october 16, 2007 a sset p rices i ncreases in lac: w hat c an or s hould m onetary p olicy d o ?
TRANSCRIPT
October 16, 2007
ASSET PRICES INCREASES IN LAC: WHAT CAN OR SHOULD
MONETARY POLICY DO?
2
Outline
I . ASSET PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY
II. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND ASSET
PRICES IN MEXICO (EARLY 90’S)
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL
DEEPENING IN MEXICO (2000’S)
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ASSET PRICE CHANNELS
FOR MEXICO
V. CONCLUSIONS
3
The role of asset prices in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy:
Stock Market Effects on Investment: Tobin's q-theory (Tobin, 1969).
Firms Balance-Sheet Effects: This mechanism is related to the “credit channel” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995).
Households Wealth Effects: Consumption is determined by the lifetime resources of consumers (Ando and Modigliani 1963).
I. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
4
How should monetary policy respond to asset price movements?
Two general monetary policy responses to fluctuations in asset prices have been proposed:
Standard or Conventional Policy (Bernanke and Gertler 2001): Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they convey information about the future path of inflation and output.
“Leaning against the bubble” or active policy (Ceccheti, Genberg, Lypsky y Wadhwani 2000): Monetary policy should be used to contain or reduce bubbles that push asset prices above the value implied by fundamentals, in order to alleviate their negative consequences on the economy.
I. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
5
Arguments in favor of activism:
Bubbles in asset prices could have severe adverse macroeconomic consequences.
The cost of ignoring bubbles can be high. Thus, reducing the bubble in advance is a preferred policy.
The difficulties in identifying bubbles in asset prices do not justify ignoring them.
I. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
6
Arguments against activism:
Identifying a bubble in progress is extremely difficult.
A “leaning against the bubble” policy could destabilize the economy.
It may require a significant policy rate hike, which may imply near-term deviations from central bank’s macroeconomic goals (with loss of credibility).
It may affect considerably other sectors.
Not all asset price booms result in burst.
Alternative vehicles to avoid bubbles are financial regulation or supervision.
I. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
7
Risk-Management Approach of Monetary Policy
A risk management approach to monetary policy involves describing the uncertainty and assessing the costs associated with each of the possible policies.
This approach evaluates monetary policy under a wide range of scenarios, considering not only the scenario with the highest probability to occur.
It may be worthwhile for Central Banks to take out some insurance against the formation of bubbles in asset markets and its potentially negative effects on the economy.
I. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
8
Outline
I . ASSET PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY
II. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND ASSET
PRICES IN MEXICO (EARLY 90’S)
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL
DEEPENING IN MEXICO (2000’S)
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ASSET PRICE CHANNELS
FOR MEXICO
V. CONCLUSIONS
9
Credit Expansions in Mexico
Early 90s 2000s
• Rigid exchange rate.
• Credit expansion based on capital inflows.
• Weak banking regulation and supervision.
• High contingent risk.
Short maturity of government debt.
Foreign currency denominated bonds.
• Inflation targeting, flexible ER.
• Credit expansion based in domestic savings.
• Strong banking regulation and supervision
• Macroeconomic stability.
Issuance of financial contracts at longer term.
Local currency denominated bonds.
II. Macroeconomic Distortions and Asset Prices in Mexico (early 90’s)
10
Mexico: Real Housing Rent Index and Net Transfer of Resources*
(Index 1980=100; % of GDP)
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Real Rent Housing Index
Net Transfer of Resources (right axis)
*Current account balance less net interest paymentsSource: Banco de México and World Bank.
II. Macroeconomic Distortions and Asset Prices in Mexico (early 90’s)
11
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Dec
-85
Dec
-87
Dec
-89
Dec
-91
Dec
-93
Dec
-95
Dec
-97
Dec
-99
Dec
-01
Dec
-03
Dec
-05
External financing to commercial banksFinancial savings from non-residentsFinancial savings from residents
Dic 89 Dic 94
Financial Saving and Banks Foreign Liabilities (Stocks as of GDP)
Source: Banco de México.
II. Macroeconomic Distortions and Asset Prices in Mexico (early 90’s)
12
Outline
I . ASSET PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY
II. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND ASSET
PRICES IN MEXICO (EARLY 90’S)
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL
DEEPENING IN MEXICO (2000’S)
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ASSET PRICE CHANNELS
FOR MEXICO
V. CONCLUSIONS
13
Financial savings (M4) and inflation
(% Rate; Percentage of GDP)
Average maturity of Government securities and inflation
(Days; Percentage)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Inflation
M2/GDP(right axis)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Jan-
90
Jan-
92
Jan-
94
Jan-
96
Jan-
98
Jan-
00
Jan-
02
Jan-
04
Jan-
06
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70Average Manurity of GovernmentSecurities
Inflation (right axis)
Source: Banco de México Source: Banco de México
III. Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Deepening in Mexico (2000’s)
14
The recent rapid growth in housing finance through private mortgages
appears grounded on more solid primary and secondary markets than in
the past.
Mortgage credit is issued at long maturities and the most common
mortgage instrument used by private financial intermediaries is a fixed
rate loan.
Financial sector reforms have facilitated the standardization of mortgages
issuances and the progressive securitization of mortgages contracts.
The expansion in mortgages credit has been preceded by several years
of stagnation and is not a response to a relaxation in lending standards.
The current expansion of credit is based in domestic financial savings.
III. Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Deepening in Mexico (2000’s)
15
Mortgage Credit (% of GDP)
Source: Banco de México
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Dec
-94
Aug
-95
Apr
-96
Dec
-96
Aug
-97
Apr
-98
Dec
-98
Aug
-99
Apr
-00
Dec
-00
Aug
-01
Apr
-02
Dec
-02
Aug
-03
Apr
-04
Dec
-04
Aug
-05
Apr
-06
Dec
-06
Total Banks
Sofoles Infonavit
III. Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Deepening in Mexico (2000’s)
16
Households Balance (% of GDP)
Source: Banco de México
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006Total 146.9 151.8 153.2 158.3 161.2 170.9 182.8
Total Real Assets 95.7 99.1 101.6 103.2 102.3 103.2 102.9
Housing 73.7 76.1 77.7 78.9 78.1 78.7 78.3Durable goods 22.0 23.1 23.9 24.3 24.1 24.5 24.5
Financial Assets 51.2 52.7 51.6 55.1 59.0 67.7 80.0Financial savings 30.1 33.1 34.7 35.3 34.3 37.4 38.9Equities 1/ 21.1 19.5 16.9 19.8 24.7 30.3 41.1
Financial Liabilities 9.7 10.1 10.9 11.1 11.9 13.0 14.4Consumption 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.5 3.3 4.3 5.2Housing 8.2 8.3 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.7 9.2
Memoranda itemsTotal Net Financial Position 41.5 42.6 40.8 44.0 47.1 54.6 65.6Total Public Pension Funds 7.0 8.8 9.8 10.7 11.0 12.0 12.3
13.4 14.3 14.1 13.5 11.4 12.3 12.2Net Financial Position excluding Equities and Public Pension Funds
III. Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Deepening in Mexico (2000’s)
17
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Dec
-00
Jun-
01
Dec
-01
Jun-
02
Dec
-02
Jun-
03
Dec
-03
Jun-
04
Dec
-04
Jun-
05
Dec
-05
Jun-
06
Dec
-06
Jun-
07
Total position
Position excluding pension funds
Net Financial Position of Households (% of GDP)
Source: Banco de México.
III. Macroeconomic Stability and Financial Deepening in Mexico (2000’s)
18
Outline
I . ASSET PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY
II. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND ASSET
PRICES IN MEXICO (EARLY 90’S)
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL
DEEPENING IN MEXICO (2000’S)
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ASSET PRICE CHANNELS
FOR MEXICO
V. CONCLUSIONS
19
Given the relative size of the stock market, an increase in stock prices,
whether driven by fundamentals or by a bubble, is not expected to have
a significant impact on consumption expenditures.
Common stocks are not the most important component of households
wealth. Nevertheless, they have been gaining importance in the last few
years.
Housing is a more important component of households wealth than
common stocks. However, mortgage credit as a fraction of GDP still
has a small value compared to a decade ago.
High transaction costs and the lack of mechanisms for withdrawing
housing equity, reduce the effect of real state price increases on
consumption expenditures.
IV. The Relevance of Asset Price Channels for Mexico
20
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Ven
ezue
laA
rgen
tina
New
Zea
land
Por
tuga
lT
urke
yC
olom
bia
Mex
ico
Ger
man
yIt
aly
Phi
lippi
nes
Bra
zil
Tha
iland
Fra
nce
Spa
inIn
dia
Kor
eaIs
rael
Aus
tral
iaC
hile
Can
ada
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
Uni
ted
Sin
gapo
reS
outh
Afr
ica
Market Capitalization (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank.
Capitalization Value of BMV(% of GDP)
38.2
30.832.0
21.520.3
15.9
19.2
25.2
31.2
10.1
41.5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1989
1992
1994
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Source: World Bank.
IV. The Relevance of Asset Price Channels for Mexico
21
Outline
I . ASSET PRICES AND MONETARY POLICY
II. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND ASSET
PRICES IN MEXICO (EARLY 90’S)
III. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL
DEEPENING IN MEXICO (2000’S)
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ASSET PRICE CHANNELS
FOR MEXICO
V. CONCLUSIONS
22
Macroeconomic stability and a strong financial regulation and supervision are factors that help to avoid the formation of bubbles in asset prices.
Nowadays, domestic financial markets have strengthened and deepened. Nevertheless, in Mexico financial intermediation is still low, both compared to international levels and to the size of the Mexican economy.
However, to the extent that asset markets become deeper, the role of asset price channels may possibly gain more importance in the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy in Mexico.
Conclusions