Page | 1

OCAMPO III. VS. PEOPLE

G.R Nos. 156547-51. February 4, 2008

FACTS:

The Department of Budget and Management released the amount of Php 100

Million for the support of the local government unit of the province of Tarlac. However,

petitioner Ocampo, governor of Tarlac, loaned out more than P 56.6 million in which he

contracted with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc.. thus, it was the subject of 25 criminal

charges against the petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner of the crime of malversation of

public funds. However, the petitioner contended that the loan was private in character

since it was a loan contracted with the Taralc Foundation.

ISSUE:

Whether the amount loaned out was private in nature.

RULING:

Yes, the loan was private in nature because Art. 1953 of the New Civil Code

provides that a person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount of the

same kind and quality. The fact that the petitioner-Governor contracted the loan, the public fund changed

its nature to private character, thus it is not malversation which is the subject of this case,

instead it must be a simple collection of money suit against the petitioner in case of non

payment . therefore, the petitioner is acquitted for the crime of malversation.

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LEUNG BEN VS. O BRIEN GR No. 13602. April 6, 1918

FACTS:

In 1917, O Brien filed a collection suit against Leung Ben for the lost of the latter in gamblings, games and banking percentage games. The amount to be collected was P

15,000.00. The respondent then filed the case for the fear that the petitioner might escape

his obligation by going abroad and thus the respondent attached the property of the

petitioner in payment of the winnings of O Brien.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a statutory obligation to pay the winnings in gambling.

RULING:

No. Although there can be a voluntary payment of money for the loser to the

winner, necessarily that in civil actions, it is not an obligatory act to pay the winnings in a

gambling because the act by nature is prohibited by law and by moral.

Thus, in this case, the duty of the defendant to refund the money which he won

from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty imposed by statute. It therefore arises ex lege. Furthermore, it is a duty to return a certain sum which had passed from the plaintiff to the

defendant. By all the criteria which the common law supplies, this is a duty in the nature

of debt and is properly classified into as an implied contract. It is well-settled that money

lost in gambling or lottery, if recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser. Thus

Leung Ben can recover the property attached by the respondent.

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PELAYO VS. LAURON

GR No. 4089. June 12 1909

FACTS:

The wife of the petitioner was to deliver a child, however, when the time of

delivery came, the parents - in- law of the wife called the physician since her husband

was not present. Thus the husband refused to pay the service fee of the physician since

the wife died during the delivery of the child. The defense of the husband was that he was

not the one who called the aid of a physician ,thus his parents shall be liable for the

services rendered by the physician.

ISSUE:

Who should pay the doctor?

RULING:

It is the husband who should pay the service of the doctor because even he was

not the one who called the doctor, it is his duty to give mutual support to his wife and

support includes medical assistance. This obligation to give is imposed by law.

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ASI CORPORATION VS. EVANGELISTA

G.R No. 158086. February 14, 2008

FACTS:

Private respondent Evangelista contracted Petitioner ASJ Corporation for the

incubation and hatching of eggs and by products owned by Evangelista Spouses. The

contract includes the scheduled payments of the service of ASJ Corporation that the

amount of installment shall be paid after the delivery of the chicks. However, the ASJ

Corporation detained the chicks because Evangelista Spouses failed to pay the

installment on time.

ISSUE:

Was the detention of the alleged chicks valid and recognized under the law?

RULING:

No, because ASJ Corporation must give due to the Evangelista Spouses in paying

the installment, thus, it must not delay the delivery of the chicks. Thus, under the law,

they are obliged to pay damages with each other for the breach of the obligation.

Therefore, in a contract of service, each party must be in good faith in the

performance of their obligation, thus when the petitioner had detained the hatched eggs of

the respondents spouses, it is an implication of putting prejudice to the business of the

spouses due to the delay of paying installment to the petitioner.

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RAMAS VS. QUIAMCO

G.R No. 146322. December 6, 2006

FACTS:

Quiamco has amicably settled with Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso for the

crime of robbery and that in return, the three had surrendered to Quiamco a motorcycle

with its registration. However, Atty. Ramas has sold to Gabutero the motorcycle in

installment but when the latter did not able to pay the installment, Davalon continued the

payment but when he became insolvent, he said that the motorcycle was taken by

Quiamcos men. However, after several years, the petitioner Ramas together with policemen took the motorcycle without the respondents permit and shouted that the respondent Quiamco is a thief of motorcycle. Respondent then filed an action for

damages against petitioner alleging that petitioner is liable for unlawful taking of the

motorcycle and utterance of a defamatory remark and filing a baseless complaint. Also,

petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioners exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged motorcycle preliminary to the enforcement of

its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the petitioner is correct.

RULING:

No. The petitioner being a lawyer must know the legal procedure for the recovery

of possession of the alleged mortgaged property in which said procedure must be

conducted through judicial action. Furthermore, the petitioner acted in malice and intent

to cause damage to the respondent when even without probable cause, he still instituted

an act against the law on mortgage.

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HOTEL NIKKO MANILA VS. ROBERTO REYES

G.R No. 154259. February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent Reyes also known as Amay Bisaya was having a coffee break at the

lobby of Hotel Nikko Manila Garden when his friend Mrs. Filart invited him to attend the

natal party of the owner of the hotel, thus respondent Reyes acceded to his friend but

when they are going to take food in the buffet table , party organizer, Ruby Lim

confronted the respondent since allegedly the latter was not invited and that the party was

for limited guests. The respondent was so embarrassed especially when he was driven

away by policemen. The trial court ruled in favor of Lim however, the Appellate Court

favored the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether Amay Bisaya (private respondent) is entitled to payment of damages.

RULING:

No. The respondent can not recover damages from the organizer of the party since

the organizer acted in pursuance of the ordered of the celebrant that the party was for

limited guests and thus, the latter approached the respondent to leave the area. The act of

the respondent is considered as a self- inflicted injury when he, being a gate crasher has

voluntary went to a party in which he is not invited. Therefore, the act of Ruby Lim is

justified and reasonable.

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ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002

FACTS:

The Petitioner Academy was conducting a visitation campaign in 1995 for the

encouragement of prospective enrollees to enroll at St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City. The victim Sherwin Carpitanos was one of the high school students who was present in

the campaign . thus, Sherwin and other students was riding then in a Mitsubishi jeepney

owned by defendant Villanueva but was driven by James Daniel III, then 15 years old

and a student of the same school. As they proceed to Larayan Elementary School in

Dapitan City, the jeepney turned turtle causing the death of Sherwin.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner academy is liable for damages against the death of Sherwin

Carpitanos.

RULING:

No, the petitioner can not be held liable for the death of the son of the respondent

because the accident was not the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin, instead even

Daniel explained that the accident was caused by the steering wheel guide of the jeepney,

thus the petitioner has no negligence in the performance of its duties. Therefore, the

owner or registered owner of the jeepney can be held liable for the death of Sherwin due

to his negligence in maintaining the good condition of the vehicle which is necessarily

required for the contract of common carriage.

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TSPIC CORPORATION VS. TSPIC EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R No. 163419. February 13, 2008

FACTS:

TSPI Corporation entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the

corporation Union for the increase of salary for the latters members for the year 2000 to 2002 starting from January 2000. thus, the increased in salary was materialized on

January 1, 2000. However, on October 6, 2000, the Regional Tripartite Wage and

production Board raised daily minimum wage from P 223.50 to P 250.00 starting

November 1, 2000. Conformably, the wages of the 17 probationary employees were

increased to P250.00 and became regular employees therefore receiving another 10%

increase in salary. In January 2001, TSPIC implemented the new wage rates as mandated

by the CBA. As a result, the nine employees who were senior to the 17 recently

regularized employees, received less wages. On January 19, 2001, TSPICs HRD notified the 24 employees who are private respondents, that due to an error in the automated

payroll system, they were overpaid and the overpayment would be deducted from their

salaries starting February 2001. The Union on the other hand, asserted that there was no

error and the deduction of the alleged overpayment constituted diminution of pay.

ISSUE:

Whether the alleged overpayment constitutes diminution of pay as alleged by the

Union.

RULING:

Yes, because it is considered that Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into

by unions and their employers are binding upon the parties and be acted in strict

compliance therewith. Thus, the CBA in this case is the law between the employers and

their employees.

Therefore, there was no overpayment when there was an increase of salary for the

members of the union simultaneous with the increasing of minimum wage for workers in

the National Capital Region. The CBA should be followed thus, the senior employees

who were first promoted as regular employees shall be entitled for the increase in their

salaries and the same with lower rank workers.

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REGINO VS. PCST

G.R No. 156109. November 18, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Kristine Regino was a poor student enrolled at the Pangasinan College

of Science and Technology. Thus, a fund raising project pertaining to a dance party was

organized by PCST, requiring all its students to purchase two tickets in consideration as a

prerequisite for the final exam.

Regino, an underprivileged, failed to purchase the tickets because of her status as

well as that project was against her religious belief, thus, she was not allowed to take the

final examination by her two professors.

ISSUE:

Was the refusal of the university to allow Regino to take the final examination

valid?

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court declared that the act of PCST was not valid, though, it can

impose its administrative policies, necessarily, the amount of tickets or payment shall be

included or expressed in the student handbooks given to every student before the start of

the regular classes of the semester. In this case, the fund raising project was not included

in the activities to be undertaken by the university during the semester. The petitioner is

entitled for damages due to her traumatic experience on the acts of the university causing

her to stop studying sand later transfer to another school.

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PSBA VS. CA

G.R No. February 4, 1992

FACTS:

On August 30, 1985, Carlitos Bautista was stabbed and killed inside the campus

of Philippine School of Business Administration where the accused were outsiders, while

the victim was an enrolled third year student of commerce.

Thus, the parents of Bautista sued the school for the collection of damages due to

the latters alleged negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the damages against the death of Bautista

RULING:

Yes, although, the action does not fall under Ouasi delicts, there is negligence on the part of the school in maintaining peace and order inside the premises; thus, there

was a breach contractual relation committed by PSBA since the incident occurred inside

the campus. The failure of the petitioner school in providing security measures inside the

campus implies the negligence of the same and constitute the breach of contract entered

into by the petitioner and the victim Bautista when the latter was enrolled and fall under

the supervision of the petitioner.

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COSMOPOLITAN VS. LA VILLE

G.R No. 152801. August 20, 2004

FACTS:

Cosmo entertainment entered into a contract lease with the respondent owner La

Ville Commercial Corporation for a parcel of land. The contract includes payment of the

first three months of rental; hence, the lease is good for seven years. Thus, when Cosmo

has paid the initial payment, it suffered business reverse and stopped operations over the

land, however, the respondent demanded for the payment of lease up to 1997. Thus being

insolvent Cosmo, sublease the land in favor of another party without the consent of the

owner of the land.

ISSUE:

Was the petitioner has the right to sublease the property?

RULING:

No, because it was established in the contract that the owner lessor has the right to approve sublease of the property, thus, Cosmo violated the condition of the contract.

Thus, the ejectment of Cosmo from one lot is reasonable. The petitioner, having

voluntarily given its consent thereto, was bound by this stipulation. And, having failed to

pay the monthly rentals, the petitioner is deemed to have violated the terms of the

contract, warranting its ejectment from the leased premises. The Court finds no cogent

reason to depart from this factual disquisition of the courts below in view of the rule that

findings of facts of the trial courts are, as a general rule, binding on this Court.

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AYALA CORPORATION VS. ROSA- DIANA REALTY

G.R No. 134284. December 1, 2000

FACTS:

Ayala Corporation contracted a deed of sale over a parcel of land owned by the

latter with Manuel Sy, with special conditions on the building construction at the area,

Thus, restrictions on the height, area and structure of the building were stipulated.

However, Sy contracted another sale of the subject property to Rosa Diana Realty,

with the approval of Ayala as well as the promise of Rosa Diana to follow such

conditions and restrictions upon building constructions.

Thus, Rosa Diana violated the contract and restrictions when it passed different

building plans to the city of Makati and to Ayala Corporation, where the former plan has

exceeded the stipulated number of storey and the prescribed land area.

ISSUE:

Whether Rosa Diana Realty must follow the deed of restriction contained in the

contract it entered with Ayala.

RULING:

Yes, because in contractual obligations the contract has the force of a law that the

same is not contrary to law or public policy, thus, it must be performed with in good

faith.

Thus, the payment of damages is an obligation of Rosa Diana Realty to Ayala

Corp. since the former violation can no longer lead to the destruction of the building

because the building was already occupied by several persons and offices.

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BRICKTOWN VS. AMOR TIERRA

G.R No. 112182 December 12, 1994

FACTS:

Bricktown Development Corporation entered into a two contracts to sell in favor

Amor Tierra Development Corporation. The total price of the sell was P21,639,875.00

was stipulated to be paid by private respondent in such amounts and maturity dates, as

follows: P2,200,000.00 on 31 March 1981; P3,209,968.75 on 30 June 1981;

P4,729,906.25 on 31 December 1981; and the balance of P11,500,000.00 to be paid by

means of an assumption by private respondent of petitioner corporation's mortgage

liability to the Philippine Savings Bank or, alternately, to be made payable in cash. On

the same date, parties executed a Supplemental Agreement providing that private

respondent would additionally pay to petitioner corporation the amounts of P55,364.68,

or 21% interest on the balance of down payment for the period from 31 march to 30 June

1981, and of P390,369.37 representing interest paid by petitioner corporation to the

Philippine Savings Bank. Private respondent was only able to pay petitioner corporation

for the subject land from the installment not covered by the initial payment up to the time

the contract be nullified.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of Bricktown in filing the rescission of contract to sell valid.

RULING:

No, because necessarily a grace period must be given to the debtor in case it can

not immediately deliver nor perform the obligation. The grace period must not be

likened to an obligation, the non-payment of which, under Article 1169 of the Civil Code,

would generally still require judicial or extrajudicial demand before "default" can be said

to arise. Verily, in the case at bench, the 60-day grace period under the terms of the

contracts to sell became ipso facto operative from the moment the due payments were not

met at their stated maturities.

In this case, the contract was not validly made because it is contrary to the

principle that the contract can not be reneged without the consent of the contracting

parties affected by the cancellation of contract, thus the petitioner did not give due for the

respondent for the chance of performing the obligation.

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PILIPINAS HINO INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 126570. August 18, 2000

FACTS:

A contract of lease was entered into between herein parties, under which the

defendants, as lessors, leased real property to plaintiff for a term of 2 years, from 16

August 1989 -15 August 1991. According to the contract, plaintiff-lessee deposited with

the defendants-lessors the amount of P400,000.00 to answer for repairs and damages.

After the expiration of the contract, the plaintiff and defendants made a joint inspection

and both agreed that the cost of repairs would amount to P60,000.00 and that the amount

of P340,000.00 shall be returned by to plaintiff. However, defendants returned to

plaintiff only the amount of P200,000.00, still having a balance of P140,000.00.

Defendants unjustifiably refused to return the balance of P140,000.00 holding that the

true and actual damage on the lease premises amounted to P298,738.90.

However, the subject property was made into a contract to sell where the

petitioner has paid the initial installment but failed to pay the remaining payments., thus

the owner of the property withhold the amount of P 924, 000.00 representing the interest

due of the unpaid installments.

ISSUE:

Whether the owner of the property subject to sell is entitled to the interest due of

unpaid installments.

RULING:

No, because paragraph 9 of the Memorandum of Agreement provides in very

clear terms that "when the owners exercise their option to forfeit the downpayment, they

shall return to the buyer any amount paid by the buyer in excess of the downpayment

with no obligation to pay interest thereon." This should include all amounts paid,

including interest. The court finds no basis in the conclusion reached by the lower courts

that "interest paid" should not be returned to the buyer.

Thus, the said interest of the unpaid installments shall be returned to the buyer

since the seller will unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the buyer if he will collect

undetermined amount.

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TITAN-IKEDA VS. PRIMETOWN

G.R No. 158768. February 12, 2008

FACTS:

The respondent Primetown Property Corporation entered into contract weith the

petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction Corporation for the structural works of a 32-storey

prime tower. After the construction of the tower, respondent again awarded to the

petitioner the amount of P 130,000,000.00 for the towers architectural design and structure. Howevere, in 1994, the respondent entered inot a contract of sale of the tower

in favor of the petitioner in a manner called full-swapping. Since the respondent had

allegedly constructed almost one third of the project as weel as selling some units to

third persons unknown to the petitioner. Integrated Inc. took over the project, thus the

petitioner is demanding for the return of its advanced payment in the amount of P2,

000,000.00 as weel as the keys of the unit.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to damages.

RULING:

No, because in a contract necessarily that there is a meeting of the minds of the

parties in which this will be the binding law upon them. Thus, in a reciprocal obligation.

Both parties are obliged to perform their obligation simultaneously and in good faith. In

this case, petitioner, Titan-Ikeda can not recover damages because it was found out there

was no solutio indebiti or mistake in payment in this case since the latter is just entitled

to the actual services it rendered to the respondent and thus it is ordered to return the

condominium units to the respondent.

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PADCOM VS. ORTIGAS CENTER

G.R No. 146807. May 9, 2002

FACTS:

The petitioner Padilla Office Condominium acquired a lot from Ortigas and

Company by Tierra Development Corporation for the construction of a building. Thus,

petitioner originally took the land from Tierra Development under a deed of sale whereas

among the terms and conditions of the deed was that, any successor in interest and long

term lessee be automatically included as members of a future association in Ortigas area.

In 1982, Ortigas realty owners association was organized and thus a membership

due was established for the development and improvements of the buildings located at

the said area. However, when the respondent association will collect the membership due

of the petitioner, the latter refused and contended that it is not a member of the

association and it can not be compelled to join the association.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a member of the association.

RULIG:

Yes. The petitioner is an automatic member of the association because it was

clearly reminded and stated in the contract of sale and conditions on successor in interest

that the latter is ipso facto included in any association to be formed for the benefit and

protection of the Ortigas Center buildings, thus the time that the contract was signed

signified the compliance of the petitioner.

Furthermore, the petitioner is estopped when it claimed that there was only a

delay in payment of the due, thus it has the intention of paying and acknowledging the

dues. Moreover, the petitioner can invoke his freedom of association because it will

tantamount to unjust enrichment when it refused to pay due to the respondent even it

affords the protection and benefits given by the association.

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MC ENGINEERING VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 104047. April 3, 2002

FACTS:

The petitioner entered into agreement with Surigao Development Corporation for

the restoration of the latter. The original amount was P 5, 150, 000.00 of which, P2.5M

was for the restoration of the damaged buildings and land improvement, while the P3M

was for the restoration of the electrical and mechanical works. However, the petitioner

contracted the service of Gerent Builders for the improvements of Surigao Development

Corporation , thus an increased for the amount considered was made turning the original

amount to P 3, 104, 851.51. It was alleged that Gerent Builders finished the improvement

of the building but it cancelled the electrical and mechanical works and simultaneously, it

demanded the amount of P 632, 590.13 as share in the adjusted contract cost. The

petitioner refused to pay Gerent using the defense that there was a quitclaim which

removed the petitioners liability.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is obliged to pay Gerent Builders.

RULING:

No. Gerent builders can not collect additional payment from the petitioner

because Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with

knowledge of their existence and intent to relinquish them. Quitclaims deserve full

credence and are valid and enforceable.

In this case, Gerent was already estopped to demand additional payment when it

accepted the payment of the subcontract made with it by the petitioner, in which the

acceptance implied that the petitioners obligation to Gerent is already extinguished even for additional services rendered by the latter in the improvements because those services

are deemed contained in the subcontract.

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BPI VS. PINEDA

G.R No. L-62441. December 14, 1987

FACTS:

Southern Industrial Project and Bacong Shipping Company purchased three

vessels thru the financing furnished by Bank of the Philippine Island with the vessels as

securities. To secure the payment of whatever amounts may be disbursed for the

aforesaid purpose, the vessels were mortgaged to BPI. For the operation of the vessels,

these were placed under respondent Interocean Shipping Corporation headed by

respondent Pineda. As BPI was not fulfilled with the services of Interocean, it hired

Gacet Inc for a period of six months. The contract between BPI and Gacet did not

however terminate the services of Interocean. Due to Bacong and SIPs inability to pay the mortgage, it sold the vessels to BPI. The transfer was entered into between BPI and

SIP and Bacong through a Deed of Confirmation.

Thus , the vessels suffered damages and successfully repaired by Pineda.

However, Pineda demanded for the balance of the total amount paid by Southern

Industrial Project but the new owner Bank refused to pay the balance for the repairs

alleging that the debt was incurred during the ownership of Southern Shipping Project .

ISSUE:

Is BPI liable for the payment of debts incurred during the ownership of Southern

Shipping Project?

RULING:

Yes, Bank of the Philippine Island can be held liable to pay Pineda for the

remaining balance of the shipping company because the mere fact that the bank and the

shipping company signed the Confirmation of the Obligation, the former bank already

assumed any obligations in relations to the subject vessels. Thus, it can not escape from

the liability of paying the past debts of the company in which it gave financial support

otherwise it will result to unjust enrichment on the part of the petitioner bank to hide from

a confirmed obligation.

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STATE INVESTMENTS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 90676. June 19, 1991

FACTS:

Private respondents Spouses Aquino pledged certain shares of stocks with

petitioner State Investments for a loan of P120, 000.00, together with the pledge was the

securing of another loan by another spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino.

When the original spouses Aquino were willing and available to pay the loan, the

petitioner refused to accept payment and released of the shares of stocks for the reason

that the second loaner Spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino were not yet ready to pay their

loan. Thus, the trial court ruled that the petitioner must accept the payment from Spouses

Aquino as long as they pay the loan of P 120, 000.00 and there pledged shares of stocks

be releases. However, there was confusion in the ruling of the trial court whether or not

the interest be paid.

ISSUE:

Whether the spouses Aquino be obliged to pay the interest of the loan/

RULING:

Yes. The claim of the spouses Aquino for the acceptance of their early payment

must be accepted by the petitioner, however, the spouses can escape from the liability of

paying the interest of the loan for it was stipulated that there must be a 17 % interest per

annum of the loan even there was delay or payment before its maturity. Thus, the alleged

interest is already a part of the contract and not as a penalty for it will constitute unjust

enrichment on the part of the spouses Aquino at the expense and prejudice of the

petitioner State Investments.

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PEOPLE VS. MALICSI

G.R No. 175833. January 29, 2008

FACTS:

The accused-appellant was accused for the crime of rape against his niece. The

incident was repeated trice by the appellant. The appellant contended that he and the

victim were sweethearts but the trial court did not give weight to that theory.

The trial court found appellant guilty of the crime of four counts of qualified rape

and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for each count of rape, to pay

P300,000.00 as civil indemnity (P75,000.00 for each count), and P200,000.00 as moral

damages (P50,000.00 for each count). The CA however modified the findings of the RTC

declaring that appellant is guilty of four counts of simple rape and to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether the award of damages was properly made.

RULING:

No, because the Supreme Court declared that the crime committed was four count

of simple rape only and not qualified rape because the special aggravating circumstances

of minority and relationship must be alleged in the information but the prosecution failed

to do so. Since it is not included, four counts of simple rape should be undertaken. The

penalty imposed then should be reclusion perpetua. The appellate court also correctly

affirmed the award by the trial court of P200,000.00 for moral damages. Moral damages

are automatically granted to rape victim. However, the award of civil indemnity is

reduced to P200,000.00 in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of simple rape is

automatically granted.

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PEOPLE VS. SIA

G.R No. 137457. November 21, 2001

FACTS:

The accused-appellants conspired to kill the victim Bermudes and carried wqith

them the victims taxicab. After several days of lost, Bermudezs corpse was discovered inside a carton box located in a fishpond. Thus the appellants were convicted for separate

crimes of anti-carnapping and murder, thus sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua. The trial court also awarded to the victims heirs, sums of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of Christian Bermudez, P200,000.00 as burial and

other expenses incurred in connection with the death P3,307,199.60 (2/3 x [80-27] x 300

per day x 26 days x 12 months) representing the loss of earning capacity of Christian

Bermudez as taxi driver.

ISSUE:

Whether the amount of damages awarded was correct.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the award of P 50, 000.00 as civil indemnity for the

death of Bermudez without even presenting of evidence. The court also affirmed the

award of moral damages for the suffering of the victims family. However, the compensatory or actual damages were deleted because of lack of proofs, thus in

determining the loss of income , the following must be taken into account: the number of

years for which the victim would have lived; and the rate of the loss sustained by the

heirs of the deceased.

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PEOPLE VS. DOCTOLERO

G.R No. 131866. August 20, 2001

FACTS:

Ganongan and his friends went to Honeymoon road at Baguio City. While they

were leaving the place, armed person stopped them, hence when Ganongan, the victim

reacted the appellant Doctolero shot him twice causing the victims death as Saint Louis Hospital The RTC finds the accused Carlos Doctolero, Sr. guilty of the offense of

Murder and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of

deceased, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death; the sum of P227,808.80 as

actual damages for expenses incurred for hospitalization, doctors fees, funeral expenses, vigil and burial as a result of his death, and P300,000.00 as Moral damages for the pain

and mental anguish suffered by the heirs by reason of his death.

ISSUE:

Whether the award of actual damages is correct?

RULING:

No, the award of actual damages in incorrect thus Supreme Court reduced the

award of actual damages to P112, 413.40 representing funeral expenses, which proven

during the proceedings. Expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year

anniversaries cannot be considered in the award of actual damages as these were incurred

after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim. However, the award of

moral damages is reduced to P50, 000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence for

the death of the victim.

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PEOPLE VS. ABULENCIA

G.R No. 138403. August 22 2001

FACTS:

The appellant had a drink with the brother of the victim, Rebelyn, when the

appellant along with the victim who was then 12 years old to but dilis in the nearby store.

The appellant and the victim never returned but the former surrendered to the authorities

and alleged that the victim has accidentally fallen into the river. However, when the body

was found, it was discovered that the victim was raped before thrown to the river. The

trial court foud Abulencia guilty of the crime of aggravated rape with homicide and

sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. It was also ordered that the accused

indemnify the heirs of Rebelyn Garcia, the sum of P75,000.00 damages, and another sum

of P20,000.00 for exemplary damages plus P6,425.00 as actual damages.

ISSUE:

Whether the award of damages is correctly imposed.

RULING:

No. the award of damages and penalty was incorrect, thus the Supreme Court both

modified the penalty by reducing it to reclusion perpetua and the award of civil damages.

The court awarded the amount of P 50, 000.00 as moral damages for the moral suffering

of the heirs of the raped victim. However, the award of civil indemnity was increasea

from P 75, 000.00 to p 100, 000.00 based on current jurisprudence in cases of rape with

homicide.

Page | 24

BERMUDEZ VS. JUDGE MELENCIO-HERRERA

G.R No. L-32055. February 26, 1988

FACTS:

The victim Rogelio, a six years old son of the petitioners was killed in a vehicular

accident caused by the alleged negligenc of Cordova, the driver of a jeep who bumped

with the victims passenger seat. The parents instituted an action for collection of damages against the accused Cordova from the crime of homicide thru reckless

imprudence. The petitioner parents reserved their right to file an independent action

based on quasi-delicts. However, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the

complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the

case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through

Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.

ISSUE:

Whether the action is based on quasi-delicts and can not stand independently from

the criminal case.

RULING:

Yes. The action was based on quasi-delicts, thus it can be based on the provisions

of the New Civil Code under Article 2176- 2194 where an action for damages from fault,

omission or negligence can prosper independently even during the proceeding in the

criminal case

The parents of the victim made a reservation to file an independent civil action in

accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even

without such a reservation, the court has allowed the injured party in the criminal case

which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict.

Page | 25

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE RELOVA

G.R No. L-45129

FACTS:

Batangas Electric System together with police officers, has searched the premises

of the Ice Plant building owned and managed by Opulencia. The authorities discovered

that Opulencia made illegal installment of electrical wirings and devices causing the

diminution of his electric bill. Thus, he was charge of violatin city ordinance enacted in

1974. Opulencia contended that the offense has already prescribed thus, the Batangas

City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that

the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of

discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal

more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. After

two weeks, another violation was again filed against Opulencia, this time for theft of

electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the electric company can file separate civil action for collection of

damagers against Opulencia.

RULING:

Yes, the electric company may file another civil action for the theft of electric

power by Opulencia. Although the criminal aspect was already prescribed in the first

criminal case And by bar on double jeopardy in the second case, Opulencia can not

escape his civil liability.

Thus, the Supreme Court ordered Opulencia to pay the damages in the amount he

stole from the city and or the electric company from the time he installed the electric

wirings and devices.

Page | 26

MANANTAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 107125. January 29, 2001

FACTS: The deceased Nicolas suggested to Fiscal Ambrocio that they will borrow the for

fiera of the accused Manantan, in order for the former to have easy access for their

planned activity. Thus, when they proceeded catching shrimps, they had drinking spree

until they decided to go to Santiago City in the evening and have another drinking spree

there. However, after they ate snacks in the city, they decided to go home. While the

Manantan was driving the carat the speed of 40 kilometer per hour, the car bumped a

coming jeepney causing the former car to swerve into the next line. Ruben Nicolas died ,

however Manantan and the Fiscal suffered injuries.

The trial court acquitted the accused of the crime of Homicide through Reckless

Imprudence. Thus, Manantan appealed for the civil liability he is going to fulfill to the

heirs of the victim. However, it was found out that the proximate cause of the death of the

victim was the negligence of Manantan and the latter was ordered to pay the heirs of the

victim in the amount of P 174, 400.00.

ISSUE:

Whether the extinguishment of the criminal liability in the case carries also the

extinguishment of the civil liability.

RULING:

No. the extinguishment of the criminal liability of Manantan does not carry the

extinguishment of his civil liability because his acquittal was based on reasonable doubt

or the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, it was

not proven that he was acquitted as if he was not present at the happening of the crime

which totally obliterates his civil liability. Thus, article 29 of the Civil Code can be

applied in case of omission or fault.

Page | 27

PEOPLE VS. BAYOTAS

G.R No. 102007. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Appellant Bayotas was charged with rape and was convicted for the said crime in

1991. while his appeal was pending, he died at the New Bilibid Hospital due to

respiratory attack. Thus, when the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect, the

Solicitor- General expressed that the civil liability of the accused was not also extinguish

upon the death of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether the civil liability of the accused was extinguished upon his death.

RULING:

No, the civil liability in general of the accused was not extinguished upon the

death of the accused. However, necessarily, the civil liability in the rape case was

extinguished since it was included in the act complained of but the remedy of the victim

is to proceed to the estate of the accused through the filing of a separate independent

action for collection of damages.

Page | 28

Barredo vs. Garcia

73 Phil 607

FACTS:

The taxicab owned by petitioner Barredo collided to a carratela. Thus, the

carratela fall down and overturned causing the death of the son of respondent Garcia. The

trial court convicted the driver of the taxicab. However, the respondent has reserved his

right to file independent civil action for collection of damages for the death of his son.

ISSUE:

Whether Barredo can held primary liable for the death of the son of the

respondent.

RULING:

Yes. Barredo can also be held primary and directly liable in the civil case because

it was found out that being the owner and operator of the taxicab, his negligence to

supervise and exert extraordinary diligence in the performance of his employees made

him liable together with his convicted employee. Thus, the failure to prove that there was

no negligence on the part of the owner of the taxicab made no way for the petitioner to

escape his civil liability. Therefore, the acts of the employee reflects the act of the

employer causing the latter liable in case of negligence in supervision.

Page | 29

DY TEBAN VS. LIBERTY FOREST

G.R No. 161803. February 4, 2008

FACTS:

A Prime Mover Trailer suffered a tire blow out during the night of its travel at a

national highway. The trailer was owned by the respondent Liberty Forest. The driver

allegedly put earl warning devices but the only evidence being witnessed was a banana

trunks and candles. Since the car was placed at the right wing of the road, thus it cause

the swerving of a Nissan van owned by the petitioner when a passenger bus was coming

in between the trailer. The Nissan van owner claimed for damages against the respondent.

The trial court found that the proximate cause of the three way accident is the negligence and carelessness of driver of the respondent . However reversed the decision

of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether there was negligence on the part of the respondent.

RULING:

Yes. There was negligence on the part of the respondent when the latter failed to

put and used an early warning device because it was found out that there was no early

warning device being prescribed by law that was used by the driver in order to warn

incoming vehicle. Furthermore, the proximate cause of the accident was due to the

position of the trailer where it covered a cemented part of the road, thus confused and

made trick way for other vehicles to pass by. Thus the respondent is declared liable due

to violation of road rules and regulations.

Page | 30

SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS. TANGCO

G.R No. 165732. December 14, 2006

FACTS:

The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also a

licensed-fire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to renew her

time deposit and along with her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security guard of the

bank, upon knowing that the victim carries a firearm, the security guard shot the victim

causing the latters instant death. The heirs of the victim filed a criminal case against security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to observe diligence of

a goof father implied upon the act of its agent.

ISSUE:

Whether Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent.

RULING:

Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission of

an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in order to

overcome this presumption, the employer must prove that there was no negligence on his

part in the supervision of his employees.

It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are

required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. Thus,

due diligence on the supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of

suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper

instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the

employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case, Safeguard Security

committed negligence in identifying the qualifications and ability of its agents.

Page | 31

VILLANUEVA VS. DOMINGO

G.R No. 144274. September 20, 2004

FACTS:

In 1991, a collision was made by a green Mitsubishi lancer owned by Ocfemia

against a silver Mitsubishi lancer driven by Leandro Domingo and owned by petitioner

Priscilla Domingo. The incident caused the car of Domingo bumped another two parked

vehicles. A charged was filed against Ocfemia and the owner Villanueva. Villanueva

claimed that he must not be held liable for the incident because he is no longer the owner

of the car, that it was already swapped to another car . however, the trial court ordered the

petitioner to pay the damages incurred by the silver Mitsubishi lancer car.

ISSUE:

Whether the owner Villanueva be held liable for the mishap.

RULING:

Under the Motor Vehicle law, it was declared that the registered owner of any

vehicle is primary land directly liable for any injury it incurs while it is being operated.

Thus, even the petitioner claimed that he was no longer the present owner of the car, still

the registry was under his name, thus it is presumed that he still possesses the car and that

the damages caused by the car be charge against him being the registered owner. The

primary function of Motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any

accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility

therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

Page | 32

CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 122039. May 31, 2000

FACTS:

Eliza Sunga was a passenger of a jeepney owned and operated by the petitioner

Calalas. Private respondent Sunga sat in the rear protion of the jeepney where the

conductor gave Sunga an extension seat. When the jeep stopped, Sunga gave way to a

passenger going outside the jeep. However, an Isuzu Truck driven by Verene and owned

by Salva, accidentally hit Sunga causing the latter to suffer physical injuries where the

attending physician ordered a three months of rest. Sunga filed an action for damages

against the petitioner for breach of contract of common carriage by the petitioner.

On the other hand, the petitioner Calalas filed an action against Salva, being the

owner of the truck. The lower court ruled in favor of ther petitioner, thus the truck owner

is liable for the damage to the jeep of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitionerr is liable.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioner is liable for the injury suffered by Sunga. Under Article 1756

of the New Civil Code, it provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at

fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary

diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts

to the common carrier the burden of proof.

In this case, the law presumes that any injury suffered by a passenger of the jeep

is deemed to be due to the negligence of the driver. This is a case on Culpa Contractual

where there was pre-existing obligations and that the fault is incidental to the

performance of the obligation. Thus, it was clearly observed that the petitioner has

negligence in the conduct of his duty when he allowed Sunga to seat in the rear portion of

the jeep which is prone to accident.

Page | 33

LUDO AND LUYM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125483. FEBRUARY 1, 2001

FACTS: Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in copra

processing. Private Respondent Gabisan Shipping Lines was the registered owner and

operator of the motor vessel MV Miguela, while the other private respondent, Anselmo

Olasiman, was its captain. On May 21, 1990, while MV Miguela was docking at

petitioners wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Ireneo Naval, petitioners employee, guided the vessel to its docking place. After the small rope was thrown from the vessel and while the petitioners security guard was pulling the big rope to be tied to the bolar, MV Miguela did not slow down. The crew did not release the

vessels anchor. Naval shouted Reverse to the vessels crew, but it was too late when the latter responded, for the vessel already rammed the pile cluster. Petitioner demanded

for damages but private respondents denied the incident and the damage. Their witnesses

claimed that the damage, if any, must have occurred prior to their arrival and caused by

another vessel or by ordinary wear and tear.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case?

RULING:

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor provides that where the thing which causes injury

is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the

ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper

care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,

that the accident arose from want of care. In this case, all the requisites for this doctrine

exist. First, MV Miguela was under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Second,

aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private respondent

did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage. There exists a

presumption of negligence against private respondents which they failed to overcome.

Additionally, petitioner presented proof that demonstrated private respondents negligence. As testified by Capt. Olasiman, from command of slow ahead to stop engine, the vessel will still travel 100 meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered stop engine when the vessel was only 50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to slow astern, the engine has to be restarted. However, Olasiman

can not estimate how long it takes before the engine goes to slow astern after the engine

is restarted. From these declarations, the conclusion is that it was already too late when

the captain ordered reverse. By then, the vessel was only 4 meters from the pier, and thus

rammed it.

Respondent companys negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan

did not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere elementary

graduate while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in navigationwas

only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively. Gabisan Shipping Lines and the

ship captain are held jointly and severally liable for damages caused to the petitioner.

Page | 34

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED vs. LEONORA NAVAL

G.R. No. 131541. OCTOBER 20, 2000

FACTS:

"On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving

a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta.

Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction

of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the

direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the

taxicab was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose

control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring

Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden,

sustained injuries as a result of the incident."

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner,

Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver,

petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent

and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual,

compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE:

What are the liabilities of both parties?

RULING:

The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of

the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. It is established that Castro was driving

at a speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope. But as he

allegedly stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left

and consequently hit the taxicab. Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event.

Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties such as commuters,

drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know about the

conditions of his vehicle and is duty bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a

good father of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the streets. As

petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a

downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record

shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision occurred.

The taxi driver is contributorily liable since he took a U-turn where it is not

generally advisable. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully

made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles

coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of

foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Considering the contributory

negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the

repair of the taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for

lack of merit.

Page | 35

AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219. MARCH 15, 1918

FACTS:

The plaintiff, riding on his pony was half way across the Carlatan bridge when the

defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of

about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a

horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his

course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it

appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the

road. The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However,

thinking that he has no sufficient time to go to the other side of the road, he pulled the

pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the

left. The defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or

slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse. When he had gotten

quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the

defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse

alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed

in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across

the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left

hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was

thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff

received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical

attention for several days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the

horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center

of the bridge he clearly saw that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have

perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving

vehicle. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was

his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other

persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse

to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until

he was almost upon the horse.

The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent

negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But it was the defendant

who had the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and when he failed to do so,

he is deemed negligent, thus liable to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff.

Page | 36

JOSE V. LAGON vs. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC

G.R. No. 135657. JANUARY 17, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1981 Lagon, a businessman and HOOVEN entered into two

(2) contracts, denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00

HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagons commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. HOOVEN filed an action against Lagon claiming

that the latter failed to pay his due despite HOOVENs performance of its obligation. Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of

breach of contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials specified in the

proposals; that as a consequence he was compelled to procure the undelivered materials

from other sources; that as regards the materials duly delivered and installed by

HOOVEN, they were fully paid.

ISSUE:

Who among the parties is entitled to damages?

RULING:

HOOVEN's bad faith lies not so much on its breach of contract - as there was no

showing that its failure to comply with its part of the bargain was motivated by ill will or

done with fraudulent intent - but rather on its appalling temerity to sue petitioner for

payment of an alleged unpaid balance of the purchase price notwithstanding knowledge

of its failure to make complete delivery and installation of all the materials under their

contracts. Although petitioner was found to be liable to respondent to the extent of

P6,377.66, petitioner's right to withhold full payment of the purchase price prior to the

delivery and installation of all the merchandise cannot be denied since under the contracts

the balance of the purchase price became due and demandable only upon the completion

of the project. Consequently, the resulting social humiliation and damage to petitioner's

reputation as a respected businessman in the community, occasioned by the filing of this

suit provide sufficient grounds for the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. On the

part of Lagon, he is ordered by the court to pay HOOVEN the amount corresponding to

the value of the materials admittedly delivered to him.

Page | 37

SPOUSES FRANCISCO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118749. APRIL 25, 2003

FACTS:

On 3 February 1984, the spouses Lorenzo and Lorenza Francisco and Engineer

Bienvenido C. Mercado entered into a Contract of Development for the development into

a subdivision of several parcels of land in Pampanga. Under the Contract, respondent

agreed to undertake at his expense the development work for the Franda Village

Subdivision. Respondent committed to complete the construction within 27 months.

Respondent also advanced P200,000.00 for the initial expenses of the development work.

In return, respondent would receive 50% of the total gross sales of the subdivision lots

and other income of the subdivision. Respondent also enjoyed the exclusive and

irrevocable authority to manage, control and supervise the sales of the lots within the

subdivision. The Contract required respondent to submit to petitioners, within the first 15

days of every month, a report on payments collected from lot buyers with copies of all

the contracts to sell. However, respondent failed to submit the monthly report.

On 27 February 1987, respondent filed with the trial court an action to rescind the

Contract with a prayer for damages. Petitioners countered that respondent breached the

Contract by failing to finish the subdivision within the 27 months agreed upon, and

therefore respondent was in delay.

ISSUE:

Did Engr. Mercado incur delay in the case at bench?

RULING:

The petitioners breached the Contract by: (1) hiring Rosales to do development

work on the subdivision within the 27-month period exclusively granted to respondent;

(2) interfering with the latter's development work; and (3) stopping respondent from

managing the sale of lots and collection of payments. Because petitioners were the first to

breach the Contract and even interfered with the development work, respondent did not

incur delay even if he completed only 28% of the development work. Further, the HSRC

extended the Contract up to July 1987. Since the Contract had not expired at the time

respondent filed the action for rescission, petitioners' defense that respondent did not

finish the development work on time was without basis. The law provides that delay may

exist when the obligor fails to fulfill his obligation within the time expressly stipulated. In

this case, the HSRC extended the period for respondent to finish the development work

until 30 July 1987. Respondent did not incur delay since the period granted him to fulfill

his obligation had not expired at the time respondent filed the action for rescission on 27

February 1987.

Moreover, since petitioners stopped respondent from selling lots and collecting

payments from lot buyers, which was the primary source of development funds, they in

effect, rendered respondent incapable, or at least made it difficult for him, to develop the

subdivision within the allotted period. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in

delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply with what is incumbent upon

him. It is only when one of the parties fulfills his obligation that delay by the other

begins.

Page | 38

JACINTO TANGUILIG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.

G.R. No. 117190. JANUARY 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Jacinto M. Tanguilig proposed to respondent Vicente Herce Jr. to

construct a windmill system for him. After some negotiations they agreed on the

construction of the windmill for a consideration of P60,000.00. On 14 March 1988, due

to the refusal and failure of respondent to pay the balance, petitioner filed a complaint to

collect the amount. Respondent denied the claim saying that he had already paid this

amount to the San Pedro General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the

deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected. According to respondent,

since the deep well formed part of the system the payment he tendered to SPGMI should

be credited to his account by petitioner. Moreover, assuming that he owed petitioner a

balance of P15,000.00, this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which

caused the structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.

Petitioner denied that the construction of a deep well was included in the

agreement to build the windmill system, for the contract price of P60,000.00 was solely

for the windmill assembly and its installation. He also disowned any obligation to repair

or reconstruct the system since its collapse was attributable to a typhoon, a force majeure,

which relieved him of any liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the payment for the deep well is part of the contract price.

Whether or not Tanguilig is liable to reconstruct the damaged windmill considering that

its collapse is due to a typhoon.

RULING:

There is absolutely no mention in the two (2) documents that a deep well pump is

a component of the proposed windmill system. The contract prices fixed in both

proposals cover only the features specifically described therein and no other. Respondent

is directed to pay petitioner Tanguilig the balance of P15,000.00 plus legal interest.

Regarding the second issue, the Supreme Court has consistently held that in order

for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art.

1174 of the Civil Code four (4) requisites must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the

obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either

unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the

debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and, (d) the debtor must be free from

any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Petitioner failed to show

that the collapse of the windmill was due solely to a fortuitous event. Petitioner

merely stated that there was a "strong wind." But a strong wind in this case cannot be

fortuitous. On the contrary, a strong wind should be present in places where windmills

are constructed. Petitioner is ordered to "reconstruct subject defective windmill system, in

accordance with the one-year guaranty".

Page | 39

DR. FERNANDO PERIQUET, JR. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-69996. DECEMBER 5, 1994

FACTS:

Spouses Fernando Periquet and Petra Francisco were left childless after the death

of their only child, Elvira, so they took in a son out of wedlock of Marta Francisco-Reyes,

sister of Petra. Though he was not legally adopted, the boy was given the name Fernando

Periquet, Jr. and was reared to manhood by the spouses Periquet. On March 20, 1966,

Fernando Periquet died. When Petra died, she was survived by her siblings, nieces and

nephews and by the petitioner. But a few days before her death, Petra asked her lawyer to

prepare her last will and testament. However, she died before she could sign it. In the said

will, Petra left her estate to petitioner, Fernando Periquet, Jr. and provided for certain

legacies to her other heirs. Felix Franciso, brother of Petra, assigned his hereditary rights

to the petitioner. However, later on, he filed an action for annulment of the Assignment of

Hereditary Rights claiming "gross misrepresentation and fraud," "grave abuse of

confidence," "mistake and undue influence," and "lack of cause and/or consideration" in

the execution of the challenged deed of assignment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Assignment of Hereditary Rights is tainted with fraud.

RULING:

The kind of fraud that will vitiate a contract refers to those insidious words or

machinations resorted to by one of the contracting parties to induce the other to enter into

a contract which without them he would not have agreed to. In the case at bench, no such

fraud was employed by herein petitioner. Resultantly, the assignment of hereditary rights

executed by Felix Francisco in favor of herein petitioner is valid and effective.

Felix Francisco could not be considered to have been deceived into signing the

subject deed of assignment for the following reasons: The assignment was executed and

signed freely and voluntarily by Felix Francisco in order to honor, respect and give full

effect to the last wishes of his deceased sister, Petra. The same was read by him and was

further explained by Atty. Diosdado Guytingco. Furthermore, witnesses for petitioner,

who also served as witnesses in the execution and signing of the deed of assignment,

declared that Felix Francisco was neither forced nor intimidated to sign the assignment of

hereditary rights.

Page | 40

LEGASPI OIL CO., INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96505 JULY 1, 1993

FACTS:

Bernard Oseraos had several transactions with Legaspi Oil Co. for the sale of

copra to the latter. The price at which appellant sells the copra varies from time to time,

depending on the prevailing market price when the contract is entered into. On February

16, 1976, appellant's agent Jose Llover signed contract No. 3804 for the sale of 100 tons

of copra at P82.00 per 100 kilos with delivery terms of 20 days effective March 8, 1976.

After the period to deliver had lapsed, appellant sold only 46,334 kilos of copra thus

leaving a balance of 53,666 kilos. Accordingly, demands were made upon appellant to

deliver the balance with a final warning that failure to deliver will mean cancellation of

the contract, the balance to be purchased at open market and the price differential to be

charged against appellant. On October 22, 1976, since there was still no compliance,

appellee exercised its option under the contract and purchased the undelivered balance

from the open market at the prevailing price of P168.00 per 100 kilos, or a price

differential of P86.00 per 100 kilos, a net loss of P46,152.76 chargeable against appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is guilty of breach of contact.

RULING:

Private respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of his obligation under

the sales contract whereunder he bound himself to deliver to petitioner 100 metric tons of

copra. However within the delivery period, Oseraos delivered only 46,334 kilograms of

copra to petitioner. Petitioner made repeated demands upon private respondent to deliver

the balance of 53,666 kilograms but private respondent ignored the same. Petitioner made

a final demand with a warning that, should private respondent fail to complete delivery of

the balance of 53,666 kilograms of copra, petitioner would purchase the balance at the

open market and charge the price differential to private respondent. Still private

respondent failed to fulfill his contractual obligation to deliver the remaining 53,666

kilograms of copra and since there was still no compliance by private respondent,

petitioner exercised its right under the contract and purchased 53,666 kilograms of copra,

the undelivered balance, at the open market at the then prevailing price of P168.00 per

100 kilograms, a price differential of P46,152.76.

The conduct of private respondent clearly manifests his deliberate fraudulent

intent to evade his contractual obligation for the price of copra had in the meantime more

than doubled from P82.00 to P168 per 100 kilograms. Under Article 1170 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines, those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of

fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,

are liable for damages. Pursuant to said article, private respondent is liable for damages.

Page | 41

TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION vs. PRIMETOWN

G.R. No. 158768, FEBRUARY 12, 2008

FACTS:

In 1992, respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. awarded the contract for the

structural works of its 32-storey Makati Prime Tower (MPT) to petitioner Titan-Ikeda

Construction and Development Corporation. In September 1995, respondent engaged the

services of Integratech, Inc. (ITI), an engineering consultancy firm, to evaluate the

progress of the project. In its report, ITI informed respondent that petitioner, at that point,

had only accomplished 31.89% of the project (or was 11 months and six days behind

schedule). Meanwhile, petitioner and respondent were discussing the possibility of the

latters take over of the projects supervision. Despite ongoing negotiations, respondent did not obtain petitioners consent in hiring ITI as the projects construction manager. Neither did it inform petitioner of ITIs September 7, 1995 report.

Subsequently, both parties agreed that Primetown will take over the project.

Petitioner then demanded for the payment due him in relation to its partial performance

of its obligation. For failure of Primetown to pay despite repeated demands, petitioner

filed a case for specific performance against Primetown. Meanwhile, Primetown

demanded reimbursement for the amount it spent in having the project completed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Titzn-Ikeda is responsible for the projects delay.

RULING:

It was found that because respondent modified the MPT's architectural design,

petitioner had to adjust the scope of work. Moreover, respondent belatedly informed

petitioner of those modifications. It also failed to deliver the concrete mix and rebars

according to schedule. For this reason, petitioner was not responsible for the project's

delay. Mora or delay is the failure to perform the obligation in due time because of dolo

(malice) or culpa (negligence). A debtor is deemed to have violated his obligation to the

creditor from the time the latter makes a demand. Once the creditor makes a demand, the

debtor incurs mora or delay. Respondent never sent petitioner a written demand asking it

to accelerate work on the project and reduce, if not eliminate, slippage. In view of the

foregoing, we hold that petitioner did not incur delay in the performance of its obligation.

Page | 42

PNB MADECOR vs. GERARDO C. UY

G.R. No. 129598. AUGUST 15, 2001

FACTS:

Guillermo Uy assigned to respondent Gerardo Uy his receivables due from

Pantranco North Express Inc. (PNEI). The deed of assignment included sales invoices

containing stipulations regarding payment of interest and attorneys fees. On January 23, 1995, Gerardo Uy filed with the RTC a collection suit against PNEI. He alleged that

PNEI was guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation sued upon, hence his prayer for a

writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff issued a notice of garnishment addressed to

the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and PNB MADECOR attaching the goods, effects, credits, monies and all other personal properties of PNEI in the possession of the bank. PNB MADECOR however claimed that the receivables of Guillermo Uy have been

applied to PNEIs unpaid rentals to the bank thru compensation, thus private respondent is no longer entitled to such. Respondent pointed out that the demand letter sent by PNEI

to petitioner was made before petitioners obligation to PNEI became due. This being so, respondent argues that there can be no compensation since there was as yet no

compensable debt in 1984 when PNEI demanded payment from petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PNB MADECOR is correct in its contention that compensation is

applicable to its receivables from and its payables to PNEI.

RULING:

Petitioners obligation to PNEI appears to be payable on demand. However, the Court found that the letter sent by PNEI to PNB MADECOR was not one demanding

payment, but one that merely informed petitioner of the conveyance of a certain portion

of its obligation to PNEI. Since petitioners obligation to PNEI is payable on demand, and there being no demand made, it follows that the obligation is not yet due. Therefore,

this obligation may not be subject to compensation for lack of a requisite under the law.

Without compensation having taken place, petitioner remains obligated to PNEI to the

extent stated in the promissory note. This obligation may undoubtedly be garnished in

favor of respondent to satisfy PNEIs judgment debt. As regards respondents averment that there was as yet no compensable debt

when PNEI sent petitioner a demand letter on September 1984, since PNEI was not yet

indebted to petitioner at that time, the law does not require that the parties obligations be incurred at the same time. What the law requires only is that the obligations be due and

demandable at the same time.

Page | 43

IGNACIO BARZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELITO ALVIAR

G.R. No. 115129. FEBRUARY 12, 1997

FACTS:

Barzaga went to the hardware store of respondent Alviar to inquire about the

availability of certain materials to be used in the construction of a niche for his wife. The

following morning, Barzaga went back to the store and told the employees that the

materials he was buying would have to be delivered at the Memorial Cemetery by eight

o'clock that morning since his hired workers were already at the burial site and time was

of the essence. A store employee agreed to deliver the items at the designated time,

date and place. With this assurance, Barzaga purchased the materials and paid in full.

The construction materials did not arrive at eight o'clock as promised. After follow-ups

and several hours later, when there was yet no delivery made, Barzaga went back to the

store. He saw the delivery truck but the things he purchased were not yet ready for

loading. Distressed by the seeming lack of concern on the stores part, Barzaga decided to cancel his transaction with the store and buy from another store.

Not being able to fulfill the scheduled burial of his wife, Barzaga demanded

damages from Alviar but the latter refused claiming that he is not liable for damages

considering that he did not incur legal delay since there was no specific time of delivery

agreed upon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent incurred delay in the performance of his

obligation.

RULING:

Respondent Angelito Alviar was negligent and incurred in delay in the

performance of his contractual obligation. The niche had to be constructed at the very

least on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2) days

to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth of the month.

Respondent's delay in the delivery of the construction materials wasted so much time that

construction of the tomb could start only on the twenty-third. It could not be ready for

the scheduled burial of petitioner's wife.

This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. In their

contract of purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was

required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2,110.00. It was

incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods

otherwise delay would attach.

Page | 44

JACINTO TANGUILIG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.

G.R. No. 117190. JANUARY 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner Jacinto M. Tanguilig proposed to respondent Vicente Herce Jr. to

construct a windmill system for him. After some negotiations they agreed on the

construction of the windmill for a consideration of P60,000.00. On 14 March 1988, due

to the refusal and failure of respondent to pay the balance, petitioner filed a complaint to

collect the amount. Respondent denied the claim saying that he had already paid this

amount to the San Pedro General Merchandising Inc. (SPGMI) which constructed the

deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected. According to respondent,

since the deep well formed part of the system the payment he tendered to SPGMI should

be credited to his account by petitioner. Moreover, assuming that he owed petitioner a

balance of P15,000.00, this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which

caused the structure to collapse after a strong wind hit their place.

Petitioner refused to pay and argued that private respondent was already in default

in the payment of his outstanding balance of P15,000.00 and hence should bear his own

loss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is correct in his contention that respondent is already in

default thus he should bear the loss of the windmill.

RULING:

Petitioner's argument that private respondent was already in default in the

payment of his outstanding balance of P15,000.00 and hence should bear his own loss, is

untenable. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not

comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.

When the windmill failed to function properly it became incumbent upon petitioner to

institute the proper repairs in accordance with the guaranty stated in the contract. Thus,

respondent cannot be said to have incurred in delay; instead, it is petitioner who should

bear the expenses for the reconstruction of the windmill. Article 1167 of the Civil Code

is explicit on this point that if a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same

shall be executed at his cost.

Page | 45

TAYAG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96053. MARCH 3, 1993

FACTS:

Juan Galicia, Sr. executed a deed of conveyance, prior to his demise in 1979 in

favor of Albrigido Leyva involving the undivided one-half portion of a piece of land

situated at Poblacion, Guimba, Nueva Ecija for the sum of P50,000.00. There is no

dispute that the first installment was received by Juan Galicia, Sr. And according to

petitioners, of the P10,000.00 to be paid within ten days from execution of the

instrument, only P9,707.00 was tendered to, and received by, them on numerous

occasions from May 29, 1975, up to November 3, 1979. It was also agreed upon that

private respondent will assume the vendors' obligation to the Philippine Veterans Bank,

however, he paid only the sum of P6,926.41 while the difference of the indebtedness was

paid by Juan Galicia, Sr.s sister. Moreover, petitioners claimed that not a single centavo of the P27,000.00 representing the remaining balance was paid to them. Petitioners

averred that private respondents failure to pay full consideration of the agreement to sell gave them the right to have the contract rescinded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to rescind the contract in the present

case.

RULING:

Considering that the heirs of Juan Galicia, Sr. accommodated private respondent

by accepting the latter's delayed payments not only beyond the grace periods but also

during the pendency of the case for specific performance, petitioners' actuation is

susceptible of but one construction that they are now estopped from reneging from their