ny b10 farmer misc- wh 3 of 3 fdr- 12-14-01 bob woodward-washington post interview of scooter libby...

8/14/2019 NY B10 Farmer Misc- WH 3 of 3 Fdr- 12-14-01 Bob Woodward-Washington Post Interview of Scooter Libby 477

1/21

THE WHITE HOUSE} Office of the Vice President

Internal Transcript December 14, 2001

INTERVIEW OF SCOOTER LIBBYBYBOB WOODWARD, THE WASHINGTON POST

Q I'm interested in the period, September llth to the20th, 10 days that shook the world; decisions, emotions and words-- focusing on the President's decision. You know, I said toMary, I only have one question: what -- if you were sitting downwriting your memoirs in 20 years and said this is what'simportant, these are the five or six decision points that were --where are they in that period?

MR. LIBBY: I'd say, on December 14th, Bob Woodward wantedto interview me. I'd call home.I believe the most remarkable thing about the President's

decision making was how insightful and decisive it was right offthe bat, in the first 24 to 36 hours, the first day-and-a-half orI so.I

By the end of day one he had set a course which includedmost of the major themes, and he had done it decisively andthoughtfully. He had given his Cabinet directions to go off anddo work for the next bit. It's not that there weren't manydecisions to come, but there were many major decisions made inthat point ojf time.

Q Can you say what they were and then what theinstructions were to the Cabinet to go off and do?

MR. LIBBY: Within the first 24 hours -- so by the time heheaded off to bed that night and the Vice President got in thehelicopter to head out of Dodge, he had decided that we had a waron terrorism; he had decided that it was not just against whoevermight have perpetrated it, but against states that sponsor it andagainst terrorism, more broadly. Those were --

Q States that might harbor terrorists?MR. LIBBY: The states that might harbor terrorism, right.

And this was a -- and you're right to pick on the word "harbor,"because it was a carefully drafted word. But these are broadthemes that you could easily imagine someone not reaching ever,let alone in so decisive a fashion.

000203


2/21

j

I believe that his leadership on this -- that this is a war,that we're going to win it, that we've been attacked, that thisis my top priority, those types of priorities -- led not only thecountry, but also were influential to even the well-seasonedmembers of the Cabinet.Q And what were the instructions that were left with --now, you're talking about from the attacks to maybe the first NSC-- or, no, the second NSC meeting here in Washington, which wasthe morning of the 13th.MR. LIBBY: That's actually the third. There was an NSC byteleconference the afternoon of the llth.Q Right.MR. LIBBY: And then there was --Q One that night.MR. LIBBY: Two sessions that night; one was a largersession, one was a more restricted session. And then there was aCabinet -- an NSC meeting in the Cabinet Room on the morning ofthe 12th, and they were all important.Q Okay. What happened at those meetings? That wouldreally be helpful, because that first day is critical to -- Imean, you could write a whole multi-volume set, boxed set on thatperiod.MR. LIBBY: Right. On the afternoon of the llth, a certainamount of time was spent with sort of status reports going around

-- you know, what are we doing domestically to protect ourselves.So there was a report there was a carrier battle group had beenput to sea; there were FAA steps to bring the planes down;immigration and border control; Coast Guard boarding vessels.Those types of reports about Cabinet members saying the thingsthey had done.There were reports from probably the Secretary -- from theState Department about what activities State might be engaging inand what we were receiving. Definitely reports from the Agencyabout, you know, initial intelligence, indications of what -- whowas behind the attack. Also whether the attack was over or not,because, you know.Q What was the answer to that?MR. LIBBY: There was a sense that the profile of the attackwas such that by the time -- by mid-afternoon people thought theattack was probably over, with the possibility that there mightbe another, you know -- it was possible a plane might be flying

000204


3/21

around as early as early afternoon. But I think by the time ofthe meeting, which was probably 3:30 p.m. or so, there was a

'i sense that we had probably -- probably -- seen the end of thatfirst wave of attack. But no one knew for sure.Q What was the most important decision the President made

in that first NSC meeting, by SIVITS?MR. LIBBY: Well, let's see. One decision was, of course,

that he was coming back -- whether he made it in that meeting orjust announced in that meeting, I don't know. But he did hear,he heard opinions from the Vice President that he thought at thispoint it was safe to come back or it was wiser to come back,although earlier in the day it was more of a question.

The Secret Service was still advising against returning> asof that afternoon session. But the President was certain that hewas coming back and that he would address the nation that night.But I think, historically, the more important decision would

relate to the notion that this is a war on terrorism and -- Ihave to think about exactly what came in at any one meeting --Q Does somebody have notes of that meeting or is there atranscript of it or something?MR. LIBBY: I don't know what the Sit Room does, you'll have

1 to check with the proper authorities as to whether they took a* transcript.Q One of the people present said Bush said, somebody has

declared war on America, this is an attack on America and we'reat war. Does that sound right?

MR. LIBBY: Sounds perfectly right to. me, yes.Q And, we're going to have the support of the world, hesaid, I want to be ready to make a statement when I come back soI want that worked while I'm getting back there; I'm going to getback there as fast as I possibly can.MR. LIBBY: All sounds about right.Q President Putin called me immediately because heunderstands that if this can happen to us, it can happen to him.

Does that sound right?MR. LIBBY: Yes.

Q Is there any way to get some, you know, those arelittle -- the whole thing, the essence of it, somebody go reduceit -- you know, this is what we can say about what exactly took\.000205


4/21

MR. LIBBY: Let me find out about that.Q What do you think, Mary?MS. MATALIN: Well, one of the things that -- and I onlyremember this because I (inaudible) -- to pass on to the Congress

(inaudible) -- was that (inaudible). He was so resolute and heleaned into the camera and he said, make no mistake --(inaudible) brief the Congress later or something. He said, tellthem they should (inaudible) understand, this is the position ofthis administration. And that tone that Scooter references --which allowed nobody to be indecisive or to be timid in theiraction (inaudible).MR. LIBBY: I mean, you could imagine a very different kindof meeting: who did this, do we have any evidence yet, what dothe Europeans think, should we'-- let's wait until the FBI pullsthings together; we've obviously been attacked, I'll tell thenation that. Could it be domestic. You know, I mean, there were

all sorts of things that you might imagine could have happened.Do we want to start off on a war when we don't know yet where itwill lead and how we do it.All of those types of things and certainly the notion ofextending two big ideas: one, in that very first day he haddecided, as we've discussed, to go into this notion of statesthat support terrorism. But another was, he was very clear --and I believe this was from the evening session -- that he sawthis as an opportunity, this is an opportunity to re-shaperelations around the world.When you think about it, it's rather remarkable sort ofinsight and looking at -- he said, we can reshape ourrelationship with Russia, for example. It's quite extraordinarythat he had that sort of insight as to where the problem wasgoing to lead so early.Q And was this at the first meeting, or the smaller, justprinciples, NSC meeting?MR. LIBBY: I can't recall which of the two; I'll have tothink about it. I might be able to figure that out for you, butI don't know as I sit here.Q Okay. What else happened that day that was ofsignificance?MR. LIBBY: A bunch of planes ran into the World TradeCenter. (Laughter.) It's a pretty open-ended question.

000206


5/21

0 This business about the rules of engagement to bringdown any plane that would not respond - do you know exactly whatthose rules were?

MR. LIBBY: Well, they weren't defined - in the time framein

. ,that was available, which was minutes theywere.n*the way they might have been. I think the normal operatingprocedure that certainly the Vice President understood "aformer Secretary of Defense was, there's an intercept --meaningthe plane, the fighter goes up and gets within sual rangeofthe other plane; and then, if there's time, you try and signal itaway or fly it away or bump it away by --

Q Or radio it.MR. LIBBY: Or radio it. Any number of --Q How many warnings would you MR. LIBBY: -- if there's time.Q -- have to give?MR. LIBBY: No, I think this is a question of if there'stime, you give as much as you can. But if at some point there sno? time -- for example, during the afternoon there was a plane

coming in from --Q The Korean.MR. LIBBY: The Korean plane, right. And it was coming in

on the west coast. And a plane went up to intercept that andthey signaled it, the plane changed direction-af. * reinformed. So it was a number of things they went through, andJthen the plane took it all the way down and eventually it was onthe ground, and then it was considered off the --

0 And there was a moment when the Pennsylvania planecrashed where you people didn't know whether it had crashed orwhether you had brought it down.

MR. LIBBY: That's correct. In fact, for several times Iasked people in the room, can you find out if we -- why thatplane went down or if we shot. At one point, I remember the VicePresident turned to me, and I think Eric Edelman, my deputy whowas with me, and said when we thought it had not been shotdown and we were told no, nothing was shot turned to us andsaid, I think an act of heroism occurred on that plane. Quiteinsightful.

At that point? 000207


6/21

MR. LIBBY: At that point. His first words, once we knew wehad not shot it down.

Q How long was the period where you thought maybe it hadbeen shot down?

MR. LIBBY: It sort of depends on your constitution. Mostlikely, if they had shot it down we would have heard it rightaway. It wasn't until probably mid-afternoon, but before the NSCmeeting, that we knew none of the planes were shot down; knew inthe sense that somebody walked in and said, nothing was shotdown. So it sort of depends on how long your internal clock wason believing that we would have heard it before that.

Q Was there a point that he felt, my God, you know, maybewe have shot that down?MR. LIBBY: Sure. I mean, we say -- we were told, there isa plane 80 miles out; then we were told thr -n - , _ _ . - - - - .miles out. And he gave the order to engag Ican't tell you, and she said, well, I was just watching CNN andthey just told me you're at Camp David. (Laughter.)

MS. MATALIN: That was later.MR. LIBBY: Was it later that week?MS. MATALIN: (Inaudible.)Q And someone said that when -- in some of theseundisclosed locations -- believe me, we don't want to disclosethem -- that there are hundreds, if not up to a thousand peoplefrom the government at these places, kind of -- is it shadow,

skeleton government if something happens?MR. LIBBY: I don't want to get into numbers and stuff like

that. There are places -- I'm not saying whether we go to them,but there are places where there are people who are there to helpwith continuity. There's a program for that sort of continuity.It comes out of the Soviet era.

Q But does it involve hundreds or a thousand people? Imean, is that --MR. LIBBY: You'll have to talk to the security types about

what those numbers -- in our world, there aren't hundreds ofpeople, period. In our world, you know, in terms of the peoplewho are involved with the decisions, there are not that many.

Q No, no. I mean, but there's a full government, waterresources people and EPA people and --MR. LIBBY: You'll have to talk to some of their folks.Q It's kind of a note of curiosity. Other emotional

moments for the President. The Cathedral speech. We're tryingto use the line, "an hour of our choosing," as the title for

1 7 00'0219


19/21

this, from that speech. A number of people have said that wasquite --MR. LIBBY: Yes, he said in his speech to the nation, hesaid something like, we have found our mission and pur moment, Ithink. There are a number of very good lines in that address tothe Congress. I think that was a very emotional moment for him,

by the way. I believe, I'm not -- I'm not, you know, I wasn'tthere, actually; we were undisclosed. But, you know, walking outin front of the Congress to make an address to the nation about awar that we were entering was a pretty big step.Q Who had the most influence? What was the role, theinfluential role of various people in all of this? Because, youknow, it's obvious he was decisive and he moved and did thesethings. But what sort of moments might there have been wheresomebody said, well, let's consider this, or, what about that.For instance, on Friday night there was a dinner of yourboss, Rumsfeld and Powell and Condi Rice. And were you there at

that dinner, Friday night up at Camp David?MR. LIBBY: No, I was there Saturday. Before the 15th?Q Before the 15th.MS. MATALIN: You were there.MR. LIBBY: I was there, yes.Q And they had a buffalo dinner?MS. MATALIN: You were there.Q And one of the things that came up was Rumsfeld wassaying, you know, we need to emphasize the other features, otherthan the military, here.MR. LIBBY: I think Rumsfeld throughout emphasized thatpoint. I don't think you have to go as late as the 14th or 15th,whatever the date was, to get to that point -- that this was acampaign that would have to be fought by many different elements.Q Who decided that? Who did -- you want to go?MS. MATALIN: -- do what you need to do, since he has to go.He has to meet (inaudible), we'll keep working.Q Okay. Look, I'm sympathetic to -- I don't want to --you know, we're going to have to come back and there are manydays, many moments, many decisions, many --

,Ji s 000220


20/21

MR. LIBBY: It's a big topic and I will help you as I can.I just can't do it in 30, 40 minutes.

Q No, you can't begin to do it. I mean, is thereanything you've written down? Is there a master chronology thatKaren has got or --

MS. MATALIN: Well, we'll have to ask Karen how she -- whather presentation is going to be, how she's organizing herthoughts.

Q Okay.MS. MATALIN: So we'll have more time with the Vice

President. We'll (inaudible). I think everybody is committed,at the President's direction, to helping you collect this historybefore it smashes on to the floor.

Q Okay. Great. Good. That's the goal. And, obviously,documents, times, time lines are, you know from your legalbackground --

MS. MATALIN: Karen is the repository for all (inaudible).Q She's got all of this stuff. And we'll talk to Jamie

at 2:00 p.m., and we have to do this by phone, we can't go --I MR. LIBBY: What day are we doing this?

-.;*MS. MATALIN: Monday.Q It has never -- I've heard this from other people, it's

never been published or broadcast that he ordered the downing ofthe plane as a --

MS. MATALIN: (Inaudible.)Q Pardon?MS. MATALIN: -- it's one of those not the way in which

Scooter just told it, I don't think.Q No, it hasn't. I mean, others had told me that he had

to -- you know, that he did and never said the details of it,which, indeed, I did not know.MS. MATALIN: Just hearing this -- and we can go back

(inaudible), because I want to take care (inaudible) be late.But you jump to the Saturday, everyone seems to think theSaturday is the date, but from hearing Scooter tell it, theopening days were far more important and far more demonstrativeof the Bush

, 9 000221


21/21

Q I just knew you had limited time and I wanted to get onyour list a -- you know, what happened that day, because that'sthe formalized process, right, of I want to hear what you think,let's get --MR. LIBBY: I think if you ask the participants to sort of

graph out important days, I don't think they would graph out -- Idon't think you would have sort of an abnormal spike on that. Imean, you'd have something, because we spent a lot of time,compared to the normal day, so it definitely would be something.But there was a -- that whole week was filled with progress, andthe week after. The week after and the week after that.

Q Right, up to the speech.MR. LIBBY: Up to and past, yes, absolutely.Q Up to this day.MR. LIBBY: Up to and past. You know, there are certain

major moments, as you get -- you know, October 7 is a majormoment, we start the air war and you've got certain thingsunderway. But it continues.

Q September 27th, when you sent those CIA people had tobe kind of a lump-in-the-tummy moment.

MR. LIBBY: The moment when we sent the CIA people in was,you know, an important moment. The exact date, I can't verifyfor you.

Q Yes, we've got it elsewhere, and actually published it.MR. LIBBY: Okay. I'm not doubting, I just don't -- Ididn't want to --Q But that seems to be a kind of, you know, now we'recrossing the line --(End of tape.)

END

00022220

ny b10 farmer misc- wh 3 of 3 fdr- 12-14-01 bob woodward-washington post interview of scooter libby...

Documents