Ul\apt•l' 1

ZN!l\ODOO~Xt1f

•

Chapter I

L'l rRODUC'liON

I

•

In the yeArs follOt~J1ng tM second ·.t~orld war, tho united 1

states and the :iovlet Ullion emerged as Cuper t-owers on the world

polltlcal sceno. Britain, lt"'rsnce, Germany, and Japan, which bad

bean ~reat Fowers in the pre-war era, found themselves reduced

to secondary status.

The two Super rowers, bo1ng rivals, soUght to onl1st

formal allies from among the smaller and medium r-owers. Each

virtually built up a sphare of influence for ltzielf'. It looked

as though the rl valry be tween the two would l'C9S ul t in another

world war. They, however, did not resort to a direct military

confrontation owing to their own domes tic cons tralnts aod the 2

compulsions of international politics, as well as from a foar

ot tba destructive implications of their nuclear weapons. They

restricted their rivalry to other i'lel&l, and they competed so

keenly as to touch oft 1nterm1t~t crises between thems~lves.

These orJ.ses t11ere tiDe and again resolved through wl Jlga

1 ,.<iilllam Fox, who first coined the term 1 super Power' defined 1t as "a great pow(\r, whose armed foroe 1S so mobllo thnt 1t can be deployed in any strategic theatre, as or,posed to a great power whoso interests and 1nnuence arG confined to a s 1ngle regional theatre"•

'-oJ• T. R. Fox, T~ilJW:lr &)OWyu:a - Tt)mir ,Res pons !bll&,tx For H)BQfl (Yale, 4) 1 PP• al-21.

Hum Kim YoWlg, ed. t Tw2ntv YtarJ of Cd§es a ;file Cold ~ lZa ( r~:aelo~ood Cliffs N.J., 1968), PP• 1»-x. Also see William G. Andrews, iLe Polltlqs ot knteroat1ona1 Crises (New York, 1970), PP• ~3 •

•

compromises bUt without mach mutual trust. ThroU.~bout the

flftlES and the early s lxt1es ( too period under study) tho

2

Super POWEJrs continued to exchange threats nnd counterthreats,

each making lt axpl1a1t that lt was ready to use nuclear weapons

by way of retaliation 1n the event o£ any unllataral t~ovo on •

the part ot the other to alter the st&tam. sum in ally part of

the world to 1ts disadvantage. The fear 1n each SQper rower of

a •ts l11'pr1se a ttaok" by the other created a s 1 ttta tlon of d1s trust 3

between them and aggravated tension throughout the world.

In the eottrse of their rivalry, the sup6r fowers attempted

to keep the actual areas ot conflict tar from th0lr own terrJ,.

to rial liml ts ln order to avert the poss 1 bill ty of any dlroct

attack on themSelves. Moreover, they entered lnto a global

eomp@t1t1on for increased political and 1deologlcal influence.

Thl.s often involved them directly as well as lodlrectly 1n

local eonfllots. Altbougb a direct eoll1s1on between r.uper

Powers or a general t.~~ar was averted, the frequency of super­

Power involvement ln the local conflicts of smaller ;'Ol!lE!rs

increased. l~os t of the local. conflicts of the post-war period 4

havo 1nc1d0ntally occurred in tho so-called Third ~.Jorld.

In the context of thiS rivalry ~tween the super Powers-­

known as the cold 'Afal\oo•a new arrangement of forces took place.

3

4

Arnold L. Horeliok and Hyron Rush, ~tn lg PQN§Z: AQd SSDJaA,. F0teL~n fo1J.;X ( Chlcar10, 1966 t PP• S.. 13.

1be term "l'h1rd world" 1S used here to mean tba cont1nents of ASla, Africa, and Latin America. Although this term 1s a sub3ect of' controversr ar:.ong scholars, lt 1s 3enerallJ taken to cover the former colonial or sett;t-colon1al developing and underdeveloped countries of the world.

3

TUl the late forties the contest between the super Powers was 5

conflnod mainly to F~rope. The ~stern Powers rallied round the

thlted states under the North Atlantic Treat1 organlzatlon (NATO),

alld EaS tern EUrope organized 1 ts elf as a bloc Wlder the leaders blp

of the soviet UD1cn. After the war, witil the llquldatlon of tbe •

colonial 61:-plres ot the European states, a rapld emergence of

nation states tf;ok place 1n ASia and Africa. These new states

d1d not immedle.tely eome \-llthin tha orblt of supel\-Power rivalry.

In the light of their long experience of ~gstern oolon1a11sm and

1mpor1al1sm, they perceived the new movae oi' tho wos tern Powers

as deSigned to trap them 1nto unproductive military and political

alllaDces.

'lbe tJn1ted states, 1n spite ot 1ts not being a traditional

colonW Power and notwl ths tnndlng 1 ts mucb-publiclzed comm1tttent

to democracy and the r1gbt of self-determination of nations,

failed to sutlport the liberation movements ln the colonial uorld.

ThiS was because lt did not want to hurt the suscept1bUltlee of

th0 colonial Powers of EUrope and Jeopardize the 1ntegr1ty ot

the western bloc. canseqQently, the antt.colonlal pollo1es of

the new states wero directed as muon against tbe un1 ted s ta tGS

as against the other &restern Powers. In the eyes of the new

states tbe l1n1ted states was tho leader of their erstwb1le

colonlal rlll.ers.

The new countries shled away eq~ally from the Govlet bloc.

An important reason for their nes1tancy about cultivating the

tr1endSh1p of the communiSt P~1ers uas that their own status

as independent so"ereign states was stUl suspect in the eyes of

the 3ov1et leaders hlp under J. v. Stalin. lbey, therefore,

decided that even though they might adopt pol1t1cal Ideas BAd

1nst1tuticns of the :.estern style, they should, by and larget

follow a policy ot non-alignment between the two Power 'blocs • •

lbe pol ley of non-alignment was thus a by. product of the bipolar

politics of the post-war era and added. e. s1gnlf1cant dlmanslon

to 1nternat1onal relations.

India, the largest non- ~ommun1s t col.ln try, became the

cblef spokesman of the pollcy of ncn-allgnment and anti. 6

colon1allsm among the new AS.laft,.Afrioan states. Tbe nev stat•

preoccupied thGlDSelvea w1tb the problems thrOWll up by the proca;s

of 11qu1dat1on or colonialiSm and the taskS of national 7

reconstruction and development rather than with the Cold war.

They t!1ere not much impressed by the propaganda aboUt the

"Communist menace" to the "free VJOrld"• Indeed they perceived

a greater menace to the peace and security of the world trom

tho growing mll1 tary strength and mutual has tUl ty of the two

Power blocs.

l'be appearance of a nwnber of new states and their eventual.

entry into the mainstream of international politics through their

policy of non-alignment was one of the most slgnlflcant develop.

ments ot the post-war era. The super Powers, w1th their global

power ob3ectives, could hardly ignore it. Initially, tbe

attitude of both tho super Powers towardS the newly emergent

6 a.H. Jansen, &f'rOeAftia. and fiM:A11Snmeqt (London, 1966), PP• 15-16.

7 Peter Lyon, IteuktMJ.sm (Bombay, :W64), PP• 73-73.

6

countries was, more or less, one of indifference. In the early

f1ft1~, the supe1'-Pover conta1t shifted gradually from EUrope

to ASia and the rest of the developing t<~Orld. 1he onset of the

Cold war 1n the Third trJOrld 1s usually taken as dating back to

the outbreak of the Korean war 1n June 1950. ASia, being the •

first continent to go through the process of colonial 11quldat1on, 8

became the first vlctlm of the poll tics betweao the sup or Powore.

r~otw1thste.ndlng tbe non-aligned approach of the countr1ea

of the Third world, the super rowers were able eventually to

enlist the new states as their allies or supporters on Issues

in wb1eh they were mutually involved. A curious and unfortunate

feature ot their bipolar pol1t1cs ln the Third world was that

they took keen 1n teres t 1n creating tlss tu"es 1n the rola tiona

among the developing countries 1n order to spread their influence.

II

Tbe maJor clroums tances wblch made the Tblrd \-10rld

vulnerable to the aompet1 t1on of the super Powers were as

follows.

fhe new states, though anxious to k~p aloof from tho

pol1t1cs of the super Povers, were, at the some t1me, faced w1tb

huge domes tic problems of surmoun t1ng th elr age-old economic alld

technological backwardll83S and promoting political stabU1t,-.

1'he7 DE'Sded massive torelgn assistance and support 1n order to be able to stand on their own feet.9 The need tor foreign economic

8

9

lhomas Patrick MeladYt wpstQEQ folic¥ AQd tho Third WQ~ (New York, l967), P• 14.

Charles w. Anderson and others, J§~YU ot: eo11t1-Qel, DfiA'lopmw (Englewood Clltta, N.J., 1967)., P• l.

6

assistance eventually exposed them to the influence of the super

Powers. The super Powers ;,.;ladl.Y provided economic and teclmolo­

gloal assiStance so that they m1gbt use sueb aas1stance lndlreotl.y

as e. means by willch to influence to their own advantage ttle lD

internal po11c1es and external affnlrs of the states • •

Besl(l!es, a nun: oar of factors created d1sun1 ty and

dis harmony among tbe countries of the Thlrd vJorld. lbeee 1 ncl.uded

cultural pluralism, lack of polltlaal solidarity and 1deolog1cal

un1ty1 and diversity of their economic and political systens.,

'Ihe only feature that the new states had in con-.mon was their

experienca or colonial exploitation, as also thelr uode~

development and poverty. Ti1eir vuln~rab1l1ty to the politics

ot the ~uper Powers \1f\S due, largely, to their heterogeneous

character.

Tba new ooun trles were broadly or two tJpes. ~icme or them

stood for independence and non-alignment mainly because the1r

emergence was the reslllt of their liberation movements--as, for

1ns tance, India, Indonesia, and others. Others ~re inclined to

align themselves with one bloc or the other because they had

em erg~ as independent staten under tho patrcnago of the former

colonial ~owers. 'lbey also sought to preserve their independence

the economic con:pet1tlon of the super r>owers 1n the Third ~vorld had, undoubtedly a posltlve aspect too. Tbe rapld pace of the economic and 1ndus trial developmmt of these newly emergent countries became poss 1 ble, laru el Yt on sccoun t of the ruthless s tru}a~le between the super Powers for economic and pollt1eal innuence in these areas.

7

under tfle protootion of the 31g r-owers. 'lbese states included

Israel, Pa.lds tan, south .Korea, south Vietnam, etc. Thus, wblle

one group of states was trying to keep out all external influence,

another found such influence convenient for tbe preservation of

both identity and national security. • These two types of s tntes were often territorially

contiguous. Their divergent approaches to 1l'ltemational politics

frequently resulted in bilateral bost1l1tles. J.1U1tary adventures,

being much too expensive, made it necessary tor them to look tor

foreign aid to strengthen themselves sufficiently to deal wltb

their immediate enemies. Thus they became sort of clients of the

super Powers. Thls strengthenGd tlla 1nnuence of the super u

POWers 1n tbe different regions of tbe ThUd \'lforld.

Tbe most important among the factors responsible for the

gradual passing of the countrle; of the Tb1rd world under the

hegemcn1al influence of the super ~ewers was the phenomenon of

local conflicts. The developing countries were frequently

involved ln disputes of various kinds, especially 1n disputes of

a territorial, political, or ideological character, all ar1slng 12

tram their colonial past.

Most disputes l4Sre border and territorial disputes. Tbese

bad their origin ln the arbitrary deltm1tat1on of the terr1tor1a1

llmlts of the new states--arbitrary, in the sense that tbe

u

12

S~ John L. sutton and Geoffrey Komp, AJ'IA9 tg iJIVQlqplng Qppntrl• 194§:19§5, Adelphi Paper 28 (London, ]966}, P• 1.

Gunnar ~·yrdal, Njian PrAfllA (London, 1968) 1 vol. 11

PP• 129·38•

8

colonial Powers took no account of tbe trad1tlonal, geograpblcalt

economic, or ethnic aonslderations in defining the borders of the

new states that they created ln the course o:r 11quldnt1ng their 13

empires.

Owlng to the sentiment of terr1tor1al nat1onal.1sm GD.d •

sovereignty, these disputes of the new states plagued their

rela t1ons with tbal r lmmedla te neighbours almos t from tbe time

they attained lndependenoe. Indeed they frequently erupted 1nto

conflicts--as, for ins tnnce, the Indo-Pakls tanl confllct, the

Sino-Indian confllot, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the conflict

between G rea ce and Turkey over CYPrus.

14ftQ1pgiM1 nlijpQ'Sl

There ware also ideological disputes ln the Third l40rld,

and 1n these, either or both the parties received support fran

the super Powers. Often these disputes were the result ot

intervention by the !Juper rowers in a dlspate vlth a view to

creatine a orlsls sltuat1on. ~e ~uper Powers defended their

intervention on ldeolog1oal groundS--as, for 1nstanoe, ln the

lorean or1s1s, ln the '11etnam ar1s1s, and ln the cuban mlssUe

cr1s1s.

Ciyll (ir1SQS

Meat s ta. tes of tile Tblrd world were harr1ed by 1Dterns1

crises brought on by economic backwardness, polltlcal 1nstab111ty1

cultural plurallsm1 violence, and the problem of intra-state

13 Ibid., PP• 175-6.

8

14 1mpor1al1sm. 1bese crises resUlted at tlmes ln civil s trlfe.

The super Pow~rs often attempted to :fish 1n the troubled waters

either by dlrectl.Y 1nterven1ng in the internal affairs of a

cr1s1s-r1dden state or by rendering economic and mU1tary aid 16

either to maintain the dominating group 1n power or to •

strengthen the revolting .factions within a state. 'lbe

congolese crls1s and the sudanese crisis are 1ns tances 1n point.

Local dlspates rac111tated the penetration of the

1nnuet1ce of tJle SUper Powers in the coltntrles ot the Tblrd

world. Tbe SUper Powers sought to cap1tal1ze on the dlftlcult1E8

of the smaller Powers in order to es ta.b11sb their credibUltJ ln

the areas concerned. They expanded their lnnueoce 1n the Thlrd

world generall7 ( l) by providing economic ass 1s ta.nae and Bllowlng

its pol1t1cal. use; ( 2) by granting mUltary ald aud promotlng

trades and ( 3) by Gxploltlng local conn lets. All these methodS

were ln fact intel'-related and eon:plementa.ry to one anotber.

Henee the 1nvolv~nt of the super Powers 1n any loool. contllot

cannot be analysed separately from the pol1t1cal, economic, and

mll1tary cornm1treonts of these Powers 1n any particular region.

III

It 1s not within tile scope of the present study to go

ln to the h1s tory of tbe poll tics ot the ~; uper Powers 1n the

14

16

For a conceptual framework of tbe phenomenon of intra­state 1mper1alism, see A.P. Misra, "Intr&-State Imperialism as a Factor in connlots w1thln and between states", Int'f"'~I.PPN s tug!CIJ. ( Dolh1) , vol. 14, no. 1, Januaryr. Marc 1976, PP• 39-41.

Ibld., P• 43a

l'bl~ world 1n detau. All the s8Jne it 1s relevant tor us to

make a general e.nalys1s of the response ot the super Povara to

the local connicts ot the Tbird world with a view to obta1n1Dg

a better understanding of the role of the super Powers 1n the

Sino-Indian conniot of 1962. 'l'he emphasis 1s on the raet tbat •

the spread of tbe cold war in the Th1rd world was due, largely,

to the interaction of the super Powers w1th the local confllcta

ot the smaller Powers. rbere 1s also an attempt to make a brief

comparative study o1' the role of the super ftowers 1n certain

maJor conn1cts of the Third world preoedlug the S1no-Ind181l

aonfllct of :was. The Korean crisis of l950t the suez cr1s18

of 1956, the Congo er1s1s of 1960, and the cuban mlssUe crlsla

of 1962 wore the maJor local conn1cts that occurred botweon

JSSO and 1962. It is possible that our choice ot these four

con1'11cts 1s arbitrary, bUt eacb of them 1s consp1cuoua tor

tho role that the super flowers played 1n it, and together the

four conflicts Ul.Jstrate the spread of the COld war from Eoat

ASla to weat ASia, and later to Africa, and finally to Latln

America. A study of these eonnlcts, whlch preceded the Slno­

Ind1aD conflict, else fac1lltates our understanding or the

behaviour of the super Powers in local confllots. Tbo,y explain

wby the 3uper r>owers reacted to local contllcts 1n tbe rnannMt

that they d1d and how their lnteraotlcn wltb local eonfllota

atteotild the col'ltllct situations and tbe pattern of tile regional

aDd global polltlcs.

However, this 1s not to overlook ttle fact that Mch

conf'llct s1tuatlon was llnlq&ae ln ltselfa no two conflict

situations were alike. Accordingly, the response of tbe Sl.lper

Powers to thos~ contllcts and the degr~ of their 1nvolvC9tnent

1n each case varlect dopencUnc on tile lnterna.tlonal pollt1ca1

sl tuatlon obta1n1ng at the tlme, tha level of their mutual

relat1onsh1p, nuclear tecbnologlcal developments and the

possible repercussions ot tbe confllot on the regional and 16

global powal\epattarns, and so on. •

TIJG iAUM QrJ.I 1g

11

on 25 June 1960, the North .Korean rorces, w1th the moral

and matsrlal support of the sovlet Union, crossed the 38th

parallel lnto south Korea. There 1s still a controversy over

the responsib1l1ty for the w81'--1.e. whether North Korea started

the war or south Korea. Suffice lt to note, for our purposes,

that once the ~ar broke out, the crisis ln Korea dld not remain

a local one any more, for the super Powers came 1n and sougbt to

exploit the connlct to further ti1elr own respective endS 1D the 17

context of the cold war.

TUl the outbreak ot the Korean \4ar, AS1a was, more or

less, free from tile r1 valry of the super Powers. wl tb tbe out­

break of war lo l(orea, NJ 1at tbe con t1nen t w1 th the hlgh est

potent1al1t1es, became tbe major arena of coni'llct between the

super Powers.

lbe Otll ted states looked upon the conflict as "overt

commllnlSt aggression ln Korea"• It vas already feeling deeply

steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. waltz, e4S-, !CRnf11aS; 1.Q WA£14 PQ).itlga (Massachusetts, 1971), P• 4.

John G1ttlngs, "The war Baforea, 1n fbe Gpgr41AD (London), 15 AugUSt 1974, P• Be

concerned aboUt the tll tlqg of the balance of power ln ASia 1n

favour of tbe communists followll'lg the emergence of the People•a

Republic of Cblna 1n 1949 aDd 1ts subSequent alllance wltb tho

soviet tln1on. It, therefore, dlreotl.y intervened 1n the .Korean

\4&r by dlspatoblng 1ts troops to the war front even before tbe •

Security councll of the united Nations bod taken n for,mal decision

to Intervene mU1te.r1ly. sumequently, us troops fought on the

slde of South Korea under the banner of the Utllted Nations.

The tbl ted states went to tho extent of apply!Dg lta

doctrine about SQQ\a1Qm1Rl of comm~n1sm 1n the Korean war. !he

American General, DOUglas A. McArthur, who commanded the ON

forces in Kore3t pusbed the military operations oven beyond the

38th parallel. When the mllltary operations reached as tar as

the Yalu .Rlver bordering China ln MBftchurla, commun1S t Chlna

decldedt ln tba 1nterest of lts own security, to enter the 18 Korean war. lbe TJDited states then t~tened to use the atom

bomb ln order to deter China from undertaking lts mUitar,v lB

actlcn. 1111s created a situation ln which the Korean war

mlght well have escalated lnto a general war.

i'be presence of the sovlet union in the Korean war was not physical, but lt gave all possible moral and material

support to North I<orea.. toblen China entered the war, 1t

1.8 China had given prlor warnlng to the united Nations that lt would not tolerate the crossing of tbe 38th parallel by the tJN forces as 1 t would threaten 1 ts terri tor1el security. 'lhe Chinese message was communicated to the securl ty councll by Ind1a.

For details about the American decision to use tbe atom bomb 1n Korea, see 0'41gbt n. Eisenhower, f161Jdata fa£ fChfllll!l (New 'iork, 1963), cb. ?.

received massive arms supplies from tbe soviet Utllon. :rh1s

enabled 1t to continue 1ts mU1tary operation there.

A general war was, however, averted 1fl Korea because tbe

western 811169 of the O'nlted states dld not support lts proposal

to escalate the ccnfllot. 1bere was also much crltlolsm of tbe

Truman Adm1n1strat1on1s Korea policy at home. • F1oolly, us fore•

vl thdrew behln4 tbe 38th parallat.

Tb1a dld not menn that the Korean crls 1s came to an end.

Ind GOd the cr1s 1s p ers 18 ted till 1953. It resulted in tbe

perpetuation of hostUlty botweeA North and south Korea ratber

tban between the two super Powers.

!be Korean lvar 1s thus an example of a local conflict

transformed by the intervention ot the super Powers--direct al'ld

1nd1rect--1nto a protracted 1nternat1ona1 crls1s threatening to

escalate 1nto a genoral war.

fbe reponse of the super Powers to the .Korean crisis had

long-term consequenc• tor AS1n. It led to the rapld expans10b

of their compet1t1ve 1ntluonce 1n ASla. 1be united stntE8

described the Korean war as a Communlat threat to the security a>

of the "tree world" and used lt as a pretext tor the tormatlOil 21

of m111 tar7 all lances 1n the reg1on. It 1s noteworthy that a

ma3or1ty of the ASian countries whlcb joined the westero m111tar~

21

lbe Chinese entr1 into the Korean war 1n no way saaggesta that 1t was motivated b7 tbe1r ldeolog1cal or expanslonJ.at ml11te.ry designs. Ch1na•s 1ntervent1on ln the war was due, largelyt to 1ts anxiety to protect 1ts own vital seourlt7 lnteresUJ. see Fred Greene, Q.S. Ppligy ADd the ~egur,,x Of Mia (Hew 'lCork, J968.J, PP• 30-32 and 12'1•8.

14

22 alliances did so, not rrom any fear of cor.unutl1sm1 bUt to strengthen

23 themselves against their local enemies.

'l'he :.ovlot Union coUld 1n no olreumstaneos allow a unUateral

Pxpans ion of U'S m111 tary 1nnuence in J.:Jia. In the mld fifties,

in the '4e.ke of the formation of US..led llili ta!'y all lances 1n AS1a •

it launched upon an econOinie and diplomatic offensive against the

¥lest in ASia. ~ov1et economic and military ass1Stanoo was veloomed

particularly by non-aligned countries. 1tlus the countries of ASla

became, in one WPY or anoth~r, subJect to the pressures of the

economic, military, and political competition between the super

POWE'r9e

Thus, through the Korean conn1ct, the :.uper Powers were

able to extend the cold war to .ASia. so keen was the competition

between them to spread their economic and military 1nnuence that

the non-aligned states \<Jere bard put to 1 t to res1s t their

overtures.

22 In 1950-51 the Utl1tGd states entered 1nto several bilateral security pacts with Japan, Nationalist China, Aus tralla and New zealand ( ANZUS) and the Ph111pp1nes. In ]954 lt took the leading part in the creation of the south­EoS t M lan Treaty Organiza t1on ( s EA'.rO) w1 th certain small powers of ~>outh and south-EaSt .AS1a as members. In the SeJDe year the Baghdad Pact was concluded with the coWltrle9 of the Middle EaSt for the containment of communism 1n that region.

The original me:~ oors of the SEA'rO werea AUS trol1a, France, now zealand, Pak 1s tan, the A-'h111pp1nes, ThallBlldL the un1 ted Ungdom, and the tmtr eel ~tates. 'lbe or1g nal memberS or the Ba.~bdad Pact were Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Pakistan Joined 1n 1955. Howevert following a neutral. is t J1Q9I'l 1n Iraq 1n :wsa, the BaJhda4 ?act was replaced by tho central Treaty Organlzatlon ( c~ro), wblch bad Iran, Pakls tan, and Tu-rkey as metbers.

23 Greene, n. 21, P• 31.

Dtl spu Qt1s1A

If the Korean \1!81' was a local coni'llct that became

aggravated, 1ntens1f1ed, and protracted through the involvement

of the ~~ Uper PowGrs, the suez oris 1s was a conn1ct where the

role of the super .P~ers contributed to o.n early resolution of •

the crisiS and a shortening of tne period of bost111tles. This

does not, hOt~ver, mean that the super Powers ware disinterested

1n the suez crisis or that they dld not seek to advance their

global power obJG~ctlves 1n tho.t region.

In October 1956 F8YPt suffered a tr1part1 te invasion by

Britain, France, and Israel, following President Nasser's announce­

ment about the nntionallzatlon of the suoa canal. 'lhe soviet Uh1ou

strongly reacted to the attack by the ·.vestern t~owers. It threatenec

to use lts nuelear weapons 1n the event of the invasion not being

called off immediately. It even proposed to the united states a

Joint soviet-US military 1ntervent1on to stop the hcstUitles 1o 24

Egypt. The t:Jn1ted states, while reJecting the soviet proposal,

threatened Britain nevertheless that lt ~ould c11t off the mucb­

neaded petroleum supplies 1f the latter continued lts attack on 25

Egypt. SLlbSequantly, there wos a censet1re 1n Egypt, and the

parties to the d1spt.tte agreed to resolve the dispute througb

oegot!ation. Thus, the rare collaboration between the super

Powers resulted 1n a shortening or the period of hostU1t1ea

and finally to a negotiated settlement of the suez dispute 1n

195?.

24 nwn Kim Young, n. 2, PP• aa.-89.

25 I bid. t P• 89e

The role of the super Powers 1n the suez crlsls was

condl tloned to a large extent by the developments ln the field

of nuclear technology and weaponry. The r.;ovlet rJnlon had Sllccess­

Mly exploded the hydrogen bolnb ln 1953, and thiS had given lt

some sort of parity wlth the united states 1n the nuclear field • • In the following years, the Guper Powers became more cautious ln

thelr reactions to the moves ot the other slde, real.J.zlng the

lmplleat1ons of a nual.ear ocnfrcntatlon or an all-out war. In

other words, both r.uper Powers were convinced that the creation

of spheres ot influence through overt mUltary contEJlt contained

rlsk, and they wore determined to prevent a recurrence of the

kind of war they had fought ln ~orea. competltlon for areas of

influence 1rl the ens ulng years was conducted mainly through

econOE1c and mllltary ald, trade, propaganda, and thrents of

direct intervention or WJe of nLtelear ueapons. However, the

nuclear tbreat was used, for all practleal purp~es, Jtmt to

prevent any alteration in the aatus QL\Q 1n the world from bo.lng 26

dls turbed. All the same, the tensions of the Cold war mounted

betwean the mld fifties and the early sixties as they had never

done before.

Dle rsaotlon of the soviet tll1on to the invasion 1n Egypt

and lts sutsequent su port for gi!YPt resulted in close Arab-Sovlot

relattons. The soviet unlon gained cor.s1,1erable influence 1n

west ASia, particularly throu.~h the es tabllshment of a1d and

trade relations 1n the economic and m111tnry fieldS t-~ltb ~ypt m

and some other countries of ttlat region.

26 Horellck and Rush, n. 3, PP• 10-13.

~ Bum Kim Young, n. 2, P• 89.

'l'be 11lcrease 1n soviet 1nnuence in 1,-Jes t ASia caused

concern 1n the united States, which reactPd by giving an as

assurance to the "Northern Tler" countries in November 1956 that

1t woUld defend their pol1t1cal independence and terr1tor1al.

1rltegr1ty. Indeed lt undertook to protect the ~ole of 't..est 29 •

ASia agalnst any communist attack. lbe united states strengthened

1ts mUltary alliance 1n the tom of the Central Treaty OrganJ.za­

tlon ( CENTO) ln \\'eSt AS1B. lhe overall result of the suez cr1s1s

was that the cold war engulfed the -whole of ,'\Sf.a.

l.be QQMQ arts Ia

With the cold war having overtaken .ASia, the attention of

the supGr Powers was drawn to the continent of Africa where, 1n

the late .f1ft1GS and the early s1xt1~, a number of new states

had come into being. 'Dley became 1nterelted ln fllllng the

vacuwn created by tha w1 thdrawal of the EUropean Powers from

certain parts of Africa. An opportt.tnlty to do so was provided

by the crisis 1n the congo 1n 1960.

ibe Congo gained 1 ts independence from Belg1wn 1n June

1960. soon lt round 1tself in the m1d8t of a clvU tofar bet\4een 3)

two factions one pro-1wres tern nnd the other pro-soviet. 'lbe

28

29

30

seo n. 21.

1be Eisenhower noctrlne was approved by the congress of the Ulll ted G ta tes 1n Narch 1957. For details of this doctrine, see tho Ngw Ygrls, TlJpea of 6 March l9S1e

For descriptive analyses of the congo crisis and tbe involvement of the super Powers there, see ~ .. }' .. Ra~1 XJ3Q gp).itiG§ Qf ljpD=41,1aJUPsm1l (New Delhl, 1969) t ~P• :Wl.-2131 and Alexander Dalling, lbe sp~iet I&ipn gpa JiPI PR1tc?Ji Na.,tlgg ( lf ew York, ]962) t PP• 140- •

Uolted Nations came into the crisis to r69olve the connlct

betw~n the two factions and to help them arrive at a settlement.

ADtlc1patlog a unilateral Gov1et lnterventlon 1n the congo, the

united states gave lts support to a resolution of the security

council which authorized the UN secretary General, nag Uammarskjoldt •

to provide the Congo wltb the necessary mUltary ald and called

Upon Belgium to wl thdraw 1 ts troops. The soviet Unton, on tbe

other band, emphasized the neeesslty tor direct UN intervention

1n the congo. It also threatened to intervene WlUaterally 1n

the event of tbe lhlted Nations not movlbg 1n directly to r•olve

the civil strife. the soviet attltllde led to the aggravatlOD ot

the crSsJ.s in tbe congo. A unilateral loterventlon by any of the

B1g Powers was, however, avoided 1o the congo, prlmarUy because

of the UN operations the~e. Nevertheless, tbe Congo crlsla

became complicated and protracted on account of the controversial

rcle played by the sov1et fll1on, nnd to some extent by the Ulllted

states, 1n support1DR rival factions. The crls 1s las ted t1ll

1963, when Mo1se i&hombe admitted defeat and aa.nounced the end

ot the secession of the province of Katanga from the Congo.

By their indirect part1cipat1cn in the congo cr1s1s, the

super i'OWel'S sought to • tabllsh their oun linkS 1n Africa. 1bua

the period following the Congo crisiS witnessed subStant1s1

pollt1cal and economic involvement on the part of tbe TJnlted

stat~ and the sovlet union in Afrlca. \d.th tbe entry of China

the rivnlry between the super Powers ln the various parts of

Africa acquired a new dimension.

Qyhgp t.!la§U.e Qr1s11

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 represents a sharp contrast

to the other local connlcts or the preceding period. In cuba a

criSis situation was, so to say, manufactured by the !1Uper }>OWer&

themselves in the course of their competition for influence in •

Latin America. In other areas they had only taken advantage of

the conf'l.1cts that were already there.

1be rtse of Fidel castro to power 1n JanuBry 1959 had led

to a steacty deterioration 1n ~t1ban-US relations. us host111t7

towardS the revolu tlonary castro Admin is tra t1on was based on the

conviction tbnt cuba had become, tor all practical purposes, a

comzz:r.m!s t ally of the soviet tl'l1on and that it 1:1SS virtually o.

ccmmunist baSe in the tvestern hemisphere. Indeed, many 1n the

Unltd ~tates regarded the ecergence of castro as tbe hnrbl.nger

ot CommuniSt penetration and expansion 1n Latin America, which

the tblted states bad h1stor1eal.ly looked upon as ltll excluslvo

sphere of infl1.1enoe.

lbe soviet Ullion trled to cap1tal1ze on the political

developments 1n cuba 1n order to a.1 ter the s trateglc and

diplomatic balance of power ln its favour in Latin America.

nurlng the summer and fall of 1962, 1 t began to ins tall

ottens1ve m1ssUes in Cuba. It also oonstruettl'd a number of

p(l'rmanent mlssUe s1tes 1n the close v1c1n1ty of the ~!ted

states. 1'he soviet decls ion to ins tall of fens lve miss Ues was

based on a mlscal.culat1on of the us position on cuba and tbe

indigenous nature of the progressive revolutionary regtme there.

on 22 October ]962 the then US President, John F. Kennedy,

ordered a quarantine of ships headed for cuba "'ltb a vlew to

preventing the landlbg of ony more of.fenslvo noviet mU1tary

equipment there. He also demanded from the soviet tblon an immediate withdrawal and ellm1nat1on of the m1ssUes and other

offensive mUitary equipment from cuba. Tho us President further

we.rnecl that any soviet assaUlt from cuba on any nation of the •

western hemiSphere would be regarded as an attack on the United

stat-, req u1r1ng o full· blast reteJ.la tlon aga.lns t the soviet 31

union. lbe crisis situation created by the soviet m1ss11ES 1D

Cuba virtually brought the super Powers to the ver~;e of n nuclear

confrontation. 'lba 1n1t1al soviet response to the American

qtlBrant.lfte was strong. After the !'.orean t~a.r, the cubaD mlsslle

crls1s was the only conflict s1tu.at1on to threaten to escalate

1n to a d.tsos trotW genGral. war between the two super Powers.

However, Kennedy and I<hrushchev su~equentl.y arrived at

a compromise, thanks to the personal intervention of the tit

secretary.Genersl, u 1hant. Th1s saved the \40rld from a nuclear

holocaust. It was, however, clear to both the super Powers that

the outbreak or a nuclear war would have been suicidal for both

of them. 'lho soviet lalion, therefore, deemed lt w1se to withdraw

lts mtssll«J from Cuba and, 1n return, secured an assurance from

the united states that 1 t would not attack cuba. It also got the

united states to dismantle lts offensive mJ.ssUe baSes 1n TUrkey,

t<Jhlch had pos e4 no less a tbrea t to the s eclU'l ty of the soviet

un1on than the missile 'baSes 1n cuba bad posed to the s eeur1ty

of tbe tlllted states.

21

Nevertheless, the cuban missUe erlsls dld contribute to

the act1v1ze.t1on of the poll tics of the Cold war 1n Latin America

and also aggravated the Slno.-Sovlet rift.

SiDP=IndiAD QgQA&Q.l

In the ebove-montioned perspective, the slno-indlan

contllct of 1962 standS out as a most slgnlf1eant example ot a

COilfllct ot the '1111rd world. 1be super Powers pla7ed an important

role in tbe conn let. For the first time 1n h 1S tory, India and

China, two g1811t AS1an Powers, were waging open war against each

other. It was also a rare example of a war betw~n a communlat

and a noo-a11gned countrr.

'l'be dlspute between Indla and Cb1na over the e.l1gnment of

tbe boundaries separating their respective torrltorlee all al.q

the Himalayas 'WOS there for a long time in an embryonic form.

l'here was, however, no overt hostUlty from eltheJ' side. In

l9fS the two eoun tr1es developed actate differences over tba

Tibetan upr1s1na. Thls brought their border dispute into tbe

open and touched ott hostll1t1es. \Vhat was a mere border dispute

capa'bl.e of be1ng peacefully resolved became tbe cause ot a hot 32

war. Besld•• during 1959-62 the 01no-Indlan terr1tor1al dJ.opute

wes rapidly dravn lnto the vortex ot the polltlcs of the super

Powers. Tbe pol1t1oal lnteract1on of tbe r,uper Powers w1tb

Indls and Cb1na at the bilateral level and their attitudes,

pollcles, end reactions to the border diSpute as lt reacbocl 1ta

32 'lbe dovelopment of the S1no-Ind1an diSpute 1s dealt wltb 1n detaU 1n Cbapter i'wo of this study. ~

THESIS ~ ~

'/ ~~~·-· <v._.-:1 \

327.54 \\. ~_c... ""2 a :; '!~~l : \. V869 Su \ ~ 0 . '19r 5

1·

111111111111111! 111111111 (; ' ::_ .. ;;Y TH2308 •

mcs t critical phase during 1959-62 aggravated dts trust,

susp1c1on, and hos tU1 ty bettfeen the parties to the dispute.

22

J.S a result or the indirect involvement of the super Powers the

dispute beoama more a pollt1cal controversy than an Issue ralatod

to the rectlf1cat1on or frontiers. In the s1tlUlt1on that develop.. •

ed the attitudes ot the two partl~ hardened, so that tbe posa1-

b111ty of a compromise settlement disappeared. 1b1s aspect of

the role of the super Pet-Jers in the development of the slno-33 34

Indian dispute and 1n the conflict or 1962, which make thJB

conflict unique among the eontllots of the Thlrd world, 18

dlscuss e4 at length in the chapters tbat follow.

CQRq;l Yl.iQ!\11

In the light of this brief re·11ew of the 1nteraot1on of

the super Powers ~~ th the principal oonniots that o,~curred

betwsen 1960 and J962 1n the l'h1rd ·~vorld, we may set down a

rew general conclusions about the behaviour of the super Powel'S

1n local oontl.lcts.

In spite of the diversity 1n the origins and to.IUi of the

dis pates, there 1B an 1nev1 tnble relationship between a looel. 35

dispute and the global situation ln \ihloh it develops. In other

33

36

Chapter 'lbree of this study 1s devoted to an analys18 or tbe role of the super rowers 1n the development of the dls pute, partloule.rl y during 1959-62.

A detBUed analysis of the response of the ~uper Powers to the connlct of 1962 1s a;ra11able 1n Chapters Four and F1ve of this study.

wal. ter GoldS te1nt t11'be Peaceful L1m1 tBtion of Disputes • Police t>owers and ~ystem Problems", JIRP~ pf" CQDAlq~ ne;p1tt~1QR ( M1ch1gao), vol.. 7, no. 3tfl9~ P• 256.

/ Ser ter~bcr

wordS, a confllct bas two e.opacts. It emerges between two or

more states on account of all 1ncompat1b111ty of interests,

cU.sparl ty of perceptions, clash of cultures, awareness of

1ncons1stencles, e.nd use of pressurea-m111tary or otherw!se-• 36

to seaure a favourable solution of the issues 1n d1spllte. ~he •

ensuing state of tension makes 1t dlfflctllt for the ste.ts

concerned to live 1n peace and rulfJl out any e.m1cabl.e solution

of tbe issues lnvolv«l. :rn the contemporary \fOrld, a oonfllct

1s not Just an isolated phenomenon. It cannot be stud1Gd

separ3tely from tbe global pol1t1oal environment 1n ~lch 1t

develops. lbe course of n conflict 1s 1Dev1tebly influenced 1n

scmo degr~ by the entire range of 1ratemat1onal relations,

wb1ch 1s, largely, dominated by the pollt!~ of the super 31

Powers. lbus, 1n the tdOrd:iJ of steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth

N. ltlal tza

Tbe immediate context of any conn1ct 1s created by the attributes and the interactions of the parties •••• 1be global pol1t1oal environment 1s formed ul tlmately by the 1nteract1ng attributes and c::apa.bUltlG:J ot the unttoo states and the soviet un1on. Always potentlellyl and often ln fao~, one or both of these eountr as wUl 1ntrl.tdo 1n tne con1'11cts of less powerful states. 38

In the period following tbe second world trJar, tbe super

Powers, whlle avoiding a mutual direct confrontation, got them­

selves increas1ngly involved 1n the local connlcts ot the

36 Thls 1s baSed partl.:; on Qulrlcy ta1ght1 s "fbe lillcal.atlon of International conflicts"'-- 1n J.AU~t cpnfl,J.gt RfJS plutlOD.t vol. 9, no. 4,/ m65, PP• 5.

I !)ec en: ber

Ibid., P• 434•

Spiegel and waltz, n. 16, P• 5.

Tblrd world. lbelr involveL'Jent had negative as well as pos1t1ve

conseqUGDces for the eoun tries concerned and for the fhlrd world

generally. 'l'hus, local conflicts became aggravated, 1ntenslt1ed1

and escalated, or localized, managed, and r~olved according to

the nature and degree of the involvement of the SLtper Powers 1n •

them.

The super Powers get involved in a conflict pr1marily 1n

order to sectu'e fulfUment ot their global power obJectives, not

for the purpose of promoting tho Interests of the smaller Powers

concerned. Generally, the super Powers do not react to a crlsls

si tuat1on ln a. local conflict unless and until they have cal cu.

lated tho galns they can make in terms of their power objectlv.-.

and have found that those gains exceed tbe risks and cost of

lovolvement. ::::ometJ.mes they go wrong ln thelr caloulatlons owing

to a mistaken perception of the s1tllat1on concerntttt or are

emotional and short-sighted. Wilen they get entanta.Gd 1n a

situation lo a bad way and f1nd that their involvement 1s not

worth the £1nanc1al and political losses they are sustalnlng,

theJ retreat or t\O ln for a face-saving COBlpromlse. 'rills 1s

\1hat happened to the Ul11tecl states, for instance, 1D the Korean

war and 1n the Vlotnam orla1a; and to the soviet tl'llon ln tbe

Cuban miss Ue crls 1s.

Rationally, a super Power would not react to a unUaterol

aet1on or the other super Power 1n a looal. confllct unless lt has

made a. fair eal.culatlon of ~at it 1s going to gain by such a

reaction and has concluded that an adven tllre 1S worth-while. lhus

there are lnstDilces of crisis situations where a super Power,

in sp1te of ltn pronounced ideological hostU1ty and 1ts desire

to thwart the unilateral aggressive moves made by the other s1de

to diSturb the s k~WJ 4WQ bas alS te.1ned from active reaction.

The tlnltecl states, for instance, dld not take any serious step

aga1ns t the soviet action 1n Hungary in 1956, when the ouez

erlsls vas on. SimUarly, the soviet union did not actively •

react to the us retal.1at1on 1n the taiwan straits crJ.sls of l958

toucbed off by the Cbines e bo:m bardment of the offshore islandS.

Generally, the reaction of the super Powers to any local confllct

sl tuat1oo 1s underlined by caLttion. They want to avoid a dlroct

confrontation batv~n thanselv~. 1'hey do not take the r1sk of

such a confrontation lltlless t!,elr vltal national interests are

involved.

Lastly, the lnvolvanent of the SUper Powers 1n local

conflicts has 1'ar-reach1ng llr.plicatlons both for the conflict

and for the regional and even global power patterns. Their

participation ln conrllcts 1ntens1fl~ the power polltlcs 1ll

that particular region and results lnvarlabl.y 1n protracted

host111t1es between the states 1n conflict rntber than 1D

compromisES. only the super Powers benefit rrom lt by playlng

off one s1do against the other 1n pursuance of their power

obJectives.

IV

In the 11ght of thiS discuss ion, an attc:ept 1s made 1n the

following chapters to study and anal )'Sa the response of the super

Powers to the S1no-Ind1an conflict of 1962 and to answer the

following quest1onss ( 1) ~!hat was tba nature of the slno-Indlan

dJ.spute'l ( 2) wbat rolet dld the super Powers play in the develop.

ment of tbe s1no-Ind1an d1sputct1 ( 3) What were their r~ponsES

to the eonfllot of ]962? ( 4) l4hat were the probable motivations

and obJ~ot1ves beh11'1d their policies towardS tb1s confllct?

(5) Finally, what was the lmpaot of thelr responseJ on the •

oon.fllot ltselt, on the regional power pattern, and on pollt1cs

at the global level?