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‘Occupy Israel’: A Tale of StartlingSuccess and Hopeful FailureEitan Y. Alimi aa Department of Political Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem,IsraelVersion of record first published: 01 Aug 2012.

To cite this article: Eitan Y. Alimi (2012): ‘Occupy Israel’: A Tale of Startling Success and HopefulFailure, Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, 11:3-4, 402-407

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.708921

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‘Occupy Israel’: A Tale of Startling Successand Hopeful Failure

EITAN Y. ALIMIDepartment of Political Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

ABSTRACT In between the Arab Spring and the US Occupy movement, Israel has had its share indemonstrating the people’s power against unjust authority in general and socioeconomic wrongs inparticular. This paper analyzes the context, rapid growth and yet swift abatement of the Israeliprotest-tent summer of 2011. I argue that the reasons for the shortly lived Israeli protest summerrelated more to difficulties in coping with intra-movement challenges, framing alignment and arelatively ‘closed’ political environment, and less to the omnipresent security complex andmilitarized political culture, which has repeatedly been suppressing other episodes in Israel’s history.

KEY WORDS: Protest, encampments, security threat, framing, political opportunity

As we again witness sporadic attempts to mobilize Israelis to retake the streets and to

pressure the government to adopt a more humane economic policy, we are reminded of the

unprecedented wave of protest that swept Israel last summer, called the ‘protest-tent’.

Beginning on 14 July 2011, thousands of Israelis occupied public places in community-

like encampments throughout the country, mounting mass rallies and demonstrations

attended by hundreds of thousands of people almost on a weekly basis. The main reason

that brought so many people to identify with and join the relatively small group of

youngsters who shortly before had moved to live in Rothschild boulevard, at the heart of

Tel Aviv, resonated with similar protest activity taking place in other parts of the world:

the neoliberal economy and its unbearable social repercussions.

As elsewhere across the world (e.g. Spain and the USA), the Israeli ‘occupiers’

expressed their anger and frustration over issues such as high cost of daily necessities (e.g.

food and gasoline), housing prices (both for purchase and rent) and low salaries. What

amplified the rage of the Israeli ‘occupiers’ in particular was related to the gradual yet

consistent retreat of the State from its traditional welfare ideology and practices in favor of

massive neoliberal privatization. In a country fraught with wars and existential threats,

where a deeply infused security culture and well-established military complex suppress all

other issue domains, and army generals often shape state policy; in such a country, the

sheer fact that such a wide-reaching and intensive opposition was mounted should not be

thought of lightly. In fact, given the negative association of the term ‘occupy’ in Israel, the

tent protesters would have never named their collective claims-making that way.

1474-2837 Print/1474-2829 Online/12/3–40402-6 q 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2012.708921

Correspondence Address: Eitan Y. Alimi, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus,

Jerusalem, 91905, Israel. Email: msalimi@mscc.huji.ac.il

Social Movement Studies,Vol. 11, Nos. 3–4, 402–407, August–November 2012

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For a moment, the Israeli protest summer, as Gamson (2011) has recently called it,

brought with it some rays of hope, pointing to a meaningful reshuffling of Israel’s political

culture from a one-dimensional security issue to a multidimensional one. In what follows,

I analyze the context, rise, rapid growth and yet swift abatement of the Israeli ‘Occupy’

protest campaign. I argue that the reasons for the short-lived Israeli protest summer related

more to difficulties in coping with intra-movement challenges, framing alignment and a

relatively ‘closed’ political environment, and less with the omnipresent security issue—a

fact that leaves me somewhat optimistic and hopeful of the Israeli experience.

Where From?

Compared to other issues (foreign, security, ethnicity, religion, etc.), socioeconomic

protest in Israel has always had the lower-hand in setting the agenda of Israel’s politics.

Perhaps the main reason for this is the omnipresent ‘security situation’, which has been

key in shaping public discourse since the pre-statehood era. This is not to say that public

unrest over socioeconomic issues has not led to protesting and rioting; nor has it been a

non-issue among political parties and candidates. The point is that as pressing and

demanding a given socioeconomic concern might be, it will always be moved aside and

silenced when ‘cannons roar’. Backtracking into the history of Israeli society and politics

it seems that the frequency and duration of socioeconomic protest tend to be inversely

related to the severity, whether real or perceived, of the security situation.

In spring 1971, for example, a time of relative calmness in terms of security threat,

Israel was shaken by a small group from a Jerusalemite slum, of Sephardic origin, who

protested against what they perceived as unjust government socioeconomic policy that

systematically discriminated against ‘oriental’ Jews. This group of youngsters, naming

themselves the Black Panthers after the US Black Panther Party that inspired them,

managed to broaden their protest and to sustain it for more than 2 years with some

significant signs of success, yet only to lose momentum in the buildup to the Yom Kippur

War. They simply did not have a chance! To give a sense of how deeply ingrained the

‘security situation’ is in people’s cognition and thinking, consider the following: in early

2003, during the national election campaign and while the second Intifada was still raging,

a lower-class woman described her unbearable economic situation as a result of

Netanyahu’s (then minister of finance) neoliberal economic policy, on national TV. When

asked whether she would favor the Labor party candidate, Amram Mitzna, given his social

welfare agenda, over Prime Minister Sharon, she replied ‘no way—Mitzna loves Arabs’.

Protest by Whom and for What?

Having to cope with the same age-old security obstacle as had others before them (again

the Palestinians, the Iranian ‘nuclear specter’, as well as heightening tension vis-a-vis

Syria with President Assad’s attempts to ignite Israel’s northern border in order to deflect

international attention from his brutal repression of his people), the Israeli ‘occupiers’

nonetheless differed from previous movements in two meaningful ways. First, and unlike

in the past, Israeli ‘occupiers’ were mostly middle-class, ranging from youngsters and

students, through workers in high- and low-tech, service workers in both private and

public sectors, to freelancers—the Israeli summer protest movement was far from a ‘poor

people’s movement’, to use Piven and Cloward’s (1979) term. What brought these people

A Tale of Hopeful Failure 403

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to take to the streets was the deepening and worrisome gap between their high future

expectations and their constantly weakening financial situations. Put simply, we are

dealing with people who could no longer make it through the month, so to speak, based on

their income.

There were (and still are) good reasons for the ‘occupiers’ discontent, which leads me to

the second point of difference. The move away from a welfare state to neoliberal global

capitalism, accelerated by Netanyahu as minister of finance during Sharon’s first term as

Prime Minister between 2003 and 2005, has reached full speed under Netanyahu’s own

administration. Not surprisingly, the initial demands centered on affordable housing (rent

or purchase), tax reform, reducing the concentration of the Israeli economy, regulation

over prices of food and other daily necessities (e.g. gas) and fair salaries.

Quickly enough, however, demands began to re-shift to what the protesters saw as yet

another source of their predicament, one that is rooted in unjust social inequalities and

wrongful national priorities. If, as the minister of finance and his proxies took pride in

arguing daily that Israel is not experiencing the unfortunate fate of Greece, Portugal,

Ireland or Spain as a result of a responsible financial system and policy, and therefore the

national budget framework must be strictly adhered to, then a solution can (in fact should)

be found in changing national priorities. Thus, instead of offering band-aid gestures and

insinuating that most protesters were in fact spoiled, reckless bohemians, what the

government should do is to relocate funds and to equalize the share of the burden.

By chanting ‘the People wants social justice’, Israeli ‘occupiers’ were not only calling

for a more humane economic policy but, closely related, accused the government of

favorably discriminating toward and applying important welfare policy measures to

benefit specific populations (e.g. ultra-orthodox) and specific places (e.g. settlements). No

wonder then that alongside demands for greater allocation of funds to education and

daycare centers, there were additional demands (although made less explicitly as a way to

attract ultra-orthodox Jews and Arab supporters) for greater investment in public housing

in pre-1967 Israel, and applying compulsory military service to all, or benefiting those who

do military service.

How Protest?

Precipitating the Israeli occupy experience was a successful e-mobilization campaign, to

use Earl and Kimport’s (2011) conceptualization, launched on Facebook in June 2011 and

which focused on boycotting cottage cheese. The campaign, which rapidly attracted over

100,000 ‘like’ followers, forced dairy companies in Israel to significantly lower the price

of cheese (along with other foodstuffs), which skyrocketed after the government decided

to stop regulating it in 2008. Encouraged by these signs of success, the Israeli occupy

campaign took off with the first protest-tent encampment put up in Tel Aviv, following a

Facebook ‘event’ by Daphni Leef, a former student and video-editor by profession who,

like many others, realized she could no longer afford accommodation rental prices in the

city. This first encampment was soon emulated elsewhere in Tel Aviv and in other cities by

participants who responded to the Facebook calls.

Whether or not the initiators of the occupy campaign were consciously inspired by

similar past episodes of encampment in public places that took shape during the 1980s and

early 1990s is unclear. What is certain, however, is that the Israeli ‘occupiers’ were

encouraged by the power of the masses they witnessed in nearby Arab countries, and

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emulated the successful indignados protest-tent campaign in Madrid, which began in mid-

May 2011. Accordingly, in addition to what Tilly (2004) called the public representation

of unity and commitment by occupying public places and turning them into community-

like housing, the main action tactic devised to voice the ‘occupiers’ demands and to

demonstrate their rapidly growing number was mass rallies.

Almost every week, usually on Saturday evening, mass rallies were organized in city

squares or other open spaces in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Beer Sheva and additional

cities across the country, with ever-broadening participation. The biggest orchestrated

rallies took place on 3 September 2011, attracting some 500,000 participants in total. The

message that was voiced in all the mass rallies was simple, authentic and, as such,

powerful; by chanting ‘the People wants social justice’, the Israeli ‘occupiers’ called for

the need to place ‘society before economy’, to be ‘a-political’, to be ‘broad based,

diffused, with no form of hierarchy and partisan organizing’ (rarely were politicians

allowed to participate, and at times the terms chaos and anarchy were also voiced) and ‘to

have the government come up with concrete solutions’.

Yet the potential of this spontaneous act of defiance to attract supporters and goal

promotion has its downsides. In the short-term, an all-inclusive message may be good for

action mobilization, resonating with as many people and groups as possible (Snow et al.,

1986; Klandermans, 1997). Indeed, the diversity of groups who quickly joined the

‘occupiers’ was unprecedented, including the student national association (led by its chair

Itzik Shmuli who soon became one of the central leading figures alongside Leef), social

workers, medical interns, youth movements from both the left-wing and right-wing ends of

the political spectrum, parents of disabled children, animal rights organizations, left-wing

groups and Israeli-Arab activists, the Reformist movement, settler groups and many

others. For a moment, it looked as if the prospects for a true social revolution were there.

In the long term, however, such a ‘catch all’ framing may not only be too abstract for

participants to sustain their commitment, but also detrimental for forming and managing

consensus over means and goals. Collective forums for deliberating strategy and how to

frame demands and goals, as well as coordinating activities, whether among the various

leadership cores or between them and other occupy protest activities initiated by lower-

class people, were scarce, leading periodically to intense disagreements and rifts. A telling

example took place in late August during a press conference held in Tel Aviv. While

several key leadership figures refused to participate, others accused those who did of

acting on their own, and that their rejection of the government-appointed commission to

look into the situation and offer solutions was unrepresentative. As it turned out, the Israeli

‘occupy’ summer resembled more a coalition-like protest activity than a movement whose

participants felt linked by ties of solidarity and identity (Diani et al., 2010).

Ironically, the lack of greater specification of claims and a proactive stance regarding

solutions (i.e. we are not the ones to come up with solutions), certainly a major cause of

alarm and embarrassment for the Netanyahu coalition, nonetheless gave the government

the wiggle room and way out it needed. To be sure, Netanyahu had little reason to be

concerned. Not only did his broad coalition have a clear and stable majority in the Knesset,

rendering any no-confidence motion insignificant, but there also was little if any

opposition to be concerned about. Kadima, which gained the majority last of the vote in

the national election, could have provided the political opening and ally, yet was too

deeply fragmented and divided to have a clear voice or even to embrace some kind of

social stance.

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Facing no meaningful threat to its political positioning, coupled with a lack of concrete

demands on the part of the ‘occupiers’, Netanyahu seized the moment, and in early August

declared the appointment of a special commission of economic experts—the Trajtenberg

commission—to offer solutions. Realizing that the government was effectively kicking

their struggle into the long grass and that they were losing the initiative, and facing

mounting public criticism over their lack of a constructive agenda, occupy leaders

convened in order to come up with specific demands. This, however, was a case of too late

and too little. By the time they tried to come up with a list of demands, leading to intense

disagreements and rifts, they had already lost the momentum and been portrayed as

complete amateurs, which only reinforced those early calls that presented them as

unworthy coffee-shop revolutionaries. On 4 September, the day after the largest public

rally of all, with some 500,000 protesters spread throughout the country despite a

horrendous terrorist attack that threatened to conjure up the omnipresent ‘security

situation’ all over again, leaders of the student groups declared it was time to disassemble

the encampments and start negotiating with the government.

The Israeli ‘Occupy’ Case in Perspective

It was not surprising that the decision to disassemble the encampments was met with

strong objection and resentment from many leading figures and groups. Despite opposition

which, in some instances, resulted in violent encounters with police forces evicting

protesters, it took several days for the Israeli occupy campaign to dissipate. One is tempted

to be skeptical about the Israeli case, especially those of us who have been living the Israeli

experience, given the gloomy experience of popular contention over socioeconomic issues

in Israel. Nevertheless, attempting to look at the glass as if it is one-third full leaves one

somewhat hopeful. Admittedly, measured by the ultimate test of success—policy

change—the Israeli protest-tent summer would be considered a failure. Yet, it is also true

that the Israeli summer has propelled an important shift in public and media discourse,

showing the way to future initiatives and forcing the government to take the public voice

into consideration more seriously than before. Of even greater importance is the fact that

the decision to disassemble the encampments reflected a failure to adequately address a

variety of challenges that social movements in other places have been facing, and not the

age-old incapacitating security situation. The fact that under such an omnipresent security

mentality (which on so many instances has proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy), we

have witnessed that such a powerful public voice is certainly a source of sober optimism.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Sidney Tarrow, Naama Tridel, and Michael Ziv-Kenet for their

helpful comments on earlier version.

References

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settings, in: N. Van Dyke & H. J. McCammon (Eds) Strategic Alliances—Coalition Building and Social

Movements, pp. 219–238 (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press).

Earl, J. & Kimport, K. (2011) Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age (Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press).

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Gamson, W. A. (2011) Arab Spring, Israeli summer, and the process of cognitive liberation, Swiss Political

Science Review, 17, pp. 463–468.

Klandermans, B. (1997) The Psychology of Social Protest (Oxford: Blackwell).

Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. A. (1979) Poor People’s Movement: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York:

Vintage).

Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K. & Benford, R. (1986) Frame alignment processes,

micromobilization, and movement participation, American Sociological Review, 51, pp. 464–481.

Tilly, C. (2004) Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers).

Eitan Y. Alimi is an assistant professor of Political Sociology in the Department of

Political Science, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He received his Ph.D. in sociology

from Boston College, USA. His research interests include social movements and

contentious politics, conflict dynamics and processes, and political violence and terrorism.

His recent publications include articles in British Journal of Political Science,

Sociological Forum, Political Studies, Mobilization, Theory and Society, Comparative

Politics, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and International Political Science Review. He

is the author of Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada—Political Opportunities,

Framing Processes and Contentious Politics, published by Routledge in 2007.

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