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LAfrican Trade and Development Journal

Numéro spécial sur le coton Anglais:Mise en page 1 21/04/11 17:00 Page1

GLOCAL African Trade and Development Journal

Special Edition: Cotton

A. Overview of the Cotton Sector in West and Central Africa

1. Situation of the CottonSector in West and Central AfricaAuthors: José Tissier, AnneLegile, Lionel Cafferini,Philippe Dierickx, Jean-Christophe Pecresse, Engineers - AFD

B. Sector Stakeholders in West and Central Africa

2. ROPPA: We don’t eat cotton, but it feeds us…3. The Association of African Cotton Producers (AproCA);Professionalising Organisations and Defending the Interests of Cotton ProducersAuthor: Komonsira Dioma, Head of Communi-cations - AproCA4. Cotton companies: what solutions for the cotton sector? Interview with Adeyemi Achamou Fahala, Agro-Economist Engineer and Permanent Secretaryof the African Cotton Association (ACA)

C. The Role of Associations, NGOs and International Agencies Working in the Cotton Sector

5. Contribution of the European CommissionAuthors: DG DEVCO, DG AGRI, DG COMMERCE6. COMPACI; the Commitment of the German Cooperationin Supporting African CottonInterview with: Wolfgang Bertenbreiter,Team Leader Cotton Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale ZusammenarbeitGmbH (GIZ)7. The Coordination and Follow-Up ofAfrican Cotton Development ActivitiesAuthors: Pierre Berthelot, Director of Cos-coton Secretariat andexpert in innovation within the All ACPProgramme relating to agriculturalgoods and Mr. Fabio Berti, Researcher at Liege University and expert in cotton with the All ACP Pro-gramme relating to agricultural goods

D. Valorising African Cotton and the Textile Industry

8. African Fashion as a Value Adding andBranding Component of Textile CottonProduction in West and Central AfricaInterview with: Seidnaly Sidhamed Alphadi, Fashion designer and President of the‘Festival International de la Mode Africaine’ (FIMA) 9. Cotton made in Africa: or How to Link Up African Producers with Major International Textile Distributors using a Business-Development AgendaInterview with: Christoph Kaut, ManagingDirector - Aid by Trade Foundation

E. Scientific Research Supporting Cotton Sectors: The Stakes for Westand Central Africa

10. The Importance andRole of African ScientificResearch in Supportingthe Cotton Sector, CORAFAuthors: O. Ndoye, H. Roy-Macauley, M. D. Faye,A. Sangaré, P. Sérémé, CORAF/WECARD

11. Introducing Biotechnologies in AfricanAgriculture: The Issue of Adopting Bt Cottonin West Africa, EndadiapolAuthor: Abdoulaye Koné, Economist specialised inrural activities - Enda diapol

F. Cotton in a Globalised Environment -The Stakes for the Sub-Region

12. Regional Approach to Revamp the Cotton Sector inWest Africa: Analysis and Proposals Authors: Léonidas Hitimana and JeanSibiri Zoundi - OECD Secretariat, Saheland West Africa Club13. Broader Vision of the Cotton Sec-tor in West and Central Africa: TheWAEMU Cotton Agenda Interview with: Balla Diong, Director of the Department of Enterprise, Industries and Crafts -WAEMU Commission14. What role for trade defence measures inpromoting a cotton processing industry inWest Africa? Author: Ousseni Illy, Visiting Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, The Global Economic GovernanceProgramme - University of Oxford15. Agricultural Risk Management Support: TheExample of Mechanisms Mitigating the Volatility ofCotton Prices in Burkina FasoAuthors: José Tissier, Anne Legile, Philippe Dierickx, Engeneers - AFD

G. African Cotton in the Doha Round

16. The Cotton Initiative: Evolutions, Difficulties and Current Status of Debates and NegotiationsInterview with: Prosper VOKOUMA, Ambassadorand C4 Coordinator in Geneva17. Quantification of the impact of U.S. cottonsubsidies on Western and Central AfricanCountriesAuthor: Daniel A. Sumner, Director, University ofCalifornia Agricultural Issues Center and Frank H.Buck, Jr. Professor,Department of Agricultural andResource Economics18. Defending Cotton against American Subsidies: Similarities and Differences between Brazil and West and Central Africa Author: Romain Benicchio, Oxfam International19. Defending Brazilian Cotton: Backgroundand AnalysisInterview with: Flávio Damico, Permanent Missionof Brazil to WTO in Geneva 20. Litigation, a way out of the deadlock in theAfrican Cotton Sector InitiativeAuthor: El Hadji Diouf,Executive Director - 2ATD

Pages 54-66

2 Content

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Pages 42-52


Editorial 3

“We have been writing and writing and writing… but cynically, little progress has been made,” said a cottonexpert who wants to “continue working on concrete issues with real comparative advantages”. So, hepolitely but firmly declined the invitation to write an article for yet another publication on African cot-

ton. While it was being drafted, this special issue on African cotton triggered various reactions from those involved,ranging from stimulation, desire for change and the search for synergies to weariness and frustration. Why haven’tthe sector’s problems, which have been analysed at domestic and international levels for at least nine years now, beenappropriately solved yet?

This ambitious project outlines the situation of the cotton sector in West and Central Africa by asking various expertsto express their views, and builds a platform where concrete, technical, realistic but ambitious crisis-resolution pro-posals could be made. Its success depends on the interest and mobilization of players in the cotton sector.

Hence, this special issue is not “yet another” publication on cotton, at least for two reasons:

l It is less a summary and more a platform pooling different expert opinions. This West and Central Africancotton sector situation analysis will be developed like an organic mosaic such that when viewed as a whole, wewill understand how to support cotton in the sub region.

l From our keyboards, we are the ears, relays and amplifiers of analysis. We welcome constructive dissonancesand contrary analyses. We need your reactions, criticisms and expert opinions. The quality of this tool dependson you, expressing your needs.

The challenge is considerable; this special issue aims at being a catalyst and hopes to contribute to reflections to feedconcrete actions. It is a knowledge-sharing and interaction forum proposing new channels for the defence and supportof the cotton sector and presenting quality initiatives.

You, dear readers, committed actors in and for the cotton sector, are invited to make useof this tool. It is only with your contribution that we will succeed in making it effective.

What is the analysis of AProCA, POPPA, ACA, Sahel and West Africa Club on the currentsituation of cotton in West and Central Africa?

What is the Niger born designer’s understanding of the role of fashion in the value-addingof African textile production?

What are the roles and activities of CORAF, GIZ, AFD, the European Commission, or CosCoton in the cotton sector?

What can African countries learn from Brazil’s experience with the Dispute SettlementBody of the WTO? Could the dispute settlement approachend the impasse on the cotton issue? Could it be the onlyremaining option for African countries at the WTO?

What tools could be used to protect an African textile mar-ket?

If these questions and many others pique your interest,then read through the following pages and send us yourfeedback.

This special issue could not have seen the light of day withoutquality contributions from various authors, the patience andcollaboration of the secretariats of their different organizationsand CIRAD which graciously provided us with photos. On be-half of the 2ACD team, thank you most sincerely. n

What’s the use of publishing one more special issue on African cotton?!

l Annick GOUBAManager,

Cotton Project, 2ATD

African Agency for Trade and Development (2ATD)"Forging Africa's Development through Trade"45-47A Rue de Lausanne, Genève - SuisseTel: +41 22 732 47 37 Fax: + 41 22 732 47 35www.2acd.org

Its main missions are:n Harmonising the different Africantrade policies at multilateral, regionaland bilateral levelsn Providing African negotiators withtechnical information necessary for draf-ting negotiating positionsn Building the capacities of African sta-keholders in trade negotiations: govern-ments, civil society, production sector,academic milieus, etc.


Questions are periodically askedabout the future of cotton inAfrica, especially in the CFAzone, where the notion of a “success story”put forward by some has been deemed tosometimes be merely approximate. After the record highs of the 2003 season,when production in countries of the Franczone stood at 1,120 million tonnes of cottonlint, representing slightly more than 4% ofproduction worldwide and close to 15% oftotal exports, production in West Africadropped by half and in 2008/09 representedonly about 2% of worldwide production and7% of exports. Since then, a slight increase hasbeen observed (492 000 tonnes in 2009/10,and then 619 000 tonnes in 2010/11), butproduction currently in the Franc zonecountries represents only 2.5% of pro-duction worldwide. The weak influence of African coun-tries in the economics of cotton in the world,the rising volatility of cotton prices1 inthe world market, the pegging of the CFAFranc to the Euro and the depreciationof the US Dollar2 – quotation currency forcotton – and finally the rise in productionprices which relate to the petroleum pricehikes and the resulting increase in cotton in-puts (mineral fertilisers3 especially)-. Ginningcosts and marketing costs are some of thestumbling blocks of the underexposed cottonsectors of the CFA zone. In addition to these different constraints,there are the repercussions to the sup-port measures taken by Western coun-tries (USA or EU) and China (forinstance, the distortive impact on worldprices is officially recognised today by theWTO and was evaluated at around 15%), theweakening of the system (bankruptcy ofseveral small and medium-sized “traders” inlate 2008, including Reinhart USA) and the

concentration of the internationalagro-business in cotton (around LouisDreyfus and Cargill), which is still difficult tofully measure and also evaluate its conse-quences. At the same time, the gap in productivitybetween the cotton sectors of West Africa(which was nevertheless a result of their in-tegration, but has yielded significantly highertechnical results than their East African coun-terparts) and the rest of the world atlarge. Yield per hectare is a good illustrationof this. In the early 1980s, cotton lint yieldsstood around 400kg, in West Africa as well asworldwide. The world average rose to about750 kg in mid- 2000s, while at the same time,West Africa barely managed to maintain itsproduction. The use of irrigation – which con-cerns 60% of the total surface area of cottonfarmland – clearly explains this gap for themost part, as the results are similar to thoseevident during a period of intensification sim-ilar to a first green revolution. The averageglobal rain-fed production today is only about450kg. With the exception of Brazil, a countrywell above the others and one which drivesthe world average up, West African countriesalways have some of the best results amongrain-fed crops. It however appears that a newgap has been created by the introduction ofgenetically modified varieties from 1996.

Still, it would be reasonable tobelieve that the future of Africancotton is promising.It would be unnecessary to stress the fact thateven in a period of crisis, cotton still holdsan important place in the economies ofseveral countries in the Sudan-Sahelregion, because it directly or indirectly con-tributes to the livelihood of a substantial num-ber of these people and is a major source offoreign exchange for these countries.

Also, producer strategy structur-ing and industry sector organisa-tion which are behind the highestperforming systems in the region, aremajor assets. They facilitate the man-agement of supply and marketingfunctions of upstream sector stake-holders. These functions have not al-ways been managed satisfactorily inother agriculture systems, particularlyfood crops.

The highly heterogeneous results observedamong farmers at the farm yields level and onwork output show that there has beenmajor progress. While it is still prematureto assess the impact of introducing geneticallymodified varieties which are already consid-erable in Burkina Faso4, the impact of someof the agricultural techniques used are quitevisible today (for example, organic fertiliza-tion, using inputs for soil fertility manage-ment and reasoned parasite management,light animal-driven mechanisation which en-sures an earlier development of cotton farm-land, etc.) and other techniques showpromising signs (direct seeding under vegeta-tion cover). Work on quality (for instance, reducing con-tamination by synthetic fibre from bags usedfor cotton fibre storage, automatic classifica-tion of cotton fibre) has also begun to pay off,thereby ensuring that African cotton regainsits prestige. The capacity for resilience of cotton pro-ducers is even higher as unfortunately, pro-duction alternatives and diversificationprospects are limited (for example, cereals,sesame, sunflower, soy, groundnuts, cashewand tubers in the most water-fed areas). Some-

By J. TISSIER, A. LEGILE, L. CAFFERINI, P. DIERICKX , J.-. PECRESSE - Engineers - AFD

The situation of cotton in West and Central Africa

The weak influence of African countries inthe economics of cotton in the world, the ri-sing volatility of cotton prices in the worldmarket, the pegging of the CFA Franc to theEuro and the depreciation of the US Dollar– quotation currency for cotton – and fi-nally the rise in production prices which re-late to the petroleum price hikes and theresulting increase in cotton inputs (mineralfertilisers especially)-. Ginning costs andmarketing costs are some of the stumblingblocks of the underexposed cotton sectorsof the CFA zone.

4 A- Overview of the Cotton Sector in West and Central Africa

François Giraudy


1 And periodically the depressed prices of cotton fibre in US$: the Cotlook A Index remained significantly below 60US cents per pound from July 2004 to August 2007, then from November 2008 to April 2009;2 The US Dollar value dropped from 1.16 Euro in February 2002 to 0.83 in April 2004, then 0.63 in April 2008 andstands today at about 0.74 Euro.3 Consequently fertiliser prices in Cameroon rose from 220 CFA/kg in 2004 to 340 CFA in 2008 then to 520 CFA in2009.4 In Burkina Faso, the farmed surface areas for genetically modified cotton in 2009/10 was over 130 000 Ha and in2010/11 it was close to 275 000 Ha, that is, two thirds of the surface area.


times it is restricted to niche markets whichin turn face sometimes crippling climatic oreconomic difficulties. At the international level, demand continuedto grow in 2010/2011 and then again in2011/2012, driven by China and India’s5 tex-tile industries needs. With farmland and, con-sequently, world production increasing in2010/11 and 2011/12, supply should ensueand the global stock-to-use ratio should staybelow the fifty-year 50% threshold. After several difficult years (partly caused byexternal factors such as the international eco-nomic and financial crisis), world cottonprices rose from mid-2009, thereby allowingseveral cotton producers to avoid new deficits(or at least, limit them). With unprecedentedlevels at over 200cts/pound early in 20116,the Cotlook A Index in early March 2011 wasestimated7 at 161 cts/lb for the 2011/2012campaign. Thus, this could be a very pos-itive year for African cotton as it is likelyto put them back in the game and boost theconfidence of the producers. In the future, itis however important to follow the evolutionof the relative price of cotton as compared toalternative mainstream productions (cerealsor oilseeds). This would explain for the mostpart, the decline in production in 2006/2007and in 2007/2008, and then the ascendingincrease since the summer of 2009. Although there has been an increase in cottonfarmland which has led to lower prices duringthe ongoing campaign of 2011/2012, ob-servers expect that they should remainabove the past ten-year average . On the whole, the West African cottonproduction system seems sustainable.In comparison with competing systems onother continents which are fuel, fertiliser orpesticide efficient, production is water-effi-cient, as it is rain-fed farming.

This upturn, resulting from ro-bust world prices and a strongerUS Dollar, should however notlead these sectors to limit orpostpone the needed planned

restructuring efforts.Some countries would consider theneeded institutional reform is, for themost part, behind them.

Senegal privatised its cotton cor-poration, SODEFITEX, which iscontrolled today by GEOCOTON.The institutional landscape seems

relatively set, with producers organizedunder the national cotton producers’ feder-ation; Fédération Nationale des Producteursde Coton du Sénégal (FNPCS). Recent years have been difficult (only20,000 tonnes of cotton lint in 2009). Thisled to producers increasingly losing interestin cotton in favour of groundnuts and thestrategic production of which was encour-aged by the authorities and thus continues tobenefit from regular support. The privatisation of SONACOS (now SU-NEOR) and DAGRIS in France were benefi-cial to ADVENS Group. As a result of this,the former became majority shareholder inSenegal’s groundnut and cotton sectors andenabled it to determine a comprehensivepolicy integrating oilseeds and agro fuels. The cotton corporation intends toboost production (40,000 tonnes of cot-ton lint in 2011) and to re-establish, even ex-ceed, its record level of 50,000 tonnes ofcotton lint and thus fully utilise its five gin-ning plants (65,000 tonnes). SODEFITEX,at the same time, started a cotton pro-ducer diversification support pro-gramme. The introduction of a poly-culturelivestock production system(groundnuts/cotton/corn) aims to diversify

the sources of income and preservethe soil (which is in jeopardy in theentire basin). This system was ap-proved by the stakeholders and anincrease of the management teamshas begun. SODEFITEX has alsobegun structuring the corn sector(for instance, the buying, the semi-processing and storage).

In Burkina Faso, thepartial liberalisation ofthe sector in 2004 alsoshaped its institutional

landscape for the long term.Consequently, alongside the long-standing cotton corporation SOFI-

TEX (which accounts for 86% of national pro-duction) two new private corporations haveemerged; FASOCOTON (the Agha Khan andPaul Reinhart Group) in the central regionand SOCOMA (GEOCOTON Group) in theeastern region.

The sector is structured following avertical integration model and is rep-resented in all the three cotton producingsub-regions. Each company faces buyer’smonopoly in their respective areas as thereis an obligation to buy all the cotton lint pro-duced there. This model is characterized bythe supply of inputs on credit (this includescotton inputs and cereal inputs) for produc-ers, with the production of cotton lint beingused as security. In addition, the announce-ment before sowing of a minimum seasonprice for cotton lint has also been important. The removal of the commitment of theState through the withdrawal from manag-ing or directly steering the sector to concen-trate on assistance and orientation with theliberalised cotton sector follow-up commit-tee (Comité de Suivi de la Filière Coton Lib-eralisée) and the increased involvement ofstakeholders are two important componentsof the reform. The two groups of stakehold-ers – cotton corporations organised underthe professional association, AssociationProfessionnelle des Sociétés Cotonnières duBurkina (APROCOB) and producers underthe union, Union Nationale des Producteursde Coton du Burkina (UNPCB) – came to-gether under one trade union: AssociationInterprofessionnelle du Coton du Burkina(AICB). Producers hold capital shares ineach of the three companies. As such, theyparticipate as shareholders on the Board ofDirectors, and thereby have a better under-standing of the difficulties they face.The organisation of the sector provided aninnovative price risk managementmechanism (through the creation of a cot-ton lint price stabilisation fund (Fonds deLissage) based on a price pegged on the in-ternational cotton lint pricing). The AFD al-located an initial 18 million Euros to theFund in late 2007, but this amount is stillbelow optimum projections made in feasibil-ity studies. The stabilisation of the institutional land-scape, stakeholder accountability in gover-nance of the sector, the use of adapted toolsand the adoption of efficient practices are

Krishna Naudin

5 In the case of India, the remarkable development in recent years is that it moved from second world importer in2001/02 to second exporter in 2007/08.6 The Cotlook index reached a record 235.5 cts/pound on 18 February 2011. But this index is more of an indication ofthe level of transactions between “traders” and industrialists than between cotton producers and traders. It also refersto a period when the market is particularly static.6 But due to the exceptional hike in current prices, doubts raised on the ICAC price determination model resulted inthis estimate being based on price averages in the first half of the 2010/2011 campaign.

A- Overview of the Cotton Sector in West and Central Africa 5

On the whole, the West African cottonproduction system seems sustainable.In comparison with competing sys-tems on other continents which arefuel, fertiliser or pesticide efficient,production is water-efficient, as it israin-fed farming.

Krishna Naudin

Anne Legile


GLOCAL


undoubtedly keys to the success of BurkinaFaso cotton. After seven successive years ofgrowth, in 2005/06 it became the first inAfrica with more than 700,000 tonnesof cotton lint produced in over 300,000family plantations and which benefittednearly 20% of the total population of thecountry.Since then, the sector has experienced diffi-cult years as it has been caught up in a crisismostly caused by external factors. Cotton cor-porations have accumulated financial lossesand have been compensated in 2006/07 bythe “Fonds de Lissage”, and the State had tointervene notably, to recapitalise SOFITEX (acompany in which it became once again a ma-jority shareholder, since GEOCOTON’s par-ticipation was dissolved following acapitalisation increase). Producers, con-fronted with payment delays and the appear-ance of internal outstanding payments togroupings, progressively concentrated onother crops. In spite of this, during the diffi-cult years, the sector maintained levels above350,000 tonnes.The crisis damaged confidence be-tween cotton companies and produc-ers, with the latter developing moreopportunistic behaviour than in the past. De-spite the announced price of 182 CFA Francsat the beginning of the 2010 campaign (asagainst 160 CFA Francs of the previous year),despite companies’ efforts to reduce the pay-ment periods and despite maintaining thetransfer price of inputs thanks to State subsi-dies, the surface area of sown land barely in-creased in 2010/11. The vagaries of rainfall in June and the priceof GM seeds influenced the size of sown landand sowing density. Yields remained belowexpectation (less than 1t/Ha), as the largescale introduction of genetically modified cot-ton (66% of sown land in that season) did notgenerate the spectacular output increase ex-pected although parasite pressure remainedlow. In the end, production barely reached400,000 tonnes, which is well below the ob-jectives set8 at the beginning of the harvest. Cotton companies were clearly worriedabout this slow revival. They anticipateda volume discount on the price in paying 200CFA Francs for the cotton and announced acomplementary price at the end of harvest.They paid up quickly and organized massivecommunication campaigns to spread thenews. Expectations for cotton cultivation haveincreased but have not yet reached the antic-ipated levels and producers, being careful,have preferred to wait for the 2011/2012 priceannouncement before making their decision. Also, the ongoing political crisis in Ivory Coastis of deep concern to the Burkina Faso cottonsector: increasingly frequent power outages9

penalise the functioning of SOFITEX ginningplants, and cotton can no longer be exportednor fertiliser imported via the Abidjan port,

thereby significantly increasing transportcosts.Current support for the cotton industry inBurkina Faso is most evident in the project todevelop the cotton sector at the institutional,technical, economic and environmental lev-els. This project, which received 11.6 millionEuros in subsidies from AFD, along with anextra 5 million US$ from the World Bank,mainly aims to build the capacity of producersand their organisations. The delay in develop-ing management assistance activities forplantations and groupings could extend theproject to 2012. This extension will thus helpUNPCB at a critical period, especially giventhat it suffered a major crisis in 2009/2010and has renewed most of its elected officials. The 2011/12 campaign will be a deter-mining period. Major institutionalchanges are expected: for instance; ad-justing the “Fonds de Lissage” mechanism,the financial restructuring of SOFITEX (withthe sale of State held shares, which is cur-rently 51% of share capital) and the industrialrestructuring of SOFITEX (with the redistri-bution of exclusive zones between SOFITEXand FASO COTON for the benefit of the lat-ter). Challenges also include the sector’s capacityto positively and strongly react to currentprice hikes. The accumulated deficits duringthe crisis period and cash flow difficulties hin-dered cotton companies from taking full ad-vantage of the increase in prices in2010/2011.

Other countries underwent more radi-cal institutional reforms which mostlydisrupted the sectors and led to majordifficulties which persist today.

In Ivory Coast, the organisation’sprincipals identified in 2002 for theprivatisation of the sector (break invertical integration and privatisa-

tion by trade) led to some isolation in thesector which found itself without the supportof its long term partners (the AFD and DA-GRIS). After a period of anarchy and loss of confi-dence among stakeholders and due to some ofthe governance deficiencies in the sector(such as random harvesting and no coopera-tion between ginners, the production drain ofneighbouring countries, producers not paid,fraudulent bankruptcy and liquidation of oneof the operators, etc.), the Ivorian cottonsector suffered the direct conse-quences of the political crisis of the lastfew years (for instance, loss of the compara-tive advantage of proximity and the high stan-dards of the Abidjan port). From almost400,000 tonnes of cotton lint in 2001/02,production steadily dropped to a threshold of120,000 tonnes in 2007/08.Today, producers have come together undera federation; the AFFICOT-CI, (Associationdes Faîtières de la Filière Cotonnière de Côted’Ivoire). The national association of profes-sional agricultural organisations of IvoryCoast (ANOPACI) has been implementing,since January 2009, a programme titled “Ac-

tion de restructuration et professionnalisationdes organisations professionnelles agricolesde la filière coton”. This European Unionfunded programme is in line with the generalframework for boosting the cotton sector inIvory Coast and is working on its restructur-ing, while 26 holding companies seem to co-exist today. Cotton companies, six in total, utilise 13plants with an installed capacity of 523,000tonnes. They have joined forces under the As-sociation Professionnelle des Sociétés Coton-nières de Côte d’Ivoire (APROCOT-CI).The AFFICOT-CI and APROCOT-CI are bothmembers of INTERCOTON, the inter-profes-sional organisation created in 2000.A support programme to reorganise the cot-ton sector was established with the financialsupport of the EU (over 15 million Euros),which concerns the paying up of overdue ob-ligations relating to the bankruptcy of one ofthe companies and improving the sector’sproductivity by re-launching animal draughtcultivation and the production of improvedseeds. Part of it also aims at promoting inter-professional management of the cotton sec-tor. The result of the latest harvest seems to reflectsome of the renewed interest amongproducers (60,000 producers in 2009/10)10

since partial State subsidies on fertilisers con-tributed to reducing production costs. It mayexceed 210,000 tonnes in this 2010/11 har-vest, thanks among others, to a new variety ofseeds, .Currently, the serious political crisis isunfortunately stalling the revamping ofthe sector. It is hindering the sector from re-newing ties with its usual donors, therebyblocking cotton companies from having thefunds they need in order to supply producerswith agro-inputs and to pay them on timeduring harvest.

The cotton sector in Benin isthe archetype of the liber-alised sector under the aegis ofthe World Bank, which has since

1992, overseen this country in its efforts toimplement liberal policies. Vertical integra-tion was thus removed as the subsectors ofinput supply, ginning, commercialisation orproducer assistance were entrusted to sepa-rate but mostly private, yet also public (i.e.,notably research and popularisation entities). This restructuring/privatisation under-taken from 1992 onwards turned out tobe a failure. The laxity of political authoritiesvis-à-vis stakeholders (ginners, input suppli-ers and producers) who do not respect therules of the game, and the lack of involvementof elected representatives in the managementof the sector (this includes the administrativearsenal of the AIC [Association Inter-profes-sionnelle du Coton] being the obvious solu-tion) and resulted during the period ofunfavourable and eroding world prices in out-standing payments. Producers progressivelylost confidence in State institutions and in thesector. Professional structuring proved to bedelicate and producers have not yet succeeded

8. 587, 050 tonnes of cotton lint9. Part of Burkina Faso electricity supply grid is linked to theCôte d’IvoireIvory Coast network10 The number of producers, 150 000 before the crisis fell to48 000 in 2008/09

African Trade and Development Journal



in federating third parties into a single pro-fessional association. Production was stable when it reached ap-proximately 350,000 tonnes of cotton lintover ten or so years. After peaking at 410,-000 tonnes in 2004/05, production has cur-rently dropped well below 200,000 tonnes.Consequently today, an industrialpark with a capacity of 600,000tonnes would be far too large.In spite of the new authorities showing inter-est in the sector (this includes processing out-standing payments and developing a projectto stabilise and boost the cotton sector) andtheir will to reorganise the sector (for in-stance creating national councils of stake-holder groups, concluding the privatisationof SONAPRA with the sale of industrialshares to the Talon Group and creating thecotton development corporation, i.e.,SODECO – Société de Développement duCoton), it appears that confidence is still flail-ing. With multiple functions including gin-ning and commercialisation of fibre, butalso upstream promotion of farm productionand downstream processing, SODECO was ina de facto dominant position. It consequentlycontrolled 90% of active ginning units whilethe private company, LCB, controlled the re-mainder.The level of arrears of payment to producersis crippling (close to 3 billion CFA Francs).Despite having some of the highest campaignprices in the sub-region (190 CFA/kg of cot-ton lint for 2010/11 and 20 CFA for criticalfunctions. Added to this was a potential 5CFA premium if production reached 50,000tonnes; 250 CFA/kg of cotton lint for2011/12) but producers still prefer foodcrops (cereals, soy, cassava) which the gov-ernment has made considerable efforts topromote including subsidized inputs andsmall equipment, partial buying at guaran-teed prices in the wake of the 2008 crisis.Consequently, cotton production reachedrock bottom levels in the period of 2009/10at only 160,000 tonnes.However, the 2010/11 campaign seemsto have helped the industry bounceback, since production is expected to reacharound 220,000 tonnes.This slight improvement in production is ex-plained by a series of measures taken to sta-bilise the sector through the AssociationInter-professionnelle du Coton, working incollaboration with the Ministry of agricul-ture. They have created village cotton pro-ducer trade unions, which should result inbetter management of solidarity11, thus sen-sitizing grassroots producers and also stimu-lating input credit committees through thefull payment of producers for the 2009/2010harvest. Although the AFD was highly critical of theselected scheme which was similar to theIvorian scheme, it continued to support thesector and also concentrated on supportingthe professional producers notably via theexploitation council (Projet d’Appui auDéveloppement des Systèmes d’Exploita-

tion (PADSE) followed by the Projet d’Appuiaux Dynamiques Productives Agricoles(PADYP) to the tune of 10 million Euros),which is dedicated to developing a compo-nent for management assistance for produc-ers’ organisations, especially in the cottongrowing areas. Thus cotton revival prospects in Beninare still uncertain.

Togo’s cotton production alsocollapsed in recent years.After peaking at 190,000 tonnes ofcotton lint in 1998/99, production

crashed in 2005/06 and stagnated at around30,000 tonnes in recent years. This situation,like elsewhere, can be explained not only bythe relative decline in cotton prices,but also by the implementation ofpoorly prepared or abortive reformsand ultimately by the producers’ lossof confidence, who for example were onlypaid for 2003/04 and 2004/05 in 2007! Thearrival at individual moments of private gin-ners (SICOT from 1994 onwards, then SOPICin 1999 and SOCOSA in 2001) without a reg-ulatory institutional framework, led to over-investment which is more glaring todaysince these three companies went out of busi-ness in 2005. The degradation of the gover-nance of the SOTOCO corporation alsoexplains for the most part the company’s in-ability to pay its debts to producers. Producers’ lack of interest led to reducedfarmland and yields - which was practicallyhalved in ten years also amplified the breakin support for the producers as well. Therewas a decline in cotton research followingtheir transfer to new structures, namely; theTechnical Advisory and Assistance Institute– ICAT (Institut de Conseil et d’Appui Tech-nique) – and the Togolese Institute for Agri-cultural Research – ITRA (Institut Togolaispour la Recherche Agricole).Producers continue to be wary despite effortsmade by the authorities (with support fromSTABEX) which took over arrears of pay-ment to producers. They liquidated SOTCOwhich was in bankruptcy and created in Jan-uary 2009 the cotton corporation; NouvelleSociété Cotonnière du Togo (NSCT). Under anational federation of cotton groupings(Fédération Nationale des Groupements deCoton – FNGPC), they obtained 40% of thecorporate capital of NSCT, but the reformprocess is not yet complete. Institutional, or-ganisational and technical capacity buildingof the FNGPT was a priority. Also, the pri-vatisation of the cotton corporation is yet tobe completed (by assigning the majorityshares of the State to a private buyer) and theinstitutional landscape needs to be com-pleted with the creation of an industry sector.

In 2010/11, production increased slightly(60,000 Ha produced 40,000 tonnes with acost price of 185 CFA Francs). The outlookfor 2011/12 is reasonable with 80,000tonnes. The authorities hope to produce100,000 tonnes of cotton lint by 2013, whichshould increase the sector’s attractiveness toinvestors.

Finally, some countries did not (oronly partially) implement any institu-tional reforms of their cotton sector.It remained more or less consistentwith the traditional model developedin West Africa with a sector incorpo-rated into a public corporation whichhad a buyer’s monopoly. However, some variants can be observed;some countries remained relatively staticand others evolved mostly following the in-creased involvement of producers.

In Mali, the implementation ofthe institutional reform of the cot-ton sector, as expected by finan-cial partners of the country was

blocked for political reasons considering thefinancial difficulties of the cotton corpora-tion, the CMDT, and the high level of publictransfers in its favour. In recent years un-certainty regarding the privatizationof the CMDT added to the long-standingproblems of West African cotton. These in-cluded the erosion of competitiveness, seri-ous financial difficulties in the corporationswhich needed to be highly recapitalized andthe appearance of arrears in the payment toproducers and their loss of confidence, aswell as the investiture required for cottonfarming). As such, cotton’s direct contribu-tion to the national GDP was only 2% in2008. Subsequently, the value of cotton ex-ports diminished year after year until it rep-resented 11% of total exports. For a long time, the Mali cotton sector wasthe first in West Africa to have a stronggrowth rate in its production sector duringthe decade following the devaluation of theCFA Franc12. Production rose from 405,000tonnes of cotton lint in 1995/96 to its recordlevel of 620,000 tonnes in 2003/04. Sincethen, production steadily dropped and thencollapsed following the fall in cotton pricesin the CFA exchange value, the CDMT’s fi-nancial difficulties and consecutive paymentarrears, and reached its 20-year low with201,000 tonnes, despite an attractive pro-ducer price of 200 CFA/kg in 2008/09. Nevertheless, producers started to re-gain confidence in the CMDT once theirarrears were paid in August 2009 and whenthe authorities decided to subsidise fertilis-ers and promote caution circles within thecotton producer cooperative associations.

11 Contrarily to their neighbours, Beninese cotton producers failed to unite under a single organisation although one of the networks rep-resents a significant majority of farmers. Also, the State has always been actively involved in structuring, creating producers’ nationalcouncils which were supposed to bring these networks together and form a single liaison. Thus, the State invalidated the latest re-electionof representatives to these councils and set rules for the next election, thereby blocking previous representatives from standing again forelections. Finally, recently farmers’ cooperative associations were briskly created to replace rural producers’ groups in the 18 most productivedistricts of the country. The purpose of these cooperative associations is to sign up on direct partnership contracts with AIC, thereby scrap-ping the role of the networks and their branches at different geographic levels. This new organization should be effective for the next cam-paign but raises several concerns about its effective operational structureisation.12 . With the exception of 2001/02, when a cotton producer strike reduced production by half.13. But the distrust of the largest producers with regard to joint surety continued…


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Thus, in 2009/10, some producers who hadturned away, returned to cotton13. However,due to poor rainfall, yields did not reach ex-pected levels14 and production barely reached230,000 tonnes, which is well below the setgoals. The international market evolutions ensuredthat at the end of the campaign an additionalproducer price was paid, as well as additionalamounts which went towards a support fund.A contribution was also paid into the recur-rent budget of the cooperative network. The 2010/2011 campaign started under excel-lent climatic conditions as it was stimulatedby early sowing and good crop installation.Despite some instances of drought betweenJune and July, the campaign was prom-ising and confirmed the observed revival ofrecent years. With over 280,000 Ha farmed,production was expected to reach 260,000tonnes, that is, a 14% increase from the2009/10 campaign. But yields were still insuf-ficient with less than a tonne per hectar andas such, the sector was not competitiveenough and could not significantly improveproducers’ income. Finally, credit perform-ance ratios were still unsatisfactory.The 2011/2012 campaign plan which is basedon a 367,000 Ha surface area and an averageoutput of 1,010kg CL/Ha, projects that about370 000 tonnes of cotton lint will be pro-duced. Producer price could be set at 255CFA/kg (which is a 38% increase from thepreceding campaign). This is likely to speedup the revival of cotton farming as observedduring three campaigns now. At the same time, the cotton sector re-form process seems to have entered adecisive phase. The CMDT first of all“branched out” in September 2009 with thecreation of four subsidiaries and a CDMTHolding. A social plan signed in early Januaryand entirely financed by the State, was exe-cuted. The invitation to tender for the privatisationof the subsidiaries through spinoffs of major-ity blocks of shares by the Holding publishedon 22 February 2010 ended in the pre-quali-fication of six companies in May 2010. Fromthe analysis of technical and financial pack-ages, the first provisional selections weremade. New Asian investors are potentialfinal allottees, and could thus join cottonproduction in West Africa. Each private investor would hold 61% of thecorporate capital. Agricultural producers andthe company’s paid staff would join togethercapital shares and hold 20% and 2% respec-tively. The State would keep the remaining17%. The institutional landscape is progressivelybeing shaped.The structuring of producer associa-tions has been completed with the cre-ation of Union Nationale des SociétésCooperatives de Producteurs de Coton du

Mali, which federates the different regional,sectorial and district levels, bringing togetherthe 7,000 cotton producer cooperative asso-ciations. An industry sector, namely the Inter-association Professionnelle du Coton(IPC), created on 3 February 2009, brings to-gether the UNSCPC and Association Profes-sionnelle des Sociétés Cotonnières du Mali(APROSCOM), but it seems to still be dys-functional. It will ensure that the differentprofessional groups involved in the sector willjointly manage critical functions and commoninterest issues: information system on sub-sidiaries, campaign plans, producer price de-termination mechanism, inputs supply,assistance management, agricultural re-search, seeds, rural roads, etc. The creation15 of a cotton ranking board(100% of its shares are held by the CDMT)completes the new arsenal.The creation of a sector regulationboard (ARSC) is also being examined(the Bill was adopted during the cabinet meet-ing of 9 February 2011 and tabled for scrutinybefore the National Assembly).Finally, a cotton development strategic frame-work and a cotton assistance policy letterwere adopted in 2010, thereby confirming thepolitical will of the State of Mali to continueto be involved in regulating the sector. Theirtargets include increasing the productivity,competitiveness and sustainability of the sec-tor, improving management in the sectorthrough consultations and establishing pro-tective measures against global price fluctua-tions. The AFD is directly involved in supportingeconomic development in the cotton produc-ing regions of Mali, with an 11-million-Europroject (Programme d’Amélioration des Sys-tèmes d’Exploitation PASE2), comprised oftwo components: improving governance inthe cotton sector under the framework of in-stitutional reform and increasing the produc-tivity and sustainability of farm holdings.Given the precedent obstacle pertaining to theCMDT was removed, the project is neverthe-less getting off the ground, and the related ac-tivities will begin in the coming months. TheAFD is also indirectly involved through thesupport structure offered by the BNDA, theNational Bank for Agricultural Developmentthus enabling it to diversify into microfinanceinstitutions. The completion of the privatisationprocess currently conditions therecommencement of investment in thesector and the stimulation of donors’interest in order to contribute to develop-ing the sector.

Cotton production in Cameroonevolved similarly to that of Mali.After a post-devaluation decade,

where production increased steadily andreached an average of 225,000 tonnes of cot-ton lint in that period before peaking at306,000 tonnes in 2005/06, cotton produc-tion crumbled to its lowest level of 110,000tonnes in 2007/08 and 2008/10. Since then,it has been struggling to recover. The 2010/11 campaign should howevershow a substantial improvement with aslight increase of over 150 000 tonnes. Thisimprovement is partly explained by an in-crease of surface area boosted by the an-nouncement of a high producer price16, a dropin inputs transfer price and the stabilizationof the situation of groups with the exclusionof bad risks. It is also explained by the netyield increase, thanks to new cotton vari-eties17. Reforms recently undertaken by thecotton corporation, SODECOTON, areprogressively being put in place and con-tribute to boosting the sector. The clarifica-tion of duties between SODECOTON and theCameroon National Confederation of CottonProducers (CNPCC) resulted in the corpora-tion re-focussing on technical advice andmanagement of issues relating to group man-agement and input credit. The removal ofsome activities (literacy education) reducedsome of the management costs while at thesame time some by-products added in value(cottonseed meal). A controlled diversifica-tion into soy is an anticipated objective, as itdoes not in itself undermine cotton produc-tion. Similarly, SODECOTON reflected on theproduction model by imagining new relation-ships with more specialised producers, by ex-perimenting with genetically modified seeds. The sector is seeking to diversify its financialpartnerships and collaborate with the State,which for example in the last two years en-couraged the subsidising of fertiliser use. Like the Burkina Faso cotton sector, it intendsto quickly establish a “Fonds de Lissage” tosustainably boost campaign profits. The continuation of the current “water, soil,tree” project which tackles the sensitive issueof soil preservation is currently planned toform part of the Debt Development ContractAgreements signed between Cameroon andFrance. Despite being on the agenda for over fifteenyears, privatisation did not advancesince the aborted attempt to take over controlin 1994 by a group of personalities in thenorthern part of the country (who nonethe-less held 11% of corporate shares), and finallydisappeared from the agenda. With 59% of di-rect or indirect shares, the State continues to

14 Yields peaked at 915 kg/Ha and was below the preceding year’slevels.15 With financial support from the World Bank16 200 CFA Francs for first quality to which is added premiumof 10 CFA Francs17 With the gains per hectare estimated at 200kg, average yieldsreached 1.1 tonnes of cotton lint per hectar. Note that new vari-eties also contribute in increasing sowing rates which reached42%.



supervise the corporation, while GEOCO-TON holds the rest. Organized under theCameroon National Confederation of CottonProducers (CNPCC), producers who in thepast created a Cameroon Cotton ProducersInvestment Corporation (SIPCOC) saved 5.5billion CFA, but found themselves excluded.They are however closely involved in thefunctioning of the sector because of a closepartnership with SODECOTON and are nowin charge of the strategic functions of supply,credit and group management assistance.

Cotton production in Chadhas practically plummetedsince the early 2000s. Since

2006/07, production was approximately100,000 tonnes of cotton lint, but this is stillbelow previous levels. In 2009/10, in spiteof an attractive producer price of 180CFA/kg; cotton lint production dropped to33,500 tonnes because of the lack of interestof the producers suffering from delays inpayment and a failing management of logis-tics (no fertilizers were supplied). Thefarmed surface area was consequentlyhalved in recent years and the yield perhectare, already among the lowest in thesub-region, collapsed (300kg/Ha on aver-age). Some consider the sector’s state of affairs asdemoralising. The industrial arsenal is sub-stantially damaged by the lack of investmentand maintenance. Indeed, the financial situ-ation of COTONTCHAD was catastrophic.The authorities appear to have taken thisinto consideration. The Ministry of Trade be-came once again the supervisory authority ofthe corporation, a new management teamwas put together and a revival plan was im-plemented (with a dismissal of one-third ofthe staff). The rapid privatization of the cor-poration whether it was in negotiations withthe World Bank since 1999, appears to be theonly possible outcome. The adopted planprojects the forming of a single productionlot involving all the industrial assets includ-ing oilseed crushing plants. The prior recap-italisation of the corporation is a point ofdebate with the financial partners. Restoring producer confidence is acrucial challenge today as professionalstructuring (the Chad cotton producers’ na-tional union – UNPCT) is among the mostfragile in the region and was disrupted whenthe government established a competingbody in late 1999. On the request of COTONTCHAD, sectoranalysis and the formulation of an ‘actionplan’ for future agricultural campaigns wereundertaken. A corporate scheme should

ensue. The sector’s scheme should project aprogressive resurgence of producer organi-sations in the management of the sector. Finally, the authorities will seek to developsemi-processing and the exportation ofthread using options provided notablythrough concessionary agreements 18 withthe USA.

Finally, in some countries like Guineaand Central African Republic, cottonproduction is residual (with less than15,000 tonnes of cotton lint in2010/11) and in others like Niger, ithas practically disappeared (less than5,000 tonnes in 2010/11).

To conclude this overview of cottonproduction in West Africa, it is worthobserving that Ghana, which is under-going agricultural and rural develop-ment in the sub-region, and whosecotton sector had crashed followingunfortunate institutional reforms(less than 10,000 tonnes produced in2010/11), intends to revamp its cottonsector by drawing experience fromneighbouring West Africa (particu-larly Burkina Faso).

ConclusionWest African cotton went through decades ofmajor institutional evolutions, in vary-ing forms depending on the country withequally differing impacts: productionboomed in some countries and practicallydisappeared in others. However, they all witnessed the growinginfluence of producers who throughtheir organisations were more involved inthe joint management of the sector thoroughpartnerships with cotton corporations. Someobservers even imagine producers com-pletely taking over cotton development cor-porations in the future, like their Frenchcounterparts did in the oilseed and proteincrop sectors. Although it is facing its own difficulties,Burkina Faso cotton increasingly ap-pears to be a reference point for stim-ulating thinking in the countrieswhich most recently invested in thecotton sector in Cameroon, Mali,Togo, Chad. The integrated characterof the sector as well as the existence ofa defined area where the ginning com-pany is within a buyer’s monopoly,and a solid industry sector are strongperformance indicators of the sector.This is also what facilitated economicinnovation with the activation of themechanism to stabilise price volatilitywhich proved its reliability after fivecampaigns. It is also an interesting re-sponse option in the face of the in-

creasing risk of price fluctuations. Technically, the cost effectiveness ofagricultural production systems inWest African cotton producing re-gions is a long term asset which shouldbecome a determining factor with regard tothe projected increase in the cost of petro-leum goods and the rising competition in thedifferent uses of water. There are majorprogress margins in developing cotton pro-duction, especially when integrating possi-bilities for complementary diversificationwith soy, sunflower so that the food cropspresent in the rotations (cereals, etc.) canbenefit from the organisation of the cottonsector; and add value to by-products (cottonlint and cotton turned into compost or char-coal). To add value to these assets, it is necessaryto renew producer support and advisorymechanisms. Institutionally, efforts regarding qual-ity, cost rationalisation policies whichare pursued within cotton corpora-tions and investment in some of thecommercial niches like equitable or bio-equitable cotton19 are elements likely to op-timally benefit from price hikes and from theappreciation of the dollar against the Euro. New institutional developmentsshould be expected with the possible ar-rival of new investors (particularly Asian) in-terested in industrial production whichwould guarantee their supply sources. Increasingly, donors are interested inthe growth of these sectors as these or-ganisations form an interesting referencepoint in contractual agriculture. This also in-corporates partnerships formed between aprivate agro-industrial investor and a multi-tude of independent family-owned agricul-tural producers. Their support is alwaysnecessary, especially when building the ca-pacity of producers and their organizationsto implement reputably critical functionssuch as research, roads, energy supply, tech-nical assistance, which cannot depend solelyon enterprise investment. n

18 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)19 These niche markets could be determining in the case of na-tional sectors with reduced production volumes like Senegal.

A. LEGILEJ. TISSIER L. CAFFERINI

J.C. PECRESSEP. DIERICKX

NB : This text in english is not the original version, but rather a free translation

of the authentic French version (See French copy of the special edition).


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10 B- Sector Stakeholders in West and Central Africa


Réseau des organisations paysannes et de producteurs d’Afrique de l’ouest (ROPPA)

We don’t eat cotton, but it feeds us…

The malaise of West African cotton farmers has become a recurrent complaint, echoed by the sector’s stakeholders. Discouragement hasreached a level at which the advantages of the sector are barely mentioned. The main grievances target the state for its inability to implementappropriate sector reforms and for its partiality in promoting cotton to the detriment of the cereal sector which is the top food securityprovider. It is true that since 2009 there has been an upward trend in international prices and, consequently, hikes in producer prices, butproducer remobilisation is rather slow…

Remonstrations are legion in the sub-regionwith varying intensities from one country toanother, although cotton farmers are almostunanimous in deploring a downward trend intheir cotton revenues and a correlated drop inproduction. The reduced income is mostlylinked to international market prices. One canrecall that at some periods, cotton corpora-tions sold at a loss on the international marketto a point that States felt the obligation to in-ject money to pay producers and keep the cor-porations alive; dollar fluctuations alsoheavily impacted prices, expressed on the in-ternational market in dollars. The conse-quence was that African cotton paid a heavyprice!The downward trend in prices with all its im-plications such as deprivation of advan-tages changed producer crop rotationsystems, in favour of other crops. InBurkina Faso and Mali, production prac-tically halved between 2005 and 2008.Other factors such as rainfall, expensiveseeds and reduced yields also contributein explaining this drop in the perform-ance of some countries like Burkina Faso.Nevertheless, one cannot help but ob-serve that despite increased producerprices since 2009/2010, production has notyet reached the record levels of the 1990s.

However, to con-clude that this sec-tor is in a downturnand an inadequatesource of incomewould be an exces-sively pessimisticopinion that Burk-inabe producerSeydou Ouedraogodoes not share, re-calling that cottonalone provides the

livelihood for 3 million people in BurkinaFaso. He is rather enthusiastic about the fall-out from the activity on the life of producersand indicates that all of them now own motor-cycles and cars, and even real estate, althoughsome have rented out properties in majorcities in the country. Better still, by revampingsome sectors like transport, processing, inputstrade, ginning and by encouraging women todevelop income generating activities, cotton

farming contributed to reducing unemploy-ment among youths as it created jobs in ruraland suburban areas, and led to the setting upof industrial units (ginning, spinning/dyeingindustries, animal feed processing plants). The economics of this observation is just aseloquent considering cotton’s significant con-tribution to the domestic gross product (GDP)of the C-4 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso,Mali, Chad) ranging from 5% to 10%. Further-more, cotton exports generate considerablerevenues for the national economies of thesecountries (40% for Burkina Faso and Benin;30% for Mali and Chad1). Unfortunately, cur-rent contribution levels are low although cot-ton has the potential to boost other sectors.

Cotton or Cereals: The best wayto manage the food security im-perativeHowever, what appears less obvious is the di-rect impact of cotton production on collectivewellbeing. In other words, the capacity of thiswhite gold to serve as an effective instrumentagainst food insecurity is yet to be demon-strated. Observers are not quite convincedabout this and are basing their opinions on theresults of studies which rather demonstratedhigh levels of food insecurity in cotton produc-ing areas (the case of Mouhoun in BurkinaFaso). Beyond this paradox, what is back onthe table is actually the substantive debate onthe relationship between cotton productionand the imperatives of food security. It all de-pends on individual sensitivities and analysisof the subject matter. “We may not eat cotton,but the cotton producer is the best cereal pro-ducer,” observed Mr Léopold Lokossou of thenational farmers’ platform in Benin(PNOPPA), inviting the state to define and im-plement a policy to assist cotton farmers in ac-cessing inputs. For most farmer association

leaders, it is worthwhile to encourage comple-mentarity between cotton and other cerealsfarmed in rotation. Seydou Ouedraogo givestwo reasons for this observation: on the onehand, cotton inputs contribute substantiallyto improving cereal farming and on the otherhand, revenues from cotton farming facilitateproducers’ access to other types of food needs. Still, with some hindsight, the observation isthat in actual fact, very few people truly prac-tice crop rotation since they do not necessarilywork on similar soil types and farming re-quirements are, consequently, different. Inthe past, cotton fertilizers were diverted forcereals; this was not beneficial to the cereals,and inevitably undermined both cereals andcotton. To minimise risk, cotton corporations

started giving cereal fertilisers to cottonfarmers. Then, with the organisationaldifficulties that arose, the managementof these inputs was transferred to cottonproducer trade unions and associationswhich were in charge of ordering the in-puts and seeking bank loans to buy them(Burkina Faso and Mali). Unfortunately,because of accumulated outstandingpayments, some banks withdrew. All ofthis clearly reveals that for the moment,

there is no proper harmonisation. From one country to another in the sub re-gion, cotton farmers who lack financial re-sources at the post-harvest period face theacute problem of access to credits. There is thewell-known system in Burkina Faso wherebymaize is harvested in September and cotton inNovember. A bag of 100kg of maize is practi-cally given away at 5000 to 6000 CFA per100kg bag during harvest and bought back ata higher cost some months later at 15 000 to17 000 CFA. Clearly, the producer is forced tosell cereals to meet some needs (children’sschool fees, health, etc.), to hire extra handsto harvest cotton (financing manpower) andto meet essential survival needs; but later dur-ing cotton sales, prices are less profitableand/or payment is late; this creates tensionsin family resources or feeding. To get out ofsuch a spiral, mechanisms should be designedto help cotton farmers face this post-harvest

Seydou Ouedraogo

1 http://docs.google.com/viewer?pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShGX-UoVifNTf9ZA4bvyC6rxkfdhe3Km0WxS3Mx


period. Solutions like warranties are beingexplored but geographically, their impact islow. Cotton corporations and banks couldalso research mechanisms which favour com-plementarity between cotton and cerealfarming in a context where cotton corpora-tions would also be called upon to assist pro-ducers in confidently facing this criticalpost-harvest phase.It is evident that risk is involved in this sectorwhich has its own share of uncertainties andhazards, worsened nowadays with the phe-nomenon of climate change. This is why theuse of a harvest insurance mechanism is in-creasingly justified. This mechanism hasbeen gaining ground in the WAEMU regionstemming from the need to prepare for badharvests, even including the occurrence ofcatastrophes or calamities likely to destroythe farming season. The evolution of this ini-tiative promoted by BOAD deserves the at-tention and cooperation of all players in thesector.

GMOs: A Double-Edged Techno -logy

On the sensitiveissue of geneticallymodified organ-isms, farmer asso-ciation leaders likeMr Dao Bassiaka,president of theFaso farmers’ con-federation [Confé -dération pay sannedu Faso], are farfrom buying intothe illusion that

this technology would perform miracles inboosting productivity and competitiveness.To wit, to date its contribution has not beenproven and it does not seem to present anysignificant productivity- and revenue-relateddifference with the conventional crop. It should be recalled that GMOs were origi-nally adopted as a solution in boosting com-petitiveness, sustaining a good market andensuring profitable prices particularly by re-ducing treatment levels and, by ricochet, pro-duction costs whence possible increasedcompetitiveness in connection with yield lev-els. The absence of pest attacks would alsoensure good quality fibre. Incidentally, al-though GMOs are part of a revival strategyrecommended by American firms and ac-cepted by West African countries, theseGMOs have been unable to uphold the prom-ise of boosting cotton production in BurkinaFaso which was supposed to have reachedrecords of 3000 tonnes per hectare (which is

© B. Pioch

11B- Sector Stakeholders in West and Central Africa

Dao Bassiaka

In parallel, one must keep in mind thatcotton, while it generates a lot ofmoney, in fact much more than cerealswould, is a highly polluting activity be-cause it is heavily dependent on che-micals.


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not at all the case!) at a time when conven-tional record yields for traditional farming wasbetween 800kg to 1½ tonnes. Looking at thefuture, Mr Dao Bassiaka wonders about thedanger, in the long term, of a policy wherebyfarmers would depend on international firmsfor seeds. What will happen to us if these firmsstopped supplying their seeds?While some countries’ experiences can openup options for others, it is obvious that a coun-try like Benin will not dive head first intoadopting GMOs. There are still talks of amoratorium, after more than five years of in-vestigations, which were supposed to en-lighten researchers and politicians on theadvantages and disadvantages of this technol-ogy clearly perceived by West African farmerassociation leaders as an “instrument of en-slavement”. In parallel, one must keep in mind that cotton,while it generates a lot of money, in fact muchmore than cereals would, is a highly pollutingactivity because it is heavily dependent onchemicals. Cotton farmers sow large surfaceareas, thereby degrading the soil, acceleratingdeforestation, destroying the environmentand increasing vulnerability to climatechange. In this connection, it would not be ex-aggerated to say that cotton alone, if one is notcareful, could ruin chances for sustainableagriculture in West Africa. Cotton wears thesoil out as demonstrated in Burkina Fasowhere the cotton basin which initially evolvedfrom the North to the South West now evolvesfrom the South West to the East.This analysis exposes the scope of challengesto be overcome and which pass through, interalia, the modernizing of farms which requireincreased equipping, access to stable marketsat sub regional levels, increased yields perhectare (which is currently one of the lowestworldwide) and on-farm consumption of do-mestic production. The fight at this level is tonegotiate prices commensurate with the workdone. It is a matter of justice and equity! Equity also requires larger scale, even inter-national, updating and amplification of WestAfrican advocacy for global governance of cot-ton challenges so as to better incorporate theinterests of African producers in internationaltrade negotiations. There are still efforts to bemade to strengthen dispute settlement mech-anisms within some authorities like the WTO.

Competing with Equal ArmsThis strategy of targeting a coalition of multi-stakeholder (public-private) interests was alsoone envisaged by West African leaders whenfaced with China and Europe subsidising theirproducers. These subsidies are indeed cause

for concern to West African producers whofear the worst: crumbling cotton prices, re-duced demand and supply on the interna-tional market, unfair competition… A 2003WAEMU study analysing the volume and ori-gin of subsidies and their impact on the cottonsector in West and Central Africa evaluatedlosses in export revenues for these countriesat over 700 million dollars between 1997 and20002. In the long term, the result would be adismantling of the structure of African agri-culture. Expanding its analysis to the stagnat-ing Doha Round negotiations, the president ofthe Faso farmers’ confederation, Mr DaoBassiaka had an even more negative observa-tion: “we cannot compete in a market of de-ceivers… we cannot accept that trade lawswould be drafted by some to be enforced onothers”. There are varying challenges; the important

component of building stakeholder capacitiescannot be ignored. Their credibility and ca-pacity to influence policy makers are condi-tioned by an appropriate ownership of thestakes of integration through instruments andlaws. Regional farmer organisation leadersand networks are expected to boost their or-ganisational capacities to better play their roleas credible liaisons between decision makersand regional integration organisations(ECOWAS and WAEMU). More than ever be-fore, it would be about formulating relevantarguments and successfully advocating onagricultural and trade policies in favour ofsmall West African producers. In this context and considering what is atstake, should we continue to question thefavouritism of cotton in national agriculturalpolicies? The immediate answer would be:cotton is the main export crop in several statesin the sub region of West Africa. Since the sec-tor is a major source of currency exchange inWest African economies, it trumps food cropsto the point that this sector which feeds thepopulation is sometimes abandoned. Aid tocotton and other cash crops (groundnuts,sesame) in terms of loans, equipment and as-sistance-advice continues to make producersof cereals and food crops (maize, millet,sorghum) green with envy. This double stan-dards policy is decried by farmer organizationleaders who make it a duty to remind Statesand authorities that apart from promoting thestrong cotton sector, they have a duty to feedthe population in a context where farming ismainly subsistence. While cotton benefits toonly a privileged group, the contrary would betrue in a flourishing cereal season with the im-pact being more tangible and massive at thedinner table of common citizens.

Revamping the Sector: A matterof Strategy and OrganisationHowever, looking at the matter keenly, it isless cotton as a sector which is questioned; itis more the strategy to promote the sectorwhich is flawed with too much self-interesttranslating a sort of fixation on foreign cur-rency. Truly, and in the opinion of leaders offarmer organisations, it is important to go fur-ther in the conception and content of an out-of-crisis plan for cotton in West Africa. Two orthree reform channels are already popular:firstly, value-adding on African cotton by cre-ating processing units in the sub region; sec-ondly establishing and respecting theprinciple of sovereignty of producers in pricesetting by virtue of free and fair competitionbetween cotton producers and producingstates and; thirdly, promoting a policy to addvalue to domestic products. According to pro-jections of the West African Economic andMonetary Union, 25% of cotton produced inWAEMU should be processed locally by 2010.But this target is far from being reached…In summary, West African farmer organisa-tion leaders have a dream: a cotton sectorwithin which producers play a key role con-ferred on them by the level of structuring oforganisations in the sector, from the bottom -up, and a ranking of producers by capacity.The reorganization of the sector that they areardently calling for must imperatively includea better utilization of the value chain, definingfor each stakeholder (researchers, input sup-pliers, producers, ginners, industrialists, tex-tile crafters) a specific role in an integrated,concerted and holistic dynamic. Reorganisation is already ongoing every-where, and the urgency of the therapy variesfrom one country to another with, neverthe-less, an observed constant factor: the need tore-establish confidence between producersand the State, if one refers to the situationanalysis of Mr Léopold Lokossou, president ofthe Benin national farmer platform(PNOPPA). He warns that if nothing is donethe sector, suffering from issues like the inter-ference of the State and a plethora of interme-diaries, could implode. To find its mark, thecotton sector must move away from the greedof players who run the show in the sector withregard to profit distribution. To redefine therules of the game in Benin, careful thought hasbeen given to organising a stakeholder brain-storming workshop for the sector’s revival.And the same must be true of its neighbourswho continue to explore the virtues of consul-tations while at the same time building inte-gration in a sub-region where cotton is worthits weight in (white) gold. n

2 http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/actualite/Autres%20acti-vit%C3%A9s/Rap_Experts_Coton.pdf

“We cannot compete in a market of de-ceivers… we cannot accept that tradelaws would be drafted by some to be en-forced on others”.

In this connection, it would not beexaggerated to say that cotton alone,if one is not careful, could ruinchances for sustainable agriculture inWest Africa.

… by farmer organization leaders whomake it a duty to remind States and au-thorities that apart from promoting thestrong cotton sector, they have a dutyto feed the population in a contextwhere farming is mainly subsistence.




B- Sector Stakeholders in West and Central Africa 13

Brief Presentation of AProCASince 2001, the African cotton sector hasfaced a major crisis partly due to the hugeand unequal subsidies given to producers insome cotton producing countries. Faced witha situation where the issue is most often astructural one, African cotton producers havemassively mobilized to defend their interestson the international scene. Thus, cotton pro-ducers from twelve countries in West andCentral Africa (Burkina Faso, Benin,Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Chad,Togo) met on the 21st and 22nd December2004 in a bid to analyze the crisis affectingthe sector and together, define strategies forthe mobilization, positioning and for actionswhich would enable them to communicatetheir vision during cotton related debates.One such cotton meeting was held in Coto-nou and led to the birth of the Associationof African Cotton Producers, AProCA.The constitutive General Assembly of April2005 enabled AProCA to establish a vi-sion, a mission and its objectives.Today, the Association has 15 memberstates which include: Benin, BurkinaFaso, the Central African Republic,Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali,Senegal, Chad, Togo, Zambia andUganda.From its creation, it had a vision:“African cotton producers living de-cently on a competitive and sustainablecotton production, and grouped in re-gional and national organizations thatare well managed and able to efficientlydefend their interests on the national,regional and international scene”. AP-roCA is thus an African construct:- resulting from national platforms work-ing with and for them to enable the produc-ers to live decently from their activities- comprising of cotton producers who arecommitted to maintaining professionalismand performance among the African cottonproducers- building strategic agreements and partner-ships around issues relating to African cot-ton- which is credible vis-à-vis its members andpartners, by giving itself the means to be fi-nancially independent and its own decision-maker in the broadest sense possible.This vision was underscored through its2007 - 2011 plan of action which was recentlyupdated in 2010 to adapt it to the progress in

the institutional, organizational and eco-nomic environment of the cotton sector bothwithin member countries and at the interna-tional level. The new 2011-2015 plan of action for the As-sociation is centred on three major strategicareas which include:- influencing national and international poli-cies;- building the capacity of organizations;- valorising and making AProCA visible.

Major Projects of the Associa-tion

Within its mission of representation, AProCAcoordinates a number of projects, amongwhich includes equitable cotton developmentand bio-equitable projects for West and Cen-tral Africa as financed by the French Devel-opment Agency, the Better Cotton Initiativepilot project funded by Solidaridad, theOxfam cotton program, the Cotton Univer-sity, etc. The equitable and bio-equitable cottondevelopment project for West andCentral Africa financed by the French De-velopment Agency aims to enable cotton pro-ducers from five countries (Benin, BurkinaFaso, Cameroon, Mali, Senegal - have already

benefitted from a pilot project) to benefitfrom the advantages of equitable trade andbiological agriculture whose demand is ex-panding fully. The project also aims to helpthem maximize their leverage in the entiresector, in terms of promoting African cottonon the world market and as a tool to scale upcompetitiveness (sustainability and quality ofproduction). The project has three compo-nents: Component 1: Consolidation and expansionof equitable and organic cotton production Component 2: Strategic sub-regional andpilot coordinationComponent 3: Development and market co-ordination The convention to finance the project wassigned in 2008 for a total of four millionseven hundred thousand Euros over fiveyears between the French DevelopmentAgency and AProCA which is the projectmanager. The total cost of the project iseleven million nine hundred thousand Euros.

The Better Cotton InitiativeProject (BCI) consists of develop-ing a market for a new commodity(Better Cotton) and then aims toreduce, at the international level,the most important environmen-tal, social and economic impact byendowing producers, agriculturalworkers, cotton growing commu-nities and the environment withlong term benefits. In the frame-work of a partnership which hasexisted since 2007, AProCA andBCI oversee the implementationof the initiative at the level of Westand Central Africa. Mali, specifi-cally the CMDT region, (Maliantextile Development) in Koutiala,was selected for the implementa-

tion of the pilot stage of this initiative whichwas entrusted to Solidaridad. The period forthe Mali pilot phase is 36 months. Othercountries will be involved in the future exten-sion of this project. The Oxfam Cotton Program aims tobuild the capacities of producers in a bid tosecure their means of subsistence in the cot-ton producing regions of Mali and WestAfrica. Alongside other partners, AProCA in-tervenes in the program at the regional levelover five strategic areas: - Producing strong and representative na-tional associations in West Africa capable ofplaying an active role in the management ofcompetitive and sustainable cotton produc-

© AProCA

By DIOMA KOMONSIRA - Head of Communications - AproCA

The Association of African Cotton Producers (AproCA); Professionalising Organisations and Defending the Interests

of Cotton Producers


GLOCAL


ing industries.- Studying the cotton sector reforms inorder to influence future policies - Building the capacities of farmers in orderthat they may effectively evaluate the prof-itability and viability of the different pro-duction systems (including GMObio-equitable trade) and adopt innovativepractices - Advocating and campaigning for bettertrade deals and a better regional and inter-national political environment for cottonproducers - Building markets for organic and equi-table cotton The Cotton University is an initiative ofthe Association of African Cotton Produc-ers. Its aim is to build the capacities of offi-cials and technicians of the sector so theybest carry out their functions within na-tional producers’ organizations so as to as-sure the competitiveness of this Africansector and enable them to better face com-petition at the international level.The Cotton University will work in networkswhich mobilize the resources of its Africanpartners: pedagogic, scientific, human andmaterial resources of a consortium of schools,universities, and training bodies. It will haveneither campus, nor classroom, nor profes-sional corps. Its headquarters is at the Poly-technic University of Bobo – Dioulasso inBurkina Faso (UPB). A headquarter agree-ment was signed to this effect. In this instru-ment, the Polytechnic University of Bobo –Dioulasso in Burkina Faso (UPB) will cater tothe technical aspects concerning the Univer-sity of Cotton, that is, all the issues relating topedagogic engineering and research. Rela-tions between the two struc-tures are governed by apartnership agreement signedto this effect in the form of aprotocol. The Cotton University ismade of four components:initial training and re-train-ing, capitalization, innovationsharing and com mu nication. Today, the Cotton Universityis a reality. It has held its firsttwo training sessions respec-tively in Bobo-Dioulasso inBurkina Faso in September2008 and in Ségou in Mali inJanuary 2009. These twotraining sessions took placeunder the module; “Doing ourbusiness ourselves” under thetheme; “strategy and leader-ship”. It brought togetherleaders among producers andtechnicians from producer or-

ganizations from national platforms of the AP-roCA members. In October 2010, the Univer-sity formulated its working documents(statutes and internal regulations).Besides its already functioning projects, AP-roCA works on the implementation of otherinitiatives, namely, the project to develop acomputerized system supported by the FrenchMinistry of Foreign and European Affairs.This information system will consist of a reli-able database on the cotton sector in membercountries and at the international level. Thisbase would be an important source of infor-mation on the quality of the information serv-ices that AProCA could provide to its membersand partners.

Partnership and Coopera-tionIn the framework of its mission torepresent and defend the interests ofproducers, AProCA is developingstrategic partnerships and agree-ments to enable them to efficientlycarry out its missions. AProCA in-tends to be present and make theopinion of producers heard in re-gional and international forumswhenever the cotton issue is dis-cussed. To this effect, the Association hasformally integrated COS-Cotton(Orientation and Follow up Commit-tee on Cotton for the EU-Africa Part-nership.), COS-PRB of the WAEMU(WAEMU Orientation and follow upCommittee regional Biodiversity Pro-gram), the COS Cotton Agenda ofWAEMU (Orientation and follow upCommittee on the WAEMU CottonAgenda), the PR-PICA (RegionalProgram on the Integrated Protec-tion of the cotton plant in Africa),etc.In 2009, AProCA and A.C.A.(African Cotton Association) signeda partnership agreement aimed at

enhancing co-operation between African Cot-ton Producer Organizations represented byAProCA and African Cotton Companies repre-sented by the A.C.A. with a view to buildingprivileged partnerships and mutually benefi-cial relationships. This agreement centres onthree priority areas which connect the AProCAand A.C.A. networks. It also determines thedialogue themes and concerted actions, aswell as internal and external communication.In its mission of representation and defenceof the interests of producers, AProCA hassince its creation, benefitted from the supportof FARM (Foundation for Agriculture and Ru-rality in the World) under the framework ofbuilding the capacities of members of the As-

© Cirad

The Cotton University will work in net-works which mobilize the resources ofits African partners: pedagogic, scien-tific, human and material resources ofa consortium of schools, universities,and training bodies.

© Cirad




sociation and the creating strategicalliances. Other structures lendtheir highly prized support to AP-roCA in the accomplishment of itsmissions: Oxfam, ICCO, SNV, etc.

AProCA and Interna-tional Trade Negotia-tions on CottonAt its inception, one of the primaryactions of AProCA was its pres-ence at the sixth WTO ministerialconference in Hong Kong in 2005.During this conference, Africancotton producers under AProCAdefended their negotiation posi-tion fully. The Association had twoobjectives with regard to attendingthis meeting: - To testify to the growing miseryof the African cotton producer dueto the distortions in world traderules,- To influence government rep-resentatives to set dated com-mitments with figures on theelimination of grants (internal support andsubsidies on exports) and find equitable andconcrete solutions to cotton problems re-gardless of the outcome of negotiations onagriculture.We remember the AProCA producers andtechnicians, sixteen in number, dressed intraditional regalia made entirely of cotton. Tosupport their message, five thousand cottonbags were made and imprinted with the slo-gan; “Grants by the West kill the economiesof the South” were distributed. A petition ofthree million, one hundred and fifty signa-tures from cotton producing African coun-tries was given to the high-rankingstakeholders of the WTO. The final declaration at the end of the HongKong Conference brought out five essentialpoints relating to the cotton document. Thesedifferent points constitute progress eventhough injustice persists after Hong Kong.From the participation of cotton producers atthe conference, it should be noted that theywere very active. In particular, they ensuredthat henceforth, skilled human resourceswould understand fully, the importance ofthe issues involved in trade negotiations. Given the general configuration of the tradenegotiations, the cotton document is, to saythe least, failing, as when it is compared toother issues, it is on standby. Concretelythen, nothing special which relates to the cot-ton issue has appeared explicitly in the con-clusions of the recent meetings involving theAmbassador of New Zealand, David Walker,Chair of the Agriculture negotiation group.And this is quite bothersome for African cot-ton producers. Nevertheless, African cotton producers havethe unflinching support of some institutionsworking to obtain concrete results on the cot-ton document. This is the case with the C4,as it benefits from the support of the ACPgroup and WAEMU. They have sent an ur-

gent call to the different negotiation plat-forms for a swift outcome which is in compli-ance with prior commitments.

A Glance at the Major and Cur-rent Problems of African Cottonand the Possibilities for Solu-tions Does one need to recall that cotton is an im-portant source of income and a powerful toolin the fight against poverty in many Africancountries, particularly in the CFA zone? Ithas significantly contributed to the creationof employment and economic growth inmany countries. However, for some yearsnow, the cotton sector has been suffering anunprecedented crisis: a progressive dimin-ishing of research and support services, thehigh cost of production factors, distortionson international markets caused by grantsfrom rich countries such as the United Statesand the European Union to their farmers aswell as problems of soil fertility, etc. The current crisis acts as a booster to re-search on new initiatives, new ways of pro-ducing which guarantee quality,competitiveness and sustainability ofAfrican cotton. Today, producers are com-mitted to researching and promoting theseinnovations. Scaling up the competitivenessof African cotton requires a constant effort toimprove the quality of the cotton fibre. Butthis particular quality of African cotton de-serves more sustained publicity on the inter-national market, which is not the case fornow, at least not to a sufficient degree . It is well known that African cotton produc-

ers have for decades made enormous effortsto keep the sector alive and promote its com-petitiveness. Conscious of the gravity of thesituation and their role in this crisis, Africancotton producers, collaborating under theAProCA umbrella, have committed them-selves to seeking appropriate and lasting so-lutions to the crisis. The creation of theCotton University falls within this viewpoint. Agricultural research is also the eldest childof the cotton sector and a natural ally, also, ithas a responsibility to stand up to new chal-lenges. It must propose new approaches toproducers which are based on innovation asregards issues as diverse as research on highyield varieties that are best adapted to cli-mate change, thus guaranteeing better eco-nomic and social benefits for the producers.Today, the cotton issue is a vital one for closeto 20 million individuals in West and CentralAfrica. AProCA is open to working with allwho share the need for concerted action inthe efforts to develop a viable new cottoneconomy. n

DIOMAKOMONSIRA

© Cirad

The current crisis acts as a booster toresearch on new initiatives, new waysof producing which guarantee quality,competitiveness and sustainability ofAfrican cotton.






Interview with ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA, Agro-Economist Engineer and Permanent Secretary ofthe African Cotton Association (ACA)

Cotton companies: what solutions for the cotton sector?

GLOCAL: Could you give a brief description of the African Cot-ton Association; its origin and mission?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The African Cotton Association(ACA.) was established on 19 September 2002 in Cotonou (Benin) tobring African Cotton Professionals together to defend their commoninterests and help to develop sustainable production, competitive-ness and promotion of African Cotton. The ACA can today boast of31 cotton companies (Active Members) from 19 countries and inter-national recognition. The ACA seeks to defend and promote African cotton in compliancewith international trade regulations by helping to improve produc-tivity, quality, competitiveness and promotion of the African cottonfor sustainable development.

GLOCAL: Can you give us an overview of the main thrusts ofthe ACA 2010-2015 strategic plan?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The ACA strategic plan designwas methodological and participatory. Accordingly, all players in thesector from the four economic regions of the continent chipped intheir support to establish this tool for promoting the African cottonsector.The strategic plan comprises five strategic goals each of which is fur-ther broken down into several strategic thrusts. 1. Defend African Cotton SectorsHelp to revamp and develop production and improve competitive-ness and promotion of African cottonHelp to strengthen and improve African cotton qualityMake ACA a baseline information platform for African cottonPromote the marketing of African cotton

GLOCAL: At a general level, what reforms will cotton process-ing in West and Central Africa bring about in other sectors(energy, legal, transport infrastructure, local productionprotection tools in the face of foreign competition…)?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA : Although all efforts that willhelp to start local cotton processing in Africa might help to curb un-employment and significantly swell state coffers, the major drawbackin this kind of initiative is energy cost. Almost all cotton producingcountries in West and Central Africa have very limited energy capital.

Load shedding is ram-pant and householdenergy consumption isexpensive.

GLOCAL: What, inyour opinion, arethe priority areason which national,

sub-regional and international institutions should focustheir efforts to strengthen cotton sectors in the sub-region?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The main problems faced byAfrican cotton sector players (producers, cotton ginners) are highinput costs (fertilisers, pesticides, spare parts, etc). The situation ofcotton seed production inputs whose costs keep soaring is a cause foralarm. Actions from national (States), regional (WAEMU, ECOWAS,CEMAC, etc) and international (European Union, United States, etc)institutions regarding this vital production aspect might provide reliefto actors.Supporting actors to buy inputs in bulk may help to significantly re-duce the costs of inputs.

It will be remiss of us not to laud the efforts of the African Cotton As-sociation (ACA) to increase African cotton competitiveness by im-proving its quality. Indeed, after the second edition of the AfricanCotton “Quality Days” organized in January 2010 in Cotonou (Benin),the ACA developed a project to combat African cotton contaminationand set an ambitious objective of «zero contamination by 2015». Na-tional, regional and international institutions are expected to throwtheir weight behind project.

GLOCAL: Should the West and Central African textile sectorpromote small-scale or industrial production in order tomaximize all its assets and generate as many viable jobs aspossible?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: Industrial production is energyintensive and energy is limited ; it is not labour intensive comparedto small-scale production which generates many jobs and consumeslittle energy; it is advisable to design a policy aimed at supportingsmall-scale producers of the textile sector in order to shore up thissector.

GLOCAL: Can you giveus an overview of thesituation of ACA mem-bers in West and Cen-tral Africa (financialsituation, an assess-ment of major prob-lems)?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOUFAHALA: As we men-tioned earlier, the mainproblems common to ACA members are the ever-increasing inputcosts and this leads to a gradual reduction in cultivated areas and inturn to an overall drop in cotton production on the Continent. This iscompounded by the implementation of the massive subsidy policypractised by the Western countries in general and the United Statesin particular. The negative and combined effects of these challengeslead naturally to a steep drop in the size of players’ purse.

GLOCAL: Is it possible to implement the type of survival andcrisis management strategies adopted by various ACA mem-ber countries during the most challenging years of the cottoncrisis?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: When the sector was hit hardby the crisis, each ACA member cotton company devised methods andapproaches to resist if not address the problem immediately. Initia-tives vary from one country to another and from one economic regionto another.

GLOCAL: What are the ACA priority action areas? On thebasis of identified priorities what are the concrete solutionsprovided by the ACA? What flagship projects are you cur-rently undertaking?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: ACA priority action areas arecontained in the strategic plan which has just been adopted by theGeneral Assembly held in Khartoum, Sudan on 11 March 2011. Theyseek, inter alia, to:- Undertake a campaign designed to make all cotton companies andorganizations of all cotton producing countries of the continent ACAmembers in order to increase the representiveness of the ACA;

Although all efforts that will help to startlocal cotton processing in Africa mighthelp to curb unemployment and signifi-cantly swell state coffers, the majordrawback in this kind of initiative isenergy cost.

Industrial production is energy in-tensive and energy is limited ; it isnot labour intensive compared tosmall-scale production which gene-rates many jobs and consumes littleenergy; it is advisable to design a po-licy aimed at supporting small-scaleproducers of the textile sector inorder to shore up this sector.



- Communicate to the media and the civil society in order to im-prove the perception of the economic, social and environmental roleof the African cotton;- Organize consultation and experience sharing and pool resourcesby making the technical commissions operational (cotton produc-tion, ginnery, logistics, marketing, classification and metrology);- Implement the ACA contamination control programme adoptedin January 2010 in order to better promote the intrinsic qualities ofAfrican cotton in collaboration with AProCA and other institutions;- Develop ACA capacities in the area of collection, processing anddissemination of any information relating to the production andmarketing of African cotton;- Rebuild the web site and update it permanently;- Forge partnerships and collaborate with other cotton associationsand other organizations of the sector;- Establish African cotton information and promotion aids.The ACA is currently focusing its efforts on improving African cot-ton quality through the implementation of the contamination con-trol project, establishment of technical commissions (organizationof experts from ACA member cotton companies) and all aspects re-lated to improving communication within the Association and be-tween the Association and other external organizations.

GLOCAL: In a context of increased regional integration,what are the roles and the contribution of an organizationsuch as the ACA?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The issue of the role of an or-ganization such as the ACA against a backdrop of increased integra-tion is moot. Indeed, the initiative that led to the establishment ofthe ACA is already a living source of integration. It is obvious fromthe growth of the ACA, which in March 2010 in Yaounde(Cameroon), decided to tailor its statutes to economic zoning as pro-vided for by the African Union, that the ACA is a regional institutionworking for regional integration in order that the cotton sectorshould continue to contribute to the economic development of eachcountry in particular and the sub-regions in general. Sub-regional organizations have understood this so well that theycannot do without the ACA when devising their cotton textile pro-motion strategies. The cases of WAEMU and CEMAC are perfectexamples.

GLOCAL: Are there, through the Cotton Association, anyplatforms for sharing knowledge, engineering skills, man-agement methodology and good management practices forcotton companies in the sub-region?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: This question touches on therationale of the ACA; seminars are organized every month of Marchas part of the ACA annual days, the organization of “Quality Days”every three years (November 2006 and January 2010 in Cotonou),the occasional organization of technical workshops (workshop tobrainstorm on cost/efficiency ratio of fertilizers in November 2005in Bamako, Mali, workshop to brainstorm on the causes of a dropin farm output in August 2007 in Lome) and the gradual establish-ment of ACA Technical Commissions are concrete proof of the ex-istence of an exchange forum within the ACA. The ACA strategicplan stipulates methods for their improvement.

GLOCAL: What is the role played by the ACA in designing aregional strategy for shrugging off the cotton sector crisisin West and Central Africa and in promoting African cot-ton?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The ACA has for long now be-come an indispensable institution for designing and implementingall initiatives seeking to improve competitiveness of the African cot-ton. Accordingly, the ACA is present at every step of the West andCentral African regional strategy design process.Moreover, the ACA is a consultation forum for players in the cottonsector. In this capacity, it plays a pivotal role in boosting the cottonsector and promoting African cotton; the various strategic goals andthe areas they cover and which were listed under abovementioned

questions are eloquent testimonies.

GLOCAL: How do you analyze the impact of the CFA F(pegged against the Euro)/dollar relationship on cottonsectors in the CFA F zone?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: One of the battles the ACAhas been fighting since it was established in September2002 is todenounce the impact of the CFA F (pegged against the Euro)/Dollarrelationship on cotton companies’ income and consequently onstate coffers. As regards the initiative to create an independent WestAfrican currency, I really do not have a personal opinion on thisissue which will be dealt with by experts of major financial institu-tions.

GLOCAL: What are the main tools used by ACA members tohedge against cotton price volatility on the internationalmarket?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: Every cotton company is in-dependent and takes initiatives it deemsefficient in time and spaceto offset price fluctuation effects.

GLOCAL: Describe your relationship with stakeholders suchas producers’ organizations and states? What leverage doyou have over these stakeholders in defending the interestsof cotton companies?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The ACA enjoys good rela-tions with other stakeholders; a tangible proof is the existence of apartnership convention between the ACA and APrOCA (African Cot-ton Producers Association) with which the ACA initiates, imple-ments and assess far-reaching initiatives for the promotion ofAfrican cotton.

GLOCAL: According to cotton sector models that are some-what liberalized in West and Central Africa, to what extentare cotton companies independent or not in the face of na-tional policy guidelines or decisions?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA : Whether a company is liber-alized or privatized is not important. The fact is that they alwayshave some independence or management autonomy. They nurturegood relations with States which play regalian roles that are vital inpromoting African cotton.

GLOCAL: “Cross-buying” or “cross-selling” in some coun-tries brings about major risks for national cotton sectorsand does not allow cotton companies to be supplied with allthe cotton produced in their area or to develop support pro-grammes for producers which generate an expected returnon investment. Is this a problem that affects several ACAmembers? How can this issue be addressed at the nationaland regional levels?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: This phenomenon is one ofthe challenges faced by cotton companies at the country level. Theintensity and impact vary from one country to another. ACA’s rolewill obviously be to organize discussion forums on the issue in orderto highlight the level of impact and seek global solutions.

© Aca




GLOCAL: The ACA undertook to defend the cotton case, canyou revisit the position and commitment of the ACA to de-fend this cotton case? What are the victories, failures and les-sons drawn from this adventure?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The defence of the cotton caseis a collective effort. The ACA is one of the main defenders of this case.Let us not forget that the ACA was set up in 2002, a few months awayfrom WTO summit in Cancun. Though still a fledgling organization,it had carried an extraordinary campaign to support C4 States. Theconcrete result of this work was the failure of the Cancun Summitsince the cotton component was not given the attention expected byplayers of the sector.

GLOCAL: How are members of your organization taking theDoha Round quagmire and do they feel the efforts made bynational delegations?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: ACA members are taking theDoha Round stagnation with both anxiety and hope. Anxiety is a re-sult of the fact that the problems persist and the Round has not yetprovided any solution. That is the case with problems brought aboutby abusive practices of subsidies granted by Western states to theirproducers. There is hope as national delegations continue to perse-vere and defend this file in the WTO.

GLOCAL: What are (or might be) the main actions taken bythe ACA to defend the cotton sector today?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: The fight against the practiceof illegal subsidies is not yet over. It has to continue until total victoryis achieved. Furthermore, there are a series of actions in the ACAstrategic plan which will help to put the African cotton sector back ontrack, namely:- Communication and lobbying to authorities, the international com-munity, civil society and the media to defend African cotton sectors,Consultation and experience sharing by pooling efforts and resourcesin order to propose concrete actions to tackle problems common tocotton companies;- Information: collection, processing and wide dissemination of allinformation on the production and trade of cotton in Africa;Promotion: initiatives aimed at refurbishing the image of and pro-moting African cotton.

GLOCAL: After the sector initiative for African cotton in 2003,some development agencies undertook to support theAfrican cotton sector. Have you received funding and variousforms of support in the ACA which have had a significant im-pact on the situation of ACA member cotton companies? Ifyes, can you give a few examples?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: All in all, some ACA membershave benefitted from various forms of support of which the main onesare:- The All ACP Commodities Programme on European Union funds athird of which is reserved for cotton;- The WACIP (West African Cotton Improvement Programme)funded by the United States which has also served as supplementaryfunding to some projects at the country level through national advi-sory committees set up for that purpose.ACA Members have indeed mostly benefitted from the All ACP Com-modities Programme by travelling to promote African cotton in Asia(China, India, South Korea, Thailand, etc) with technical backstop-ping from the International Trade Centre (ITC) under South-SouthCooperation implementation. This project also provides significant support to the ACA in:- Designing its strategic plan with technical backstopping from theITC;- Implementing its project to curb contamination courtesy of techni-cal support from the World Bank;- Establishing and revamping Technical Commissions (Cotton Pro-duction Technical Commission, Transport Technical Commission,Ginnery Technical Commission, Metrology Classification Technical

Commission) under the supervision of COS-COTON (body responsi-ble for monitoring the implementation of the cotton component ofthe All ACP Commodities Programme). Let us also note that the WACIP supported the ACA considerably inAugust 2007 in organizing a technical workshop on the theme“Causes of the drop in cotton farm output” and a study trip for ACAmembers to South Africa in 2009.

GLOCAL: Is South-South cooperation a concrete reality in thecotton sector? If yes, can you give us a few examples concern-ing the ACA or its members?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: As I have just said, several ex-perience sharing and African cotton promotion missions were organ-ized with the technical support of the ITC with funds from theEuropean Union. During the second edition of the African cottonQuality Days held in January 2010 in Cotonou, the ITC also invitedseveral nationals of Asian countries to see for themselves the effortsmade by African countries to improve cotton quality. That is a tangi-ble example of South-South cooperation.

GLOCAL: What in your opinion is the middle ground forSouth-South cooperation and competition for establishinglasting relations?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: With the current level of devel-opment of countries of the South, I think South-South cooperation isthe best way of establishing enduring relations.

GLOCAL: Do you think the cotton issue will be addressed sat-isfactorily in the Doha Round? If not what is the alternativesolution?

ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: It is allowed to hope. Failure togive pride of place to the cotton issue in the DOHA Round is ignoringthe macro-socio-economic importance of cotton for more than twentymillion Africans.Cotton is and remains a socio-economic crop of great value to all pro-ducing countries. Not to give it the attention that it deserves is helpingto impoverish many souls on earth. Consequently, all means likely tomove the issue forward or tackle it are welcome.

GLOCAL: What would be your final word?ADEYEMI ACHAMOU FAHALA: States, national, regional andeven international organizations are fortunate to have the AfricanCotton Association. It is a consultation forum for all actors in theAfrican cotton sector. It is found in the West, East, Centre, North andSouth of the Continent. It is the portal to all players in the Africancotton sector. The very existence of a five-year strategic plan (2011-2016) is eloquent testimony of the new momentum of this Pan-African Association to better organize itself to face up to the herculeanchallenges of the cotton sector.I am therefore appealing to all national, regional and international

organizations to consider it as a credible partner in implementing ac-tions likely to help improve the competitiveness of African cotton. n

ADÉYÈMI ACHAMOUFAHALA




GLOCAL

20 C- The Role of Associations, NGOs and International Agencies Working in the Cotton Sector


Contribution from the European Commission (DG DEVCO, DG AGRI, DG TRADE)

The WTO Cotton Initiative and theEU responseCotton and cotton textile industries are crucialto the economic growth of both developed anddeveloping countries. Cotton is one of the mostvaluable and widely produced agricultural cropsin the world. It is grown in more than 100 coun-tries, on about 2.5% of the world’s arable land,making it one of the most significant crops interms of land use. Cotton is a heavily tradedagricultural commodity. In many countries, cot-ton exports provide not only an essential inputfor foreign exchange revenues but also accountsfor a major share of the country’s GDP. This isparticularly the case in Africa but also in someCentral Asian countries.Cotton is a product which has a long and oftenemblematic history. Because of its importancein world trade as well as to economies of manydeveloping countries, it can be argued that cot-ton is a very «political« crop. World cotton pro-duction inevitably varies from year to year, thus,variations in supply can cause major fluctua-tions in prices. Cotton is a good example of howprice sensitive an agricultural product can be:the decrease in world cotton prices directly af-fects millions of small producers in the cottonproducing countries of Central and West Africa. Cotton forms an important part of the economicsector in more than 20 African countries. Mostof the African cotton is produced by small farm-ers on fields of less than two hectares. Cotton-growing is almost always associated with foodcrop production and cotton also provides cashincome for household expenditures (food,schooling, health care). Therefore, there are im-portant links between cotton production,poverty reduction and food security. This is thereason why the support offered to the cottonsector is an important aspect of EU cooperation.The development dimension is central and theEU has always been at the forefront of fully in-tegrating development into its multilateral andbilateral negotiations. This trade and develop-ment approach is the foundation of the Eco-nomic Partnership Agreements (EPA) that theEU is currently negotiating with the sub-Saha-ran Africa regions. In 2003, four African countries, Benin, BurkinaFaso, Mali and Chad - the so-called «CottonFour» - requested that the WTO’s Doha Devel-opment Agenda should include a Cotton Initia-tive. Their goal is to have far reachingreductions on cotton subsidies, tariff cuts andensure assistance is increased to encouragelocal cotton production and revenues. The Cot-ton Initiative was perhaps the first time fourcommercially insignificant countries drew in-ternational attention to a common cause. The«Cotton Four» have demonstrated that whensmall nations unite, they are able to participateand influence the global trading system. The WTO membership as a whole recognized

the demands of the «Cotton Four» as legitimateand put cotton high on the agenda of the Dohanegotiations. It is clear today that there will beno conclusion of the Doha Round unless cottonis addressed ambitiously in relation to the threepillars: market access, domestic support and ex-port competition. The EU was amongst the first to translate com-mitment into solid action. The EU was fullyaware of the key impact cotton production hadon the development of countries that are amongthe poorest in the world and through its owninitiatives, was committed to a profound reformof its cotton regime. In 2004, the EU launched the «EU-Africa Part-nership on Cotton» under which substantial fi-nancial assistance was made available. Since2004, over €320 million have been allocated tocotton programmes and projects (EU memberstates, in particular France, Germany and theNetherlands, have contributed significantlythrough projects managed independently by theEuropean Commission). The «EU-Africa Part-nership on Cotton» focuses on cooperation withBenin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. It reflectsthe key role cotton plays in the economic poli-cies of these countries as this sector employsaround two million workers and some 15 mil-lion people depend on cotton production andexports for their livelihood. These figures exclude assistance that is indi-rectly related to cotton, like general agriculturalprojects, infrastructure (main roads, bridges),trade facilitation (e.g. port handling), privatesector development and general macro-eco-nomic assistance. The EU member states in-creased their contribution to the EuropeanDevelopment Fund (EDF) to over €22 billionfor the tenth EDF period (2008-2013). The lionshare of this amount has been allocated toAfrica.The «EU-Africa Partnership on Cotton« was es-tablished during the Paris Forum in 2004, to-gether with an Action Framework. The aim wasto address the concerns of African cotton pro-ducers strongly affected by the decrease in cot-ton prices during the 1990s and 2000 onwards. The partnership covers two aspects; a «Trade«component aims at establishing more equitabletrade within the Doha Development Round,while a «Development» component enhancesthe competitiveness and value addition ofAfrican cotton by optimizing the impact onproducers‘ yields. The Action Framework implements these twocomponents through six strategic axes: - Developing, monitoring, assessing and up-dating national and regional cotton strategies;- Improving the institutional environment,internal organization and efficiency of the cot-ton industry;- Improving the competitiveness of the cottonindustry in Africa;

- Reducing the vulnerability of the cotton indus-try;- Increasing the value addition generated by thecotton industry;- Strengthening the coordination at interna-tional, regional and national levels. The Action Framework is coordinated and im-plemented by the «Comité d’Orientation et deSuivi du Partenariat UE-Afrique sur le Coton»(COS-Coton) composed of the ACP countries,the EU, regional integration organizations, EU-ACP organizations and the private sector. Assuch, COS-Coton has to manage the needs ofthe industry stakeholders in order to ensure co-herence and ownership of the Action Frame-work and related programmes, including thecotton component of the All ACP AgriculturalCommodities Programme. EU development aid programmes target cottonproducers in the most affected ACP countries.The EU has also committed to substantially re-ducing trade distorting domestic proceduresand has proposed a series of market accessmeasures for developing countries.

Overview of the EU cotton marketThe EU cotton territory grew steadily until theend of the 1990s, when it peaked at almost540.000 hectares. Since 2006, the decline inthe area has been very significant. In the periodspanning 2006-2010, the EU cotton territorydropped by 33%, to 293.000 hectares. The EUcotton territory increased by 10% in the 2010/11season, in response to high prices on the worldmarket. In 2010, cotton was produced in threeMember States over a total surface area of325.000 ha. Greece (80%, mainly Macedonia,Thessalia and Sterea Ellada) is the principalproducer, while Spain (19%, mainly Andalucía)is in second place. Bulgaria produces cotton onless than 1000 ha. Production ceased in Italy in1991 and in Portugal in 1996. Practically all EUcotton is grown on irrigated land. Similarly, EU production of ginned cotton hasfallen since the 2004 reform: from almost500.000 tons in 2006, it dropped to 225.000tons in 2010, which is less than 1% of the esti-mated 2010 world cotton production of 25.2million tonnes. With 180.000 tonnes, Greeceaccounts for 80% of EU production in 2010,while Spain produced the remaining 20%

EU cotton area 1982 - 2010 (000 ha)


C- The Role of Associations, NGOs and International Agencies Working in the Cotton Sector 21

(45.000 tonnes). Cotton production in Bul-garia was insignificant at around 200 tonnes. The 2004 reform resulted in importantchanges in the behaviour of producers, espe-cially in Spain, where yields dropped signifi-cantly from above 4 tonnes per hectare to 1.1t/ha in 2009/10. Greece also experienced a re-duction in yields, although to a smaller extentcompared to Spain. In 2010 Greece and Spainexperienced opposing trends as regards yields:in Spain, they grew by 85% to 2.1 t/ha, inGreece they decreased by 32% to 2.1 t/ha. Thedecrease in Greece was due to unusually severepest attacks and adverse weather conditionsduring harvesting.EU cotton imports followed the same trend: asharp decline from 870.000 tons in 2002 to150.000 tons in 2009. Overall, over the period2007 -2009, the EU imported an average of240.000 tons of ginned cotton. More than onethird of cotton imported into the EU camefrom central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistanand Tajikistan), and 9% from both the UnitedStates and Turkey.EU exports remained relatively stable: from220.000 tons in 2003 to 215.000 tons in2008. Over the period of 2007-2009, the EUexported an average of 220.000 tonnes perannum. Turkey is by far the most importantmarket for EU cotton, accounting for over halfof EU exports. 21% of EU cotton is exported toEgypt.

EU Cotton reformEven though EU production represents only avery small part of total global production, theEU reformed its agricultural cotton regime in2004. Upon joining the EU, Europe’s cotton-producing countries (Greece and Spain) ob-tained generous support for theircotton-producing farmers. The ‘Mediterranean Package’ of 2004 endeddeficiency payments and introduced crop-spe-cific «coupled» (35%) and «decoupled« (65%)direct aid from 2006 onwards. Full decouplingwas not considered possible for cotton, as theAccession Treaty of Greece requires the Com-munity to support its cotton production.The 2004 reform was successfully challengedby Spain in the European Court of Justice(ECJ). The Court did not question the natureof the reform, but it did query the way it wasprepared and adopted. In particular, the Courtruled that insufficient consideration had beengiven to labour costs linked to cotton growingand to the viability of the ginning industry.Nonetheless, the ECJ allowed the scheme to

continue until new reform was adopted.After extensive studies and an impact assess-ment, new reform was adopted by the EUCouncil in 2008 which would be applicablefrom 2009. It respects the same rate of cou-pled and decoupled direct aid (35%-65%) on abudgetary level. The maximum base area forwhich aid could be paid was reduced to250.000 ha in Greece, 48.000 ha in Spain, and3.342 ha in Bulgaria and 360 ha in Portugal.In instances where the production area ishigher than the national base area, the aid perhectare is decreased proportionally.In addition, the reform contains a restructur-ing fund for Greece and Spain to finance fivemeasures: (1) dismantling ginning plants, (2)investments in ginning plants, (3) participa-tion of farmers in quality schemes, (4) infor-mation and promotion activities, (5) aid forharvesting machinery contractors affected bythe dismantling of plants.

The reform eliminated domestic supportwhich had the most distorting effect ontrade (the so-called WTO amber box) andthereafter changed the incentive to pro-duce. European cotton farmers now makeproduction decisions according to marketevolution, rather than on financial support.The 2004 European cotton reform has hadpositive effects on production for Africanproducers. Cotton still plays an important role in cer-tain parts of Europe, so the EU continuesto support its domestic cotton production.

However, overall, cotton production in the EUis only a small fraction of world output so itsaid does not have any significant impact onworld prices. Since 2009, cotton prices have continued torise: the Cotlook A index (a weighted CIFprice) reached an all-time record of 4.791 $/ton 14 February 2011. The Cotlook A rose by250% in 2010, almost a quadruple increasesince January 2009, when it stood at 1.233 $/t.

Way ForwardReforms by the EU only make sense if all cot-ton producers who support their productionand exports make a similar commitment. Eu-rope constitutes a very small part of global cot-ton production. It does not export cotton andimports duty and quota free from least devel-oped countries. Our reform does not removethe pressing need for other developed coun-tries to reform their agricultural supportstrategies. The U.S. plays a big trade-distorting role. TheEU accounts for less than 2 per cent of theworld cotton market, while nearly half of the

world’s cotton production comes from theUnited States and China. Depending on mar-ket prices, the United States pays up to fourbillion dollars annually to its 25,000 cottonproducers. This allows the United States to re-main the world’s largest cotton-exportingcountry, accounting for 37% of the world mar-ket.In 2008, the U.S. made timid overtures, oncondition that China also open its cotton mar-ket. The proposal was rejected by China whichfeared opposition from the sensitive north-eastern part of the country. The talks havebeen deadlocked since then, but the Demo-cratic administration is less dependent on thecotton lobby than its predecessor and moremindful of the repercussions of US policies onthe world’s poorest regions, particularly inAfrica. The EU remains convinced that the appropri-ate framework in which to negotiate rules oncotton subsidies should be the WTO agricul-tural negotiations. The EU is committed tosupporting African countries in their quest fora solution regarding cotton. This must be anintegral part of the agricultural DDA negotia-tions. The EU encourages other WTO Mem-bers, notably the U.S., to follow its example inreforming its cotton policy.In the past, the EU has made concrete propos-als regarding the adoption of cotton-specificrules at the WTO. First, eliminate the mosttrade-distorting forms of domestic support;second, eliminate export support in the cottonsector; and third, allow for a complete and fullmarket opening for cotton for the least devel-oped countries, which would be similar to theEU’s «Everything but Arms» initiative. A few issues outside the negotiations them-selves have come into play recently. In the caseinitiated by Brazil against the U.S, the WTOCotton Panel decision, may lead to changes inthe future. The WTO panel ruling in favour ofBrazil was followed by intense negotiations be-tween the two countries to reach a mutualagreement and avoid trade retaliation by Brazilagainst U.S. goods and services. In June 2010, the U.S. and Brazil agreed on apreliminary deal and Brazil agreed not retali-ate. In this agreement, the U.S. succeeded inpostponing any change to its cotton subsidiesuntil its next Farm Bill in 2012. Under theagreement, it is clear that the U.S. will be com-pensating Brazil for the fact that it will notchange its cotton subsidies programmes untilthe next Farm Bill. Critics of the WTO procedures claim that theoutcome of the Brazilian case highlights theshortcomings of the WTO dispute settlementprocess. Brazil was somewhat of a stand-in forAfrican cotton producing countries that couldnot afford to file a case against the U.S. becausethey did not have enough trade to make retal-iation a real threat. Had Brazil imposed retal-iation measures upon the U.S., Africancotton-producing countries might have had abetter chance of having their demands metduring the Doha negotiations. n

Yield: tons of unginned cotton per hectare(1982 - 2010)

Yield: tons of unginned cotton per hectare(1982 - 2010)


GLOCAL


COMPACI; the Commitment of the German Cooperation in Supporting African Cotton

Interview with: WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER, Team Leader Cotton Program, Deutsche Gesellschaft fürInternationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)

GLOCAL : Could you please introduce yourself and the organi-zation you work for in a few words?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : I’m currently responsible for thecotton programme implemented in the framework of GIZ. It’s called theCompetitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI) which is implementedin collaboration with the DEG and local partners. It is financially sup-ported by the Bill and Melinda Gates’ Foundation and the German Min-istry for Economic Cooperation and Development (the BMZ).Since 1989, I’ve been working for the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusam-menarbeit (GTZ) which is now the GIZ (merger of GTZ, DED and In-WentDED). The GIZ has close to 17,000 employees and operates in morethan 130 countries. It allows us to have a structure which is more efficientand easier for our customers to deal with as they transact with one com-pany rather than 3.

GLOCAL : How long have you been working on projects relatedto African cotton?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : I started working on cotton in2005 as an adviser to the Ministry in the framework of the WTO negoti-ations and I was member of the steering committee on the project, “Sup-port for the C4 Cotton Initiative” as implemented by IDEAS whichsupports the C4 initiative. The latter includes: training negotiators andsupporting the writing of papers. It was a joint project between Germany,the Netherlands, France, Denmark, the UK, and Sweden. From the dif-ferent studies we carried out on cotton came a proposal from the OttoGroup which led to the development of the “Cotton Made in Africa Ini-tiative” which is partners with the COMPACI programme.

GLOCAL : Is the GIZ only involved in the African cotton sectorthrough the Competitive African Cotton Initiative?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : Yes, it is at the moment.Through the COMPACI, the GIZ is involved in Côte d’Ivoire, BurkinaFaso, Benin, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The Cotton Made inAfrica initiative (CmiA) has partnered up with COMPACI. We are re-sponsible for the field work, farmer training, the development of creditfacilities and for providing CmiA support in the development of theverification system and in the training of verifiers. The CmiA deals withthe marketing of the cotton produced by managing the field verifica-tions and implementing community development projects. To give youa little background, in the beginning, the CmiA was a Public/PrivatePartnership which was financially supported by the German govern-ment. We have had the COMPACI for 2 years and CmiA is now gener-ating its own funds and becoming more and more independent andself-sustaining.

GLOCAL : Was the GTZ (the German cooperation) involved inprojects connected to African cotton before the COMPACI?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : Before the COMPACI, we wereinvolved in a long term cotton project in Egypt which supported the sectorin different areas; from the growing of cotton to the industrial textiletransformation. We worked on quality management, on supporting theentry into the European market and the creation of an “Egyptian Cotton”label. Then we got involved in a project in Tanzania while working on anIntegrated Pest Management system. We have learnt from our experiencein Egypt that the development of a label requires a structure responsiblefor it and that it cannot survive unclear shifts of responsibility betweenactors from the public and private sector, otherwise, the label loses itsreputation in the market. Presently, the label has regained its reputationand they have developed the skills and valuation criteria to guarantee itssuccess.

GLOCAL : This is very interesting and Iassume that all this knowledge couldbe poured into Cotton made in Africa.

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER :Within Africa there have been discussionsbetween different actors and among otherstakeholders in the African Development Bank and COMESA about thepossibility of creating a quality label for African cotton. Also, this idea wasdeliberated on by the African Cotton Association. It was a little sensitiveat first to have the Label “Cotton made in Africa” marketed by a Germannon-governmental organization and to brand the cotton that it promotedwith a few cotton companies in Africa, but at the same time, the Africancotton companies could not support the cost of setting up and promotingthe label, or the setting up and running of the verification system. Fur-thermore, building up the relationship with the retailers in Germany andworldwide in order to generate the demand for CmiA cotton and helpingthese companies in the sourcing mechanisms were other challenges weas a German NGO had to face. To have a label is good, but the promotionand the marketing of it are vital.

GLOCAL : What kind of relationship do you have with theAfrican cotton organizations, whether they are producers’ or-ganizations or cotton companies?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : CmiA is an African cotton labeland we are looking forward to integrating the ACA and AProCA to agreater extent into Cotton made in Africa and COMPACI. AproCa is in-volved in the Cotton University; some members of the ACA are alreadymembers of CmiA. We are currently trying to understand how membersof AproCa and ACA can be members of the CmiA’s advisory board. Atfirst, the CmiA had a top down approach and now that it is up and run-ning, it will become a multi-stakeholder initiative.

GLOCAL : Was this step by step integration of a wider group ofstakeholders a strategy from the beginning or somethingCmiA and COMPACI decided along the way?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : It was a strategy from the begin-ning. An initiative like ‘Better Cotton’ did it another way; they started witha big stakeholder community. CmiA started as an initiative of the OttoGroup, the DED, WWF and two retail companies. The initial stakeholdergroup was quite small. We decided to start small, set up the structure,implement the initiative and prove it can work. Now that it works, wecan integrate the different stakeholders. This is Cotton made in Africa;we cannot only remain with representatives from Europe, we have to in-tegrate representatives from the cotton companies. Jean Claude Tallonof the ICA Benin is a member of the advisory board, as is Ibrahim Mal-loum (honorable president of the ACA). We also have people from theUS… All these members arrived progressively. We now have cotton com-

To have a label isgood, but the promo-tion and the marke-ting of it are vital.

« GIZ »



panies asking to join the CmiA initiative. The next step is to understandhow we can integrate the farmers’ organizations.

GLOCAL : Could you tell me more about the COMPACI ap-proach?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : For the COMPACI approach,we provide support in a 50/50 commitment framework from us andfrom the African companies we work with. There is a qualificationround: the companies have to be able to have a 50% share in the projectand we check the quality of their balance sheets, otherwise, we cannotstart a partnership.

GLOCAL : How would you assess the state of the sector?WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : During the cotton crisis of2004/5, cotton prices were quite low, then the cotton prices stabilizedand the cotton companies stabilized as well. The financial crisis and thespeculation placed cotton companies once again in a very difficult sit-uation and some of them went bankrupt. After the financial crisis of2009, things are now going back to normal and the market demand forcotton is currently higher than the production and supply. In the last 8months, the cotton prices have been rocketing. Most of our partnersover the last season have managed to regain solid financial positionsThere are also issues connected to very high cotton prices. In somecountries like Benin, companies outside Benin are sending trucks toBenin farmers and buying the cotton at a higher price than the priceagreed with the Benin cotton companies which have invested in farmertraining and support mechanisms. Thus, Benin cotton companies arelosing large quantities of cotton to this “pirate buying” done by compa-nies not playing by fair rules. This happens in southern Africa quiteoften but it is quite new in West Africa.

GLOCAL : Looking at the liberal approach of Zambia, Malawiand the less liberal approach of West African cotton producercountries, which approach works best?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : In my view, the less liberalizedapproach works best. Let’s take the example of Tanzania which used tohave a rather a strictly regulated cotton sector, with training and so on.After liberalization, cotton companies started being in competition forthe cotton and the cotton companies which invested in pre-financinglost all their money as farmers were seeking the best prices for theirproduction. The cotton companies stopped pre-financing the input aswell as the funding for training and other services, now the farmers inTanzania have the highest prices per kilogram of cotton in Africa. Whenthe farmers were trained by the cotton companies they had yields of600/650kg, now they have yields of 250/300kg. They have higherprices but lost 50% of their yields. Looking at a less liberalized sectorlike in Burkina Faso where there are concession areas, the companiesinvest in farmer training through pre-financing, they collect the cottonand the farmers agree on the price. Farmers in West Africa have higheryields than farmers in East Africa where there’s little or no support forcotton producers. Zambia presents a different scenario with companieslike Dunavant or Cargill heavily investing in cotton farmers. The com-panies have contracts with the farmers which state that the farmerswill repay the loans upon delivery of cotton. Still in the last few years,they have had up to 20% side-selling.

GLOCAL : Given the impact of “pirate buying” on the cottoncompanies and thecountries whose bal-ance sheets heavily de-pend on cotton, couldor should a regional ap-proach try and sort outthese issues?WOLFGANG BERTEN-

BREITER : There has to be an agreement within the regions. In Eastand Southern Africa, there has to be a legal framework linking the com-panies and providing training and support to the farmers they are back-ing. Or there could also be a regulation stating that pirate buyers arenot allowed in the country or that there is a levy on this kind of buyingwhich would then allow the governments to reinvest in farmer trainingand pre-financing…

GLOCAL : Given the state of the textile capacities in West andCentral Africa, do you think that the surpluses collected afterthe high cotton prices could be reinvested to support thebuilding of cotton transformation capacities?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : No. Textile transformation goesto the cheapest places. When compared to Asia, the African textile sec-tor is far from being competitive. Spinneries for instance need 24/7electricity supply. This is one of the biggest problems in East or WestAfrica at present. Salaries of workers are lower in Asia than in WestAfrica

GLOCAL : Within their energy and infrastructure strategy,could organizations like UEMOA push forward the capacitieswhich would allow the textile industry to take off?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : If they made the necessary in-vestments, it could. There would be international investors going toWest Africa. Chinese companies for instance would move to Africa toproduce there and avoid the barriers, negotiations and also limit thetax burden they face when they produce in Asia or try to enter the Eu-ropean and America markets. This would allow them to also take ad-vantage of AGOA and /or EBA

GLOCAL : In your work in West and Central Africa, what arethe biggest challenges you are confronted with? Is corrup-tion one of them?

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITER : Corruption is not a problem forus because we’re working with cotton companies which have integrity.We’re working with companies that respect the international Code ofConduct. The biggest challenge is farmer training: how to get the infor-mation down to the farmers and how to make sure they apply the con-tent of the training. We realized that we need to invest more in theextension system so that the information about good agricultural prac-tices is properly transmitted to the farmers and helps them understandthat this allows them to maintain, for a longer period, their productioncapacity. Another challenge is to understand how the cotton can be in-tegrated into the national investment plan as developed within theframework of agricultural programmes. The use of cotton for politics isan issue as well. Last year in Malawi, the President was running for re-election and wanted to do something for farmers so he decided to tellthem that their cotton would be bought at a given price. This price waswell above the world market price and the cotton companies could notpay the price without going bankrupt. The cotton companies could notbuy the cotton and the farmerscould not sell their cotton. Soas not to lose face and stillsolve the problem, middlemenwere brought in who boughtthe cotton from the farmers ata lower price and sold it to thecotton companies. n

In some countries like Benin, companies outside Benin aresending trucks to Benin farmers and buying the cotton at a hi-gher price than the price agreed with the Benin cotton com-panies which have invested in farmer training and supportmechanisms. Thus, Benin cotton companies are losing largequantities of cotton to this “pirate buying” done by companiesnot playing by fair rules. This happens in southern Africaquite often but it is quite new in West Africa.

« GIZ »

WOLFGANG BERTENBREITERWhen compared to Asia, the Afri-

can textile sector is far from beingcompetitive. Spinneries for ins-tance need 24/7 electricity supply.This is one of the biggest problemsin East or West Africa at present.




Genesis of the EU-Africa CottonPartnership The EU-Africa Partnership on Cotton wasset up in response to the expressed concerns ofthe African cotton sector which were hit by adownward trend in cotton prices in the 1990sand early 2000. At the Paris Forum in 2004, theEuropean Union and African countries approvedthe creation of the Partnership and its actionplan.The Partnership has two components: ‘Trade’, onthe one hand, which aims at establishing equi-table trade relations under the WTO rules andthrough the Doha Development Programme;and on the other hand, ‘Development,’ whichaims to improve African cotton competitivenessand add value to it by optimising the impact onproducer revenue. During the July 2004 Paris Forum, an ACP-EUCotton Orientation and Follow-Up Committee(Cos-coton) was created particularly to follow upon the development component of the Actionframework while taking into account the tradecomponent. Its priority is to oversee financial re-source mobilization, stimulate the actions agreedupon, coordinate and disseminate available in-formation on the topic. Cos-coton has 11 mem-bers who represent 5 categories of stakeholders:the ACP States, the European Union representedby the Commission and a Member State(France), regional integration organisations rep-resented by WAEMU, the joint ACP-EU organ-isations (CDE, CTA) and the private sector(AProCA for producers, ACA for ginners, ACTIFfor domestic fibre-processing businesses). Thecommittee is currently chaired by Burkina Faso’sAmbassador to Brussels, who represents theACP Cotton Group.

Action Framework of the Partner-ship: A Coordination and Monitor-ing ToolFollowing one of the key recommendations ofthe external evaluation of the Partnership con-ducted in early 2009, the Partnership “ActionPlan” has, since February 2010, been replacedby a Partnership “Action Framework”. The latterreasserts the relevance of the EU-Africa Partner-ship on Cotton and the need to pursue it whileadapting it to the context which is also changing. The general goal of the Action Framework is tosupport the African cotton sector so that it cancontribute to developing agriculture and to fight-ing poverty. Specifically, it aims at enhancing thecompetitiveness, value-added and viability of theAfrican cotton sector by optimising producerrevenues.

The Action Framework is both a strategic refer-ence document and a tool for the coordinationand monitoring of actions carried out under theEU-Africa Partnership on Cotton. Six strategicfocus areas were defined on the basis of an analy-sis of problems and challenges to be addressed,as perceived by African cotton sector stakehold-ers (see box). The reference document serves asa “measuring rod” with which the relevance andcoherence of development activities proposed forthe sector are evaluated. In short, they must bein line with one or more of the focus areas of theAction Framework. As a monitoring and coordination tool, it is peri-odically updated in taking into account the WTOConsultative Framework Mechanism for Devel-opment Aid in Favour of Cotton, using informa-tion collected from various funding agencies andinter-trade organisations working in the cottonsector. The resulting six-monthly publication al-lows COS-coton and development partnersworking in the sector to coordinate activities im-plemented and identify possible synergies. Thus, the October 2010 update has identifiedsupport to the sector aggregating 460 millionEuros, 70% of which are from the EC and itsMember States. The C4 countries, the main pro-ducers in West and Central Africa, received closeto 50% of EU assistance (see www.acp-org.org)

The Action Framework translates the Partner-ship goals through six strategic focus areas whichare defined on the basis of an analysis of theproblems and challenges to be overcome, as per-ceived by African cotton sector stakeholders:

1. Improvement of the capacities to develop,monitor, assess and update national and regionalcotton strategies 2. Improvement of the institutional environ-ment, internal organisation and efficiency of cot-ton value chains 3. Improvement of the competitiveness of thecotton value chains of Africa4. Reduction in the vulnerability of cotton valuechains5. Increase in value addition generated by thecotton value chains, and 6. Strengthening, efficiency and effectiveness ofcoordination at international, regional and na-tional levels.

Strategic focus area no. 3 is subdivided into twostrategic sub-areas: 3A. Improvement in the exogeneous determi-nants of cotton value chains competitivenessthrough a decrease in subsidies to cotton pro-duced in developed countries and improvedmarket access conditions

3B. Improvement of the internal de-terminants of cotton value chainscompetitiveness through market ac-cess, support to technological inno-vation and productivityenhan cementWhile monitoring the implementa-tion of any activity which supportsAfrican cotton, Cos-coton has paidspecial attention to the cotton com-ponent of the All ACP AgriculturalCommodities Programme (AAACP,www.euacpcommodities.eu) lately,because of its multiregional dimen-sion. Launched in September 2007,this EU-funded 45 million Euro ini-tiative uses an innovative approachto tackle agricultural commodity is-sues. This consists in making the ex-pertise of five internationalorganisations (World Bank, CFC,UNCTAD, FAO, ITC/CCI) availableto the ACP agricultural sectorsthrough a one-stop service, and thusprovides a favourable environmentto promote the principles of theParis Declaration on the effective-ness of development aid: comple-mentarity, coherence and

By PIERRE BERTHELOT and FABIO BERTI*

Coordination and Monitoring of African Cotton Development Activities

The Action Framework translates the Partnership goalsthrough six strategic focus areas which are defined on thebasis of an analysis of the problems and challenges to beovercome, as perceived by African cotton sector stakehol-ders: 1. Improvement of the capacities to develop, monitor, as-sess and update national and regional cotton strategies 2. Improvement of the institutional environment, internalorganisation and efficiency of cotton value chains 3. Improvement of the competitiveness of the cotton valuechains of Africa4. Reduction in the vulnerability of cotton value chains5. Increase in value addition generated by the cotton valuechains, and 6. Strengthening, efficiency and effectiveness of coordina-tion at international, regional and national levels. Strategic focus area no. 3 is subdivided into two strategicsub-areas: • 3A. Improvement in the exogeneous determinants of cot-ton value chains competitiveness through a decrease insubsidies to cotton produced in developed countries andimproved market access conditions • 3B. Improvement of the internal determinants of cottonvalue chains competitiveness through market access, sup-port to technological innovation and productivity enhan-cement.




coordination of technical assistance. The Programme mandate concentrates on sup-porting:- Strategy formulation for commodities;- The implementation of such strategies by,inter alia, strengthening producer organisationcapacities, promoting good agricultural prac-tices and a better functioning of the markets; - The introduction and assistance in the broaderuse of market based risk management tools.

The Cotton Component of the AllACP Agricultural CommoditiesProgramme1

The programme focuses one third of its re-sources (15 million Euros) on supporting theimplementation of the EU-AfricaPartnership on Cotton. Using a selec-tion process based on consultationswith the ACP regions, and a detailedscrutiny of proposals by COS-coton,about forty interventions were ap-proved by the AAACP Steering Com-mittee. The paragraphs belowillustrate the Programme’s ap-proach to some of the main chal-lenges of the sector, as outlined bythe strategic focus areas of thePartnership.

Assistance to Strategy Formu-lation The first point of the AAACP man-date is similar to strategic focusarea No. 1 of the Partnership. Bothpropose as a starting point the im-provement of the capacities to de-velop, monitor, and assess nationaland regional sectoral strategies inorder to ensure the long term viability of a givensector – cotton in this case. The specificity of theAAACP strategy development exercise, notablythrough the expertise of ITC, FAO and UNC-TAD, mainly comes from its participatory na-ture and its use of “value chain” analysis. Assuch, it aims to bring together representativesfrom every level of the value chain in order tocarry out a sector analysis and for their com-mon identification of priority bottlenecks withthe aim of finding solutions. In the case of cot-ton, this exercise also creates a dialogue plat-form (consultation framework) poolingrepresentatives from professional organizationsand public institutions concerned. To support the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership on Cotton, the AAACP fi-nances the development or updating of regionalcotton strategies in the four regions of Africa.

West Africa: The programme is involved inupdating the cotton-to-clothing agenda of theWAEMU (2003) by bringing together bothpublic and private cotton stakeholders in the re-gion. In November 2010, the process resultedin a workshop to validate the “Revised Strategyfor the Implementation of the WAEMU Cotton-to-Clothing Competitiveness Agenda (2011-2020)”. The opening of this workshop washonoured by the presence of no less than fourCommissioners of the regional organization.

Heads of State are expected, in March 2011, toapprove this document.

Central Africa: The region opted for a differentstrategy from that of West Africa so as to incor-porate its specificities. Following discussionswith ECCAS and CEMAC to agree on a proce-dure, a consultation workshop took place lateMarch 2011 in Douala, Cameroon.

East and Southern Africa: Encouraged by COS-coton, the programme supported the finalisa-tion of a cotton-to-clothing strategy for theregion; the process had already begun beforethe launching of the AAACP. This RegionalStrategy for Cotton-to-Clothing value chain was

officially launched on 4 June 2009. It was ap-proved by the Heads of State of SADC membercountries as well as those of COMESA membercountries, thereby underscoring the broad con-sensus on the strategy.

Implementation of StrategiesThis component of the AAACP Programme cov-ers a wide gamut of actions and addresses inparticular strategic focus areas nos. 3B (im-provement of the internal determinants of cot-ton value chain competitiveness) and 4(reduction in the vulnerability of cotton valuechains) of the Partnership Action Framework.To illustrate this point, below are some exam-ples of actions performed with a view to over-coming the major challenges identified bycotton sector stakeholders:

Productivity: A project aimed at buildinglocal capacities in Benin, Burkina Faso and Malito adopt Good Agricultural Practices and Inte-grated Pest Management for cotton systems as-sociated to agro-pastoral systems, is beingimplemented by the FAO under the frameworkof the AAACP. This project, funded by AAACPto the tune of 1.5 million Euros, aims at boostingthe productivity and quality of cotton cultivatedin Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali through the“Farmers’ Field School” approach. It consists in

encouraging learning by doing: cotton farmersare grouped such that, with assistance from afacilitator, they manage themselves a set of ex-periments on farming practices and pest man-agement under their own operating conditions.Promising results have been obtained whichshow a boost in productivity. These need to beconfirmed and further generalised. Similar experiments are ongoing in East andSouthern Africa. With co-funding from the CFC,the programme targets small East African pro-ducers and intends to help them boost yieldsand cotton production-related revenue byshowing the economic and ecological relevanceof integrated crop management. This action,designed as a pilot project, will generate results,

information and experiences whichcan be reproduced in other small-scaleproducer communities.

The Quality of African Cotton:The competitiveness of African cottonon the international market is under-

mined by the issue of its quality.It is mainly buyers’ perception ofthis quality that is problematicand needs to be corrected. Never-theless, COS-coton has stronglyencouraged AAACP partner in-ternational organisations to lookinto the issue of the quality ofAfrican cotton as a whole. Hence,with co-funding from CFC, theprogramme is promoting a stan-dard method for the instrumentaltesting of cotton which in the longterm should replace manualgrading. This 6.3-millionEuroproject includes training pro-grammes and the setting up (in

Mali and Tanzania) of regional technical centreswhich should provide assistance to national lab-oratories involved, particularly for export certi-fication. A second component of this mobilization topromote the quality of cotton concerns the pre-vention of seed cotton contamination. This five-million-Euro project, more than half of which isfunded by AAACP, is implemented through col-laboration between the World Bank, CFC andITC. It facilitates, inter alia, the training of pro-ducers and other value chain stakeholders suchas handlers and transporters. It also gives pro-ducers the necessary resources (“clean kits”) forharvest. The World Bank contribution centreson institutional issues and incentives. The ITC complements this support by linkingcotton fibre consumers (yarn manufacturers)and buyers seeking high quality cotton. Theprocess falls under the broader framework of ademand-based promotion of African cottonwith a view to improving market understandingthrough direct contact between African busi-nesses and its clients, particularly from emerg-

« Courtesy ITC/AAACP »

The first point of the AAACP mandate is similar to strate-gic focus area No. 1 of the Partnership. Both propose as astarting point the improvement of the capacities to deve-lop, monitor, and assess national and regional sectoralstrategies in order to ensure the long term viability of agiven sector – cotton in this case.

1 Since 2004, COS-coton has identified over 160 specific aids toAfrican cotton, a majority of which was provided by the EuropeanCommission and its Member States, mainly France/AFD, Ger-many and the Netherlands. This article concentrates on AAACPassistance because of the multiregional nature of most of its ac-tivities.


GLOCAL



ing countries (China, India, etc.)., It must alsobe seen in the context of support for the devel-opment of South-South cooperation initiatives.

Agricultural Risk ManagementOne of the main goals of the AAACP pro-gramme is to introduce ACP countries to andspread the use of various risk management in-struments, particularly price risk and weatherrisk. This component of the programme focuseson the awareness-raising of potential users(producer organisations, inter-trade associa-tions, traders, financiers, governments) and thebuilding of their capacities. Activities financedby the programme and implemented by theWorld Bank and FAO include (i) training, (ii)sector, strategy and product risk assessment,and (iii) expert capacity transfer to the regionsconcerned.

The Future of the Coordinationand Monitoring of Cotton Devel-opment ActivitiesStrengthening the coordination and monitoringrole of the Partnership with regards to develop-ment activities is key to achieving its objective,especially with the AAACP activities ending inlate 2011. One of the main recommendations ofthe mid-term review of the Partnership was thedecentralisation of COS-coton, which impliesbringing it closer to stakeholders in the regions,while maintaining the Brussels anchorage. Thisdecentralization is currently ongoing and, for astart, it is implemented through the creation ofcotton focal points in the main cotton-relatedAfrican regional economic zones(COMESA/SADC, WAEMU/ECOWAS andECCAS/CEMAC). In the field, the decentralisation of COS-cotonshould translate into having a lasting presenceof cotton experts in these regions, each havinga cotton sectoral strategy. It will play a pivotal

role in assisting and coordi-nating public-private con-sultation frameworksdeveloped in particular tomonitor, implement and up-date regional strategies. Inthis perspective, it will alsobe primordial to ensure thatregional strategies and na-

tional strategies are complementary, just likethose developed by regional inter-trade associ-ations (AProCA, ACA). In the longer term, it willbe necessary to ensure the coherence of thesesectoral strategies consistent with national, re-gional and pan-African (CAADP) agriculturalpolicies. Another major challenge in the area of

future assistance to African cotton would be toempower the main professional associations inthe sector, through capacity building, to go be-yond being mere “beneficiaries” and becometrue players in their own development. The decentralisation of COS-coton should alsocontribute to increasing the relevance and co-herence of information and communication be-tween African cotton sectors and all partiesinvolved in developing African cotton. In this context, with the imminent end of theAAACP, the question of the sustainability ofCOS-coton and of its decentralised structurehas yet to be answered. Solutions are being ex-plored, notably through a study on the designof a possible new intra ACP cotton programmewhich could be funded by the 10th EFD, butalso through the stakeholders themselves pro-gressively taking ownership of the coordinationand monitoring of cotton development activi-ties. n



One of the main recommendations of the mid-term re-view of the Partnership was the decentralisation of COS-coton, which implies bringing it closer to stakeholders inthe regions, while maintaining the Brussels anchorage.This decentralization is currently ongoing and, for a start,it is implemented through the creation of cotton focalpoints in the main cotton-related African regional econo-mic zones (COMESA/SADC, WAEMU/ECOWAS andECCAS/CEMAC).

PIERREBERTHELOT

FABIO BERTI



*Pierre Berthelot heads theCOS-coton Secretariat inBrussels and is an innova-tion expert within the Coor-dination Unit of the All ACPAgricultural CommoditiesProgramme Fabio Berti is in charge ofresearch at the University ofLiege, Gembloux Agro-BioTech, Rural Economics andDevelopment Unit, and acotton expert with the AllACP Agricultural Com-modities Programme.


D- Valorising African Cotton and the Textile Industry 27

Interview with SEIDNALY SIDHAMED ALPHADI Fashion designer and President of the ‘Festival International de la Mode Africaine’ (FIMA)

How Can African Fashion Stimulate the African Textile Sector?

GLOCAL : Can you briefly introduceyourself?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : My name is Alphadi. I am afashion designer and I am doing my best toensure that African culture and design receiveinternational recognition. I have not alwaysworked in fashion. I have a PhD in Tourismand I was Director of tourism in Niger forseven years. I stopped working in tourism inorder to concentrate on designing because Ithink that African textile needs “strongerhands” to gain recognition. In 1994/1995, fol-lowing the death of our colleague Chris Sey-dou, a great designer and forerunner inAfrican fashion, I became president of theAfrican Fashion Designers Federation (ADF).I am equally chairman of a festival which Ifounded; the International Festival for AfricanFashion (FIMA).This festival is an open doorevent showcasing African textiles, African des-igners and youngsters through the youngfashion designers and top models competi-tion. I am the Goodwill Ambassador for cul-ture in my country as I have a passion forculture, textiles, and designing, all of which Ibelieve form the bedrock necessary for deve-loping a continent which creates jobs.

GLOCAL : What is the value of cotton toyou as a designer?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : The fact that one has to work withimported material is a serious waste. Cottonis the main raw material which we use to pro-duce our collections. Africa only has cotton. Ithas no linen, silk or polyester. We are tryingto produce designs using African raffia, butcotton is the most practical material and is onewhich sells faster in both the domestic and in-ternational markets. It is important for us togive high value to cotton on the African mar-ket.For so many years, I refused to use Africanwax as it had been produced in Holland for thepast 150 years. Dutch wax is very profitable onthe African continent but it is consumed ex-clusively by Africans and for this reason, Ithink that it should be produced on the conti-nent. If African textiles are not produced wi-thin the continent, then I hold that is not

African. This is my opinion and it is also basedon the belief that weaving, drawing, printingand designing should be done within thecontinent in order to better develop the conti-nenet and combat poverty. Recently, I createda brand: ‘Daviva by Alphadi’; using a type offabric produced in Nigeria. Daviva was origi-nally a registered trademark of the Chineseand French and they created several jobs inthe textile sector in Nigeria. The cotton pro-duction and printing are done on the spot andto me, this is how true African cotton shouldbe sourced. We have produced Alphadi loin-cloths which, for about a year now have be-come highly coveted on the market, anddesigners are working a lot with this fabric be-cause they have a sense of belonging vis-a- visthis raw material, African cotton. An Africandesigner without African fabrics will not reallyhave the feeling that he/she has designed so-mething. We are trying to use raffia to createweavings from Burkina Faso, Senegal, Maliand Niger. There have also been some at-tempts at blending - like what Aissa Doine ofSenegal does, blending raffia threads and cot-ton to create upholstery or dress fabric.

GLOCAL : What in your opinion is Afri-can fashion?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : It is fashion which allows des-igners, weavers, textile manufacturers and theAfrican culture to excel. African fashion musthave a synergy which builds an industry whichcreates jobs, fights poverty, creates and regis-ters trademarks. The challenge is to create thedynamics for our fashion to be consumed onthe international dimension, for it to reuniteour people, or our black American, Brazilianand Caribbean brothers, so that Africans willunderstand that they do not need to mimicEurope and that they have their own highquality skills and designers. African fashionshould be used by Africans themselves, asthese values would contribute to building thecontinent, and remain in or return to thecontinent.Fashion is noble on every dimension: mate-rials, models, designers, make-up, hair… andall the way to the industrial dimension. Afri-can fashion should also be a luxury product:fashion is first of all high-end, before breakingdown to ready-to-wear. Fashion to me is alsofreedom. Where there is a fashion designer,the freedom to speak and dress-up as onewishes will follow. In Africa, we are some-times blocked by Islamists who hinder fashiondesigners from expressing themselves as theywould like, causing designers to depart from

the continent resulting in the lost of some ofour best brains. Africa must work hard tooverturn this painful situation.

GLOCAL : How can you describe the ba-lance of power between African fashionand European or Western fashion inAfrica?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : The balance of power is mainly amatter of resources. Today, money makes allthe difference. Our African financiers do notbelieve in African fashion and do not give it anopportunity to thrive, to be available in everyshop like other brands such as Zara, Mango,etc. In Europe, major sponsors invest infashion design. Designers earn 15-20% of theproceeds and the rest goes to the sponsors. Wehave genius designers, famous names and tra-demarks but there is no one supporting us inAfrica. This is the area that absolutely needsto be improved upon. Mango and Zara are ta-king over the African market today; the Chi-nese are also taking over the market becauseour governments have not considered thestakes with regard to job creation and the fightagainst poverty to the point of committing tothe sector. Since African fashion designers are

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I am the Goodwill Ambassador for cul-ture in my country as I have a passionfor culture, textiles, and designing, all ofwhich I believe form the bedrock neces-sary for developing a continent whichcreates jobs.

An African designer without African fa-brics will not really have the feeling thathe/she has designed something.


GLOCAL

28 D- Valorising African Cotton and the Textile Industry

neither visible nor supported financially, theyprefer to escape. In Africa we are expected todo everything ourselves…designing, sponso-ring, marketing and branding. At some point,we just die out if we do not have enoughstrength to carry out all these activities.

Which designer in Europe would even dream ofopening or running your average shop with per-sonal capital?

GLOCAL : How can we create a durableAfrican model for African Fashion?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : First of all, there is a vision to com-municate: fashion can help Africa. We shouldgive a chance to the value of the brand. Our tra-demarks are registered, but today an Africanbanker sponsors construction of buildings butdoes not give value to the African brand whe-reas a European banker knows how to give highvalue to European brands, invest on the basisof this added value and support activities, evendevelop products….

GLOCAL : How do African political andeconomic officials see the contribution ofAfrican fashion in the economies of Westand Central Africa?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : African fashion is not one of theirpriorities hence it is not reflected in their poli-cies. There needs to be real commitment in thisarea for results to be visible in training, jobcreation and in adding value to African cotton.The African Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA) exists in the United States to enableAfricans to export their textiles but, no Africancountry really benefits from that since there isno quality productivity accompanying massproduction, good schools, etc. African politi-cians need to meet and summon their ministersof finance, economic stakeholders and banks toemphasize the importance of African creativityand fashion, and explain the place of African je-wellery and fashion in job creation, as well asthe production of goods which are consumedin the African and international market. No-body can take our place in seeking funding forour factories. That is the only way of helpingAfrican fashion to grow. I am now interested insuch issues and I am trying to find out how Ican open shops in the United States and findthe right bankers who believe in me. I have atrademark as well as children in fashion indus-try and I would like to take up this fight. I havebeen in fabric production for a long time nowand I am working on improving the quality ofmy product by surrounding myself with the se-nior Chinese and Turkish technicians.

GLOCAL : What in your opinion could itcontribute in a boom for African fashion?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : We should start with training: ofthe designers who should develop knowledge

and skills so that they can create without “imi-tating” anybody. Next, we should train andbuild the capacity of producers so that the rawmaterials will be of very good quality and weshould also train actors in the clothing industry.Learning to grade a model from size 38 to 50 isnot an easy task in Africa today because of lackof know-how. It is necessary to provide meansand find funding groups for these people whohave received training to work and distributetheir products in Africa and in the world atlarge. Designers, producers, communicatorsand distributors are all instrumental in the suc-cess of fashion in Africa. For this to take effect,we need intelligent, charismatic Heads of Statewho understand what is at stake and to cham-pion this cause and make it truly progress in theregion.

GLOCAL : Should African textile productstarget the resources of ‘the average Afri-can’?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : Obviously! We should be able toproduce in Africa textile goods that can beconsumed on the African market. There is anAfrican market that we must make sure weconquer: by producing our own shirts and ‘bou-bous’ in large quantities. We should also diver-sify our materials. Cotton can be used toproduce goods that are not 100 % cotton. It canbe blended, mixed, processed with viscosefibre, silk or raffia to give African designersother materials to work with. Africa also needsthe prestige and haute couture fashion. Whenshirts are produced and tagged Alphadi, theycost nothing less than 15 000 Frs, but 2 yardsof loin cloth which is sold everywhere in Nia-mey costs 1000frs; sewing a shirt costs 1000frsso with 2000 or 2500frs one can have a ‘clean’shirt.

GLOCAL : What are the new trading pro-jects for the Alphadi brand?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : Today, my new strategy is builtaround the concept of the “House ofAlphadi”.This is something which I intend toalso develop in Mali, Niger and elsewhere whilegiving more emphasis to improving Africandying. This will also be done by bringing in Eu-ropean dying experts to train those who workwith me in solving the problem of dyes thatwash out and help us have products that can beexported to Europe and America. This complexwill have a production component, beautifulboutiques, a restaurant, hotel rooms, a nightclub and a bar. The entire project will be like a“fashion café” and represent the image of “Al-phadi”. Today, I print Daviva fabrics in Nigeria. I in-tend to build at a later date, a factory and createprints on the spot.

GLOCAL : How and why was the Interna-tional Festival for African Fashion foun-ded?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : I realized that as Africans, we wereneither visible nor taken seriously in fashion re-lated issues at the international level. The questfor equity was my main motivation. When YvesSaint Laurent came up with products sold at5000 Euros, we were not able to sell similarquality items at 600 Euros. After ten years ofbrainstorming, we wanted to showcase des-igners from the five continents on the sameplatform and chose the desert as a neutralground where everyone was equal. At this time,Niger had a terrible problem of rebellion in thenorthern region .I told my president at thetime, Ibrahim Baré Mainassara that only art,culture and beauty could stop the war. That iswhat happened and that is how the first FIMAwas born. It was created to give exposure andprovide opportunities to African designers andthe textile industry. FIMA was created for thelocal population and from the onset, I havesought to involve the political authorities in thisendeavour because only presidents could in-fluence financial stakeholders and take deci-sions to promote fashion and let it play its rolein African textile.The first FIMA was very difficult: we mounted1500 tents in the middle of the desert, withsound, music and lights, we dug wells. Pathé’O,Yves Saint Laurent, Christian Lacroix, Kenzo,Alphadi and many others were showcased onthe same catwalk, and we saw the skill of Afri-can designers. President Baré died a year afterthe first FIMA and the festival has not conti-nued as we would have loved it to but at leastthe first edition proved that the attempt wasworthwhile and ensured the continuation of theadventure with other editions. It is a festivalwhich generates many jobs, fills up hotels,helps Niger and gives it a vision of greatness.

GLOCAL : Security wise, such a festivalwas no easy feat in a country which ishome to Islamists…

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : Yes, Islamists tried to kill me seve-ral times because I was organizing this festival.I asked many women to participate in the cat-walks and showed them that cultural diversityand modernity existed. The fight which I amleading is not often understood and acceptedby the people of Niger. My vision and charismascare them.

GLOCAL : You wrote in the editorial ofFIMA 2009: “After the affirmation ofAfrican fashion at the internationallevel, we are initiating a new essentiallyeconomic journey geared towards thecreation of a true cultural industry,based on education and training, for aculture of excellence that is indispensa-ble for quality production.” Can you saya word or two about the creation of atrue cultural industry?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : FIMA is a way of ‘selling’ Africa andenabling African fashion to be recognized. For

First of all, there is a vision to communi-cate: fashion can help Africa.

Designers, producers, communicatorsand distributors are all instrumental inthe success of fashion in Africa. For this totake effect, we need intelligent, charisma-tic Heads of State who understand what isat stake and to champion this cause andmake it truly progress in the region.



the past two years we have created exhibitionstands where designers can exhibit their workand sell to the buyers present during the 5days of the festival, as well as create a realmarket. There were businesspersons fromMali, Senegal and Niger. Financial transac-tions and orders went smoothly among Afri-cans. Today, we hope to have a similarsituation between Africans and Europeans.Fashion traders in Africa who own shops inCameroon and Gabon shop from the ready-to-wear show in New York. We would likethem to come and buy from FIMA and fromthe other shows that we shall create.

GLOCAL : Tell me something about theAlphadi caravan.

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : It is a way of thanking each coun-try that takes part in FIMA by bringing FIMAto their country, and for preparing future des-igns and designers for subsequent FIMA edi-tions and for encouraging countries tocontinue attending FIMA. As such, FIMA willnever stop. In two years, I have organized 10caravans which have helped us choose 10countries, 5 models and 2 designers per coun-try who will take part in the top model andyoung designer contests. In the end, to thankthe country, I present my collection, stay fortwo more days to discuss with participants, gi-ving them an opportunity to see, touch thedesigns and realize that we can succeed inAfrican fashion.

GLOCAL : How far have you gone withthe creation of the Advanced School ofFashion and Arts?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : We have acquired land, the planshave been drawn up and the budget obtained.Unfortunately, after the allocation of land,there was a coup d’état in Niger which led to astalemate because political officials have notgiven me back the land so that I can com-mence activities. We have lost a year for no-thing.As regards the running of the school, we willmake requests on the budget of the state ofNiger, and the rest of the budget will be cove-red by school fees paid by students. It will bean Advanced School of Arts with 150 selectedstudents. It shall be a three-year programmemade possible after obtaining the AdvancedLevel General Certificate of Education. Ourgoal is to build a school which reflects the ex-cellence and prestige of African creativity.Also, we intend to train technicians: tailors,small craft trainees who shall be trained for 3to 6 months in embroidery, pearling, etc. Inaddition to fashion, we intend to includemusic, contemporary dancing, hair stylingand make-up in the school. We are looking forretired workers from the fashion industry toteach since this will help us reduce costs. Thisschool is my life’s dream. Without trainingand funding, there cannot be any progress andtraining is the foundation that needs to first belaid down. We hope to have Pan-African stu-dents, students from the Diaspora, Haiti, Gua-deloupe, Martinique, some European and

American students to be able to discuss, ex-change ideas and make our sponsorship, des-igns and jewellery an international realitybased on proven techniques.

GLOCAL : How can we concretely “ex-pose and amplify the phenomenon of[cultural] industrialization and of [tex-tile] trade at the international level”?(IFAF 2009 press kit)

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : We need to find policies and do-nors who understand that culture has noboundaries and that it enables us say “we in-novate and produce by ourselves”. Nobodycan develop our culture for us. We need to findfunds. We have oil, we have the money, theseare all the things we need to to make us a suc-cess. Culture is an excellent sector which cangive Africa her place at the international level.

GLOCAL : In a global economy, the tex-tile industry is threatened by issues re-lating to cost and profitability. Giventhe need for competitiveness, what isthe role and importance of African crea-tivity as a development factor?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : African creativity is a plus; an in-credible added value. Today, Africa has geniusdesigners. I can even say that behind everysuccessful European designer is an African;New York and London have many Nigerianand Ghanaian designers. Africa has designerswho have run away, who have been rejectedbecause they are homosexual, because theyare Rastafarians, and they leave because theyhave no freedom. One day, we will need to discuss those returnsand those cultural problems. I started workingin fashion at 25, I could have started at 20.Being from a Muslim family, my parents didnot at first accept that I should embark on thisprofession which was not in line with their va-lues and this was not good for the family andwas considered by some as degenerate. InAfrica, you are stifled if you do not follow thenorm. If in 15 – 20 years these young or oldtalents return to the continent to bring theircontribution, they will change Africa. Deepcultural transformations are possible. DuringFIMA, the young designer competition isstronger, more grandiose than FIMA itself,the geniuses who exhibit their work therereally want to show what they can do. Weshould continue giving a chance to theseyoung people and to African creativity.

GLOCAL : African women are loved fortheir full figures. In internationalfashion which only presents very slimmodels, shall Africa have something dif-ferent to bring to the canons of femininebeauty?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : Africa is unfortunately a continentwhich is not listened to by her own children.If Africa could do this, it would be fantastic

and finally give a positive image of the femalefigure. But the influence of the stereotype ofinternational fashion and the low quality ofAfrican creations do not allow us to distin-guish ourselves from this stereotype for fearof being completely disqualified. We still havethe obligation to align ourselves with the ca-nons of international fashion. Progressively, Ibelieve we shall get to a stage where we canpresent the standard size 10 models and de-termine three sublime models with theirbeautiful figures and slowly and steadily movetowards achieving a balance. Models are ourcommunication tools. We need to talk aboutbeauty and about the value of the Africanwoman. The work done by models is just achannel that needs to be developed and theydo not need to run to Europe and UnitedStates of America for recognition.

GLOCAL : What did I forget to ask thatcould be important to this reflection onAfrican fashion?

SEIDNALY SIDHAMED AL-PHADI : It is important to insist on howimperative it is that our political leaders un-derstand the benefits and challenges of Afri-can fashion and African designs. They mustsupport the cultural, artistic, and textile pro-jects until their completion. We should alsostop the exodus of our national talents, thosecreative youths who run away and never re-turn. We should give them a chance and letthem work. If they go away, we provide ope-nings for them to return. The human factor isvery important. Today, African designers aretired; they have invested more into their pro-jects than they are receiving in return from theAfrican market. With a billion people inAfrica, I believe there is a market to conquerand we should move towards a situationwhere Africans no longer depend on Europewhen they wish to buy goods but instead buytheir own indigenously sourced goods. Ob-viously, without peace, we cannot effect anyserious change. This is why this is a complexand vital challenge. n

Interview avec SEIDNALY SIDHAMED ALPHADI

Nobody can develop our culture for us.We need to find funds.


Culture is an excellent sector whichcan give Africa her place at the inter-national level.

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GLOCAL



Cotton made in Africa (CmiA): or How to Link Up African Producers with Major International Textile Distributors using a

Business-Development Agenda

Interview with CHRISTOPH KAUT, Managing Director, Aid by Trade Foundation

GLOCAL : Could you please introduce yourself in a few words?Christoph Kaut : My name is Christoph Kaut, I am one of the managingdirectors of the Aid by Trade Foundation. Within the Foundation, I han-dle the development policy sector: we have 4 areas of work for both theAid by Trade Foundation and Atacora - which is the marketing arm ofthe Foundation. These include: development policy which is my area,global sourcing to simplify the procedure for retailers to get hold of “Cot-ton made in Africa”, marketing, which is very important because we area social business and we need to look at the social aspect as well as thebusiness market, and last but not least, sales. The development policy as-pect includes the whole systematics of CmiA: verification, impact assess-ment, social investments at the smallholder level. It is about setting upthe system, running it, maintaining and monitoring it.

GLOCAL : What is “Cotton made in Africa’s” product?CHRISTOPH KAUT : The goods which we trade in are idealisticgoods, rather than the technical quality of cotton. What we are selling issocial and ecological values within the framework of sustainability. Whatwe seek to ensure is that when the retailer utilizes CmiA, he can claimthe cotton was produced in a better way, moresustainably using greater social responsi-bility than ordinary cotton. To give a proofof our unique selling proposition we in-stalled a verification system which gives usand the retailer the certainty that what wesay is controlled and true. We don’t pro-duce or trade. Our sourcing person in thesourcing market has the role of match-maker; he brings together the spinnerswho spin, the CmiA to the cotton manu-facturers, and the garment producers tothe retailers.

GLOCAL : In a nutshell is it right to say that your activity ismainly about marketing and branding?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : We ensure certain standards in cotton pro-duction. This is the money-making side of the coin as we receive the li-censing fee for certain products. The reverse side of the coin is thetransferring of the licensing fee back to West and Southern Africa. HereI must say we are a young initiative, just a start-up social business.. Inthe coming years we will increasingly transfer income made from li-censing fees paid by retailers to CmiA smallholders. We started by co-financing two community projects to improve rural education inBurkina Faso and Benin. More projects in other CmiA countries are cur-rently in the pipeline. Moreover, it is our vision to start paying dividendsto the CmiA smallholders by 2013 / 2014.When we look at sales, we have been quite successful and I think we arefollowing the right strategy. We started out in 2007 selling the first CmiAlabeled pieces and earning the first licensing fees for a little less thanhalf a million items and now in 2010, we have reached over 10 millionpieces.

GLOCAL : Your company is a social enterprise: business

and development, how do they work together and where isthe balance?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : This is simply explained. To our understand-ing, the idea of a social business is that as a business we make aprofit. As a social business, the CmiA distributes its profits to thosewho created the wealth, i.e., the smallholder farmers. As mentionedabove, our vision is to transfer the first surpluses in 2013 / 2014which we would like to call dividends. They may be larger or smallersums, as this depends on the success of our business.

GLOCAL : Talking about social businesses, Unicef chairmanJürgen Heraeus said “The minute they’re subsidized, they canbe accused of unfair competition.”(Self Actualization for All,CmiA website) Can the cotton production benefiting fromCmiA support be accused of unfair competition?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Not yet. The bigger and more experienced theinitiative, the more criticisms it will receive, this is normal.

GLOCAL : CmiA has an interesting end-to-end approach in

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BurkinaFaso

Trade partner

Market CmiA

Generate licensing

Offer products made of CmiA cottonto customers

Provides cotton at market prices

Cotton trader

The Aid by Trade Foundation markets the CmiA cotton and spends the funds generated by licensing fees on creating impact in Africa

BeninFaso

Mozambique

cotton and provide support

gfees and funds (for community projects)

Use fees and funds for social & environmental impact in Africa

Malawi

Côte d’Ivoire

COMPACI SUPPORT

2009-2012

Zambia

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the regions in where CmiA is active: you work with small-holder farmers who are connected to a specific companywhich is your partner. How are you interacting with thesevery different groups of stakeholders and how do they in-teract together?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Looking at the systematics or the organi-sation of cotton production in Africa you will usually find cottoncompanies operating the ginneries. As they do not operate theirown farms, cotton companies are dependent on smallholders tosupply them with cotton grown on their fields. Cotton companiesprovide smallholders with inputs, such as planting material, agro-chemicals, and fertilizers. As a rule, these inputs are supplied oncredit later deducted from the sales price of cotton delivered by thesmallholders. In addition, cotton companies invest into smallholdertrainings in order to raise the productivity of smallholders. This in-vestment is beneficial for both parties: The cotton company can ac-quire more cotton (sometimes of better quality) and the farmerincreases his income by realizing higher yields per hectare. It’s awin-win situation. Our collaboration with cotton companies is im-portant: we work with them to realize our verification target: an in-creasing degree of sustainability for a large number of smallholderfarmers. Moreover, we develop our community projects togetherwith them and farmer’s representatives.

GLOCAL : You havean ambitious targetof selling 60 to 70million items in2013. How will youdo this; by multiply-ing the number ofCmiA producers? Byimproving theyields?CHRISTOPH KAUT :We will continue to in-crease both productivityand the number ofCmiA producers. By theend of 2011, we hope tohave verified over260,000 CmiA farmers.However, looking at oursales targets, we willhave enough verifiedcotton which will enableus not to have shortagesalong the supply chain.

We are currently working at a rate of 10% sales of the whole verifiedCmiA cotton and it is sometimes still a challenge to get hold of thecotton.

GLOCAL : What do you think about certification? CHRISTOPH KAUT : We call it verification, others call it certifi-cation. Cotton made in Africa does not issue a certificate. Our phi-losophy regarding verification is a little bit different: we believe thatwith certification you verify certain standards, however, in our stan-dards, we have one set of exclusion criteria and another set of de-velopment standards, which we call sustainability criteria. For thelatter, we work closely with cotton companies and smallholders toimprove their performance with regard to the standards at the giventime. This is done for instance through focused training measures.We thus have a constant improvement approach with smallholdersand cotton companies..

GLOCAL : You’re working through third party verificationcompanies aren’t you?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : The basics of our verification system were de-veloped by the Dutch University of Wageningen. These were further re-fined and operationalized by a team from PricewaterhouseCooperswith previous experience in standards development in the coffee sector.The verification system was then thoroughly discussed with all ourstakeholders (farmer organizations, cotton companies, developmentinstitutions, as well as social and environmental NGO’s). Regular ex-ternal verifications are done every two years by two selected profes-sional and independent verification companies, Ecocert and Africert.Additionally, cotton companies have to complete yearly self assess-ments. When things are not completely clear, we get a report and there’sa second round of verification to see whether certain practices whichare not considered to be appropriate under CmiA are ended.

GLOCAL : Looking at the gross margins criteria in your as-sessment guidelines: “3-year-average gross margin forCmiA-farmers is 20 % higher than that of non-colla boratingcotton farmers” which is considered ‘Green’ = Good/ sustain-able. Is this 20% difference high enough to have an impact onthe cotton producers’ development? If so, why and how?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : This is a very philosophical question. Certainlya 100% increase in income would be better but a 20% rise achieved overa longer period of time is already very helpful. We believe that 20% is aminimum average. This is largely due to the techniques used. Currently,the cotton prices are fairly high and the cotton farmers put a lot of at-tention into their fields. We have a rotating crop system so that thefarmer is not only producing cotton but also sweet corn and soybeans.When the cotton prices fall again, the farmers may attend to their sweetcorn fields more actively and they find that if you do not do the weedingproperly, you suddenly find your cotton production goes down. It is atricky system in which we work and it is very hard to make predictionson one crop.

GLOCAL : You are assessing the farmers on different criteria(people, planet - water, pesticide and fertilizer use andprofit). How has their performance evolved since the adop-tion by the advisory board in 2008 of the final version of theverification framework? CmiA is helping the smallholderfarmers and the cotton companies improve and move fromred to yellow to green. Would it be possible to have your viewon the general evolution of your farmers’ base and the impact

To our understanding, the idea of a social business is thatas a business we make a profit. As a social business, theCmiA distributes its profits to those who created thewealth, i.e., the smallholder farmers.

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The challenges of sourcing «CmiA» cotton

Based on the mass-spelling system and its input/out-put approach, if a retailer wants to produce a CmiAarticle in a country where no cotton is available, the

spinning mills have no possibility to purchase new CmiA cot-ton and the retailer cannot produce any CmiA product.Countries with their own cotton production (India, Pakistan)do not import cotton in big quantities, thus the prices for im-ported cotton might be a little higher than the local cottonwhich would lead to a higher price for the ready garment andgenerate extra costs for the retailer who wants to produceCmiA items.The retailers see CmiA still more as a “project”. We wouldprefer that they see us as a regular case for most of their mer-chandise. The idea of a project might be understood by someparties of the supply chain as an additional income and theyask for a higher price for the final product, even though theCmiA cotton is traded without any up-charge.We have to make sure that always enough cotton in availablefor us in Africa. In years like 2010 the producers and tradershave sold the cotton fast and for almost any price theywanted. We have established a new position in the founda-tion, the “Cotton Scout”. He makes sure that always enoughCmiA cotton is available in Africa to feed our demand.


GLOCAL



the CmiA initiative is having on the socio-economic environ-ment of the farmers you’re working with?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Change is coming along slowly. Two years aretoo short a time to deliver predictable data, especially when farming isdependent on climatic patterns, such as sun, rainfall, etc. For the agri-cultural product, we’re only looking at a minimum -year timeline. Onsome years, the farmers may have had superb training but unfortunately,the rain arrived late and the yield remained small. However, together withour partner programme Compaci, we are currently in the process of es-tablishing a monitoring baseline, against which we will be able to monitormedium and long term changes...

GLOCAL : What about ‘Cotton made in Asia or South America’following the same kind of sustainability guidelines? Whatmakes Africa different in terms of positive branding?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : We are thinking of expanding into Asia or SouthAmerica. The “Cotton made in the Africa” system and its verification sys-tem works everywhere we find smallholder farmers. However, at thistime, we are sufficiently busy setting up our system in Africa where westill find ample growth opportunities. I believe the biggest social and en-vironmental impact for us can be found in Africa.

GLOCAL : Traceability through the added-value chain is an in-teresting subject: as explained in one of your articles “all na-tional cotton businesses come together and are handled” inAfrican ports. How have the issues around the necessity forseparate transportation for cotton been resolved? What kindof solutions and technologies have you found with the inter-national cotton traders and the African cotton companiesyou’re working with?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : We have a track and trace system which is a vol-untary system for the retailers. And if they want it, they need to provideus with the data. Thereafter the cotton is traceable through the valuechain. We have a hard identity preserved criterion which means that ourcotton is our cotton up to the bale being a tradable unit. From then on-wards we’re working on a mass-balance system which is an input/outputsystem which has to do with the complexity of the value chain. As long asit comes from Africa, the cotton may be utilized in the manufacturingprocess of the CmiA. However, stocks utilized for CmiA production needto be replenished with 100% CmiA cotton. Applying this system allowsthe manufacturers to realize short lead times in production – essential ina market driven by fashion and seasons. At the end of the day, the CmiAstill receives its licensing fees with which we can support the CmiA farm-ers in Africa.

GLOCAL : This is a form of traceability but it does not allow forverification that the raw material used to produce CmiA textileitems has been produced from the cotton grown in the small-holder farms involved in the CmiA project, or does it?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : If you want to produce a fiber and from that par-ticular fiber, produce a shirt, i.e., full and direct traceability throughoutthat entire value chain, you will end up with a product which is signifi-cantly more expensive than if you’re applying a mass-balance system,which is comparable to the eco-grid system applied in some countrieswhen purchasing electricity from renewable sources. As a result of beingmore expensive due to greater controls, if the CmiA was to ensure reducedlicensing fees, it would consequently reduce our ability to support ourcore group: the smallholder farmer and his family.

GLOCAL : Looking at the difficulties retailers are facing when

they want to use CmiA cotton for the items theyproduce in China, Bangladesh, etc, is the optionof trying to help boost the transformation of cot-ton in Africa something interesting for your ini-tiative or is it way out of your remit?CHRISTOPH KAUT : The retailers’ wish is definitely inthis direction and we are certainly encouraging this trend.However, we are talking about an extremely complexframework. For instance, we discussed with a prominentbusinessman in order to try and understand why he wouldnot start manufacturing garments in Benin. He pointedout that besides other issues, electricity would cost him

about six times more than it would in China, therefore, this would notallow Benin to be competitive. However, other countries have shown that it can be done. One of our largepartners is producing its garments in a newly opened factory in Ethiopia.Given rising production costs especially in China, and rising urbanizationin Africa, we believe that it is a good chance we will see an increasing vol-ume of “Cotton made in Africa” also being manufactured into garmentson this continent. “CmiA - cotton grown and manufactured in Africa”. Itwould make a great logo!

GLOCAL : South Africa is an important country for the CmiA, ifI’m not mistaken. Is it one of the countries where the whole cot-ton textile production chain can be located?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : As a garment manufacturing hub, South Africaseems to have increasing problems in terms of competitiveness. As a con-sumer market, it is large by African standards, but rather small by inter-national comparison. Even though it continues to have potential, wethink the future of African manufacturing is in other more densely pop-ulated countries on the continent, such as Cameroon, Ghana or, as pre-viously mentioned, Ethiopia. Retailers are producing in locations whereproduction costs are lowest and this unfortunately does not seem to bethe case in South Africa.

GLOCAL : Could you please tell me about the school uniformproject you’ve developed in Benin?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Usually for community projects, we try to workas closely together with the local community as possible. In this instance,providing school uniforms and building a number of schools and schoolgardens were more or less the ideas put forward by the local CmiA farm-ers in northern Benin. We placed the projects into a budget but the farm-ers were the ones to decide what was to be done and where it was to bedone. We were asked to provide financial support for locally producedschools uniforms in order to allow more children to attend school and tosupport the construction of permanent school building in locationswhere farmers could only afford to build school huts. About one third ofthe overall investment in this project comes from the farming communi-ties, , mostly not in cash but in kind - which is equally important. Wehope to have a very fruitful and successful local involvement. After com-pletion we will assess the impact of these projects.

GLOCAL : Looking at the school uniform project in Benin andfollowing a question the panel was asked during a conferenceon Cotton, Textile and Development in Ouagadougou in No-vember, could the local / regional production of school uni-forms be a motor to boost West and Central Africantransformation of raw cotton and help support the construc-tion of a viable textile industry?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Viability is an issue. When we worked togetherwith our partners in Benin to produce these school uniforms, it was vitalfor us to have a local product and employ local labour. The aim was tokeep the value addition in the communities. This way, production benefitsthe local communities but it is unfortunately unable to compete at a global

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Given rising production costs especially in China, and ri-sing urbanization in Africa, we believe that it is a goodchance we will see an increasing volume of “Cotton madein Africa” also being manufactured into garments on thiscontinent. “CmiA - cotton grown and manufactured inAfrica”. It would make a great logo!



level. For instance, production of thesame uniforms, called khakis, wouldhave cost half the price if we had pro-duced them in Bangladesh.

GLOCAL : The CmiA is a young ini-tiative but can you already see howyou are influencing the way peopleproduce and buy textile products?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : If you are ask-ing about our general impact, then it is tinged with disappointment.When you look at the overall market for sustainable cotton products, itis so small compared to standard cotton whether you’re looking at fairtrade, organic cotton or our cotton: It is not more than 1% of the overallproduction nor is it more than 1% in the market. We still have a longand tough road ahead, not only for us but also for our collaborationswith our colleagues from the other initiatives to push forward moresustainable products, in our case, cotton into the markets. This by farcannot yet be considered as being mainstream.

GLOCAL : The CmiA entered the American market throughthe Social Accountability International organization andthe British market through the Sustainable Clothing ActionPlan. The CmiA also has a presence on the German market,but what about other European countries? In terms of so-cial consumerism of cotton products, what would the CmiAmarket typology for other European countries (Spain,Italy, the Netherlands, France…) look like?CHRISTOPH KAUT : I think it is fair to say that the further northyou go, the more sensitive people are to social consumerism, while fur-ther south, the longer it takes to get there. We are actually working witha French company called Celio. There is some interest from other bigFrench brands as well. When it comes to expanding, it ’is not easy forus because we are a sustainable brand and we bring something new intoa company. If the company is only working to maximize short-termprofits then their purchasing department will be working that way.Companies need to adopt and integrate sustainability into their overallstrategy and adjust their incentive systems accordingly. Some compa-nies have already been through these changes and the structures areready in place when they approach us so we can start working togetherimmediately. However, with companies have not having adopted astrategy, the process of integrating sustainable products is long andcumbersome. With some companies, it took a year and a half or longerbefore the CmiA took off.

GLOCAL : The CmiA and the Aid by Trade Foundation worktogether and one of them is a start-up while the other is afoundation. In terms of a long-term perspective, is the objec-tive to have the CmiA as a completely independent structureor is the Aid by Trade Foundation with the support of thefunding from the GTZ and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-dation going to keep supporting the functioning costs of theCmiA?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : We understand that the COMPACI and the in-volvement of the BMZ and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation aretemporary. Once the Compaci project comes to a halt, “Cotton made inAfrica” will continue its work and also take over functions currently fi-nanced through Compaci.. We intend to progressively take over thepart of the COMPACI programme which involves training farmers inagricultural techniques.

GLOCAL : In terms of headcounts, how many people work forthe Aid by Trace Foundation, for CmiA and Atacora?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : Overall, we’re about nine people in Germany,and on top of that we have outsourcing people working in Bangladesh,

Turkey and Hong-Kong.

GLOCAL : The CmiA started the “The Demand Alliance” whichbrings together retail organisations like REWE Group,Puma, 1888 Mills, Mustang Jeans, Edgars, MONKS, 3 Suissesand many more to try and increase the demand for “sustain-ably grown cotton”. How did you bring together these retail-ers and generate momentum?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : The Foundation’s founder, Dr. Michael Otto,who also happens to be the Chairman of the supervisory board of theOtto Group and one of the principal owners is certainly well connected.He gave us significant support, a kick start and a chance to address andrecruit many of the retailers we are now working with. Down the roadit becomes slightly easier to get access to new retailers as we get betterknown for what we do and who we are. In order to to expand sales wenow work in two areas, which includes: attracting new retailers into theDemand Alliance, and the second is to increase the volume of CmiA uti-lized by those who are already partners of Cotton made in Africa initia-tive. Usually, the company starts with a fairly small amount of cottonto test how their sourcing and manufacturing chain can integrate withthe CmiA methodology. Once the tests have proved successful, retailerscan start purchasing increasingly larger quantities. The Otto Group, forinstance, started with fairly small amounts but in the matter of twoyears they are already planning to increase consumption of CmiA fivefold. That is impressive. We are also seeing this with other partners ofthe Demand Alliance, such as Puma, S’Oliver and Tchibo.

GLOCAL : How international is that Demand Alliance?CHRISTOPH KAUT : Well, we have companies from northern Ger-many and southern Germany! Joke aside; What I mean to say is thatthis because we are sometimes seen as a rather German initiative whichis not the whole truth. First of all, we work with companies which maybe located in Germany but are international organizations with a mar-ket worldwide, such as Puma, for instance. We also work with compa-nies which are not German at all like Celio in France, Anvil in the UnitedStates. Our main challenge is to continue to grow as fast as we did inthe past three years in order to make the system work and to improvethe lives and the environment in rural Africa. Whether we reach thistarget through sales in Germany or abroad is of secondary interest.However, as you can imagine, concurrent growth in Europe and NorthAmerica is certainly the best of all the options, especially in North Amer-ica where the Gates’ Foundation is very well connected. They are help-ing us open doors so that we can access important retailers.

GLOCAL : The CmiA is about development and business: howare the CmiA business partners able to calculate their re-turn on investment, what are the criteria in terms of repu-tation, branding, sales, customer satisfaction…? What arethe key drivers for businesses supporting CmiA?CHRISTOPH KAUT : Retailers address this question in differentways. Generally, there is awareness that a sustainable product offeringprovides a competitive advantage. Customers expect and demand “eth-ical products”, therefore, the CmiA helps retailers meet the demands oftheir customers. Some retailers have their own labels and we fit the cri-teria of their own label and they sell us. In this case, you will not evensee the CmiA label, they will only see a sustainability label of a particularcompany, such as the Pro Planet label with the REWE Group. Othersare labeling their products CmiA, others will only mention CmiA in their

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If you are asking about our general impact, then it is tingedwith disappointment. When you look at the overall marketfor sustainable cotton products, it is so small compared tostandard cotton whether you’re looking at fair trade, orga-nic cotton or our cotton: It is not more than 1% of the ove-rall production nor is it more than 1% in the market.

When it comes to expanding, it ’is not easy for us becausewe are a sustainable brand and we bring something newinto a company.


GLOCAL


CSR reports saying that they aresourcing x% of their total textilefrom cotton produced sustainably.They all have different approaches,I do not know which one is better,they exist in parallel and obviouslywork.

GLOCAL : When asked “Whatdoes it mean to activate thepower of the market?”, yougave the following answer:“Activating market forces ul-

timately means generating so much demand that the commod-ity is in short supply and when we talk about limitedsupply in a market economy, we’re talking abouthigher prices and that’s precisely the effect we’re hop-ing to acheive for our farmers. Generate more demandfor cotton made in Africa than there’s cotton then theywill be able to sell their raw material at a higher priceand thereafter reap the benefits.” Coming back to theCmiA’s ambitions, how are you doing as far as this ob-jective of “generating so much demand that the com-modity is in short supply” is concerned? What areyour targets and timeline?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : When we’re talking about activatingthe market forces, we mean that we would like to see the CmiA estab-lished and accepted in the market. Retailers should be able to buy CmiAproducts and pay our (moderate) licensing fee, because they know thatby utilizing Cotton made in Africa they are more competitive than theircompetitors on the market. In development terms, this means that tradein a globalized world can add to continuously improving the living andworking conditions of our target group, the smallholder farmers and theirfamilies, as well as their environment. The power of the market wouldthus be the driving force behind a sustainable development “at eye level”across the continents.

GLOCAL : I guess reputational risk is one of the major risks forthe CmiA, how do you mitigate it?

CHRISTOPH KAUT : We believe, there are three aspects which addto the reputation of “Cotton made in Africa” and the Aid by Trade Foun-dation implementing this initiative. First, the Aid by Trade Foundationhas a strong and independent Board of Trustees and Advisory Board fromdifferent backgrounds: we have members from the production and fromthe retails sector, development institutions, social and environmentalNGO’s, banks and think tanks from Europe and Africa. Second, we havea solid and tested system to independently verify “Cotton made in Africa”in the fields and the ginneries, and thirdly, we are open and transparentwith regards to our system, the verification criteria as well as the gover-nance and verification results. This is also one of the reasons why theCmiA is an associate of the ISEAL body of standards.

GLOCAL : In an article titled “We Are Family” about the Com-paci Stakeholder Workshop in Ouagadougou you said: “Peo-ple get to talking with each other. For many, from Europe orthe USA, it gives insight into an entirely new universe of expe-riences and leaves a deep impression. […] Both sides realizethat they have equally important parts to play, and everyone’swork receives recognition,”

Could you please expand on that because I believe that this is

actually a key component to a real non-green washing andsuccessful business/development projects. CHRISTOPH KAUT : When it comes to our yearly stakeholders meet-ing, alternately held in Europe and Africa, I think there are two mainpoints. First, participants meet people from other parts of Africa and theyare thus able to exchange and learn together, secondly, these meetingsare a great opportunity for all participants to learn about other stages ofthis highly complex textile value chain; cotton ginners meet spinners, gar-ment manufacturers meet retailers; and thirdly, retailers are very likelyto meet and speak to farmers in the field, something they have most likelynever done before. Bringing farmers and retailers together under thecommon label of “Cotton made in Africa” provides for very emotionalmoments, where we can see how our ideas work at the eye level and seeall of our partners in person.

GLOCAL : If I can ask a personal question, why did you get in-volved in CmiA?CHRISTOPH KAUT : I got involved in this initiative because I found

it very interesting that the CmiA’s intention is to improve the lives of alarge number of smallholder farmers in Africa by activating marketforces, opening mainstream markets for a hitherto non-marketed prod-uct. The initiative does not stop its activities at the border of a countrybut addresses the entire value chainIf we manage to upscale the CmiA, then we may have instruments whichwould better balance wealth in a globalised world and which goes beyondthe stereotypical development projects and charity. The smallholderfarmer, the cotton companies and the retailer are all working togetherin a win-win situation to mutually benefit from the production and mar-keting of a sustainable product. This model will certainly never be com-pletely free of conflict, however, it can prove that a more equitable socialand environmental development is achievable in our today’s globalisedworld. n

Usually, the company starts with a fairly small amount of cotton to test how their sourcing andmanufacturing chain can integrate with the CmiA methodology. Once the tests have proved suc-cessful, retailers can start purchasing increasingly larger quantities. The Otto Group, for ins-tance, started with fairly small amounts but in the matter of two years they are already planningto increase consumption of CmiA five fold. That is impressive. We are also seeing this with otherpartners of the Demand Alliance, such as Puma, S’Oliver and Tchib.

Retailers address this question in different ways. Generally,there is awareness that a sustainable product offering providesa competitive advantage. Customers expect and demand “ethi-cal products”, therefore, the CmiA helps retailers meet the de-mands of their customers.

When we’re talking about activating the market forces, we mean that wewould like to see the CmiA established and accepted in the market. Re-tailers should be able to buy CmiA products and pay our (moderate) li-censing fee, because they know that by utilizing Cotton made in Africathey are more competitive than their competitors on the market. In de-velopment terms, this means that trade in a globalized world can add tocontinuously improving the living and working conditions of our targetgroup, the smallholder farmers and their families, as well as their envi-ronment. The power of the market would thus be the driving force behinda sustainable development “at eye level” across the continents.

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If we manage to upscale the CmiA, then we may have instru-ments which would better balance wealth in a globalised worldand which goes beyond the stereotypical development projectsand charity. The smallholder farmer, the cotton companies andthe retailer are all working together in a win-win situation tomutually benefit from the production and marketing of a sus-tainable product.

Interview avec CHRISTOPH KAUT


UNIVERSITE CHEIKH ANTA DIOP DE DAKAR (UCAD)

Faculté des Sciences Economiqueset de Gestion (FASEG)

Laboratoire de Politiques Commerciales (LAPOCOM)

Master Professionnel II de Politiques et Négociations Commerciales Internationales(PNCI)

The current international environment is shadowed by a growing trend in economies anda efforts towards a better integration into the global economy. In this context, universitieshave pursued relentless efforts in diversifying their academic platform and curricula inorder to attract and better serve growing demands for training people confronted with moreand more complex issues and a keen competition in the international sphere.The implementation of the Master on International Trade and Negotiations lends supportto this objective.

I. Training modulesThe Master on International Trade and Negotiations cover two parallel programs, an aca-demic one for the students with Bachelor degrees and a vocational training and capacitybuilding for professionals on trade policy formulation and international negotiations.The students also follow a two months internship programmes in various entities working on international trades policy and negotiations,such as: Trade Ministry, International Trade Department, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Enda-Tiers Monde, Interna-tional Food and Research Institute (IFRI), as well as in the private sector. Students are due to deliver a report following the end of thepractice as part of the requirements to complete the Master programme.

II. Research on trade policiesResearches on issues relevant to international trade, trade policy formulation as well as facing the current negotiating challenges suchas the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), trade facilitation, safeguards measures and issues of importance to the regional inte-gration process are dealt with in the Laboratory on Trade Policy. Programmes and activities include writing dissertations and researchesfrom students and teachers.

III. Jobs placement for studentsData from survey undertaken besides various intakes of students holding the Master degree in this program show that promising resultsin terms of job placement, for the years 2006-2007 (Table I):

IV. Figures indicate that the private sector is the main destination for the insertion of students trained in the Master program (29%),followed by the education sector (26%), government (23%), NGOs and post-doctoral studies account for 11% respectively.It is also interesting to note that trainees from the 1st intake on vocational training were previously serving before joining the Masterprogram in the following entities: Ministry of Economy and Finances (3), Customs Services (3), Public Administration (1), Education(3), private sector (3) and Trade Ministry (1).

V. Organisational mattersStudents from intakes 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 have set up business incubation projects as part of their efforts to showcase the skillsand capacities acquired during the Master program. Efforts are also made to set up an Alumni Association that would shed additional exposure to the Master program. In this context, an“Annual Forum” for the Master Program will be launched in order to discuss any issues relevant to international trade policy and nego-tiations.

TABLE I : Job placement of students according to sec-tors of activities

Government

Education

Private sector

NGOs

Ph. D studies

Other

N.A.

Total

Intake 1

Bachelors

6

8

4

4

22

Intake 1

Vocational training

8

3

2

13

Total

8

9

10

4

4

35

TABLE II: Job placement of students according to sec-tors of activities (%)

Government

Education

Private sector

NGOs

Ph. D studies

Other

N.A.

Total

Intake 1

Vocational training

62

23

15

100

1ère promotion

formation continue

62

23

15

100

Total

23

26

29

11

11

100


GLOCAL

36 E- Scientific Research Supporting Cotton Sectors: The Stakes for West and Central Africa


IntroductionCotton, which is mostly farmed for its fibre, isan important component in global marketspeculations. Farmed in over 100 countries, itis a widely traded basic agricultural productwith more than 150 countries importing or ex-porting cotton. The six largest consumercountries are also among the seven largestproducers. Between 1980/1981 and2004/2005, cotton trading represented 30%of production worldwide, moving up to 40%in 2005/2006.Agriculture is the main source of income andemployment for more than 80% of the activepopulation in most countries of West and Cen-tral Africa (WCA) where cotton provides a di-rect or indirect source of income to 15-20million people. Though a considerable share of the cottonproduced is exported, it remains central to thebalance of trade in WCA countries. Cottonprovides up to 80% of the export revenues ofBenin, 66% of Burkina Faso and over 50% forMali and Chad (before the latter launched itspetroleum activities), as well as 30% in all theproducing countries of the WCA. As a result of its high quality, cotton is one ofthe rare sectors where Africa is competitive.This is why cotton research is very active inproducing countries, with the West and Cen-tral African Council for Agricultural Researchand Development (CORAF/WECARD) spear-heading the research.

Stakeholders in research on cot-ton in wcaCORAF/WECARD is in charge of coordinatingagricultural research in West and CentralAfrica. This organisation was created in 1987 in col-laboration with the Conference of African andFrench leaders of agricultural research insti-tutes. In 1995, CORAF/WECARD broadenedits base and included English and Portuguesespeaking countries from West and CentralAfrica. It brings together the national agricul-tural research systems (NARS) of 22 coun-tries. These countries combined occupy asurface area of 11.5 million km² and have apopulation of 318 million inhabitants, 70% ofwhom are involved in agriculture.CORAF/WECARD is in charge of harmonisingresearch and efficiently orientating it to en-sure a better impact on the population. TheExecutive Secretariat of this organization is

based in Dakar, Senegal. It is headed by an Ex-ecutive Director who leads a team of about 30individuals. Nevertheless, the national re-search systems in the 22 member countries re-main the heartbeat for the researchers whoimplement projects. CORAF/WECARD ismandated to: - Promote cooperation, consultations and in-formation sharing between member institu-tions on the one hand and partners on theother hand;- Define common research goals and prioritiesat the sub-regional and regional levels;Serve as a consultative body for any researchcarried out by sub-regional, regional or inter-national organizations working in the sub-re-gion;- Design and ensure an efficient implementa-tion of sub-regional research developmentprogrammes aimed at adding value to na-tional programmes;- Harmonise the activities of existing researchcomponents and facilitate the creation of newregional programmes or other operational re-search units at the regional level(CORAF/WECARD, 2007).The second category of research stakeholdersare the national research institutes with spe-cial interest in cotton; in some cases, these re-search institutes have specialised centresfocusing on cotton research alone, as is thecase in Benin with the INRAB which has aCotton and Fibre Agricultural Research Cen-tre [Centre de Recherches Agricoles Coton etFibres – CRA-CF] and ITRA in Togo with theHumid Savannah Agronomic Research Centre[Centre de Recherche Agronomique - SavanneHumide – CRA-SH]. Cotton development corporations, some ofwhich have been privatised, fall under thethird category of stakeholders. Mali has theMali Textile Development Corporation [Com-pagnie Malienne de Développement du Textile– CMDT]; in Senegal, the Textile Fibre Devel-opment Corporation [Société de Développe-ment des Fibres Textiles – SODEFITEX] hasa mission to develop the cotton agro-industryin the country. In Togo, the main goal of theNew Cotton Corporation of Togo [NouvelleSociété Togolaise de Coton – SOTOCO] is todevelop and improve cotton production in thecountry. These cotton corporations are grouped under

the African Cotton Association which aims todefend their international interests and facil-itate experience sharing between African cot-ton corporations in the areas of agronomy,industries and trade.Another category of stakeholders is the pro-ducer associations. In each cotton-producingcountry in West and Central Africa, such as-sociations already exist and mainly serve todefend the material and moral interests of itsmembers. These associations also function asa liaison between public authorities and devel-opment corporations. AProCA (Association ofAfrican Cotton Producers) works at the conti-nental level and federates all national associ-ations.Some producer countries have grouped them-selves into alliances of excellence based ontheir comparative advantages. As such, Benin,Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad when broughttogether under a project (see major projects),decided to create the following alliances of ex-cellence: - INRAB in Benin for genetic resource man-agement, biodiversity and bio-safety, and theRegional Gene Bank;- INERA in Burkina Faso for genetically mod-ified cotton and modern bio-techniques;IER in Mali for natural resource managementand genetic variety engineering;- ITRAD in Chad for entomology.These countries, associated with other cottonproducing countries in West and CentralAfrica, intend to create, on the long term, anAfrican Cotton Research Centre which wouldincorporate all the research concerns of stake-holders in the sector.

Role and relevance of research insolving the cotton crisisThe new techniques and technologies devel-oped to produce greater quantities and bettercotton ( for example through improved com-post, fight against insects, etc.) are proof thatcotton research in Africa is quite dynamic.However, some difficulties persist especiallyin the areas of agronomy, variety improve-ment and entomology.Problem Analysis In agronomy, low soil fertility is a main short-coming in cotton production. In crop produc-tion areas, the soil is generally poor in organicmatter and deficiencies in some of the trace el-ements are often observed;In the area of improving the cotton plant,most (practically all) of the varieties availableare not tolerant/resistant to insects (like He-licoverpa armigera) or even to diseases de-

Par O. NDOYE*, H. ROY-MACAULEY* , M. D. FAYE*, A. SANGARÉ*, P. SÉRÉMÉ*

Research on cotton in West and Central africa

CORAF/WECARD is in charge of harmo-nising research and efficiently orienta-ting it to ensure a better impact on thepopulation.

* CORAF/WECARD, 7 Avenue Bourguiba BP 48 Dakar, Senegal


E- Scientific Research Supporting Cotton Sectors: The Stakes for West and Central Africa 37

spite being high yield crops. In entomology, the presence of several cottonplant insect pests is a serious issue (such asH. armigera, the destruction of capsules;Pectinophora gossypiella and Cryptophlebialeucotreta, lepidopterous frugivores). The technological qualities of fibre and lintalso constitute a recurrent problem amongstakeholders of the cotton sector in West andCentral Africa.

Recommended SolutionsThe recommended solutions are generallybased on the results of the research in the dif-ferent sectors. In agronomy, the use of inorganic fertilisers(NPK) and carbamide, as well as organicmatter through compost or harvest residue isstrongly advocated by agricultural researchservices in several countries. In plant breeding, the new varieties re-searched try to align the potential for highyield with good fibre quality and high oil con-tent so as to satisfy all users. Entomology seeks to guarantee that cropshave limited insect damage while at the sametime, preserving the environment and thehealth of producers. To achieve this, the ad-vocated method is treatment with plant ex-tracts. Also, threshold treatments areincreasingly being used to reduce the num-ber of chemical treatments, since the use of

chemicals is based on the evaluation of thevulnerability threshold of insects (number ofindividuals, larvae or eggs in a given surfacearea).

PrioritiesThese have been determined to revolvearound three main areas: fertilisation, pestcontrol and research for higher performancevarieties.Fertilisation is quite important for good cot-ton production. However, most producers donot have enough financial resources whichallow them to scrupulously respect researchrecommendations in the area of inorganicfertilization. One of the channels explored isorganic fertilization using harvest residue orcompost in combination with inorganic fer-tilizers. One of the main obstacles to good cotton pro-duction in West and Central Africa is the highnumber of pests found on cotton plants dur-ing farming. Programmes which have beendeveloped through the entomology servicesof national agricultural research instituteshave consequently aimed at primarily, reduc-ing pressure from parasites, especially frompiercing-sucking insects. Research is ongoing for varieties which areagronomically and technologically more ap-propriate for users’ needs. These varietiesshould merge good productivity, high prof-itability and good fibre technology withgrains which have high oil content.

Potential DonorsAt the regional level, possible financiers in-clude regional economic communities like

the ECOWAS or CEMAC in collaborationwith their financial partners. In West Africa, WAEMU, in collaborationwith the AfDB is financing a project in fourcountries (the C-4, see PAFICOT Projectbelow).Other donors, who have financed or are cur-rently financing research on cotton in othernon-West and Central African regions, areUSAID, CFC, the World Bank and ICAC. African countries are maintaining relationswith emerging countries through bilateral co-operation. It is in this context that Braziltransferred plant material for evaluation incountries like Mali and Burkina Faso. South-South cooperation with emerging countries,in agricultural research is increasingly ex-panding since these countries offer multipleservices to African countries: as they are ac-tive in training through the award of schol-arships or the sending of researchers toinstitutes. Emerging countries also financeresearch projects.

Presentation of a Viable OrganisationTo create a strong and viable organisation, itis important to develop a multi-stakeholder

These have been determined to revolvearound three main areas: fertilisation,pest control and research for higher per-formance varieties.

South-South cooperation with emer-ging countries, in agricultural re-search is increasingly expanding sincethese countries offer multiple servicesto African countries: as they are activein training through the award of scho-larships or the sending of researchersto institutes. Emerging countries alsofinance research projects.


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platform around the concept of the IntegratedAgricultural Research for Development(IAR4D). From this platform and based on thevalue chain, all stakeholders can share theirconcerns which will be taken into considera-tion during research.

Research Centres and Training in Westand Central AfricaIn West and Central Africa, there is no centrethat is totally dedicated to research on cotton.However, in Mali, there is the Research andTraining Centre for the Textile Industry [Cen-tre de Recherche et de Formation pour l’In-dustrie Textile – CERFITEX] which is a publicscientific and technological institution. It wasborn from the ashes of the Advanced Schoolof Textile Industries [Ecole Supérieure des In-dustries Textiles – ESITEX].The mission of CERFITEX is to provide initialand further training and also contribute topromoting research in textile and related sec-tors at the national, sub-regional and regionallevels. To this effect, it is in charge of provid-ing for:- Advanced and professional training on tex-tiles- Further training of professionals, particu-larly in entrepreneurship- Applied technological research- Studies, advice, expertise and assistance

Main projectsSeveral research projects on cotton are beingundertaken in West and Central Africa, whichinclude among others:

WACIP (West African Improvement Pro-gram) which groups the C-4 countries (Benin,Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad). This pro-gramme aims to strengthen the cotton sectorin West and Central Africa and was launchedin 2006 for a period of three and a half years.It is the continuation of the programme calledSectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton for thesame four countries, initiated in 2003 by theWorld Trade Organisation. WACIP, funded byUSAID, aims at:Increasing the income of the cotton farmersselected in the C-4 countries by 15% for cottonand 10% for corn and catjang;Increasing the revenue of cotton processingfirms in the C-4 countries by 20% and by 2%for the selected ginners.

PAFICOT, the cotton-textile sector supportproject [Projet d’Appui à la Filière Coton-Tex-tile] is a multinational initiative implementedin the C-4 countries. It is financed by the AfDBthrough the WAEMU, for a period of five years(2009-2013). It aims to contribute to povertyreduction strategies in rural areas by securingand increasing the revenues of stakeholders inthe sector and sustainably improving cottonproduction.

FSP-Coton is a project created by the FrenchMinistry of Foreign Affairs which financed thepriority solidarity fund [Fonds de SolidaritéPrioritaire] with CORAF/WECARD as techni-

cal supervisor. It was carried out in Benin,Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo. It aims to re-vamp the cotton sector in Africa and increaseits competitiveness while consolidating itssustainability. It has three components whichinclude: The sustainable improvement of productivityin the cotton sector in Africa by supporting thecreation of a regional platform for technolo-gies and the regional coordination of phy-tosanitary research; Building the representation and negotiationcapacities of stakeholders;Mastering sectorial information managementthrough assistance for instituting a cotton ob-servatory within AProCA (Association ofAfrican Cotton Producers) and the structuringof a regional system on cotton.

CFC-Cotton, the Common Fund for Com-modities has funded several projects in Africa.In the WCA, they include the Cotton GrainContamination Prevention Project which wasimplemented by the IFDC (International Fer-tilizer Development Center) and which haveinvolved the participation of Burkina Faso,Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.

The role and importance of re-search in regional integrationAt the regional level, CORAF/WECARD is incharge of implementing the agricultural policydefined by the regional economic communi-ties, in pursuance of the NEPAD policy, underthe impetus of the FARA (Forum for Agricul-tural Research in Africa).The mission and mandate objectives of theCORAF/WECARD incorporate a research in-tegration tool in West and Central Africa. Theydevelop federating programmes and projectswhich take into consideration the needs of allthe stakeholders. Through their local agricultural research insti-tutes, countries have attempted to harmonisetheir approaches and pool their efforts inorder to establish joint programmes. To thisend, exchange trips and periodic meetings areorganized on specific themes. In this respect,the Regional Programme for the IntegratedProtection of Cotton in Africa [ProgrammeRégional de Protection Intégrée du Cotonnier

en Afrique – PR-PICA] plays an importantrole in the regional integration of research be-cause it brings together six West African coun-tries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali,Senegal and Togo). It is however important to recall that researchis suffering from some difficulties amongwhich include:Lack of qualified staff: Agronomical researchis no longer attracting young people becauseit generates less income than other sectors likeinformation and communication technolo-gies;Lack of adequate infrastructure: Not all re-search laboratories, centres and stations areproperly equipped for high-level research;Research funding is very limited becauseStates do not allocate enough resources. Agri-cultural research funding in Africa mainly de-pends on projects financed by donors. This iswhat motivated the creation of the MaputoDeclaration which calls on African States to al-locate 10% of their budget to agricultural re-search.

ConclusionsCotton is a very important component of tradespeculation in Africa’s economy, particularlyin some West and Central African countries,hence its name “white gold”. In spite of its eco-nomic importance, cotton is still facing severalinstitutional, organisational, and even techni-cal and technological challenges. Agriculturalresearch is attempting to overcome these dif-ficulties by organizing the research institutesof the countries involved, through projectsand often in partnership with multilateraldonors under the aegis of regional economiccommunities. CORAF/WECARD has the role of coordinat-ing research, and is also spearheading regionalintegration by promoting cooperation and col-laboration between member institutions andby harmonising the activities of research com-ponents. n

A.SANGARÉ

RFERENCES

- Association des Producteurs de Coton Afri-cains. AProCA. http://www.aproca.netCentre du Commerce International. CCI.2008. Guide de l’exportateur du coton. . Ver-sion électronique. Kyos, Genève, Suisse - Centre de Recherche et de Formation pourl’Industrie Textile. CERFITEX.http://www.cerfitex.edu.ml- Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la Re-cherche et le Développement Agricoles/Westand Central African Council for AgriculturalResearch and Development. CORAF/WE-CARD. 2007. Plan stratégique 2007-2016. 41pages.West African Cotton Improvement Program.WACIP. http://www.wacip.org

O. NDOYE

H. ROY-MACAULEY

M. D. FAYE





P. SÉRÉMÉ


E- Scientific Research Supporting Cotton Sectors: The Stakes for West and Central Africa 39

IntroductionBiotechnology is defined as “applying scien-tific principles on living things (biologicalagents) to produce goods and services”. Inother words, it is the combination of the sci-ence of living things – biology – and a groupof scientific disciplines like microbiology,biochemistry, biophysics, genetics, molecularbiology, etc. It was only recently introduced to Africancotton, beginning in South Africa, and thenextending to Burkina Faso. In West Africa,stakeholders have disagreed on its adoptionand popularization despite the efforts under-taken by ECOWAS and CORAF, two institu-tions whose partnerships have resulted in thecreation of an Action Plan for the Develop-ment of Biotechnology and Biosafety in WestAfrica (APDBBWA). Even among C-4 coun-tries and Senegal, opinions are divided; whileBurkina Faso is a leading genetically modi-fied cotton producer in the sub-region, Maliand Senegal are still hesitant despite havinglaws allowing them to resort to it. Benin andChad, the two other C-4 countries are beingvery prudent. Benin has just renewed, for thesecond time, its moratorium on GMOs whichruns until 2013 and this should help thecountry develop a legal and technical frame-work which couldeventually lead to the adop-tion of biotechnology into local agriculture inthe future. As for Chad, it is more of a statusquo issue. The sector is undergoing institu-tional reforms which are delaying the inclu-sion of GMO issues in cotton farming. In summary, in West Africa, opinions are di-vergent; to some, Bt cotton1 is an opportunityfor cotton farmers to increase their revenueby allowing for considerable drops in produc-tion costs and increased yields, thereby repo-sitioning African countries on the worldmarket. Other players on the other hand be-lieve that this new variety will create depend-ence on large seed producing multinationalcorporations (Monsanto, Bayer, Syngenta),and will negatively impact the environmentand human health, and there are possibilitiesof some pests developing resistance. Cantransgenic cotton succeed in West Africa?What could be the main challenges andstakes of its introduction? How can the diffi-culties which have been observed elsewhereregarding this new transgenic variety be

avoided in Africa? These are some of the is-sues which underlie transgenic cotton inWest Africa.

Stakes and Challenges to Trans-genic Cotton in West Africa In Africa, family and rain-fed agriculturewith low capital intensity is practiced bysmall farmers who use rudimentary equip-ment and face several ecological constraintsdue to climate change. Aside from the ab-sence of a mechanism to fix the cost of cottonlint which could thereby mitigate the volatil-ity of world prices, one of the main difficul-ties of West African cotton production is thehikes in production cost, imputable on theyearly increase of agricultural input prices. In recent years, producers faced pest resist-ance especially from the lepidopterous in-sects. To combat it, they resorted to amassive application of chemical insecticides(pyretrinoids) to fight them off. In general,cotton farming requires about ten treatmentsper season, thereby exacerbating productioncosts. Other producers used endosulfanwhich turned out to be disastrous for the en-vironment and human health. Today, thishighly toxic product is banned in most WCAcountries. In the quest for alternative solutions to miti-gate these difficulties, some West Africancountries like Burkina Faso have also ex-plored the option of transgenic cotton whichhas been known to produce a toxic proteinthat eliminates insects such as Helicoverpa

Armigera, Earias Insulana and Earias Vit-tela. Today, despite slight divergences,transgenic cotton is widely accepted by themain stakeholders involved in the manage-ment of the sector (producers, cotton corpo-rations and the State).It must however be mentioned that the chal-lenge raised by transgenic cotton in reducinginsecticides should be linked to the challengeof the cotton sector competitiveness in abroader sense. Can transgenic cotton guar-antee this competitiveness? To answeringthis question would be a major challenge.However, competitiveness should not beanalysed from the perspective of the qualityof the fibre alone. It must include several fac-tors which concern the production chainfrom; the working time to transport costs(lint and fibre), to ginning costs, to exportcosts. All of these charges should be consid-ered and incorporated into a minimizationstrategy. Of all these charges, considering theresults observed elsewhere with transgeniccotton, this new variety, if properly managedin West Africa, could reduce working time,production costs and also improve the yieldsfor small producers. The solution for theother costs in the competitiveness analysisconcerns mostly internal management. Itshould however be noted that if yields in-crease (a high probability with transgeniccotton since this variety is developed underconditions that guarantee better growth),producers can expect higher incomes andbetter living conditions. The main condition

By Abdoulaye KONE - Economist specialised in rural activities - Enda diapol

Introducing Biotechnologies in African Agriculture: The Issue of Adopting Bt Cotton in West Africa

1 Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacteria naturally foundin the soils. It was discovered that the proteins in of this bacteriaare toxic to some insects. Scientists isolated the BT genes andintroduced them into the cotton genome. The resulting trans-genic cotton (BT cotton) is thus immunized against somecertainpests.


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for such a result to be achievable would be thefair distribution of profits between the tech-nology owners, cotton corporations and pro-ducers. However, such results can only bereached if some of the inherent difficultieswith transgenic cotton are better managed.These include intellectual property rights, sec-ondary pest resistance and gene transfer. Also, higher yields could improve the positionof West African cotton on the world marketwhich is currently dominated by the USA,China and India, where production is domi-nated by transgenic technology. This helpsthem widen the gap between African countriesand consolidate their position as leaders. Forexample, the fact that India is the 2nd largestcotton producer and the 3rd world exporterowes its rank to transgenic cotton. During the2009/2010 campaign, transgenic cotton wasgrown on approximately 8.3 out of the 9.6 mil-lion hectares, representing about 87% of thetotal surface area. Considering the yearlyadoption rate (10%), it is possible that in theyears to come almost all Indian cotton will betransgenic. Brazilians and other competingAfrican cotton farmers are not on the sidelinesof this new technology; they carried out closedspace trials and are about to adopt transgeniccotton for commercial purposes.

Strategies To Counter Some OfThe Difficulties in AdoptingTransgenic CottonEngineering transgenic cotton required con-siderable human, material and financial in-vestments. After several years of work, thisnew variety was created; this is why ownerfirms demand the payment of intellectualproperty rights (IPR). IPR are a group of ex-clusive rights granted for intellectual cre-ations. It comprises of the patent of invention,the new plant variety certificate, etc. Whyshould cotton producers pay IPR? The lawrecommends that a new invention must be

protected by law. It is unanimously recognisedthat transgenic cotton is an innovation and assuch deserves to be under the IPR system. Ap-plying this right would favour and encouragethe improvement of their technology. It placesowners in a better position by providing themwith a means for constant improvement be-cause no human creation is absolutely perfect.As such, Bollgard I cotton (a single gene no-tably Cry1AC) which has shown its limitationsin pest control was improved with Bollgard II(two genes: Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab). This new va-riety better protects the cotton plant againstlepidopterous pests. The other difficulty with transgenic cottonproduction is the resistance of secondarypests; jassids, predacious plant bugs, mirids,aphids, whiteflies, etc. Note however thatthese insects are not lepidopterous pestswhich target transgenic cotton. To controlthese pests, the best strategy is to administerthe recommended treatments. The refugezone is also an efficient and highly recom-mended method against resistance. This zonewhich covers about 20% of transgenic cottonfarmland should be cultivated with conven-tional cotton and should not undergo anytreatment so that the pests can settle there andperform some biological duties. The risk forproducers who do not practice the refuge zonein transgenic cotton farming is the possibilitythat resistance will develop after 10 to 12years. The risk of gene transfer, which is anotherproblem Bt cotton faces, can be avoided ifthere is a 15metre separation between thetransgenic cotton field and the other non-Btfields. Cotton is primarily a self fertilisingplant; its pollen is heavy and sticky so theprobability of wind transportation is almostnull, but insects (bees) can transport thispollen over 30 metres. This is why as an addedprecaution, some researchers advocate about100 metres between fields. Such a measure isdifficult to implement considering the pres-

sure on arable land in WCA. In any case, thecurrent solution to avoiding gene transfer isstill problematic for small-scale producers inWCA.

ConclusionUp till today, most large cotton producingcountries (USA, India, China, etc.) that haveadopted transgenic cotton appear to be satis-fied with the results of this new variety, bothin terms of improving outputs and increasingproducers’ income. It can be recommended tosmall West African producers on this basis,but it should be noted that the technologyshould not be imported as is. Several factorscontribute to its success; soil quality (rich innitrogen and phosphorous), rainfall levelsand, most especially, the variety of the genewhich will be inserted. It would be a mistakeif Africans imported seeds from multinationalcompanies and used them without makingsure that they were adapted to local condi-tions. No agricultural technology has univer-sally optimum qualities especially in thecontext of diversity of climatic conditions. TheIndian and Burkina Faso experiences are quiteenlightening on the topic. However, consider-ing that environmental and sanitary impactsof transgenic cotton are not well known, itwould be better to be cautious or to adopt amoratorium. In the context of stiff competi-tion regarding cotton fibre in the world mar-ket where most competitors (USA, India,China) are already trading transgenic cotton(its fibre do not containGMOs), time could beagainst Africans. Theirexcessive caution couldbe perceived as resist-ance to innovation. n

ABDOULAYEKONE




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42 F- Cotton in a Globalised Environment –The Stakes for the Sub-Region

By LÉONIDAS HITIMANA and JEAN SIBIRI ZOUNDI - OECD Secretariat for Sahel Club and West Africa

Regional Approach to Revamping the Cotton Sector in West Africa

IntroductionThe cotton sector in West Africa has been ina crisis caused by diverse factors which haveexisted since 2004. Between 2004 and 2009,production dropped by half, from 1.2 to 0.6million tonnes. The decline in cotton produc-tion in recent years originates from the diffi-cult global context which we have been facingand the hardly favourable national strategiesand policies. World prices underwent a sharpdownward turn between 1995 and 2009,owing to three main catalysts. Firstly, globalstocks during that period represented double(10 million tonnes) as compared to previousyears. Secondly, there was stiffer competitionfrom synthetic fibres. Cotton consumption, ascompared with other fibres, dropped from52% in 1975 to 35% in 2010. Thirdly, subsi-dies were granted by several countries (theUSA, China, India, Brazil), to sustain produc-tion in countries where the average produc-tion costs exceeded the market price. Although we have observed a downwardtrend in subsidies in recent years, subsidieshave not yet been totally discontinued. Ac-cording to the International Cotton AdvisoryCommittee (ICAC), subsidies in the cottonsector amounted to 4.7 billion dollars in2009-2010, as against $6.2 billion in the pre-ceding crop season. For instance, in theUnited States of America, grants droppedfrom 3.2 billion dollars in 2008-2009 to 1.8billion dollars in 2009-2010. This issue ofsubsidies prompted an initiative in favour ofthe cotton sector in Burkina Faso, Mali, Beninand Chad (C4). But the attention which wasfocussed on subsidies seemed to conceal othermajor structural challenges pertaining to thedevelopment of the cotton sector.Cotton constitutes a key economic and socialinvestment for West African producers, espe-cially in terms of export earnings (this is ap-proximately 50% of export revenue forBurkina Faso and Benin),and in addition, mil-lions of people depend directly or indirectlyon cotton for their subsistence. The ‘Cottonsystem’ plays a strategic role in food securitywith a trickling effect on food production(maize, sorghum, cowpeas, sesame…). Thus,the cotton zones have become « models » ofeconomic and social development in ruralareas, to the extent that cotton companieshave contributed to the construction of roadsand building infrastructure to facilitate trade,constructing health centres and schools. At the time when most pessimists have beentalking about the phasing-out of West African

cotton, it would worthwhile to explore theshared regional vision which is liable to givea new lease of life to the West African cottonsector. In March 2010, the 8th African CottonAssociation Week (ACA) was held inYaounde, Cameroon. During this event, thestakeholders deliberated on draw-ing up a strategic regional plan andestablishing regional industrial tex-tile centres. Such awareness re-garding the need for a coordinatedregional strategy is encouragingand deserves our fullsupport withregard to enhancing the competi-tiveness of the crop. This note is designed as a contribu-tion to such in-depth reflection.

The competitiveness ofWest African cotton isfacing tough timesThe performance of the cotton sec-tor in West Africa has been hampered by sev-eral factors including: a low level oftechnological development in the face of com-peting countries; slow and incomplete re-forms; a low level of maximisation of the« quality » potential demonstrated by theWest African cotton and the peg-ging of the CFA franc to the Euro.

Low rate in technological de-velopment as compared tocompeting countries. Africa is lagging behind technolog-ically when compared with othercompeting countries. This explainsthe poor yield in West Africa. Re-garding modern biotechnologies,with the exception of South Africa,Burkina Faso is the only countrythat adopted the transgenic Cot-ton (Bt cotton) in 2008, withnearly 100 000 ha under cul-tivation in 2009, meaning thatone-quarter of the total cul-tivable area of the countryproduced cotton. Most of thecompeting countries in WestAfrica have, to a large extent, adoptedBt cotton, but the international marketdoes not distinguish between the con-ventional and the transgenic fibre.Since 1996, the area under Bt cottonproduction recorded a substantialgrowth in Asia and America. In 2008,Bt cotton represented 51% of produc-

tion, 44% of the area under cultivation and48% of global trade. Bt cotton has made itpossible to reduce the use of insecticides andincrease yields in India, from an average of302 kg/ha in 2003 to 560 kg/ha in 2008,whereas the yield in French-speaking West

African countries decreased from 400 to 300kg/ha between 1995 and 2009. This level ofoutput is still low as compared to the globalaverage estimated at over 600 kg/ha. The lowrates of investment in research, as well as the

system of rain-dependent production accountfor the poor performance.

Slow and uncompleted reforms withsometimes mitigated resultsThe implementation of cotton reforms initi-ated in the 1990s shows guidelines andrhythms varying from one country to the

Chart 1: Evolution in yields of cotton fibre in India from1960 to 2008 (in Kg/ha)

Source: CSAO/OECD Secretariat based on USDA data,2010

Chart 2: Evolution in yields of cotton in West Africa and inthe world (1960 to 2009)

Source: CSAO/OECD Secretariat from USDA data, 2010



other. In most instances, these reformshave been slow and incomplete – and ac-cording to some, have had mitigated re-sults which are similar to the reformscarried out in East and South Africa. Thegeneral finding is that cotton productionalmost collapsed after those reforms.However, it is difficult to determinewhether this is attributable to the effectsof the reforms or to the uncertainties thathave plagued the world cotton trade. Nev-ertheless, it could be observed that pro-duction slumped less in countries wherereforms were oriented towards an inte-grated sector, like in Burkina Faso. Incountries like Benin, the models of priva-tization did not take into account theneed to preserve the integrated sector, in-sofar as the owners of ginning factoriesmade no commitment to lend support tothe cotton production and marketing sec-tors.

Advantages of manual harvestingthwarted by laxity in the classifica-tion of cotton qualityWest African cotton is essentially har-vested manually. So, the fibre obtainedcontains fewer knots and shorter fibresthan cotton harvested mechanically. Inaddition, African countries that cultivatefewer varieties produce relatively homog-enous fibres. This accounts for the goodreputation of this good quality fibre afterit is processed, and its being highly appre-ciated in the Chinese market, the princi-pal destination of West African cottonexports. However, this « quality » poten-tial is not developed due to the contami-nation of cotton by foreign agents (vegetablewastes, plastic bags, etc.). Even though thelength of the fibre is very much appreciated,such impurities cause the West African cot-ton to be sold at a discount. In certainAfrican countries, the introduction of abonus for quality by the ginning factories hasprompted producers to be more rigorousduring the grading and sorting operationsprior to storage and transportation of thecotton. That is particularly the case in: Zim-babwe (10 cents/pound between 1995 and2001), Zambia (+5 cents per pound), Burk-ina Faso (+ 1 cent per pound). In most WestAfrica countries where grading is lax, thishas proved insufficient. For instance, inMali, 99 % of the harvest is purchased as firstchoice, irrespective of the grading results(highly contaminated or not). This situationis prejudicial to the global reputation of theWest African cotton. Greater stringency instandards would make for a higher sellingprice that may reach 0.10 USD. Unfortu-nately, the ginners, producers or policy mak-ers do not seem prepared at the moment toface up to this challenge.

Depreciation of the US dollar in rela-tion to the CFA franc pegged to theEuro is a disadvantage to the sectorBetween 2001 and 2008, the exchange rate

of the dollar for the CFA franc was dividedby two. In April 2002, the exchange rate was740 FCFA for 1 USD on average as against416 FCFA for 1 USD in July 2008. Such a de-preciation of the dollar when compared tothe CFA provoked a drop in prices for pro-ducers in countries of the CFA zone. Thebuying price for cottonseed in weighted av-erage dropped in the West African Economicand Monetary Union (UEMOA) zone from198 CFA/kg in 2004-2005 to 159 FCFA perkg in 2007-2008. During the same period,the cost of inputs (most of which came fromthe euro zone) sharply increased and theprofit margin, after reimbursement for in-puts, was divided by three.In some West African cottonbasins, there was a dropfrom 180 000 CFA/ha to 60000 CFA/ha between 2004and 2008. Despite an in-crease in the price of cottonbetween 2001 and 2008,cotton fibre for countries inthe CFA zone lost 30% of itsprice value. In 2010, thetrend in the depreciation ofthe dollar compared with theEuro was maintained; a dol-lar was about 470 CFA. Inspite of an upsurge in the

price of cotton on the inter-national market in 2010 and2011 (world prices doubledwithin a year, between Jan-uary 2010 and January2011), this exogenous factorwill therefore continue toerode the competitiveness ofcotton exported from theCFA zone.

Build a regional vi-sion to improve thecompetitiveness ofcottonCotton production is organ-ized across trans-borderbasins – geographically inte-grated spaces within which alot of trading takes place be-tween communities thatmost often share the samehistory and culture. In 2003,55% of the cotton fibre pro-duction in West Africa wassituated in the trans-borderzones between BurkinaFaso, Ghana, Mali and Côted’Ivoire. A regional ap-proach based on compara-tive advantages would allowfor lower costs and a consol-idation of intra-regionalmarket strategies and thepromotion of local textileproducts. This vision couldbe buttressed by the follow-ing elements.

Establish a textile industry based ontrans-border production basinsLocally produced textiles cover only 17% ofthe needs in the UEMOA zone. Over 80% ofthe textiles are covered by imports and sec-ond hand clothing. Cotton fibre consump-tion in the region is one of the lowest in theworld. From a regional perspective, the tex-tile industry therefore represents a hugemarket to be captured by the regional indus-try. That regional industry can only be madepossible through an agreement on coordina-tion and mutual production which guaran-tees opportunities for the distribution of

Chart 3: Exchange rate of the CFA/Dollars and price of the fibre inUSD and in CFA (2001 – 2008)

Chart 4: Consumption of cotton fibre per inhabitant (average2000 to 2009)

Source: CSAO Secretariat based on data USDA, 2010

F- Cotton in a Globalised Environment –The Stakes for the Sub-Region 43


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African cotton in markets of major cottonproducing countries. Such an approach, am-bitious as it may be, would facilitate the im-provement of local production andcompetitiveness. In order to benefit from theeconomies of scale, the textile industry shouldbe set up in trans-border zones, especially toreduce transportation costs. The quality of thecotton fibre and the availability of cheaplabour are assets in the West African textileindustry. To this, there is the added advan-tage offered by the potential demand resultingfrom a high demographic growth. The localprocessing of cotton could depend on the ex-istence of a potentially dynamic market and acertified demand in diversified products, par-ticularly uniforms for government workers,school children, military, police, customs uni-forms and medical overalls, etc. This will war-rant a transitional period of protection, arequirement for any nascent textile industry.Pakistan, from 1988 - 1999, was the 2nd worldexporter of unprocessed cotton, but it becamea net importer by the mid-90s due to the de-velopment of its textile industry. This countrylater rose to the position of the number oneworld exporter of spun yarn. Such processingwas possible thanks to a proactive policy thatsystematically promoted the textile industryand the devaluation of the national currency.Another support measure in re-launching thetextile industry would be to have lower elec-tricity charges in favour of the textile sector,as seen in various Asian countries.

The implementation of a regional strat-egy for ECOWAS and UEMOA for thepromotion of fertilizers in West AfricaIn less than 10 years (from 2001 to 2010) thecost of chemical fertilizers doubled from 200CFA to about 400 CFA per kg. Developing alocal fertilizer industry and promoting mutualproduction of fertilizers depending on thecomparative advantages of the various coun-tries would enable a reduction in costs andrender agricultural inputs accessible. Speedyimplementation of the regional strategy forthe promotion of fertilizers in ECOWAS andUEMOA adopted in 2006 could enhance thecompetitiveness of West African cotton. Using25% of Nigeria’s annual gas production wouldbe sufficient to produce enough nitrogenousfertilizer to cover the yearly requirements ofthe whole of Africa, whose potential needs tobe developed at the intra-regional level.

Promote a regional policy with thequality label « African cotton » The manual harvesting of cotton gives WestAfrican countries a comparative advantagewhich should be developed. If this asset wereproperly developed by reducing the level ofcontamination of the untreated cotton, WestAfrican countries could obtain a bonus of upto ten cents per pound from the internationalmarket. The institution of a common regula-tion for West Africa through concerted effortscould provide an opportunity for protectionand guarantee the « West African quality labelcotton ». For instance, a system could be es-tablished as an incentive for producers to im-prove quality by carrying out additionalsorting prior to ginning, in order to attain thequality required by buyers. An independentquality inspection prior to dispatch could bet-ter convince buyers of the accuracy and relia-bility of the control. The future of the sectorwill depend on the willingness by operators inthe sector to meet the new requirements of atextile industry undergoing profound indus-trial changes.

Mutual system of regional innovationof Cotton Some research projects are long and costlyand require rare expertise that any countrywould be hard put to provide single-handedly.Joint research at regional level would make itpossible to set up not only regional poles ofexcellence but also promote the developmentof high-tech regional laboratories. The leadtaken by Burkina Faso in the field of trans-genic cotton could then be put to account inthe entire region and lead to lower costs perhectare of crops. This «leader country» ap-proach whereby research is developed in onecountry to serve the «region», has stood thetest of time in OECD countries.

Establishing a regional “fonds de lis-sage” to reduce the high volatility inpricesIn 2008, Burkina Faso adopted a « fonds delissage » (smoothening fund) in view ofdampening the impact of the high variabilityin world cotton prices which had becomehighly volatile. The main objective of this fundwas to manage risks related to the volatility ofcotton price in the short-run. It consists ofmanaging the free fluctuation of prices withindefined margins which reflect market trends.

Other countries (Mali, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoireare preparing to adopt a similar mechanismon price fixing. Other price stabilizationmechanisms do exist (bottom price, forwardtrading, etc.) which need to be broadened. Atthe regional level, a reflection of this trendwould make it possible to further this impetusand enhance convergence with a view to im-plementing a coordinated strategy on man-agement policies which would curb thenegative impact of price volatility. Such a re-gional fund could be set up within a regionaleconomic organization.

ConclusionThese few examples show the inclination to-wards an ambitious, integrated and commonvision for the development of the WestAfrican cotton. Such an ambition should nothowever conceal the difficulties posed by thepolitical reality/implications of such an ap-proach. Is it possible to have the same politi-cal commitment for a common action like theone which prevailed in 2003, when theC4 was formed? Is it also possible to realizesuch an ambition as long as the developmentaid approach to the cotton sector remains ahotly debated topic in several countries? Theapproach adopted within the context of theon-going reforms in the cotton sector increas-ingly highlights the complexity of the prob-lem. Redesigning the future of the West Africancotton equally requires resolving the issue ofthe destination of the West African cottonfibre once and for all. Is the idea to respondas a matter of priority to the development ofthe textile industry in West Africa or to pro-mote the international market? It is expectedthat the common regional vision will actuallyenable all actors concerned by the future ofthe cotton sector to reach a consensus onthese issues. n

LÉONIDASHITIMANA

Bibliography

l World Bank (2009), Organisation and Performances of cotton sectors in Africa: lessonsfrom reforms, Washington DC, pp. 262

l CSAO-OECD (2006), Cotton in West Africa: an Economic and social challenge, Paris,pp. 135

l Nubukpo, K. K., and Keita, M. S. (2006). Prix mondiaux, prix au producteur et avenirde la filière coton au Mali. Cahiers Agricultures vol. 15, 7.

l Perrin, S., and Lagandre, D. (2005). «Coton africain face à la concurrence du marchémondial.» AFD, 75012 Paris, pp.

JEAN SIBIRIZOUNDI





GLOCAL : How would you define the cotton-textile sector?What activities does it include?

BALLA DIONG : Explained practically, it is a process through whichall the stages of cotton manufacturing is carried out, including; theprocess through which cotton is produced, processed and sold – fromthe sowing of the cotton grain to the confection/sale of clothing or theproduction of crushed oil.We hope to assist competitively viable cotton industries which underthe management of the States involved, can contribute to reducingpoverty, improving the valorisation rate of a product which so far hasbeen considered as a raw material with a view to progressively attainingthe main goal of the Cotton Agenda: a threshold of 25% in processingunginned cotton produced in the region. These activities are carried out within the various segments of the valuechain: - Research (agronomics and pest control technology, pedology and soilfertility management, entomology and crop protection and agro-socioeconomics); - Seeds (genetic engineering, variety improvement); - Chemical inputs (fertilisers, pesticides); - Production (clearing, seeding operations, weeding, ploughing, manur-ing, treatment, harvest, transport, storage);- Marketing (merchandising, cotton lintclassification/quality, evacuation);- Ginning- Exportation (classification of the fibre,transportation, shipment, lint, waste);- Spinning/weaving/ennobling and mar-keting;- Dyeing and marketing;- Cotton grain crushing (oil, oilseed cake,marketing).

GLOCAL : Could you give me some ele-ments to help understand why thelast Cotton Agenda did not yield theexpected results?

BALLA DIONG : The adopted institutional framework did not facili-tate the regular holding of meetings: the members of the follow-up com-mittee were geographically scattered and the meetings were becomingexpensive to hold; national focal points, for lack of resources, were un-able to carry out their missions of participatory analysis and of steeringthe programme in pursuance of the goals of the Agenda. Also, operatingleverages, keys to the implementation of the action plan of the Agenda,were not yet in place. Some of these leverages were the Regional Fundto promote cotton production and encourage the local processing offibre, the Regional Investment Fund for the development of the textileindustry in the WAEMU, permanent sectorial State-private sector con-sultations around all actions to be implemented to boost the competi-tiveness of the sector, the active campaign to share the Agenda andpromote the WAEMU zone. The decision of some technical and financial partners to continue work-

ing in the sector in a bilateral fashion - which is unrelated with the guide-lines of the WAEMU Cotton Agenda - made the situation even more un-clear.

GLOCAL : Can we not say today that contrary to the first 2004-2010 Agenda, the new Cotton Agenda is off to a most auspi-cious start?

BALLA DIONG : The revised Agenda is enjoying more favourableconditions, notably financial support of the All ACP Programme on basiccommodities including cotton, technical assistance from the CCI for up-dating the Agenda in relation to other international organisations likethe WB, CFC, FAO, etc. The upward trend in cotton fibre prices on theworld market, stronger awareness of the need to put in place partner-ship conditions which are profitable to all stakeholders (farmland pro-ducers , transporters, ginners, etc.) are all positive elements in thiscurrent context.

GLOCAL : How will the scenarios on which the cotton agendaare based resist if prices fall again?

BALLA DIONG : The first agenda was born in a context of growingproduction with bearish cotton fibre prices on the world market, usingmechanisms which are completely foreign to the States concerned.

The decision of the WAEMU Commissionto revamp the Agenda dates back to 2008;well before the very interesting surge of thecurrent price of fibre. Since the new Agenda is only a revision andan update of the first approach, most of thethemes remain up to date and the goal ofprocessing 25% of produced fibre is stillhigh on the agenda. The only change is thegoal achievement period which is now tenyears. This approach benefits from theworld market cotton fibre prices but it wasnot designed and developed because of thistrend.

GLOCAL : Could you talk about the sectors where the “first”cotton agenda produced results?

BALLA DIONG : The “first” agenda was set up a Follow-up Commit-tee with the majority of its members being representatives of the cottonprivate sector, with rules of procedure. The WAEMU member Stateshave formally created focal points, some of which have worked well. Ithas also ensured the holding of periodic meetings of the Follow-up Com-mittee and the harmonising of cotton standards within the WAEMU.Under this agenda, BOAD carried out two studies on the creation of Re-gional Funds dedicated to the cotton-textile sector widely debated uponby the stakeholders concerned and the Enterprise Development Centre(CDE) carried out a study on profitable services which included the tex-tile-clothing sector to the WAEMU. The “first” cotton agenda can alsobe credited for the implementation of the AfDB support project for thecotton-textile sector in the C-4 countries under the Cotton Agenda.

Interview: MR BALLA DIONG - DEIA/WAEMU - Cotton Agenda

Mr Balla Diong, Director of Enterprise, Industry and Crafts for the Department of Development, Enterprise, Telecommunications and En-ergy of the WAEMU Commission, is in charge of supervising the drafting of the summary document on the revised strategy for the imple-mentation of the agenda for competitiveness of the cotton-textile sector in the WAEMU for the 2011-2020 period. In this 2ACD publication,Mr Diong gives a technical opinion on the ongoing work. The revised Cotton Agenda is under examination and awaiting validation fromthe Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

Broader Vision of the Cotton Sector in West and Central Africa:The WAEMU Cotton Agenda

We hope to assist competitively viable cot-ton industries which under the managementof the States involved, can contribute to re-ducing poverty, improving the valorisationrate of a product which so far has beenconsidered as a raw material with a view toprogressively attaining the main goal of theCotton Agenda: a threshold of 25% in proces-sing unginned cotton produced in the re-gion.


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GLOCAL : How can the new agenda be more successful? Whatgovernance tools / techniques / methods / model can guaran-tee the success of this ten-year strategy?

BALLA DIONG : The revised Agenda seems more elaborate than thefirst. It has broadened its scope of action by including an oilseed crushingsub-sector and a design/dressmaking/clothing sector. The implementa-tion of the AfDB support project and the attainment of the projected re-sults provide the new Agenda with several useful lessons to draw from. Afocal point dedicated only to the cotton-textile sector within the WAEMU,is a new tool which has been developed and incorporated into the newagenda. The Select Technical Secretariat (STR) within the WAEMU is more dy-namic in steering and following up activities than the first which was ge-ographically dispersed. Its implementation plan is a project managementtool with participatory and consensual execution at the stakeholder leveland it ensures the identification of potential assistance actors during eachfinancial year and boosts them. The new agenda enjoys early funding fromthe All ACP programme and has a high chance of receiving funding fromthe 10th EDF. It is clear that the prospects of triggering off the most im-portant action levers, including funds, are better than with the previousagenda.

GLOCAL : Who are the stakeholders identified for this new Cot-ton Agenda?

BALLA DIONG : We have identified three main groups of stakeholders:Technical and Financial Partners (European Union, ITC, World Bank,CFC, FAO, AFD) and we expect to build further contacts through donorround table discussions with sub-regional institutions (BOAD, BCEAO,WAEMU Commission, CCR); and with States (public and private sec-tors).

GLOCAL : What is the importance, the influ-ence and the driving force of the WAEMU increating a dynamic system, which gives co-herence and drives active stakeholders tosupport the region’s cotton sector so as to im-plement a coherent and efficient strategywith measurable progress?

BALLA DIONG : The WAEMU has experience ininitiating and coordinating such a programme. Forexample, the PRMN (Restructuring and Re-updat-ing Programme), the Regional Initiative for Sus-tainable Energy Development (IRED) and thequality promotion programme were all managedby the Enterprise Development Department(DDE), which was able to mobilise considerablefinancial resources. The Regional Fund for Agri-cultural Development (FRDA) of the Union was also created. The initiatives will be in partnership with the BOAD, particularly, as re-gards the creation of funds and the organisation of the donors’ roundtable.The Regional Consular Chamber (CCR) will also be involved in order toassure a concrete participation of the private sector.

GLOCAL : How are the different development projects of donorsand development agencies, as required by the WTO Cotton SubCommittee, included in or aligned to the WAEMU CottonAgenda?

BALLA DIONG : Apart from the European Union which is the maindonor in the All ACP Programme, international agencies such as the ITC,the World Bank, CFC, FAO and UNCTAD are in charge of the implement-ing part of the Programme and other partners like the AFD will act as po-tential donors in the area of securing revenue. The AfDB is also involvedin the sector through the WAEMU Cotton Agenda. Our wish is that allthe technical and financial partners interested in the cotton-textile sectorwill join the movement of the revised Agenda according to their prioritiesand the usual rules of conduct for support.

GLOCAL : How can this ten-year cotton strategy contribute toadvancing sub-regional integration in the WAEMU? Could yougive specific examples? How about collaboration with othercotton producing African countries?

BALLA DIONG : The participatory approach adopted during the up-

dating of this Agenda further united stakeholders within various subsec-tors as well as with regional partners and community integration strate-gies. Under the first Agenda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad signed a co-operation agreement with the WAEMU Commission in relation to theimplementation of the African Development Fund Support Project forthe cotton-textile sector in the four countries following the Sectorial Ini-tiative in Favour of Cotton. This is proof of integration. This cooperationconsolidated the intention of cotton producing countries in Central Africato draw inspiration from the WAEMU strategy and undertake commonaction at the international level. Also, processing plants targeted in the Agenda will be installed in the dif-ferent countries concerned depending on the comparative advantages asregards the long term impact on the other countries (prospect of regionalspecialisation, for example).The following are planned at the different levels of the value chain: re-search actions (standards of excellence according to the comparative ad-vantages), variety gene banks, group acquisitions of inputs at the regionallevel, spare part purchasing, co-operative database for ginning companies,experience sharing, etc. The programme which aims at fighting against non-spinnable cotton con-taminants includes Chad, Cameroon and Central African Republic.Through experience sharing and dissemination, the results will spreadout to other African producers. Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs)will need to contribute by sharing their experiences of cotton producingwith different sub-regions in Africa.

GLOCAL : What is the level of research in the WAEMU? How canit be revitalized so that it contributes to the success of the cottonsector in the region?

BALLA DIONG : With limited resources in allcountries, research programmes on cotton aresteered towards four sectors: (1) genetic engineeringand variety improvement, (2) agronomy and pestcontrol technologies, (3) entomology and crop pro-tection and (4) agro-socio economics. Some coun-tries appear to have a greater comparativeadvantage than others. Genetic engineering and va-riety improvement seem better adapted to Togowhich provides the best strains in the sub-region.Burkina Faso has specialised in transgenic seeds.

Entomological research is much more advancedin Benin which has one of the highest performinglaboratories in the sub-region. However, pedagogical research for better man-agement of soil fertility seems to be lagging be-hind. Also, nowhere does soil typology exist

which can ensure that farming techniques are adapted to soil specificities,neither is there a sub-regional genetic bank guaranteeing the sustainabil-ity of strains. In order to allow research to fully play its role, the Com-mission, through the implementation plan of the Agenda will assist in: - Developing and implementing regional cotton research/technology de-velopment programmes;Creating an inventory of research centres by comparative advantage witha view to creating standards of excellence;- Facilitating transfer of competence between research centres for varietyimprovement, pest and disease control, and agronomy;- Building exchange capacities of agricultural research organizations andfacilitating a resource mutualisation plan as well as the sharing of scien-tific and technical information (for example, providing technical infor-mation to laboratories);- Strengthening partnerships within the research, popularization and pro-ducer organizations (as a blueprint for research-popularisation).The AfDB cotton-textile support project for the C-4 countries will con-currently finance the building of a network of institutes for research inagronomy, entomology and selection, as well as establish standards of ex-cellence in these areas.

GLOCAL : There are currently some options which would allowthe region to propose different types of cotton: organic cotton,equitable cotton, transgenic cotton. How does the WAEMU ap-proach include and encourage diversity in the cotton supply in

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the region? What are the regional regulatory frameworks to be devel-oped for the preservation of this diversity of supply (non-con-tamination of organic cotton by Bt cotton…)?

BALLA DIONG : Diversity of production is a niche which is yet to bedeveloped and which by the way, is included in the development pro-gramme of the priority sectors listed in the WAEMU Agricultural Policy(PAU). As such, the production of organic cotton and equitable cotton,which have higher prices than traditional cotton, is encouraged. Transgenic cotton is stagnating in several member States of the Unionexcept Burkina Faso, despite its low production costs.

GLOCAL : How do we boost competition in the sector and buildinfrastructure (energy, roads, ports, etc.) which would there-after encourage international textile businesses to come andinvest in Africa (as was the case in Ethiopia, Lesotho…)?

BALLA DIONG : Internal and external factors are required to createan environment that is conducive to both development and competitionin the sector, and they must be well understood. These factors includelong term financing, cost control and the quality of factors influencingproduction, a secure and reassuring legal and judicial framework for in-vestors, etc. If we want to unlock the full development potential of thiscotton-textile sector and hope to achieve a rate of 25% in the processingof cotton fibre, more than 95% of which is currently exported, it is im-portant to create a specific environment which is attractive to interna-tional textile businesses so as to encourage them to can come and investin WAEMU.This can be achieved through case studies (for example, Alok Industriesof India is settling up a branch in Burkina Faso) and exchange trips aretaking place in Ethiopia and Lesotho to identify what gives these coun-tries the edge so as to understand the requirements of investors andconsequently formulate a policy in that respect. The supply of energy and the building of roads, ports and other infra-structure remain the responsibility of the States, which are currently in

the process of buildingthem.

GLOCAL : In relationto the CFA and thecost of inputs pur-chased in Euros andcompetitiveness ofcotton in the zone;how can one get outof this rut?BALLA DIONG : As a

result of the rising cost of the cotton inputs, the technical methodologyhas not been fully implemented, thus leading to a steady drop in yields.The following solutions are proposed: - Develop a reliable regional cotton input supply chain (identificationof needs, invitation to tender, quality control, purchasing system) anda distribution mechanism, in a mutualisation sense;- Carry out a feasibility study for the creation of production units backedby private investment in order to ensure the supply of fertilisers whichare of WAEMU origin;- Formulate an action plan for the promotion of organic fertilisers;- Build the capacities of (village) cotton farmers’ associations for inputmanagement and access to credit;- Implement the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizers in the area of taxationand subsidies on fertilisers;- Reduce import taxes on other inputs in the sub-region.

GLOCAL : What do you think about the prospects of develop-ing the production of nitrogen fertilizers from Nigerian gas?

How viable is such aproject? What are theadvantages/shortcom-ings and the uses ofsuch a project? BALLA DIONG : Thisproject is an extension of thestudy that recommendedfertilisers of a WAEMU ori-

gin should benefit from phosphate deposits in Niger, Togo and othercountries.If these projects mature and are able to successfully supply fertiliserswhich are cheaper than non-WAEMU and ECOWAS fertilisers, then,we will have limited, even erased the Euro-dependence with regard tothe importation of fertilisers. The viability of this project is assured as it concerns a market with con-siderable needs. It will need also support from public authorities inorder to supply at the regional level.

GLOCAL : How can creativity be supported and African trade-marks and fashion developed? What would be the role of aregional organization like WAEMU in this regard?

BALLA DIONG : A regional organisation like the WAEMU can act ondifferent levels: - Support WAEMU member States in the measures which taken to pro-tect the local creations; - Create a framework for sharing and partnership between textile in-dustrialists, ready-made clothing manufacturers and regional designerswhich would facilitate the vertical integration of the value chain in thesub-region;- Protect designers against piracy through checks upon entrance.

GLOCAL : What do you think about creating a “West AfricanCotton” label guaranteeing the quality of cotton and a sus-tainable approach to producing this cotton?

BALLA DIONG : Cotton sold under the label “West African Cotton”will logically be more expensive than conventional cotton. It requiresspecific production measures in order to arrive at a superior qualitywhich is established through traceability accompanied by transparencyvis-à-vis clients. It requires a communication system which will place the demands ofthe client before those of a producer who is taking the demands of hiscustomers into consideration.

GLOCAL : The birth of an African textile industry will requireprotection against external competition. Would it be usefulto provide the WAEMU with “a separate body in charge oftrade defence within the WAEMU Commission”, as well as anarsenal of trade protection measures?

BALLA DIONG : The WAEMU has community laws on dumping,competition, etc. which, if enforced by all States, would be the first stepin protecting the textile industry in particular. Also, all the WAEMUmember States are TRIPS signatories but do not have the human andfinancial resources to implement them properly.

GLOCAL : Do you think it is necessary to introduce a lawwhich safeguards measures to protect the budding textile in-dustry in a regional development strategy?

BALLA DIONG : Considering what is happening today particularly,with textiles manufactured in Asian countries, reproductions of localdesigns, fraudulent importation of textiles in the form of second- handclothing, it would be imperative, in the launching period of this buddingindustry, to introduce a protective law so that young enterprises canprove their competitiveness in the domestic and sub-regional markets.In our opinion, it is relevant to adopt safeguard measures to protect thebudding, even, embryonic textile industry.

GLOCAL : Any final words?BALLA DIONG : I would like to encourage allpartners working in this sector to register on thePMO of the updated Cotton Agenda and pool theirefforts with those of our States and the Com-mission so as to further promote quality cot-ton fibre in our regions. The proclaimedambition of the WAEMU is justified consid-ering the expected direct and indirect impactit would have in terms of increased revenueand job creation likely to contribute to meet-ing one of the major millennium develop-ment goals, which is poverty reduction. n

If we want to unlock the full develop-ment potential of this cotton-textilesector and hope to achieve a rate of25% in the processing of cotton fibre,more than 95% of which is currentlyexported, it is important to create aspecific environment which is attrac-tive to international textile businessesso as to encourage them to can comeand invest in WAEMU.

The proclaimed ambition of theWAEMU is justified considering theexpected direct and indirect impactit would have in terms of increasedrevenue and job creation likely tocontribute to meeting one of themajor millennium developmentgoals, which is poverty reduction.

BALLA DIONG


NB : This text in english is not the

original version, but rather a free

translation of the authentic French

version (See French copy of the spe-

cial edition).


GLOCAL



IntroductionIt is simplistic to assert that African cotton –notably West African cotton – is in the dol-drums. The structural moroseness of worldprices2 due, inter alia, to the unfair practicesof some developed countries in the worldmarket – export subsidies – have indeedsapped the enthusiasm of African producerswho were previously excelling in the area.After reaching its peak in 20053, cotton pro-duction in the West African region plum-meted and has been struggling to bounce backever since. The debate on revamping the sector as well asthe strategies proposed to turn it around havegiven rise to many comments from expertsand has brought together political decision-makers but until now, the tunnel’s end isnowhere in sight. However, everyone agrees that the low rate –or lack – of on-the-spot processing of cottonis the Gordian knot hanging over the cottonsector in West Africa. In fact, barely 2% oftotal production is processed locally while theremainder is bound for the world market. Al-though efforts were made post-independenceto set up processing units in various coun-tries, most of them did not withstand the testof time and everyone watched helplessly assmall West African textile industries gradu-ally folded up. From roughly forty industriesfound in the WAEMU zone in the 1980s, onlyabout twenty were still operational in 2006. Many reasons account for this disaster but theaccusing finger increasingly points atthe massive imports of textile products fromAsia - and to a certain extent, to the second-hand clothes from developed countries – asthe immediate causes of the sudden death ofthe West African textile industry.How then can this industry be turned aroundin a regional market estimated to exceed 700billion CFA when from this amount, only 25%of cotton production from on-the-spot pro-cessing generates 50,000 direct jobs? That isthe question which has been confoundingWAEMU officials. After throwing all itsweight behind the C4 initiative against subsi-dies for developed countries under the WTO,the Union adopted a strategic plan to boostthe cotton sector in 2003 and one of its cen-tral objectives was to locally process cotton.4

However, the question is how a viable WestAfrican textile industry can be established (orre-established) within a context of massivelow-cost imports – not to mention the issuesof fraud and imitation products from Asia anddeveloped countries. Without an appropriate

solution to this problem,any attempts to revive the sector may provefutile.This brainstorming session with a non-expertin textile seeks to offer a modest contributionto the debate on re-energizing the cotton sec-tor in WAEMU by promoting local processingand supporting the local industry in particu-lar. This is where the future of African cottonlies. After an overview of the textile industryin this region, we will look at the types of sup-port this industry can receive in order tocheck the invasion of Asian products and sec-ond-hand clothes.

A gloomy textile industry After independence in the 1960s, youngAfrican States viewed industrialization as alogical means to develop and free themselvesfrom the yoke of colonialism. Accordingly, inmost newly independent States, plannedstrategies were devised to develop local in-dustries, in order to among other things, ul-timately replace previously importedproducts. These strategies, known as “importsupplanting” policies did not produce the ex-pected outcome and there are several reasonswhich accounting for this. In most countries,government efforts were hindered by hightransport and energy costs, narrow marketsas well as the lack of qualifications and tech-nologies5. Moreover, in the 1980s, the debtcrisis compelled many African governmentsto embrace the Structural Adjustment Pro-grams (SAP) of the World Bank and the Inter-national Monetary Fund, which led to thedrastic reduction of the State’s economic roleand the privatization of State-owned compa-nies. Although many of these companies wereindeed poorly managed, they accounted formost of the industrial production and gener-ated jobs. Their hurried and premature priva-tization at a time when the African privatesector was still fledgling, dealta serious blow to the conti-nent’s industrializationprocess. Finally, trade liberal-ization, one of the SAP compo-nents, dramatically opened upAfrican markets, floodingthem with cheap importedproducts and hastening the al-ready weakened and fledglingAfrican industries towards theabyss. Although the first industrialunits were established in WestAfrica, from the 1950s, it was

during the 1965-1985 period that the textileindustry was developed courtesy of the volun-tarism policies carried out by States. This so-called “vintage” period, was however followedby difficult years marked by crisis in state-owned companies, structural adjustment, theCFA franc devaluation, fraudulent practicesand imitation goods, as well as massive im-ports of Asian textile and second-handclothes. This situation triggered a process ofdeindustrialization in the region, for example,if there were 41 textile industrial units withinthe WAEMU in 1980, there were approxi-mately only 20 in 2006.6

The Ivory Coast example alone is enough toillustrate this West African textile industrydisaster. Although the former leaders in theWAEMU zone had 12 industrial units and in-spitereaching a 20% processing rate of na-tional cotton lint production in the 1990s, the

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By OUSSENI ILLYDoctor in International Economic Law, Global Leaders Fellow - Universities of Oxford and Princeton

What role do trade defence measures have in the promotion of a cotton processing industry in West Africa?

“For the cotton sector to survive it is imperative to startprocessing cotton.”1

1 Declaration of the Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure during the inaugura-tion of the new spinning mill in Fitina, Mali on 21 February 2004 2 The world cotton market is characterized by price instability with a long-term gen-eral downward trend. Between 1995 and 2001 for example, cotton lost nearly 70%of its value (see Cotton Sector Initiative, WTO document, TN/AG/GEN/4, 16 May2003). Although there has been a rise (if not a surge) since 2010, it would be naiveto rejoice for this increase is mainly due to vagaries of weather (floods in China, andPakistan, drought in Brazil).3 During the 2004-2005 season, cotton producers in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Coted’Ivoire, Senegal and Chad produced a total of 1.1 million tons of cotton lint. Thisproduction stood at only 500 0000 tons the previous year. Cf. http://www.afriqueav-enir.org/2010/12/08/l%E2%80%99envolee-des-cours-du-coton-profite-aux-agriculteurs-africains/4 Final Declaration of the Regional Consultative Ministerial Meeting on the CottonSector in WAEMU/CEMAC, WAEMU, 18 June 2003 5 G. MUTUME, « L’Afrique s’efforce de redynamiser ses industries », Afrique Re-nouveau, vol. 8, n˚3, October 2004, p. 4.6 Atlas de l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest, Série économie, CEDEAO-CSAO/OCDE, aout 2006, p. 17.



Ivorian textile industry today, has become ashadow of its former self. More than twothirds of factories are at a standstill and therest are working well below their productioncapacity.7 Before the crisis, the processingrate dropped to 5% but today, it barely ac-counts for 2% of national cotton produc-tion.8

The situation is hardly any better in Senegal.Of the 12 factories in the country, 4 are at astandstill and the others are just tickingover.9 With the liquidation of the FASOFANI in 2000, Burkina Faso lost the onlyloincloth production unit it had. All in all, noWAEMU country was immune to this crisisand the few remaining industries might stillwind up their production unless urgentmeasures are taken to save them.In Nigeria, professionals of the sector arealso unsettled. Although there were about ahundred factories functioning in 1999, ac-cording to sources, there are now only abouttwenty to forty today. However, the situationis somewhat different between the English-speaking countries and the French-speakingcountries, where in the case of the latter,more than 90% of the cotton was exportedas fibre. During the periods of 1993/94 -2003/04 for example, 90% and 65% ofNigerian and Ghanaian cotton respectivelywas consumed by the local industrial base.10

Once States within the region finally under-stood that local processing was the only last-ing solution for their cotton sector ratherthan a hypothetical cotton world price whichwas completely out of their control, a majorcampaign was launched to rehabilitate theWest African textile industry. As regardscombating WTO subsidies, we know the out-come and with the standoff in the DohaRound of negotiations, the chances of suc-cess are increasingly remote. As the MalianPresident aptly put it, combating developedcountries subsidies is a noble cause, but it isworthwhile for Africans to work on the emer-gence of a real cotton processing industry inAfrica. Based on this observation, WAEMU Mem-ber States undertook in 2003, efforts to re-build and strengthen the local textileindustry by adopting a strategic develop-ment plans for the cotton textile sector. Inaddition, a goal was set to increase regionalproduction by 25% by 2010.11

Although a general report on this undertak-ing is not available at the moment, it shouldbe acknowledged that the results achievedare far from satisfactory. During a recentmeeting held in Ouagadougou (11-12 No-vember 2010), the Commissioner for the de-partment of Company, Telecommunicationsand Energy Development of the WAEMU ac-knowledged that the results obtained fromimplementing the plan were well “below ex-pectations”. However, we have observed thattextile factories have been established hereand there. In Mali, the Fitina textile industrybecame operational in 2004 while the MaliTextile Industry (Itema) re-opened for busi-ness in 2005 after closing its doors for more

than ten years. In Burkina Faso, the Alok fac-tory, the result of an Indian collaboration,was recently set up in Bobo Dioulasso, takingthe number of textile industries in this coun-try to two. Other initiatives have been ap-plied in other WAEMU countries. Thetrouble is that these efforts may become fu-tile unless appropriate measures are taken toguarantee the sustainability of current or fu-ture industrial units. In a global contextcharacterized by cutthroat competition, willthe new African factories have the mettle toface up to the «invasion» of Asian products,which, among others, caused the collapse ofthe first factories? As one top executive of theMalian textile industry pointed out, “thegreatest danger to the Malian industry is toopen up the domestic market wide to foreignproducts.” He added, “Although we faceproblems of inaccessibility and high electric-

ity costs, we would have been out of thewoods if we were slightly protected againstthe inundation of foreign products”.12

It is therefore imperative to consider effec-tive the protection policies for the new WestAfrican textile industries which are develop-ing. To this end, new legal instruments havebeen drawn up and it is high time theWAEMU took ownership of them.

Trade defence as a way ofshoring up revival Trade defence instruments are old toolswhich all States have used in the past to pro-tect their national industries (especially bur-geoning industries)against unfair competi-tion from other coun-tries or against theinflux of foreign prod-ucts which threaten toruin them. These aretemporary measureswhich enable industriesin distress to adjust or

consolidate newly established strategies.Some neoclassical economists have tried invain to describe them as protectionist meas-ures without any economic justification butthe fact is that they were invented in theNorth which uses them more than any otherregion today. Among these instruments, there are anti-dumping measures, compensatory measures(or anti-subsidies) and safeguard measures.For a long time now, the need for these in-struments was not felt in Africa due in par-ticular, to the high custom duties whichalready protected the local industry. Thatdoes not seem to be the case today with theunbridled opening up of borders. Canada was the first country to adopt a na-tional anti-dumping law in 1904. Faced withstiff competition from the American steel in-dustry whose producers were accused of try-ing to destroy the Canadian industry withprices deemed very low, the Canadian gov-ernment adopted a law which increased du-ties on any foreign steel product sold on theCanadian market at a price below its «nor-mal value». The aim of the law was to re-es-tablish competitiveness between Canadiansteel and imported steel – American steel inthis case – in order to ensure the survival ofthe local industry. The Canadian law wassoon copied by many countries struggling tobuild their national industry. South Africa isone of such countries and practically the onlyAfrican country to use them. Its anti-dump-ing law dates back to 1914. Today, anti-dumping measures are author-ized within the WTO through the Agreementon the implementation of Article VI of the1994 GATT – better known as the Anti-dumping Agreement). Although the imple-mentation regulation of this Agreementexists to date within the WAEMU (Rule No09/2003/CM/UEMOA of 23 May 2003),, noanti-dumping measure has been adopted bythis organization. Yet Chinese exports toAfrica are heavily suspected of dumping andare usually subject to these measures inother countries and regions of the world.Anti-subsidies measures which help to neu-tralize the competitive advantage granted toforeign producers through export supportprograms of their governments (subsidies)are the second trade defence instrumentcommonly used in trade relations betweenStates. The United States was the first coun-try to come up with them durring the earlystages of their industrialization. AlexanderHamilton, the first Treasury Secretary of in-dependent America declared in 1791 that thegreatest danger to the fledgling American in-dustries was export subsidies granted by Eu-

7 Etude de faisabilité de la relance du secteur textile en Cote d’Ivoire, Centre d’analysesocio-économique pour le développement de l’Afrique (CASE-DAFRIQUE), 2010, p. 48 Idem 9 M. L. DIATTA, « Le textile ouest-africain en crise », in Les Afriques du 12 décembre2007. Voir également Atlas de l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest précité. 10 Atlas de l’intégration régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest, p. 17.11 See the Final Declaration of the Regional Consultation Ministerial Meeting on Cottonin WAEMU/CEMAC, WAEMU, 18 June 2003. 12 Propos cites dans Panos Infos (http://www.panos-ao.org/ipao/spip.php?article3570).

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GLOCAL



ropean States (notably England).13. In 1897,the first formal American anti-subsidy lawwas drawn up to defend the interests of theAmerican industry.Today, anti-subsidy measures are authorizedwithin the WTO under the Subsidy Agree-ment and compensatory measures containingas regards anti-dumping measures, addi-tional custom duties equivalent to the subsidyreceived by the foreign exporter. In relationto the WAEMU, to date, it does not have anyanti-subsidy community codes. However, it isvery complicated to implement this instru-ment as you need to prove that foreign ex-porters – especially the Chinese – arereceiving subsidies from their government. The third instrument, made up of safe-guard measures, is one which theWAEMU countries should accordgreater attention. As opposed to thefirst two which require the display ei-ther of a price lower than the normalvalue (dumping) or the existence of asubsidy, while safeguard measuresonly requires proof of a «massive in-crease» in imports which puts the ex-isting local industry in danger andprevents some from being establish-ing. Although there are no statistics toshow the percentage increases inAsian and Chinese textiles subsequentto the liberalization of African mar-kets, common sense and simple obser-vation are sufficient to assert thatconditions for implementing safe-guard measures have been met. Fur-thermore, it is no secret that theseimports and second-hand clothesled to the destruction of the localtextile industry and helped to deterany investment in the sector. As paradoxical as this may seem,the WAEMU’s Council have been seekingways to protect community textile producers(see Final Declaration of the Regional Min-isterial Consultation Meeting inWAEMU/CEMAC mentioned above), butdoes not have any safeguard laws. It is hightime that this law was adopted and efforts putin place to ensure that it does not remain adead letter (as it is the case with the an-tidumping law). It should also be noted that there is no organ asyet which is responsible for trade defence withinthe WAEMU Commission (as is the case in othercommunities such as the European Union or theSouthern Africa Customs Union: SACU). Thisrole is played by the Competition Departmentwhich is neither the appropriate organ (trade de-fence transcends competition and includes in-dustrial policy) nor does it have the necessaryskills to manage defence instruments.

ConclusionTo build or rebuild the West African textile in-dustry is a mammoth challenge. For somepeople it is almost a pipe dream. It is not un-common to often hear the following com-ments: «Africa has missed its industrialrevolution and should instead cash in on theprice increases of raw materials (still true?)and cheap Asian imports instead of embark-ing on a hopeless industrial process”. Thesearguments are buttressed by the pretext thatthe policy to replace imports in the 1960s and1970s ran aground and the continent has veryfew capabilities to develop an industry (lackof infrastructure, unskilled labour, high en-ergy costs, etc). At the same time, the issue of

poverty alleviation could not have been lessfashionable. Yet we forget that in the historyof economic development, there has neverbeen a single nation which tackled underde-velopment and misery by merely exportingraw materials and importing finished prod-ucts. We cannot dwell on such arguments ifwe know the pivotal and indispensable role ofindustry in developing a country. If the Americans listened to the advice ofAdam Smith, the spiritual father of neo-liber-alism and revered economist of the 18th Cen-tury, they would still be a poor, agriculturalnation today. Shortly after gaining their inde-pendence from England in 1776, the Ameri-cans tried to lay the groundwork for theindustrialization of their country by usingmainly protectionist measures. Smith consid-ered this as a big mistake (from the economicstandpoint). According to him, the UnitedStates had to focus their efforts on agricultureproduction as they had “comparative advan-tages” when compared to other countries, es-pecially those in Europe.14 A century on,having persisted with their choice, the UnitedStates became the leading economic and in-dustrial power in the world, lifting millions ofpeople out of poverty. According to most an-

alysts, the American industry would neverhave become what it is today without the pro-tection they enjoyed from the outset (and stillenjoy today; according to WTO statistics, theUnited States is one of the greatest users oftrade defence measures). Africans should draw lessons from this. How-ever, the context has changed and a lot of tactand “intelligence” is now needed. While it waspossible to adopt all kinds of protectionistmeasures in 1776, it is somewhat more diffi-cult today as a result of the various free tradetreaties which countries have signed. It istherefore necessary to make the most - as faras possible – of the “loopholes” in the defenceinstruments (authorized by the different

treaties) in order to protect this in-dustry. That is the only way it willgrow and carve out its own niche inthe domestic and regional marketsand later, in the international mar-ket. In a century which has beenmarked by a widespread opening ofmarkets and globalization pres-sures, any industrial policy whichfails to incorporate this strategy isdoomed to failure. Although the introduction of “pro-tectionist” measures might increasethe costs of textile products in theregion and this might not go downwell with some importers, one mustchoose between the short-term in-terests of consumers and importersand the long-term development in-terests of the continent, which un-doubtedly lies in industrialization. It

is up to Africa to embark on in-dustrialization and develop orconversely, continue “surviving”and thus remain the laboratory of«new ideas» on development

fashioned by everyone and as such, continueexporting its raw materials while benefitting«quietly» from «cheap» imports from abroad.To conclude, nobody can be so naive as to be-lieve that protection alone will save and boostthe West African textile industry. Lack ofcompetitiveness, which is real and linked,inter alia, to energy costs, as well as a lack ofinvestment in vocational training, develop-ment research, innovation and ruthlesslycombattingfraud and imitation goods aresome of the many elements to consider in theplan to reinvigorate the West African textileindustry. Without these factors, includingtrade defence, which is temporary by nature,efforts in this regard could become meaning-less. n

OUSSENIILLY

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13 A. Hamilton, “Report of the Secretary of Treasury on the Sub-ject of Manufacturers, 1791”, cité dans J. F. Beseler and A. N.Williams, Antidumping and Anti-subsidy Law: The EuropeanCommunity (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986), p. 3.14 Erik S. Reinert, How rich countries got rich and why poor

countries stay poor (London: Constable), 2010, p. 25; see also, Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder: de-velopment strategy in historical perspective (London: Anthem),2002, p. 5.

Yet we forget that in the history of economic develop-ment, there has never been a single nation which tack-led underdevelopment and misery by merely exportingraw materials and importing finished products.





cial edition).



Agricultural production is a naturally riskyactivity and farmers are therefore very cau-tious in their decision-making as regards thetools likely to best protect their revenue bothat the technical and economic levels.The spectacular development of cotton pro-duction in West Africa drew its strength fromthis rationale by creating an enabling envi-ronment which guarantees the supply of in-puts on a credit basis and thecommercialisation of all the produce at aprice fixed at the beginning of the farmingseason. For several years, thissystem of announcingthe purchase priceearly to producers,backed by a supportfund, has proven itsability to manage thefluctuations in theworld prices. How-ever with the increas-ingly speculativetrend, the market hasbecome increasinglyunstable. Today,sharp price fluctua-tions seem to be astructural characteris-tic of agriculturalmarkets, thereforethis makes it indis-pensable to resort tovolatility reductionmechanisms in orderto support and de-velop the sector.

A MechanismBased on Risk-SharingIn 2004, the AFDtook the initiative oforganising country-wide consultations with its European andAfrican partners. Detailed surveys resulted inthe elaboration of outlines aimed at limitingexcessively harsh producer price fluctuationswithout necessarily opposing the tight mar-ket trends.This mechanism takes into consideration thebenefits of the previous support funds but atthe same time, it makes important improve-ments. On the one hand, the mechanism fix-ing the price announced to producers at thebeginning of the season that it would no

longer rely on negotiations carried out eachyear between producers and cotton compa-nies. Prices are henceforth subject to the evo-lution of world prices. They are determinedeach year through a mathematical formulawhich facilitates calculations of estimates ofwhat has been called a trend line price. Thisprice is the average of the prices recorded theprevious two years and the projected price ofthe current year and there are price predic-tions for the next two years. Once estab-lished, the trend line price of the fibre can becalculated by any external observer, through

public data on international cotton prices(Cotlook A Index) and the exchange rate.Price-sharing between the cotton companiesand the cotton producers is established insuch a way as to ensure 60% of the FOB1

price to producers and 40% to the cottoncompanies; both parties are thereby directlyincited to improve their productivity giventhat they will become the direct benefici-aries.A final 5% security margin is deducted be-fore announcing the basic producer price

at the beginning of the farming season. Thecompiling of principles, parameters and theformulae calculation in a document on theregulation of the smoothening fund gives it apredictable aspect, practically automatic forfunding and drawing operations. The fundsare lodged in a financial institution selectedby public call to tender and managed by thelatter. But the smoothening fund may be completedor reinforced by soliciting market-based in-struments, in this case, by-products. The ac-quisition of a sales option by the cotton

companies, for instance enables it if the mar-ket is receptive2, to be assured of the sale ofa fixed quantity of cotton fibre at a given mo-ment and at the price agreed in that option.Contrary to forward buying (future) wherethe commitment is firm, the purchaser may(hence the name option) decide to sell at theagreed price or cancel3 the sale option… The

By José TISSIER, Anne LEGILE, Philippe DIERICKX - Engineers - AFD

Agricultural Risk Management Support: Examples of MechanismsThat Mitigate the Volatility of Cotton Prices in Burkina Faso

Historique de la production de coton-graine au Burkina

Campagne (avril n à mars n+1)

1 FOB: Free On Board;2 If a speculator is ready to counteract the bid of the cotton com-pany which fears a drop in prices;3 In a case where the market price is higher than the price agreedupon in the sale option;


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2006/07277 440

165154

0-8,92,80

2007/08149 444

145162

132,8

5,60

2008/09190 295

165157

0-3,81,90

2009/10153 510

160167

70

1,90

2010/11189 000

172+10nana9,4

11,34

Production (t fibre)Basic producer price CFA/kgEquivalent selling price CFA/kgSupplement price CFA/kgImpact on funds MMCFAFSituation of funds MMCFAF 11,81

2010-11 estimates are in italics.

A. LEGILEJ. TISSIER

cotton company may thereafter be almostcompletely sure to cover its production costgiven that it is certain in every instance to re-alise an amount corresponding to the differ-ence between the selling price mentioned inthe sale option and the purchase price of thesale option. Finally, whatever the tools used, the interna-tional community recognises that certainevents are external shocks to the countries orindustries which may finally lead to the col-lapse of the sector. Neither of these stakehold-ers through their inter-annual smootheningtools, nor the market through its by-products,can withstand this situation. Confronted bywhat is commonly referred to as the marketcollapse, the State is therefore faced with thefollowing options; it could either refuse toreact and assume the risk of the collapse of thesector (with related societal as well as eco-nomic and fiscal consequences, which can bemore or less drastic depending on the impor-tance of the sector within the nation’s econ-omy) or intervene. The availability of asmoothening fund enables them do so in apreventive manner, considering that as soonas the trend line price is set, it is possible todetermine whether the announcement of avery low production price may discourage pro-ducers and lead to a sharp discontinuance ofcotton production.

Setting Up An Innovative Mecha-nism In Burkina FasoThe stabilisation of the institutional landscapefollowing the liberalisation/ privatisationprocesses and the greater involvement of play-ers in the governance of the sector show howBurkina Faso became the first country (andthe only one so far) to have set up a smoothen-ing fund mechanism aimed at dealing with the“controllable risk” taken by the players. In early March 2008, the Inter-professionalCotton Association of Burkina Faso officiallyvalidated the administrative rules of thesmoothening fund and the agreed institu-tional set-up (for example, the creation of anassociation specially dedicated to the manage-ment of the smoothening funds and the hiringof a depository bank and controller of funds:the Bank of Africa (BOA)).The AFD was the only donor to have replen-ished the smoothening fund, thanks to a veryconcessional and sovereign loan of 15 millioneuros and a subsidy of 3 million euros, dis-

bursed in late 2008 in favour of theSmoothening Fund Association. The initialgrant of funds is however lower than the opti-mal projections defined in the feasibility stud-ies (60 CFAF per kilo of cotton fibre producedin the country).

A Mechanism That Has Met ItsObjectivesThe mechanism was implemented with aretroactive effect during the first farming sea-son post-2006/07 and the players respectedthe rules. The system functioned within theset scenarios (i.e., in neutral situations, caseswhere the referential price stood above theceiling price leading to the payment of a sup-plement to the producer price as well as thecontradictory situations where companies ac-quired a drawing right.Projections for the current farming season arevery positive. The smoothening fund shouldreach its highest level by the end of the2010/11 season. A very significant amount willremain available for the distribution at a veryconsistent supplementary price to producers.

A Regional Level To Attain AndPartners To MobiliseThe whole integrated risk price managementmechanism is yet to be fully developed inBurkina Faso but it has already borne fruit.The Burkinabe sector stands out as the onlyone that was able to maintain a productionlevel beyond 300,000 tons of cotton duringthe crisis. In the current year, there have been severefluctuations over a very short period and thisexposes certain shortcomings in the system.The 2010-11 producer price, based on an ex-ternal index (the average of the Cotlook Aindex during the entire twelve months of theyear), it seems incompatible with the sellingprice of cotton producing companies whopractised forward buying at the beginning ofthe season when prices had not yet reachedthe current peak.A survey sponsored by the Inter-professionalAssociation AICB is ongoing to analyse thefunctioning of the mechanism and proposeimprovements. It could lead to a review of cur-rent rules (modification of price distributionbetween producers and ginners; integration ofthe price of the seed and the quality of thefibre, fixing the ceiling price, extension of tun-nel boundaries…) This adjustment shall also

better take into consideration the possibilityof extraordinary years without necessarilyquestioning the basic principles of the mech-anism. The first conclusions reached were pre-sented to the AICB in early February and thisbody shall make its decisions prior to the be-ginning of the 2011-12 farming season. The regional mechanism, destined if need beto refinance the national smoothening fundswhich meet the eligibility criteria and whichdefines the governance of sectors, is howevernot in place. The smoothening fund in Burk-ina Faso remains to this day, the only oneavailable. Several sectors wish to create their own na-tional smoothening tools (Senegal,Cameroon…) and regional players (UEMOA,BOAD) and some of their financial partners(World Bank, ADB, other bilateral partners)are becoming increasingly interested in thisissue of integrated price risk management. The current economic crisis has been charac-terised by a highly volatile and soaring worldcotton prices but concurrently, it seemsfavourable to the development of new initia-tives. n

P. DIERICKX




Environment and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA-TM) is an inter-national non-profit organisation based in Dakar, Senegal. Founded in 1972, ENDAis an association of autonomous entities co-ordinated by an Executive Secretariat.ENDA's worldwide representation includes:

l twenty-four teams at the Dakar headquarters each working on development and environment themes;l twenty-one poles in Southern countries: fourteen in Africa, five in South America, two in Asia;l an European delegation; Japanese representation to follow soon.

Enda collaborates with grassroots groups in search of alternative development models on the basis of the experience,expectations and objectives of marginalised peoples. This mutual commitment translates as:

l presence at all levels of decision-making and action;l involving intellectuals and professionals in defining and implementing development models for the majorityand the least privileged;l fighting poverty: this is the primary principle behind Enda activities;l involvement in international debates to render third world positions visible and influential.

Enda Systèmes et Prospective (Syspro)

Through its entity Syspro, Enda acts on the mechanisms of international economic governance and carries the voiceof Southern civil society in areas where the rules and policies are developed. Its main focus remain both the North-South trade, South-South trade as well as trade negotiations at national, regional, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Enda Syspro, as one the main centers of resources and expertise on trade issues in Africa and the South, has built ahuge expertise in terms of research, advocacy, training and policy dialogue which strengthened its capabilities todeal with new emerging debates and allowed the entity to create a critical mass of actors and networks around Africanissues and international negotiations.

Among its recent accomplishments : l the training of dozens of parliamentarians in several countries in West Africa on integration and trade agree-ments;l the training of FEFA members, which is the West African association of women entrepreneurs and associationsof producers on advocacy and trade negotiations skills l the publication of several studies «Article XXIV of GATT in EPA (2009),» Intra-regional trade in West Africa«(2010),» Analysis the west africa market access offer in CGEM «(2011),» Integration and EPAs in West Africa«(2011),» Relations between China and Africa «(2011); l several memorandum and position papers on trade negotiations; l several regional multi-stakeholder dialogues: «The legal and systemic issues in the EPAs, in May 2009, Dakar,»the future of intra-regional trade in West Africa «, February 2010, Abidjan,» Trade and Development in Africa«June 2010, Dakar. l Several conferences and debates: «The relations between China and Africa,» January 2010 «The relationshipEurope-Africa, December 2010, etc.. l Participation in negotiation sessions on EPAs s as the representative of the west African civil society in the Re-gional Negotiating Committee.

CONTACT : Enda Syspro, 73 rue Carnot, BP 6879 Dakar, SénégalTél : +221 33 82170 37 Fax : +221 33 823 57 54

Email : [email protected] : www.enda.sn/syspro2


54 G- African Cotton in the Doha Round


The Cotton Initiative: Evolutions, Difficulties and Current Status of Debates and Negotiations

Interview with: PROSPER VOKOUMA - Ambassador of Burkina Faso in Geneva and C4 Coordinator

GLOCAL : On 30 April 2003, the C4 submitted the Sectoral Initia-tive in Favour of African Cotton to the Agriculture Committee.Could you remind us of the genesis of the diplomatic defence ofAfrican cotton at WTO?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : In late April 2003, the C4 (Benin, BurkinaFaso, Mali and Chad) lodged a proposal with the WTO titled “Poverty Re-duction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton”. The four member coun-tries of the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton asked the United States(USA) and the European Union (EU) to put an end to their cotton tradedistorting subsidies. African producer countries demanded compensationfor losses incurred. As you surely know, the United States and the European Union did notreact to this first C4 intervention. They were of the opinion that the CottonInitiative could not be included in the Doha agenda because it was a newfile and was not part of the mandate given by the ministers in Doha. Butthis C4 proposal was massively backed by developing countries. It is in this framework that His Excellency Blaise COMPAORE, Presidentof Burkina Faso went to Geneva in June 2003 to present the initiative atan important meeting of the General Council of the World Trade Organi-sation. It is important to recall that this debate occurred on the eve of theministerial conference in Cancun in 2003.In his speech, the Burkina Faso president declaredin substance “for the first time, African countriesare not asking for charity, we are simply askingthat WTO members respect the rules of the or-ganisation; rules that they freely adhered to”. Itwas the beginning of the diplomatic and strategicassault to ensure the adoption of the Cotton Ini-tiative as part and parcel of the Doha developmentagenda. Naturally, to meet this goal, it was indispensibleto have support from the different negotiatinggroups (Africa, LDC, ACP). After major diplomatic work and aggressive lob-bying with support from the media, these groupsdecided to make theirs the case of the Sectoral Ini-tiative in Favour of Cotton. This was the firstdiplomatic victory of the file. During an importantmeeting of the WTO General Council which heldin August 3003 in Geneva to prepare for the Cancun Ministerial Confer-ence, the Africa group, ACPs and LDCs took turns in supporting the CottonInitiative. Developing countries like Brazil, India and China also gave their support.African countries did same in their individual discourses. It was only following this general support from developing countries andsome developed countries that America made a short declaration acknowl-edging that the issue was important and deserved to be examined. This was one of the first and most important diplomatic victories of theCotton Initiative. From that moment on, the Cotton Initiative was incor-porated in Doha consultations. Finally, from September 2003, it was planned that cotton would be in-cluded in the official agenda of the Cancun Ministerial Conference. At thesame time, consultations and the diplomatic assault continued. All of these efforts across the board led to the case being included in theCancun Ministerial Conference agenda, immediately after the openingspeech. This was a major milestone victory for the C4, the Africa Group,the LDCs and the ACPs. During the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Africa focussed its at-tention on the cotton case. The flag bearers of West and Central Africa(WCA), that is, the four contending countries, stigmatised the contradic-tions in cotton production conditions around the world and, beyond that,conditions for the international inclusion of African countries in a liberal-ized world. Thanks to the arguments put forward demonstrating the dis-parities in figures and the glaring iniquity, the case of African cottonenjoyed widespread sympathy and support during the Cancun Conference.The main blocking factor was developing countries refusing to debate onSingapore issues concerning competition, investment, facilitating trade and

transparency in procurement. These issues were the main reason for astalemate between the EU and developing countries. But it is the disagree-ments on agriculture in general and on cotton in particular which crys-tallised these divergences during the conference. For the first time,international trade negotiations stalled on an African demand recognisedas legitimate by most of the other countries.

GLOCAL : Do you think that this sectoral initiative is a textbookcase? What are the main lessons to be drawn? What about themechanics of negotiations and working together? Has the Africanand international dynamic in defence of cotton been useful inother negotiations? Did it lead to the creation of bodies, of con-sultation communication methods, of sub regional diplomaticstrategies to defend other raw materials, or of other topics of ne-gotiations?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : Thanks to the solidarity built around this case,we did not give up and were encouraged to continue the fight. To a certainextent, the cotton case could appear as an appetizer for greater battles orbattles of another type. On the one hand, several countries known for theirliberal positions quickly supported the African countries in their positions,particularly concerning the elimination of African subsidies (the case of

Canada, Australia and Argentina for example,known active members of the “CairnsGroup”). (By the way, it is this threat whichcould explain the EU’s reluctance to firmlycommit to supporting the cotton case in Can-cun, fearing vicious criticisms on the commonagricultural policy (CAP) reform process). Onthe other hand, civil society organisationswould take over the cotton case, seeing in itan ideal textbook example to highlight inco-herencies between the trade and develop-ment cooperation policies of the EU and USA.For several NGOs, cotton was also an idealcommunication tool to question the legiti-macy of international bodies in charge of reg-ulating trade and economic development.

GLOCAL : The debate around subsidiesis complex (their role and impact on the global economy, theirprotection, ranking and transfer in different departments of theWTO…). Could you summarise the C4 position on this debate?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : The Agreement on agriculture prohibits allsupport for measures known to distort production and trade. Concerning cotton, the world market on this product is distorted becausedeveloped countries, particularly USA and Europe, give massive subsidiesto cotton farmers (on average, 3 billion dollars per year in America andabout 900 million Euros in Europe), allowing America and Europe to slashprices and consequently seriously distort competition.It is in this light that following the Framework Agreement of July 2004, in-cluding cotton in negotiations on agriculture with the condition that itwould be handled “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically”, confirmedin December 2005 by the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the C4 madeproposals on the three pillars of negotiations (market access, domestic sup-port and export competition) in June 2006, notably through a formula toreduce orange box domestic support to cotton (see WTO document underTN/AG/SCC/GEN/4 of 16 June 2006). This formula also specifies con-cepts and modalities applicable to the blue box, specifically for cotton, thereference period for cotton and its implementation period. “Blue box”, “or-ange box” and “green box” are terms used to designate categories of subsi-dies which distort trade, ranking them by intensity. After some progress on market access and export competition, domesticsupport is and remains the lever on which quick action must be taken tosend a strong signal to all least developed cotton producing countries.

GLOCAL : Argentina has reservations on a positive evolution towards reducing subsidies, mentioning the transfer of some blue

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G- African Cotton in the Doha Round 55

box measures to the green box. Do you agree? In your opinion,what are the measures impacting African cotton that are “subjectto tricks”?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : One of the main challenges of the Doha roundis to avoid what we call “box shifting”, that is replacing orange measureswhich are being eliminated with blue or green measures which are still tol-erated. This is why negotiating conditions and rules to govern the use ofthe blue and green box, after the conclusion of the Doha round would beparticularly important in a general sense, but for particularly for cotton.The key elements in this context are the base years which should be usedto determine the surface areas or quantities on which blue procedurescould be applied and the required limits depending on the value of thegoods.

GLOCAL : African countries had high hopes in the creation of theSpecial Commission for Cotton. What is the outcome?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : Following the July 2004 Framework Agree-ment stipulating that cotton would be treated “ambitiously, expeditiouslyand specifically”, in the negotiations on agriculture, the Cotton Sub Com-mittee was created on 19 November 2004 and was mandated to focus itswork on “all trade distorting policies affecting the sector” in three key areasof agriculture (market access, domestic support and export competition).But this trade component is linked with negotiations on agriculture andthere has been no major progress because our partners categorically refuseto effectively delve into negotiations. The Sub-Committee did a remarkablejob, but the outcome does not depend on it, be-cause it is the members who negotiate within theCotton Sub-Committee.

GLOCAL : In the Cotton Sub-Committee situ-ation report of October 2010, it was men-tioned that the mandate specifying that thecotton issue should be handled “ambi-tiously, expeditiously and specifically […]was far from achieved”. Has this commit-ment, mentioned in August 2004 in all re-sults of July and in the Hong KongMinisterial Conference in 2005 ever beenrespected? If yes, to what extent and forwhat results?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : The mandate of theHong Kong Ministerial Conference in December2005 to handle the cotton issue ambitiously, expeditiously and specificallyis far from being achieved. What have we observed so far? The ambition isstill proclaimed, but for lack of probing results it is void of all meaning. Expeditiousness is by far the point that could not be achieved because since2005 little progress has been made on the domestic support pillar. Finally,it appears to be void of meaning as well considering the little interest ofsome developed countries on the treating of this file that we refuse to seerelegated to the last phase of the negotiation.

GLOCAL : In your opinion, how can this mandate be “achieved”in the final phase of the Doha round? What are the main stum-bling blocks to be lifted?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : To achieve this mandate, our partners, partic-ularly the United States and the European Union must truly commit to thenegotiations by accepting the C4 proposals or at least by making counter-proposals to African cotton producing countries in the same logic as theHong Kong mandate, and considering the single commitment, the otherareas of negotiations should evolve in the same direction.

GLOCAL : What do you think is the impact of Brazil’s “victory” ona positive evolution in the reduction of trade distorting subsi-dies?

Do you think that with reference to the Brazilian approach,African countries should explore dispute settlement so as tobenefit from a situation which gives them stronger negotiatingauthority and tools against the United States? Brazil had encouraged African countries to resort to disputesettlement at a time when it was lodging a complaint at the DSB.What is the current state of possible or ongoing co-operationwith Brazil in “building” a dispute settlement case?Brazil, India and Pakistan want to actively engage in a South-South support and co-operation policy with African cotton pro-ducing countries. Could you tell us the level of evolution of theseprojects and the specific sectors targeted as far as Burkina Fasois concerned? PROSPER VOKOUMA : The USA/Brazil dispute, initiated in 2002 ledto the effective condemning of America’s subsidies to its cotton farmers.This decision was confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body in 2005 and

2008. Despite several consultations between the USA and Brazil, they wereunable to make progress in finding a solution to the cotton dispute sincethe USA always refused to embark in effective negotiations, hiding behindthe claim that any solution required the approval of Congress which wasnot ready to amend its system to support cotton. To avoid retaliation andto continue negotiations towards an agreement, the United States pro-posed the elimination of the GSM-102 export credit guarantees. This wasa first and welcome step towards aligning the United States policy withsome WTO requirements. A bilateral agreement signed between the twocontenders also provides for financial compensation to Brazil, amountingto about 147.3 million dollars per year, to provide technical assistance andbuild capacities in the cotton sector.Thus, the final verdict of this “deal” is still pending. The positive point tobe noted by African cotton producing countries is that the agreement keepspressure on the United States which must comply with WTO rules. It hasforced the United States to handle at least one issue (the export credit guar-antee program) systematically so that, hopefully, there would be totalalignment with WTO obligations. Concerning the idea to resort to dispute settlement, note that at the end ofthe consultation meeting of C4 trade ministers held on 26 November 2011in Cotonou (Benin), the ministers asked negotiators in Geneva to reviewthe pertinence of referring the Cotton Initiative to the Dispute SettlementBody of the WTO.In executing the Ministers’ instructions, a series of activities were organisedin early 2011 in Geneva and Brussels: (i) the brainstorming workshop on

cotton, organized by the ACP secretariat, on27 January 2011 in Geneva; (ii) the brain-storming workshop on “dispute settlement:an advantage or shortcoming in negotia-tions?: the case of Cotton at WTO”, organ-ized by the C-4 on 12 February in Geneva;and (iii) the meeting of Brussels and Geneva-based Representatives of cotton producingAfrican, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) coun-tries which held on 16 and 17 February 2011in Brussels (Belgium). A report was draftedfollowing these activities. Developments de-pend on the decision makers of our countriesat the appropriate level. Concerning South-South co-operation, dur-ing the series of meetings for the cotton con-sultative framework co-operation between

African cotton producers and countries like Brazil, India and Pakistan wasreviewed.It is important to mention that under South-South co-operation on cotton,Brazil and India made interesting proposals to the C-4 countries. Brazil’s offer for co-operation translated into the creation of an assistanceprogramme for C4 countries and the organisation of study trips in 2007for producers, researchers and public administration officials of Benin,Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad; and the organisation of a rotating missionof a team of Brazilian researchers in C4 countries, so as to define with theircounterparts, partnership sectors worthy of interest. These partnerships,among others, are being progressively developed. India made a co-operation offer to the C4 countries in 2007, which startedto be concretized with the organisation of a rotating mission of Indian ex-perts in May 2010, with the aim of evaluating the needs for technical as-sistance and capacity building, technology transfer and developmentresearch in C4 countries, in Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda; and to share theexperiences of Indian development research centres with their partners inthe countries to be visited through intensive training and specialisations. In Burkina Faso, the Indian delegation had working sessions with the tech-nical services of the public administrative body in charge of cotton, theBurkina Faso cotton inter-trade association [Association Interprofession-nelle du Coton du Burkina (AICB)], cotton research, the Chamber of Com-merce and industrial and small-scale textile business persons. Furthermore, just like with Brazil, at bilateral level, the Burkina Faso/Indiajoint committee is also active and co-operation avenues are being devel-oped in various other sectors. We have also engaged in discussions with Pakistan and with the People’sRepublic of China which does not want to be left on the sidelines of thisco-operation.

GLOCAL : The EU seems to be the “good student” concerning thecoherence between the Hong Kong commitments and actionstaken to reduce domestic support measures for cotton (deletionof category orange assistance), efforts to multiply aid, openingup cotton market access, several disbursements and develop-ment projects in the cotton sector, etc. Are there subtleties whichcould mitigate or back this observation?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : One must acknowledge that the European

© Cirad




Union which, with its reform of 2004, confirmed in 2006 following thedemand of the European Union Court of Justice to comply with rules inforce, made efforts by decoupling 65% of its cotton subsidies and trans-ferring all other trade distorting subsidies from the orange box to the bluebox, considered as less distorting. At the time, we had already applaudedthis positive move and asked that more efforts be made to arrive at 100%decoupling, and we continue to call for this additional effort. Added to this reform, the European Union has launched since 2004 apartnership in favour of African cotton through which no less than 15million Euros are allocated to strengthen the cotton sector. However, European subsidies are the highest in the world per kilogramof cotton produced, cotton support decoupling rates (65%) is substan-tially lower than the average decoupling rate on other goods (>90%)thereby contradicting the commitment that the EU made in Hong Kongto continue to do more in the cotton sector than in other sectors of agri-culture, considering its importance for the development of poor coun-tries.African cotton producing countries consider that it is an incomplete re-form which does not meet the Hong Kong demands.

GLOCAL : What are the stakes of co-operationand collaboration between African cottonproducing countries and China within awider framework of economic diplomacy?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : I would say that rela-tions are evolving from bilateralism to multilateral-ism. This important evolution is the result of China’ssupport to inter-African organisation. Since 2003,China has been strengthening its multilateral rela-tions with African regional and sub-regional organ-isations. Since the first Sino-African summit,China’s policy on Africa has been multilateral, con-sidering that it is defined by the African continentas a whole and not by individual States. China’s efforts to strengthen its economy are notlimited to petroleum. The economy of the MiddleKingdom needs other goods including cotton. Itshould be recalled that China is the world’s top cot-ton consumer. In 2000, Chinese-African relations intensified interms of the quality of trade. Trade between Chinaand Africa moved up from about 9 billion dollars in2000 to 40 billion dollars in 2005, and then to 55 billion in 2006. Someanalysts estimate that this upward trend would reach over 100 billiondollars in 2011. ,

GLOCAL : Is USA, through its West African Cotton ImprovementProgram (WACIP) succeeding in eliminating the prejudice suf-fered by African cotton producing countries because of the sub-sidies it gives to its producers? Do you have figures that couldbe used to evaluate the total amount of WACIP programmesand the types of funding allocated to them (preferential rateloans, gratuitous funding, interesting contracts for Americanseed dealers and input producers, etc.) as well as estimates ofthe losses incurred by C4?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : The general objective of the West AfricanCotton Improvement Program (WACIP) is to reduce poverty and hungerby increasing the revenue of cotton producers and processers. Accordingto some WACIP officials, to resolve the main problems with African cot-ton, it is important to concentrate on technical aspects like input supplyand loans, improvement of ginning techniques, etc. WACIP cost twenty-eight (28) million US dollars from 2006 to 2010.Note that the programme which ended in 2010 was renewed. We applaudthis financial contribution and urge USA to be more generous consideringthe major difficulties (hikes in input prices, particularly fertilisers, uncer-tainties in the cotton value chain) that West African cotton is facing. How-ever, while we understand the importance of development aid in favourof cotton, we want to underscore here that we believe the commercial as-pect is the perfect solution for our cotton sector, in danger of extinction. Regarding estimates of losses sustained by the C4, it is clear that Westand Central African countries in particular sustained and continue to sus-tain substantial losses because of subsidies to American cotton producers.These losses could worsen if USA does not comply with WTO rules in theshort term. According to World Bank studies, American subsidies alone reduce WestAfrican farmers’ yearly earnings from cotton exports by more than 250million dollars. It is possible that losses incurred by African countriesfrom American subsidies exceed the advantages in growth and potentialsof Africa that these countries could draw from the law which providespreferential access of African goods to the American market.

GLOCAL : In the case of the EU-ACP/Africa partnership, whathave been the impacts of the projects developed since the Cot-ton Initiative? What are the prospects for the new EU-Africacotton action framework?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : On the whole, most activities programmedfor the cotton component seem to evolve normally, although it is still toosoon to evaluate their efficiency and impact. Nevertheless, the excessivedelays in the cotton strategy elaboration process for West and CentralAfrica must be underscored. For West Africa, the complexity is intensified by the need to start with anupdating of the Agenda for the cotton-to-clothing sector adopted byHeads of State and Government in 2003 and an evolution towards a re-gional strategy shared by all stakeholders. Faced with the observed delays, the Cotton Steering and Follow-Up Com-mittee asked the Agricultural Commodities Coordination Unit to activateits decentralisation process in West Africa to facilitate work within aframework of mobilising all stakeholders towards formulating and adopt-ing a regional cotton strategy. This document presents the latest updateof the implementation of the EU-Africa partnership on cotton which wassigned by the EU and African countries in July 2004 (Paris Forum). This

partnership resulted in the adoption of a joint action planwhich evolved into an action framework. Following a mid-term evaluation of the partnership on June 2009, the ac-tion plan was revised and became the Partnership’s actionframework. The action framework reasserts the relevanceof the EU-Africa cotton partnership and the need to con-tinue by adapting it to the current context. The actionframework is both a strategic reference document devel-oped around regional cotton strategies and a tool to moni-tor actions undertaken within the EU-Africa CottonPartnership. It is a tool to monitor all specific aid to Africancotton which is periodically updated on the basis of infor-mation obtained from the different donors and inter-tradeorganisations in the African cotton sector.

GLOCAL : Several agencies carry out cotton relatedprojects in the C4 countries and in Africa in gen-eral. Could you tell us how we could have a sum-mary of impact analyses, of evaluations of realprofits, the meeting (or not) of the goals of theseprojects so as to understand how internationaldevelopment aid contributes (or not) in taking the

cotton sector out of a crisis? PROSPER VOKOUMA : The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference ofDecember 2005 reiterated the option taken in July 2004 in Geneva totackle the cotton issue not only from a commercial standpoint but alsothrough the development aspect. Paragraph 12 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration defines theframework within which the international development community isrequired to further intensify its aid specifically on cotton. At the sametime, African cotton producers are encouraged to pursue and increasetheir reform efforts aimed at boosting productivity and efficiency. Within the framework of implementing these measures through the con-sultative framework mechanism of the WTO Director General in favourof cotton, development aid in favour of cotton is divided into two cate-gories: cotton-specific development aid and development aid for agricul-ture and related infrastructure. It is a constant that this aid is heavilyinfluenced by domestic reform measures which have not all always beenpositive especially under the privatisation process. It appears that six years after the adoption of these measures, the balancesheet regularly recorded by the Director General is not quite successful.The contributions of development partners on the development aspectof the cotton file, in their current form, seem insufficient. The similaritiesbetween projects and programmes designed and funded by bilateral andmultilateral donors should be noted as well; this does not ensure a ra-tional use of resources and the true effectiveness of the said projects andprogrammes. To rectify these situations of inefficiency, and in a bid tobetter include the specific development needs of the cotton sector in thecountries behind the Cotton Initiative (C4), the C4 opted for the inclusionof the necessary relationship between the development component of thecotton file and the Aid For Trade initiative and for the definition of aframework conducive to the formulating of a joint multidimensional andintegrated programme to replace the haphazard national projects, andsubmit to development partners.

GLOCAL : In a strategy of value adding on cotton and greater tex-tile processing in the region, how do you see the connection be-tween preserving trade and diplomatic relations, South-Southco-operation and protecting domestic or regional processing orconsumption?

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PROSPER VOKOUMA : In a strategy of adding value to cotton andincreased processing of the fibre, national or regional cotton strategiesshould be made available with an indication of areas of intervention offinanciers on cotton. South-South co-operation will have to be developedwith a view to a better integration of the cotton value chain, including in-creased processing on a regional scale; the capacities of African cottonproducing countries would have to be built as well, and competitivenessboosted through, inter alia, reduced production costs, training and re-search. It is in this framework that since 2003, the WAEMU Commission createdan agenda for competitiveness in the cotton-to-clothing sector which hadas main goal to process 25% of cotton produced by 2010. This agenda, which did not achieve expected results because of difficultiesin its implementation, is currently being revised particularly concerningthe strategic and operational goals of the cotton-to-clothing sector in-cluding all concerns relating to competitiveness, processing and market-ing of cotton. However, our strong conviction is that the considerable potential of thecotton-to-clothing sector for the economic development of our countriescannot be exploited sustainably as long as the issue of streamlining thefunctioning of the cotton world market does not become reality.

GLOCAL : Cotton and the consolidation of regional integration– how is cotton an instrument favouring regional integration(political, social, commercial, cultural)? How could it play aneven greater role?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : More than 15 million persons live directly orindirectly from cotton farming in West and Central Africa where thisproduct is the main source of income. (i) It first allows them to improvetheir material living conditions, because revenues cotton sales contributein meeting a good number of day-to-day needs. (ii) It also provides accessto education and health care through farmers’ contribution to the build-ing of schools and community health centres for example. (iii) Finally,other crops benefit from cotton farming in terms of fertilizers, know-how,mechanisation and loans. The important role played by cotton corporations in opening up tradeand social policies should be added to the points above, because to betterensure the transportation of cotton, these corporations contribute in con-structing and repairing roads and feeder roads at both national and re-gional levels. Opening up the region has a multiplier effect as it connects productionareas with marketing areas.

GLOCAL : The current low cotton processing levels in the entiresub-region is an issue at the crossroads of several others (en-ergy strategy, financing, transport infrastructure, etc.). How doyou perceive an evolution in this sector in Burkina Faso and thesub-region, in what order of priority? What are the stumblingblocks that the highest State political authorities could con-tribute in lifting?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : It is an ongoing debate at the WAEMU Com-mission. This debate naturally included securing the revenues of cottonproducers, attracting private investment in fibre processing, and involv-ing ginners in fibre processing. So, I will not make any comment on theissue.

GLOCAL : If you had to mention two pitfalls, topics of tension,main truths that are painful to say and hear concerning the cur-rent situation of the cotton sector in West and Central Africa,what would they be?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : I don’t know if there are truths that arepainful to say or hear concerning the current situation of African cotton. But for the production of cotton in African countries to be profitable andbecome a key economic activity for our socio-economic balance, I believeit is necessary to handle the problems of competition at WTO level, withtwo main goals: stopping the unacceptable American (even European)subsidies on cotton and maintain a “customs security belt” at the bordersof African countries, while waiting for the successful implementation ofthe sector’s strategy and cotton value-adding.

GLOCAL : In the tandem of the people and leaders for Africa’sdevelopment: is the « need for self-sufficiency » a historical re-sponsibility of our generations?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : This generation should take up its responsi-bilities towards future generations. Everywhere in the world, it takes timeto build modern nations and define development strategies. Africa is notan exception to this rule, but it must effectively own its destiny by activelyengaging in a collective project whose construction and implementationis incumbent on political and intellectual leaders as well as all social stake-holders on the continent and beyond.

On this avenue, and to complement efforts made by institutional andnon-institutional stakeholders in each country at regional, continentaland global level, we should not be content to only make evaluations, butalso work towards developing an Africa with its own concept of gover-nance and its own development methodology based on realities of thecontinent and tackling the challenges of modernity and globalisation.Current generations have the responsibility of bequeathing to future gen-erations: (i) an Africa which found its own way by making the best use ofits traditions, reviewed in light of the challenges of the 21st Century, andthe best international experience which it freely interprets instead of itbeing imposed in the form of standards and conditions; (ii) an Africawhich has a production and trade system so that it can enjoy the advan-tages of globalisation, and to define its own rules of the game to preserveits ecosystems, progressively develop its own competences and produc-tion system, to conceive its own sustainable development by taking backownership of its considerable potential; and (iii) an Africa which has re-newed its relations and strengthened fair and equitable partnership withthe other countries and continents of the world, which has extricated itselffrom dependence and which makes its voice heard in the concert of na-tions.

GLOCAL : Using the cotton issue as an illustration, how do youthink Africa could progress towards greater (earned) freedomto make its choices and exercise broader capacity to defendthem?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : I have already partially answered this ques-tion. At the risk of repeating myself, I would say that the cotton case endedup being an emblem of the Doha Round. The issue of agricultural subsi-dies poses serious threats on the credibility of the WTO. The inability tofind an adequate answer to the Cotton Initiative is, to date, one of theparalyzing factors of the Doha Development Programme. The C4 countries and all African countries undertook not to give up thefight and to keep the pressure on countries which give trade distortingsubsidies to their cotton producers. They had to stick together withfarmer organisations as well as national and regional non-governmentalorganisations behind the same cause as has always been the case in thecotton case. This is how Africa can make its voice heard and defend itsinterests, and this can only be done in solidarity, unity and commitment.

GLOCAL : What have we forgotten to ask you that you believe iscrucial to this analysis on African cotton?

PROSPER VOKOUMA : For eight years, we have not stopped showingthe distress of African cotton producers to the world. We said and re-peated that in our opinion, what is at play at the WTO is the credibility ofthe multilateral trade system, no more no less, and we should all be at-tached to it. With the United States of America, the picture is much bleaker. It is thegreatest source of cotton market volume distortion and, worse, despitethe WTO ruling against it in a dispute with Brazil, there is no positive signthat it would align its subsidy practices to those authorised by the multi-lateral trade system. We have high hopes in the Farm Bill reform, plannedfor 2013 to finally see this great country conform to WTO rules. Africancotton farmers are not asking for special treatment, neither are they ask-ing for differentiated treatment; they are simply asking that the rules andprinciples that WTO members gave to themselves, be implemented. The increase in cotton prices observed since July 2010 is not reasonenough to do nothing, and this increase reflects a structural imbalancebetween demand and supply. During the 2009/2010 season, ACP coun-tries produced 800 000 tonnes of cotton fibre, that is 3.5% of global pro-ductions. Meanwhile some years ago, Burkina Faso and Mali producedmore than that amount. In the short term, cotton prices should remainhigh. But African cotton farmers are not benefitting from these hikes. Inthe medium and long term, prospects are bleaker and uncertain. On theone hand because the rise in prices would translate, theoretically and me-chanically into an increase in the price of textiles and clothing; such in-creases cannot be borne by the world market on finished textiles andclothing. The consequence would either be an incentive for consumersto reduce their clothing and textile consumption or to transfer this con-sumption on non-cotton clothing and textile.In any case, it would impact global cottonconsumptions. More fundamentally, cotton prices andhence, cotton farmers’ income in comingmonths will be a direct function of global cot-ton production, and consequently of meteorologicalconditions. If meteorology in the main producingcountries is bad, production will be low and priceshigh, and vice versa. Finally, allow me to thank you and through youragency, all those who are fighting for our cause. n

PROSPER VOKOUMA

G- African Cotton in the Doha Round 57NB : This text in english is not the original version, but rather a free translation of

the authentic French version (See French copy of the special edition).


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GLOCAL African Trade and Development JournalGLOCAL

In September 2002, Brazil lodged acomplaint at the World Trade Or-ganisation Dispute Settlement Body(DSB) against American cotton sub-sidies. The issue was quite simple:world prices were at their lowestand USA had become the mainplayer on the cotton market with40% of global exports in 2003,against 17% in 1998. This successappeared to be more the result of avery generous subsidy system to25 000 American producers, whoreceived over $3 billion per year insubsidies, than competition be-tween local producers1. Brazil ar-gued that these subsidies pulleddown world prices by completelyisolating American producers frommarket signals. As a result, theother producers, be they Brazilian,Chinese, Indian or African, were thebig losers in this unfair competition.In West Africa, with cotton beingthe main source of agricultural rev-enue, involving 10 million produc-ers and having a leading role in localeconomies, the international cottonmarket and the impact of Americansubsidies progressively climbed onthe regional policy agenda, follow-ing calls from cotton producer or-ganisations. Moreover this sector,facing considerable national chal-lenges including privatising cottoncorporations and the chronic lack ofinvestment, was directly threatenedby volatile prices and the UnitedStates’ unfair practices.The observation was unequivocal: subsidiespulled down world prices and allowed Ameri-can producers to monopolize the market tothe detriment of other producer countries,which include some of the poorest countrieson the planet. Hence, the cotton case becamea perfect illustration of what is at stake at theWTO: the multilateral trade system should en-sure the reviewing of trade rules and practiceswhich favour the wealthier countries and un-dermine economic development in countriesof the south. This is the purport of the Doharound, or at least, it is against this backdropthat the new negotiation round was advocatedto developing countries in Doha in 2001. Alarge majority of these countries were reluc-tant to embark in new negotiations when theyhad not yet completely implemented agree-ments from the previous rounds. However,

they conceded to it with the promise of “a de-velopment round”. Contrarily to Brazil, West African C4 coun-tries2 decided to defend their cause during thisnegotiation round, through a specific cottoninitiative aimed at removing subsidies whichimpact trade. There several reasons explainthis choice: a legal procedure before the WTODSB requires financial and human resourceswhich only developed or emerging countriescan afford, which is why to date, none of theLeast Developed Countries (LDCs) has filed acomplaint with the DSB. In this case, theyconsidered that the political risk of a head-onattack with the United States was too high. Itis particularly interesting to observe that thefirst sectoral cotton initiative lodged by the C4countries3 applied a systemic logic: reducedsubsidies beyond the USA alone. Finally, thecomplementarity between the Brazilian and

African initiatives wouldstrengthen their respective de-mands, and keep the topic on thepolitical and media agenda andresult in the elimination of tar-geted subsidies. 2005 was a key year for theseprocesses. In March, WTO mem-bers adopted the report of the Ap-pellate Body4. Brazil thus won itslong legal battle with the UnitedStates. American cotton subsidieswere deemed illegal and cause ofvisible prejudice to Brazil and, byextension, to other producercountries. In the same year, theMinisterial Conference organisedin Hong Kong confirmed that theDoha round must address cottonambitiously, expeditiously andspecifically5. The belief was thatthe USA would execute these legaland political decisions, consider-ing that the binding nature ofWTO decisions was often cele-brated as the principal asset ofthe multilateral trade system. 6 years later, while the tenth an-niversary of the Doha negotia-tions was being anticipated forthe end of the year, the problemof cotton subsidies was still un-solved. The Doha round was dor-mant and was yet to be finalised,and the calls of G20 leaders toconclude negotiations in 2011was only adhered to by those whostill believed in it. These coun-tries in question did not seem

able to make the necessary compromises andconcessions to seal a good deal. Most develop-ing countries, be they emerging or not, arehoping to end with it and conclude this round,more for systemic reasons and to safeguardthe system than for the economic value of thepackage on the table. On the other side of thetable, the United States is threatening to undothe progress made since 2001 by continuingto demand even more concessions from the

By ROMAIN BENICCHIO, Policy and Media Adviser, Oxfam International, March 2011Opinions expressed in this article are personal opinions from the author and not official Oxfam International’s Statements

The WTO Cotton Case: Legal and political victories yet to be consolidated

© Cirad

1 “Cultivating Poverty: The impact of US cotton subsidies onAfrica”, Oxfam briefing Paper, Sept. 2002,http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp30_cotton.pdf2 Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad3 WTO document : TN/AG/GEN/4, 16 May 20034 WTO document : WT/DS267/AB/R, March 20055 Ministerial Declaration adopted on 18 December 2005: http://http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm



major emer ging countries with the hope ofgaining the imperative support from its Con-gress. While in early 2011, a revival of activity inGeneva has been observed, cotton is still es-sentially absent in ongoing technical debates.Indeed, cotton is one of the topics requiringpolitical arbitration at the highest level andwhich consequently can only be handled atministerial level, at best during a possiblemeeting in July 2011 (considering the calen-dar adopted in the beginning of the year). Ifthe round is effectively completed, it would bepartly evaluated from results obtained on thereduction of cotton subsidies. The negotiations that African countries optedfor have not produced the expected results,despite commitments made in Hong Kong.Also over five years following the DSB deci-sion against American subsidies, these pro-grammes are still in place. The United Statesused every legal option available to delay theimplementation of the decisions of the Appel-late Body. This also allowed a renewal of thecondemned subsidies programmes with the2008 Farm Bill6, in spite of WTO decisions. Today, American cotton subsidies pro-grammes are still in place, although some ofthem are not activated in high-price seasonsbecause of their counter-cyclic nature. But notonly did American tax payers have to pay $2.2billion in subsidies to “King Cotton” in 20097,they now have to subsidize $147 million forBrazilian cotton every year. The long dispute settlement procedure didnot succeed in eliminating the disputed pro-grammes, but resulted in the following agree-ment between Brazil and the United States:The former agreed not to use their right to re-taliation measures, in exchange for the lattercommitting to paying compensation to aBrazilian cotton research institute. Thisagreement should allow the American admin-istration to work on reforming the subsidiesunder the next Farm Bill in 2012. In otherwords, the United States is subsidizing Brazil-ian producers so that it can continue subsidis-ing its own producers. But the root of theproblem persists.Brazil, for the moment, has given up its initialstrategy of cross-retaliation on the services orintellectual property sectors, so that these in-fluential economic sectors which are not quiteconcerned with agricultural subsidies can putpressure for cotton subsidy reform in the USA.The strategy is attractive on paper but involvestrade and diplomatic risks for Brazil. Anotherelement which may have influenced Brazil’sstrategy is the fact that in the current Ameri-can political context, such retaliation meas-ures may have a counterproductive impact.American policy makers could perceive such

measures as a declaration of trade war and notas the logical reaction to the United Statescompletely ignoring a WTO decision. After nine years of legal and political battle, itis now agreed that American subsidies will bereformed by 2012 at best. One can alreadyimagine that despite the threat of Braziliansanctions and the desire of Congress to reducethe federal budget, cotton subsidy advocateswill continue to fight tooth and nail for thesegenerous programmes to be maintained. Since 2002, the forces on the cotton markethave also changed. American productiondropped by more than 40% between 2004 and2009. In spite of this, the USA is still the leadingworld exporter. At the same time, India be-came an exporting country by increasing itsproduction by 20%. China, the world’s largestcotton importer, also increased its productionby 13%. Over this same period, African pro-duction dropped by more than 40%8.

These figures highlight the extreme vulnera-bility of African cotton and the challenges thatit faces. Although these challenges are evi-dently not limited to the impact of Americansubsidies, it is clear that the internationaltrade system is yet to concretely contribute insaving African cotton. n

Quantification of the impact of U.S. cotton subsidieson Western and Central African Countries: A Reviewof Issues and Analyses - Summary of an analytical studywhich will be published by 2ACD shortly

Cotton subsidies have been a headline issue in international trade policy and negotiationsfor a decade. In the early days of the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations, theC-4 countries of West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) demanded that U.S.cotton subsidies be eliminated because they depressed the price of cotton on world mar-kets. Since then, WTO negotiations have continued with no resolution of cotton issues.However, in a well-known WTO dispute Brazil showed that U.S. cotton subsidies depresscotton prices and harm the Brazilian cotton industry. Even after losing the case, theUnited States refused to remove the most offending subsidies, but instead negotiated topay Brazil compensation. Between 2001 and 2010, U.S. government outlays for cotton subsidies totaled about$26.4 billion. This article measures, through an empirical simulation model, how theU.S. cotton subsidies affect cotton in Western and Central Africa. Using data on subsidyrates and estimates of supply and demand parameters, the model finds that U.S. cottonsubsidies caused more than $1.6 billion in lost revenue for the 12 cotton-producing coun-tries of West and Central Africa over the 2001 to 2010 period. The impacts of subsidyvaries by year inversely with cotton prices, but, for example, in 2006 U.S. cotton subsidiesreduced cotton revenue in these countries by more than $200 million and, notably, byabout $65 million in Burkina Faso and $25 million in Benin, two of the poorest nationson earth. One component of cotton subsidies, the Marketing Loan Program, contributedalmost half of the subsidy-induced revenue losses. This article evaluates the economic prospects for African countries to successfully pursueWTO dispute settlement along the general lines of the U.S. cotton case brought by Brazil.The WTO does not have provisions to compensate for past losses or to allow third partiesto receive compensation for a dispute that they had notjoined. Moreover, given high current and projected cottonprices, effects of the U.S. cotton program are likely to besmaller than in the past decade. Importantly, MarketingLoan Program benefits are likely to be zero in the nearterm. Thus the African nations are unlikely to benefit easily froma new WTO dispute. However, with continued internationalpressure, and given budget and other concerns, the UnitedStates may reduce cotton subsidies unilaterally in the 2012 FarmBill, and Africa may help further such reforms. n

By DANIEL A. SUMNER, Director, University of California Agri-cultural Issues Center and Frank H. Buck, Jr. Professor, Depart-ment of Agricultural and Resource Economics

DANIEL A.SUMNER

6 “Square pegs in round holes: How the Farm Bill squanderschances for a pro-development trade deal”, Oxfam briefingnote, July 2008:http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/square-pegs-in-round-holes/?searchterm=farm%20bill7 EWG farm subsidy database: http://farm.ewg.org/progde-tail.php?fips=00000&progcode=cotton8 Source: http://www.africancotton.org/doc/Edition%20Spe-ciale%20de%20Cotton%20Outlook_English-310709.pdf

ROMAINBENICCHIO





cial edition).


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GLOCAL : Could you in a few wordscome back to the genesis of the Brazil-ian “battle” for its cotton production?What triggered the filing of a caseagainst the US?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : At the time Brazilrequested consultations with the UnitedStates in September 2002, the US 2002Farm Bill and other US legislation guaran-teed and mandated the payment of a widevariety of export and domestic subsidies forthe production, use and export of US uplandcotton. US upland cotton producers wereamong the highest-cost producers of uplandcotton in the world with average total costsfar exceeding US and world market pricesover the five-year period before Brazil re-quested the establishment of a panel in Feb-ruary 2003. Since 1998, those costs hadincreased but at the same time world cottonprices had fallen significantly. This situationpersisted until very recently.The percentage of US production exportedhad accelerated as had the US share of worldexports which had increased from 25 percent of world share in 1998 to 38 per cent oftotal world exports by mid-2002. This madethe United States by far the largest exporterof upland cotton in the world. Brazil’s inter-ests had suffered serious prejudice fromlower world prices and excess US exportmarket share since at least 1999. Signifi-cantly depressed and suppressed Brazilianand world prices due to the effects of US up-land cotton subsidies had impacted nega-tively on Brazilian farm income, tradebalance, cotton-related services, federal andstate revenues, and employment, amongother factors.The 2002 Farm Bill and other US laws man-dated the payment of numerous subsidiesuntil 2007. These guaranteed levels of sub-sidies meant that the United States wouldcontinue to produce massive volumes of up-land cotton regardless of US costs of produc-tion and regardless of world prices forupland cotton. The United States’ projec-tions at the time demonstrated that duringthe remaining life of the 2002 US Farm Bill,US production would remain at very highlevels and the expected world price levelwould remain far below the US cost of pro-duction.

GLOCAL : Why did Brazil choose thelegal approach to defend its cotton pro-duction? Was a negotiation option everconsidered?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : Before requestingthe establishment of a panel, Brazil and theUnited States held three rounds of consulta-tions concerning the subsidies between De-cember 2002 and January 2003. Theseconsultations did not result in a mutually ac-ceptable negotiated solution to the problem.The problem before Brazil was to find themost effective solution to a situation wherewe were convinced that the US subsidieswere inconsistent with WTO disciplines. Therecourse to the WTO dispute settlementmechanism was the most adequate toolavailable to address such situation.

GLOCAL : Could you please identify andcomment on key moments, turningpoints, arguments in the defense of theBrazilian case, up to the decision madeby the WTO Dispute Settlement?Could you please explain the arrange-ment both countries agreed on?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : Brazil and theUnited States concluded a Framework for aMutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dis-pute in the World Trade Organization(WT/DS267) on 25 June 2010. The Frame-work does not in itself constitute a mutuallyagreed solution to the dispute. It sets out pa-rameters for discussions on a solution withrespect to domestic support programs forupland cotton in the United States, as well asa process of joint operation reviews as re-gards export credit guarantees under theprogram GSM-102. Brazil and the UnitedStates also agreed to hold consultations notless than four times a year, unless they agreeotherwise, with the aim of obtaining conver-gence of views in respect of a solution to theCotton dispute. The Framework also pro-

vides that, upon enactment of successor leg-islation to the 2008 Farm Bill, Brazil and theUnited States will consult with a view to de-termining whether a mutually agreed solu-tion to the Cotton dispute has been reached.Brazil and the United States also concludeda Memorandum of Understanding on 20April 2010, whereby the United States hasstarted to make monthly payments thatamount to USD 147.3 million per year to aninstitution designated by Brazil. The moniesreceived are to be used for authorized activ-ities of technical assistance and capacitybuilding related to the cotton sector in Braziland to international cooperation in the samesector (for example, in countries in Sub-Sa-haran Africa).

GLOCAL : What are your views on thesituation in the Doha Round at the mo-ment? How could the negotiation dy-namic be reactivated?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : Negotiations areat critical juncture. We came very near to apossible and balanced conclusion in 2008.Since then, some developed Members addedtheir voice to the US seeking to increase am-bition in the round selectively, requestingfurther concessions from key developingcountries in NAMA and Services, with nomembers willing to provide further conces-sions in Agriculture. This would fundamen-tally change the equilibrium found in the2008 package. The only way to find a solu-tion in the narrow window of opportunityavailable in 2011 would be in the confines ofthe 2008 package, as the only realist andpragmatic basis for the negotiations.

GLOCAL : How much have the USachieved in terms of cotton subsidysuppression since the introduction ofthe sectorial initiative on Cotton by theC4 in 2003?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : Very little hasbeen achieved so far in terms of subsidy sup-pression. The relative decline in US cotton

Interview with: FLÁVIO DAMICO - Permanent Mission of Brazil to WTO in Geneva

Defending Brazilian Cotton: Background and Analysis

The problem before Brazil was to findthe most effective solution to a situa-tion where we were convinced that theUS subsidies were inconsistent withWTO disciplines. The recourse to theWTO dispute settlement mechanismwas the most adequate tool available toaddress such situation.

The only way to find a solution in thenarrow window of opportunity availa-ble in 2011 would be in the confines ofthe 2008 package, as the only realistand pragmatic basis for the negotia-tions.



subsidies in recent years results from amarket situation where high internationalprices prevail. Therefore, the current situa-tion is not the product of substantive re-forms in cotton subsidy programs in theUS. In the event of a price decline, shouldthe US maintains its current policies inplace, subsidies, due to their countercyclicalnature, would rise again. In this context, itis also important to note that the US has notfully implemented the results of our cottondispute until now.

GLOCAL : What is the current US cot-ton subsidy situation and how is it im-pacting Brazil?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : The domesticsupport measures that were challenged byBrazil and found to cause adverse effects inthe form of price suppression in the worldmarket are still in place and have not beenchanged. Although the effect of such meas-ures is temporarily withheld due to the pre-vailing high prices, the fact that thedistorting policies are still in place, theyprovide the necessary hedge for subsidizedfarmers to continue to expand their produc-tion incurring less market risks than theirunsubsidized competitors in the developingworld.

GLOCAL : In your opinion what shouldbe expected from the 2012 Farm Bill interms of cotton subsidy suppression?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : The outcome ofthe discussion of the 2012 Farm Bill is stillopen. The US indicates that reforms to itssubsidy programs are contingent on theconclusion of the Round. Anyhow, if thescenario of high cotton prices is confirmed,the US administration might have moreroom for changes in its programs, whichmight help the implementation of the re-sults of our dispute in the WTO and addresssome of the concerns that are being dealt inthe Doha negotiations. According to somepress articles recently published, the USNational Cotton Association is currently fo-cusing its demands on the continuation ofprograms that are considered “green box”,such as “direct payments decoupled fromproduction”, or non-product specific cropinsurance, which are the only programs inoperation at the moment due to high inter-national prices. These trends and the do-mestic pressures for budget cuts might havesome impact in facilitating reforms in themost distortive programs, such as “market-ing assistance loans” and “countercyclicalpayments”. As yet, we have no certaintythat this is going to be case.

GLOCAL : Do you think the “Africancotton question” will find a solutionwithin the WTO? Is this likely to hap-

pen in the near future?FLÁVIO DAMICO : It is very hard toanticipate whether the “African cottonquestion” will find a solution to the satisfac-tion of the C-4. Moreover, it is quite clearthat it has taken more time than it shouldand that African producers have incurredgreat losses over time. In any event, in2012, in the context of the Farm Bill discus-sion, we are hopeful that the results of theWTO panel will be taken into account andthat the legislators will bring the US intocompliance by significantly reforming suchprograms. If such step are taken, significantprogress will be achieved in redressing thissituation. As to the Doha Round, anothersource of pressure, as stated above, the ne-gotiations are through a critical stage and,at this juncture, it does not appear evidentthat we will be in a position to achieve re-sults in 2011.

GLOCAL : Following into the steps ofyour country what do you think abouta potential African countries’ caseagainst the US cotton subsidies withinthe WTO Dispute Settlement body?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : The domesticsupport measures that were challenged byBrazil and found to cause adverse effects inthe form of price suppression in the worldmarket are still in place and have not beenchanged. In that regard, as far as the inter-pretation of legal provisions is concerned, adispute launched by other WTO Memberscould build to a great extent on the case-lawdeveloped in the dispute that was broughtby Brazil. On the other hand, the currentmarket situation is very different now fromwhat it was at the time Brazil decided tolaunch its case. This may have an impact onthe way a panel assesses the adverse effectscaused by the subsidies, the need for fur-ther evidence with possible impact on coststo be incurred by the complainants.

GLOCAL : Are there any important les-sons the Brazilian delegation havelearnt (expert papers to support thecase, negotiation techniques, workwith NGOs and cotton producer’s or-ganizations…) which would be usefulfor the African countries if they wereto file a case against the US cotton sub-sidies?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : It is important to

have a solid legal basis for the complaints,as well as a very good understanding of USlegislation, a well developed factual data-base on the specifics of production, costs,price trends and the way market actors op-erate. At the panel stage, the testimony ofknowledgeable producers who are familiarwith the way the cotton market works (andhow the subsidies impacts on it) can be veryhelpful.

GLOCAL : Are these arguments still rel-evant given the current high cottonprice market and the future evolutionof the international cotton prices?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : The current mar-ket situation is indeed quite different fromthe situation that Brazil faced at the time itlaunched its dispute. These developmentsmay have a bearing on a panel’s factualanalysis of the effect of the subsidies.

GLOCAL : The South-South cooperationis an interesting development. Couldyou please tell us more about the proj-ects related to African cotton yourcountry is involved in (type of projects,countries, resources, Brazilian organ-ization involved…)? What is the diagnosis on which theseprojects rely? Are there any noticeableimpacts assessed already?

FLÁVIO DAMICO : Brazil is imple-menting an ambitious program of coopera-tion, technical assistance, technologytransfer and capacity-building with Benin,Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali in the field ofcotton. The Brazilian Agency of Coopera-tion (ABC) and the Brazilian Enterprise forAgriculture Research (Embrapa) are send-ing us reports on the advanced state of thecooperation and the implementation of thisprogram. The main activities include (a) the con-struction and development of a “ModelFarm for Cotton” in Mali, for the benefit ofall Cotton-4 countries (estimated value ofUS$5,5 million) ; (b) capacity building insystems of cotton cultivation and geneticenhancement; (c) introduction of varieties;(d) biological control of plagues; and (e) en-hancement of the cotton industry prof-itability. n

M. FLÁVIO S.DAMICO

It is very hard to anticipate whetherthe “African cotton question” will finda solution to the satisfaction of the C-4. Moreover, it is quite clear that it hastaken more time than it should andthat African producers have incurredgreat losses over time.


GLOCAL


IntroductionSince African countries started linking the dif-ficulties encountered in their cotton sector tothe slump in international prices and Ameri-can subsidies, they have striven to seek solu-tions thereto. It has never been for them aboutcasting doubt on the domestic problems af-fecting the sector. American subsidies have al-ways been considered an important factor inthe problem besetting the African cotton sec-tor. Many formal and informal consultationshave been organised; several organisations,inter-governmental and of civil society, wereinvolved. Finally, a decision was taken to en-courage a sector initiative instead of referringthe issue to the Dispute Settlement Body(DSB). That initiative had its merits and de-merits. Its chief merit was that it brought theproblem affecting the African cotton sector tothe notice of the WTO. Its main demerit wasthat it precluded the possibility of pursuingany litigation against the United States.

Negotiations have been going on for eightyears now. One of the major achievements wasthe creation of a Special Committee on Cottonin November, 2004. Since then, results arestill awaited. It was however predictable. Cot-ton remains an agricultural product. Any “ex-traordinary” solution applied to cotton shouldbe based on the “principle” applied to agricul-ture. That is the exception that confirms therule. There can be no decision on cotton inso-far as there is no agreement on agriculture.Therefore, the creation of the Special Commit-tee on Cotton was a logical sequence to theJuly 2004 Package that placed cotton underthe responsibility of the Special Committee onAgriculture. In 2011, there is still no agree-ment on agriculture; it is quite logical thatthere haven’t been serious discussions on cot-ton! Brazil won the case against the United Statesover the same dispute and on the same prob-lem. They reached a trade arrangement thatsatisfied both parties, with the exclusion of allothers. The WTO system allows that. Theirarrangement of April and June 2010, isstrictly private. The period of grace for apply-ing countermeasures is an option granted to

the winning party. It is in a bid to ensure theflexibility of cross-retaliatory measures toguarantee the arrangement that best caters totheir interests. That is legal, and those are therights conferred on Brazil retroactively by themere fact of bringing the matter before theDSB; which is not the case with the Africancountries. Added to this, and this is not of least import,any solution found by the African countries,as part of negotiations in the WTO, will conferrights only for the future. It is the distinguish-ing feature of negotiation. Whereas the mainfeature of dispute settlement is recognisingthe past prejudice and taking cognizance of it.The purpose of this paper is to show that if thecase of the African cotton gets bogged down inthe WTO, then litigation remains the final ex-pedient to explore.

AFRICAN COTTON CASE BOGGEDDOWN IN WTO: SYSTEMICRIGIDITIES AND CONFLICTINGSTRATEGIESThe legitimacy of the African cotton case inWTO has never been put to question. To beginwith, it was difficult to come up with reasonsfor its failure or the reasons for its gettingbogged down, to the extent that the C4 cannotenjoy any substantial benefits after eight yearsof proceedings. If the anticipated results failto materialise, that will be due to a combina-tion of some WTO principles that make forrather functional rigidity and the more or lessequivocal strategies.

Series of African Applications Ill-Adapted to the WTO SystemThe Sectoral Initiative in Favour of AfricanCotton comprises two major applications, onebeing a claim for compensation and the other,a proposal that African cotton be consideredas a special product. They result from an in-novative and not necessarily incoherent ap-proach, but are not in line with the workingprinciples of the WTO.

An inappropriate compensationclaim

By invoking an emergency solution or the ac-ceptance of the cotton case, the African coun-tries demanded compensation. They held thatinsofar as it would take some time to com-pletely eliminate the allegedly illegal Americansubsidies, they must receive financial compen-sation to offset the loss of revenue they in-curred. They felt that the only practicable

short-term measure was the payment of a con-tractual financial compensation to redress thecommitments resulting from the Doha Round,for the members concerned. Such compensa-tion should be calculated proportionally to thesubsidies granted by the countries that supportcotton production, and will be reduced and/oreliminated progressively with the reduction orelimination of the subsidies. For the C4 countries, claims for compensationare justified by the inefficiency of the WTOcompensation instruments. In fact, compen-sation by way of additional concessions onother products cannot be effective in the caseof cotton-producing LDCs, which they are.The other rare export products they possessalready enjoy other preferential treatmentunder other trade arrangements. The secondmechanism which consists of raising customsduties on import products would only weakenthe cotton-producing LDCs further, sincemost of their imports are made of essentialgoods for development and poverty alleviationin their own countries. Those two compensa-tion instruments have therefore proven to becounter-productive. They had no choice but todemand compensation. Although it is a clas-sical international move, the practice is pro-hibited and inappropriate outside theframework of WTO litigation. It is of courseoriginal, but it is not provided for under thetrading system outlined in the scheme utilisedby the Cotton Initiative. Finally realising thatinsistence on that claim could end in a dead-lock, the WTO could not defer the matter. Apositive response would mean a «precedent»which, if put into wide use, would blast thetrading system.

A request to make cotton a specialproduct unsuccessful

The Cotton Initiative clearly demands thatAfrican cotton be considered as a special prod-uct under the WTO; which would grant specialtreatment in terms of market access. That re-quest was made as part of the negotiations onthe Doha Round at a time when the specialsessions of the Committee on Agriculture werecontemplating the creation of a special prod-ucts system for developing countries. Thoseproducts are deemed special because of theirimportance in achieving food security, ruraldevelopment and/or providing a meansof livelihood. The Cotton Initiative rode onthat wave, and the C4 countries demanded theextension of the concept to the offensive inter-ests of developing countries, where the expor-tation of such products turns out to be vital for

By Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF, Executive Director of the African Agency for Trade and Development (2ATD)

Litigation, a way out of the deadlock in the African cotton Sector Initiative


That initiative had its merits and demer-its. Its chief merit was that it broughtthe problem affecting the African cottonsector to the notice of the WTO. Its maindemerit was that it precluded the possi-bility of pursuing any litigation againstthe United States.


agricultural development and the survival ofthe rural population in LDCs, as is the casewith cotton. On these grounds, they are alsodemanding guarantees for fair access to theworld market. But it soon became evident that the movehad no chance of succeeding. Under theWTO system, special products apply to thedefensive interests linked to the protection ofone branch that plays a crucial role in the de-fence of considerations other than non-tradeconcerns. The special product is therefore, bydefinition, under the special and differentialtreatment. That is confirmed by the use towhich it was put in the July 2004 Package. Itcan only been invoked in case the product inquestion does not in itself bear proof of com-petitiveness on the international market;which is not the case with African cotton thatran into difficulty owing to the change intrading system brought about by the use ofsubsidies. The intrinsic value of African cot-ton confers on it a certificate of competitive-ness that the Africans are the first to takeadvantage of. From this perspective, it can-not be deemed a special product. The initia-tive attempted to use the concept of specialproduct in an offensive manner. But in thefinal analysis, it is no less a bold, but in-op-erational tool.

A combination of conflicting strategiesdetrimental to the African caseThe choice of a defence strategy for the cot-ton case before the WTO has not been easy.The Cotton Initiative was born of the exclu-sion of the option of dispute settlement, achoice which turned out to be unfortunate.The same applies to the associating of tradingand developmental issues, whereas theAfrican case is essentially commercial.

An exclusive choice of the option ofrestricted negotiation

Even though the case seems to be an experi-ment by the African countries on the modesof functioning of the WTO, the low level ofparticipation in the different negotiationrounds and the lack of commitment to thelegal procedures of the institution confirmedthe passive presence of the Continent in thedecision-making process. It is not an over-statement to say that all the gains derivedfrom the trading system arose more from aunilateral determination or from the desireby other members to strike a balance thanfrom a deliberate, motivated quest. Hence,that Initiative called for interference withinthe labyrinths of the WTO, which gave rise tothe preliminary question of method. Disputesettlement or negotiation: what is the wayout? The choice was not easy, given the igno-rance about the machinery and especially thehigh profile of the opponent. The UnitedStates is in the line of sight. To the participants in the trade negotiation,the U.S. is an economic and trade monsterand it is not in the interest of the AfricanLDCs to confront it. Any initiative aimed atopposing it may have more damaging eco-

nomic repercussions than its subsidy policy.It believes that the most direct means is tonegotiate an effective reduction in agricul-tural subsidies under the WTO Talks. Suchmultilateral strategy offers the advantage ofallowing the U.S. to seek alliances with otherdeveloping countries and thereby increase itsclout in the negotiation.

The option of negotiation may seem exclu-sive, notably owing to difficulties in referringthe matter before the WTO DSB. A certainnumber of preliminary questions pertainingto pre-litigation were brandished. They ren-dered any reference of the case to the DSBchancy for the African countries. It had to beshown that the peace clause which is couchedin Article 13 of the Agreement on Agricultureand which precluded any litigation on thematter for a period of nine years had lapsedon grounds of the volume of American sub-sidies in relation to the 1992 base year. Then,it became necessary to work out some settle-ment points around the level of commitmentby the United States. Were its subsidiesbelow or above the pledged level? The uncertainties surrounding those ques-tions and the absence of local expertise couldbe considered as obstacles to a credible liti-gation process before the DSB. It is not su-perfluous to mention that, at the time ofsetting aside the option of litigation for rea-sons evoked hereunder (January-March2003), Brazil had already brought the matterto the DSB that, finally, found Brazil rightabout the peace clause and the level of com-mitment of the United States.In the final analysis, the arguments advancedin favour of the complainant, relied essen-tially on the need for African countries toclaim their rights through legal channels andbased on the will to test the mechanisms ofthe WTO system. This avenue will not beadopted, perhaps by ignorance, by paucity ofresources or lack of expertise for sure. Butthe heavy political stake raised by this casewould have played a determinant role. Theseparate decisions by Benin and Chad to jointhe Brazilian case as third parties are dictatedby an independent, sovereign analysis of thesituation, outside any participatory process.

A linkage of trade and developmentquestions rejected in the WTO

Is the WTO the ideal forum for dealing withdevelopment and poverty-reduction prob-lems? The question arose from the momentof drafting the Cotton Initiative which gener-ated some tension over the system guidelinesto give to the African submission. The cottonproblem is multi-dimensional. Even thoughit is socio-economic in origin, its interna-tional manifestations rather point out to so-cial injustice deriving from non-compliancewith a certain number of international traderegulations. In its title, the Initiative calls for poverty re-duction. But participation in the fight againstunder-development depends on the strictdiscretionary powers of the wealthiest eco-

nomic partners. It can only be invoked byvirtue of moral considerations or for pur-poses of solidarity. The secret machinery ofthe international system are so designed thathistorically, forums have been developedwith a view to harmonising mechanisms foreconomic intervention, bilateral or multilat-eral, aimed at supporting the poverty reduc-tion strategies. The operational methods ofinstitutions such as the IMF, the World Bank,or even the OECD are sufficiently explicit forus to expatiate on them here. In the field oftrade, such participatory development effortis manifested by unilateral offers of tradeconcessions of the type General PreferencesSystem. We now remain in a field devoid ofthe slightest notion of competition or com-petitiveness and where advantages aregranted on a voluntary, unilateral basis. It isobvious that nothing in the diagnosis of theprecarious situation of the beneficiaries ofthe aid makes mention of any liability or faultimputable to the supplier state. Thus, invoking poverty reduction seems anoverabundant means that will be counter-productive in the defence of the cotton case.It is true that a possible elimination of subsi-dies will make for better marketing of Africancotton and will have a direct incidence onpoverty reduction, but it still remains that thesought goal is not a unilateral concessionbased on moral considerations, but compli-ance with common undertakings subscribedto, independently of the level of developmentof the various countries. By orientating theInitiative along the lines declared for povertyreduction, Africa gave the impression thatthey were begging for what is their rightfulentitlement. Since the Cancun fiasco, cotton seemed tohave gotten lost within the meanders of tradenegotiations that gave no valid sign of re-sumption. The informal discussions con-ducted in the meantime highlighted two newkey points: inclusion of cotton in the negoti-ations of the Committee on Agriculture andstrict separation between the trade compo-nent and the development component for thecotton case. Voices were raised against thetreatment of a case on development issues byWTO. That is why the WTO came to organisean international conference on African cot-ton on 23, 24 and 25 May, 2004, in Cotonou.By initiating that meeting to deliberate on anagenda exclusively related to development,WTO appears to have opted for a system thatwas not unanimously adopted, but on whichthe contending parties seemed to havereached a compromise. The consensus fromthat meeting was that the WTO should ulti-mately play a role of inter-mediation, to helpfind an emergency solution and by postpon-ing the effective inclusion of the trade com-ponent of the cotton case in the July 2004Package. For the C4 countries, it is time for pragma-tism. It must be noted that if we came upwith an agenda and solutions exclusivelylinked to development, it is because of ourconcern to maintain the WTO system. They



GLOCAL



came to the conclusion that it was necessaryto accept something in order to save the sectorfrom collapseand to remain consistent withthe emergency nature invoked in the Initia-tive. Separation of the trade component fromthe development component in the case wastherefore endorsed. It is presented as an ele-ment in an African strategy, a stop-gap meas-ure to give small landholders a respite andwhich encompasses the fact that the discus-sions on the trade component will resume assoon as the international context becomespropitious. But the Development optionelected in Cotonou discredits de facto the in-voking of the urgent nature of the Cotton Ini-tiative; and the silence over the subsidyproblem encouraged the adoption of a reallyfalse therapy for a crisis that is first and fore-most systemic.

THE SOLUTION OF DISPUTESETTLEMENT FOR AFRICANCOTTON IN WTO: IMPEDI-MENTS YESTERDAY AND FU-TURE STRATEGIESIt is evident that the African countries had notgiven thought to dispute settlement in theircase. The collective option for non-litigationended up marginalising the C4 in the solutionof the dispute between Brazil and the UnitedStates. But that missed opportunity has notclouded all the horizons. Referral to the DSBis still possible. It suffices to start in time andacquire the political, legal and financialwherewithal to achieve the goal.

A marginal posture in the Brazil/UnitedStates dispute on cottonThe third party status of Chad and Benin doesnot derive from a concerted strategic ap-proach, but rather from individual sovereigndecisions. The real problem lies in the fact thatthe third party status confers only limitedrights to the interested parties. Worse still, itis of no use if the main parties in the disputedo not agree right from the start, on themodalities for implementing the decision ofthe DSB.

An inefficient status of African thirdparties

Benin and Chad reserved their rights as thirdparties. Article 10.2 of the Dispute settlementunderstanding (DSU) allows members ofWTO with substantial interest in a matter tosignify their interest by joining the dispute.That offers them the possibility to be heard bythe Special Group and to submit writtenbriefs. As a general rule, members of WTO re-sort to this procedure where they have sub-stantial interests and where there are systemicinterests of concern to them.In their capacity as third parties, Benin andChad had the possibility of giving their pointof view to the Special Group on the differentpoints debated and registering their preoccu-pations. But they did not have ample room formanoeuvre in order to influence the decisionsof the Special Group. Benin and Chad participated neither in the se-

lection of members, nor in the organisationalmeetings of the Special Group during whichthe timetable for meetings are worked out.They were also disadvantaged in the imple-mentation of decisions and final recommen-dations of the DSB. WTO legislation requiresrecommendations and decisions of a SpecialGroup to be applied without discrimination,on the basis of the most favoured nationclause (MFN). However, the outcome of a dis-pute is binding only on the principal parties.In the cotton case, this means that the UnitedStates that lost the case (following the rulingthat their subsidies are incompatible withtheir obligations under the WTO Agreement)must implement that decision without dis-crimination towards the other members of theWTO. But by virtue of Article 21.5 of the DSU,only the plaintiff, Brazil, had the possibility ofrequesting a Special Group to verify whetherany new measure adopted by the defaultingparty, the United States in the case in point,was in conformity with the rules of the WTO.Furthermore, only Brazil had the possibility ofnegotiating compensation in case of breach ofthe decisions by the United States and adopt-ing retaliatory measures where the decisionsand recommendations of the Special Groupwere not implemented. That is the main in-convenience in the status of African third par-ties. That option had the advantage ofguaranteeing the LDCs, lacking financial re-sources, participation in a lengthy dispute set-tling procedure without filing individual suits.Unfortunately, the anticipated gains havebeen annihilated by the emergence of disputesin the implementation of the decisions of theDSB on cotton. The United States and Brazilwho did not agree on the modalities for exe-cution of the decision concerning them wereforced to resort to a series of arbitrations, untilthe advent of the Special Group on implemen-tation.

An additional stage in the disputebetween Brazil/United States pre-cluding the possibility of Africancountries enjoying collateral gains

Following the different decisions of the DSBand the arbitration conducted, the disputeover implementation persisted. Brazil contin-ued to feel that measures envisaged by theAmericans as compensation were not in con-formity with the decisions of the WTO judges.Brazil therefore requested, under the purviewof Article 21.5 of the DSU, the formation of aSpecial Implementation Group. The potentialbenefits that can accrue to the African coun-tries under the new procedure are linked tothe nature of the final decision of theinitial Special Group on implementation. Is itthe logical sequence of the decision of the Spe-cial Group? Is it a deferred implementation ofthe initial recommendations of the DSB; andtherefore an MFN-type decision applicable toall Members of WTO? We believe that the answer to that question isnegative. What would really be the interest ina new case just to repeat the same incanta-tions of the DSB? If the decision of the Special

Group about implementation is to produce thesame effect, in terms of rights and obligations,as that of the initial Special Group, the proce-dure outlined in Article 21.5 put in motion byBrazil will only be a legal instrument for de-laying tactics by members caught out by theDSB. It will just serve as an opportunity to un-duly prolong commercial advantages from il-legal measures. In terms of computation ofdeadlines, it simply means that the Brazilianvictory over the United States will be consti-tuted of the entire reasonable implementationperiod, in addition to the normal 90 days al-lowed under the new procedure, not countingthe ensuing additional possibility of appeal.That legal incongruity would end in economicloss. Failure to withdraw measures declaredillegal continues, meanwhile, to cause preju-dice for which liability has not been clearly de-fined under the trading system. What logic can justify the trading losses in-curred by a plaintiff member being “ignored”by deliberate, unilateral default on the part ofthe offending member? Despite the fact thatsuch a vision will render the procedure out-lined under Article 21.5 redundant, doubt willbe cast on the coherence and credibility of theentire system. That interpretation has confirmed the practiceby members and the DSB in the debate on hi-erarchy between the procedure under Article21.5 and that under Article 22 of the DSU. Theprovisions of Article 21.5 organise recourse tothe original Special Group for settlement ofany dispute over the conformity of the meas-ures taken for the implementation of recom-mendations; whereas Article 22 provides forthe possibility by the plaintiff, and after expiryof the deadline for implementation, of sus-pending the concessions and other obliga-tions. The fact that the DSUwas not establishedjointly with the hierarchy raises a problem ofinterpretation that may be prejudicial to theparty winning the case. In practice, it emerged that the suspension ofconcessions should be preceded by determi-nation of conformity effected by the originalSpecial Group.In this case, it means referral to the originalSpecial Group by Brazil emanates from thewill to endow itself with legal guarantees forexecution of suspension of concessions and fu-ture obligations, which is a prerequisite for le-galising the retaliatory measures envisaged.Hence the precedence of the procedure underArticle 21.5 over that set forth in Article 22 ofthe MOU; which can be deduced that the im-plementation measures that will be taken byBrazil will be within a bilateral arrangementand therefore cannot benefit the African coun-tries, neither by way of MFN, nor in their ca-pacity as third parties. Finally, this new complaint by Brazil could nothave a positive impact on the African cottonthat continues to suffer under American sub-sidies. The reason is simple: this additional stage inthe dispute process makes it a purely privatematter that precludes other members of the



WTO from enjoying any possible gains fromthe settlement of the dispute. As long as theoriginal contentious measures are not with-drawn – which would have benefited every-body – any subsequent consensus-basedsolution can concern only the parties fully in-volved in the litigation. That explains the margin for manoeuvreavailable to the United States and Brazil towork out their arrangement.

A dispute settlement atthe WTO as alast option for African cottonIs drawing the attention of the DSB of theWTO to the prejudice suffered by the Africancountries not the ultimate option for Africancotton? Not only have all the other optionsand strategies failed to attain the anticipatedresults, but the momentum seemsfavourable, the working modalities and prof-its assured.

Non-extendable deadlines, afavourable momentum

Since the complaint by Brazil against theUnited States on cotton in September 2002,the possibility of an African complaint stillremains open. The African countries couldhave, individually or collectively, filed a com-plaint against the United States. They couldalso have, by the same move, joined Brazil.That would have made it possible to availthemselves of the technical argument put for-ward by Brazil, reduce the financial impactsof engaging in a long-drawn litigation shouldthey file an independent suit, and guaranteeda mutualisation of benefits in case of success.Nothing of the sort happened. It is a lost op-portunity. Nevertheless, at the time Brazil issavouring the fruits of successful dispute set-tlement, there is nothing to stop the Africansfrom lodging a complaint. Certainly there hasbeen a delay, but it is never too late. But for

how long do they have to wait?On the basis of some problems affectingAfrican cotton, there are American subsidiesauthorised by the 2002 Farm Bill. That is thecontentious measure challenged by Braziland targeted by Benin and Chad in their ca-pacity as third parties. It was declared par-tially incompatible with the tradecommitments of the United States. It shouldtherefore be withdrawn or offset by othertrade compensations, to the extent allowedby the WTO system. As long as the AmericanAgriculture Bill remains in force and pro-duces effects liable to distort internationaltrade, the possibility of an African complaintremains open. The United States voted another Farm Bill in

2008. How is it different from the 2002 Bill?Talking about the relevant subsidies we areconcerned with, we consider it a consolida-tion of the same practices reposing on a for-mally modified legal base,which changesneither its nature nor its content; much lessits effects. The 2008 Farm Bill is an exten-sion of the 2002 Bill. Therefore the possibil-ity for African states to bring a suit againstthe United States remains open. It could relyon the 2008 Farm Bill, with the negative ef-fect that any eventual compensation will takeeffect from that date. On the contrary, by relying on the combinedforce of the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills it ispossible to prove that Africa has been sub-jected to continued prejudice since 2002;and that the time for which any subsequentdamages are calculated must be with effectfrom that date. It emerges that even with a nine year delay,an African complaint has all the chances ofproducing the same effects as the Braziliancase, with retroactive acknowledgement ofthe damage inflicted and a proportionallyconsequent compensation. The snag is that,it is perceptible that there is a delay beyondwhich, under certain conditions, an Africansuit will no longer offer the guarantee ofrecognition of previous prejudice. TheUnited States is contemplating a new FarmBill for 2012. The arrangement of April and June 2010that it made with Brazil is a powerful incen-tive. The new agricultural law will substan-tially reduce its subsidies and the impact oninternational trade, including a share of theAfrican markets. This new Farm Bill might not provoke dis-putes; the United States would do well tocomply with the decisions of the DSB. Partic-ularly, it will supersede agricultural bills inforce. Their effects do certainly persist,whereas the topic is out of date. Any Africansuit will be aimlessand the arguments ad-vanced will be inoperative. If the contestedlaws are no longer in force, there can be nopossible litigation. Admissibility of complaints in the WTO isappraised not only in terms of induced ef-fects, but also in terms of reality about the ex-istence of a practice based on the domesticlaw in force. One can conclude that a newAmerican Farm Bill in 2012, to reform theagricultural subsidy policy in the directionrequired by the DSB, will extinguish any pos-sibility of Africans filing a claim against theUnited States, in the specific field of cottonsubsidies. That means that in spite of the indisputable il-legality of the American subsidies, confirmedby the WTO, the indisputable prejudice suf-fered by African countries will never be recog-nized, much less compensated for. And it is notthe negotiations that would change anything.If the African countries therefore want to referthe matter to the DSB, it is imperative for themto know that the deadlines within which to re-flect and take action made available to themsince 2002 will probably expire by 2012.

Recover rights, individually or col-lectively : the approach of a “collec-tive claim”

Several reasons have been advanced for notlodging a complaint with the DSB of theWTO. The African LDCs have often thoughtthat dragging the United States before theDSB would be “hostile” and could exposethem to reprisals. The likely loss of a propor-tion of the American aid to development,coupled with the risk of losing its chance ofbeing selected into AGOA convinced them toinstead focus exclusively on negotiation. Theissues of the lack of financial resources tohandle the long and costly dispute procedurewere also raised. These reasons cannot beseen as obstacles against referring the case ofthe African cotton through dispute settle-ment procedure to the WTO.Hostility is not a feature in settling disputesin the WTO. This was not conceived within apunitive or vindictive spirit that seeks to dis-grace the defending party or weaken its localcommercial capacity. The objective of thedispute settlement is to guarantee a balanceof the rights of the plaintiff by the withdrawalor the non-application of a measure by amember that would cause trade imbalance.The United States and the European Unionoften clash within the context of the systemof dispute settlement at the WTO, withoutputting to question their trade partnership.Emerging countries like India, Brazil orChina use the system wisely as opposed totheir trade partners who may have protec-tionist tendencies. They are being “attacked”at the WTO in a bid to urge them to increas-ingly open their market and to trade withthem. It is therefore imperative for the African cot-ton producing countries to abandon this“idyllic” vision of international trade whichhinders them from making maximum use ofthe opportunities offered by the system.From this perspective “collective action”would be salutary, for them, at all levels. Itwould make it possible to annul the likelynegative effect of a suit against the UnitedStates. Instead of an individual suit whichcould expose any one country, all themorereason, for a multiplication of plaintiffsaround the cotton issue. The WTO regula-tions make provisions for that. Paragraphs 2and 3 of Article 9 of the DSU on the proce-dures applicable if there are several plaintiffs.If necessary, a unique special group is consti-tuted to review the case and present its con-clusions in a manner that would not in anyway compromise the rights of the parties tothe dispute, if distinct special groups hadstudied their respective cases. Such a collective suit is therefore a series ofindividual suits combined retroactively. Itcan also be conceived, primarily by a seriesof informal consultations between potentialplaintiffs and result in the setting up of a spe-cial group unique in the sense of the WTOlaw. In this case, the existence of hard corestakeholders with the C4 simplifies the issue.The four countries concerned may submit a

Nevertheless, at the time Brazil issavouring the fruits of successful dis-pute settlement, there is nothing tostop the Africans from lodging a com-plaint. Certainly there has been adelay, but it is never too late. But forhow long do they have to wait?




collective suit at the WTO against Americansubsidies, alone or by opening up to any otherWTO member, African or not, that would de-fend the same positions. This approach pres-ents several advantages.First and foremost, it “dilutes” the sentimentof hostility against the United States and es-pecially, allays fears of individual reprisals.That an African country should submit a suitagainst the United States, in an individual ca-pacity, would be a natural thing to do. Itwould even be welcome. But the context mayturn it into a rash decision which could be set-tled by a collective suit. Actually, it is difficultto imagine that the United States would initi-ate collective repressive measures againstLDCs among the poorest in the world, just tobe seen clamouring for the withdrawal of anagricultural law presumed incompatible withits commercial commitments. The UnitedStates would not take the risk to ruin its entirecooperation policy on development in Westand Central African, due to commercial dis-putes caused by the present economic situa-tion.Then, the collective suit calls for a reconsider-ation of the arguments concerning the human,financial and institutional means which maybe inappropriate. It is difficult to think that agroup of African countries, be they LDCs,which in addition have suffered prejudice overseveral years, do not agree to mutualise theirfinancial resources in the hope of winning abattle which would enable them to recouptheir losses and obtain compensation for theprejudice suffered. It should be added that in-stitutions like the Advisory Centre on WTOLaw (ACWL) whose mandate is to assist LDCsin such a procedure, as well as other expertisethat Africa has had to build and maintainthrough various capacity building pro-grammes, can still be mobilised in order toguarantee a procedure for settling disputes atminimum cost and maximum efficiency.

Winning litigation at the WTO...What Next?

In spite of the time lost by the African countriesto bring action against and the time taken bythe United States to comply with the prescrip-tions of the DSB, the Brazilian “victory” is par-adoxically being presented as the catalyst for asubsequent suit by African countries. The sameAmerican subsidies produced the same effectson the African countries. The same agriculturallaw will be sought, the WTO panel will presentthe same arguments and will reach the sameconclusions; and the African countries willbenefit from a favourable decision as long asthe 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills are in force. Wehave learnt that the rise in cotton prices overthe past few years could be prejudicial toAfrican countries at the WTO. This can perhapsbe verified, at the level of negotiations, but notwithin the context of the litigation. These pricehikes are based on the economic situation. But,the economic mitigation of the effects of theAmerican law on litigation does not call toquestion its illegal nature. Litigation does notonly focus on the present effects of the Farm

Bill, but on the damage caused from the dateof entry into force right up to their final with-drawal. Litigation at the WTO does not adaptto market fluctuations.If the African countries won the case after asuit against the United States, they could ex-pect two things. Firstly, the withdrawal of theAmerican agricultural law on litigation: Mind-ful of the deadlines, it is likely for that to bedone before the end of the procedure and sub-sequent to the agreement between Brazil andthe United States. It is an anticipated commer-cial benefit which is going to ease the proce-dure for implementing later DSB decisions.Then they will have the great privilege of seeingthe prejudice they suffered in the past recog-nised and assessed on that basis, like in thecase of Brazil. Then we have the intricate prob-lem of getting the losing party, the UnitedStates in this particular case, to implement thedecision. To certain observers, the WTO dis-pute settlement system can be efficient only in-sofar as the winning party has effectiveretaliatory means to constraint the losingparty. That is the point in the dispute betweenBrazil and the U.S.. The latter would surely nothave agreed to compensate Brazil if Brazil didnot have the retaliatory means by way of intel-lectual property, for instance. Following thisline of thought, we may believe that victory ofthe African countries over the United Stateswill only signify a moral victory impossible toconvert into commercial gains; and therefore,a suit by the African countries will not come tomuch. Such sombre thoughts should be ban-ished for the following reasons:A moral victory is always good to win. It is theacknowledgement of a tort and assuming lia-bility for prejudice inflicted. In the WTO con-text, it is a signal to the LDCs of an equitable,predictable system liable to guarantee theirgradual integration in the world economy.

The negotiations on cotton started since2003. A Special Committee on Cotton existssince November, 2004. But that has made forno progress because there is no obligation onany country to negotiate. But dispute settle-ment will force the United States to appearbefore a panel and it would be obligated.We cannot presume bad faith on the part ofthe United States if it came to lose in a disputewith the African countries over cotton. Thereis nothing standing on the way of UnitedStates to implement the decisions of the DSBin good faith. It could withdraw its con-tentious subsidies, where necessary, agree tooffer equitable compensation in reparationfor the prejudice suffered by the African coun-tries.Absolute failure by the United States to imple-ment the decisions will expose the system. Thatwould mean that the WTO dispute settlementsystem only works for trade between the majortrading powers. It is not designed for LDCswouldn’t have no means to enforce their rights.The prejudice recognised for African countriesand their right to ensuing reparation cannot bestatute barred. Better still, prejudice is recog-nised with effect from the date the AmericanFarm Bill entered into force; and the compen-sation accruing to them is determined on thatbasis. Even if perchance reparation turns outnot to be effective, it doesn’t mean the right canbe invalidated. It will be payable ad vitamaeternam. n

EL HADJI A.DIOUF

We cannot presume bad faith on thepart of the United States if it came tolose in a dispute with the African coun-tries over cotton. There is nothingstanding on the way of United States toimplement the decisions of the DSB ingood faith.

NB : This text in english is not the original version, but rather

a free translation of the authentic French version (See French

copy of the special edition).


Exemption de la Recherche et Promotion de l’Innovation : Quelles flexibilités pour les pays d’Afrique

centrale dans la mise en œuvre de l’Article 27 de l’ADPIC ? Désiré LOUMOU et Mathurin

NGUE KEND, APPIA, Yaoundé, Cameroun

Impacts du cycle de Doha sur le secteur laitier au Cameroun. Rostant Roland

LEUDJOU NJITEU, ConsultantInternational, Yaoundé, Cameroun

Quête de cohérence dans l’élaboration des politiques commerciales en Afrique de

l’Ouest : OMC, APE et Intégration Régionale.Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF,

Drecteur Exécutif 2ACD

Questions contentieuses dans les Accords de Partenariat Economique (APE) entre l’Europe et les Pays ACP: Les barrières

non tarifaires. Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF, Directeur Exécutif 2ACD

Questions contentieuses dans les Accords de Partenariat Economique (APE) entre l’Europe et les

pays ACP Les Clauses de la discorde. Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF, Directeur Exécutif 2ACD

Essai d’interprétation de l’Article XXIV duGATT : Taux et délais d’ouverture des marchés

dans les APE entre l’UE et les Pays ACP.Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF,

Directeur Exécutif 2ACD

GLOCAL, Revue Africaine sur le Commerce etle Développement, N°1, Septembre 2010

Les enjeux de la réglementation régionale des services financiers: Le code CIMA au

défi des règles multilatérales et des pratiques des multinationales dans le secteur

des assurances. Amar KEBE, Juriste

GLOCAL, Revue Africaine sur le Commerce etle Développement, N° 2, Octobre 2010

GLOCAL, Revue Africaine sur le Commerce et le Développement, N°3, Janvier-février 2011

La propriété intellectuelle en Afrique de l’Ouest : Un outil pour l’innovation, l’intégration

et le développement de la région ? Amadou TANKOANO, Professeur à l’Université

Abdou Moumouni de Niamey, Niger

Le Dossier du Coton africain à l’OrganisationMondiale du Commerce : L’ultime option du

contentieux. Dr El Hadji A. DIOUF, Directeur Exécutif 2ACD

Etude de l’impact des subventions du coton américain sur les pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et

Centrale : Examen des problématiques et analyses. La question du préjudice causé aux pays

de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et Centrale par les subventions du coton américain est-elle encorepertinente aujourd’hui ? Daniel A. SUMNER


"Forging Africa's Development through Trade"

African Agency for Trade andDevelopment (2ATD)

45/47A Rue de Lausanne 1201 Genève -SUISSE Case postale 2173, 1211 Genève 2

Téléphone : +41 22 732 47 37 - Fax : +41 22 732 47 35E-mail : [email protected]

Site web : http://www.2acd.org

The African Agency for Trade and Development(2ATD) is an International Non GovernmentalOrganisation (INGO) governed by Articles 60and following of the Swiss Civil Code. It wascreated in Geneva on 7 July 2010. It is a non-profit-making Organisation which is run withsubsidies and other resources authorised bySwiss law and regulations. Its head office is inGeneva and it has regional and nationalbranches in Africa.

Its main missions are:n Harmonising the different African trade po-licies at multilateral, regional and bilateral le-velsn Providing African negotiators with technicalinformation necessary for drafting negotiatingpositionsn Building the capacities of African stakehol-ders in trade negotiations: governments, civilsociety, production sector, academic milieus,etc.

EDITION TEAM:

Executive Director:El Hadji A. DIOUF

Manager, Institutional Development andPartnership:

Imane EL HACHIMI

Research assistant:Fatima Badet MAHMADOU

Manager, Cotton Project:Annick GOUBA

Manager, Technical Assitance and Capacitybuilding:

Oumar SISSOKO

With the collaboration of:Folake Idowu

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect

the positions of the 2ATD

© 2ACD 2011 ISSN 1664-5189

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LCall for contributions:

This Journal, GLOCAL, has the ambi-tion to focus on keys african issues oninternational trade (multilateral, regio-nal, bilateral, national). Please contactus to share your papers/ contributionsor suggestions at this e-mail address:[email protected]
