observing the 1998-99 nigeria elections - carter center · observing the 1998-99 nigeria elections...

SPECIAL REPORT SERIES

OBSERVING THE1998-99 NIGERIA ELECTIONS

SUMMER 1999

The Carter Center National Democratic Institutefor International Affairs

FINAL REPORT

THE CARTER CENTER STRIVES TO RELIEVE SUFFERING BY

ADVANCING PEACE AND HEALTH WORLDWIDE; IT SEEKS TO PREVENT

AND RESOLVE CONFLICTS, ENHANCE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, AND

PROTECT AND PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE.

NDI WORKS WITH DEMOCRATS IN EVERY REGION OF THE WORLD TO

BUILD POLITICAL AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS, SAFEGUARD ELECTIONS,AND PROMOTE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, OPENNESS,

AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT.

1

OBSERVING THE 1998-99 NIGERIA ELECTIONS

NDITHE CARTER CENTER NDI

OBSERVING THE

1998-99 NIGERIA ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT

DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

THE CARTER CENTER

ONE COPENHILL

ATLANTA, GA 30307(404) 420-5185

FAX (404) 420-3862WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

SUMMER 1999

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1717 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. N.W., SUITE 503WASHINGTON, DC 20036

(202) 328-3136FAX (202) 939-3166

WWW.NDI.ORG

THE CARTER CENTER

2


NDI

SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, USA, MAY 1993

3



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Nigerian Presidential Elections Delegation and Staff List 4

List of Abbreviations 7

Foreword 8

Executive Summary 10

Background: From Brutal Repression to Open Elections 13

Nigeria: Past to PresentFrom Abacha to Abubakar

Transition Issues 15

Constitutional Framework and Rules of the GameVoter RegistrationPolitical PartiesCampaign and Electoral Competition

Monitoring the Elections 18

BriefingsDeploymentObservation Methodology

NDI/Carter Center Election Activities 21

October Assessment TripsDec. 5 Local ElectionsJan. 9 State and Governors ElectionsPresident Carter’s January VisitFeb. 20 National Assembly ElectionsFeb. 27 Presidential Election Observation MissionPreliminary Assessment and Post-election ObservationsPost-election Opportunities

Conclusion 32

Acknowledgments 34

Appendices 38

About The National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center 72

THE CARTER CENTER

4


NDI

NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONSDELEGATION AND STAFF LIST

Feb. 23 – March 1, 1999

Leadership Team

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 39th President of the United States; Carter Center ChairMrs. Rosalynn Carter, former First Lady of the United States; Carter Center Vice ChairThe Honorable Mahamane Ousmane, Former President of the Republic of NigerGeneral Colin Powell, Former Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Delegation Members

Pauline Baker, President, Fund for Peace, USAHis Royal Highness Moulay Hicham Benabdullah, Prince of MoroccoRichard Blum, Chairman, Richard C. Blum and Associates, L.P., USAAllison Boyer, Africa Project Officer, Cohen & Woods International, USACharles Brumskine, President Pro-Tempore of the Liberian Senate, LiberiaShari Bryan, Resident Director in Nigeria, National Democratic Institute (NDI), USAAlessandra Cabras, NGO Liaison, Global Coalition for Africa, Italy/USAJason Calder, Program Coordinator, Global Development Initiative, The Carter Center, USADavid Carroll, Associate Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAJames Carter IV, Bachelors student, Georgia State University, USACharles Costello, Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAGillian Flies, Associate Director/Logistics Manager, Carter Center Nigeria Office, USAChris Fomunyoh, Regional Director, Central, East and West Africa, NDI, USAShirley Robinson Hall, Former U.S. Representative to the United Nations; former NDI board

member, USAJames Kavanagh, Consultant to Moroccan Prince Moulay Hicham Benabdullah, USASharon Pratt Kelly, Former Mayor of Washington, D.C.; President/CEO, ATC Research, USADarren Kew, Doctoral student, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USARobert La Gamma, Director, Carter Center Nigeria Office, USAPeter Lewis, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, USAPaul Lubeck, Professor, Sociology and History, University of California at Santa Cruz, USAPrinceton Lyman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa; Overseas Development

Council, USACarrie Manning, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Georgia State University, USAMariano Matsinhe, Member of Parliament and Head of Commission for National

Affairs, Mozambique

5



Henry McConnon, Private sector, optics wholesaler and retailer, USAPatrick McConnon, Associate Director, Program Development, National Center for Infectious Dis-

eases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USATim McCoy, Senior Program Officer for Central, East and West Africa, NDI, USAMora McLean, President, African-American Institute, USAGwendolyn Mikell, Director, African Studies Program, and Professor, Anthropology, School of Foreign

Service, Georgetown University, USAYusuf Mwawa, Member of Parliament, MalawiMarie Nelson, Director for Africa Policy, Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, USAJohn Paden, Clarence J. Robinson Professor of International Studies, George Mason University, USADave Peterson, Senior Program Officer for Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, USAPearl Robinson, Program Director, International Relations, and Associate Professor,

Political Science, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USALinda Rotblatt, Legislative Assistant to Senator Russell D. Feingold (D-WI), USAKarin Ryan, Assistant Director for Human Rights, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter

Center, USASoedjana Sapi’ie, Professor, Electrical Engineering, Bandung Institute of Technology, IndonesiaNadia Sood, Masters student, International Affairs, Columbia University; Researcher, Ford Foundation

Project on Ethnic Conflict, USAGeorge Springer, President, Connecticut Federation of Educational and Professional

Employees, USAShandal Sullivan, Executive Assistant to the Associate Executive Director for the Control and Eradica-

tion of Disease, The Carter Center, USARose Waruhiu, Executive Director, The Democratic Foundation, KenyaCharles Williams, Chief of Staff and Legislative Director for Congressman Jim McDermott

(D-WA), USALaurie Wiseberg, Founder/Executive Director, Human Rights Internet; Adjunct Professor, Graduate

School of Common Law, University of Ottawa, CanadaKirk Wolcott, Program Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center, USAKenneth Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, USA

THE CARTER CENTER

6


NDI

NDI/Carter Center Staff

Matthew Cirillo, Finance Manager, Financial Administrator, The Carter Center, USACatherine Clarke, Logistics Assistant, Student intern, The Carter Center, UKDeanna Congileo, Press Officer, Senior Associate Director of Public Information, The Carter

Center, USATunde Durosinmi-Etti, Logistics Coordinator, Carter Center in Nigeria, NigeriaTynesha Green, Field Office Manager, Program Administrative Assistant, Democracy Program,

The Carter Center, USAEric Happel, Field Support Officer, Program Officer, NDI, USACurtis Kohlhaas, Leadership Coordinator, Conference Coordinator, Conference and Events Planning

Department, The Carter Center, USACurtis Majekodunmi, Logistics Assistant, Carter Center in Nigeria, NigeriaKarine Pouchain, Logistics Assistant, Student intern, The Carter Center, FranceBrent Preston, Assistant Logistics Manager, Carter Center in Nigeria; independent public opinion

consultant, CanadaMichael Thayer, Field Support Officer, Program Officer, NDI; Assistant Logistics Manager, Carter

Center in Nigeria, USASara Tindall, Logistics Officer, Carter Center Liberia Field Director, USA

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

Some of the 66-person NDI/Carter Center delegation gather in Abuja for dinner Feb. 28, 1999,the day after observing the Nigeria presidential election.

7



AD Alliance for DemocracyAPP All People’s PartyCDCC Constitutional Debate Coordinating CommitteeEU European UnionIFES International Foundation for Election SystemsINEC Independent National Electoral CommissionIRI International Republican InstituteLGA Local Government AreaNADECO National Democratic CommitteeNDI National Democratic Institute for International AffairsNGO Nongovernmental organizationOAU Organization for African UnityPDP People’s Democratic PartyPRC Provisional Ruling CouncilTMG Transition Monitoring GroupUN United NationsUSAID U.S. Agency for International Development

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

The NDI/Carter Center leadership team meets with delegates to draft a statement during a debriefing inAbuja. From left, NDI President Kenneth Wollack; delegation co-leaders retired Gen. Colin Powell,Rosalynn and President Carter; and Carter Center Democracy Program Director Charles Costello. Notshown is delegation co-leader, former Niger President Mahamane Ousmane.

THE CARTER CENTER

8


NDI

FOREWORD

organizations. At the invitation of all key politicalfigures in Nigeria, our two institutions organizedelection assessment and observation missions foreach round of the transition process, including a 66-member international delegation to observe theFeb. 27 presidential election.

The Carter Center and NDI have a long and deepinterest in Nigeria’s welfare and in the region. TheCarter Center maintains strong health and agricul-ture projects in the country, and NDI continues itswork with newly elected officials, democraticinstitutions, and pro-democracy NGOs. We have asolid history of working together on joint electionmonitoring projects. Both institutions have experi-ence in assessing political processes and observingelections, either separately or jointly, throughnumerous delegations around the world.

Nigeria presented various political and logisticalchallenges, perhaps greater than either organizationhad faced in its previous election monitoring efforts.For one, the country’s desire to quickly replace themilitary with a civilian administration provided fora brief transition period – just four months from anOctober registration exercise through a series offour elections for local councilors and chairmen,state assemblymen and governors, National Assem-bly representatives, and the president. Complicat-ing matters was the country’s vast size and popula-tion, poor communications system, frequent fuelshortages, and run-down infrastructure.

The Feb. 27 election of retired Gen. OlusegunObasanjo, as the culmination of a political transi-tion to install democratically elected civilianofficals at all levels of government, represents alandmark opportunity for Nigeria. This transitionfrom military to civilian rule was conducted gener-ally without violence, and for that, Nigerians shouldbe justifiably proud. However, the registrationprocess and all four election rounds were marred, to

The importance of fostering democracy inNigeria cannot be overstated. The mostpopulous country in Africa, a dominant re-

gional military and economic power, and one of thelargest exporters of petroleum in the world, Nigeria is anation of vast natural and human resources. It is also anation of greatly unrealized potential, plagued fordecades by financial mismanagement, widespreadcorruption, and explosive ethnic tensions. Successivemilitary and civilian governments have plundered thepublic coffers and allowed the nation’s infrastructureand productive capacity to fall apart.

After 15 straight years of military rule, whichreached stifling levels of repression during Gen. SaniAbacha’s five-year regime, Nigerians hungered forchange. A fervent desire to elect a civilian presidentand live under a democratic system of governmentdominated the aspirations of nearly all Nigerians.This occurred with a brutal military dictator’spassing, an enlightened leader’s unexpected rise topower, and the Nigerian people’s determination.

With Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar’s rise topower following Gen. Abacha’s death in June 1998,Nigeria’s pace of political change has been remark-able. Before last summer, the prospects for a demo-cratic opening seemed dim, with many politicaldetainees languishing in prison and harsh limitsplaced on press freedoms and public expression.However, within weeks of Gen. Abubakar’s acces-sion, political parties were legalized, politicalprisoners were released, the press became unfet-tered, and a new timetable announced Nigeria’sreturn to democratically elected civilian rule.

Seeing the potential for nongovernmental organiza-tions (NGOs) to assist, The Carter Center and theNational Democratic Institute for International Affairs(NDI) responded positively to overtures from theNigerian government, the Independent NationalElectoral Commission (INEC), and civil society

9



varying degrees, by electoral irregularities, andsometimes, outright fraud. Both Nigerian civilsociety and the new government should explicitlycommit to achieve electoral reforms before thenext round of elections to remove this corruptingstrain from the new Nigeria’s political life.

We thank the delegates who participated inour missions for their contributions, especially theco-leaders who joined President Carter for thepresidential election observation: former Presidentof Niger Mahamane Ousmane and former Chair-man of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. ColinPowell. We also would like to thank CharlesCostello of The Carter Center and ChristopherFumunyoh of NDI, who directed the NigeriaProject for their respective organizations.

We are especially grateful to the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID),whose generous funding made this initiative possible.We also appreciate the support from private donorswho supplemented that funding.

An important positive development in theseelections was the formation and commitment ofthe Transition Monitoring Group (TMG). Thiscoalition of 64 Nigerian pro-democracy organiza-tions fielded more than 10,000 domestic observersin all 36 states for the presidential election,providing perspective and the most comprehen-sive monitoring force for the election. TMG’smembership and leadership crossed all ethnic,regional, and religious barriers, making it a trulynational coalition. We are grateful to the TMG, aswell as other local and international observergroups, for their level of cooperation during thetransition process. These organizations’ continuedactive participation in civic affairs will be criticalto democratizing Nigerian society over the longterm.

Although the efforts of election officials,observers, and others were crucial to the transi-tion, the most important actors remain the peopleof Nigeria. The international community must stay

engaged as Nigerians move toward the democratic,transparent, and equitable society that so manyhave desired for so long. Given that the first step onthis steep road toward democracy was a shaky one,commitment from all sectors is vital. Keeping trueto this path will mean an improvement in the livesof millions of Nigerians and will serve as an inspira-tion throughout Africa and around the world. ■

President Jimmy Carter Kenneth WollackChairman PresidentThe Carter Center NDI

THE CARTER CENTER

10


NDI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ment to democracy, and identify and report onpotential obstacles involved in a credible transition tocivilian rule. The initiative’s three primary goals wereto:

✓ Assess the election process in the context ofthe broader political transition.

✓ Focus international and national attentionon the transition’s implementation.

✓ Lend the international community’s support,encouragement, and technical assistance to Nigeriansas they chose their leaders.

Program activitiescentered on conductingsmall, high-levelinternational electoralassessment missions tocoincide with the Dec.5, 1998, local elections;the Jan. 9, 1999, state

and gubernatorial elections; the Feb. 20 NationalAssembly elections; and a larger international obser-vation mission for the Feb. 27 presidential election.Additional activities included organizing a joint tripto Nigeria, led by President Carter, in January duringthe middle of the transition; NDI’s ongoing support tothe TMG domestic monitors; and The Carter Centerarranging for a media consultant to lead a workshopfor journalists covering the elections.

For the Dec. 5 and Jan. 9 elections, delegatesreported that polling was largely orderly andpeaceful and most Nigerians they encountered feltthe elections represented a positive step in thetransition. However, the delegates also notedseveral clear shortcomings in the administration ofboth elections and recommended improvements.

From Jan. 18-23, President Carter led a mission toNigeria to meet with Gen. Abubakar, potential

The sudden death of military dictator Gen.Sani Abacha in June 1998 and the positivesteps taken by his successor, Gen. Abdul-

salami Abubakar, raised hopes that Nigeria againmight become a democratically elected civiliangovernment. Nigeria’s importance, coupled withits size, wealth, and political instability, promptedPresident Carter to call the ensuing elections “themost important in the world this year.”

In fall 1998, NDI and The Carter Center sentseparate teams to Nigeria to establish relationshipswith Nigerian democrats, assess their needs duringthe transition process, and determine what role thetwo organizationsmight play inassisting Nigeria tofoster democracy.Based on these tripsand invitationsfrom the Nigeriangovernment, NDIand The Carter Center agreed to design and imple-ment projects to support Nigeria’s democratic transi-tion to civilian rule.

From the outset, NDI and The Carter Centerrecognized that most Nigerians viewed the transi-tion process with guarded optimism. While manyapplauded Gen. Abubakar’s intent to return thecountry to democratic rule, they knew he was partof Gen. Abacha’s regime and the military was stillfirmly in control. Additional concerns included theabsence of a national constitution to guide theelections, a flawed voter registration process, andcampaigns largely devoid of issues or politicalplatforms.

As a result, The Carter Center and NDI moni-tored the transition at all stages of the electoralprocess. They also continuously engaged Nigerianpolitical leaders in discussions to gauge their commit-

From the outset, NDI and The Carter Center recog-nized that most Nigerians viewed the transition pro-

cess with guarded optimisim.

11



candidates, party agents, and others from a cross-section of society. The team also met with INECChairman Justice Ephraim Akpata, who, at Presi-dent Carter’s request, agreed to accredit thousandsof additional TMG domestic observers for trainingby NDI to observe the next two election rounds.

While voting for the Feb. 20 National Assem-bly elections adhered to electoral regulations inmany places, NDI/Carter Center delegates andobservers from other organizations reported lowvoter turnout and serious irregularities nationwide.Abuses of the electoral process – including ballotstuffing, inflation of results, and voter intimidation– were widespread enough to question the elections’outcome in certain electoral districts.

The delegation recommended that INECcorrect the situation immediately, and PresidentCarter sent an open letter to INEC and the politicalparties stating his concern about the irregularities.These statements garnered considerable press atten-

tion, both in Nigeria andabroad, and underlined thepotential for a problematicpresidential election thefollowing week.

For the Feb. 27 presi-dential election, The CarterCenter and NDI organized a66-member internationaldelegation from 12 countriesthat observed 335 pollingsites in 20 of Nigeria’s 36states. Members convenedin the capital city of AbujaFeb. 28 and reviewed apreliminary statementdeveloped from field reports.At a press conference thatevening, President Carterread from that statement, inwhich the delegation notedpositive election aspects and

irregularities.National returns showed Gen. Obasanjo of the

People’s Democratic Party (PDP) winning theelection by a margin of 18 million to 11 millionvotes over Chief Olu Falae of the joint Alliance forDemocracy (AD)/All Peoples Party (APP). Basedon alleged irregularities, Chief Falae immediatelyannounced that the entire process had been “afarce.” NDI/Carter Center delegate leaders met withGen. Abubakar to share their concerns over theflawed electoral process. They later met with ChiefFalae, who informed them that he was planning toappeal the results. After President Carter left Nige-ria that night, retired Gen. Colin Powell and otherdelegates met with Gen. Obasanjo to discuss theelection returns.

The delegates reconvened after the first pressconference for more discussion and drafted a secondstatement for release the next morning, March 1. ByBy then, the delegates had received more comprehen-

Representing Nigeria’s future, these children pose on a street in Lagos.

JASO

N C

ALD

ER

THE CARTER CENTER

12


NDI

sive reports from the field, analyzed data that themonitors had gathered, and compared the data toofficial results being reported from INEC. Thedelegation’s second statement was more compre-hensive and focused on irregularities in greaterdetail, including inflated vote returns, ballot boxstuffing, altered results, and the disenfranchisementof voters.

Afterward, President Carter signed a letter onbehalf of The Carter Center that was sent to INECChairman Akapata. It stated, “There was a widedisparity between the number of voters observed atthe polling stations and the final results that havebeen reported from several states. Regrettably,therefore, it is not possible for us to make anaccurate judgment about the outcome of thepresidential election.”

NDI and The Carter Center, as well as otherorganizations involved in the transition, made specificrecommendations in their public statements designed toimprove future elections. Summaries and completetexts of each of the NDI/Carter Center statements arein this report’s appendices.

An election is not by itself sufficient to institutional-ize democracy. A strong civil society, ongoing peace-building initiatives, protection of human rights, andtransparent and effective governance are essential.The international community must do all it can toencourage the new government and opposition partiesto work together to promote genuine democracy andinclusiveness and assist Nigeria in regaining its place asa leader in Africa and the rest of the world. NDI andThe Carter Center intend to remain engaged in Nigeriato contribute to achievement of these objectives. ■

This Lagos man seems skeptical, as many Nigerians,about the military government’s promise to hand overpower.

KA

RIN

RY

AN

13



BACKGROUND:FROM BRUTAL REPRESSION TO OPEN ELECTIONS

A series of military coups, attempted coups,and failed efforts to establish democracyhave marked Nigeria’s political history.

After gaining independence from Great Britain in1960, the nation’s military leaders ruled for 29 of its39 years and throughout the last 15 years. (SeeAppendix A for a list of Nigerian heads of State.)While most of these rulers vowed to return powerto the civilians, only Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo as amilitary head of state in the 1970s did as promisedin 1979. Since then, a series of civilian and militaryadministrations have squandered Nigeria’s richpetroleum wealth and vast human potential. Thesituation reached its lowest point during the repres-sive regime of Gen. Sani Abacha, who had designsto prolong his dictatorship indefinitely.

The current transition program represents theculmination of a long and difficult process of politicaltransition in Nigeria. It also represents the first steptoward establishing sustainable democracy in a countrythat has yet to hold two successive presidential elec-tions. To better understand the challenges facingNigeria and the importance of these elections, it isnecessary to examine earlier events.

NIGERIA: PAST TO PRESENT1

Nigeria’s dilemma has deep historical roots.Like most African states, Nigeria was anartificial creation of colonialism, including

some 250 ethnic and linguistic groups, of which three –

the northwestern Hausa-Fulani, southwesternYoruba, and southeastern Igbo – became dominantrivals. The stresses of ethnic and regional competi-tion led to political turbulence and civil war in thelate 1960s, and these tensions have influenced thenation’s politics in succeeding years. The quest fordemocratic government has occupied many leaderssince 1966, when the military overthrew the firstparliamentary government.

In the ensuing decades, military leaders havegoverned for all but four years. Nigeria’s economywas transformed in the 1970s, when the countryemerged as a leading oil exporter. Yet the new bountydid not bring prosperity or development. Instead, itsignaled a massive increase in corruption and misman-agement, as civilian and military leaders struggled overcontrol of the central government and its revenues.

These deep-seated challenges have been evident inrecent crises. In June 1993, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida’sregime conducted presidential elections as the finalstep in a promised democratic transition. Althoughthe poll yielded an apparent winner – Chief M.K.O.Abiola, a popular Yoruba businessman – Gen.Babangida annulled the election. He abdicated hiseight-year reign, however, and installed a civiliancaretaker government, which Gen. Abacha quicklyshouldered aside.

FROM ABACHA TO ABUBAKAR

The new regime harassed and detainedjournalists, human rights activists, politi-cians, and other dissidents or rivals. Chief

Abiola was arrested along with dozens of govern-ment critics. In November 1995, the governmentexecuted Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight compatriotsfrom the Ogoni community, who had agitated for

1 Political consultant Dr. Peter Lewis of AmericanUniversity in Washington, D.C., contributed thishistorical overview, which was published in The CarterCenter’s 1997-98 State of World Conflict Report.

THE CARTER CENTER

14


NDI

environmental standards and economic rights inthe country’s oil-producing areas. Many countriesand international organizations condemned theseexecutions and restricted aid and relations withNigeria. Ultimately, the pall of political repressionbrought with it economic decline and deepeningsocial strains.

The Abacha government sought to burnish itsimage by announcing political and economicreforms. Despite the promise of a new democratictransition agenda, the government permitted onlyfive carefully screened parties to participate inelections and conducted the program in a repres-sive political atmosphere. In April 1998, all fiveparties nominated Gen. Abacha as their solecandidate for the presidency, leading many todenounce the transition as a manipulated exerciseto preserve the military’s power.

Political dissent and social tension gave rise towider instability. Demonstrations and riots engulfed themajor southwestern cities where Chief Abiola’s baseof support resided. Anti-government bombings alter-nated with anonymous shootings of opposition fig-ures. In the southeastern oil-producing areas, theOgoni and other ethnic minorities continued to pressfor equity and environmental improvements. In thenorthern cities, a dissident popular Islamic move-ment challenged traditional authorities. Two majorcoup attempts rocked the military, which was besetwith factionalism, while rumors developed aboutother revolts.

On June 8, Gen. Abacha died suddenly, report-edly of a heart attack. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakarreplaced him, quickly taking steps to reverse someof the most unpopular features of Gen. Abacha’srule. Several prominent political prisoners werereleased, the regime began a dialogue with thedomestic opposition, and the country’s diplomaticisolation eased.

Despite these hopeful steps, the country wasthrown into turmoil when Chief Abiola died suddenly

on July 7, while still in detention. Official reportsand an independent foreign-led autopsy attributedthe death to a heart attack, but Chief Abiola’sfamily and sup-porters bitterly criticized the militarygovernment. Rioting after Abiola’s death claimed atleast 60 lives. Within two weeks, Gen. Abubakarannounced a new program for transition to demo-cratic rule, set to conclude in May 1999. ■

15



TRANSITION ISSUES

before the December local elections. It was to bebased on the 1995 constitution drafted under Gen.Abacha’s regime and revised extensively by Gen.Abacha but never released from his administration.Gen. Abubakar later announced the appointment ofthe Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee(CDCC) to organize public debate and recommend anew constitution. Gen. Abubakar hand picked theCDCC, which conducted all of its work behind closeddoors.

In December, the CDCC recommended theadoption of the 1979 constitution with some amend-ments based on the 1995 draft. The 1979 constitutionwas created through a relatively transparent processduring Gen. Obasanjo’s regime, and many Nigeriansviewed the CDCC’s recommendation positively. Themilitary government, however, never formally an-nounced that the CDCC’s recommendations would beimplemented.

The pace of political change in Nigeria hasbeen extremely rapid since the death ofGen. Abacha. Following his demise, Nigeria

witnessed the legalization and creation of politicalparties, vast improvements in the level of pressfreedom and political competition, and the comple-tion of four rounds of elections. The initial transitiontoward civilian rule, completed with Gen. Obasanjo’sswearing in as president on May 29, took less than ayear from when the transition began. Despite theseand other generally positive developments, severalissues surfaced during the transition process thatcaused serious concern and add to the challenges ofbuilding a democratic future in Nigeria.

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

AND RULES OF THE GAME

Nigeria’s transitionoccurred without aconstitutional frame-

work or a genuine public debateon the nation’s constitutionalfuture. Lacking a constitution,Nigerians cast their ballotswithout knowing what powerstheir elected representativeswould have, how various levelsor branches of government wouldinteract, how the federal govern-ment and the states would sharepower, or even how long electedofficials would serve in office.

Shortly after he assumedpower in June 1998, Gen.Abubakar announced that aconstitution would be publicized Ballot boxes and materials await pickup at a distribution center in Nigeria.

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

THE CARTER CENTER

16


NDI

Calls from civic organizations and political leadersto hold a public constitutional debate went unheededby the military goverment. The government alsodismissed urgings from leading pro- democracy andhuman rights groups to hold a Sovereign NationalConference that would address the constitution andother political matters.

Throughout the election period, the militarygovernment relied on decrees and ad-hoc regula-tions to guide the transition process. In August1998, Gen. Abubakar issued Decree No. 17, whichestablished the Independent National ElectionCommission (INEC) to manage and oversee voterregistration and four rounds of elections. RetiredJustice Ephraim Akpata was selected to chair theCommission. (See Appendix B for the INEC-established Transition Timeline.)

Nationally, INEC developed a reputation forneutrality and fairness during the transition, despiteits members being appointed without public inputor scrutiny. At the state level, some of its officialswere seen as partisan supporters of the militarygovernment or a given political party. Also, whileINEC issued rules to guide the electoral process, itoften released rules governing each round of elec-tions just days before the vote, and never adequate-ly addressed many important issues.

VOTER REGISTRATION

INEC’s first major task was to conduct a nationalvoter registration exercise. Registration, heldOct. 5-19, 1998, had logistical problems that

would hamper INEC’s efforts at every subsequentstage of the election process. Shortages of materials,delays in the opening of registration centers, poorlytrained officials, and attempts by political partyagents to manipulate the process were among themany problems.

More significantly, the 57,369,560 people offi-cially registered to vote exceeded reliable estimates

of the total number of eligible voters possible inNigeria. In Kaduna State, for example, more than 97percent of the total 3.9 million population, from thelast national census conducted in 1991, supposedlyregistered to vote. Other states also registered highlyquestionable voter registration figures.

A poor registration exercise lay at the root ofmany subsequent problems during the transitionand created opportunities for fraud. Even with theoverriding interest among Nigerians to see themilitary leave power as soon as possible, many saidthat the transition process should have been post-poned to conduct a credible registration of voters.

POLITICAL PARTIES

To help prevent the formation of regional orethnic-based political parties, an issue thathas plagued Nigergia for decades, INEC

established strict registration conditions. To com-pete in local elections, political parties were re-quired to set up and maintain offices in 24 of the 36states in Nigeria and demonstrate an ethnic andregional mix in each party’s leadership. To continuethe transition process, parties initially were requiredto obtain at least 10 percent of the vote in 24 statesduring local government elections. This figure laterchanged to 5 percent, with a caveat that at leastthree parties would advance to the later threerounds of elections. (See Appendix C for an Elec-tion Overview and a list of parties contesting theelections in each round.)

The INEC regulations, while well intended, setthe stage for intense competition between parties toattract and retain prominent politicians, potentialcandidates, and financial backers, especially in partsof the country where support for the parties wasweak. With no regulations for campaign finance,parties competed vigorously for wealthy, well-connected, and potentially dubious individuals tofund campaigns out of their own pockets.

17



Most of the parties formed hastily and furthersuffered from youth, inexperience, and a general lackof ideology. As a result, a complicated pattern ofshifting allegiances emerged during the transitionprocess. Meanwhile, the more established parties,such as the PDP and APP, drew on political ma-chinery in place from past elections to give them adecided advantage in garnering financial andpolitical support.

CAMPAIGN AND

ELECTORAL COMPETITION

The only parties to qualify from the localelections – the AD, APP, and PDP –scrambled to absorb unsuccessful parties or co-

opt their leaders and financial backers. Voters, al-ready trying to decide among parties without clearlystated platforms, also were confronted with an INECtimetable that required parties to submit their candi-dates’ names less than three weeks before each elec-tion.

Party primaries often occurred just days before thedeadlines, so the selection of candidates, cam-paignperiod, and process of voting was often frenzied andconfused. Adding to the confusion, INEC ballots didnot include the candidates’ names; only the partynames and symbols appeared. Voters often went to thepolls without knowing the name of their parties’candidate.

With parties and candidates largely keeping quietabout issues, “big money” politics shaped the transi-tion, particularly in the latter voting rounds. Delegatesheard about individuals bankrolling election cam-paigns and widespread instances of poll officials, partyagents, and voters being bribed. In an environment ofsevere poverty, temptations abound for buying andselling votes. From the time of voter registrationthrough each round of elections, NDI and CarterCenter delegates and staff were repeatedly warned ofthe potential for fraud, rigging, and collusion during

the transition process.President Carter’s friendship with Gen. Oba-

sanjo, who sits on The Carter Center’s agricultureboard and has been a member of The CarterCenter’s International Negotiation Network, alsobecame an election issue when Gen. Obasanjobecame a frontrunner in the presidential election.Early, false accusations that The Carter Center wassupporting his campaign were firmly dispelled whenthe NDI/Carter Center delegation issued its state-ments on the elections. ■

An INEC presiding officer registers voters who wereaware of voting procedures posted nationwide.

CA

TH

ERIN

E C

LAR

KE

THE CARTER CENTER

18


NDI

MONITORING THE ELECTIONS

✓ Draft reports on the local, state, NationalAssembly, and presidential elections.

✓ Show the international community’s supportfor Nigeria’s developing democratic process.

To achieve these objectives, NDI and The CarterCenter worked together closely on all stages of theelections. Electoral assessment missions, whichexamined the political and electoral environment

during the initialstages of thetransition, wereconducted tocoincide with theDec. 5 local, Jan. 9state, and Feb. 20National Assemblyelections. NDIassumed primaryresponsibility forinternationalassessment missionsaround the time ofthe first twoelections. TheCarter Center thentook the lead onthe third electoralassessment missionand on the larger,internationalobserver missionfor the Feb. 27presidentialelection. Throughbriefings, deploy-ment plans, and

NDI and The Carter Center have developedexpertise in assessing political processesand observing elections through numerous

election observation missions around the world.Although some international observation missionsfocus narrowly on election day events, the two organi-zations take a more comprehensive approach byassessing both the pre-election campaign period andthe aftermath of the vote. The elections in Nigeriaproved to be amongthe most challengingdue to a restrictedtime for preparationand more than110,000 polling sitesthroughout thecountry.

Given Nigeria’ssize and the limitednumber of pollingstations that could bevisited during the fourelections, it was notfeasible for NDI andCarter Center delega-tions to visit everystate or most pollingsites. Instead, each ofthe four missions hadthese objectives:

✓ Assess in animpartial and nonpar-tisan manner theevolving politicalenvironment.

NDI President Kenneth Wollack (left) and fellow delegate CharlesBrumskine of Liberia discuss a point during a briefing session.

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

19



EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

training on observation methodology, delegates wereinstructed on their roles and responsibilities as inter-national observers.

BRIEFINGS

For each electoral assessment or observationmission, delegates arrived in Lagos a few daysbefore the actual election. The delegation

spent a full day being briefed on the latest develop-ments in the country. Nigerian civic and politicalparty and civic leaders, INEC representatives, andTMG members gave presentations. Local journal-ists, international experts on Nigeria, and U.S.Embassy officials led additional briefings. Delegatesalso received site-specific security and logisticsbriefings by NDI and Carter Center staff members.

DEPLOYMENT

Delegates were deployed in teams of two orthree to sites nationwide for each election.They made efforts to cover all six electoral

zones and as many states as possible. Within eachstate, delegates covered several wards and individualpolling sites. By coordinating with TMG domesticobservers and other international organizations’observers, they were able to gather information from awide sampling of sites that included rural and urbanareas and communities representative of Nigeria’smany ethnic and religious groups.

NDI and Carter Center staff traveled through-out the country before each election to set upmeetings for delegates and make logistical arrange-ments. Days immediately before the vote, delegates

President Carter(back to photo)observes a presidingofficer as sheexplains votingprocedures.

THE CARTER CENTER

20


NDI

attended meetings with candidates, local party offi-cials, INEC representatives, journalists, and civic andtraditional leaders. These meetings enabled thedelegates to better assess the campaign period andoverall political environment in a given area. Dele-gates used these interactions to assess the previousrounds of voting, the perception of the transition, thecampaign process, and concerns of vote buying,intimidation, harassment, and violence.

This information helped delegates to determinewhich sites to visit on election day and providedimportant background for their assessment. Duringthese meetings, delegates were told about suchissues as voter apathy and fatigue, the candidates’lack of actual campaigning, and the prevalence of“big money” politics. These insights helped preparethe delegates for specific electoral irregularitiesmany of them would observe on election day. (Foran example of the deployment plan used for thepresidential election observation, see Appendix H.)

OBSERVATION METHODOLOGY

In selecting observation sites, The Carter Centerand NDI consulted with international experts,representatives from each of the three parties,

INEC, and other international observer organiza-tions including IFES, IRI, the Commonwealth, andthe United Nations. Consideration was also givento population centers, the six geo-political regionsin the country, the electoral zones set up by INEC,and the strongholds of the various political parties.

Upon arriving at their sites, NDI/Carter Centerdelegates met with other international observers,TMG members, and domestic monitors to ensurethat observers did not duplicate efforts. Observersfrom the various organizations usually met eachevening to discuss plans and share their findings.

For each of the elections, delegates were askedto carefully document any irregularities, but notintervene in the electoral process. On election day,

delegate teams usually observed 10-20 polling sites,often revisiting some sites two or more times to fullyassess the voting process or follow up on potentiallysuspicious or problematic developments. Delegatesalso followed the polling through each of the sixstages to ensure the validity of reported results.These included accreditation, voting, counting,ward collation, Local Government Area collation,and state collation. Some delegates visited stateINEC offices after the voting to share findings ormet with INEC officials the morning after theelection to gather results.

On election day, NDI and The Carter Centermaintained call-in centers in Lagos (and Abuja forthe presidential election) to receive interim reportsfrom each of the teams in the field. Carter Centerstaff compiled the information from the teams andprovided it to the delegation leaders. The day aftereach election, all delegates convened for a debrief-ing, in which they discussed their findings anddrafted the election statements. They then pre-sented these statements to INEC, the public, and inmost cases, to the media during a press conference.(See Appendices D, E, F, K, and L for the NDI/Carter Center Statements.)

For the National Assembly and presidentialelections, NDI/Carter Center observers used stan-dardized checklists to record their findings. IFESand the United Nations designed them, in consulta-tion with other international observer groups,designed them. The checklists covered each of thesix stages of the polling process: (See Appendix Ofor samples of the Election Observation Checklistsused for the National Assembly and presidentialelections.) ■

21



NDI/CARTER CENTER ELECTION ACTIVITIES

Both organizations identified more programareas where they might assist in democracy-buildingactivities. NDI focused on providing technicalassistance to the TMG and conducting domesticelection monitoring activities. The Carter Centerbegan exploring the possibility of longer-terminitiatives in the areas of human rights, independentmedia, economic development, and conflict resolu-tion in the troubled Niger Delta region. Bothorganizations opened offices in Nigeria to embarkon these initiatives and prepare for the electionassessment and observation missions.

When NDI first met with the TMG, it was acoalition of 12 human rights organizations basedprimarily in Lagos and other parts of southwesternNigeria. While the TMG showed evidence ofdetermined political will, it did not have theorganization capacity or outreach to train anddeploy a nationwide monitoring effort at that time.

DEC. 5 LOCAL ELECTIONS

The first of four elections in the transitionprogram began Dec. 5, 1998, with candi-dates from nine political parties vying for

8,811 councilor and council chair positions in 776Local Government Areas (LGAs). Although INEChad not yet perfected the machinery for the localelections and controversy remained over the flawedregistration process, these elections had consider-able voter interest.

Many Nigerians expressed enthusiasm about theability to choose representatives they hoped wouldbe accessible, responsive, and able to work onpressing local problems. This enthusiasm, tinged

OCTOBER ASSESSMENT TRIPS

In October 1998, NDI and The Carter Centersent separate teams to Nigeria to establishrelationships with Nigerian democrats and to

assess their needs for the transition program. NDIsent three people for three weeks of meetings with across-section of Nigerian civic and political leaders.NDI identified potential partners for election-related activities. In particular, NDI met membersof the then-nascent TMG, a coalition of pro-democracy NGOs, and began discussions on howNDI might assist the TMG in supplying domesticmonitors for Nigeria’s elections. (See Appendix Nfor more information on the TMG and its summarystatement on the presidential election.)

The Carter Center sent a five-person team toAbuja and Lagos, from Oct. 11-16, to assess poten-tial roles for President Carter and The CarterCenter to play during Nigeria’s transition to civilianrule. The delegation met Head of State Abubakar,INEC members, the leading political associations,media representatives, human rights and civilliberties organizations, conflict resolution specialists,members of the business and religious communities,and U.S. Embassy staff.

During these meetings, both teams recognizedthat most Nigerians viewed the transition withguarded optimism. Although unresolved constitu-tional issues and the conditions for political partyregistration established by the INEC were potentialsources of contention, most Nigerians seemedwilling to participate in the transition to ensure aquick end to military rule. Based on these trips andinvitations from Head of State Abubakar, NDI andThe Carter Center agreed to cooperate on design-ing and implementing projects to support Nigeria’sdemocratic transition to civilian rule.

THE CARTER CENTER

22


NDI

Party agents at a Lagos poll watch as election officials tally votes.

KA

RIN

RY

AN

with skepticism among those that had witnessed andparticipated in previous failed transitions, also wasmotivated by the overriding desire of most Nigeriansto end 15 years of military rule.

A joint NDI/Carter Center electoral assessmentteam, led by former Washington, D.C., MayorSharon Pratt Kelly, with 11 delegates and eight staffmembers, including one delegate each from Ghana,Kenya, and Niger, visited Nigeria from Nov. 30through Dec. 8. On election day, team membersobserved activities at 205 pollingsites in six states. While therewere isolated incidents of vio-lence, the NDI/Carter Centerteam noted that the electionswere generally peaceful andorderly.

The team’s report gave highmarks to INEC officials at everylevel, but noted several shortcom-ings as well as electoral irregulari-ties that would plague all fourrounds of elections. Based on itsobservations, the team recom-mended improvements forsubsequent rounds of voting. (SeeAppendix D for a complete list ofdelegates, their general observa-tions, and their recommendationsto INEC.)

Regarding voting procedures,many polls opened late andlacked necessary materials, andsome poll officials appeared to bepoorly trained or unwilling tofollow INEC regulations. Ac-creditation and voting were oftenconducted simultaneously, instead of consecutively, asthe election commission stipulated. Few polls hadindelible ink to prevent multiple voting and thesecrecy of the ballot was seldom maintained, withmany voters marking their ballots in full view of poll

officials and other voters.These procedural problems were witnessed

throughout the country and during all four rounds ofvoting, but the team noted that such problems did notappear to greatly concern the voters. In most cases,this did not seriously compromise the integrity of theelection process.

The delegation also noted more serious prob-lems. For instance, the transition opened with noconstitution in place, and the rules governing the

local elections were announced just days beforevoting. This development caused confusion anduncertainty among voters and candidates. Meanwhile,the local government elections were the first inNigeria’s history to be monitored by independent

23



KIR

K W

OLC

OT

T

domestic observers, but INEC only granted credentialsto 370 local observers.

The NDI/Carter Center team and other observersin the field estimated that only 20-30 percent ofregistered voters participated in the election, a causefor concern especially given that the official voterturnout was announced at 46.47 percent. As was thecase in all four rounds of elections, our observersreported that the turnout of women was notably low.

When the polls closed, the PDP emerged as theclear winner, taking more than half the votesnationwide. Both the PDP and the APP capturedmore than 5 percent of the seats in at least 24 of the36 states to advance to the subsequent rounds ofelections, as stipulated by INEC. The AD, whilewinning 5 percent in only 12 states, also advancedunder an INEC amendment. This amendmentoccurred days before the election, guaranteeing atleast three parties would continue in the transitionprocess. Although some of the parties charged

Voters contend with long lines and heat to placetheir votes during the Dec. 5 local elections.

alleged incidents of intimidation, bribery of officials,and vote buying, most Nigerians appeared to acceptthe first round of elections as credible and expressedconfidence in the transition.

JAN. 9 STATE AND

GOVERNORS ELECTIONS

Ajoint NDI/Carter Center election assess-ment delegation, led by former Congress-man Harry Johnston, visited Nigeria from

Jan. 5-12, 1999, to observe activities surroundingthe elections for state assemblies and governors.The team of 12 delegates and additional staff,representing four countries, visited more than 100polling sites in eight states on election day. Again,the team reported a generally peaceful and orderlyelection, low voter turnout, and procedural andother problems, to which it suggested a series ofrecommendations to improve the transition process.

THE CARTER CENTER

24


NDI

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

(See Appendix E for a complete list of delegates tothe Jan. 9 elections, as well as their observationsand recommendations to INEC.)

Several positive developments between the firsttwo elections encouraged the team. Polling officialsappeared to have learned from training sessions,security around polling stations had improved, andthere was a noticeable increase in adherence toINEC voting procedures, at least in the limitednumber of sites observed. Still, many problems ob-served during the first round of elections persisted.These included logistical problems, such as delaysin poll openings, missing voting materials, and acontinued lack of ballot secrecy and indelible ink.

Fundamental problems in the broader contextalso concerned the team. INEC continued to limitthe number of domestic observers, accrediting fewerthan 800 of the 10,000 sought. Again, the NDI/Carter Center team and other observers noted alow voter turnout, estimated at roughly 25 percentof registered voters, while official INEC figures putthe total at 52.67 percent. This matter raised

concerns of vote tally inflation that would becomesignificant in the final two rounds of elections.

Results for the state elections showed the PDPemerging as the strongest of the three remainingparties, again capturing more than half the votesnationwide. Of the 35 gubernatorial seats con-tested, the PDP won 20, followed by the APP withnine, and the AD with six. The election in BayelsaState, in the troubled Niger Delta region in the farsouth, was postponed due to violent clashes overthe distribution of the state’s oil wealth.

PRESIDENT CARTER’S JANUARY VISIT

President Carter’s first trip to Nigeria since thesummer of 1997 came days after the stateelections and a few weeks before the legisla-

tive and presidential elections. The purpose of thisvisit, planned for the mid-point of Nigeria’s transi-tion, was “to call international attention to Nigeria’scourageous steps to form a democratic society,” saidPresident Carter.

President andMrs. Carter meet

in Abuja withHead of StateAbdulsalami

Abubakar and hiswife during aJanuary pre-

presidentialelection trip.

25



KA

RIN

E PO

UC

HA

IN

From Jan. 18-23, President Carter led a delega-tion to learn firsthand about Nigeria’s transitionprogram and survey the ongoing election observa-tion mission that NDI and The Carter Centermounted. Charles Costello, the Center’s Democ-racy Program director, and Chris Fomunyoh, NDI’sregional director for Central, East and West Africa,joined President Carter on this trip.

The group met in Abuja with Head of StateAbubakar, and President Carter praised him forputting Nigeria firmly on track for a return tocivilian democratic rule. The U.S. Embassy staffbriefed the delegation in Abuja and Lagos. Thegroup then met with officials and potential presi-

dential candidates from the three parties, as well asleaders from the media, religious groups, business,labor, and local NGOs. They also visited theNational War College in Abuja to meet membersof Nigeria’s military and applaud their efforts atworking toward peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone.In addition, they listened to six TMG membersabout the conduct of the first two phases of theelections.

In Abuja, the group met with INEC ChairmanAkpata and 14 members of the Election Commis-sion. President Carter questioned them on severalmatters, including the still-evolving electoral rules,requirements for selecting presidential candidates,

poll workers’ training, and the certification ofdomestic observers. At that point, only 800 ofthe TMG domestic observers had been accred-ited, and President Carter expressed hisconcern over INEC’s seeming reluctance toaccredit more observers. As a result of Presi-dent Carter’s intervention, INEC guaranteedthat 10,000 TMG monitors would be accred-ited and, ultimately, more than 11,000 domes-tic observers received accreditation forNigeria’s presidential election.

FEB. 20 NATIONAL

ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

In late January, AD became the first party to choose its presidential candidate when it selected Chief Olu Falae, a former

finance minister and an ethnic Yoruba fromthe southwest. Meanwhile, AD and APPsought a merger in an effort to defeat the PDP.

This woman, who is turning inher registration card, wasamong the relatively fewwomen observed during each ofthe four elections in Nigeria.

THE CARTER CENTER

26


NDI

In early February, Justice Akpata ruled against theproposed alliance, stating that it ran contrary toNigerian law and the Commission’s guidelines, butadded that nothing would prevent the AD and APPfrom fielding candidates on the same platform of oneparty. Both parties protested and even threatened toboycott the election.

At its February convention, the APP chose alittle-known Ibo businessman, Ogbonnaya Onu, asit candidate. After heated discussions within theAPP leadership and the AD, the two parties an-nounced that Chief Falae would be the joint AD/APP candidate, running on the APP ticket. Hisrunning mate was northerner Alhaji UmaruShinkafi from the APP. Meanwhile, the PDP se-lected as its standard-bearer Gen. Obasanjo, aYoruba from the southwest, who defeated Dr. AlexEkwueme, an Ibo from the southeast, who had beenvice president under Nigeria’s last civilian govern-

ment. Alhaji Abubakar Atiku, a northerner, waschosen as the PDP vice presidential candidate.

Weeks of intense jockeying and deal making,coupled with the highly publicized presidentialprimaries and the decision of AD and APP to field asingle presidential candidate, dominated politics inthe days leading up to the National Assemblyelections. Consequently, the parties did very littleactual campaigning and most Nigerians did notknow until election day the candidates for theSenate or House of Representatives, nor see muchimportance in these National Assembly races.

On election day, The Carter Center and NDIfielded a 20-person team that visited more than 150polling sites in nine states and Abuja. Voter turnoutagain appeared to international and domesticobservers to be quite low, with no more than 20percent and at some polling sites less than 5 percent ofthe registered voters on average. Meanwhile, INEC

An INEC presiding officer checks the registration list to certify each voter’s eligibility.

CA

TH

ERIN

E C

LAR

KE

27



reported an official count of 43.84 percent, one of themany discrepancies that the NDI/Carter Center teamand other observers in the field noted. (See AppendixF for the National Assembly election delegates listand their recommendations.)

While voting in many places followed electoralregulations, the NDI/Carter Center delegates wit-nessed several serious irregularities countrywide.The delegation reported that abuses of the electoralprocess – including ballot stuffing, inflation ofresults, and outright intimidation – were widespreadenough to question the outcome of elections incertain constituencies and senatorial districts.

The delegation recommended that INEC takeimmediate corrective action, and President Cartersent an open letter to INEC stating his concernabout the irregularities. He also sent letters to thepolitical parties, calling on both presidential candi-dates to address these problems. (See Appendix M for

a copy of President Carter’s letter.)

FEB. 27 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

For the presidential election, NDI and TheCarter Center organized a 66-member inter-national delegation led by President Carter

and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, formerPresident of Niger Mahamane Ousmane, and retiredU.S. General Colin Powell. The team includedelected officials, political leaders, and regional andelection experts from 10 countries in Africa, Asia,and North America.

After meeting in Lagos on Feb. 24 for extensivebriefings, the delegates were deployed in two- andthree-member teams for additional meetings withINEC officials, party representatives, and others in 20states plus the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. On

Retired Gen. Colin Powell (center) discusses voting procedures with a presiding officer in Lagos, as other NDI/CarterCenter observers and party agents look on.

GIL

LIA

N F

LIES

THE CARTER CENTER

28


NDI

President Carter closelyexamines voting records during

the presidential election.

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

National returns showed Gen. Obasanjo and thePDP winning the election ...

Saturday, election day, the NDI/Carter Centerobservation team visited 335 polling stations in 112wards and in 61 Local Government Areas (LGAs).Delegates also observed the collation process at 33wards, 20 LGAs, and six states.

National returns showed Gen. Obasanjo andthe PDP winning the election by a margin of 18million votes to 11 million votes for Chief Falaeand the AD/APP alliance. Obasanjo gained themajority of the vote in 27 states and the FederalCapital Territoryof Abuja. Falaewon the majorityin nine states,including all six inthe Southwestzone. (See Appen-dix J for finalresults of the presidential election.)

The day after the election, all delegates con-vened in Abuja for a debriefing and to meet withthe leadership team. The delegation reviewed apreliminary statement that had been developedfrom call-in reports by the observation teams in thefield. President Carter, President Ousmane, Gen.Powell, Ken Wollack, and Charles Costello held apress conference late that afternoon to release thepreliminary statement.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND

POST-ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

In its preliminary statement, the delegationnoted several positive aspects of the election,including the campaign’s peaceful nature and

voting processes and an adherence to INEC regula-tions in many areas nationwide. The delegation alsonoted several serious electoral irregularities and

overt fraud in manystates. (See AppendixK for a copy of thepreliminary statementon the presidentialelections.)

Among those whowitnessed electoral

abnormalities in person was President Carter, whosaw a stack of ballots neatly placed in one ballotbox in precise numerical order. Several otherdelegates observed instances of ballot box stuffing,including visiting polling sites where INEC officialsor party agents illegally printed multiple ballotswith their own thumbs. In at least nine states,particularly in the South-South zone, NDI/CarterCenter delegates observed voter turnouts that were

29



significantly lower than theofficial tally.

In some states, delegatesestimated that less than 10percent of registered voters castballots, but official turnout ratesfor those same states exceeded85 percent. Many individualpolling sites recorded that all500 registered voters had castballots when the NDI/CarterCenter delegation and otherobservers saw fewer than 100people there during the day.

Another significant devel-opment that the delegationreported was the altering ofresults. In many instances, NDI/Carter Center observers re-corded low numbers of accred-ited voters at polling stations,sometimes less than 10 percent of those registered.During the counting and/or the collation process laterin the day, however, they found that these samepolling stations reported considerably higher numbers,sometimes even 100 percent of the registered voters.

Usually the votes at these polling stations weremainly or entirely for a single party. At manypolling stations where the delegates observed theseirregularities, it appeared that the party agents andpolling officials were involved in the malpractice.

On Sunday, Feb. 28, delegates gathered inAbuja to discuss findings, draft a preliminarystatement, and hold a press conference. The delega-tion co-leaders including President Carter, Gen.Powell, and President Ousmane met privately withHead of State Abubakar to discuss the dele-gation’sinitial find-ings and share some of their concernsabout the electoral process.

By late Sunday afternoon, the group had gatheredpreliminary results and held its first press conference.The delegation concluded its first statement with the

following observation: “While at this time the delega-tion has no evidence indicating that that the electoralabuses would have affected the overall outcome of theelection, they nevertheless compromised the integrityof the process in the areas where they occurred.”

After the press conference, President and Mrs.Carter returned to the U.S., while the remainder ofthe delegates reconvened for further debriefing.During the course of the evening, official electionresults began being reported. These results showedthe extent to which electoral abuses played a role inthe elections. One of the delegation’s main con-cerns was the disparity between the number ofvoters observed at the polling sites on the day ofthe election and INEC’s reported high turnout.Whereas most delegates reported less than 20percent of registered voters at the sites visited andrarely more than 50 percent turnout at any site,INEC reported a total voter turnout of 52.13 acrossthe country and eight states with 70 percent or higherturnout.

Although delegates were suspicious of voter tallyinflation from the earlier state and local elections,

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

Mrs. Carter shakes hands with future voters in Keffi.

THE CARTER CENTER

30


NDI

more firsthand evi-dence of electoralirregularities and fraudfrom the legislativeand presidentialelections promptedthem to emphasize theinflated vote tallies inthese later reports. Inaddition, the increasednumber of interna-tional and domesticobservers for thepresidential electionhelped confirm earliersuspicions that thispractice was indeedwidespread.

Concerned withthe results from thedelegation’s findings,Gen. Powell and other delegates met with Gen.Obasanjo late Sunday evening, and with Chief Falaeearly Monday morning to discuss the group’s findingsand alert the candidates of an early morning pressconference. Chief Falae announced that the entireprocess had been “a farce” and informed the delega-tion that he was planning to appeal the results. TheNDI/Carter Center co-leaders urged Chief Falae totake his appeal through the court system rather thanto the streets, and he agreed to adhere to the INEC-specified legal route.

On Monday, March 1, the delegation releasedits second statement and held a second pressconference focused on electoral irregularities ingreater detail, and the wide disparity between whatwas observed and what the INEC officially reported.The second statement did not contradict the prelimi-nary statement, as was alleged by some.

After more election returns arrived, PresidentCarter sent a letter to INEC Chairman Akpata. (SeeAppendix L for NDI/Carter Center Statement on the

presidential election and Appendix M for PresidentCarter’s letter to INEC.) It stated:

“There was a wide disparity between thenumber of voters observed at the pollingstations and the final results that have beenreported from several states. Regrettably,therefore it is not possible for us to make anaccurate judgment about the outcome of thepresidential election.”

After all votes have been cast, a presiding officer empties the ballots to begin counting.

KA

RIN

E PO

UC

HA

IN

31



POST-ELECTION OPPORTUNITIES

Throughout Nigeria’s transition process, NDIand The Carter Center stressed that theircomprehensive role stretched beyond

merely watching the voting process. Therefore,both organizations undertook assessment missionswell before the first round of elections and estab-lished offices in Abuja and Lagos. One of theirobjectives was to explore potential longer-termactivities to continue fostering democracy inNigeria after the elections.

At the conclusion of the elections, NDI assessedthe political climate and determined that its post-election work would focus on:

✓ Assisting newly elected officials at the statelevel.

✓ Providing ongoing assistance to civil societywith the National Assembly committee system.

✓ Aiding civil-military relations programming.Maintaining offices in Lagos and Abuja, NDI held

it first post-election program in April, convening the36 governors-elect for a national Governors’ Forum.The forum provided the governors a chance to shareideas, discuss policy, and build nonpartisan relation-ships. NDI sponsored a post-election conference for

the Transition Monitoring Group in May, whereTMG members discussed their future role in Nigeria’snew dispensation. Later this year, NDI will work withthe National Assembly and civil-military program-ming and continue to work with state governors andcivil society at large.

The Carter Center, in addition to its ongoingagriculture and health programs in Nigeria, identi-fied potential longer-term projects. Based on aseries of meetings during the transition, The CarterCenter planned to pursue the following:

✓ Explore a role in facilitating consensus for astrategy on economic reform, with special emphasison anti-corruption efforts and transparency in theprivatization process.

✓ With approval from the incoming govern-ment, seek ways to help resolve tensions andpromote sustainable development in the troubledNiger Delta region, building on President Carter’sJanuary meeting with representatives from minoritycommunities there.

✓ Via meetings with key human rights actors inNigeria, The Carter Center would like to help pro-mote rule of law, provide technical assistance forpolice and judicial officials, and strengthen theNational Human Rights Commission. ■

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

(l-r) Gen.Powell,

PresidentCarter, and

PresidentOusmane speak

at a Feb. 28press conference

in Abuja. TimMcCoy, anNDI senior

program officerand interpreter,

is in thebackground.

THE CARTER CENTER

32


NDI

“While the international community has an important roleto play in supporting this democracy, it is ultimately the

people of Nigeria who must determine the legitimacy of thisand future elections in the country.”

CONCLUSION

the legitimacy of those elected and their ability togovern.

From the onset, a compressed timetable andtop-down structure controlled by the very militaryofficials it intended to replace affected the process.Whether the transition should have been givenmore time immediately after a registration exercisethat was, by most accounts, seriously flawed,became a topic of some considerable debate.Whether voting in specific areas should have beencanceled and held again also became a question

that cast doubton the legiti-macy of theprocess. Al-though thesequestions areless relevantnow that theelections areover and a newadministrationis poised to

govern, they remain serious for Nigeria’s future.Throughout the transition, Nigerians feared that

the military would renege on its promises and holdonto power. This fear created a tendency to over-look imperfections in the process so as not to givethe generals a pretext to halt or reverse the transi-tion or annul the election results as was done afterthe last presidential race in 1993. This tendencymay be understandable given Nigeria’s past, but itshould not be an excuse to ignore the problems inthe electoral process.

Many positive signs during the four electionsencouraged The Carter Center, NDI, and ourdelegates. Foremost were Gen. Abubakar’s commit-ment to seeing the transition process from start tofinish; INEC’s dedication and credibility, especially

Nigeria’s elections and transfer of powerfrom a military regime to a civilian gov-ernment mark historic steps for the coun-

try. The 1998-99 transition remains, however, justone step in a longer process of democratization thatwill require continued commitment from all sectorsof Nigerian society. While the international com-munity has an important role to play in supportingthis democracy, it is ultimately the people ofNigeria who must determine the legitimacy of thisand future elections in the country.

Nigeriadeserves credit forthe giant strides ithas taken so far.Commendable arethe actions ofGen. Abubakar,Justice Akpata,many of the INECand party officialswho adhered tothe electionguidelines, security officers, local governmentofficials, and the Nigerian voting public whocontributed to the transition process under ex-tremely tight time restrictions and against formi-dable challenges. To all of their credit, the electionsproceeded on time, with limited disruption orincidences of violence, and achieved their primarygoal of transferring power.

However, this transition process fell short of itsdemocratic objectives. Electoral irregularities,including fraud and vote rigging, that our observersand others in the field witnessed are cause forserious concern. Especially disconcerting were theinflated voter returns and altered results in manystates. These instances not only call into questionthe integrity of the overall election process, but also

33



at the national and state levels; and the determina-tion and courageous efforts made by NGO mem-bers, the independent press, women’s groups, andmany others. A vibrant civil society, that continuesto build on the democratic foundations now inplace and serves as a watchdog against futuregovernmental or military repression, is critical.

In the end, the role of both international anddomestic observers is to watch and report, not tojudge or investigate. Challenges to the politicalprocess should begin with parties working throughthe established legal system. Ultimately, politicalchange depends on the standing government, theincoming administration, opposition parties, andthe will of the people. Nonetheless, we, as observ-ers, can offer some recommendations based on ourobservations during this transition and on pastinitiatives in which our organizations were involved.

Specific recommendations for improvingelections and developing democracy in Nigeria arelocated at the end of each of the five statements inthe appendices to this report. We encourageNigerians and the wider international community toconsider them carefully, particularly focusing on thefollowing:

✓ Promote and strengthen strict enforcement ofNigeria’s electoral laws and regulations, based on ajust and representative constitution, to preventfraud and increase confidence in democratic institu-tions and processes.

✓ Ensure that ruling and opposition partieswork cooperatively to establish common rules ofdemocratic conduct.

✓ Support local nongovernmental organizationsand other civic-minded groups to play a watchdogrole in safeguarding democracy.

✓ Emphasize federalism and local governmentauthority and provide for a reinvigorated judiciary

to maintain the rule of law.✓ Integrate the military into a democratic

society and develop the mechanisms and knowl-edge among civilian leaders to oversee and managesecurity affairs.

For democracy truly to take root, Nigeria mustpromote more effective systems of checks andbalances among its government institutions, safe-guard human rights and liberties at all levels ofsociety, and guarantee public accountability. Theinternational community must do all it can toencourage the new government, opposition parties,and the public to work together to promote genu-ine democracy. NDI and The Carter Center intendto continue assisting in these areas to help Nigeriaachieve its great potential as a leading democraticAfrican nation. ■

THE CARTER CENTER

34


NDI

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Twadell, Deputy Chief of Mission Nancy Serpa, andPolitical Counselor Jim Young, who helped arrangePresident Carter’s trip and meetings in the NigerDelta and supported our operations throughout theelection period. Pat Patterson, Embassy principalofficer in Abuja, greatly assisted our field staff. InWashington, D.C., Undersecretary of State ThomasPickering and Nigeria Desk Officer David Abel,among others, supported our efforts and responded toour requests throughout the transition.

The elections could not have occurred withoutthe work of several key actors, especially INECChairman Justice Ephraim Akpata. Operatingunder difficult conditions and strict time pressures,INEC administered the process with confidence.Several organizations greatly assisted INEC, such asthe United Nations, European Union, Common-wealth, Organization for African Unity, as well as

The Carter Center and NDI are grateful tothe delegates, partners, and staff who madethis project possible. The U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) providedfunding support for the Nigeria Project through adirect grant to NDI, which then provided asubgrant to The Carter Center. Throughout theprocess, NDI and The Carter Center worked closelywith USAID personnel and deeply appreciate theircollaboration and contributions to Nigeria’s transi-tion. Felix Awantang, Denise Dauphinais, SylviaFletcher, Jerry Hyman, Donald Krumm, KatherineNichols, Dana Peterson, and other USAID officialsdemonstrated professionalism and good humor andmade our work in Nigeria possible.

Several U.S. Department of State officialsprovided support to the NDI/Carter Center team.In Lagos, these included Ambassador William

Carter Center and NDI staff, consultants, interns, and local personnel pose with President and Mrs.Carter following the presidential election press conference in Abuja.

EMM

A S

EIM

OD

EI

35



individual governments and many NGOs, includingthe International Foundation for Election Systems(IFES) and the International Republican Institute(IRI). We thank each for their assistance andcooperation.

Also critical to the elections’ success was theTransition Monitoring Group. Courageous andtireless individuals led the TMG, committed toensuring that the elections were held according tointernational standards and that they were observedand monitored, for the first time in Nigeria’s history,by trained Nigerians. Special thanks goes to TMG’sChairman Clement Nwankwo, its Secretariat staff,and its Coordinating Committee members.

In addition, we recognize Nigeria expert Dr.Peter Lewis of American University and his valu-able contribution as primary consultant to TheCarter Center. Special thanks also go to SusanPalmer of the IFES, for many years on The CarterCenter staff, who provided important technicalinsights and political information.

We commend the NDI and Carter Center in-country staff for an outstanding job in organizingthe election-related missions to Nigeria. For NDI,these included Field Office Director JerryHenderson and Political Consultant Shari Bryan,who logged months of tireless work under stressfulconditions. Assisting them were Logistics Coordina-tor Michael Thayer and Office Manager EricHappel. Critical to NDI’s operation were Dr.Balfour Ageyman-Duah and Smydge Perry, whoworked directly with TMG and its members formore than four months. Their training and techni-cal assistance contributed greatly to TMG’s success.

For The Carter Center, Field Office DirectorRobert LaGamma and Associate Field OfficeDirector/Logistics Manager Gillian Flies wereinstrumental, including arranging President Carter’sJanuary visit on short notice and overseeing thechallenging presidential election observationmission. Assisting them were Consultant BrentPreston, Logistics Assistant Curtis Majekendomi, and

again Michael Thayer, who provided logistical supportfor The Carter Center.

In Washington, D.C., Dr. ChristopherFomunyoh, Regional Director for Central, East andWest Africa led NDI operations. Additional staffthat contributed greatly to the Nigeria programincluded Vice President for Program Tom Melia,Senior Associates Peter Manikas and Pat Merloe,and a hard-working team including VerniceGuthrie, Ryan McCannell, Kym McCarty, TimMcCoy, Todd Dusenbery, and Susan Perez.

In Atlanta, Democracy Program DirectorCharles Costello was responsible for directing TheCarter Center’s Nigeria program. Conflict Resolu-tion Director Harry Barnes and Director of PeacePrograms Gordon Streeb directed the project beforeJanuary. Democracy Program Associate DirectorDavid Carroll and Conflict Resolution ProgramCoordinator Kirk Wolcott led daily operations,including hiring and managing staff, and selectingand briefing delegates. Assisting them were Democ-racy Program Administrative Assistant TyneshaGreen and Logistics Coordinator Janet Owens.During the elections, several other Center staffplayed vital roles in Atlanta and Nigeria, includingNancy Konigsmark who oversaw arrangements forPresident Carter’s January visit, Jason Calder,Catherine Clarke, Matt Cirillo, Curtis Kohlhaas,Mike Meenan, Karine Pouchain, Laine Price, andKarin Ryan.

A large part of the credit for our work must goto our Nigerian staffs, led by Logistics CoordinatorTunde Durosinmi-Etti, who provided technical andmanagerial assistance throughout this initiative.The local team in Lagos included Office ManagerRaphael Odunlami, Program Assistants JosephAdebo and Joseph Olaore, Logistics Officers JabrilIyamah and Segun Adeuja, and driver Hakim Yetti.In Abuja, the team included Office Manager SandraOmali, Program Assistants Julie Nembis and DeboOlorunmola, and driver Samuel. These individualsbrought inspiring enthusiasm, dedication, and insight

THE CARTER CENTER

36


NDI

to their work.Throughout the transition, NDI and The Carter

Center received important assistance from theNigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in accreditingand obtaining visas for our international observers.Special thanks also go to Nigerian Ambassador tothe United Nations Professor I.A. Gambari and hisstaff in New York, who assisted immeasurably byproviding visas expeditiously.

Sincere thanks also go to the NDI/CarterCenter delegates who volunteered their time andexpertise and brought unique contributions to thesuccess of this endeavor. The delegates acceptedgrave responsibilities under frequently harsh condi-tions without complaint, demonstrating greatcommitment to the cause of advancing democracythroughout the mission.

Finally, we again acknowledge Kirk Wolcott,who drafted sections of this report and managedfinal editing and revisions. Other sections weredrafted by Gillian Flies, Robert LaGamma, PeterLewis, and Brent Preston. David Carroll, ShariBryan, Chris Fomunyoh, Todd Dusenbery, andCarter Center Publications Manager Pam Smithassisted in editing the report, along with CarterCenter interns Catherine Clarke, Karin Pouchain,Laine Price, and Caroline Wild. ■

37



WORKS CITED

Chazan, et. al. “Nigerian Heads of State, 1960-Present.” Politics and Society in ContemporaryAfrica, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1992).

Lewis, Peter. “Nigeria Summary.” 1997-98 State ofWorld Conflict Report, The Carter Center.

Map of Nigeria, United States Central IntelligenceAgency, May 1993.

“Nigeria’s Future: Can Obasanjo Save Nigeria?” TheEconomist, March 6, 1999, pp. 44-46.

Rupert, James. “Nigeria Confirms Vote Result:Loser Cites Fraud, Calls for Protest.” WashingtonPost, March 2, 1999.

THE CARTER CENTER

38


NDI

APPENDICES

A. Nigerian Heads of State, 1960−Present

B. Transition Timeline

C. Election Overview

D. Local Elections Statement

E. State and Gubernatorial Elections Statement

F. National Assembly Elections Statement

G. President Carter’s Letter about the Elections

H. NDI/Carter Center Presidential Election Deployment Plan

I. Map of Nigeria’s States

J. Registration Figures and Election Results

K. Preliminary Presidential Election Statement

L. Presidential Election Statement

M. President Carter’s Letter to INEC

N. TMG Summary Statement

O. Election Day Checklists

P. Selected News Articles

39



APPENDIX A

THE CARTER CENTER

40


NDI

APPENDIX B

TRANSITION TIMELINE

1998 Oct. 5 Voter registration begins

19 Voter registration endsINEC announces registered parties

Dec. 5 Elections: Local governmentCouncilors and Chairmen

1999 Jan. 7 Elections: House of Assemblyand Gubernatorial

Feb. 15 Election campaign begins

20 Elections: Senate and House of Representatives

26 Election campaign ends

27 Elections: Presidential

March 6 Run-off, if any, for National Assemblyand presidential elections

May 29 Swearing in of the President

41



APPENDIX C

ELECTION OVERVIEW

Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced Oct. 19 that it had registerednine political parties to contest the first round of elections:

Local Elections

Alliance for Democracy (AD) The United Democratic MovementThe Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) The United Peoples’ PartyPeoples’ Redemption Party Movement for Democracy and JusticeDemocratic Advancement Movement National Solidarity MovementAll Peoples’ Party (APP)

INEC stipulated that to contest the next three rounds of elections, parties must win at least 5 percent of thevote in 24 of Nigeria’s 36 states. The following three parties advanced:

State and National Elections

APPAD*PDP

* The PDP and APP secured the required votes in the minimum number of states. AD won 5 percent inonly 12 states, but INEC registered the party, stipulating that at least three parties would contest theremaining elections.

AllianceTo defeat the PDP, which won more than half the votes in the first two elections, the APP and AD soughtto present a joint candidate for the Feb. 27 presidential election. INEC Chairman Justice Ephraim Akpataruled that the proposed alliance was unacceptable, but he did allow the parties to put forward a singlecandidate for the presidential election if the candidate ran for one party only.

Presidential ElectionsAfter the parties held their conventions, the AD decided to run its candidate on the APP ticket. The APP-AD alliance and the PDP named their presidential and vice presidential candidates as follows:

AD/APP PDPPresident: Chief Olu Falae (AD) Gen. Olusegun ObasanjoVice President: Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi (APP) Alhaji Abubakar Atiku

THE CARTER CENTER

42


NDI

APPENDIX D

43



THE CARTER CENTER

44


NDI

45



APPENDIX E

THE CARTER CENTER

46


NDI

47



THE CARTER CENTER

48


NDI

APPENDIX F

49



THE CARTER CENTER

50


NDI

51



APPENDIX G

THE CARTER CENTER

52


NDI

APPENDIX H

53



APPENDIX I

THE CARTER CENTER

54


NDI

APPENDIX J

55



APPENDIX K

THE CARTER CENTER

56


NDI

57



APPENDIX L

THE CARTER CENTER

58


NDI

59



THE CARTER CENTER

60


NDI

61



APPENDIX M

THE CARTER CENTER

62


NDI

APPENDIX N

63



THE CARTER CENTER

64


NDI

65



APPENDIX O

THE CARTER CENTER

66


NDI

67



69



© 1999, The Economist Newspaper Group Inc. Reprinted with permission.Further reproduction prohibited. www.economist.com

THE CARTER CENTER

70


NDI

71



THE CARTER CENTER

72


NDI

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTEFOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization work-ing to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Calling on a global network of volunteerexperts, NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic

values, practices, and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build politicaland civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness, and accountabil-ity in government.

Democracy depends on legislatures that represent citizens and oversee the executive, independentjudiciaries that safeguard the rule of law, political parties that are open and accountable, and elections inwhich voters freely choose their representatives in government. Acting as a catalyst for democratic devel-opment, NDI bolsters the institutions and processes that allow democracy to flourish.

Build Political and Civic Organizations: NDI helps build the stable, broad-based, and well-orga-nized institutions that form the foundation of a strong civic culture. Democracy depends on these mediatinginstitutions −− the voice of an informed citizenry, which link citizens to their government and one anotherby providing avenues for participation in public policy.

Safeguard Elections: NDI promotes open and democratic elections. Political parties and govern-ments have asked NDI to study electoral codes and recommend improvements. The Institute also providestechnical assistance for political parties and civic groups to conduct voter education campaigns and orga-nize election monitoring programs. NDI is a world leader in election monitoring, having organized interna-tional delegations to monitor elections in dozens of countries, helping to ensure that polling results reflectthe will of the people.

Promote Openness and Accountability: NDI responds to requests from leaders of government,parliament, political parties, and civic groups seeking advice on matters from legislative procedures toconstituent service to the balance of civil-military relations in a democracy. NDI works to build legislaturesand local governments that are professional, accountable, open, and responsive to their citizens.

International cooperation is key to promoting democracy effectively and efficiently. It also conveysa deeper message to new and emerging democracies that while autocracies are inherently isolated andfearful of the outside world, democracies can count on international allies and an active support system.Headquartered in Washington, D.C., with field offices in every region of the world, NDI complements theskills of its staff by enlisting volunteer experts from around the world, many of whom are veterans of demo-cratic struggles in their own countries and share valuable perspectives on democratic development.

73



ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER

The Carter Center strivesto relieve suffering byadvancing peace and

health worldwide. With afundamental commitment tohuman rights, the Center isguided by theprinciple thatpeople, with thenecessary skills,knowledge, andaccess to resources,can improve theirown lives and thelives of others.

Founded in1982 by Jimmy andRosalynn Carter inpartnership withEmory University,the nonprofitCenter works toprevent and resolveconflicts, enhance freedom anddemocracy, and improve health.The Center collaborates withother organizations, public orprivate, in carrying out itsmission. In this way, the Centerhas touched the lives of peoplein more than 65 countries.

Charitable contributionsfrom individuals, foundations,corporations, and other donorssupport the Center’s activities.Programs are directed by residentexperts or fellows. They design

and implement activities incooperation with President andMrs. Carter, networks of worldleaders, and partners in the UnitedStates and abroad.

The Center is located in a35-acre park, two miles east ofdowntown Atlanta. Four circular

pavilions house offices for theformer president and first ladyand most of the Center’sprogram staff. The complexincludes the Ivan Allen IIIPavilion and the nondenomina-

tional Cecil B. DayChapel, other confer-ence facilities, andadministrative offices.Adjoining the Center isThe Jimmy CarterLibrary and Museum, arepository for therecords of the Carteradministration. It isoperated by the Na-tional Archives andRecords Administrationof the federal govern-ment and open to thepublic. The Center andthe Library and Museum

are known collectively as TheCarter Presidential Center.

More information aboutThe Carter Center is availableon the World Wide Web atwww.cartercenter.org. ■

PAU

L D

ING

MA

N

The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre park, two miles east ofdowntown Atlanta.

THE CARTER CENTER

ONE COPENHILL

ATLANTA, GA 30307(404) 420-5100 ◆ FAX (404) 420-5145WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1717 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. N.W., SUITE 503WASHINGTON, DC 20036

(202) 328-3136 ◆ FAX (202) 939-3166WWW.NDI.ORG

observing the 1998-99 nigeria elections - carter center · observing the 1998-99 nigeria elections...

Documents