o papel do int nac no debate sobre a seg nacional 2012

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The Role of the National Interest in the National SecurityDebate

Rear Admiral Simon Williams OBE

Royal College of Defence Studies

SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER

2012


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CONDITION OF RELEASE

The United Kingdom Government retains all propriety rights in theinformation contained herein including any patent rights and allCrown Copyright where the author is identified as a Civil Servantor a member of Her Majestys Armed Forces. For all other authorsthe proprietary rights vest in the author or their employer. Nomaterial or information contained in this publication should be

reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any formwithout the prior written consent of the UK Ministry of Defence.The Publication right in these papers vests in the Secretary ofState for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in each of these papers are those of the Author and do not necessarily represent those of the UK Ministryof Defence or any other department of Her Britannic MajestysGovernment or those of the Authors employer, nationalgovernment or sponsor. Further, such views should not beconsidered as constituting an official endorsement of factual

accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation of the UKMinistry of Defence or any other department of Her BritannicMajestys Government or those of the Authors employer, nationalgovernment or sponsor.

Briti sh Crown Copy righ t 2012/MODPublished with Permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majestys Stationery Office


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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES

The Role of the National Interest in the National Security

Debate

A DISSERTATION

BY

Rear Admiral Simon Williams OBE

July 2012

British Crown Copyright 2012/MODPublished with the Permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majestys Stationery Office


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INTENTIONALLY BLANK


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Ab st ract

This dissertation explores the contested concept of the national interest. It uses five authors,

drawn from across the spectrum of International Relations theory, who have each explored

the concept from a different perspective. Their contrasting conclusions illuminate different

facets of the nature of this contestation, and differing conclusions on what the meaning of the

national interest. Using a synthesis of these differing approaches the way in which the

national interest has been applied in recent UK defence and security thinking is briefly

analysed, with the express purpose of underlining not only the utility of this concept, but also

the dangers of its confused application.


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Contents

Introduction 4

The Concept of Interest 10

Concepts of the National Interest 15

The National Interest in the National Security Debate 38

Conclusion 41


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The Role of th e National Interest in the National Security Debate

British leaders were more likely to be clear about what

they were not prepared to defend than to identify a causus

belli in advance. They were even more reluctant to spellout positive aims, perhaps because they liked the status

quo well enough. Convinced they would recognise the

British national interest when they saw it, British leaders

felt no need to elaborate it in advance.

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 1

Introduction

When in October 2010 the Rt Hon David Cameron stood before the Conservative

Party Conference delivering his first speech as an incumbent Conservative Prime Minister for

the first time in 13 years, the title of his speech was Together in the National Interest. 2 It is

doubtful if his speechwriters and party strategists reflected that at a similar time of austerity,

in the late 1960s and early 1970s, another British Prime Minister the Labour leader Harold

Wilson also frequently referred to the national interest to motivate the public to whom he

was appealing 3. That two Prime Ministers from across the political divide, and half a century

apart, refer to the national interest suggests that this concept has some totemic power in the

minds of political leaders.

However, it is not just Prime Ministers who invoke the national interest in British

political discourse. Despite being authored by two very different administrations: one the

New Labour government of Tony Blair, and the other the coalition government led by David

Cameron, the two statements that define the mission or purpose of the British Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) under each administration show a remarkable consistency of

approach. In both statements the national interest or national interests enjoy a centralposition.

For the FCO in 1997, then under the leadership of the left-wing labour minister Robin

Cook, the summary of the FCO mission declared:

1 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy , (London: Simon&Schuster, 1994) p962 http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/10/David_Cameron_Together_in_the_National_Interest.aspx accessed

11 Jun 123 Joseph Frankel, National Interest: A Vindication, International Journal , 24:4 (1969:Autumn) p.717


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The mission of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is to promote the national

interests of the United Kingdom and contribute to a strong international community !

We shall pursue for Britain four benefits through our foreign policy. 4

And the statement went onto qualify the four benefits as: security, prosperity, the quality of

life, and mutual respect 5.

The purpose of the FCO declared in 2010 by the Foreign Secretary, William Hague,

is to:

! use our global diplomatic network to protect and promote UK interests worldwide.

Retain and build up Britains international influence in specific areas in order to shape

a distinctive British foreign policy geared to the national interest. 6

And the four headline priorities of the FCO are: Our purpose, Security, Prosperity and

Consular 7. Thus, security, prosperity, the national interest, and Britains interests provide a

common thread, despite political change, in the headline political direction on foreign affairs

over the last 15 years.

In this period the UK Government has published eight salient Government policy

documents relating to the UKs national defence and security. These are: the Strategic

Defence Review of 1998 (SDR 98); the SDR New Chapter (2002); Delivering Security in a

Changing World (2003); Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities (2004);

the National Security Strategies (NSS) 2008, 2009 and 2010; and the Strategic Defence and

Security Review 2010 (SDSR) 8. A simple word search across these seven documents helps

trace how often the concept of interest has been invoked at the highest level of security

policy. A search based on use of the noun interest and its plural interests show that they

appear a total of 302 9 times, and when prefixed by the adjective national they appear a total

4 Chris Brown, Ethics, Interests and Foreign Policy in Ethics and Foreign Policy , ed Karen Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge:

CUP, 2001) p155 ibid p156 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/what-we-do/our-priorities/our-purpose/ accessed 23 Jun 127 idem8 Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-

20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf ; CM 5566, The Strategic Defence Review a New Chapter, (London: Stationery Office,

2002); CM 6041 Delivering Security in a Changing World, (London: Stationery Office, 2003); CM 6269 Delivering Security in a

Changing World: Future Capabilities (London: Stationery Office, 2004); CM 7291, The National Security Strategy of the United

Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world (London: Stationery Office, 2008); CM 7590, The National Security Strategy of

the United Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation (London: Stationery Office, 2009); Cm 7593, A Strong

Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy , (London: The Stationery Office, 2010); Cm 7948 Securing

Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (London: Stationery Office, 2010);9

Detailed search results are as follows: the words interest or interests appear as nouns: 92 times in SDR 98; 3 in SDR(NC);10 in 2003 White Paper; 0 in 2004; 18 in NSS 08; 96 in NSS 09; 43 in NSS10; 40 in SDSR. Prefixed by National, interest(s)


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of 34 times across these eight documents. However, the term the national interest appears

only once in the body of the texts of SDR 98 and NSS 08, once in the 2003 White Paper, it

doesnt appear at all in NSS 09, and yet it is used 11 times in the NSS 10, and 6 times in the

SDSR. There has clearly been an increase in the emphasis placed upon the national

interest as a concept in these most recent analyses of Britains national security, but what is

intended by the use of these terms?

The highest level of military doctrine the grand strategic level is authored to set

the key political context and concepts for the subsequent military strategic, operational and

tactical levels to draw upon 10 . With some degree of constancy in the usage of the terms

national interest and national interests at the highest level of Britains foreign policy, it

might be expected that British Defence Doctrine (BDD) would be able to set out what these

concepts mean.

The opening sections of the fourth and most recent edition of BDD does contain

definitions and explanations of the key terms used in the construction of Defence Doctrine

beginning with security and moving onto the National Interest 11 . BDD reflects the usage of

the term national interest in the NSS, using the same wording as the introductory paragraphs

of the NSS 2010, in that: Our national interest comprises our security, prosperity and

freedom 12 . This apparently tautological description 13 is explained as a virtuous circle in that

prosperity provides the means for security and freedom, and security the means for

prosperity and freedom. It reflects the prevailing orthodoxy in the NSS that economic growth

and national security are interdependent, but growth comes first 14 . In a later section BDD 15

examines the use of the Armed Forces in promoting and defending national interests

worldwide. The text makes clear that the authors see a clear differentiation between the

concept of the national interest (singular) and national interests (plural). However, the

appears: 9 times (plural form), 1 (singular) in SDR 98; 1 (plural), 1 (singular) in 2003 White Paper; 1 (singular) in NSS 08; 1

(plural) in NSS 09; 15(singular), 4(plural) in NSS 10; 6(singular) in SDSR.10 British Defence Doctrine JWP 0-01 4th Edition (Nov 2011) piii11 ibid p1-312 NSS 2010 p10.13 BDD Ed 4 describes UK national security as: The security of the UK is rooted in perceptions of national sovereignty and

interests and how these may be best protected and promoted. The most important duty of the Government is to maintain the

freedom and integrity of the nations territory and people. In addition, it will seek to secure a range of broader interests: political,

economic and social. P1-2.14 NSS 2010 p4. Our ability to meet these current and future threats depends on tackling the budget deficit. ! An economic

deficit is also a security deficit.15 ibid p3A-2


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coordinates and boundaries of either of these concepts remain elusive in both the NSS and

BDD.

Previous editions of BDD had attempted to provide an outline of the concept of the

national interest, but concluded that as the definition was subjectively grounded: It is not the

role of the military to define the national interest; that is a political function ! 16 . However,

the second edition, which followed SDR 98, went on to reflect on the nature of military power

as ... the ultimate instrument of policy the instrument to be brought into play when other

means require reinforcement or have failed in some way to protect the national interest

reflected in policy. 17 Thus, in the eyes of these earlier authors the national interest what

ever it was provided the key political context for military action. This approach to defining

the national interest contextually reflected a Clausewitzian search for the political objective 18

for the employment of military force, with the national interest in this case clearly perceived

as a form of superordinate of all national objectives.

The foreword to the NSS 2010 states that Britains interests remain surprisingly

constant 19 . This may be may be a modern reflection of Lord Palmerstons 1848 dictum we

have no eternal allies or perpetual allies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and those

interests it is our duty to follow 20 ; such interests are perhaps not eternal and perpetual, but

slowly evolving, reflecting significant change in the global environment when it occurs. Yet

despite this apparent constancy in the application of the concept of interest and interests

over the last 150 years, in the space of a decade, the way in which the national interest is

perceived has changed in British thinking. This is reflected in the manner in which the

national interest has been explained by the authors of BDD, who have been seeking to

interpret what is meant when the national interest or national interests are invoked at the

grand strategic level.

The genesis of this dissertation was from the first hand observation of practicesacross Whitehall over the first ten years of the 21 st Century 21 . Despite its use by politicians of

16 British Defence Doctrine JWP 0-01 2 nd Edition (Oct 2001) p2-317 ibid p2-418 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , (Princeton: PUP, 1984) p9219 NSS 2010 p420 Kissinger p9621 It is also the result of a direct personal challenge by the then VCDS (Gen Sir Timothy Granville-Chapman) to me to explain

the National Interest, and the subsequent objective modelling work done by Air Commodore Harry Atkinson, Captain Andy

Burns and Lt Col Eldon Millar, when they were working for me in the Directorate of Strategic Plans in the MOD, as we sought toanswer that challenge.


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both major parties in almost equal measure, FCO officials would frequently reject the use of

the term the national interest or national interests as having overtones of a bygone era.

The Ministry of Defence as reflected in BDD had difficulty in being specific on what was

being inferred when the terms were applied, but it was clear, on the basis of SDR 98, that the

national interest and national interests were important concepts 22 , as they apparently

reflected cross-party ministerial thinking.

However, it is not surprising that there was, and is, discord across Whitehall on the

use of these concepts, the challenge in their usage is perhaps best summed up by Arnold

Wolfers 23 , who is worth quoting in full:

Statesmen publicists and scholars who wish to be considered realists, as many do

today [1952], are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by

the national interest, more specifically by the national security interest. It is not

surprising that this should be so. Today any reference to the pursuit of security is

likely to ring a sympathetic chord.

However, when political formulas such as " national interest " or " national security "

gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean

the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all.

Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus they may

be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors [ sic ] with an attractive and

possibly deceptive name.

As Wolfers states these concepts may not mean the same thing to different people,

and as illustrated from personal experience, the national interest and national interests

are therefore essentially contested concepts 24 . In his philosophical deliberation on the nature

of such concepts Gallie concludes that we are unlikely to achieve agreed definition, therefore

those encountering them should seek to understand how they have been employed and how

they have evolved to better inform their own usage25

.

The purpose of this paper is not to define the national interest or national interests,

this, as Gallie intimates, would be a fools errand. But it is to explore what may be meant by

the use of the terms national interest and national interests, in the context of the national

22 SDR 98 Supporting Essay 223 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol, Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), pp.

481-50224

W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Vol. 56 (1955-1956), pp. 167-19825 ibid p197--8


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security debate. It will also seek to illustrate the dimensions or vectors of the national

interest. It will explore whether, when a Prime Minister uses these terms they have a different

meaning than when they are employed by a Foreign Secretary, or indeed by a Minister of

Defence. And finally it will address whether the more frequent adoption of these terms in the

debate around the UKs national security indicates any shift in the UKs strategic debate, or

whether it is merely a change in semantic emphasis and common usage?

To answer these questions the concepts of the national interest and national interests

will first have to be unpacked. To achieve this, and following Gallies advice, five

interpretations by different commentators will be offered. These have been selected not

because they reflect a particular theoretical school (although all are drawn from different

theoretical approaches) but because they illustrate a particular viewpoint on the national

interest, and they either offer a model or some other form of definition that should help guide

the practitioner to understand the dimensions of the contested space that the national

interest occupies. In the light of these analyses the NSS 2010 and SDRS usage will then be

interpreted in order to reflect on the latter two questions posed: does the adoption of the

national interest as an organising principle reflect a shift in policy, or is it a rhetorical device?

But first the concept of interest itself needs to be explored before the qualifying adjectives

used in discussions of foreign policy, national security and defence can be added 26 .

26

The most common adjectives used in the five recent security policy documents are: defence, direct, common, economic,fundamental, national, overseas, political, security, strategic, and vital.


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The Concept of Interest

In around the 4 th Century BC Thucydides described the motives for war and conflict

as being fear, honour and interest 27 . Although this is the most common translation, these

words have also been translated in a less flattering way as the Athenians acting chiefly for

fear, next for honour and lastly for profit 28 . Hedley Bull favours this latter translation in his

analysis of Hobbes view on the motives or causes that lead to war. He concludes that

Hobbes follows Thucydides in treating fear not in the sense of unreasoning emotion, but

rather in the sense of rational apprehension of future insecurity as the prime motive ! 29 .

And that [It] is the motive of fear, leading to a search for superior power, which, more than

competition for material goods or clashes of ideology, brings states into conflict with one

another ! 30 . In this sense Bull is identifying interest as being associated with material

gain, and that interest is the self-interest of a state.

The concept of interest at an individual level is one of debate in political theory 31 that

is not restricted to material gain. But for Adam Smith, and the economists that were to follow

him, pursuit of rational self-interest lies at the heart of human economic motivation 32 . In

Smiths treatise The Wealth of Nations 33 he wrote:

[It] is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we

expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves,

not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own

necessities, but of their advantages 34 .

27 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War , (Project Gutenberg: e-book, 2009) trans. Richard Crawley p64. Thucydides

has the Athenian ambassadors appealling to the Lacedaemonians: And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance

our empire to its present height: fear being our first motive, though honour and interest afterwards came in.; see also Michael

Howard, When are Wars Decisive?, Survival , Vol 41(1) Spring 1999, p12728 Hedley Bull, Hobbes and the International Anarchy, in Alderson and Hurrell, Hedley Bull on International Society ,

(Basingstoke: Macmillian, 2000) p19329 idem30 idem31 Robert Q Parks, Interests and the Politics of Choice, Political Theory , Vol 10(4) (Nov 1982) pp547-56532 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collection Action , (Cambridge: HUP, 1971) p60. Olson echoes Thucydides in his recognition of

other incentives, such as the desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social psychological objectives. These

motives are explored further in the discussion of Finnemores work.33

Adam Smith, An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , (Project Gutenburg: e-book, 2009)34 ibid p14


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At a collective level similar behaviours are expected, and states, by extrapolation, are

expected to behave in much the same manner as individuals 35 . Each state seeks to achieve

economic advantage through its relative comparative advantage, which leads to mutual

growth 36 . There is always a moral tension in discussions on relative advantage as gain is

often assumed to be associated with loss, in other words such rational calculations of interest

are perceived as zero-sum games. In the Christian tradition of the West actions to maximise

self-interest are frequently seen as being selfish and therefore immoral or unethical, and self-

interest becomes identified with selfish interest 37 . However, it is clear from Smiths

discussion, and those that were to follow him, that he perceives the rational pursuit of self-

interest as constructive and not destructive, and in no way immoral.

Chris Brown has analysed the response to Robin Cooks FCO 1997 mission

statement and Cooks supporting narrative that spoke of a foreign policy with an ethical

dimension. Brown resolves the apparent tension between a policy that sought to promote

the national interests of the United Kingdom, with policy with an ethical dimension 38 . He

describes this tension between interest which is associated with prosperity, and ethics

which is associated with mutual respect as being fundamentally an investigation of the

relationship between ethics and self-interest 39 . Brown has examined the proposition both

ethically and morally and finds that self-interest is defensible on both grounds. He concludes:

All serious approaches to ethics reject the notion that behaviour based on naked

short-run self-interest, with no regard for the interests of others, could be regarded as

moral. However, virtually no ethical theory mandates a totally other-regarding

approach to moral problems. 40

He rejects Robin Cooks claim to have changed UK foreign policy by introducing an ethical

dimension, arguing that all foreign policy, except in a few limited cases, is fundamentally

ethically based. He does acknowledge that the emotional argument moral absolutism as he

characterises it frequently defeats a rational public discourse 41 on an interests based

foreign policy. However, he concludes, States have a primary duty to pursue the interests of

35 Olson, pp5-65, and 98-102. In Olsons theory he infers (p36) that states are in effect a small group in international society,

although each is composed of much larger groups, their representative state level of behaviour more closely accords to that of

individuals.36 Kissinger p22; see also Smith p34637 This is to grossly oversimplify a complex doctrinal and moral debate between Christian perfectionists and non-perfectionists,

but serves to illustrate this issue.38 Brown, p1839 idem40

ibid p21.41 Ibid p23


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their peoples but in the context of a set of wider duties towards other states, and, through

other states the rest of humanity. 42 In this sense the state through a pursuit of its self-

interests is setting the conditions for the betterment of its own and other societies.

In a similar way Adam Smith identifies the role of the state in providing security as

key to setting the conditions for its prosperity, and a defence of its interests, in his oft

misquoted statement that:

The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and

invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of military

force. 43

Smiths treatise accepts that this will be an increasingly expensive charge on a society as

technology advances 44 , but that if the interests of the state and its society are to be

advanced then there is little choice but to accept them. In this, Adam Smiths economic

theory, connected prosperity, interests and security.

The connection between interests and security lies at the heart of the UN Charter,

where in order to achieve the common goods set out in the Charters declaration, the drafters

included the phrase to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of

methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest ! 45 . In

recognising that there is a common interest there are also clearly, by inference, individual

self-interests, some of which will be held in common and some not. The only exception to the

rule of using armed force only for the common interest is in the inalienable right of self-

defence that Charter recognises in Art 51 46 . Thus, the UNs foundational document

recognises that nations are not only self-interested, but that they also share interests in

common, and fundamentally one of these is in restricting the use of armed force. The

Charters language doesnt associate interests exclusively with material gain but takes a

much broader perspective.

A number of the works 47 that seek to explore the concept of the national interest

begin with the etymology of the word interest tracing it from its Latin origins, through to the

Norman French meaning of a monetary return on an investment. In origin interest refers to

42 ibid p26.43 Smith p49344 ibid p50545 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 p246 ibid p1047

Recent example include Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory , (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005),and W. David Clinton, The Two Faces of National Interest , (Baton Rouge: LSUP, 1994) p21-25.


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a formal objective in property and finance: in other words it is a material and objective

factor 48 . However, all the papers and books on this topic since Charles Beards seminal

investigation of the concept was first published in 1934 have acknowledged that there are

two dimensions to any discussion of interests: objective (physical/ rational) and subjective

(metaphysical/ emotive) 49 . The challenge is that in the moral absolutism, of those who

reject an interests based approach to national policy making there is an implicit assumption

that interests are synonymous only with material wealth, and that this in turn is identified with

self centred and selfish behaviour, and thus all interests are seen as selfish, and the first

contestation of the concept of national interest is drawn along ethical lines 50 .

The Peace of Westphalia was intended to achieve the separation of religious belief

and practice from the conduct of affairs between states. In a sense it was the separation

between the physical and metaphysical worlds in international affairs, dividing the rational

and the emotional. But as the Cold War was to illustrate, conflict still has the potential to

retain an ideological dimension, however much the Soviet Union and the US were to practice

Realpolitik in their evolving relationship, ideological division lay at the heart of their

animosity 51 . And although the concept of honour may appear to be outmoded, international

actions are still carried out on the basis of reputation, because reputation underpins

influence, as Michael Howard has described 52 . To this end both objective and subjective

interests still play a major role in international affairs, however, the former are measurable

and the latter often elusive. Thus, there is a tendency to focus on the material, observable

and tangible interests, rather than the elusive and intangible interests that may be at stake 53 .

Perhaps the harshest accusation that those employing moral absolutist arguments

can deploy against statesmen is that their actions are an application of raison dtat, which

through in Kissingers words the national interest supplanted the medieval notion of a

universal morality 54 , or its later form of Realpolitik 55 . Even before the Peace of Westphalia

was signed, Cardinal Richelieu the French First Minister (1624-1642) had put intopractice Machiavellis advice to his Prince that the actions of the state were of a different

48 Burchill, p1049 Charles A. Beard, The idea of the National Interest , (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966)50 Jack Donnelly, Realism, in Burchill et al (ed), Theories of International Relations 4 th ed , (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009) pp49-

5451 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , (Oxford: OUP, 2005) p4052 Howard p12753 Chris Brown, On Morality, Self-interest and Foreign Policy, Government and Opposition Vol 37 (2) 2002 p182-18354

Kissinger p57-6855 ibid p103


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moral character to those of the individual citizen; in state action, the ends justify the means 56 .

Richelieu, Kissinger says, ! introduced the modern approach to international relations,

based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose 57 . It was

a dispassionate foreign policy free of moral imperatives 58 . The conjoining of self-interest

and national policy was seen to remove the state (and in its earliest form, its dynastic

sovereign) from the normative moral judgments of normal human intercourse and instead

demand a different perspective. This different perspective is not free from moral or ethical

judgment, however, in history it can, and has been seen to fail to apply an ethical balance,

and has unleashed unstoppable competition between states 59 . Bismarck, the author of much

of the Realpolitik that set the stage in the nineteenth century for the wars of twentieth,

believed that an objective rational calculation of the national interest would prove more

effective than moral restraint 60 . This was to remain the prevailing view until President Wilson

imposed a new vision upon a European order exhausted after the four years of the First

World War 61 .

Thus, following the First World War the tainted concepts of raison dtat and

realpolitik appeared to be fundamentally associated with already morally suspect nouns

interest and interests through their conjunction with the adjective national, and rendered

the concept of the national interest unpopular and unappealing. It was against this

background that Charles Beard began his study of the concept of the national interest in

1934 62 in an attempt to rehabilitate the term. As Chris Browns work illustrates this

rehabilitation is an ongoing work in progress, and to illuminate this essentially contested

concept a selection those who have sought to define, as well as rehabilitate it, will be

reviewed.

56 ibid p58; Clinton p657 ibid p1758 ibid p62. In an age dominated by religious zeal and ideological fanaticism, a dispassionate foreign policy free of moral

imperatives stood out like a snow-covered Alp in the desert.59 Ibid p127-860 ibid pp103-16761

ibid pp29-55 and 218-24562 Beard


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Concepts of the National Interest

James Rosenau, in the 1968 edition of the International Encyclopaedia of the Social

Sciences 63 , provides a sound overview of the dimensions of the contested nature of the

national interest as a concept. He begins his description by reviewing another of the

contested spaces this concept occupies, and that is the division of its use as either a tool of

political analysis, or as one of political action. He states:

As an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the

adequacy of a nations foreign policy. As an instrument of political action it serves as

a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words

refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the

intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs. Beyond these general

considerations, however, the two uses of the concept have little in common. 64

And it may be argued they now have even less in common, as a reading of Mr Camerons

speech 65 to his party makes clear, his understanding of the national interest is inclusive of

domestic and foreign affairs. The second of our conceptual divides is therefore a very broad

one that between its usage by actors and usage by analysts 66 .

The third divide in the use of the concept that Rosenau highlights is that between

what he characterises as the objectivists and subjectivists in the their use of the concept

as a tool of analysis. He emphasises that the root of this division lies in the nature of

interests, in that they are rooted in values (what is best) 67 . The objectivists such as Hans

Morgenthau dont refer to material objectives, but take as their starting point that the best

interests of a nation is a matter of objective reality 68 , and the analysts task is to uncover

these. An interest may be about a tangible or intangible object, but it is the value assigned to

an object that is of importance to the objectivists, and in some way these values are additive

to the national interest. The subjectivists deny that an objective reality the national interest exists but that the national interest can be interpreted from a pluralistic set of subjective

preferences 69 . These preferences change as the internal or external environment changes,

63 J N Rosenau, National Interest, in Sills D L(ed), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: MacMillan,

1968) Vol 11 pp34-4064 ibid p3465 Cameron idem66 The first area of contestation being based on an ethical rejection of its use.67 Rosenau p3468

idem69 idem


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and as Rosenau states The national interest is what the nation i.e. the decision-maker

decides it is. 70 Although they start from very different positions both subjectivists and

objectivists claim great utility in their particular application of the concept.

The fourth area of contestation that Rosenau highlights is that of the referent object:

the nation. This is intrinsically bound up with the question of what the boundaries of a nation

are, whether they are territorial, ethnic, linguistic, or are based on a common culture 71 . This

challenge (of the terminological purist 72 ) can be circumvented if the nation is equated to the

nation-state. But the question then becomes one of how the interests of the many groups

that constitute a national society have their views represented. Is the national interest the

sum of many national interests, or is it the sum of many individual and group interests, or is it

a concept greater than the sum of these parts 73 ? These rhetorical questions may be

answered through the two different approaches of the objectivists and subjectivists, but the

analytical results achieved will be different in each case.

The fifth and final area of contestation is the analytical object of the national interest

itself. In earlier usage the public interest and the national interest were seen to be

synonymous, however following Beards work there was both an analytical and political

separation between these terms. The national interest was identified with foreign policy and

international affairs, and the public interest became identified with domestic policy 74 . The two

are of course related in many ways, but there was seen to be a conceptual divide between

the two. However, in the intervening years since Rosenau wrote his work on the national

interest, this conceptual division is less, rather than more, clear and the bounds of what

constitutes the national interest, foreign policy or foreign and domestic policy is increasingly

blurred 75 .

The five dimensions of contestation of the concept of national interest can be

summarised as:

70 ibid p3671 ibid p3772 idem73 ibid p38; Clinton p5574 ibid p35; Clinton p5475

Condoleezza Rice, Rethinking the National Interest, Foreign Affairs , Vol 87(4) (Jul/Aug 2008) pp2-14, 16-26. In this paperRice mixes domestic and foreign policy issues.


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Ethical. A rejection of the concept because of its identification with raison dtat and

realpolitik, or a belief that it is ethical and indeed necessary to consider the self-

interests of nation.

Application. Its use a tool for political action, versus its use as a tool of analysis in

political science and policy development.

Objective vs Subjective. In one view the concept exists as an object of reality that

political actors can recognise, measure and weight; in the opposing view political

actors subjectively construct it.

Referent Object. The definition of a nation (and its national society) and whether the

national interest is an aggregation of the interests of that society, or a single concept

that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Analytical Object. In one school of thinking the national interest is limited to the

external interests and relations of a state, in another it includes domestic interests

both public and individual.

Given these five areas of contention Rosenau submitted that the concept would be

abandoned at sometime in the future, except he asserted for an analysis of where it was

employed by political actors in their efforts to mobilise support for their actions 76 .

Burchills study77

of how the different theoretical approaches in International RelationsTheory have used the national interest illustrates its conceptual fungibility. Other than

Marxists who reject the term altogether because in their view all interests are class based,

and the national interest is purely a reflection of the special interest of the dominant class, all

the major theoretical approaches have employed the concept. Each resolves the contested

dimensions in one way or another, although not always consistently within the same

school 78 . This leads Burchill to conclude:

The national interest will continue to feature in the political discourse of states

because it has important subjective utility. However, by examining the concept as it isunderstood across the spectrum of International Relations Theory, it is clear that

while it may retain rhetorical and lexical functions in the modern age, the national

interest lacks substantive objective content. 79

It is apparent that the areas of contestation that Rosenau observed remain. However,

Rosenaus prophecy has not been fulfilled, and despite Burchills detailed theoretical

76 Rosenau p3977 Burchill p3078

Burchill pp 206-21179 Burchill p211


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analysis, and damning conclusion, this concept refuses to lie down. There is both continuing

academic literature that uses the concept, and perhaps more importantly it is in active use in

public policy, where it is deployed not just rhetorically, but also as an analytical framework

that is apparently guiding the development of public policy 80 .

In order to provide a framework with which to consider this slippery concept 81 , and

to provide some constructive dimensions that will aid those who are seeking to shape

political rhetoric, or to develop policy that will be captured in a policy document, five different

approaches to the national interest have been chosen. The first is that by Beard himself, the

second by Bernard Brodie 82 , the third by Martha Finnemore 83 , the fourth by Joseph Frankel 84

and the last by Donald Nuechterlein 85 . These commentators illustrate a particular viewpoint

on the national interest; they are not tied to a particular theoretical approach, although they

do reflect different branches of International Relations Theory. They are not set out in

chronological order, this would be to suggest that each is built upon the other, but they have

been divided functionally: the first three provide a particular view of the national interest and

interests; and the latter two offer complete models with which to approach these concepts.

Charles Beard

In the introduction to the 1966 edition of Beards work Alfred Vagts asserts that

Beards purpose in writing his study was overtly political 86 ; Wolfers concluded that Beards

historical study was intended to shape the idealistic political agenda of the New Deal with a

harder edge, but it was nonetheless written to claim that the national interest was built

primarily around economic considerations 87 . For Beard the evolution from dynastic interest,

to state interest (under the sobriquet of raison detat )88 , through a transitory phase of national

honour 89 , resulted under the pressure of the national state system and the increase in

80 The analysis of the eight most recent UK Defence and NSS documents, and the US NSS of 2010 and 2012 illustrate this

assertion. See also Phillip Stephens, National interests collide in the new world disorder, Financial Times , 16 Sep 2010; Patrick

Porter, The Maps are Too Small: Geography, Strategy and the National Interest, World Today, May 2010, pp4-681 Joseph Nye, Redefining the National Interest, Foreign Affairs , Vol 78(4) (Jul/Aug 1999) pp22-3582 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (London: Cassell, 1974) pp341-37483 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society , (Ithaca: CUP, 1996)84 Joseph Frankel, National Interest , (London: Pall Mall, 1970)85 Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted , 2 nd Ed, (Lexington: UPK, 2001)86 ibid p xiii87 Wolfers p481-48288 Beard p1489

Ibid p17: Like other slogans of politics, the term was never minutely analysed or defined, but it was treated as coveringsomething transcending in nature all material and economic interests.


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influence of popular political control and the great expansion of economic relations, [to] the

lines of a new formula national interest. 90 Beards work is of importance because it was

the first modern investigation of the concept of the national interest. Earlier writers such as

Machiavelli, Rohan, Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith had all commented on this conception but

only in an oblique way and it fell to Beard to revive and define the concept afresh.

Beginning with a broad historical sweep Beards work quickly and deliberately

focuses on the United States and the development of the national interest in the USs

political dialogue. He traces two core movements, which he classes as Jeffersonian and

Hamiltonian, as the differing poles of this notion of national interest. These are based on the

approaches to early US politics of Thomas Jefferson and his political opponent Alexander

Hamilton. To the Jeffersonians he ascribes a predominantly agricultural and territorially

contiguous expansionist perspective; it was his view that the Jeffersonians drove the

expansion westward and southward but otherwise sought isolation from the international

system except for the export of surplus agricultural goods as their political ideal. To the

Jeffersonians traders, manufacturers and investors were mobile and not intimately connected

to the land, and therefore the nation 91 . The Hamiltonians, Beard describes, as being more

inclined to industrial manufacture and therefore had an outward market orientated even

colonial view of international relations 92 . He traced the rise and fall of each of these ideas

of what was in the national interest agriculture or industrial expansion before concluding

with an early analysis of Roosevelts New Deal, which he sought to situate within his

formulation of the national interest 93 .

Given that he was writing at the time of the Great Depression, and the early stages of

recovery from that shock it is unsurprising that Beards focus is largely on economic well-

being as the key determinant of national interest. He is an unalloyed admirer of Alfred Thayer

Mahan, and his views on the identification of national interest with national commerce, and

therefore a need for a nation to protect its maritime interests94

. He rejected the narrowintrospective formulation of the Jeffersonians, and viewed the expansionist aspects of the

Hamiltonians formulation as equally damaging.

90 Ibid p2191 ibid p53, p43692 ibid pp43-46, p43693

ibid p43894 ibid p76


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Beard remains relevant not only because he developed the modern concept of the

national interest, but also because he perceived it as an evolving formula that would follow

the lines of different political perspectives. His focus on the economic dimension is also

helpful as it emphasises how analyses of the national interest are intimately bound to the

frame of reference of the analyst. Beard would closely identify with the political rhetoric of

2008 and onwards with its emphasis on the threat of economic collapse. In order to generate

a different view an alternative frame of reference is required. Arnold Wolfers 1952 article

pointed to just such a different frame of reference:

[People] fear policy makers may be unduly concerned with the " interests of all of

mankind ". They see them sacrificing the less inclusive national community to the

wider but in their opinion chimeric world community. The issue, then, is not one of

transcending narrow group selfishness, as it was at the time of Beard's discussion,

but rather one of according more exclusive devotion to the narrower cause of the

national self. There is another difference between the current and the earlier debate.

While it would be wrong to say that the economic interest has ceased to attract

attention, it is overshadowed today by the national security interest ! 95

Bernard Brodie

It is perhaps surprising that among those selected to tease out the bounds of these

concepts Hans Morgenthau is missing. It was Morgenthaus work that had stimulated the

paper by Wolfers that has already been extensively quoted. Morgenthaus work In Defense

of the National Interest 96 was highly influential in developing the realist branch of

international relations theory as well as the modern discourse on the national interest.

Although the national interest is in the title of this work, and features in much of Morgenthaus

writings, [he] wrote and spoke about the national interest as though its meaning were

somehow self-evident ! [yet] he offered surprisingly limited conceptual illumination 97 .

Morgenthau equated the national interest with power, and saw it defined in these terms, andhe wrote: Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective

category which is universally valid 98 . Thus power and interest were for Morgenthau

inextricably linked; but his concept of power was to remain equally vague, which makes

discussion of his conception of the dimensions of the national interest highly challenging.

95 Wolfers p48296 Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest , (New York, 1951)97 William E Scheuerman, Morgenthau , (Cambridge: Polity 2009) p80; see also, Michael J Smith, Hans Morgenthau and the

American National Interest in the early Cold War, Social Research , Vol4 8(4) (Winter 1981) p783.98 Burchill p35


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Burchills review of his work suggests that Morgenthau had concluded that there were

invariable components to the concept which refer to the protection and security of the

physical, political and cultural entity called the nation. 99 For Morgenthau the national

interest can always be defined rationally even if the rational definition does not always prevail

in concrete foreign policy 100 ; combining these two components of protection and rationality

we begin to approach the key dimensions of Morgenthaus thinking. That the national interest

was intimately bound up with the survival of the state, and by extension its vital interests.

However, it is Morgenthaus contemporary Bernard Brodie who provides a more

detailed exposition these vital interests. Brodie does not directly invoke the national interest

but explores the concept of interests through the vehicle of vital interests. In his book War

and Politics he developed his ideas in a chapter provocatively titled Vital Interests: What are

They, and Who Says So? 101 . The notion of interests as vital is central to Morgenthaus

work, Sondermann contends he defined the survival of a political unit ! in its identity as

the irreducible minimum of a states interests ! encompassing in this the integrity of the

states territory, its political institutions and its culture 102 . George Kennan expressed a similar

view when he stated:

The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are

basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well being

of its people. These needs have no moral quality. ! They are the unavoidable

necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either

good or bad. 103

These interests are vital interests because without them the state as constituted ceases to

exist. As the state is perceived to be the possessor of a legal personality 104 and to act

rationally 105 ; the state becomes an analytical as well as a legal entity, and assumes an

anthropomorphic character, and by extending the analogy, can therefore live or die 106 .

Brodie examines the source of these vital interests, but immediately hits upon one ofthe conundrums of the concept of interests. He asserts that vital interests are those that we

99 ibid p37 100 Smith p777101 Brodie p341102 Fred A. Sondermann, Concept of the National Interest, Orbis , Spring 1977 p125103 George F Kennan, Morality and Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs , Winter 1985104 Brown p17105 Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , (Boston:Little Brown, 1971) pp10-38106

J Martin Rochester, The National Interest and Contemporary World Politics, Review of Politics , Vol 40(1) (Jan 1978) pp81-84


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are ready to fight to preserve, and therefore the importance of vital interests comes not

necessarily from some intrinsic quality, but rather what we are ready to do about some

infringement of them, real or imagined 107 . This underlines that when we speak of the

national interest, we speak of values 108 , and vital interests are those we value most, but they

are not necessarily objective in nature; they may be based upon an objective quality

(territory), but it is the value placed upon that quality that makes it a vital national interest 109 .

In Brodies own words they are not fixed by nature nor identifiable by any generally accepted

standard of objective criteria 110 . These vital interests are the result of the subjective

judgement of political leaders, who are interpreting the mood and opinion of their people, on

what they believe does or does not demand action. For small nations this is a relatively

simple calculation, however for larger states it becomes more complex:

It is clear enough what we mean by national security when we are considering a

direct military attack upon our own territories. This is normally the only kind of national

security that small nations can afford to concern themselves with ! Great nations,

however, and especially what we now call the superpowers will often be concerned

with what they deem to be threats to their security that are more distant in space, time

and even in conception than simply direct attack upon their home territories. The

main reason, of course, is that the superpower feels itself able to do something

effective about a threat that remains as yet indirect or remote ! 111

For Brodie the boundary of vital interests can, and is, expanded as a result of an ability to do

something effective about a threat; he develops from this the notion of national

responsibility [sic] rather than simply of national peril 112 as a motivation of self-interest fixed

on security. The immutable and rational guide to national interest that Morgenthau wrote of is

therefore, in Brodies view, an expansible concept, driven by the subjective judgements of

the political leadership of a state.

Brodie introduces the role of tradition in determining vital interests 113 , although

realists contend that interest related values are determined by rational calculation, heaccepts that what may appear rational is conditioned by cultural preferences and norms.

107 Brodie p342108 Sondermann p124109 There are a number of historical instances where states have negotiated over territory to achieve other goals. The ownership

of Alsace-Lorraine is an example of how a vital interest has changed its character over the course of a century (1870-1970).

See Kissinger for an in depth analysis of this issue.110 ibid p343111 ibid p344112



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Brodie emphasises the challenge of defining vital interests against this background and

concludes:

! how[ever] variable and subjective those interests we call vital, we must

nevertheless be clear that we cannot dispense with the basic concept. Some interests

are quite unambiguously vital. The perennial problem ! is to determine the outer

boundaries of what is truly vital ... 114

One of those features describing the outer boundaries is the morality or amorality of vital

interests 115 .

Brodie challenges the notion that enlightened self-interest 116 should be a

statesmans guide through the moral maze of vital interests. He argues that the pursuit of

purely moral causes can lead to crusade, when a more limited view of pure self-interest

better constrains states from such adventures. He raises the prospect of Thucydides second

premise for action: honour. In the context of moral action based on honour he quotes Walter

Goodman as saying Honor[sic] like charity goes with power, for the powerless are rarely in a

position to exercise such virtues ! 117 . However, he concludes that, moral considerations

cannot be expunged from the momentous weighting of such judgements as to what is, or

what is not, in the vital national interest 118 .

Brodies vital interests are it would appear coterminous with Morgenthaus conception

of the national interest. Brodies focus on those interests that are vital to the survival of the

state narrows the analytical aperture, but nonetheless offers an insight that highlights three

key aspects related to this analysis of the national interest:

interests may be defined by a test of whether a state will take action to defend them

or not;

the more powerful a state the more it is tempted to see its vital interests as defined by

its responsibilities rather than just on the basis of its survival; interests are determined through a subjective process involving the interplay between

political leaders and their public. This process is influenced by tradition, and a

societys notions of both honour, and its own moral frame of reference.

114 ibid p358115 ibid p365116 idem117



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Martha Finnemore

Reflecting that theories of International Relations are not mutually exclusive, Brodie

an avowed realist included the role of tradition and other soft influences in the shaping of

the perceptions of vital interests in his analysis. The constructivist school of International

Relations sees the role of culture as central to the development of relations between states.

However, as Katzenstein summarises it, the key difference in this schools approach to the

self-interests of actors in the international system is that: State interests do not exist to be

discovered by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of

social interaction 119 . And challenging the realist view of power the issue is whether the

manifold uses and forms of power 120 can be explained by material factors alone, or whether

ideational and cultural factors are necessary to account for them ! The issue is what

accounts for power, not whether power is present. 121 Central to this debate is the role of

identity, as Jepperson et al commented: [T]he concept of identity thus functions as a

crucial link between environmental structures and interests 122 and many national security

interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived

identity of others. 123

In her book National Interests in International Society Finnemore set out to examine

those aspects of state behaviour that challenged the view that states only act in their limited

self-interest, as described by a narrow view of their identity 124 . The actions she sought to

explain were those that apparently went beyond acts that were in the common interest 125 .

The common interest can be seen as an overlapping of national self-interests, but the actions

that Finnemore describes were for a greater common good in which the satisfaction of more

self-regarding interests are not clearly evident. In this Finnemore contends she is seeking to

119 Peter J Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security , (New York: CUP, 1996) p2120 It should be recalled that for Morgenthau the national interest was synonymous with power. Burchill p35121 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, Norms Identity and Culture in National Security, in Katzenstein (ed), ibid p40122 ibid p59. Although In The Origins of National Interests Chafetz et al, have sought to add clarity to another conceptual

discussion on the role of identity which they state offers too many vague and imprecise definitions; in this volume they set out

to provide stronger evidence on the connection between identity and national interests. Glenn Chafetz, Micheal Spirtas and

Benjamin Frankel, Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy, in Chafetz et al (ed), The Origins of National

Interests , (London: Frank Cass, 1999) pvii 123 ibid p60124 In Katzenstien (ed). There are a number of other papers that explore aspects of the relationship between culture and national

security. The four most relevant to this study are on the confounding behaviours that include the development of the norms of

non-use for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the role of military culture in the development of military doctrine, and the

norms that have emerged on the role of humanitarian intervention. The last is by Finnemore.125

Finnemore p128. Normative behaviour is not always to the common good, Finnemore points to slavery, racism, and ethniccleansing as acts undertaken in the common interest of one set of groups, but are not common goods for all humanity.


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understand state behaviour by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of

meaning and social value, because [u]ltimately, power and wealth are means, not ends 126 .

She addresses the role of domestic politics as a determinant in the defining of national goals

and interests, but based on her investigation she states domestic policies and local

conditions cannot explain many of the interests and policy choices made 127 .

Finnemores approach deliberately eschews economics, but rests on sociology and

sociological insights 128 . This distances her from those who have based their work such as

the neorealist Kenneth Waltz on micro-economic models and ideas. In Waltzs Theory of

International Politics he describes the development of the national interest through the

metaphor of the state as a major corporation maximising its profits 129 . Finnemore deliberately

chooses cases where the material self-interest is either absent or impossible to determine

with certainty. There are four case studies that she investigates: the creation of state science

bureaucracies in wake of the formation of UNESCO; the International Red Cross and the

adoption of the Geneva Conventions; The World Bank and the adoption of its agenda on

global poverty reduction designed by Robert McNamara; and in the The Culture of National

Security she adds a fourth, an investigation into the norms of humanitarian intervention. The

latter case makes plain her rationale and her focus:

Humanitarian intervention looks odd from conventional perspectives on international

political behaviour because it does not conform to the conceptions of interest that

they specify. Realists would expect to see some geostrategic or political advantage to

be gained by intervening states. Neoliberals might emphasise economic or trade

advantages for interventions. 130

Finnemore does concede that Liberals of a more classical and Kantian style might argue

that these [humanitarian] interventions have been motivated by an interest in promoting

democracy and liberal values 131 . But she places little faith in such arguments, and states

that Realism and most liberals do not investigate interests: they assume them. She

contends that constructivists ask the key questions as to what the interests are , andinvestigates the ends to which power will be used 132 . Her model is that norms shape

interests and interests shape action ! . [and] norms create permissive conditions for action

126 Finnemore p2127 idem128 ibid p3129 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics , (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979) p134130 Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in Katzenstein (ed) ibid p156131

ibid p157132 idem


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but do not determine action 133 ; and these norms are those established by the international

society of which states are a part.

Finnemore concludes that having investigated these case studies conventional

theoretical approaches that emphasise self-interested motivation fail to explain the

behaviours observed and that:

States do not always know what they want. They and the people in them develop

perceptions of interest and understandings of desirable behaviour from social

interactions with others in the world they inhabit. 134

She rejects the notion that this is a utopian or idealistic view, but stresses that it provides an

additional perspective on the motivations of states based on their interests, which extend

beyond the material. These are strongly reflected in the views of Tony Blair in his two

speeches almost a decade apart in Chicago, in which he spoke of the moral worth of

interventionism 135 .

Finnemore is not writing from a feminist perspective, however, her implied critique of

realism accords with some feminist views. Such Feminist thinkers strongly criticise the realist

concept of power as being based on masculine norms, and contend that their notions of

security are gender biased and do not admit of other motives or perceptions. This criticism

extends then to the formulation and construction of interests that traditional realists and

liberals develop 136 .

Brodies injunctions against idealistic and moralistic action would if they were

observed serve as an insurmountable obstacle to Finnemores perspective on what shapes

and constitutes national interests. Accepting Finnemores observations broadens the scope

of what constitutes a national interest, and reshapes how such interests may be determined

from an analytical and policy development perspective. It widens the aperture to include an

analysis of prevailing international norms considerably extending interests beyond only thosethat would be considered vital.

133 ibid p158134 Finnemore (1996) p128; see David Chandler, Culture Wars and International Intervention: An Inside/Out View of the Decline

of National Interest, International Politics , Vol 41 (2004), pp354-374 for a directly opposing view.135 See http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/speeches/entry/tony-blair-speech-to-chicago-council-on-global-affairs/ for Blairs 2009

speech, and http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/798.pdf for a transcript of his 1999 speech.136 Jacqui True, Feminism, in Burchill et al (2009) pp250-252; Barbara Goodwin, Using Political Ideas, (Chichester: Wiley, 2007)

pp199-233; see also Anna Jonasdottir, On the Concept of Interest, Womens Interests and the Limitations of Interest Theory, inJones and Jonasdottir (ed), The Political Interests of Gender , (London: Sage, 1990).


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The three thinkers outlined thus far each has a very different perspective on the

scope, scale and nature of the national interest. These may be summarised in that:

they are agreed that there are significant subjective elements to the definition of

interests that are shaped by culture;

they differ on the nature and bounds of such interests, and each in turn is seeking to

influence how policy is determined (especially with regard to Beard and Brodie);

they accept the primacy of the nation-state, although Finnemore believes it to be

more permeable than Beard or Brodie would admit in their construction;

and each has been shaped in their perspective by the prevailing historical milieu:

Beard by the Depression; Brodie by the Cold War and Vietnam; Finnemore by the

ending of the Cold War and the rise in interventionism.

Finnemores is the most inclusive in that it recognises the notion of vital national

interests, but does not limit a discussion of the national interest to this set of interests.

Taken individually or collectively these three differing approaches do not provide a clear

analytical framework for either the development of policy or an understanding of the

motivations that underpin state action that the national interest is intended to convey. In order

to take account of these diverse perspectives, and provide such an analytical framework, two

different but holistic models of the national interest will be outlined.

Joseph Frankel

Frankels monograph is in his words written in the Aristotelian tradition of political theory,

with a strong behavioural bias 137 . It is therefore to be expected that it is a logical analysis 138

based on the premises of rationality and ethical conduct that satisfies a vision of the good

life139 , but that focuses on the behaviour of states, their societies, and the political actors that

are the agents of a society. Frankel reprises earlier works and narrows the focus of hisanalysis of the national interest to that related to foreign policy, and concludes that the:

national interest is the most comprehensive description of the whole value complex of

foreign policy. It is also an exceptionally unclear concept. Like all other difficult concepts

it gives rise to the temptation to go to extremes.

137 Frankel (1970) p13138

idem139 John Lewis, History of Philosophy , (London: EUP, 1962) pp55-7; Frankel (1970) p29, p45


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But he goes on to claim it is possible to organise around [the national interest] our thinking

about the purpose of foreign policy and international behaviour in general 140 .

Frankel proposes a new classification for the national interest dividing its usage into

three: aspirational, operational and explanatory/ polemical 141 categories. Accepting that each

set of use will overlap the other, Frankel nevertheless attempts to provide contextual

definitions. To separate the aspirational and the operational he uses immediacy, origin,

influence, and capability. Aspirational interests are long-term, they are rooted in history or

ideology, they dont directly influence policy, and they are a result of political will as opposed

to being rooted in a defined capacity to achieve a stated end. Operational interests are the

antithesis of aspirational interests and would in modern parlance be viewed as SMART

(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Resourced, and Time oriented) 142 . The national interest in

the explanatory and polemical division is used to explain, evaluate, rationalise or criticise

policy, and in Frankels words its main role is to prove oneself right and ones opponents

wrong 143 .

Frankel recognises that the national interest is used in domestic politics, but seeks in his

analysis to separate foreign and domestic policy. He accepts that the two are on a number of

levels interrelated, but believes they can be distinguished when analysing the national

interest 144 . He argues that ultimately aspirational interests are subject to the interplay

between foreign policy oriented interests and those focused on domestic policy, whereas

operational interests are more subject to their exposure to the international environment and

are therefore more exclusively foreign policy oriented 145 . He asserts that although in

domestic politics there are any number of competing interests, in foreign policy generally a

national interest can be determined through the policy making agents in a society. Pursuing

this line of argument he dispenses with the problems around the conceptual contest between

interests in the singular or plural - the national interest versus national interests - as

specious. He concludes that in foreign policy it is a singular observable phenomenonhowever vague and nebulous it may appear to be 146 .

140 Frankel (1970) pp26-27141 ibid p31142 ibid p31-38143 ibid p35144 ibid p38145

ibid pp38-41146 ibid p43


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depending upon modes of transport, economic capability and cultural preferences. Time too

is a culturally oriented quanta, although absolute as a physical attribute, it is relative in terms

of interests, and can be seen to operate in the employment of such concepts as strategic

patience. Time is also in Frankels model one of the key determinants as to whether an

interest is aspirational or operational. The last of his second order dimensions is the special

case of Vital Interest . There is little to separate Frankel's commentary on vital interests from

that of Brodies, or indeed Morgenthaus, except that he identifies the weight attached to a

vital interest as being relative to the identity of the state that encroaches or appears to

challenge that interest. The more an encroaching state is perceived as an enemy the more

likely an interest is to be viewed as vital. Thus, the notion of an interest being classed as

vital is related to the likelihood of a challenge, the notional strength of that challenge, and the

potential harm to the vitality of national society that failure to protect that interest would

engender.

Frankel's analysis then moves to a discussion of how interests are defined and the

major factors that affect their selection, prioritisation and explanation. This analysis is

behavioural, and focuses first on the agents of decision, and then on the roles of image,

motivation and value. These factors are in effect an explanation of how and why his three

divisions and six dimensions capture the totality of the national interest 152 .

Figure 1 is a diagrammatic representation of Frankel's complex and nuanced

arguments, it is intended to capture his idea of the division of interests, and his first and

second order dimensions of the national interest. Frankel himself does not produce such a

synthesis. However, employing this heuristic it becomes clear that such an approach does

not provide a simple guide to what is, and what is not a national interest. It does, however,

provide a framework that once interests are identified they can be located, in terms of

whether they are aspirational or operational, and the degree of priority they are likely to enjoy

based on their first and second order dimensions. The framework provides a mechanism thatcan be used to interrogate explanatory and polemical uses of the national interest in order to

substantiate or reject them in terms of policy and any subsequent strategy development.

152 ibid pp97-137


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Figure 1 Representation of Frankels Categories/ Dimensions of the National Interest

Figure 2 is an alternative perspective that shows how Frankel expressed the generalcharacteristics of his categories of the national interest located within a two-dimensional

model for simplicity.

Context Salience Scope Time Space Vital Aspirational General/

Broad Low Wide Long Global Unlikely

Operational Specific/narrow

High Narrow Short/medium

Withincapacity

Likely

Explanatory/Polemical General orspecific Politicalagenda Wide ornarrow Short toLong Domesticallyrelated PossibleFigure 2 Alt ernative Representation of Frankel's Conceptual Framework

Using Frankel's construct provides a mechanism to review and place in context

Beard's, Brodie' and Finnemore's approaches to the national interest. It does not solve all the

five areas of contestation of the concept of the national interest identified above, but Frankel

at least acknowledges them all, and then attempts to resolve them by making a value

judgement on which is the most valid.

Against the five areas of contestation he makes the following judgements. He rejects

the notion that the identification of the national interest gives rise to self-regarding unethical

behaviour, and is therefore an immoral concept. He accommodates the diverse uses of the

concept in his division of the national interest into three broad categories, similarly his model

accepts that interests have a duality and as value-based propositions can be both objectively

and subjectively based. He is firmly of the view that the referent object described by the

adjective national is the nation-state, and he has no doubt that the primary analytical object

is that of external relations of a state, and not its internal domestic politics; however, he


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admits to the role of domestic politics in shaping the behaviour of states in their external

affairs. He creates a special case for the external security interests of the state, which to

Frankel are those defined as vital interests.

Frankel was a keen advocate of the national interest as a key tool in academic,

political and strategic analysis. However, his short but comprehensive study has had only

limited effect in the subsequent discourse on national interests. It is to one of the few thinkers

in this field who developed a comprehensive heuristic model, that has had an effect, that we

now turn: Donald Nuechterlein.

Donald Nuechterlein

Donald Nuechterlein follows Frankels line of argument with regard to the importance

and relevance of the national interest, but offers a much more rigorous and prescriptive

approach to its examination. Using this approach he sets out to resolve the issues of

confused usage and application of the national interest as a concept in academic analysis,

policy development and strategic formulation. Nuechterleins books and papers follow a

consistent application of the methodology he first proposed in the mid 70s. His work makes

only passing reference to that of Beard, Morgenthau and Frankel, and indeed in his 1979 153

restatement of his foundational 1976 154 paper he makes no reference to them at all. In this

Nuechterlein is asserting that his approach is different, and his confidence in it can be

deduced from the fact that he has made only minor alterations to his conceptual framework

over the thirty years 155 that he has been explaining and promoting it.

Nuechterlein accepts the contested nature of the concept but seeks to rescue it by

expressing from the outset the assumptions he is making about the national interest. These

assumptions set out his position on each of the areas of contestation, and he follows Frankel

in establishing that the national interest should be: a concept capable of being used to balance self-regarding and other regarding

behaviour 156

a concept that is used for policy analysis and policy development

a concept that encompasses both objective (needs) and subjective (desires)

153 Donald Nuechterlein, The Concept of National Interest: A Time for New Approaches, Orbis , Spring 1979 pp73-92154 Donald Nuechterlein, National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,

British Journal of International Studies, Vol 2(3) (Oct, 1976) pp246-266155

Nuechterlein (2001) is the last book length exposition of his methodology.156 Nuechterlein (1979) p126, p138


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about the actions of sovereign states

about the rational pursuit of foreign policy, and is distinct from policies that are

pursued in the public (internal) interest

and based on these assumptions he develops a simple working definition that: the national

interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other

sovereign states comprising the external environment 157 . In Nuechterleins hands the

national interest can only be understood in terms of its relationship to the interests of other

states.

Using his working definition Nuechterlein identifies four basic interests that motivate

states, which to quote his definitions 158 are:

Defence interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat

of physical violence directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat

to its system of government.

Economic interests: the enhancement of the states economic well-being in relations

with other states.

World Order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic

system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and

commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.

Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values, which thepeople of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.

It is clear that from these definitions, and applying Frankels categorisation of the concept,

Nuechterlein is primarily focused on those national interests that are operational. Although he

accommodates the aspirational interests of a society through his inclusion of the ideological

element, that he later refers to as Promotion of Values. These basic interests are aligned

with Frankels dimension of context. In Nuechterleins construct the use of the national

interest as an explanatory or polemical device, should only be based on a rational calculus,

and is therefore a second order category.

Recognising that there will inevitably be trade-offs and compromises between these

basic interests Nuechterlein provides a set of definitions that describe the intensity of these

interests, to aid in differentiating and prioritising them. This second element of his rational

calculus of interests is analogous to a combination of Frankels dimensions of salience and

157 Nuechterlein (1976) p247, (1979) p75158 Nuechterlein (1976) p248, (1979) p75, (2001) pp15-17 in the latter he refers to these basic interests as: Defence of the

Homeland; Economic well-being; Favourable World Order; and Promotion of Values, although the basic categorisation remainsthe same.


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scope, and the second order dimensions of time, space and vitality. However, Nuechterleins

framework is much more definitive, and is therefore a more readily applied analytical tool. In

brief he defines intensity on a non-parametric scale the values of which he describes as in

descending order of importance: survival, vital, major, and peripheral. In brief, these are

defined in terms of harm, and in his terms they are 159 :

Survival. When the very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy, either from overt

attack or the threat of attack.

Vital. Serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong measures,

including the use of conventional military forces are employed to counter an action,

or to deter the threat of action.

Major. The political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be

adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment, that

without corrective action may become serious threats (and thus vital interests).

Peripheral. The well being of the state is not adversely affected, but those of its

citizens or companies operating abroad may be endangered.

Nuechterlein adds a further set of criteria set out as 8 value factors and 8 cost/ risk factors

to help the analyst determine whether an interest is vital or not 160 . He summarises his

model as a 4x4 matrix (Fig 3) in which various interests that make up the national interest

can be visualised. He contends that the national interest not a simple aggregation of these

needs, such that a large number of peripheral interests could outweigh a vital interest, butthrough a weighted analysis of the elements of choice, decision-makers can better

perceive where their interests lie.

Basic interest Intensity of Interest

Survival

(critical)

Vital

(dangerous)

Major

(serious)

Peripheral

(bothersome)

Defence of homeland

Economic well being

Favourable world order

Promotion of values

Figure 3 Nuechterlein's National Interest Matrix 161

159 Nuechterlein (1976) pp249-250; to those familiar with the application of security classifications which are based on potential

harm these have a familiar ring base as they are on a four point scale from Top Secret to Restric

o papel do int nac no debate sobre a seg nacional 2012

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