed policies and mechanisms currently beingintroduced within their agencies to increase the level ofNorth/South collaboration between themselves and

“In my opinion we will have to work more andmore with national staff. The reality today iseconomics. It’s very much cheaper to employ

national staff. This is the reality forsimilar results.”

“In Bosnia, when they hear you are a local, theywant to know whether you are a Serb or Croat or

Bosnian or Muslim. So then you arepart of the conflict.”

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partner organisations. Some agencies have alreadyestablished a global pool of relief workers, for exampleRedR in association with CARE Atlanta, Oxfam UKand UNICEF Kenya, with communication betweenworld-wide members being facilitated by the web.Possible means to establish common terms andconditions for the employment of local staff and torecruit local staff to more senior management positionswere also discussed. These issues will be consideredfurther within the four working groups set up to takeforward a range of collaborative initiatives arising fromthe Seminar.

For more information, please contact FrancescaTaylor, Research Consultant, 34 Parkville Road,Fulham, London SW6 7BX tel: + 44 171 3853047fax: +44 171 6102771, email: taysol@aol.com.

To obtain a copy of the report or for details of any ofthe four working groups set up following the Seminar,dealing with training, common registers, health staffand general collaboration issues, please contact BobbyLambert, Director, RedR, 1 Gt George St, LondonSW1P 3AA. tel: +44 171 2333116, fax: +44 1712220564, email: bobby@redr.demon.co.uk

NewsPolicy and practice:developments aroundaid agency security

Over the last few years a number of aid workersand human rights monitors have been killed orkidnapped during the course of their work – we

call to mind the death of an agency staff member in ahostage release action in Tajikistan in late 1997, andthe abduction of the UNHCR representative in NorthOssetia in late January 1998. The feeling that aidagencies are increasingly becoming a target is puttingthe security of aid personnel high on the agenda.

Statistics available from both the ICRC and the UNindicate a serious increase since the early nineties in thenumber of incidents in which the physical integrity ofaid personnel is threatened. The highest number offatalities among UN staff has been among nationalrecruits, but internationally recruited staff is at greater(statistical) risk of being kidnapped. Importantly, theICRC analysis of security incidents reveals an increaseto some 50% in the number of incidents that areinterpreted as crime and banditry.

Simultaneously a number of aid agencies are facing courtcases with claims for compensation from maimedpersonnel or the relatives of deceased aid workers. Somehave denied responsibility on the grounds that aidworkers failed to follow security guidelines. Where warinsurance cover had been taken out, it often transpiredthat the cover was inadequate (see RRN Newsletter 7).

There remains a tendency among many aid agencymanagers to deny the reality of security risks. Classified

explicitly as ‘tragic incidents’ or implicitly as an‘occupational hazard’, no questions are raised about howprofessionally the agency manages security, and to whatdegree the agency itself may have contributed to threatsarising or their impact being more tragic than shouldhave been the case. Many security guidelines on theground remain deficient (see RRN Newsletter 7). Moresecurity manuals for aid agencies are being produced,but a common weakness remains the inability to analysethreats and to develop a combination of security-enhancing strategies that are an appropriate response todifferent types of threat. Some aid agencies have soughthelp and advice from ex-military personnel, usually withrather mixed results. In the USA, for example, there hasbeen a strong interest from the military in puttingthemselves forward as ‘security experts’. One of thechallenges is to consider different security-enhancingstrategies and to produce from them a propermanagement tool. Essentially these challenges are:removing or reducing the threat by gaining increasedacceptance; reducing the vulnerability of the aid agencywith protective devices and protective procedures, ordeterring the threat with a counterthreat, i.e. the use ofarmed protection by or for aid agencies.

The question of armed protection and of the role of UNpeace-support troops in that regard remains controversialand in need of policy clarification. The Red Crossmovement has been clarifying the conditions andpurposes for which armed protection may be necessary(crime and banditry). The movement remains very wearyhowever of ‘military humanitarianism’, an association

...the highest number of fatalities among UN staffhave been national recruits, but internationally

recruited staff are at greater (statistical) riskof being kidnapped...

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it sees in the long run as increasing rather than decreasingrisk. The UN also recognises that armed protection maybe required. There is a tendency to use private securityservice companies which provide armed guards andwhich are fully insured and properly licensed. Thissolution conforms with a global trend towards aprivatisation of violence.

Awareness raising and policy development

The security of aid personnel was one prominent themeat the June 1997 ‘Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum’ thatwas organised by the ICRC and that brought togethersenior humanitarian and political players1. In December1997, the ICRC in Geneva also organised a one-dayseminar on security for NGOs. The Swiss governmentin January 1998 convened the first Periodical Meetingof States Party to the Geneva Conventions on the GeneralProblems of the Application of InternationalHumanitarian Law, which brought together 133 Statesand 36 observers. One of the two general topicsconcerned the respect for and protection of the personnelof humanitarian organisations2. The meeting mainlyincreased awareness of the problem and the Statesgenerally insisted on the conduct expected ofhumanitarian personnel. For their own protection, it wasnecessary for them to adhere to the principles ofhumanitarian action and, particularly, to the Code ofConduct of the Red Cross Movement and InternationalNGOs (see RRN Network Paper 7). An option thatreceived marked support was to have organisationscomply with certain criteria in respect of ethics andindeed efficiency, to make public financing subject toadherence to the Code, and even to establish a systemof accreditation for the organisations. Also emphasisedwas the need for greater coordination, not only betweenhumanitarian agencies, but above all betweenhumanitarian and political organisations, such as the UNSecurity Council. On the other hand, some delegationsstressed the primary responsibility of the States inensuring the protection of humanitarian aid personnel.A number of cases exist where the whereabouts ofsuspected murderers of aid personnel are known, yet noaction appears to be taken (see RRN Newsletter 9).

Following an informal consultation with some agencyrepresentatives (see RRN Newsletter 8), ECHO hasdeveloped a working document ‘Security of ReliefWorkers and Humanitarian Space’. This will serve as abackground to a communication3 from the Commissionto the Development Council of the EU. ECHO, jointlywith the ICRC, are also organising a conference inLisbon in March on ‘Humanitarian Action: Perceptionand Security’. The conference will considerhumanitarian action in relation to modern warfare,political factors and the media, but also the principlesof humanitarian action and the issue of armed protection.

Information collection and analysis

There are currently no statistics available showingsecurity incidents affecting NGOs, and NGOs generallyappear slow in responding to altered working conditionson the ground. In the USA, a number of concerned aidworkers have started the International Committee forthe Protection of Aid Workers (ICPAW, see RRNNewsletter 9), while in Europe a few NGOs are taking asimilar initiative under the umbrella of VOICE (seearticle on page 17). This should provide an opportunityfor lesson learning from incident analysis. Either willhave to make a strategic decision whether or not toengage in public advocacy over recent security incidents.

Legal protection

Two major instruments for the legal protection ofhumanitarian personnel are the Geneva Conventions andthe UN Convention on the Safety of UN and AssociatedPersonnel. A debate exists as to whether attacks onhumanitarian personnel could be considered as warcrimes or grave breaches of international humanitarianlaw, and whether they therefore come under the remitof the International Criminal Tribunal. A diplomaticconference is scheduled in Rome between 15 June and16 July 1998 to agree on the status of such tribunal.

Institutionalising responsibility

A number of aid agencies have clarified their securitymanagement structure, and build-up capacity. Both theICRC and the UN leave most of the security managementto the country delegation, but also have a dedicatedcapacity at headquarters. For the UN as a whole, this isthe office of the Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD)in New York – both have recently strengthened theircapacity. Other agencies, such as the InternationalFederation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent andUNHCR, also have dedicated security officers. Thepicture among NGOs is mixed, but generally, few appearto have staff dedicated full-time to security.

Training

However, a more professional management of securityrequires training, skill development, drill and staffdiscipline. This remains an area in need of strengthening.UNHCR is the UN agency with most staff in dangeroussituations. The agency is running training courses, butprobably not fast enough to cover its many staff withina reasonable time span. RedR in the UK has been offeringtwo-day training courses on security and communicationfor almost two years now. In January 1998, InterAction,the umbrella organisation of US PVOs, with OFDAsupport, ran a pilot course for NGOs on the training oftrainers on security4. The pilot revealed that it isunrealistic to try and train people on security and astrainers in a mere five days. It revealed areas in which

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the curriculum should be strengthened. The strength ofthe pilot course lay in its comprehensive approach tosecurity, including, among the more traditional topicsof mine awareness and telecommunications, threatassessment, different security strategies and inter-personal anger defusing skills. A proposal is being puttogether to build on the experience. A modular trainingworkbook could usefully be developed from thematerials already produced, while future training coursesshould preferably be organised closer to the field.

These various initiatives are clearly complementary.Perhaps a multi-agency network and collaborative effortis now needed, to exchange experiences in themanagement of security, to develop the analysis oftrends, threats and contributing causes, to developstandards for agency policy on security (a point madein the People-in-Aid Code of Best Practice in theManagement and Support of Aid Personnel, RRNNetwork Paper 20), to advocate for broader legalprotection and around policies of donors and politicalauthorities, and to more clearly articulate their needs

and views with regard to war insurance coverage.

Notes1. Obtainable from Mme. A. Cusinay at the ICRC2. ICRC Preparatory Document for the first periodical meeting.

Oct. 97; the Swiss government will report on the periodicalmeeting at the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross/Crescent.

3. Both the background paper and the communication will beavailable from ECHO information and on the ECHO Website

4. For more information: Jane Swan at InterAction on fax 1 (202)667 8236 or email jswan@interaction.org

Assistance strategyfor Afghanistan: UN‘business as usual’ ora new model ofpartnership incomplex politicalemergencies?

I n April last year, the UN’s highest coordinatingbody, the innocuously named AdministrativeCommittee on Coordination (ACC), chaired by the

Secretary General and including the Executive Headsof UN agencies, IMF and World Bank, met in Genevafor one of its regular six monthly sessions. It took adecision to select Afghanistan as one of two countriesto serve as a testing ground for a new approach by the

international community to complex politicalemergencies. Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner forRefugees, was apparently instrumental in the choice.

The decision complemented existing efforts to reviewthe way in which assistance was being provided inAfghanistan. Three months earlier, an extraordinaryconference had been held in Ashgabad, Turkmenistan,bringing together UN member states, both from theregion and from major western donor countries, with arange of aid actors, including the Bretton Woodsinstitutions, UN agencies, international and AfghanNGOs, the ICRC and the Red Cross and Crescentmovement. It resulted in the broad agreement to developa holistic strategy for bringing sustainable peace toAfghanistan, recognising that “peace needs to be soughtthrough political negotiation as well as built throughsupport given to the population”.

Both the Ashgabad meeting and the ACC decision tookplace against the backdrop of growing internationalalarm at developments within the country. The Talibancapture of Kabul in late 1996 revealed their ownregressive policies and a number of ugly trends,including the country’s growing importance as a sourceof ‘drugs and thugs’ and of regional political instability.By any social and humanitarian yardstick, Afghanistanmerited a renewed injection of international concern.The fighting is in geographically limited areas, but couldspread. After 18 years of war, the economy is in ruins,the environment degraded, infrastructure shattered, andland mines and unexploded ordnance litter the country.Up to one million people have been killed. There remainan estimated three million refugees and internallydisplaced people. The country has some of the worstsocial development indicators in Asia if not the world.Afghan authorities lack administrative resources,expertise and will. Abuses of human rights andhumanitarian law abound. Women are denied the rightto congregate and speak in public, have unequal accessto health and education, and in urban areas are preventedfrom working. The psychological and physical sufferingendured by millions of people and the long-term damagecaused by an almost total dislocation of social andeconomic infrastructure are incalculable.

In September 1997, a high-level inter-agency missionarrived in the region led by Hugh Cholmondeley, theauthor of reports that prompted the ACC decision todevelop a strategic framework approach. The mission,including representatives from UNDPA, UNDHA,UNDP, the World Bank and Oxfam, participated in aworkshop with all assistance ‘stakeholders’, makingtrips into Afghanistan and meeting with a range of actorsbefore preparing a draft Strategic Framework document.

The document assessed the nature of the problem facingboth Afghans and the international community, reviewed

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the assistance record, and assessed the internationalcommunity’s approach which, it said, had saved manylives, but lacked a unifying vision. It addressed thesupply-driven nature of much aid planning and activity,the many overlaps and inconsistencies in programming,and the problem posed by absence of basic informationabout conditions on the ground to allow measurementof the impact of assistance efforts.

It proposed a new approach which is both radical andplain common sense. It suggested that immediate stepsbe taken to gain consensus among all those involved asto the nature of the political, economic, social andhumanitarian problem. Principles should be identifiedto guide overall assistance efforts and the internationalcommunity’s relationship with the Afghans whilsteffective means should be found to develop a coherentand coordinated assistance effort in which the respectivecompetences of stakeholders – including countries inthe region, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, Afghanauthorities and communities – are recognised and theirresponsibilities made explicit.

In early November, the document wasreviewed by the Afghan Task Force, asmall ‘home-grown’ group consisting ofdonor, UN and NGO representatives,which meets regularly in Islamabad toprovide a sounding board to the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, Alfredo Witschi-Cestari. Itrecommended that the Strategic Framework serve as thebasis of an assistance strategy for Afghanistan, and thatthis ASA as it has come to be known should be drawnup immediately to give greater operational flesh to theconcepts in the Strategic Framework paper.

A draft ASA was circulated in mid November, reviewedby donors and aid agencies in Islamabad, and presentedto the Afghan Support Group of donors (14 countriesplus the EU that between them account for the vast bulkof the response to the Consolidated Appeals forAfghanistan, formed after the Ashgabad meeting on theinitiative of Dutch Minister Jan Pronk).

The Assistance Strategy set out three overall goals toinform the vision of sustainable peace in Afghanistan:that assistance must, at a minimum, do no harm and,where possible, help build peace; that all assistance mustempower Afghans to build sustainable livelihoods; andthat saving lives and reducing human suffering mustremain a priority. As these priorities raise contradictions,it is acknowledged that they will need to form the focusof further discussion over the coming months. Thestrategy also proposed a number of principles to sustaininternational assistance efforts and urged that a meansbe found to ensure that the strategy supports, and issupported by, the international community’s politicalefforts to seek a peaceful settlement.

These principles included upholding the UN Charter,the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and theConvention on the Elimination of all forms ofDiscrimination against Women; the presumption of thesovereignty of the Afghan state, transparency, respectfor local traditions and customs, and commitment tosecuring Afghan involvement in and ownership of thestrategy. The document proposed that a commonprogramme be formulated and that programme-wide,independent monitoring and evaluation be initiated. Italso proposed a common fund, setting out steps for therevision of the Consolidated Appeal to allow it to serveas a management tool for donors and assistance actorsalike. The plan is that in future no projects will be ‘standalone’, but will be attached to a programme or sub-programme which will in turn need to demonstrate thatit has addressed a number of issues, including assessmentof Afghan capacities; of external players’ capacities; andimpact on fulfilment of agreed principles. The idea is toenable donors to fund more intelligently, allowing themto support the integrity of programmes and not leave

them second guessing whether genderconcerns have been thought through, forexample. Also, in future Appeals willinclude all funding information, even ifdonors continue to fund agenciesdirectly.

The Assistance Strategy was warmly endorsed by donorsin New York. One said that the only thing it had incommon with other UN documents was the staple thatheld it together. The only major reservation concernsthe common fund: that it might pose bureaucraticproblems for donors, and that it is premature (becausedonors would like to see how common programmingworks before adopting common funding mechanisms).

Actors in the field are now faced with the challenge oftranslating the Assistance Strategy and the commonprogramme into reality. Issued on February 4th, the 1998Appeal for Afghanistan elaborated steps that might beused to build a common programme, including proposalsfor revamping the Appeal itself. The UN Coordinator’soffice, both in Islamabad and through its five regionalcoordination offices within the country, is systematicallyconsulting all ‘stakeholders’ on how a commonprogramme might be formulated, and what coordinationis needed, and desired by them to make it happen.

A major effort is now under way to communicate thepurpose and possible benefits of the commonprogramme with both Afghans and agencies, whetherUN or NGO, recognising that their attitude andcommitment could make or break it. Generally speaking,NGOs are positive while healthily sceptical, not leastabout the UN’s own ability to join in and staff a trulycoordinated, needs-driven, logical and collaboratively

Meanwhile, reality formost Afghans continues

to deteriorate.

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programmed initiative. These doubts are shared by manyin the UN itself.

At the time of writing, individual UN agencies’ positionsare uncertain. While the merits of a common programmeare recognised, there are seemingly inevitable suspicionsabout its compatibility with the mandates and much-prized independence of individual UN agencies. No clearsignal has been given by UN agency headquarters onwhat position should be adopted, leaving the decisionas to what attitude to adopt to local Heads of Agenciesand their field staff . But donor commitment, the supportbeing provided by the Afghan Task Force, and the moraland financial backing of three key UN entities – UNDP,UNDHA and the UN Department of Political Affairs –are providing support to drive the new approach forward.

Meanwhile, reality for most Afghans continues todeteriorate. There is greater activity on the internationalscene to find a political settlement, much of it catalysedby the Secretary General’s Special Envoy LakhdarBrahimi, but there are few signs that the warring parties,particularly the Taliban, are prepared to come to termswith each other. A major earthquake in February innorthern Afghanistan which killed thousands served asan abrupt reminder of the miserable circumstancesendured by vast numbers of people.

The fate of the process is in the balance. If it succeeds,it might herald a new approach to complex politicalemergencies, one characterised by a new partnershipbetween donors, aid actors and beneficiaries. If it fails,it might be condemned as yet another experimentinflicted upon the Afghans, an effort doomed by theintransigence of the international community towardsreforming ‘business as usual’. But as a genuine effort ata collective approach to building peace and saving lives,it deserves to succeed.

The OttawaConvention and theNobel Prize: twovictories in the fightagainst anti-personnel mines

The use of anti-personnel mines did not becomean ‘international problem’ until the early 1990sand it has been NGOs working in heavily mined

countries that have raised the international awarenessof this plague.

The mobilisation of civil society throughthe International Campaign to BanLandmines (ICBL)

The ICBL is a civil society movement composed ofNGOs. Founded in 1992 by six organisations, it nowhas over 1000 members led by a Steering Committeeconsisting of: Handicap International, Human RightsWatch, Medico Internacional, Mines Advisory Group,Physicians for Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans ofAmerica Foundation, and Save the Children – Sweden,as well as the Cambodian Campaign, the AfghanistanCampaign, the South-African Campaign and the KenyanCampaign for a ban on landmines. The ICBL providesinformation to the media, mobilised citizens and exertspressure on national and international governmentalauthorities.

The objective of the ICBL is to see a total ban on anti-personnel mines as the new international norm. Toachieve this objective, the ICBL proposes that Statesenter into a collective commitment, which at a nationallevel is translated into laws and independent mechanismsof control. The ICBL also wants to see a greatercommitment and improved technical and financialmeans to prevent mine accidents and increase de-mining.

The ICBL advocates the global acceptance andimplementation of the Ottawa Convention on a banagainst anti-personnel mines.

Over the past five years and in the face of growing publicconcern, States have been forced to clarify their position.Negotiations under UN auspices started in 1995 and1996 to review the inadequate 1980 Convention on theuse of anti-personnel mines. But no acceptableconsensus could then be reached.

Following the failure of those negotiations, and giventhat the UN Conference on Disarmament was not anappropriate forum to ensure results, the ICBL hassupported the so-called ‘Ottawa Process’.

The ‘Ottawa Process’ has been a Canadian initiative,inspired by the proposals of the ICBL which, inDecember 1997, resulted in the signature of a‘Convention on a Ban on the Use, Stockpiling,Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines andon their Destruction’. With over 120 States havingsigned the Convention, the chances that this will becomea global convention are great, and a total ban imposesitself now as the new international norm.

The existence of this committed core of States, willgradually attract other countries which want to conformwith international humanitarian law. This will increasethe reality of a total ban, and isolate those States whosemilitary and industrial practices remain unacceptable.

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The EuropeanPlatform on ConflictPrevention andTransformation

As attacks on humanitarianism grow and thespotlight has been turned on the role of NGOsin fuelling conflict, so NGOs are increasingly

looking towards advocacy at the level of policy makingas a means of addressing human rights abuses whichthey are powerless to tackle in the field. Set up followingthe European Conference on Conflict Prevention(February 1997) hosted by the National Committee forInternational Cooperation and Sustainable Development(NCDO) in Amsterdam, the European Platform onConflict Prevention and Transformation seeks tocoordinate NGO action and support for conflictprevention policy making at EU level.

The 1997 Conference resulted in the Amsterdam Appeal,an action plan for European leaders which highlightedkey concerns for an effective EU approach to preventingconflict and outlined key advocacy issues for NGOs.The Appeal recognised the need for multiple actors andcoalition building in strengthening pressure on EUgovernments. The Platform was a direct result of thisexpressed need, seeking to: facilitate networking;support the establishment and functioning of nationalplatforms; encourage cooperation and exchange ofinformation in advocacy and lobbying activities; andact as a catalyst for innovative activities. Three mainareas of activities for 1998 are scheduled to include:

• identification of relevant actors, experts, publicationsand events in the field of conflict prevention andresolution – resulting in an updated version of the1996 ‘Prevention and Management of Conflicts; anInternational Directory’ first published by NCDO;

Simultaneously with the signing of the ‘OttawaConvention’, the Nobel Prize for Peace 1997 has beengranted to the 1000 organisations that make up the ICBL.This honour clearly reinforces the ICBL in its efforts toconvince other States to sign up to the ‘OttawaConvention’ by the year 2000, and to respect itsstipulations. However, the ‘Ottawa Convention’ and theNobel Prize do not represent a complete achievement.The objective of the ICBL is the total elimination of allanti-personnel mines, on the one hand by theimplementation of a total ban on their production, saleand deployment, but also through tangible support topopulations who have to live with this deadly pollution.

States and intergovernmental organisationsneed to agree to a substantial increase inthe practical aid to populations that arethreatened or victimised by mines

The first step to take is that of accelerated de-mining.Increased and accelerated de-mining in mine-afflictedcountries should be part of the international cooperationpolicies and, given the scope of the problem, the highcost of de-mining and the limited financial resources, itis vital to increase local capacity to prevent mine-accidents and to remove mines. Priority has to be givento a complete de-mining of inhabited areas, in line withthe needs and priorities of a local population and itslivelihood.

Secondly, the local capacity to integrate the victims ofanti-personnel mines needs more support. Increasedmedical and social assistance is to be made a componentof the reconstruction of war-torn societies, and therehabilitation of their social services. This support needsto be part of broader public health policies, so that itbenefits not only mine-amputees but all people withdisabilities, and in a more general sense the wholepopulation of a mine-infested area.

The financial resources for de-mining and for medicaland social assistance should not come from alreadyexisting development funds.

Continued campaign work to achieve thetotal ban on anti-personnel mines

All States have to be convinced to sign the ‘OttawaConvention’ and to implement the required legal andpractical measures to ensure a total ban. The ICBL hasto remain alert particularly to the following points:

signatories need to adopt national legislation to outlawthe development, production, stockpiling, sale, import,export and use of anti-personnel mines and theircomponent parts. These measures have to be extendedto the so-called ‘sub-munitions’ or explosivesprogrammed to self-destruct, whose effects and impact

are similar to those of anti-personnel mines.

governments have to ensure that their national businesscorporations comply with the legislation, both at homeand in their overseas branches. Commercial companiesrelocating their anti-personnel mine business to thirdworld countries, or becoming shareholders in foreigncompanies that produce such mines cannot be tolerated.

Governments have to ensure that the total ban on anti-personnel mines is introduced in all forms of trainingand instruction of their military. Moreover, acceptanceof the ban on anti-personnel mines is to be made acondition of continued bilateral military cooperation.

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• the Directory, together with findings from basicsurveys of prevention activities in the maininternational conflict areas, will be made accessiblethrough a dedicated website which will also offer amonthly bulletin and calendar of events;

• education and awareness raising aimed at the public,media, formal education systems, NGOs andchurches in the form of television documentaries,field trips for journalists and the development of aneducational rapid response system; advocacy andlobbying, initially focused on the British Presidencyof the EU.

The Platform is guided by a Steering Committeecomposed of representatives of the Life and PeaceInstitute, Sweden, Saferworld and International Alert,UK, Flemish NGO Consultation on Conflict Prevention,Belgium, German Network on Civilian ConflictTransformation / Berghof Research Centre, Germany,Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations,Switzerland, and the Foundation European Centre forConflict Prevention, The Netherlands, and the secretariatis based at the European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

It will be interesting to see how the initiative develops –the recent focus on conflict prevention activities is stillthe subject of considerable debate, raising questions suchas: whether the existence of conflict as a motor of changeis always bad and therefore always to be prevented; howmuch donors are reaching towards NGOs to fill a gap intheir own foreign and diplomatic policy without realanalysis of their comparative advantage; and whetherwithout real coordination, NGOs as peace-makers willconfuse more than they clarify. However, theestablishment of a forum for debate of such issues isperhaps encouraging if such questions are raised. Theobjective of providing concerted pressure on EUgovernments (and it is to be hoped the EU itself) iscertainly to be applauded. It remains to be seen if such awide coalition of interests can achieve the sort ofcoordination and cooperation necessary to make suchan initiative work.

Prevention and Management of Conflicts:An International Directory, 1996/ NCDO-Amsterdam

The directory is comprised of two parts. Part I offers anintroduction to the subject with chapters contributed byK. Rupesinghe, P. van Tongeren, A.J. Jongman and A.P.Schmid and a typology of conflict prevention activities.Part II lists African, American, Asian, Australian andEuropean initiatives and intergovernmentalorganisations and gives case studies of their work.

The European Platform on Conflict Prevention andTransformation, PO Box 18184, 1001ZB Amsterdam.tel: +31 (30) 253 7528, fax: +31 (30) 253 7529

Project for ahumanitariansecurity network

In the course of recent years, security incidents onthe ground have increased in frequency, complexityand intensity. Information on these incidents

emerges in a relatively piecemeal way, and this preventsany attempt at compiling statistics, analysing cases incontext, and learning from them. Nevertheless,information does exist, although it is difficult to accessin the public domain. Security is a collective issue andcan no longer be identified in a fragmentary way byeach individual organisation. The processing, analysisand dissemination of information are key factors inguiding the decisions of the organisations not just onthe ground, but also at the headquarters level and forthe humanitarian sector overall.

This being so, an initial group of four humanitarianagencies (Action Contre la Faim, Disaster ReliefAgency, Intersos and Medecins du Monde) has cometogether through the European NGO Consortium VOICE(Voluntary Organisations Cooperating in Emergencies)to reflect upon these points and to put forward someconcrete proposals. This working group has set up aproject aimed at compiling a database common to thehumanitarian organisations, pooling information relatingto the security of their staff. This programme aims torecord, analyse and identify the principal trends insecurity incidents which should make it possible toidentify patterns of violence and their appropriateresponse. Currently the project is completing theidentification phase, and should now move into thedesign phase.

The implementation of the programme will besupervised by a Steering Group composed of a smallnumber of voluntary organisations. These will beresponsible for guiding and validating the various stagesof progress. In order to allow more organisations to beinvolved in the project, an ‘Enlarged ConsultationGroup’ will be established. Its members will be keptregularly informed of the developments in the projectand will be able to pass on their comments and remarksto the Steering Group.

The formation of these groups is currently beingdefined. Organisations wishing for furtherinformation on the project may contact Mr. PierreGallien, Action Contre la Faim, Paris. tel: (33) 1 53808814, fax: (33) 1 4565 9250, email: pgallien@club-internet.fr

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SPHERE Project -progress to date

In Newsletter 10 (November 1997), we reported onprogress made by the SPHERE Project sectormanagers and technical working groups on

compiling agreed minimum standards. Since then,comments and experience in the five sectors of health,water and sanitation, nutrition, shelter and food securityhave been sought from an extensive range ofhumanitarian actors and the sector managers are in theprocess of preparing second drafts.

A reminder of exactly what the SPHEREProject is...

The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response(SCHR) and InterAction launched the SPHERE Project– minimum standards in humanitarian response – on 1July 1997. The one-year project involves front-lineNGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,interested donor governments, and UN agenciescooperating to develop a set of standards in core areasof humanitarian relief. These standards will help toimprove the quality of assistance given in emergencies,and the accountability of agencies to their beneficiaries,their membership and their donors. The standards willderive from a charter of humanitarian rights – drawnfrom existing international law – relevant to all with alegitimate claim to assistance in disaster situations.

A recent Sphere Project Newsletter article listed thoseminimum standards of provision to which everyoneshould be entitled – for copies of that Newsletter, contactemail: purdin@ifrc.org or tel: + 41 22 791 6202. Listedbelow are the principal areas for which standards arebeing developed and the working group membersinvolved in the drafting process. In addition to theworking group members, a further group of specialistsare involved in a peer review capacity. The key to theinitiative’s success is inclusivity. If your agency is notlisted as a member of either the working or peer reviewgroups and you wish to have access to drafts forcomment, please contact the relevant sector manager.

Water and sanitation:water supply; excreta disposal; vector control;

solid waste disposal; drainage.Contact: John Adams: jadams@oxfam.org.uk

Working Group: ACF, CARE, ICRC, IFRC, MSF,UNHCR, RedR.

Contributors to this section:Policy and Practice: developments around aidagency security: Koenraad Van Brabant, RRN –thanks to Philippe Dind, Toni Pfanner and RichardManlove for their inputAssistance Strategy for Afghanistan: MichaelKeating, Senior Advisor to the Office of the UNResident/Humanitarian Coordinator, AfghanistanThe Ottowa Convention and the Nobel Prize:Luciano Loiacono, Handicap InternationalThe EU Platform on Conflict: Laura Gibbons, RRNProject for a humanitarian security network:Pierre Gallien, Action Contre la FaimThe SPHERE Project: Laura Gibbons, RRN – basedon information received from SPHEREPlease note that the views represented reflect only those ofthe author, and not necessarily of their organisation or any

organisations mentioned.

Nutrition:mortality; morbidity; analysis; general nutritionalsupport; support for malnourished persons; public

health social/care environment.Contact: L. Gostelow, A. Taylor:

l.gostelow@scfuk.org.ukWorking Group: SCF-UK, Concern, UNICEF, WFP,

ACF, MSF Int, LSHTM/ENN, OXFAM.

Food Security:needs assessment; food provisioning; resource

management.Contact: H. Hale: hvhale@mindspring.com

Working Group: CARE, Food Aid Management,EuronAid, WFP, FAO, ADRA, CRS, World Vision,

USAID/FFP.

Shelter and Site:clothing; housing; household items; site selection;

site planning.Contact: P. Wijmans: wijmans-kalembo@wxs.nlWorking Group: CONCERN, LWF Field offices,

RedR, ODI, IFRC, UNHCR, MSF.

Health Services:assessment; health information system; measlesprogramme; control of communicable disease;

healthcare service delivery.Contact: J. Kreysler: kreysler@ifrc.org

Working Group: CDC-USA, KochInstitute-Germany, Royal Tropical Institute

Netherlands, Epicentre-France, WHO,AMREF-Kenya, ARC, IRC, MSF, GOAL,International Red Cross & Red CrescentMovement, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF.

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To obtain any of the above, please complete the form overleaf and return it to:

1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: AData Collecting System Focused on Food Securityand Population Movements by Tine Dusauchoit(March 1994)

2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: TheProgramme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM)by Derrina Mukupo (March 1994)

3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by MarkDuffield (March 1994)

4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The PoliticalEconomy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the SomaliRegion 5, Eastern Ethiopia by Koenraad Van Brabant(September 1994)

5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold WarEra: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs byKumar Rupesinghe (September 1994)

6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: InitialSuccesses and Failures in Food Assistanceby Susanne Jaspars (September 1994)

7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement and NGOs in DisasterRelief (September 1994)

8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role ofFormal and Informal Research Methods in ReliefOperations by Patrick Ward and Martin Rimmer(April 1995)

9 Development in Conflict: The Experience of ACORDin Uganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (April1995)

10 Room for Improvement: the Management andSupport of Relief Workersby Rebecca Macnair (September 1995)

11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha,Southern Ethiopia by Penny Jenden (September 1995)

12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons fromthe Health Sector by Joanna Macrae(September 1995)

RRN Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by RRN Members

or contributing specialists.

13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide andDirectory to the Internet for Agencies Involved inRelief and Rehabilitation by Luke Aris, Peter Gee andMark Perkins (February 1996)

14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on CivilianPopulations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventionsand a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects byDerek Summerfield (April 1996)

15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for theAssessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? byAlistair Hallam (April 1996)

16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance toRwanda: Study III Main Findings andRecommendations (June 1996)

17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security?by Jindra Cekan, Amy MacNeil and Steve Loegering(November 1996)

18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflictand Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report),by Jon Bennett and Mary Kayitesi Blewitt (November1996)

19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards:What Relief Workers Need to Know by James Darcy(February 1997)

20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in theManagement and Support of Aid Personnel(February 1997)

21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern SudanExperience by Iain Levine (May 1997)

22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis byPhilippa Atkinson (May 1997)

23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: The Caseof Sri Lanka by Koenraad Van Brabant (November1997)

24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations byCelia Palmer (February 1998)

1 Water and Sanitation in Emergenciesby Andrew Chalinder (June 1994)

2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmesby Jeremy Shoham (December 1994)

3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies:from Nutritional Needs to Political Prioritiesby Susanne Jaspars and Helen Young (January 1996)

4 Seed Provision During and After Emergenciesby the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme(December 1996)

RRN Good Practice Reviews are commissioned ‘state of the art’ reviews, on different sectors or activities

within the relief and rehabilitation field. Prepared by recognised specialists, and subject to peer review, they are produced in

a format that is readily accessible to field-based personnel.

5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populationsin Emergency Operations: Registration and itsAlternativesby John Telford (September 1997)

6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for DisplacedPopulations in Emergenciesby Andrew Chalinder (January 1998)

7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmesby Alistair Hallam (Forthcoming)

RRN Newsletters provide a forum for brief analysis and update on current developments in the field, key policyissues etc. Hard copies of the Newsletter are available free and can also be downloaded from the RRN website.

The RRN Administrator, Relief and Rehabilitation Network, Overseas Development Institute,Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP, UK

Tel: +44 171 393 1674/47/40 Fax: +44 171 393 1699 Email: rrn@odi.org.uk

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Regional focus...CAMBODIA

With less than six months to go until the nextscheduled elections, a climate of extremepolitical uncertainty reigns across the

country. Following the violent ousting of Prime MinisterPrince Ranariddh by his coalition partner Hun Sen inJuly 1997, fighting between forces loyal to the twoleaders has intensified along the Thai-Cambodianborder. Rebel Khmer Rouge forces have rallied behindthose supporting Prince Ranariddh resulting in a militarystalemate while attempts by neighbouring countries tobroker a diplomatic solution have so far beenunsuccessful. In the face of Hun Sen’s intransigenceregarding an agreement thatwould allow PrinceRanariddh to return andcontest forthcomingelections, the continuingviability of the internationally-sponsored peace process is morethan ever in doubt.

The 1991 Paris Peace Agreementsgave rise to UN-sponsored elections inCambodia two years later which saw thewinner Prince Ranariddh forced into ashaky power-sharing arrangement with hisformer enemy Hun Sen. With the latter effectivelymaintaining control over the administration and thearmed forces, governing became a delicate task ofcooperation and compromise. Despite much initialprogress, in the absence of genuine reconciliationbetween the two parties the coalition began to breakdown.

With the stakes surrounding control of the governmentgrowing day by day as elections approached, both sidesbegan to jockey for position by arming themselves andseeking alliances with other political groupingsincluding the Khmer Rouge rebels. Using this as apretext, Hun Sen’s vastly superior military forces struckquickly in July 1997 seizing control of the government.In the aftermath of the fighting in Phnomh Penh, manyof Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC party and governmentofficials fled the country. The extra-judicial executionsof key military leaders loyal to Ranariddh as well as thesubsequent decision of other FUNCINPEC people whohad remained in the country, to work with Hun Sen,

have left the party deeply divided.

Most opposition politicians have now returned toCambodia, though Ranariddh himself is faced with theprospect of a trial before an impartial court if he re-enters the country. While an official amnesty from KingSihanouk would clear his son’s name, to ask for thiswould be an admission of guilt which Ranariddh so farhas been unwilling to do. He has instead chosen toremain outside the country in the hope that internationalpressure can be brought to bear on Hun Sen. So far thisstrategy has shown few fruits in a climate of increasinginternational ambiguity over the peace process in

Cambodia.

With few notable exceptions the19 countries which wereguarantors of the ParisAgreements seem to be optingfor ‘stability’ over the principleof democracy in Cambodia.The failure of Ranariddh’speople to live up to the vastexpectations placed upon themwhen they entered thegovernment has, in theclimate of increasing

cynicism regarding Cambodianpolitics, led to a hands-off approach to political

developments there by the international community.While it is firmly behind the forthcoming elections andis providing significant funds to organise them, theinternational community has shown less concern as towhether the elections will be genuinely free or fair. TheUN is urging the warring parties to agree to a ceasefireso that, as in the early 90s, all refugees can be repatriatedbefore the elections. Underlying this approach is adangerous assumption that elections represent a panaceafor the country’s political problems.

Few people, either donors or local politicians, areaddressing the difficult question of how the governmentwhich emerges following elections – which will likelybe another coalition – can avoid the same pitfalls as theprevious one. Insufficient attention is being paid to howthe country’s weak political institutions can bestrengthened. Outside Phnomh Penh it is likely thatpockets of insecurity will remain across the country fora long time to come. While an ailing Pol Pot haseffectively been marginalised within the Khmer Rouge,

CAMBODIA

Vietnam

PhnomPenh

Laos

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those in power remain as ready as ever to protect thelucrative economic activities in their zones by militarymeans.

Meanwhile the reconstruction effort continues despitethe decision of one major donor – the USA – to cut allbut non-essential humanitarian aid in an effort to placepressure on Hun Sen. While Cambodia has continuedto receive record amounts of aid in the past few years,the recent political instability has led to a ‘wait and see’attitude among many other major donors. Thehumanitarian needs in Cambodia nonetheless remainprodigious with the well-publicised case of some 60,000refugees in Thailand overshadowing a much moresubstantive and intractable problem of internaldisplacement which is not being effectively addressed.With an estimated 50% of prostitutes and 8–10% ofsoldiers testing HIV positive, the country has anotherhealth, social and economic problem that willincapacitate it even if the fighting stops today.

CONGO BRAZZAVILLE

A five-month civil war ravaged CongoBrazzaville when in June 1997 forces frompresident Lissouba surrounded the

residence of one of his mainpolitical rivals Denis SassouN’Guesso. Indiscriminateshelling and bombing led tointense destruction in the capital, with some650,000 people becoming internallydisplaced, and 40,000 taking refuge in theDemocratic Republic ofCongo (formerly Zaire).Estimates are of 5–10,000 killed.Residential and commercial andadministrative buildings,including those of the UN andthe national Red Cross, werelooted, and there has beenwidespread violence against women.

In October the militias of N’Guesso, supported byAngolan troops, pushed inland, consolidating a militaryvictory over Lissouba and another political rival, B.Kolelas. N’Goussa has proclaimed himself president.There remain pro-Lissouba troops in the area betweenthe town of Dolisie and the Gabonese border.

Following a rapid interagency assessment mission inOctober 1997 the UN launched a Flash Appeal for US$17.7 million, which has received only limited response.The main humanitarian concerns were and remain foodsecurity and nutrition, health and shelter. CongoBrazzaville is a net food importer and the war had

Gabon

CONGOBRAZZAVILLE

Brazzaville

Cameroon

Central AfricanRepublic

D. R. Congo

disrupted commercial transactions. Most IDPs werehosted by relatives in their villages of origin, drawingon rural food stocks. Even though basic staples becameavailable on the market again, high prices createdproblems of access. High levels of malnutrition amongunder-fives were reported. Aid agencies worked hardto provide emergency medical services and to gethospitals and health centres rehabilitated and resupplied.

After weeks of continued looting, the new president hasmoved to bring normalisation and his governmentappears relatively inclusive. Civil servants were askedto return to their posts and received two months of salaryarrears. Militias were disarmed. By the end ofNovember, most checkpoints in the capital haddisappeared and administrative buildings were guarded.Due to the improved security, by January 1998 anestimated 70% of the population of Brazzaville hadreturned. So too had foreign companies like Elf,Electricité de France and the Lyonnaise des Eaux.

An analysis of the Brazzaville crisis needs to take intoaccount several social, economic and political factors.

From an international perspective, some analysts haveseen the Brazzaville crisis as apredictable domino consequence ofthe fall of Mobutu – the changes in

Zaire have fundamentally altered theexisting regional alliances and balances,

and strengthened the position of Angolanpresident Dos Santos. There is little doubt

that Angolan army’s support of N’Guesso’smilitias has been decisive in the Brazzavillecivil war. The position of Gabon, more inline with French policy, has been reserved.During the war Gabon has maintained a

conciliatory attitude, but in theend it seems perfectly satisfiedwith the victory of the rebel

movement.

In recent years however, the nationaleconomy of Brazzaville has been

deteriorating, and the country is heavily indebted.Annual income per capita fell from US$ 1030 in 1992to US $ 640 in 1994. With some 80,000 civil servants,Congo Brazzaville is one of the most extensively‘administered’ African countries. The costs of thismediocre civil service weigh heavily on the budget. Theintensive urbanisation (70% of the population of 2.6million) has resulted in high unemployment rates evenamong educated youth. An ‘armed militia’ culture hasbeen developing for some years in this seedbed offrustrations. Much of the destruction took place in themost deprived areas in the northern sector of Brazzavillecity, where basic social needs were already high.

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SRI LANKA

The conflicts in Northern Ireland and SriLanka appear equally intractable: the aimsof the opposing groups are too far apart;

the minds are set on the past and not on the presentand the future; and high emotions canquickly drown any rational analysis orproposal. When the People’s Alliancegovernment started peace talks with theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the autumnof 1994, Sri Lankans made hopeful comparisonswith Northern Ireland, where the IRA had thendeclared a ceasefire. The Northern Ireland talksremain under threat of renewed paramilitaryviolence, while full-scale war has been raging again inSri Lanka since April 1995.

The prospects for a negotiated peace were significantlydiminished when on 25 January three LTTE suicidecommandos exploded a truck bomb just outside theTemple of the Tooth in Kandy, killing at least 16bystanders. The attack on this site of pilgrimage iscontrary to international humanitarian law, which theLTTE in 1988 had promised to respect. The choice ofthe target – the Temple is the most sacred shrine ofSinhalese Buddhists – and the timing – the 50thAnniversary celebrations of Sri Lanka’s independencewere scheduled to be held in Kandy a week later send aclear message about how Tamil militants perceive SriLanka’s failure to build a nation. The attack was alsoextremely provocative, sure to enrage hardline Sinhalesenationalists whose intransigence matches that of theLTTE.

In response the Government outlawed the LTTE as apolitical party, a step it had so far refrained from takingon the grounds that it would make peace talks illegal.Heavy fighting erupted again in the Vanni area, wherethe army since May 1997 has been moving slowlyforward to capture the strategic landroute between

Vavuniya and Kilinochchi. Meanwhile and for the firsttime since 1983, local elections were held ingovernment-controlled Jaffna, in which moderate Tamilparties participated.

The banning of the LTTE leads to renewed pressure bySri Lanka on the UK government to outlaw theorganisation and close its office in London. One of thestanding counter arguments of the UK government tothis demand had been that the LTTE was not banned inSri Lanka. India banned the LTTE after it murderedRajiv Gandhi in 1991. It recently in absentia condemnedPrebakharan, the LTTE leader, to death for thatassassination. The USA banned the LTTE in 1997.

Most Tamils, and surprisingly also the mostly SinhaleseUNP opposition party, have criticised the

government’s ban of the LTTE as leaving onlya military option to end the war. The UNP

however has also rejected thegovernment’s devolution proposals for apolitical solution to the conflict. Thegovernment needed the UNP support toget a two-thirds majority forconstitutional reform. It is to be fearedthat the two major parties, the SLFP andthe UNP, will renege on their agreementof 1997, and return to the partisan and‘winner-take-all’ politics that has helpedcreate deep fractures in the body politic

and remained a major obstacle to peace.

On the other hand, the beginning exploitation of theoffshore oilfield of N’Koss, for which French andAmerican companies have been competing, willfundamentally alter the parameters of the nationaleconomy. A debate has started on how best to managethe natural resources of the country.

Although the humanitarian emergency has subsided, thecountry is clearly far from recovery. The violence hascaused deep social disruption, the economy andadministration remain in need of reform and it must notbe forgotten that the new government has been bornfrom a military coup at a time when democratic electionswere being prepared.

LIBERIA

Following its first six months in office, observersare still very uncertain about the nature of thenew Liberian Government – developmentalist

or rogue state? Mixed signals from Taylor’sadministration in the key areas of security and theeconomy have left Liberians and outsiders wary ofthe new peace. An issue for policy-makers is how bestto intervene in order to support and encourage efficientand responsible governance. Conditionality on aidflows is being introduced by both the US and EC, butits effectiveness as a lever remains to be seen. Thereal challenge lies in the kinds of programming fundsare used for, as well as in the types of relationshipthat outsiders can develop with the new administration.

Early consolidation of the State security apparatus wasto be expected from the Taylor government, and someof the accompanying tensions could also have beenanticipated. The difficult situation in neighbouringSierra Leone has been a major factor adding to theinsecurity in Liberia, while grievances from theconflict are still unresolved at local levels and at the

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national political level. In spite of these realproblems, the behaviour of the government so farhas been worrying, with concern over therestructuring of the national army, the setting up andarming of special police forces, and continuedharassment of the press andopposition.

The restructuring of thenational army has beenconducted independently bythe government, who rejectedprovisions in the Abuja accord forECOMOG assistance. Almost the entire highercommand has been dismissed or retired, and onequarter of the ranks have been laid off, replaced withformer NPFL generals and fighters. In the area ofhuman rights protection and press freedom, thedisappearance and murder of a prominent oppositionpolitician and his family in December was one of aseries of incidents that have included harassment ofsenior Krahn figures, and of members of the pressseen as critical of the government.

Although Taylor’s government has distanced itselffrom some actions, claiming the police haveoverstepped their authority, responsibility mustultimately lie with the cabinet and president.Representations have been made on these issues fromdiplomatic quarters, and from the Liberian humanrights community, with clear messages from bothdonors and potential investors that such occurrencesare unacceptable. It remains to be seen whether thistype of pressure will prove effective, but thegovernment’s seeming commitment to rejoininginternational circles has led to some optimism. Thefailure of the international community to push forintervention on the restructuring of the army mayhowever represent a missed opportunity to influencethe composition and professionalism of the newarmy, both of which are now questionable.

Economic developments since the election have alsobeen highly ambiguous. The appointment of seriousprofessionals to key economic positions has beenwelcomed by international financial institutions, andprogress is being made in balancing the budget,integrating the dual currencies, and rescheduling thelarge outstanding foreign debt. However, corruptioncontinues unabated within the civil service, andprivate deals continue to play an important role inthe exploitation of mineral and forest resources. Thislatter is particularly worrying, as the unequalredistribution of profit from Liberia’s natural wealth,and its diversion from national development toprivate hands, was a major factor in creating theconditions that led to violent conflict in the first place.

This issue has been included in the list ofconditionalities proposed by Minister Pronk, who ischairing the donor conference on Liberia in April,and such attention is welcome. The international

financial institutions shouldensure that any new financing ordebt forgiveness is dependent onaccountability and transparency

in all aspects of the economy.In conjunction with the use

of aid as a lever, however,donors should attempt

to support positiveindigenous effortsand mechanisms ofchange. Positive

local capacities do exist, and must be strengthenedwherever this is feasible. Indirect ways to promoteaccountability, good governance, and the protectionof human rights in Liberia, from support of grassroots activists to direct capacity building withinrelevant ministries and government departments,may have as important an impact as directconditionalities.

Some initiatives exist, including the new UN peace-building office which has a mandate to assist thegovernment in renewing structures destroyed in thewar, and to promote adherence to internationalstandards of good governance. Other plans, such asa US initiative to provide specialist training for therestructured police forces, have been temporarilyabandoned due to apparent lack of cooperation fromthe Liberian side. Support for the functions of thejustice ministry and courts has also been minimal sofar. Intervention in this area of national lawenforcement is a delicate issue, but must at least beattempted. If approached in a sensitive way, capacitybuilding could help to support those forces withinthe government that favour adherence to the rule oflaw, and to undermine those elements pursuing otherobjectives.

Efforts to promote peace-building and sustainablelegitimate livelihoods at local levels, as NGOs areattempting through reconciliation and communitydevelopment programmes, are also important andshould be expanded. Undermining the negativeforces in Liberia will be difficult, but can only beachieved through support for local mechanisms ofaccountability and conflict resolution. Pro-active andpragmatic engagement to encourage thesemechanisms should thus constitute the most positiveand ethical response from the internationalcommunity, and should be employed alongside thenegative use of conditionality and threats.

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REG

ION

AL focus

KOSOVO

In recent months fears of an escalation of violencein Kosovo have increased. There have beenwidespread human rights violations, and in late 1997

students started taking to the streets. In November 1997the Kosovo Liberation Army appeared for the first time.Its size, capability and strategies remain unknown, butwith 70% of the population under 30 years old,and an unemployment rate of overhalf the population, these are manyof the ingredients that make for anexplosive mixture.

Kosovo is a province in the new Yugoslav republic, butdoes not have an equal status with Serbia andMontenegro. Some 90% of the population are Albanian-speaking, mostly Muslim, Kosovars, whilst the mostlyorthodox Serbs constitute less than 10%.

In March 1989 Kosovo saw its autonomy seriouslyreduced and in the summer of 1990 it issued a‘declaration of independence’. For about six years now,Kosovars have been running a parallel education andhealth system from mosques, garages and flats, afterpolicy changes blocked the use of the Albanian language– a system funded mainly from a 3% tax contributed byall Kosovars abroad. An agreement, brokered by theSant’Edigio community, was reached in September1996, but collapsed over different interpretations andwhen street protests erupted in Belgrade.

In September 1991 Kosovars held a referendum forindependence and in the following May, semi-clandestine elections took place for a president and aparliament. The Democratic League of Kosovo, underits chairman Dr. Rugova, has been the strongest politicalparty with a strategy of peaceful resistance. Dr. Rugovahas been seeking the status of an internationalprotectorate for Kosovo, and hoping for negotiationswith Belgrade under foreign mediation. The governmentin exile under Prime Minister Bukoshi is howeverincreasingly impatient with the non-violent strategy thatis failing to bring results. There are indications that itsalliegance is shifting to the Parliamentary Party ofKosovo, headed by Demaci, which is more prepared toadopt a strategy of civil disobedience and activeresistance. The Serb Resistance Movement of Tajkovicin Kosovo has been opposed to the regime in Belgrade,but in recent weeks, Bozur, a movement of Kosovo Serbssupportive of Milosevic, appears to be newly active.

The international community has consistently voicedits concerns over Kosovo, most recently at the BonnPeace Implementation Council’s conference and in astatement from the International Helsinki Federation.Although the power of Milosevic in Belgrade has waned,and the ‘democratic’ opposition in Serbia disintegrated,

Milosevic appears still to be the only authority that cannegotiate an agreement on Kosovo. Encouragingly, theYugoslav army has expressed its preference for apolitical rather than a military solution.

One of the problems for the international community isto find mechanisms to exercise pressure withincentives and disincentives. Yugoslavia

remains affected by an ‘outer wall’ of sanctions,which exclude it from multilateral institutions

such as the IMF, the World Bank, the UNor the OSCE. This cuts it off fromvital capital flows, much needed in

the face of high unemployment, rising foreigndebt and trade deficits. Leverage then cannot beexercised through these institutions. Economicincentives and disincentives would have to come viaprivate companies that supply gas and oil to Serbia, orthat are involved in financial transactions andprivatisation agreements. Unfortunately, thepreconditions to the lifting of the ‘outer wall’ ofsanctions are currently treated as one package:cooperation with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague,autonomy and full equality for ethnic Albanians inKosovo, democratisation in Serbia, the completion ofthe division of assets among the successor states of theformer Yugoslav republic, and the official recognitionof the presidential elections in Montenegro. Unless theseconditions can be dealt with separately, there is noflexibility and no room for manoeuvre.

At the same time, however, it is important that Kosovarsdevelop realistic demands and expectations. Theinternational community does not look favourably uponthe creation of another state. The parallel education andhealth systems are not sustainable. Rather than lookingonly at Western models, Kosovars could benefit fromgreater exposure to the experiences in other EastEuropean countries.

From ‘Kosovo Briefing’ and ‘Serbia – The MilosevicFactor’ (Feb. 1998), two reports produced by theInternational Crisis Group in Brussels, fax: + 32 2502 5038 or Rue des Minimes 26, 1000 Brussels.

Contributors to this section:Cambodia: Dylan Hendrickson, ConciliationResources (and with LWF reports)Congo Brazzaville: Pierre Gallien, Action Contrela Faim, France (and with IRIN and UN reports)Sri Lanka: Koenraad Van Brabant, RRNLiberia: Philippa Atkinson, Part-time RRNRegional RepresentativeKosovo: Koenraad Van Brabant, RRNPlease note that the views represented reflect only those ofthe author, and not necessarily of their organisation or any

particular organisations mentioned.

KOSOVO

Serbia

AlbaniaMacedonia

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28

lett

ers

Training courses

LettersPlease send us your comments on our publications:omissions, corrections, additions, views or just encouragement!

The RRN CoordinatorODI, Portland HouseStag PlaceLondon SW1E 5DPUNITED KINGDOM

H.E.L.P. – Health Emergencies in LargePopulations

This course, an initiative of the ICRC and now taught incollaboration with various institutes, provides advancedtraining in the management of health emergencies. Thecourse will cover priority areas in eight fields: planning,environmental health, health services, coordination, food

Working in Long-Term Conflict: Managingthe Organisational Challenge, Oxford, 21-25September 1998

This course forms part of INTRAC’s 1998 Short CourseTraining Programme, with the aim of increasing theability of NGO managers to think strategically aboutthe development of their organisations’ capacity to workin conflict situations. Fee: £785

For more details contact: INTRAC, PO Box 563,Oxford OX2 6RZ, UK. tel: +44 1865 201851, fax:+44 1865 201852, email: intrac@gn.apc.org

The Health Worker Abroad: A SurvivalGuide, Bath University, Thursday 23 April 1998

The day is organised by the Institute of Refugee HealthCare Studies, part of the School of PostgraduateMedicine, and aims to help health workers makeappropriate preparations in order to avoid the range ofproblems and hazards of working abroad. Fee: £40 forthe day including coffee, lunch and tea.

For further information, please contact: Dr. BrunoBubna-Kasteliz, St. Martins Hospital, Midford Road,Bath BA2 5RP, UK. tel: +44 1225 832383 ext. 4756

International Humanitarian Law andCurrent Conflicts 22-27 June 1998

At this week-long seminar, elements of internationalhumanitarian law will be examined and discussed andin an interactive environment. Centred on current casestudies, the seminar will be supplemented by backgroundreadings and information drawn from the experience ofhumanitarian organisations. The seminar will consist ofup to 25 participants with field experience or positionsof responsibility in humanitarian and HR organisations.Fees: US $1,300 for room, board, teaching and materials.

For details contact: P. Rosenblum, Harvard HumanRights Program, Harvard Law School, Pound Hall401, Cambridge, MA02138 USA. tel: + 1 617 495362fax: +1 617 4951110 or email: hrp@law.harvard.edu

In Sri Lanka the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies(whose origins are described in RRN Network Paper23, The Coordination of Humanitarian Action) havereproduced excerpts of James Darcy’s paper on HumanRights (RRN Network Paper 19) in their bi-monthlyNewsletter, while Good Practice Review No. 5 on theCounting and Identification of Beneficiary Populationshas informed topical discussions. We are very gratefulto the Consortium for carrying an informative note onthe RRN in its January 1998 internal Bulletin.

Two RRN Network papers, those on the Red Cross/INGO Code of Conduct and the People in AidCode of Best Practice, were part of the resourcematerials for the participants in InterAction’straining course on security.

A British relief worker – who will remain unnamed– used James Darcy’s RRN Network Paper 19entitled “Human Rights and International LegalStandards: what relief workers need to know”, toprepare himself for a job interview.

In this edition we look at how RRN material is used – please keep us informed of the waysin which you adapt RRN material to meet your needs!

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training

Impact Assessment for Development Policyand Project Appraisal: Environmental,health, social and gender impacts, Developmentand Project Planning Centre, University of Bradford,UK. 1 June – 10 July 1998.

Co-organised by the University of Bradford and theLiverpool School of Tropical Medicine, this courseconcentrates on the assessment of the four major typesof impact commonly associated with developmentpolicies and projects.

Designed for those with a responsibility for or an interestin development policy design and appraisal, projectplanning and impact assessment, course applicants mustdemonstrate that their future work will involve theapplication of the ideas and techniques from the course.

Fees: Full programme £4,125. Modules may be studiedseparately.

For more details contact: The Director, ImpactAssessment for Development Policy and ProjectAppraisal, Development and Project Planning Centre,University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP UK. fax:+44 1274 385280/383981

Masters in Humanitarian Assistance,University of Geneva, November 1998

As from November 1998, the University of Geneva willbe offering a Masters in Humanitarian Assistance, whichaims to examine the global and complex nature ofhumanitarian issues. A multidisciplinary approach isguaranteed by the participation of a variety of differentfaculties and institutes attached to the University. Inaddition, the participation of UN and humanitarianassistance organisations in Geneva (ICRC, MSF, WHO,HCR) means that the course will be relevant to thepractice and reality of fieldwork on a daily basis.

The Masters consists of six thematic modules to bestudied over one year or more:• humanitarian assistance: origins and perspectives• management of humanitarian crises• ways in which humanitarian organisations operate• humanitarian and social assistance• crises and development• dissertation

It is also possible to obtain a certificate in each individualmodule.

Entrance requirements: a first degree (or equivalent) andprofessional experience in the area of humanitarianaffairs. Candidates should be fluent in French andEnglish. Fees: CHF 15,000. Estimated living costs inGeneva: CHF 2,000 per month.

For more details contact: Multi-faculty HumanitarianAssistance Programme, Centre Médical Universitaire,9 Avenue de Champel, 1211 Genève 4, Switzerland.tel: +41 22 702 5599 fax: +41 22 789 2417 email:ppah@cmu.unige.ch website: www.unige.ch/ppah

Workshop on Media Issues, New York, U.S.A.24 July 1997

The Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for InternationalStudies at Brown University held a workshop to launcha new set of training materials for humanitarianorganisations on media issues in New York last year.Prepared by the University of Wisconsin’s DisasterManagement Centre and Interworks, the materials drewupon the Project’s 1996 study, The News Media, CivilWar, and Humanitarian Action by L. Minear, T. G.Weiss and C. Scott. UNDHA, the I.O.M., the AmericanRed Cross and World Vision contributed to thepreparation of materials and convening of the workshop.

Copies of the trainees materials and an instructor’spackage may be obtained from the DisasterManagement Centre, 432 North Lake Street, Madison,WI 53706, USA. US $10 per electronic copy.

and nutrition, communicable diseases, epidemiology andinternational humanitarian law. Each course will takemaximum of 25 participants.

Geneva, ICRC, 11-29 May 1998: course in English;registration fee CHF 2,000. Minimal living expenses inGeneva for three weeks amount to a further CHF 2,500.

Baltimore, John Hopkins University 6-24 July 1998and Hawaii, John Burns School of Medicine 13-31July 1998: courses in English; registration feeUS $ 1,500. Minimal living expenses for three weeks,based on use of dormitory, amount to a further $ 1,500.

For more information contact the ICRC, H.E.L.P. 98Geneva/USA 19 Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, fax:+41 22 730 2223 email: ideslarzes.gva@icrc.org

Montreal, Université de Montreal, 1-19 June 1998:course in both French and English; registration fee,including bed and breakfast CAN $ 1,800. Minimalliving expenses for 3 weeks in Montreal amount to afurther CAN $ 650.

Further details from Canadian Red Cross, 1800 AltaVista Drive, Ottawa, ON K1G 4J5, Canada, fax: + 1613 7311411 email: plaberge@redcross.ca

Other courses scheduled this year will take place in HongKong between 6-24 July (English) and in Pretoria (SouthAfrica) between 12-29 October (English). Details fromICRC, H.E.L.P., Geneva.

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30

conf

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Conferences‘From rhetoric toreality: the role of aidin local peace-buildingin Afghanistan’A Unique Forum to Discuss the Policy andPractice of Peace-Building, York, 12-15January 1998

Haneef Atmar, Programme Manager, NorwegianChurch Aid (NCA), Afghanistan Programme

MA in Humanitarian Assistance, TuftsUniversity, Medford, MA, USA, September 1998

Commencing September 1998, The Tufts UniversitySchool of Nutrition Science and Policy (SNSP) and theFletcher School of Law and Diplomacy will offer a oneyear Master of Arts in Humanitarian Assistance. Thiscourse will be available to mid-career professionals andofficials from government, international, and private aid/consulting agencies with significant field experience inthe areas of famine, conflicts and complex emergencies.

There are four compulsory core courses:• Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies• Applied Nutrition for Humanitarian Crises• Independent Seminar in Humanitarianism• one course selected from the other core courses

offered by the programme.

The other four courses can be chosen from SNSP/Fletcher offerings. Students are asked to write a Mastersthesis as part of the second semester requirement.

Candidates must have an undergraduate degree, havedemonstrated leadership qualities and have a potentialto make a substantial contribution in the field ofhumanitarian assistance.

For further information, please contact: AdmissionsCommittee for Masters in Humanitarian Assistance,Feinstein International Famine Centre, TuftsUniversity, 96 Packard Avenue, Medford, MA 02155,USA. tel: +1 617 627 3423 fax: +1 617 627 3428,email: jhammock@infonet.tufts.edu

RedR Training Programme 1998

RedR offer a number of valuable and varied trainingsessions throughout the year. For a list of 1998 courses,please contact: Caroline Mitchell, RedR, 1 St GeorgeSt, London SW1P 3AA, UK. tel: +44 171 233 3116 fax:+44 171 222 0564.

Disaster Management Training for theInternational Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction,Disaster Management Centre, Cranfield University 28July - 3 September 1998

The 1998 Disaster Management Course is aimed at thosewith or anticipating disaster management responsibilitiesbut who may have a limited knowledge of theory andpractice. Participants will consider a number of areas,including governmental appointments, NGOs, military,emergency services, UN agencies and academics.

The course will be held in Oxfordshire and is fullyresidential. Some of the aspects covered will include:problem analysis and planning techniques, informationmanagement and early warning, complex emergenciesand conflict resolution, recovery and reconstructionissues and gender and human rights issues.

Fees: £7,550 (£2,600 for full residential costs, £4,950tuition fees); capacity is limited to 35 participants.Funding may be applied for from various sources.

For more details, please contact: The Administrator,Disaster Management Centre, Cranfield University,RMCS, Shrivenham, Swindon, Wiltshire SN6 8LA,UK. tel: +44 1793 785287 fax: +44 1793 785883email: disprep@rmcs.cranfield.ac.uk

This article examines the background to a workshophosted by the British Agencies Afghanistan Workshopand Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit(PRDU) at the University of York and assesses its valuein terms of the integration of a diverse range of viewsand experiences. The responsibility for all viewsexpressed in this article lies with the author.

Background

The York workshop brought together 66 policy-makers,practitioners and academics to discuss and exchangeviews on issues of peace-building and multi-facetedrecovery in Afghanistan. The workshop grew out ofconcerns over the nature of aid and conflict in the‘complex political emergency’ of Afghanistan, a country

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conferences

that has known little but war over the past 19 years. Theaid community’s major concern has been the fact that,at worst, aid has been part of the problem and, at best, ithas been a passive phenomenon without any real impacton peace-building at national level. The former featuredthroughout the1980s when aid was as much motivatedby the Cold War as humanitarian concerns, whereas thelatter has characterised the humanitarian response to theAfghan crisis in the post Cold War era. In the post ColdWar era, aid actors have either considered peace-building as too political or felt that there was little theycould do about conflict and peace in Afghanistan.

The reality of Afghanistan has certainly posed strategicchallenges to the aid community. The country is stillsuffering from a civil war which has claimed thousandsof lives, made millions refugees internally displaced andhomeless, and caused widespread destruction in urbancentres and rural peripheries. The political top-downapproach to peace-making mainly sponsored by the UNhas never produced a durable solution to the conflict.Moreover, while most, if not all, aid agencies havecleared their political conscience of the Cold War eraand factional power struggle, which would leave themconstrained vis-à-vis peace-building in Afghanistan,their impact on peace is still invisible. The confusedtop-down versus bottom-up, community-based practiceof peace-making and building has not had the desiredresults, partly because not all aid organisations haveadopted a mandate for peace-building and are stilluncertain about the consequences of their adherence toeither of these processes. By supporting the politicalprocess of peace-making through advocacy andlobbying, agencies fear provoking resentment withnegative consequences for their agencies’ own survival.On the other hand, in the Afghan context, thecommunity-based approach can never produce lastingpeace if conditions conducive to peace do not exist atnational, regional and international levels. At best, suchan approach may support a localised peace, but this maystill be vulnerable to the national process of conflict. Inaddition, such local activity might shift responsibilityfrom the international community to local communities,whose war is as much sustained by the regional andinternational processes.

Despite the unpredictable nature of the Afghan conflictand aid agencies’ strategic confusion in the past, theoutlook is not as bleak as it may seem. The UN aidmechanism is taking the remarkable initiative ofdirecting aid resources towards multi-faceted nationalrecovery with the aim of building peace in Afghanistanthrough a ‘Strategic Framework’ (see article on page13) and an ‘Assistance Strategy’ which require aconcerted effort from all aid actors. What is needed nowis for the amalgamation of UN political and aid

mechanisms to underpin this strategic process.

At another level, in part the result of an awakeningprocess marked by the Norwegian Church AidAfghanistan Programme workshop ‘NGOs and Peace-building in Afghanistan’ in 1994, peace-building hasfound its way onto the agenda and into the strategicthinking of some aid agencies. Several aid organisationsare now taking steps to address localised tensions andviolence by providing alternative livelihoods forcombatants, restoring communications betweenopposing factions and revitalising the role of Afghan‘social capital’ to manage the conflict. The time is nowripe to give community-based peace-building nationaland international political support. In this context, theneed for a well-informed forum involving practitioners,policy-makers and academics working in Afghanistanwas evident, providing them with the opportunity toexamine past experiences and redefine their philosophy,strategies for, and approaches to, peace-building inAfghanistan.

The value of the workshop

The value of such a gathering depends upon (a) theparticipants and (b) the culture and methodology itadopts to deal with the challenges. The York workshopmanaged to bring together a gender-balanced group ofpolicy makers and practitioners from donor, operational,international and national organisations working inAfghanistan as well as academics with a professionalbackground in Afghanistan. In addition, the workshopbenefited from the input of a group of practitioners andacademics with experience from other conflict settings.This workshop was unique in that the concerns andexpectations of all stakeholders from the aid community(donors, national and international agencies) were wellarticulated and deliberated by their respectiverepresentative groups. The active participation ofAfghans in the workshop contributed significantly tothe debates for a number of reasons.

Context sensitivity and appropriateness ofthe debates

The workshop found that even ‘principle-based’approaches could do harm, if not properly sensitised tothe Afghan context. It is therefore vital that strategiesand policies are formulated through active participationof Afghans. Since they are the ones to be affected bysuch aid policies, the Afghans are best placed to knowwhere, when and how intervention helps or hinders.

Agents from the Afghan communities

Afghan participation in the workshop should not beconsidered merely as token representation. In theabsence of a national interlocutor to the aid community

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Aid Programmes for Bosnia Seminar, London,28 November 1997

Focusing on opportunities for European organisationsin the International Reconstruction Programme forBosnia-Herzegovina, this seminar held in Londonprovided a comprehensive, authoritative and up-to-datebriefing to companies. The Institute of European Tradeand Technology invited senior representatives of majorinternational donor agencies, UK officials and countryexperts to talk about their programmes and assess theprospects for the next two to three years.

Themes covered included:• the latest development and project opportunities in

Bosnia-Herzegovina;• objectives and priorities of the main donor agencies;• tendering procedures and operational practice;• practical issues on the ground;• how to track contract opportunities, find partners and

much more.

To obtain a report, please contact: Mary Marshall,IETT, 29 Throgmorton Street, London EC2N 2AT,UK. tel: +44 171 628 9770, fax: +44 171 628 7692.

Conference on ‘The Promotion andProtection of Human Rights in Acute Crisis’,organised by DFID and the Human Rights Centre, EssexUniversity. London, 11-13 February 1998

The British government has repeatedly signalled thecentrality of human rights to its approach to internationalrelations as a whole. The aim of this conference was tostimulate discussion on the particular problem ofprotecting human rights in ‘acute crisis’ and to producea set of policy recommendations for donor countries onhow best to contribute to international efforts to promotehuman rights in crises. The complementarity betweenhuman rights law and international humanitarian lawwas discussed, and the importance of agencies involvedin crises being sufficiently flexible to know what is mostappropriate to a particular situation. There was alsodiscussion of the differences between protection andassistance, and of whether or not assistance canundermine protection, though this was not resolved. Itis clear that the humanitarian and human rightscommunities have some way to go before theyunderstand each other and their respective roles inprotecting human rights fully. Draft recommendationsinclude: strengthening international accountability, theneed for a pre-involvement strategy and for an ongoingstrategic approach recognising the centrality of HRprotection but does not attempt to substitute assistancefor political objectives, and on improving HR fieldoperations and their coordination with other actors. Therecommendations will be part of an ‘Agenda for Action’to be published in April.

For more information on the seminar and ‘Agendafor Action’ contact: Human Rights Centre, Universityof Essex, UK. tel: + 44 1206 872558 fax: + 1206873627

for Afghanistan, the role of the Afghan NGOs and theAfghan employees of aid agencies as agents of civilsociety for recovery and peace-building is increasinglyimportant. Twenty-three Afghans participated in theworkshop, bringing with them a voluntary ethos, a highdegree of professionalism and a commitment to theAfghan cause for peace and recovery. For them, theworkshop served as an international forum to air theviews of Afghan grassroots groups who, in spite of theirenormous suffering, still go unheard internationally.

Moreover, such a forum can help the professional andpolitical growth of future civil leadership in the aidenvironment of Afghanistan. It provides a uniqueopportunity to interact with international professionalsand gain knowledge that is difficult, if not impossible,to gain in the non-particpatory environment of manyexpatriate-dominated aid organisations.

The York workshop was a remarkable event, advancingdebates with the aim of enhancing the role of aid in thepeace-building process in Afghanistan. A reportsummarising the debates and major findings of theworkshop will be available from PRDU within the nextcouple of months. There are plans for a follow-up of theworkshop debates in Afghanistan.

For a copy the report contact: Arne Strand or SultanBarakat, Post-war Reconstruction & DevelopmentUnit, University of York, Heslington, York, UK YO15DD. tel: +44 1904 433 959, fax: +44 1904 433 949

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conferences

ForthcomingConferences

Who Wins Wars? The Human Cost ofConflict , London School of Oriental and AfricanStudies, 14 March 1998

This conference, organised by Oxfam and Cooperative,is the culmination of a series of seminars run in Londonto provide a forum on conflict-related issues. Theconference brings together key decision makers, expertsin the field of conflict, campaigners and members ofthe public to debate conflict-related issues.

The programme will run from 10am to 4pm and asandwich lunch is provided. There will be a range ofspeakers, seminars and a Question Time paneldiscussion.

5th Annual Conference of the InternationalEmergency Management Society (TIEMS),Washington, DC, 19-22 May 1998

TIEMS was founded in 1993 as a non-profit organisationfor the purpose of bringing together users, planners,researchers, managers, response personnel and otherinterested parties to exchange information on the use ofinnovative methods and technologies to improve ourability to avoid, mitigate, respond to and recover fromnatural and technological disasters.

The theme for the TIEMS 1998 Conference will be‘Disaster and Emergency Management: InternationalChallenges for the Next Decade’, reflecting the fact thatthe current decade is the International Decade of NaturalHazard Reduction. The conference is intended fordisaster and emergency leaders, planners, managers,researchers, educators and practitioners from theinternational community.

For more information, please contact: The GeorgeWashington University, Conference ManagementServices, 2029 K Street, NW, Suite 501, WashingtonDC 20006, USA. tel: +1 202 973 1110 fax: +1 202973 1111 email: cms@admin.dup.gwu.edu, or visitthe website at www.gwu.edu/~cms/tiems/

6th Annual International Conference onConflict Resolution – Sharing Tools for Personaland Global Harmony, St Petersburg, Russia, May 8-18 1998

A multidisciplinary and multicultural conferencefocusing on conflict resolution. Presentations willexplore conflict resolution within diverse contexts,including: arts and creativity, education, gender, globalconflict, economics and business, health and healing arts.There will be hands-on training and dialogues on theoryand perceptions of conflict and resolution, andnetworking and collaboration. The programme consistsof six days of all-day institutes, workshops, round tablesand community meetings.

For more information please contact: Steve Olweeanor Sandra Friedman, Common Bond Institute, 12170South Pine Ayr Drive, Climax, MO 49034, USA. tel:+1 616 665 9393, email: solweean@aol.com or visitthe website at ahpweb.org/events/98russia

4th Annual Meeting of the InternationalAssociation of Peacekeeping TrainingCentres (IAPTC), Oslo, 8-9 May 1998

The conference will explore issues in civil-militarycooperation in peace operations, the role of humanitarianorganisations in peace operations and the training ofsoldiers and civilian police. Any institutions that wouldlike to be members of the IAPTC are invited.

More details can be obtained from Mrs Tryggestador Mrs Harket at the Norwegian Institute forInternational Relations, Oslo. fax: +47 2 2177015 orby email at TorunnL.Tryggestad@nupi.no or websitewww.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/iaptc.htm

Principled Aid in an Unprincipled World:War and Humanitarian Principles, hosted byODI and ECHO in London, 7 April 1998

The conference will be opened by Ms Clare Short,Secretary of State for International Development, andMme Emma Bonino, European Commissioner forHumanitarian Aid, and all speakers have extensiveexperience in the practice and policy of humanitarianassistance.

The aim of the conference is to clarify understanding ofhumanitarian principles and provide a forum in whichtheir incorporation into practice can be discussed. It willinclude keynote papers and case studies and concludewith a discussion panel on which key actors from thehumanitarian community will take this issue forward.

Any further enquiries regarding invitations can beaddressed to: Forum Europe, tel: +44 181 8708969,fax: +44 181 8745302, email: kbj64@dial.pipex.com

Places must be reserved in advance and will be allocatedon a first come, first served basis.

For further information, please telephone AlisonWillis, Oxfam Campaigns Department on +44 171931 9330.

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Conflict Transformation. Strategies andExperiences. A comparative review of somereports.

The proliferation of small arms, civil war andwarlordism are symptoms of the so-calledprivatisation of violence. Simultaneously, in

recent years there has been a notable trend towards theprivatisation of diplomacy. Track one approaches toconflict, ie. diplomatic and military initiatives by stateactors, are complemented by a growing number of tracktwo approaches: interventions by private actors –individuals, but especially NGOs – and attempts to buildpeace ‘from below’. These various publicationsdocument a variety of conflict transformationexperiences and it is possible to discern somefundamental structural themes that can be grouped underthe peace process, the peace accords and a sustainablepeace.

Key actors in the process of peace are the violent powerbrokers, indigenous civil society groupings and outsidemediators. Of central importance in any peace process

are the different and shifting constellations betweenthem. Regional groupings of governments may try tobring about an end to violence, such as the Contadoragroup in Guatemala2 or the Economic Community ofWest African States in Liberia1. Individual governmentsmay also try to play a constructive role as was the casewith the Italian government in Mozambique3, and theNorwegian and Spanish governments in Guatemala2.Surprisingly, in Liberia, the US as a potentially veryinfluential player engaged in a very low key manner1.Conflict transformation initiatives may be undertakenby the UN, often through a Special Representative ofthe Secretary General, but the report of a conferencethat brought many of them together12 focuses on post-conflict peace-building and does not review activitiesat the mediation phase. In a number of instanceshowever, it is non-state initiaves that come to play animportant role. The Lutheran World Federation was animportant actor in the peace process in Guatemala2, aswell as in the San Egidio community in Mozambique3.

The evaluation of the role and experience of InternationalAlert in Sri Lanka is mixed, while the organisation, after

having played a majorrole in obtaining properrecognition for the RUFin Sierra Leone, becamethe object of sharprecriminations followingthe military coup thatinitiated a new cycle ofviolence11. Fascinatingare the in-depth accountsof the role of T. Rowlandof the multi-nationalLonhro, in brokering thepeace between Frelimoand Renamo inMozambique3, and of K.Lode, a former residentrepresentative ofNorwegian Church Aid inMali, in enlarging thespace for Malian civilsociety to carry the peaceprocess6,7.

A strategic question foroutsiders attempting totransform a conflict is thatof working with the

Publications

1. The Liberian Peace Process 1990-1996. ed. by J. Armon and A. Carl. (1996)2. ‘Negotiation Rights: the Guatemalan peace process’. ed. by J. Armon, R. Sieder

and R. Wilson (1997)3. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective. ed. by J. Armon, D. Hendrickson

& A. Vines (1998)All three are available from Conciliation Resources, London. Fax +44 171 8370337 or email accord@conciliation.gn.apc.orgArticles of the Guatemala report will be published in Spanish in Cuadernos deDebate. Contact Dr. R. Poitevin, FLACSO Guatemala, Apartado Postal 263-A,01009 Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala. Fax +502 3326 729 or emailflacso@concyt.gob.gt. Each report contains the texts of major accords, a chronologyof major events, an overview of key actors, and analytical articles putting the warand peace process in context.

4. Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitationin Mozambique (1997)Evaluation Dpartment Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PO Box 8114 DEP,N 0032 Oslo. Commissioned by the donor.

5. Synthèse du Processus des Rencontres Intercommunautaires du Nord du Mali(1995-1996), by K. Lode (1997)Misjoneshogskolens Forlag, Stavanger, Oslo, Norway.

6. Civil Society takes Responsibility. Popular involvement in the peace process inMali, by K. Lode (1997)Peace Research Institute, Oslo, fax: +47 22 5477 01 or email info@prio.no. TheMali report is an insider account by a key protagonist in the peace process.

7. Norwegian Church Aid’s Humanitarian and Peace-Making work in Mali (1997)Evaluation Department, Norway. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PO Box8114 DEP, N 0032 Oslo. Commissioned by the donor.

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publications

p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r yleaderships and/or ofattempting to strengthenand support aconstituency for peace atthe grassroots level. Ineither case, people need tobegin to consider theirfundamental and longerterm interests. The morebroad-based a peaceprocess, the more chancethere appears that it willbe sustainable. In Liberia1

and in Guatemala2 civilsociety groups foundthemselves increasinglymarginalised from thepeace process and thepeace accords wereconcluded above theirheads. In Somalia, the UNand Ethiopia initiallyattempted a top-downapproach to peacemaking, and then shiftedgear with the creation ofintermediary district andregional councils. One ofthe problems that hasensued however is thatsubsequently donors andinternational agencieshave generally not been very forthcoming in supportingor recognising these institutions.10 In Sri Lanka,International Alert works with groups of parlimentariansand in Burundi with networks of members of the nationalelite and in both countries the organisation has also beenworking with national media representatives11. Searchfor Common Ground after some initial abortive attemptsto work with national elite members in Macedonia hasfound a niche and a strategy at intermediate level, witha major focus on the media and education8. TheMozambican Catholic Church played an important rolein the peace process, when such a role became acceptableto both warring parties3. When in Mali the warringparties were prepared to make peace, they created a spacefor civil society involvement in the process. K. Lodeand his Malian colleagues facilitated the mobilisationof that civil society through a whole series ofcommunity-level meetings5,6.

The mission of UN troops in Macedonia constitutes thefirst deployment to prevent conflict. Revealinglyhowever, the objective of the mission is limited topreventing ‘spill-over’ of the tensions with the Albanians

in Kosovo and the violence in Albania itself. It does notaddress the tensions of Macedonia with its neighbours,nor the potential internal conflict between mostly urbanMacedonians and rural Albanians in the country8.

There are two important aspects to peace accords: theirquality and their transparency. By publishing keyagreements, Conciliation Resources hopes to contributeto lesson-learning for the negotiations and drafting offuture peace accords1,2,3. The more ambiguity theycontain, the more issues remain unaddressed and thegreater the risk that the peace accords will collapse.Peace accords should not simply contain measures toend a war, but be specific about post-conflict peace-building arrangements. Peace accords also need to comein the public domain. The 1991 Tamanrasset accordswere not available to ordinary Malians which fuelledsuspicions and allowed the signatories to renege onthem6. The publication and dissemination of peaceaccords among the people concerned is therefore itselfa step in the peace process.

Peace accords may lead to a cessation of hostilities, butdo not by themselves guarantee a sustainable peace. The

8. Peace building in Macedonia. Searching for common ground in civil society.by M. Lumsden (1997)Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway. fax: +47 22 5477 01 or emailinfo@prio.no. The Macedonia report an external consideration of the strategy ofSearch for Common Ground in the context of multiple tensions in the republic.

9. Learning Conflict and Teaching Peace in Former Yugoslavia (1998) by P. Jarman& J. ObergTransnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Lund, Sweden. fax:+46 46 14 45 12 or email: tff@transnational.orgAn account of a series of workshops in the Balkans that provided a first opportunityfor people of different groups to meet and discuss the violence that has sweptthe region. With comments and reflections on the role of facilitator.

10. Building the Peace. Experiences of collaborative peacebuilding in Somalia 1993-1996. (1997)Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden. fax: +46 18 693059 or email:lpi@algonet.seA commissioned study to draw lessons from the years of involvement withcommunity based, bottom up, peace building in Somalia.

11. NGOs in Conflict. An evaluation of International Alert. by G. Sorbo, J. Macrae& L. Wohlgemuth (1997)Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway fax: +47 5557 4166 or email:cmi@amadeus.cmi.noA comprehensive evaluation that apart from the three case studies also discussesInternational Alert’s organisational management. It contains a number of relevantarticles in annex as well as International Alert’s reply to the evaluation.

12. Winning the Peace. Concepts and lessons learned of post-conflict peacebuilding.by W. Kuhne (1996)Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik D 82067, Ebenhausen, Germany. fax: +498178 70312 or email: Keuhne@swp.extern.lrz-muenchen.deThe report of a conference in July 1996 that brought together several SRSGs,UN force commanders and other UN personnel, World Bank and NGOrepresentatives. The report summarises key issues from post-conflict peacebuilding experiences in Mozambique, Haiti, Angola, Cambodia, Somalia,Rwanda, Liberia and El Salvador and summarises a number of thematicdiscussions, one of them being the authority and resources of a SRSG.

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question is whether or to what degree peace agreementshave addressed the root causes of war. In Mozambiquethe main cause may have been the regionaldestabilisation policy of the South African ‘apartheid’regime, but in many other countries the violence isrooted in political, social and economic injustices. Asustainable peace requires the demobilisation,disarmament and reintegration of fighters, the return andreintegration of refugees, political integration and powersharing, and trauma healing and reconciliation. But italso requires economic reconstruction, equal humandevelopment opportunities, and social justice. The peaceagreements in Liberia seem to have rewarded thewarlords for their violence1 while the peace accords inGuatemala remain at the level of a political elite. Theydo not open the way for a broad-based participatorydemocracy. There is more recognition of the rights ofthe indigenous Maya population, but the injustices inland ownership and land use have not been addressed2.Amnesties appear inevitable in ending wars as diverseas those of Mali6 and Guatemala2, but there remainsstrong debate in Guatemala about the naming of thoseresponsible for gross human rights violations - theCommission for Historical Clarification has been givena mandate and a time frame that render it ineffectivefrom the start. Reconciliation is explored as a theme inthe Balkans9. Although people on all sides have suffered,there are instigators and victims of violence, and thereare those that have gained and those that have lost fromthe war. Most may accept to again share one living space,but genuine emotional reconciliation may takegenerations. Demobilising fighters and collecting smallarms is often a difficult and incomplete process andshould receive more donor support4. Former fighters mayreintegrate socially, sometimes as in Mozambique, withthe effective use of traditional healing rituals3. The majorchallenge however is one of economic integration.Where that does not happen, as in Mali, there may be anincrease in banditry and in regional arms trafficking7.Peace agreements and elections can lead to morepolitical and social inclusion, but they do not bringdevelopment and equal economic opportunities to all.Unfortunately, often international attention and aid fizzleout once peace agreements have been signed andelections held. Mozambique, the north of Mali andGuatemala continue to struggle with the same povertyand underdevelopment as before the war, conditions thatare only aggravated by high debt and structuraladjustment programmes that are imposed for the sakeof economic growth without much consideration of theirimpact on a sustainable peace.

Making Peace Work: the Role of theInternational Development Community,Policy Essay No. 18, ODC, Washington DC, USA,1997 (pp. 120, A5).

Post-conflict reconstruction/peace-building form thefocus of much recent attention by the internationalcommunity. Since the end of the Cold War, donorgovernments have increasingly been called upon tosupport transitions to peace. This 18th in the series ofODC (Overseas Development Council) Policy Essaysoffers a digestible (A5, 120pp) set of recommendationsfor policy makers engaged in maintaining andconsolidating peace in countries emerging from conflict.The essay is based on six case studies examining thepeace processes in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambiqueand Nicaragua, drawing lessons for international supportto political, institutional, social and economic structuresin ‘post’-conflict societies.

The authors recognise that the role of donors is to helphost governments and the international community toprioritise action in the four phases of peace-building:negotiation, cessation of hostilities, transition andconsolidation. Six key lessons in developing appropriatepolicies are identified from the case studies. The authorsdistinguish between priorities for immediate action, i.e.those areas where it is felt that adequate informationexists to identify priorities for support, including:coordination within the international community,recommending the appointment of a UN residentcoordinator (or World Bank coordinator) for peacebuilding activities to help minimise turf battles; the needto be transparent with host governments as to the levelof financial assistance they can expect; the need toinvolve all combatants in a collaborative forum ofnegotiation; and those areas where there is a need forfurther research such as the need to lengthen time framesfor peace-building beyond the current 1-2 year phasebefore multi-party elections are held.

The essay is well laid out, with chapters on commonfeatures of countries in conflict / ‘post’-conflict phases.It is written in clear language with lessons and case studyexamples drawn out in boxes for rapid perusal; theauthors know their target audience well.

The principal shortcoming seems to be the somewhatlimited attention to the complexity of influences on thedonor. Essentially the authors focus on the role of donoraid departments and their relations with hostgovernments and combatants. There is little discussionof relations between aid departments and their trade andforeign policy or defence counterparts, more often thannot the source of confused messages to unrepresentativeregimes. There is little advice on how to tackle the

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NGOs and complex political emergencies.David Hulme and Jonathan Goodhand; WorkingPaper 1, University of Manchester (IDPM) andINTRAC, 1997 (33pp, A4)

This is Working paper 1 of a two year study funded byDFID to explore the potential contribution of NGOs topeace-building in complex political emergencies. Thisfirst paper begins with a review of current literature onconflict and NGOs and presents a conceptual frameworkfor analysis of case study material. It will go on to drawon comparative case studies of NGOs in Afghanistan,Sri Lanka and Liberia. The authors seek to add toresearch which has gone before or is currently underway in its use of two distinct methodological tools: byconducting the study from the viewpoint of thecommunity rather than the more familiar internationaland national perspectives; not least because ‘conflictentrepreneurs’ (not a pleasant term) or organisers ofviolence have a sophisticated understanding ofcommunity level dynamics and are able to exploit thisknowledge. In order therefore to tackle their hold onsocieties, peace-builders must have the same tools.Second, the authors have taken case study material fromCentral and SE Asia to broaden the basis for comparisonoutside the traditional African conflict context.

Chapter 1 offers tentative definitions of terms such aspeace-building, conflict, NGOs and peace in a bid tobring clarity to the debate by providing a common pointof departure, and thus contribute to a set of‘programmable’ definitions. The authors subscribe tothe view that conflict is an inherent part of change in asociety and that peace is not merely the absence ofconflict but of structural inequity. It follows thereforethat the key issue is not how to prevent, but rather howto manage conflict and that simplistic dichotomiesbetween peace and conflict only serve to cloud the realissues. There has been a tendency for NGOs to use theterm peace-building rather loosely, often unhelpfullysubsuming elements of prevention, alleviation andresolution of conflict; where there does seem to beconsensus however is on the fact that the term impliesmore than simply relations with warriors, includingattitudes and socio-economic circumstances of thesociety and that peace-building is not a single event butrefers to the pre-, during and post conflict phases.

Less familiar terms such as ‘predatory social formations’(Crisp 1995) are identified as an important feature ofCPEs, drawing attention to the role of vested interestssuch as drug warlords in Afghanistan in continuinguncertainty and conflict. NGOs too are considered, forexample the relationships between external, formalorganisations and local, informal ones which may eitherbuild or undermine peace efforts. Some also distinguishbetween relief, development and peace-building roles.

Chapter 2 looks at causes and mutations of conflict,acknowledging that conflict itself can change conflict,so that the original causes are no longer those whichsustain the conflict. The authors also consider thequestion of social capital and the equation ‘increasedsocial capital = reduced conflict’. If social compactingis considered to be an appropriate tool for peace-building, the next question is can it be enhanced byexternal intervention given the complexity of socialstructures? Is social capital always positive? Is there ananti-social capital which excludes certain groups or isexploited by ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ – Ku Klux Klan?

Their conceptual framework begins with a breakdownof NGO roles along a sort of worst case scenario to bestcase spectrum: fuelling conflict, a holding operation andpeace-building. Against this they consider a table ofindicators to measure the impact of NGOs, and finallyexplore issues relating to the framework – 1. socialcapital as peace capital, 2. local leadership andinstitutional analysis – e.g. Taleban in Afghanistan 3.Peace auditing NGOs – ensure NGOs are realistic anddon’t overclaim their role in peace building.

The authors also look at types of intervention – directe.g. Aid to purchase arms, capacity building, advocacy.

Whether you agree or not, clarity is a starting point – itsquite an extensive study aiming to cover – how donorsidentify which NGOs to support, how to channel fundingto enhance NGO performance and accountability andhow NGO responses are related to and integrated withina wider response. Each could form the subject of a singleresearch project and on top of it all from communityperspective. How will they do it?

It is a fair point that without framework and systematicanalysis we cannot tell how successful or not NGOs areat peace-building or any means of comparison – througha peace building lens darkly? Expect to come up withdifferent sets of recommendations, tailored to specifictypes of NGOs working in specific conflicts at particularlevels at particular phases in these conflicts. Will thislead to less ‘department store’ off the peg programmesto more boutique/niche NGOs with customisedprogrammes to suit specific contexts? PresumablyVolume 2 will include comparative case study material.

question of groups and factions who have an economicinterest in sustaining war.

However, in the short space accorded the discussion itwould be difficult to cover all this ground – perhapsmore of the same will be forthcoming.

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38

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Refugee Survey Quarterly 16(3) 1997.UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research,Geneva, and Oxford University Press. 226 pp.

This issue is dedicated to forcibly transferredpopulations, a process for which the terms ethniccleansing and deportation are often used. The flight ofentire populations is not a result but a driving objectiveof conflict and a such, raises not only humanitarian needsbut also human rights questions about the right to remain,freedom of movement and residence within a territory,and the right to return. Close cooperation between reliefagencies and, for example, the UN Commissioner forHuman Rights and the Subcommission on the Preventionof Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities isrequired. The situation poses particular problems for aidagencies as repatriation becomes a highly chargedpolitical question. Return must be accompanied withconflict resolution and reintegration, but alongside arequestions of restitution and compensation for the lossof property. Inevitably, as UNHCR has experienced inthe course of its work in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States for example, aid agencies are drawninto the political work of conflict resolution.

Beyani’s article explores the interplay between politicaland legal problems, highlighting gaps in internationallaw especially with regard to the acquisition of internalterritory by means of ethnic cleansing. His case studiesinclude the Former Yugoslavia, Abkhazia, Palestine andRwanda. Nahajlo’s article is an insightful overview ofthe history of population transfers and deportations inthe Soviet Union under Stalin, and of renewed ethniccleansing in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus afterthe demise of the Soviet Union. Dale’s article is adetailed case study of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflictwhich remains unresolved. The journal also includesreports and presentations by the Special Rapporteur onthe human rights dimensions of population transfers,including the implantation of settlers and settlements,an overview of relevant international law instrumentsand the states party to them, and a select bibliography.

This excellent publication highlights the challenges forhumanitarian and human rights work that havecharacterised the arena in Eastern Europe and the CIS.It should enrich humanitarian aid paradigms that havebeen shaped by African cases which, until the GreatLakes crisis, focused on Cold War ideological conflicts,insurgency against repressive governments, war-createdfamines and predatory warlords in collapsed states.

‘Mines antipersonnel. La guerre en tempsde paix.’ 1996 by Handicap International. EditionsGRIP/Complexe. rue Van Hoorde 33, 1030 Brussels.100 pp. ISBN 2 87027 655 9

‘Le complexe francais de production desmines et systemes associes.’ 1997 by B. Elomari& B. Barrillot. Observatoire des Transfertsd’Armements. BP 1027 F 69201 Lyon Cedex 01. 80pp. ISBN 2 9508291 4 7

These are two publications sponsored by HandicapInternational in the context of the Global Campaign fora Total Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines. The firstbooklet provides a brief and clear overview of the issues.It traces the reasons for the proliferation of antipersonnellandmines, and their consequences – which are notlimited to the death or physical disability of individuals.Landmine victims suffer psychological trauma and alsorequire socio-economic support to reintegratethemselves back into their communities. Minefieldsendanger and impede rural livelihoods and minecasualties pose a heavy burden on the health structure.A humanitarian response to the problems of mine victimsis necessary but insufficient. There is a need foraccelerated and, for civilian purposes, completeclearance of existing minefields and for a total ban onthe production and deployment of new antipersonnelmines to prevent the problem reoccurring. It is thelimitations in existing international treatises, and thereluctance of military establishments and politicalleaders to commit themselves to a total ban onantipersonnel mines that has given rise to the globalaction of non-governmental organisations. The reportconcludes with a recommendation for total transparencyand unilateral action of states. The second publicationprovides an overview of major companies that produceand export antipersonnel mines, and of the position ofcountries worldwide towards production and export. Theloopholes in existing international treatises are thenhighlighted and the ways in which the arms industrytries to exploit these. The main part of the study is adetailed review of official statements by the Frenchgovernment, followed by an inventory of Frenchcompanies and their ‘network-organigramme’, and themines they produce. This inevitably raises the questionof the political control and enforcement of governmentalpolicy over private sector activity. The report concludeswith a call for specific French legislation and a tighterinternational convention.

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AN

D finally

And Finally...

Laura Gibbons, RRN Coordinator.

Koenraad Van Brabant, RRN Policy and Development Officer.

Sarah Scott, RRN Administrator .

The RRN Team

The RRN forms part of the Humanitarian Policy Programme, a wider group within ODI focusingon research into and evaluation of humanitarian policy.

...with additional support, advice and assistance from Caroline Dobbing, part-time RRNAdministrator , John Borton, Research Fellow, Joanna Macrae, Research Fellow, PhilippaAtkinson, RRN Regional Representative, West Africa, Philip Winter, RRN RegionalRepresentative, East Africa.

40

RRNBackground

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network was conceived in 1993 and launched in 1994 as a mechanismfor professional information exchange in the expanding field of humanitarian aid. The need for such amechanism was identified in the course of research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute(ODI) on the changing role of NGOs in relief and rehabilitation operations, and was developed inconsultation with other Networks operated within ODI. Since April 1994, the RRN has producedpublications in three different formats, in French and English: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papersand Newsletters. The RRN is now in its second three-year phase (1996-1999), supported by four newdonors – DANIDA, ECHO, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the Department forInternational Development, UK. Over the three year phase, the RRN will seek to expand its reach andrelevance amongst humanitarian agency personnel and to further promote good practice.

Objective

To improve aid policy and practice as it is applied in complex political emergencies.

Purpose

To contribute to individual and institutional learning by encouraging the exchange and disseminationof information relevant to the professional development of those engaged in the provision of

humanitarian assistance.

Activities

To commission, publish and disseminate analysis and reflection on issues of good practice in policyand programming in humanitarian operations, primarily in the form of written publications, in both

French and English.

Target audience

Individuals and organisations actively engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance at nationaland international, field-based and head office level in the ‘North’ and ‘South’.

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network is supported by:

Ministry of Foreign AffairsDANIDA ECHO

Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Department for InternationalDevelopment (NEW LOGO!)