NUMBER 99

CAUCASIAN ARMENIA BETWEEN IMPERIAL A1\ID SOVIET RULE: THE INTERLUDE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Richard G. Hovannisian University· of California, Los Angeles

Conference on

"NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CHA.c"TGE IN TRANSCAUCASIA"

Co-sponsored by

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center

and

American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies

April 24-25, 1980

Caucasian P~enia Between Imperial and Soviet Rule The Interlude of National Independence

Richard G. Hovannisian University of California, Los Angeles

Cut adrift from central Russia by the revolutions of 1917, Transcaucasia

broke apart into three national republics in 1918. The attempts of the

Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians to organize independent states

ultimately failed, however, and by mid-1921 the whole region had been

absorbed into the Soviet system. Still, it was upon the foundations of

those imperfect, transitory states that the Soviet republics of AZerbaijan,

Armenia, and Georgia emerged. The Russian Communist Party's deviation in

adopting the principle of a federated state structure was required in part

to counteract the influence of the nationalist parties and the draw of

national sentiment in the successionist provinces. For the Armenians, the

transformation of their independent republic into a Soviet national republic

remains especially significant, in view of the fact that only on that small

sector of the historic Armenian territories has national life and even

presence continued since 1920.

Although the three independent Transcaucasian states had many common

features, the Armenian republic could be singled out for its enormous

comparative disadvantages and its association with the geographically and

politically broader Armenian question - a question that had ruffled the

table of international diplomacy for four decades. ~Thile, for example,

Georgia and }~erbaijan could conceivably have become viable, independent

states limited to the territories under their actual control in 1919, no

such calculation was possible for the little, landlocked Armenian state.

To achieve anything more than nominal indeper~ence, that republic would have

to incorporate the Turkish Armenian provinces and gain an outlet on the sea.

2

During a century of Russian rule in the Caucasus, the Armenian element

had increased by leaps and bounds, the Armenian professional and commercial

classes. had become preponderant in Tiflis and other cities, and the Armenian

rural population had freed itself in many districts from economic servitude

to the large landowning Muslim beks and aghas. Yet, the geographic distributiorr

of the Armenians was such that in any equitable partition of Transcaucasia

nearly all of their commercial and financial centers would be excluded from

the Armenian region, as would several hundred thousand or possibly even a

majority of their people. Under tsarist rule, the Russian Armenian provinces

had remained undeveloped and not a shadow of the vigorous Armenian financial.,

professional, cultural, and political life in Tiflis existed at Erevan, a

sleepy oriental town of 30,000 in 1914, as compared with more that 300,000

in Tiflis and in metropolitan Baku. 1

These factors help to explain the extreme reluctance of the Armenian

leaders, even those of the dominant party, the Dashnaktsutiun, to organize

an independent state around Erevan in 1918. The creation of such a state

was not the logical Qutcome of the national cultural revival of the nineteenth

century or the revolutionary movement of the past thirty years. Tbe

resistance movement had focused on the emancipation of the Turkish or

Western Armenian population and the introduction of local self-government

or possibly regional autonomy in the Turkish Armenian provinces. Insofar

as the Russian Armenian provinces were concerned~ most Armenian intellectuals

and civic leaders had sought only the implementation of the liberal reforms

promulgated but not extended to the Caucasus duricg the reign of Tsar

Alexander II.

The opportunity for independence came at the worst possible historic

moment and seemed to be no opportunity at all. The Armenian population of

the Ottoman empire had been decimated by the actions of the Young Turk

3

regime, the extensive Armenian political, cultural, and religious networks

had been shattered> and several hundred thousand refugees languished in the

Arab provinces, the Caucasus, and South Russia. The very foundation of the

emancipatory movement had been deeply, perhaps irreparably, sapped. And

although the Russian Armenians had been uplifted by the patronizing attitude

of the Russian government during the first year of the world war, they were

soon disillusioned by the new repressive measures in 1916, after the

Imperial armies had occupied the half of Turkish Armenia which had been

awarded Russia in the secret Allied pacts. The Turkish Armenian refugees were

prevented from returning to the occupied territories, making it seem as if

Tsar Nicholas 'had taken to heart the motto ascribed to erst\vhile foreign

minister Lobanov-Rostov, "~.rmenia without Armenians. 11 The creation of the

Provisional Government in 1917 offered a respite, and thousands of refugees

did repatriate to the provinces of Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, but that movement

was paralleled by the spread of defeatism and desertion in the Russian

armies, turning Armenian dreams into a nightmare by the end of the year.2

Refusing to side with the Bolshevik revolution or to acknowledge the

legitimacy of the Council of People's Commissars, the major political societies

in the Caucasus, Baku excepted, organized an interim executive board and a

legislative body to regulate regional affairs pending the establishment of

the so--called democratic order in Russia. These measures, however, did

not relieve the Sovnarkom from having to recognize, as a part of the Treaty

of Brest-Litovsk~ the right of the Ottoman government to reoccupy the

Turkish Armenian provinces and to annex the Transcaucasian districts of Kars,

Ardahan, and Batum. Nor did the attempts of the hastily-organized Armenian

and Georgian detachments to man the extensive front thwart a Turkish offensive

to secure these gains. By Y~y, 1918, the Turkish forces had even breached

the Brest-Litovsk boundaries and entered the soutlnvestern sector of the

Tiflis guberniia and the Araxes river valley in the Erevan guberniia. It was

4

then that the Georgians took the initiative in dissolving the Transcaucasian

federative government and declaring the independence of their historic

territories under German protection. Muslim leaders followed by

proclaiming the creation of the Azerbaijani republic, having received

assurances of Turkish benevolence and military support in liberating Baku

from the Armenian-Russian coalition there. 3

It was under these circumstances that the Armenian National Council in

Tiflis had to face the prospect of declaring P~enian independence and

accepting a crushing peace treaty in the name of the Republic of Armenia.

That new republic had to repudiate all claims to the Turkish Armenian

provinces as well as Kars and Ardahan in Russian Armenia, to allow Turkish

occupation and probable annexation of the entire Araxes river valley, including

the Alexandropol-Julfa railway, and to grant transit and other privileges to

the Turkish armies. The Armenian republic began its existence on about

4,500 square miles (12,000,square kilometers) of bleak, rugged terrain,

crammed with refugees, devoid of the bare essentials of li'fe, and surrounded

by hostile forces. 4 Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan~ Armenia inherited none

of the arsenals; storehouses, administrative machinery, or financial and

commercial-industrial resources of the previous regimes. Rather, it became

the ntand of Stalking Death," as famine, contagion, and exposure swept

away nearly 200,000 people during the ensuing year. 5

It must have taken the last measure of courage for the Armenian political

leaders, bewildered and discouraged, to depart for Erevan, now the Republic's

capital, to try to bring some form to the country's "formless cl'l..aos,n in the

words of Prime Hinister Hovhannes (Ruben Ivanovich) Kachaznuni. Trapped in

this unenviable position, those leaders remained true to their political

principles by going through the motions of establishing a parliamentary

republic, with the cabinet answerable to the legislature and, theoretically,

the legislature to the electorate. Such exercises in the midst of great

5

nat~onal peril and ~ragedy may have gratified the ideological sentiments

of the politicians--yesterday's revolutionary intellectuals--but could have

little effect on easing the suffering of the masses. There were those who

insisted that the times required dictatorial rule, and, although the

champions of democracy in the legislature frequently criticized the high-

handed methods of the interior ministry under Aram Manukian's direction,

none could dispute the fact that the ministry did produce same modest results

in the first months of independence. The conflict between the yearning

for democratic institutions and the necessity for authoritative measures

was never resolved during the existence of the Armenian republic. 6

Until the end of the world war, the Armenian diplomatic missions in

Constantinople and Berlin attempted, without success, to persuade the Turks

or to have the Germans coerce the Turks to withdraw to the Brest-Litovsk

' 7 boundaries, thereby giving Armenia a little better chance for survival.

The Turko-Azerbaijani conquest of Baku and the accompanying massacres in

September, 1918, further demoralized the Armenians~ This, however, was to

be the last successful Turkish campaign of the war. The next month the

Ottoman empire capitulated by terms of the Mudros armistice, and in December

the Turkish armies of occupation finally withdrew from Erevan province,

picking clean the fields and villages, down to sickles, doors, and railway

ties, and ushering in a winter of death for the thousands of Russian Armenian

9 peasants who hurried back into the Araxes valley to reclaim their lands.

The defeat of the Central Powers transformed Armenia's previous

disadvantages into seeming advantages. In Allied eyes, Georgia and

P~erbaijan were tainted as collaborators of the defeated enemy powers~

whereas battered Armenia stood as the loyal, martyred nation. The wartime

anguish of the Armenian people had elicited ~~ressions of outrage and

promises of restitution in every Allied country. British Prime Minister

David Lloyd George captured the essence of the public indignation in his

6

promise that Armenia, "the land soaked w:i.th the blood of innocents, 11 would

never be restored to "the blasting tyranny of the Turk.u10 And among the

first acts of the Paris Peace Conference, which convened in January, 1919,

was the decision that "because of the historical misgovernment of the Turks

of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in

recent years, the Allied and Associated Po.rers are agreed that .Armenia, Syria,

Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish

Empire." The Armenians, together with other communities formerly under Turkish

rule, had reached a state of development "where their existence as independent

nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of

administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as

11 they are able to stand alone." Hence, after centuries of foreign domination,

Armenia was to emerge as a united self-governing state ur~er Allied protectiona

There ~~ld be prodigious difficulties in view of the decimation of the

Armenian population and the ruin of the country, but the regenerative

qualities of the Armenians had been tested and tried throughout history,

and the anticipated worldwide repatriation and the probable partial ¥~slim

exodus would make possible an Armenian majority within one generation.

On the heels of great expectations often follow greater disappointments.

Such w~s to be the Armenian experience. In negotiation of the Mudros

armistice~ the British authorities had been inflexible in demands for Allied

control of the Turkish waterways, but they made concessions on several

points considered less crucial, including evacuation of the Ottoman armies

from the Armenian provinces. The Allies simply reserved for themselves the

right to occupy any or all of Turkish F~enia in case of disorder.12

That

clause was never invoked, even though the Turkish resistance movement first

became manifest in that region and was devoted to the preservation of the

territorial integrity of the Asiatic provinces and denial of any concessions

7

to the Armenians and Greeks. The repeated Allied delays in imposing a

peace settlement aggravated the probl~, and by the time the Sultan's

representatives signed the Treaty of S~vres in August, 1920, .the clauses

relating to Armenia were stillborn. Mean~hile, the Erevan republic remained

inundated with refugees and was heavily encumbered in efforts to pass from

emergency, stopgap measures tow~rd a normal operating procedure and the

implementation of political and economic reforms.

Amidst these unsettled conditions, the Parliament of Armenia was

elected in the summer of 1919 to supplant the previous multiparty appointive

legislature, the Khorhurd. In keeping with progressive, democratic procedures,

the regulations enfranchised all adults regardless of sex, race, and religion

and required that the elections be conducted on the basis of general, direct,

equal voting and proportional representation. That the Armenian Revolutionary

Federation (the Dashnaktsutiun) would gain an absolute majority w~s a

foregone conclusion. The party had struck root throughout the Caucasus by

the turn of the century and had influenced Armenian collective action since

the tsarist attempt to expropriate the holdings of the Armenian Apostolic

Church in 1903. In 1917, the Dashnaktsutiun had participated in the several

Transcaucasian administrative bodies and in mid-1918 had taken the helm of

government in Erevan until the end of the ~r. The disruption of the party

network in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the loss of numerous leaders during

the war years, and the involvement thereafter of so many others in the affairs

of state drained the Dashnaktsutiun, but its control in the Eastern ~~enian

provinces was still pervasive.

Even if it had been possible to conduct the electoral campaign under

ideal conditions, the opposition parties ~~uld have been dwarfed in the new

legislative body. The Armenian affiliate of the Socialist Revolutionary

party, other than emphasizing the need fer integral bonds with Russia and

8

interracial harmony, offered little that was net already contained in the

platform of the Dashnaktsutiun. The small Marxist Social Democrat groups

were split into at least five rival factions, composed mainly of students

and intellectuals, and handicapped by the absence of a significant proletariat

in the Armenian provinces. The liberal Armenian Populist (Zhoghovrdakan)

party, like the socialist opposition parties, functioned under the anomaly

of having more followers in Tiflis and Baku than in Erevan and of directing

organizational affairs through a central body situated outside the .~enian

republic. But unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats,

the Populists had shared authority in a coalition cabinet from December, 1918,

to June, 1919, and the rank and file members identified increasingly with

the concept of national independence. The party had the potential of becoming

the catalyst for the various non-socialist elements, particularly if a

proposed merger with the Western Armenian Sahmanadir Ramkavar (Constitutional

Democrat) party and other nationalist-reformist groups were effected. 13

The electoral boycott and denunciation of "yellow bourgeois parliamentarian­

ism" by the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were not unexpected.

but the election-eve withdrawal of the Populist slate caused deep consternation.

Even though the Populist ministers of the coalition cabinet had participated

in the declaration of the theoretical unity of Turkish Armenia and Russian

Armenia on the Republic's first anniversary, the Populist central committee

in Tiflis soon alleged that this had been an illegal act, taken without the

concurrence of the Western Armenian bodies abroad. Tne Populists would

therefore refrain from voting. 14

Disappointments and shortcomings aside, Armenia's first national election

was conducted as schedul~d, June 21-23, 1919. The totals posted by the central

election bureau must have grat~fied the most zealous elements of the

Dashnaktsutiun, since the party received nearly 90 percent of the popular

9

vote, as compared with 5 percent for the second-place Socialist Revolutionary

15 party. Some observers believed tr~t the Dashnaktsutiun had used the guise

of a d~ocratic process to tighten its control over the government rather

than to place the state on more popular foundations. The Armenian Revolutionary

Federation, on the other hand, was not a monolithic organization., since it

had provided a broad umbrella in the emancipatory struggle. Hence, while

the Dashnakist deputies could be expected to stand unanimously on the principle

of free, independent, united Armenia, their divergent social and·economic

views could easily give rise to internal cleavages and expose the rivalry

between the fundamentally conservative and traditionalist Turkish Armenian

leaders and the more radical, internationalist Russian Armenian intellectuals.

The Parliament {Khorhrdaran) of Armenia convened on August 1, 1919, in

an air of excitement enhanced by the arrival from Rastov, Baku, Tiflis, and

Constantinople of several of the recently-elected deputies. On August 10,

the legislature confirmed a new council of ministers, headed by Alexandre

Khatisian. At forty-five years of age, Kr.atisian was by disposition and

experience a man of government. Laying aside a degree in medicine early in

his career, he had entered the public arena, rising rapidly to become mayor

of Tiflis and president of the Union of Caucasian Cities. Following the

Russian revolutions, he served as a member of the Armenian National Council,

the several peace missions, and the Transcaucasian federative government, as

foreign minister in Kachaznuni's coalition cabinet, and, since April of 1919, as

acting prime minister. Although his own cabinet in August was composed entirely of

Dashnakists, except for the military minister, Khatisian believed that his

party should uphold the government ~~thout interfering in its day-to-day

operations and that the principal criteria for civil service should be training

and talent. Hence, e:very state ministry included nonpartisans~ Populists,

Socialist Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats, several of wham were division

and bureau chiefs. Khatisian's critics complained that it was unreasonable

10

to stand on cumber~ome democratic procedures or expect the peasantry to

remain patient amidst worldwide social ferment and the apparent reluctance

to sweep away the tsarist class structure. Not sterile legalisms, but swift,

revolutionary action held the key to Armenian survival. ~·foreover, the

enlistment of so many comrades in governmental work hindered the task of

rebuilding the party and raised the spectre of tainting it with the inevitable

shortcomings of the administration. By and large, however, Khatisian's views

prevailed until mid-1920, and under his direction the departments of government

gained increasing independence from the party. 16

The question of party-state relations was debated heatedly during the

Ninth world congress of the Dashnaktsutiun which took place in Erevan frcm

late September to early November, 1919. Arguing that direct party control

of the government was essential in steering the country through great peril,

veteran revolutionary Ruben Ter-Minasian stood at the fore of those delegates

demanding unqualified submission of the Dashnakist ministers to the supreme

party Bureau. At the other extreme~ Khatisian's adherents emphasized the

party's history of unrelenting opposition to authoritarian regimes and its

wholesome tradition of democratic decentralization. If Armenia was to avoid

the Bolshevik malady of party-government synonymity and self-perpetuating

elitism, the independence of the state machinery had to be maintained and

the Bureau's influence channeled through the Dashnakist faction of the

legislature. The exchanges gave way to bitter taunts before it was decided

that the party faction, in consultation with the Bureau, w~uld select the

candidate for prime minister~ who in turn would then secure the faction's

approval of his proposed ministerial slate before submitting to the full

parliament for confirmation. Comrades in the cabinet were to hold no party

post, and members of the Bureau who might enter the government were required

to w~thdraw from active participation in the supreme party organ during

that tenure. The Dashnakist faction would discharge its organic legislative

11

duties without undue e..-«ternal interference, although it ;.;ould admit· the

Bureau's right to enforce the decisions of the world congresses. vfuile

Ter-l1inasian criticized the cumbersome features of the scheme and protested

that the parliamentary faction had essentially been given the power to

neutralize the Bureau in the affairs of state, Khatisian, Simon Vratzian,

and other champions of the distinction between party and government were

gratified by the prospect of mutual cooperation rather tr~n unilateral

dictation. The election of a new party Bureau, ho"rever, underscored the

complications of which Ter-Minasian had wdrned, since four of the seven

members were either serving in the cabinet or held government positions abroad.

While it was hoped that forthcoming negotiations with non-Dashnakist parties

within and outside the Republic would culminate in a coalition cabinet of

united Armenia and relieve the Bureau reembers of their governmental duties, the

actual responsibility for directing the party in the interim had tc be

shouldered by the three remaining members. 17

After one year of nominal independence, the Republic's international

status remained obscure. The Allied and Associated Powers, while acknowledging

Armenian sacrifices and loyalty during the war, cited technical difficulties

in explaining their inability to recognize Armenia as a formal ally and

therefore as a member of the Paris Peace Conference. In lieu of diplomatic

recognition, the victorious powers showered the Armenians with professions

of good will and vag~e assurances of a secure national future. Wnen the

Allied heads of state departed from Paris after signing the German peace

treaty in June, 1919, they still had not drafted the Turkish settlement,

resolved the question of a mandate for Aroenia, or arranged for the

repatriation of the Armenian refugees. Heam.rhile, rivalry among the Powers

intensified in the Near East, giving hope and courage to the organizers of

the Turkish resistance. There was, however, some room for optimism, since,

with all its vacillation, the Supreme Allied Council never challe~ged the

•

12

presumption that the future united Armenian state would encompass Turkish

Armenian provinces. wnen Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha pled the Ottoman

case in Paris, the Council retorted -w-ith a stringent rebuke, ruling out

t . d T 1 i h d . i i i. '- • b •-- i · lS con ~nue urK s omJ.n on n e tner tne .-'..ra or .cu..w.en an provJ.nces.

Armenophile societies the world over clammored for support of the Armenians,

and tangible international concern was demonstrated in the outpouring of .

public and private charity to sustain the "starving Armeniansu throughout

the Near East and the Caucasus.

In Transcaucasia, geographic and demographic factors made the Armenian

republic higr~y susceptible to coersion. Since most of the country's precarious

lifeline from Batum passed through Georgian territory, Armenian efforts to

gain the disputed districts of Akr~lkalak and Borchalu had to be circumspect.

Georgia demonstrated that it could w~eak havoc with the flow of American

relief supplies under the pretext of essential railway repairs, the lack

of rolling stock, or unstable domestic conditions. Nor could the Armenian

gOVel,"'llD.ent ignore the status of the half million Armenians in Georgia. Their

tribulations after a brief Armeno-Georgian armed conflict in Borchalu in

December, 1918, served as a cogent reminder of their vulnerability.19

.Azerbaijan, like Gerogia, had inherited a rich, populous commercial center,

which was founded on seemingly inexhaustible oil ·fields. And if Georgia

could pressure Armenia by manipulating rail traffic, Azerbaijan could easily

suspend the shipment of crude oil, without which the Armenian transportation

system would grind to a halt. a;storic racial and religious animosities,

compounded by the immediate struggle for the districts of Karabagh, Zangezur,

and Sharur-Nakhichevan, shaped the sad course of Armeno-Azerbaijani relaticns. 20

The small, positive achievements in Transcaucasia, from the Armenian

point of view, included the establishment of diplomatic relations among the

three sister republics and a change in the initial Georgian and Azerbaijani

tendency to discount ~rmenia as a significant political force. Armenia

13

had incorporated a part of Lori (southern Borchalu) at the end of 1918

and had loosened the Georgian hold on the rest of the district, which became

a neutral zone. In the chronic disputes ~ith Azerbaijan, Armenia was

outmatched in manpower and resources, but the Armenian officer corps was,

according to Allied military obser~ers, the best trained in the Caucasus

and could rely on the martial tradition of the mountaineers in the contested

districts. Although the Azerbaijani army held key positions in Karabagh,

the Armenian militia of Zangezur successfully blocked every attempted

Azerbaijani advance into the county. Moreover, Armenia alone was regarded

With favor by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

Armenian eroroys and organizations functioned freely in the vast areas under

General Denikin's control, and Russian military and political spokesmen,

while refusing to hear of the separation of Georgia or Azerbaijan,

privately professed sympathy with the goal of a united Armenia encompassing

the historic national territories on both sides of the old Russo-Turkish

frontier. 21

Insofar as the domestic situation was concerned, there was no prospect

of strong econamic recovery so long as the Armenian republic remained

confined to its existing territories. Large shipments of grain normally

imported from Russia were choked off because of .the unsettled conditions and

the hostility between Georgia and the Volunteer Army. During the war years,

the limited local harvests had decreased by ~ore than 40 percent, the lands

under cultivation declined by a third, and the primitive industrial production

and mining nearly ceased. The Turkish invasion and occupation in 1918 compounded

these losses, with more than 200 villages plundered, half the vineyards in the

Araxes valley ruined, and about 200,000 large horned animals driven away,

together with thousands of carts and agricultural implements. Hence, 80 percent

of the households of Armenia were left without a single horse and nearly half

14

had neither cow nor ox. During the spring sowing season in 1919, only a

fourth of the farmland was planted, and agricultural income dipped to a

22 sixth of.the prewar level.

The Republic was stifled under the crush of almost 300,000 refugees,

whose four years of abject existence had transformed them into starving,

half-crazed mobs, agitated by the unfulfilled promises of impending

repatriation and increasingly resentful of their Eastern Armenian compatriots

and all officials, whether Armenian of ~Jlied. The municipal administration

of Erevan was driven to despair as the population of the capital tripled to

90,000 at a time when the war damage }~d left fewer living quarters. In

the Alexandropol (Leninakan) district, nearly 100,000 refugees clustered

together in makeshift shelters or abandoned military barracks, and more people

arrived daily from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. 23

Under these circumstances, there could be no serious discussion of

financial solvency. The combined net income of all government departments was

30 million rubles in 1919, whereas expenditures exceeded a billion rubles.

More than 70 percent of the outlay was channeled through the ministries of

welfare, provisions, and military affairs--the agencies most directly involved

in sustaining the population rather tr~n rebuilding the country. The 23 million

rubles allocated to the ministry of education, while not inconsequential,

represented less than 3 percent of the disbursement, and the average allowance

for the operations of the cabinet and the ministries of foreign affairs and

justice was 1 percent. In the absence of a central banking system and a

significant reserve of precious metals and exportable goods, the exchange

rate of the state ruble plunged by the beginning of summer to a fourth of that

of the Rusaian imperial banknote. With monthly wages averaging 100 rubles,

most families were unable to procure adequate supplies of staple foods. The

pric~ of a pood (36 pounds) of wheat was 350 rubles; bread, 300-400; rice,350;

15

24 beef, 400; mutton, 560; cheese, 575; lard and butter, 2,000. These prices

tripled by the beginning of 1920 and continued to spiral for the remainder of

the year. Such a level of inflation fed corruption. Extortionary practices

of village commissars and militia chiefs brought discredit upon the goverrnent,

but the swirl of events had not allowed for major administrative reforms.

}fJ:Lny unscrupulous bureaucrats of the old regime clung to their posts, and the

newer appointees often proved no less odious. Untrained and inexperienced,

they were grossly ignorant of local needs and customs. Yet, with the paucity

of qualified personnel, the ministry of internal affairs dared not risk still

greater disorder by turning out the entire incumbent hierarchy.

The deplorable behavior of many officials shattered the patience of even

those who understood and shared in the government's quandary. In caustic

newspaper editorials, the Dashnaktsutiun demanded revolutionary changes,

warning that the public judged its leaders by the functionaries with whom

it had immediate daily contact. The peasantry had traditionally regarded

administrative organs as oppressive agencies that should be avoided or

deceived. Hence, they hid and hoarded vital supplies and tried to evade taxes

and other obligations of citizenship. The following admonition typified the

criticism leveled at respected comrades in high public office:

The Armenian legislature may propose and adopt such admirable democratic laws as to stir the envy of the parliaments of Europe; the gove~ent of Armenia may make wonderful decisions and be committed to public service; the cabinet of Armenia may have-as indeed it does--very trustworthy, capable, and dedicated individuals; but all this is worthless, void of any positive significance, left dangling in air, unless there is the necessary mechanism to er~orce the laws, enact the decisions, and give substance to the goal of public service.

As long as our government fails to take stringent measures to renovate the commissar-militia structure, as long as it leaves unmuzzled the arbitrariness and assaults upon the bodies and spirits of the people of Armenia, as long as the various adventurers, extorters, and speculators sally forth from all sides under the guise of "commissars" and umilitiamen," t;he government, regardless of who may head it, will be unable to call up new recruits, combat desertion, safeguard the goods and properties of the population,

16

uphold honor and dignity, eliminate racial discord, gather and distribute seed-grain, and thus inspire broad public support for the government anrl ad~inistration of ~-menia.25

Land reform and agrarian revival were of the utmost importance, especially

as the peasantry constituted nearly 90 percent of the population. Large

estates were not common in this mountainous country, but the kulak.or tanuter

class was significant in some districts. The Dashr~ktsutiun had always

advocated communal ownership by the tillers of the soil and periodic internal

reallocation based on household size and need. Hence, the legislature soon

set maximum ·limits of individual proprietorship and created committees to

receive and redistribute the excess parcels. Yet, except for the partition

of a few estates around Etchmiadzin and Karakilisa (Kirovakan) the reforms

remained unimplemented. There were, in fact, instances in which fields

seized by the peasantry were restored to ~heir previous O\vners and state

lands were leased to Russian Molokan villages in return for food, farm

equipment, and animals. Many poor farmers were forced to sell their plots

to speculators, and complaints poured in from every district that Armenia

was fast becoming a nation of landless peasants. The government tried to

deal with this situation by annullingthe sales and establishing boards of

conciliation to compensate the buyers, but many of the defrauded peasants

had already left or lacked the proper contractual papers with which to lodge

a claim. Significant progress in land reform w~s never achieved under the

Republic. 26

Most of the six to seven thousand industrial laborers in the Armenian

provinces before the world war were employed in agriculturally related

enterprises such as distilleries, tanneries, and textile mills. Even that

elementary activity ceased during the war, and it was not until 1919 that

a slight revival occurred, engendered by public works programs and the

initiative of refugee entrepreneurs from Van and Mush. Approximately

17

5,000 workers were employed in 300 small factories and 400 distilleries

by the end of the year. Although the goverr~ent's labor plank included

guarantees against ~~loitation, little progress was made in alleviating

the harsh working conditions. The ministry of welfare and labor called

attention to the violation of fair employment practices and ordered government

inspectors to enforce the eight-hour work day, the prohibition of child labor,

the procedures for dismissal, and other laws designed to protect the w~rkers.

Owners and managers were to be warned that failure to comply with these

regulations would result in fines and prison terms of up to six months. 27

There is no evidence, however, that sentences of that ty~e were ever imposed.

Until 1920, labor unrest was limited to economic demands, which were usually

couched in expressions of patriotism and loyalty. The Dashnaktsutiun tried

to keep abreast of the movement by patronizing the professional unions, but it

soon became apparent that some of the workers in the railway center at

Alexandropol and in the post-telegraph union had been radicalized beyond the

control of their union leaders. 28

The unremitting struggle for survival obscured most of the small,

positive achievements in the Republic. Yet, conditions had improved

significantly by mid-1919. With temporary British backing, the Republic

incorporated the district of Kars and the southern sector of the Erevan

guberniia, expanding from less than 5,000 to more than 17,000 square miles

and facilitating the repatriation of most Russian Armenian refugees. 29

w1lile the communication and transportation routes were never fully secure,

a thousand miles of roads were operative, several segments being upgraded for

automobile traffic between Erevan and the district tow~s, and hundreds of

miles of telegraph line were repai~ed and extended during the summer and

autumn of 1919. The first intercity telephone link was opened with service

between Erevan and Etchmiadzin. The Armenian Railway F~ministration, which

18

had begun to function in 1918 with 2 locomotives, 20 freight cars, and

5 miles of track, had expanded to more than 400 miles a year later, with 2

complete passenger trains, 32 locomotives, and some 500 freight cars and

cisterns. Daily service was introduced on the Alexandropol-Kars and the

Erevan-Tiflis runs, and in 1919 the volume of freight increased tenfold

between January and July. 30

Unable to satisfy the land hunger, the agricultural administration was

nonetheless one of the best staffed and organized departments of government.

Functioning with divisions for agriculture, veterinary medicine) water

resources, mountain resources, forestry, and state properties, the administration

introduced a number of projects that would bring many long-range benefits if

the Republic endured. Programs of horticultural instruction were developed,

five field research stations and a school of agriculture were opened, a

nationwide_ campaign of animal innoculation was launched and five of sixteen

projected ambulatory stations were set up, breeding farms and model dairies

were organized in Kars and Lori, workshops manufacturing simple farm implements

were operated, and a comprehensive study was commissioned with the goals of

harnessing the Zangu~ Arpa, Kazakh, Garni, and Abaran rivers for hydro-electric

energy and _bringing an additional 200,000 desiatins (540,000 acres) of land

under cultivation. 31 A stat~ campaign to plant every field in 1920 resulted in

the purchase and distribution of 370,000 poods of seed-grain, which while far

short of the projected goal was nonetheless sufficient to produce the largest

' 32 • wheat crop since the early years of the world war.

Small but significant gains were also registered in the other state

ministries. Under the direction of the ministry of internal affairs, the

municipal c~~rters were liberalized and broad prerogatives were granted the

city administrations in public works, enlightenment, local economy, and

provisions. Rural self-administration through the medium of district and

county assemblies had long been an objective of nearly all liberal and

19

revolutionary societies in the Caucasus, and after months of preparation

the first elections for county zemstvos were held in January, 1920~ in

Erevan, Etchmiadzin, and Alexandropo1. 33 In legal affairs, the ministry of

justice had to begin the long process of reversing the deep-rooted popular

aversion to t~e courts. Litigation in the Russian language, terrifying

preliminary investigations, and the bleak prospect of gaining favorable

decisions without influential intermediaries had kept most Armenians away

from the courts. It was now necessary to nationalize the legal

and create a judicial hierarchy with courts of cassation and a supr~e

court. These had been organized by 1920, and in }~rch, after weeks of

preparation, Armenia's first trial by jury took place. The case was simple

and the jury's verdict was swift in coming, but there was much ado about

the event. The newspapers hailed it as a milestone in justice and Prime

Minister ~Atisian spoke in the courtroom of its significance in the

evolution of a democratic republic. The actual legal proceedings were

awkward and even amusing, as the prosecutor, public defender, and judges

of the tribunal groped for the proper Armenian legal terms, but there was

above all a sense of exhilaration. After centuries of submission to the

courts and discriminatory regulations of alien governments, the Armenians

had succ·eeded. in introducing the jury system in their national language. 34

~The ministry of public enlightenment and culture was headed by Nikol

Aghbalian~ a man of boundless optimism who planned to replace the old-style

parochial school system with compulsory five-year elementary education based on

a progressive curriculum. While the existing harsh realities did not permit

the enrollment of all school-age children in 1919-1920, the 420 elementary

schools, had 38,000 pupils, and with the opening of new ~ymnasia at Erevan,

Alexandropol, Dilijan, and Karakilisa the number of secondary schools increased

to 22, with more than 5,000 students. Although these figures do not take

into account the erratic operation or closure o·f some schools because of

20

lack of heating fuel or because of requisitions for hospitals and

orphanages, they nonetheless stand in sharp contrast with the previous

combined enrollment of 14,000. Adult literacy classes and people's

universities were opened in several cities, and in January, 1920, the

State University was inaugurated at Alexandropol, giving cause for new hope and

1 b . 35 ce e rat~on.

The Armenian republic .had made noteworthy progress since the oppressive

days of its creation. That this progress was only relative, however, ~~s

clearly reflected in a report of J. Oliver Wardrop, the British commissioner

for Transcaucasia. After visiting Armenia in October, 1919, he wLote:

"Erivan is more depressing than any place I have ever seen." Wardrop, an

avid student of Georgian culture, nonetheless praised dedication of the

Armenian leaders and suggested that the Armenians. had the qualities to

overcome the obstacles if given half a chance. His report included the

following appraisal:

After th~ comparative·comfort of Tiflis and the positive luxury of Baku it was painful to see the misery of Armenia. Not only have the people reached the limit of physical privation and suffering, but their moral character has been put under a strain which has in many cases passed the breaking point, and in all has produced lamentable results which must last for a long time. I cannot wonder that our P~erican friends hesitate to take the mandate for such a country where for many years no return seems likely for the financial and other aid indispensible to make human life tolerable. Yet the Armenian people have a .stubborn power of resistance, an indomitable tendency to steady work ••• ,so that they will certainly umake good" if they have any kind of chance.

They are not, perhaps, an easy people to get on with, especially at present; they are (according to some of themselves) generally devoid of anything like "charm~" rather one-sided in their vie\v, indisposed to admit they have any faults of character or conduct, e."'tcessively individualistic (not to say "egotistic"), but they are very clever, hardworking, thrifty, frugal people who cannot fail to achieve physical well-being and prosperity when an opportunity is given them. In any case, they have been faithful allies, and have fought with a bravery and endurance which must forever close the mouths of those who formerly slandered them, and said that it was their metier to be massacred unresistingly

21

which justifies their claim to a free political life for which they have a decided aptitude.36

Armenia's prospects for a free political life were dampened in 1920

by the failure to gain e,.'{ternal assistance. The 1-lestern orientation of the

government was predicated on the belief that the support of one or more of

the Allied Pm..rers was essential for the establishment of a viable, unified

state. After months of vacillation, however, the United States finally

rejected the Armenian mandate despite America's long record of humanitarian

d 1 • • • 1 • h h A • 37 an re 1g1ous 1nvo vement wlt t e nrmen1ans. No other power would

shoulder the obligation, so that when the European Allies began at long

last to concentrate on the Turkish settlement in 1920 they had already

discounted the possibility of including Cilicia and the western half of

Turkish Armenia in the new state. In the meantime, Turkophile sentiment

resurfaced among European colonial and mercantile circles, which ~.;arned

of the dire economic consequences of a drastic partition of the Ottoman empire

and of the unrest that such a policy would arouse in the Muslim-populated

colonies. Jealous and suspicious of one another, the Allied governments were

also gripped by internal dissension. wnen, for example, the Supreme Council

granted recognition to the Transcaucasian republics in January, 1920, at

British Foreign Secretary Curzon's urging and agreed to equip the Armenian

army with surplus arms and equipment, the British War Office headed by

Winston Churchill delayed delivery for more than six months in the belief

that any material given the shaky Caucasian states would end up in Bolshevik

or Turkish hands. Ironically, the War Office's calculated delays contributed

in no small measure to the fulfillment of its mvn prediction. 38

While the Allied Powers proceeded with plans to partition the Ottoman

empire without facing up to the fact that military enforcement of the terms

~,;rould be required in Turkish Armenia, Hustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and other

22

Turkish resistance leaders sought Soviet support in the struggle against

the common enemies. Soviet leaders, in their turn, recognized the potential

role that Turkish influence would play in stirring the Muslim colonial

world against the Hestern powers and thereby saving the Bolshevik revolution

and the Soviet state. Preliminary contact had already been made through

the deposed Ittihad (Young Turk) leaders who had taken refuge in Germany

and the Caucasus. Although Kemal considered the Ittihad clique headed by

Enver and Talat to be his political foes, he did not hesitate to use their

good offices in efforts to draw Soviet Russia into the Turkish struggle for

political survival. Kemal and General Kazim Karabekir, the army commander at

Erzerum, also dispatched their own agents to contact the Bolshevik underground

in Baku with the goal of creating a . landcbridge between Russia and

Turkey. This was to be achieved by placing Azerbaijan in the Soviet sphere,

neutralizing Georgia, and crushing Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the dominant

Musavat party aspired to permanent national independence but was not immune

to Turkish pressure and influence. Several thousand Turkish officers and

civilians served in that republic as military cadre, teachers, civil servants,

and police officials. Moreover, Ittihad fugitives such as Halil Pasha (Kut),

Nuri Pasr~ (Conker) and Kuchuk Talat were treated as honored guests. Their

role in the sovietization of Azerbaijan was not insignificant. 39

The collapse of the White Armies in South Russia brought direct

communication between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey a giant step closer.

In a message to Kemal at the beginning of 1920, Foreign Commissar Grigorii

Chicherin reportedly welcomed the imminent linkage and encouraged the

Nationalists to prepare for military action along their southern and eastern

frontiers. Kemal wrote his military commanders that the Nationalists had

now gained effective leverage against the Allied Powers, for unless those

governments made major concessions the ~ationalists would ally ~nth Soviet

Russia and thereby open the floodgates to Anatolia, the ftrab provinces, Persia,

23

Afghanistan, India, and beyond. Allied recognition of the Transcaucasian

states, Kemal continued, ~vas a futile but dangerous attempt to erect a

barrier between Russia and Turkey. The sche1r.e would be tbvarted, hm,;ever.

by the use of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and, if necessary, by joint

Soviet-Turkish action against any of the Caucasian peoples who refused to

40 cooperate.

In April, after the Nationalist counter-government of the Grand

National Assembly had been organized at Angora (AnkBra),Kemal wTote Chicherin

to acknowledge Soviet Russia as a champion of all peoples subjected to the

yoke of colonialism and to give assurances of Turkish support in the

struggle against the imperialist powers. In the Caucasus, once Russia had

gained sway over Georgia and brought about the ~~pulsion of the last

remaining British garrison at Batum, the Nationalists would begin military

operations against "the imperialist Armenian government" and exert pressure

on Azerbaijan to enter the Soviet state union. To hasten effective

collaboration against the foreign interventionists, Soviet Russia should

supply the Nationalists with arms, food, technical assistance, and financial

aid, including an initial installment of 5 million gold liras.41

Events were already unfolding ·swiftly in Transcaucasia. Having decided

to sovietize Azerbaijan and having used the good offices of influential

Turks such as Halil Pasha in preparation for the near bloodless coup, the

Russian government ordered the Red Army to advance across the frontier on

the night of April 27/28, 1920. By dawn the first echelons had entered

Baku aboard armored trains, drawing the great petroleum center back into the

Russian sphere. Armenian reaction to Azerbaijan's sovietization was not all

unfavorable. In fact, many Armenians welcomed the change, reasoning that the

Christian minority in eastern Transcaucasia would be safer under any form of

Russian rule than under the previous oppressive Husavat regime. Some Armenian

24

officials even believed that the Soviet leaders could be persuaded that

a united, independent Armenia would be in the best interests of Russia

itself. An Armenian mission departed for ~foscm.r on April 30 to propose a

treaty of friendship based on Soviet recognition of the independence of the

Armenian republic, inclusive of Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan,

acceptance in principle of the goal of a united Armenian state, and permission

for Armenian refugees in Russia to emigrate with all their movable belongings

42 to the Caucasus.

The three-man delegation of Leven Shant, Hambardzum Terterian, and

Leven Zarafian arrived in Moscow on Xay 20 and soon began discussions with

Foreign Commissar Chicherin and Assistant Commissar Lev Karakhan. The t;w

officials gaveassurances that Soviet Russia had no desire to subvert the

Armenian government and would assent to the transfer of the refugees to Armenia.

The Armenian republic, they agreed, should include the disputed territories

of Zangezur and Nakhichevan, while the fate of Karabagh could be decided

through arbitration or plebiscite. Armenia, on the other hand, should

recognize the need for Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey to collaborate against

the Western imperialists and should desist from any measures that might

hinder communication and cooperation between the two revolutionary movements.

Chicherin implied that at least a part of Turkish Armenia should be included

in the Armenian republic and offered Soviet mediation in bringing about

an equitable settlement with the Turkish Nationalists. Encouraged by the

cordial reception and swift pace of the discussions, the Shant delegation

wired the Erevan government on Ju~e 10 tr2t agreement in principle had been

reached on the major issues and all that remained was the need to work out

the details and give substance to the treaty. 43

The anticipated treaty, however, did not materialize. The delay of a

positive response from Erevan may have been attributable to difficulties in

25

communication but possibly also to the Armenian government's concern that

the premature announcement of a friendship treaty with Soviet Russia might

adversely affect the disposition of the Allied Powers, which had recently

determined that the Armenian republic should be a•·7arded most of the Ottom2.n

provinces of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van. But there was more to the •

Soviet decision to interrupt the negotiations and insist upon their continuation

in Erevan. A Nationalist delegation w2.s en route from Angora w~th proposals

for a Soviet-Turkish alliance, the new Soviet Azerbaijani government bitterly

opposed any modus vivendi that would give Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and possibly

even Mountainous Karabagh to Armenia, and Armenian comrades such as Anastas

Mikoyan and Avis Nurijanian had intensified their denunciations of the Erevan

44 government before the party leaders in Moscow. A bloody Dashnakist reign

of terror, the Caucasian comrades claimed, had been unleashed against Bolsheviks

and their sympathizers who had supported the attempted coup d'~tat known as

the May rebellion. The subject of extensive literature, intense controversy,

and significant historical reevaluation, the May uprising and its background·

can be presented here only in concise, simplified form.

Throughout 1919 the Bolshevik organizations in the Caucasus had been torn

by dissension over the problem of nationalism. The Baku comrades were among

the firseto suggest that the most effective way to' break the grip of the

dominant petty bourgeois parties was to accommodate national sentiment by

calling for the creation of a Soviet Azerbaijani republic--and by inference,

Georgian and ~enian Soviet republics--federated with Russia. Most veteran

Bolsheviks in Georgia and Armenia, having vociferously denounced Musavat,

Menshevik, and Dashnakist separatism, branded the proposal as a repugnant

ideological deviation. The protracted controversy was ultiinately decided in

favor of the Baku position, as Lenin and the central committee concurred that

26

revolutionary labors in the de facto states vmulcl be

facilitated through advocacy of separate Soviet republics and even separate

national party organizations joined at the regional level as affiliates of Lt.-

the Russian Communist Party. )

In contrast with Azerbaijan, Armenia had no significant proletariat or

any of the objective conditions considered necessary for a 11arxist revolution.

The country was overwhelmingly agrarian had been so terribly devastated

that even veteran Bolsheviks such as Arshavir Melikian argued tha~ instead

of militant revolutionary activit~ there should be a long period of peaceful

agitation and education of the masses. \{hile the younger Communists repudiated

their teachers and demanded the immediate overthrow of the Dashnakist "lackeys

of imperialism," Bolshevism did not a,significant following in Armenia

46 before 1920. In fact, when the Georgian Mensheviks cracked down on their

Marxist competitors, the Armenian government granted haven to many Armenian

Communists and provided them employment as teachers and civil servants. This

influx in 1919, together with the efforts of professional cadre sent by the

party's regional committee produced a loose organizational network, witn the

auto and rail garages in Ala~andropol becoming the most active link. Still,

at the end of the year, there were)according to Soviet statistics, fewer than

500 Bolsheviks in all Armenia. 47 During the first party conference at Erevan

in January, 1920, the twenty-two participants restructured ·the Armenia committee

(Armenkom) of the Russian Communist Party and charged it with the responsibility

of coordinating preparatory measures to overthrow the government. Resolutions

and exhortations aside, most local Bolsheviks continued to believe that success

could be achieved only with the supportive intervention of the Red Army. The

Armenkdm's own behavior between January and }fuy reflected this attitude, in

deed if not in word.48

The sovietization of Azerbaijan in late April and the approach of the

27

Red Army toward the Armenian frontiers excited and emboldened the

By that time, some elements of the army and citizenry had been radicalized

because of the Allied failure t~ extend measurable political and

support, the inability of the government to meet the basic needs of the populace,

the repressive actions of politically-inspired bands, and the general fatigue

of many Eastern Armenians and their yearning for a return to normalcy under

the accustomed wing of Russia. During the May Day celebrations in Erevan,

the Dashnakist-organized meetings were countered by Bolshevik orators and

marchers, while in Alexandropol a public turned into an angry

manifestation of anti-Dashnakist and anti-governmental sentiment. Securing

the neutrality or tacit sympathy of the army garrison, the Alexandropol

Bolsheviks seized the railway station on ~!~y 2 and organized the Revolutionary

Committee of Armenia (Revkom) there five days later. Then, on May 10, the

Revkom declared Armenia a Soviet republic and the "Dashnak goverr.tlent of

mauserist and imperialist speculators" liquidated. 49

Disturbances of lesser ,proportions and shorter durations also occurred

at Sarikamish, Kars, Dilijan, Nor-Bayazit, and several other towns and

villages. Yet, the conspirators did not act with the requisite resolve and

aggressiveness. The Armenkom in Erevan was caught off guard by the Alexandropol

rising and failed to respond decisively to the unexpected situation. Even

the more militant Reykom assumed a basically defensive stance, not venturing

out of its armored-train headquarters or taking advantage of the friendly

disposition of the Russian Molokan and Muslim villages around Alexandropol.

The inability of either the Armenkom or the Revkom to provide clear

direction and to capitalize on the temporary confusion of the government

made suppression of the movement inevitable. On the night of }~y 13/14, loyal

troops and Turkish Armenian partisan units moved into Alexandropol, dispersing

28

the Revkom. Several rebel le~ders were executed, and many more fled to

Baku~ But the Armenian Bolsheviks had received the baptism of fire and

contributed a small pantheon of martyrs, memorialized in Soviet literature

and monuments.so

The May revolt resulted in widespread demoralization within the country

and loss of trust and prestige abroad. The gradual, evolutionary policies

of Alexandre Khatisian were discredited, and on May 5 his cabinet was

replaced by the entire Bureau of the Dashnaktsutiun. The Bureau justified

its violation of the restrictions ~posed upon it by the party's world

congress on grounds that the very existence of the Republic was in jeopardy.

The loyalty of all non-Bolshevik parties during the uprising and the spirit

of unity in~he celebrations marking the Republic's second anniversary

strengthened the Bureau's position. DUring the summer of 1920, Hamazasp

Ohandjanian's Bureau-government drove the Bolsheviks underground or out of

the country and turned the regular army and Turkish Armenian detachments

against the previously defiant Muslim-populated districts from Zangibasar and

Vedibasar in the vicinity of Erevan to Sharur in the lower Araxes river

51 valley. The triumphant sweep to the south, after two years of a policy

of contair~en~ vindicated Ruben Ter-Minasianrs position in the eyes of many

previous skeptics. But if patriotic dictatorship was the answer to Armenia's

problems, there was not enough time to prove the experiment. Turkish

preparations for war had been in progress since early summer, and in

September, 1920, shortly after the first round of direct Soviet-NatioPAlist

negotiations, Mustafa Kemal gave the order to attack.

The strain in Armenian-Soviet relations after the May rebellion contributed

to the 'interruption of the negotiations in Moscow. At the beginning of July,

Chicherin informed Shant that Boris V. Legran, an official of the foreign

affairs commissariat, was assigned to resume the parleys in Erevan and to

do w~~tever possible to resolve the disputes between ~\rmenia and its neighbors.

Legran soon entrained for Baku, accompanied by Halil Pasha, who had been

pleading the Nationalist case in Moscow and was returning with a large

Soviet consignment of gold to be delivered in Anatolia. It was not until

early August that Shant's was able to procure transportation to

the south and not until mid-September that the Armenian envoys returned

tardily to Erevan. Meanwhile, Soviet-Turkish negotiations were being

conducted in Moscow. 52

Mustafa Kemal and other ~eaders of the Grand National Assembly were

gratified by the Soviet disposition to extend military and financial

assistance but were wary of the political ramifications. While Chicherin's

messages praised the heroic Turkish struggle for independence and welcomed

cooperation against the imperialist powers, they also implied that the fate

of areas of mixed Armenian, Kurdish, Laz, and Turkish habitation in the

eastern provinces should be regulated on the basis of the prewar population

and the principle of self-determination~ taking into account all those

people who had been forced to flee. The Soviet government was prepared to

serve as a mediator in attaining a just and equitable ~oundary settlement

between Turkey, Armenia, and Persia. 53 In May, a Turkish delegation headed

by Foreign Commissar Bekir Sami Bey departed for Moscow to deal with such

complications and, more importantly, to formalize relations and hasten the

54 shipment of desperately needed arms and currency.

During the negotiations, which began shortly after Bekir Sami's arrival

on July 19, Chicherin and Karakhan readily offered Soviet military and

financial aid and concurred that a landbridge between Russia and Turkey should

be created quickly. Karakhan revealed that the XIth Red Army was already

under orders to occupy the Karabagh-Nakhichevan corridor. The Soviet officials

nonetheless urged the Angora government to resolve the Armenian question, which

had aroused worldwide concern, by assenting to a frontier rectification that

30

would give the Armenians the districts of Van, Bitlis, and Mush and altmV"

Turkey to occupy the strategic mountain passes near Sarikam.ish. A mixed

commission could determine the exact boundaries and facilitate the work of

repatriation and any exchanges of population. Adamantly refus to make

territorial concessions for promises of material assistance, Bekir Sami

only agreed to apprize his government of Chicherin's suggestions. He

maintained that Soviet aid should be dispatched immediately as a sign of

good faith and that a preliminary treaty on non-territorial issues should be

concluded. This position was supported by Stalin, who was uns)~pathetic

toward the Armenian case, and by Lenin, whose main concerns at that time were

the difficulties on the Crimean and Polish fronts and the broader question

of relations with the West. 55

Hence, on August 24, two weeks after the Sultan's plenipotentiaries

' in Paris had signed the Treaty of Sevres, which required Turkey to recognize

the independence of Armenia and to cede to it the eastern border provinces,

a draft Soviet-Turkish accord was initialed in Moscow. All previous treaties

between Russia and Turkey were declared null and void, Russia would decline

to recognize any international act not ratified by the Turkish Grand National

Assembl~ and both sides were to make every effort to open an unobstructed

avenue between the two countries for the flow of men and materiel. Other

provisions related to trade and transit, the status of nationals of one country

living in the other, and future diplomatic relations. Separate protocols

on Soviet military and economic aid were also prepared. Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsek),

a member of the Turkish delegation, carried the treaty, together with the

first of a promised five million gold rubles, to Trebizond. From that Black

Sea port, he wired the terms to Angora on September 18. In their reports to

Mustafa Kemal, Bekir Sami and Yusuf Kemal drew attention to the reser~ed

attitude of Chicherin and Karakhan but added that Lenin was S)~pathetic and

31

had given the impression that once the threats fron Poland and General

Wrangel had been eliminated, Russia would ass~e a more aggressive role in

h C 56 t e aucasus. Two days ter receiving the terms of the draft treaty,

Mustafa Kemal authorized General r~rabekir to begin the offensive against

Armenia. This was the theater chosen by the Nationalist leaders to impress

upon the world their r ' 57 ection of the Treaty of Sevres.

Capturing the border posts and Sarikamish by the end of September,

Karabekir then coordinated the campaign against Kars. According to military

in one of the worst military fiascos in Armenian history, Kars fell amidst

uncontrollable and desertion on October 30, 1920. The Armenian will

to resist had been broken, and by November 6 Turks had advanced into

Alexandropol, forcing Ohandjanian's government to accept a truce based on

the Brest-Litovsk boundaries and permitting Turkish occupation of FJexandropol

and its environs. Additional Turkish demands on Novermber 8 for the

surrender of large quantities of arms and materiel and for control of the

entire railway from Alexandropol to Julfa elicited a final desperate defense

effort, but within a week ~-menia was compelled to acquiesce. Alexandre

Khatisian ~eparted for Alexandropol to begin negotiations with Karabekir

58 Pasha for an Armeno-Turkish treaty of peace.

Despite the need for a Russo-Turkish alliance, the Soviet government

viewed the Turkish offensive with apprehension and tried unsuccessfully to

halt the fighting through its good offices. rue resulting friction did not

obscure the desirability for cooperation with Turkey, however, and preparations

to dispatch additional arms and money to Anatolia were not interrupted.

Meanwhile, on October 11, Boris Legran and his Soviet mission finally arrived

in Erevan to resume negotiations wit~ the Shant delegation. Previously, Legran

had been denied entry into Armenia pending Shant's return from Moscow. This

32

had not, however, prevented communication between the t..,.;o sides, and on

August 10, Armenian envoys Arshak Djamalian and Artashes Babalian concluded

an accord with Legran in Tiflis. Armenia accepted the provisional Red Army

occupation of Zangezur and Nakhichevan, whereas Soviet Russia acknowledged

the independence and sovereignty of the A_~enian republic and assented to its

administration of the rail>·7ay running from Erev-an through Nakhichevan to

Julfa. The guidelines for resolving the Armeno-Azerbaijani territorial

disputes would be included in the forthcoming treaty to be negotiated in Erevan

between Legran and Shant.59

Ironically, ~-menia's acquiescence in the en-

croachment of the Red Army came on the same day that Avetis Aharonian affixed

\. his signature to the Treaty of Sev~es, creating united, independent Armenia--

at least on paper. 60

Even though Shant returned to Erevan on September 14, Legran did not

arrive there until October 11, two weeks the Turkish offensive had begun.

Conditions had changed so drastically that he now called upon the Armenian

government to renounce the S~vres treaty, permit the free movement of men and

supplies between Turkey and Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, and seek Russian

mediation in the conflict with Turkey. The Red Army, Legran urged, should

be invited to prote~t the country. Unwilling to turn away from the long-sought

European solution to the Armenian question or to condone foreign military

occupation, Ohandjanian's cabinet nonetheless did accept the offer of friendly

intercession. Moreover, according to teros of the draft treaty signed

Legran and Shant on October 28, Scviet Russia was to relinquish all sovereign

rights over the former Russian Armenian provinces and influence Turkey to

bring about the union of a part of Turkish Arnenia with ~xmenian republic.

The status of Mountainous Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan was to be settled

by mutual concessions or plebiscite. Russia was to have free transit privileges

through Armenia and, if Zangezur and Nakhichevan \vere awarded to Armenia, was

33

to be granted telegraph, radio, and other facilities to maintain communication

with friendly or allied governments.61 w~en Legran put the draft treaty

before the Communist party's Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo) in Baku, serious

objections and reservations were expressed. Since Kars had nmv fallen and

there was no time for consultations in Moscow, Legran returned to Erevan to

demand Armenia's sovietization. Comrade Budu rhlivani accompanied him to

serve as the Soviet mediator in the Armenian-Turkish conflict, but General

K b k . .1 . d b d . . 62 ara e·~r summar~ y reJecte t.e attempte lntercess~on.

Defeated and discredited, Armenia's Bureau-government gave way on

November 23 to a coalition headed by Simon Vratzian. To that last cabinet

fell the heavy obligation to conclude peace and preserve the physical existence

of the Armenian people at almost any price.. Still, for a few days, Vratzian

tried to persuade Legran that sovietization would invite greater tragedy, since

Armenia would be blockaded by Georgia and deprived of extern.al economic aid

at a time when Russia itself was gripped by famine. Renunciation of the

S~vres treaty, moreover, would be tantamount to a sentence of death on the

Armenian question, bringing to nought the untold sacrifices in the national

movement for emancipation. On November 30, Legran announced that the decision

to sovietize Armenia was irreversible. He demanded that Armenia break all

bonds with the Western imperialists and unite with the Russian workers and

63 peasants. A few Armenian Bolsheviks had already crossed the frontier on

November 29 from Azerbaijan into Karvansarai (Ichevan), where they proclaimed

64 Armenia a Soviet republic and appealed for the intervention of the Red Army.

In these circumstances, Vratzian's government bowed to the inevitable and

appointed Dro Kanayan and Hambardzum Terterian to arrange for the transfer of

power. · The treaty signed by Legran and the Armenian representatives on

December 2 gave some ground for hope. Armenia became an independent Soviet

34

socialist republic, and Soviet Russia acknowledged as indisputable parts

of that state all lands that had been under the jurisdiction of the 'Armenian

government prior to the Turkish invasion, included. Russia was to

take immediate steps to furnish the requisite military force to consolidate

and defend the republic. Neither the army command nor members of the

Dashnaktsutiun and other socialist parties were to be persecuted for their

previous activities. Power would pass temporarily to a military revolutionary

committee composed of members appointed by the Communist party and two

left wing Dashnakist members, selected with the approval of the Communist

party. Until that body was organized, the government would be entrusted to

Dro, the military commander, and to comrade Otto A. Selin, the plenipotentiary

f S . R . 65 o ov~et uss~a. For the government of independent Armenia, all that

remained was to issue its final decree: "In view of the general situation in

the land created by external circumstances, the government of the Republic of

Armenia, in its session of December 2, 1920, decided to resign from office

and to relinquish all military and political authority to Dro, the commander

in chief, now appointed as minister of war." 66

The announcement of Armenia's sovietization did not remove the Turkish

menace, since Karabekir threatened to resume the offensive unless his

government's peace terms were accepted forth\v.ith. Those terms obliged Armenia

to renounce the Treaty of S~vres and all claims to Turkish Armenia and the

province of Kars, to accept temporary Turkish jurisdiction in Sharur-

Nakhichevan,to recall all representatives from Europe until the Angora

government had settled its differences with those adversary states, and to

reduce the size of the Armenian army to 1,500 men. In case of need, Turkey

would extend military assistance to the remaining small Armenian state. Only

after all these terms had been fulfilled would the Turkish army .. withdra\v

from the Alexandropol region and establish the Arpachai river as the new

35

intern2tional fron~ier. Even though his gover~ent had officially relinquished

power, Khatisian signed the ~reaty of Alexandropol (G~mr~) shortly after

midnight on December 2.67

Denounced and branded a traitor by Soviet and

other non-Dashnakist authors, Khatisian justified his action as an exigency

measure taken with the knowledge of the new Erevan government and intended

to give time for the Red Army to enter Armenia in sufficient numbers to block

a further Turkish advance. Realizing that he had no legal jurisdiction,

Khatisian hoped that the new Soviet government, with the support of Russia,

would repudiate his action and force the Turks to withdraw at least to the

b d . 68 prewar oun ar~es. As it turned out, these calculations proved ill-founded.

The efforts of the Soviet Armenian government to recover a part of the lost

territories were supported only with mild diplomatic notes by Soviet Russia,

69 which proceeded toward normalization of relations with the Angor2 government.

The Military Revolutionary Committee of Armenia arrived in Erevan on

December 4, followed two days later by the first echelons of the Red Army.

The Revkom·, dominated by young, vindictive Bolsheviks, immediately repudiated

th~ treaty negotiated between Legran and the former Armenian government on

December 2 and initiated an aggressive course of war conmunism. Hundreds of

former government officials and non-Bolshevik political leaders were imprisoned,

the army officer corps was exiled, and a harsh regime of retribution and

requisition was imposed. These oppressive policies, coupled with the trenchant

anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik sentiment of the Turkish Armenian refugee

population and the collusion of sooe Dashnakist partisan leaders, produced a

surge of rebellion in February, 1921. The Revkom was driven out of Erevan

and a so-called Salvation Committee was swiftly organized under Vratzian's

h "d 70 presidency to coordinate the movement sweeping t e countrys~ e.

Not until Georgia had been sovietized in March were sufficient Red Army

reinforcements brought in to suppress the revolt. In April the Salvation

Committee and thousands of insurgents ar..d civilians withdrew into Zange·zur,

36

where the battle w~s continued until a

issued an ~nesty and gave reassurances r the future status of Zangezur

and Karabagh. Lenin had already his Caucasian comrades fer their

overzealousness and advised that in the republics necessitated

a 11 s lo er f 1 d · · · · 1· 11 71 w , more care u , an more systematkc trans~tkon to soc~a ~sm.

Alexandre Miasnikian (Miasnikov, Martuni), a trusted veteran party professional,

was transferred from the European theater to head the A-rmenian government.

In July, 1921, as Miasnikian began to the more cautious measures

of the New Economic Policy, thousands of anti-Bolshevik rebels and bewildered

civilians crossed the Pxaxes into Iran to begin the bitter lives reserved

f . d '1 72 or expatr1ates an ex1 es.

On the international front, Soviet Russia the Armenian

question to cement the Turkish alliance. Having all attempts at

mediation, Mustafa Kemal even made a play to occupy Baturn and the border districts

of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalak in Georgia. The maneuver, apparently intended

to win additional concessions regarding Armenia, bore results.73

By the

Treaty of Moscow (~~rch, 1921), which established normal relations and

friendship between Soviet Russia and the Angora government, Turkey dropped

its claims to Batum and the other districts in return for Russian abandonment

of attempts to redeem for Soviet Armenia the Surmalu district of Erevan. In

that sector, the new Turkish boundary was extended to the Araxes river, thus

incorporating the fertile Igdir plain and Mount Ararat. What was more~

the treaty provided that Sharur-Nakhichevan would not be attached to Soviet

Armenia but would instead be-constituted as an autonomous region under Soviet

Azerbaijan, even though it was separated from eastern Transcaucasia by

intervening Arm . . 74 en1an terrltory. ~~atever qualms Chicherin and Karakhan

might still have had were sublimated to the decisive support the Turkish

d 1 . . d 4' I s 1 • 7 5

A t . 1 t d b th '1" t e egat:ton rece1ve .. rom V. • ta .... ::.n. r.s s 1pu a e y e -rea Y

37

Moscow, almost identical terms were included in the Treaty of Kars (October,

1921) between Turkey and the three Transcaucasian Soviet republics. 76 Described

by a purged Soviet historian as one of the most oppressive and ignominious

trea t".; • th 1 f h. 77 h d 1 d h 1 d h _.._es J.n e anna s o J.Story, tl_at ccument c ampe t .e i on t e

Armenian question and locked Soviet Armenia within its limited existing

territory. The European Powers put their o•vn seal on the Armenian question

two years later by renegotiating the Treaty of S~vres. The Turkish victory

in the resultant Lausanne treaties was so thorough that neither the word

"Armenia" nor "Armenian" was allowed to appear any-v1here in the texts. It was

bitterly ironic for the Armenians that, of the several defeated Central

Powers, Turkey alone expanded beyond its prewar boundaries and this, only on

the Armenian front.

The brief interlude of Armenian independence had ended. Born of

desperation and hopelessness, the Republic lacked the resources to solve

its awesome domestic and international problems. Yet, within a few months

it had become the fulcrum of national aspirations for revival, unification,

and perpetuity. Limitations and shortcomings aside, the rudiments of

government were created and organic development did occur. The failure to

achieve permanent independence left a worldwide-Armenian dispersion burdened

with unrequited grief, frustration, and resentment. Nonetheless, the Republic

of Armenia was superseded by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, where a

part of the nation would strive to etch a place in the sun. The light was

often obscured during the subsequent years of toil and tribulation, but the

transition to contemporary Soviet society was finally made. Yet, however

differeftt the organs of government and the structure of society in the. 1980's,

the heritage of the actions and the attitudes of the 1917-1921 era still

asserts itself forcefully in Soviet .~enia today.

38

FOOTNOTES

1. M. H. Adonts, Hayastani zhoghov~dakan tntesutiune.ev hai tntesagitakan

mitke XX dari skzbin [The popular economy of ~~enia and Armenian economic

thought at the beginning of the twentieth century] (Erevan, 1968),pp.273-279;

A. Shakhatuni, Administrativnyi peredel Zakavkazskago kraia (Tiflis, 1918),

pp. 61-73; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and

Nationalitv in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972), p. 7. See also

United States, The National Archives, Record Group 256, File 867B.OO, Documents

4, 10, 11, 23, (RG 256, 867B.00/4/10/ll/23).

2. Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918

(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 40-93; Djon Kirakosian, Zapadnaia

Armeniia v gody pervoi mirovoi veiny (Erevan, 1971); V. Arzumanian, Hayastan,

1914-1917 [Armenia, 1914-1917] (Erevan, 1969); ~inisterstvo Inostrannykh Del

SSR, Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym dokumentam b. ministerstva

inostrannykh del,_ ed. by E. A. Adamov (Moscow, 1924).

3. Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 101-190; Firuz Kazemzadeh,

The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921) (New York and Oxford, 1951), pp. 54-124;

Republic of Georgia, Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkaz'ia

i Gruzii (Tiflis, 1919); Republic of Armenia Archives, File 1/1, Hayastani

Hanrapetutiun, 1918 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1918]; US Archives, RG 84,

American Consulate, Tifl~, General Correspondence, 1917-1919, File 711,

Consular reports and enclosures; S. T. Arkomed, Materialy po istorii otpadeniia

Zakavkaz'ia ot Rossii (Tiflis, 1923); A. Stavrovskii, Zakavkaz'e posle Oktiabria

(Moscow and Leningrad, [1925]); [Republic of Azerbaijan], Le 28 Mai 1919 [Baku,

1919}.

4. Hovannisian, Road to Independence, pp. 194-198; Rep~ of Arm. Archives,

39

File 1/1; A. Poidebard, "Le Transcaucase et la Re'publique d'Arme'nie dans les

textes diplomatiques du traite' de Brest-Litovsk au traite' de Kars, 1918-1921, 11

Revue des ~tudes arm~niennes, IV (no. 1, 1924), 37-50. Kh. H. Badalian, Gernana-1

turkakan okupantnere Hayastanum 1918 tvakanin (The German-Turkish occupants

in Armenia, 1918] (Erevan, 1962), pp. 172-185.

5. Melville Chater, "The Land of Stalking Death,u National Geographic

Magazine, XXXVI (Nov., 1919), 393-420. See also Richard G. Hovannisian,

The Republic of Armenia, I (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1971), 126-144,

and US Archives, RG 59, File 867.48 passim, an~ RG 256, File 867.00 passim.

6. See Richard G. Hovannisian, "Dimensions of Democracy and Authority

in Caucasian Armenia," The Russian Review, XXXIII (Jan., 1974), 37-49.

7. Hovannisian, Road to Independence, .PP• 216-238; Rep. of Arm. Archives,

File 74/11 H. H. patvirakutiun ev divanagitakan nerkayatsutschutiun Tajkastanum,

1914-1918 t.t. [R. of A. delegation and diplomatic mission in Turkey, 1914-1918],

File l00/1, H. H. patvirakutiun, 1918: E. Ohandjaniani tghtere [R. of A.

delegation, 1918: H. Ohandjanian's papers, 1918],and File 3531 H. H. Berlini

nerkayatsutschutiun, 1918-1919 [R. of A. Berlin mission, 1918-1919].

8. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 128-146; Suny, on. cit., pp. 259-352.

9. Hovannisian, Republic of Armenia, pp. 58-60; Central State

Historical Archives, Armenian SSR, fund 200, wad:. 1271; Rep. of Arm. Archives,

File 9/9, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 (Republic of Armenia, 1919]; US Archives,

RG 256, 861K.00/5, and RG 59, 861.00/4017; E. K. Sargsian, Ekspansionistskaia

politika Osmanskoi imperii v gody pervoi mirovoi veiny (Erevan, 1962), pp. 389-391.

10. Great Britain, Parliament, Hou~e of Commons, Parliamentary Debates,

5th series, Vol. C (1917), col. 2222. See also Richard G. Hovannisian, "The

Allies and Armenia, 1915-18,'' Journal of Contemporary History, III (Jan., 1968),

145-155; Artin H. Arslanian, "British 'Wartime Pledges, 1917-1918: The Armenian

Case," Journal of Contemporary History, XIII (July, 1978), 517-530.

40

11. United States, Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, 13 vols.

(Washington, D.C., 1942-1947), III, 785-786_, 795-796, cited hereafter as

Paris Peace Conference.

12. Materials on the Mudros Armistice and its bearing on the Armenians

are included in the following representative sources: Great Britain, Cabinet

Office Archives, Cab 23/8, Minutes 480(2), 484(3), 486(2), 488(4), 492(9), and

Cab 24/67, G.T. 6068 and 6069; Foreign Office Archives, FO 371/5259, E5732/53732/44

War Office Archives, 106/645, "Execution of the Armistice with Turkey; 11 Great

Britain, Committee on Imperial Defence, Historical Section, History of the

Great War: Naval Operations, Volume V, prepared by Henry Newbolt (London, 1931),

351-357, 418-421; The Times History of the War, XX (London, 1919), 101-104;

Hovannisian, Republic, pp. 55-57; Ali Turkgeldi, Moudros ve Mudanya mutarekelerinin

tarihi [History of the Mudros and Mudania Armistices] (Ankara, 1948), pp. 27-73;

Frederick Maurice, The Armistice of 1918 (London, 1943), pp. 17-20, 85-87;

Gwynne Dyer, "The Turkish Armistice of 1918," Middle Eastern Studies, VIII

(nos. 2-3, 1972), 143-178. 313-348.

13. For the background and political and economic platforms of the

Armenian political societies, see, for example, Louise Nalbandian, The

Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963); Mikayel Varandian

H. H. Dashnaktsutian ~atmutiun [History of the A. R. Federation] (Paris and Cairo,

1932-1950), 2 vols.; Davit Ananun, Rusahayeri hasarakakan zargatsume [The social

development of the Russian Armenians], III, 1901-1918 (Venice, 1926); Arsham

Khondkarian, "Opozitsian Hanrapetakan Hayastanum" [The opposition in republican

Armenia], Vem, I (nos. 1-2, 1933), 63-82, 68-79, and II (nos. 1, 3, 4, 1934), 76-

97, 42-60, 73-95; Vahan 1Y!inakhorian, "Andjatakannere11 [The Secessionists}, Vem,

I (nos. 1-2, 1933), 100-111, 90-107; Adonts, op. cit., pp. 302-429.

14. Hovannisian, ReDublic, pp. 459-468; Zhoghovurd (Erevan), June, 1919; . Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK KP Armenii--Armianskii Filial Instituta

41

Marksizma:-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Revoliutsion kocher ev trutsikner, 1902-1921

[Revolutionary appeals and circulars, 1902-1921] (Erevan, 1960), pp. 508-511,

cited hereafter as Revolutsion kocher.

15. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 66a/3, H. H. Vrastani divanagitakan

nerkayatsutschutiun ev Vrastani karavarutiun, 1919-1920: Teghekatu, 1919

[R. of A. diplomatic mission in Georgia and the Georgian government, 1919-

1920: Bulletins, 1919], no. 90, July 22, 1919; Hovannisian, Republic, pp. 471-

475.

16. Nor Ashkhatavor (Tiflis), Aug. 7/3, 12/2-3, 1919; Gabriel Lazian,

Demker hai azatagrakan sharzhumen [Figures from the Armenian emancipatory

movement} (Cairo, 1949), pp. 305-313; Ruben [Ter-Minasian], Hai heghapokhakani

me hishatak.nere [Hemoirs of an Armenian revolu.tionary], VII (Los Angeles, 1952),

226-236, 271-343.

17. H. H. Dashnaktsutiun, Kazmakerpakan kanonner, hastatvads 9-rd Endh.

Zhoghovi koghmits [Organizational regulations, confirmed by the Ninth Gen.

Meeting] (Erevan, 1919); Hratch Dasnabedian, H. H. Dashnaktsutian kazmakerpakan

karuitsi holovuite [The development of the organizational structure of the

A. R. Federation} (Beirut, 1974), pp. 106-113; Ruben, op. cit., pp. 148-160.

18. Paris Peace Conference, IV, 509-512, and VI, 688-694.

19. Hovannisian, Republic, pp. 66-78, 93-125.

20. Ibid., pp. 78-92, 156-196.

21. Ibid., pp. 360-364, 373-376; Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 3/3,

Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t. [Republic of Amenia, 1919], File 20/20, Hayastani

Hanrapetutiun) 1920 t. [Republic of Armenia, 1920], File 71, H. H. nerkayatsutsich

Haravayin Rusastani zinial uzheri mot, 1919 t.--1920/21 t. [R. of A.

repreaentative to the Armed Forces of South Russia, 1919-1920/21]; and File 373,

H. H. patvirakutiun ev rusakan nakhkin nerkayatsutsichner, 1919-1922 [R. of A.

delegation and the former Russian representatives, 1919-1922]; Avetis Aharonian,

42

Sardarapatits minchev Sevr ey Lazar. ' Sardarabad to Sevres and Lausanne]

(Boston, 1943), pp. 21-23, 26-27; A. I. Deniv~n, Ocherki russkoi smuty, 5 vols.

(Paris and Berlin, 1921-1926) IV, 176-177.

22. li. G. Zatikian, 11Hayastani giughatntesutian vijake 1918-1920

tvakaunerin" [The condition of Armenia's rural economy in the years 1918-1920),

Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 13th yr. (no. 2, 1973), 209-220; H. Petrosian,

"Tntesakan-kaghakakan iravijake Areve1ian Hayastanum, 1914-1917 tt." [The

economic-political situation in Eastern Armen~a, 1914-19171, Banber Erevani

Hamalsarani, 7th yr. (no. 2, 1973), 33-45; A. Sargsian, "Hai giughatsiutian

tntesakan vijake Dashnakneri tirapetutian orok, 1918-1920 tt." [The economic

situation of the Armenian peasantry in the days of Dashnakist control, 1918-

1920}, Banber Hayastani arkhivneri, 4th)~·. (no. 3, 1963), 234-253; Akademiia

Nauk Armianskoi SSR~ Institut Ekonomiki, Sovetakan Havastani tntesakan

zargatsume, 1920-1960 [The economic development of Soviet Armenia, 1920-1960]

(Erevan, 1960), pp. 234-235, 290-299 passim, 313; V. A. Mikayelian, Hayastani

giughatsiutiune Sovetakan ishkhanutian hamar mghvads paikari zhamanakashrdja~um

(1917-1920 t.t.) [The Armenian peasantry during the period of the struggle

for the Soviet order.·~ 1917-1920] (Erevan, 1960), pp. 99-120; Ds. P. Aghayan,

Hoktemberian revoliutsian ev hai zhoghovrdi azatagrume [The October revolution

and the liberation of the Armenian people] (Erevan, 1957), 1>1? .. 193-202.

23. Rep. of·Arm. Archives, File 20/20; H. Zatikian, "Hai gaghtakanutian

u Hayastani bnakchutian tvi parzabanman shurdje (1918-1920 tt.) 11 [Concerning

the clarification of the number of Armenian refugees and the population of

Amenia, 1918-1920], Banber Erevani Hamalsarani, 7th yr. (no. 1, 1973), 249-

251; Near East News (Tiflis), Dec. 29, 1919; Haradj (Erevan), April 4/2-3, 1920.

24. Nor Ashkhatavor, July 24/3, 1919, and Feb. 7/2, March 6/2, 10/2, 1920;

Haradj, Jan. 3/4. 7/4, 1920; Adonts, oo. cit., pp. 485-487.

43

25. Nor Ashk.ha'tavor, Sept. 9/2, 1-19.

26. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919-1920 t.

[Republic of Armenia, 1919-1920], and File 13/13, Havastani Hanrauetutiun, 1920 t.

[Republic of Armenia, 1920]; A. Sargsian, nDashnaktsakanneri agrarayin

kaghakakanutiune [The agrarian politics of the Dashnakists], Banber Hayastani

arkhivneri, 6th yr~ (no. 2, 1965), 207-225; V. A. Milr..ayelian, "Hoghayin hartse

ev giughatsiutian drutiune Hayastanum 1917-1920 tt." [The land question and

the condition of the peasantry in Armenia, 1917-1920], Patma-banasirakan handes,

3d. yr. (no. 1, 1960), 110-124.

27. Rep. of Arm. Archives, file 13/13; Nor Ashkhatavor, Sept. 23/3, 1919.

28. Haradj,·Jan. 10/2, 18/4, 30/4, 1920; Armianskii filial IML pri TsK

KPSS--Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Arm •. ssR--Arkhivnyi otdel MVD Arm. SSR.

Velikaia Oktiabrtskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda Sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii

(Sbornik dokumentov), ed. by A. N. }fuatsakanian, A. M. Akopian, and G. M.

Da11akian (Erevan, 1957), pp. 286-292, 297, cited hereafter as Velikaia

revo1iutsiia; H. S. Karapetian, Mayisian apstambutiune Rayastanum, 1920

[The May Rebellion in Armenia, 1920] (Erevan, 1961), pp. 62-68.

29. Hovannisian, Republic, pp~ 197-249.

30. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, File 13/13, and File 66a/3, no.

110, Aug. 14, 1919; Nor Ashkhatavor~ July 20/2, .1919, and Ash~~atavor, Nov.

2/4, 11/4, 1919; S. Vratzian, Kharkhauumner [Gropings) (Boston, 1924), Pf·

119-124.

31. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 5/5, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1919 t.

[Republic of Armenia, 1919], File 10/10, and File 13/13; Nor Ashkhatavor, Aug.

24/3, 1919, and Ashkhatavor, Sept. 25/3 and Dec. 14/3, 1919; Sept. 20/1,

23/1, 1919, and Jan. 31/2, 1920. See also V. Evoyan, nDashnaktsakan karavarutian

giughatntesakan ev petakan guikeri minisrutian fondi tesutiun, 1918-1920"

[Suryey of the records of the agriculture and state properties ministry of the

44

Dashnakist goverr..ment, 1918-1920], Banber Havastani arkhivneri, 4th yr-. (no. 2,

1963), 201-218.

32. Haradj, Jan. 10/4, 23/4, Feb. 1/1, 3/2, 15/1, 17/2, 18/1, 21/2, 24/3,

March 27/1, 31/4, and April 3/2, 1920.

33. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10, File 13/13, and File 66a/3, no. 85,

July 16, 1919; Haradj, Jan.-Feb., 1920. See also Near East News, Feb. 20/4,

1920, and Britain, FO 371/4950, E2428/36/58 encl.

34. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 10/10; [Par1ianent of Armenia], Havastani

Hanrapetutian orenkneri havakadsu [Collection of the Laws of the R. of A.]

(no. 8, 1919).~oc. nos. 78-78, and(no. 31, 1920), doc. nos. 28 and 40; Ruben,

op. cit., pp. 287-290; Haradj, Nov. 5/3, 1919, and Jan. 4/3, Feb. 3/2, 4/2, 6/2,

and March 5/2, 17/3, 18/1, 1920; Vardges Aha~onian, "Dadarane Hayastani Hanrapetuti

medj" [The court in the Republic of Armenia], Rairenik A..msagir. XVII (Nay-June,

Aug.-Oct., 1939), 126-130, 133-136, 76-80, 97-103, 117-125.

35. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 13/13; Near East News, March 8/2, 1920;

Ruben, op. cit., pp. 280-283; Haradj, Jan. 30-Feb. 6, March 2/1, and April 8/2,

1920; S. Vratzian, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun [Republic of Armenia] (Paris, 1928),

pp. 331-333, cited hereafter as :Hanrapetutiun.

36. Britain, FO ~71/3660, 154611/512/58. See also FO 608/78, 342/1/6/20063

encl., and FO 608/79, 342/1/12/21114 encl.

37. See James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia(Kent, Ohio, 1967), and

Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Dip1ocacy and the Near East (Minneapolis, 1971).

38. See FO 371/4951-4958, File 134/58 passim, and FO 371/4931-4142, File

1/58 passim.

39. Richard G. Hovannisian, "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of

the Soviet-Turkish Entente," International Journal of Middle East Studies, IV

(April, 1973), pp. 129-147; K~zim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz [War of

Independence] (Istanbul [1960]), pp. 57-58, 74-75, 121-122, 185-186, 299-300,

45

358-359, 523-524, 7.86-787, 794-801; Ali Fuat Hil1i mucadele hatiralar!

[Memories from the national struggle] (Istanbul, 1953), pp. 42-45, and his I.

Moskova hatiralad. [Hoscow memories} (Istanbul, 1955), pp. 48-61, 129-137,

220-235; S. Vratzian, Hayastane bolshevikian murji ev trkakan sali midjev

(Armenia between the Bolshevik harr~er and the Turkish anvil] (Beirut, 1953),

pp. 20-28, cited hereafter as Murji ev sali midjev; Feridun Kandemir, Milli

•• mucadele bajlangicinda Mustafa Kemal, arkadarlari ve kar~isindaki1er [Mustafa

Kema1, his friends and opponents at the of the national struggle]

(Istanbul [1964]), pp. 74-75, 88-89; Britain, FO 371/5165-5169, File E262/44

passim, and FO 371/3673, File 168738/58 and 171821/58.

40. Britain, FO 371/5165 and /5168, El428/6768/262/44, Reports for weeks

ending 19 February and 26 May, 1920; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 464-467; Turk

Inkilap Tarihi Enstit~sti, Ataturk'un tamin, telgraf ve beyannameleri [Ataturk's

circulars, telegrams, and declarations], Vol. IV, 1917-1938 (Ankara, 1964),

180-184.

4 1\ J·· . 304 305 b k 667 1. Atatur~un tam~n ••. , pp. - ; Kara e ir, ep. cit., p. ;

FO 371/5170, El2472/262/44, and FO 371/5178, El4638/345/44; The proposal

regarding action against Armenia is not included in Soviet publications. See,

for example, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSR, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki

SSSR, II (Moscow, 1958), 558 •.

42. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 17/17, Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t.

[Republic of Armenia, 1920]; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 406-407, and Hurji

pp. 152-153; Hambardzoum Terterian, 11The Levon Chanth Hission

to Moscow," Armenian Review, VIII (Summer, 1955), 3-6; S. T. Alikhanian,

Sovetakan Rusastani dere hai zhoghovrdi azatagrman gordsum (1917-1921 tt.)

[Soviet Russia's role in the work of liberating the Armenian people (1917-1921)]

(Erevan, 1966), pp. 97-99; Aghasi Esayan, Hayastani midjazgayin-iravakan

drutiune, 1920-1922 [The international-legal position of 1920-1922]

(Erevan, 1967), pp. 103-104.

46

43. Terterian,_op. cit., pp. 8-13; Vratzian, Hanraoetutiun, p. 409,

and Murji ev sali midjev, p. 153; Alikhanian, op. cit., p. 108.

44. Terterian, op. cit. 13-20; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 409-410, and

Murji ev sali midjev, pp. 153-155; P~ikhanian, op, cit., pp. 99-111; Cebesoy,

Moskova-hatiralar!, p. 67.

45. P. A. Azizbekova, V. I. Lenin i sotsialisticheskie preobrazovaniia v

Azerbaidzhane (1920-1923 gg.) (Moscow, 1962), pp. 85-86; G. Zhvaniia, Velikii

Oktiabr' i bor'ba Bol~hevikov Zakavkaz'ia za Sovetskuiu vlast' (Tbilisi, 1967),

pp. 200-207, 221-228, 276; Institut Istorii Partii TsK KP Azerbaidzhana-Filial

Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi

oartii Azerbaidzhana, ed. by H. S. Iskenderov et al. (Baku, 1963), pp. 296,

300, 307-309; Institut Istorii Partii TsK Kompartii Armenii-Filial Instituta

Y~rksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS, Hayastani Komunistakan kusaktsutian patmutian

urvagdser [Outlines of the history of the Communist party of Armenia], ed. by

Ds. P. Aghayan et al. (Erevan, 1967), pp. 282-283, cited hereafter as Komkusi

urvagdser; Kh •. H. Barseghian~ Hayastani Komunistakan partiayi kazmavorume

[Organization of the Communist party of Armenia] (Erevan, 1965)~ pp. 248-264;

G. B. Gharibdjanian~ V. I. Lenin ev Andrkovkase [V. k. Lenin and Transcaucasia]

3 vols. (Erevan~ 1970-1975), III, 256-258, 264-270; Hovannisian, Republic,

pp. 400-403.

46. G. B. Gharibdjanian, Hayastani komunistakan kazmakerputiunnere

Sovetakan ishkhanutian haghtanaki hamar mghvads paikarum [The Communist

organizations of Armenia in the struggle for the victory of the Soviet order]

(Erevan~ 1955), pp. 262-266, cited hereafter as Kazmakerputiunnere; P. S.

Kol'tsov et al., "Iz istorii kommunisticheskikh organizatsii Zakavkaz'ia,"

Voprosy istorii KPSS (no. 6, 1962), pp. 56-73; H. Danielian, Spartak Hayastanum

[Spartak in Armenia] (Moscow, 1931), pp. 89-91; B. Borian, Armeniia, mezhdunarodnai;

diplomatiia i SSSR, 2 vols. (HoscovT-Lenir:grad, 1928-1929), II, 88-95.

47

47. •· Borian, op. cit., p. 95; Karapetian, oo. cit., pp. 105-106, 111-112;

Gharibdjanian, Kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 268-284, 299, 308-310; Aghayan, on. cit:,

pp. 216-218, 224-226; Komkusi urvagdser, pp. 282-284; Hovannisian, Republic,

pp. 403-408; Ruben, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

48. Barseghian, op. cit., pp. 268-297; Borian,op. cit., pp. 95-102;

Revoliutsion kocher, pp. 524-526, 528-530; Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 92-98;

Gharibdjanian, Kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 317-324; Ve1ikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 303-313.

49. Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 99-149; Revo1iutsion kocher, pp. 543-545,

549-551; Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 323-359; GP~ribdjanian, Kazmakerputiunnere,

pp. 347-369; Komkusi urvagdser, pp. 289-293; K. Sasuni, Mavisian khrovutiunnere

ev tatarakan apstamb shrdjannere (The May disturbances and the insurgent

Tatar districts] (Beirut, 1968); Vratzian~ .Hanrapetutiun, pp. 348-367.

50. Borian, op. cit., pp. 103-114; Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 149-304;

Gharibdjanian, Kazmakerputiunnere, pp. 369-379; Aghayan, op. cit., pp. 249-260;

Barseghian, op. cit., pp. 304-312; Vratzian, Hurji ev sali midjev, pp. 97-144.

51. Sasuni, op. cit., pp. 137-145, 153-158; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 360-

376; A. Khatisian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian dsagumn u zargatsume [Creation and

development of the Republic of Armenia] (Athens, 1928), pp. 180-187; Veysel

'" •• 1\ . Unuvar, Istiklal harbinde bol~eviklerle sekiz ay, 1920-1921 [With the Bolsheviks

for eight months during the war of independenceJ 1920-1921] (Istanbul~ 1948),

pp. 21-42.

52. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 17/17; Terterian, op. cit., pp. 20-22;

Velikaiia revoliutsiia, pp. 373-374; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

Biographical information on Legran is given in A. N. Mnatsakanian, Revoliutsian

Andrkovkasum ev Rusastani patviraknere [Revolution in Transcaucasia and the

envoys of Russia} (Erevan, 1961), pp. 206-225. For sources on the gold and

other materials secured by Halil Pasha for the Nationalist cause, see Karapekir,

op. cit., pp. 788-790, 799-800, 836-838; Cebesoy, !>foskova hatiralari, p. 63;

Gotthard Ja'schke, "Neues zur russisch-tiirkischen Freundschaft von 1919-1939,"

48

Die l.."e1t des Is1ams, new series, VI (no. 3/4, 1961), 204-205; Dokumenty

vneshnei politiki SSSR, III (Moscow, 1959), 675 n.54.

53. See, for example, Dokumentv vneshnei po1itiki SSSR, II, 554-555;

Karabekir, op. cit., pp.784-786; Jasctke, , pp. 207-208; Jane Degras,

ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I (London, Ne-tl York, Toronto, 1951),

187-188.

54. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, II, 556; Karabekir, op. cit.,

pp. 703-704, 714, 752, 754-756; Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralari, p. 61.

55. Cebesoy, Moskova hatira1ari, pp. 62-79; Dokumenty vnes~nei po1itiki

SSSR, II, 725-727; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 113-116; S. I. Kuznetsova,

Ustanovlenie soveto-turetskikh otnoshenii (Moscow, 1961), pp. 19-21.

56. Cebesoy, Moskova hatiralari, pp. 80-82; Tevfik Biyiklioglu, Ataturk

Anadolua'da (1920-1921) [Ataturk in Anatolia, 1920-1921} (Ankara, 1959),

p. 70.

57. Karabekir, op. cit., p. 887. Disagreements among the Turkish leaders

regarding the most suitable time to attack Armenia are discussed and documented

in Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 714-718, 727-731, 764, 766, 769-772, 776-777, 878,

i. '. 856-857, 860; Hikmet Bayur, "Kuvay-i milliye devrinde-Ataturk'un diJ> siyaset

ile ilgili bazi gorus ve davranij1ari" [Some views and attitudes concerning

Ataturk's foreign policy during the period of the national liberation forces],

Belleten, XX (Oct., 1956), 667-678, 683-684, 692-696; Turk Inkilap Tarihi

Enstit~su, Ataturk'~n soylev ve demerleri [Ataturk's speeches and statements],

I (Ankara, 1945), 89-99.

58. K. Sasuni, Hai-trkakan paterazme (The Armeno-Turkish war] (Beirut,

1969); Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 413-436, 501-508; Artashes Babalian, nKarsi

ankume" [The fall of Kars], Hairenik Amsagir, I (Oct., 1923), 52-68; Hakob

Ter-Hakobian, Hayastani verdjin aghete (Armenia's last tragedy] (Constantinople,

1921); Khatisian, op. cit., pp. 245-253; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 887-902.

49

59. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 17/17; pp. 384-385;

Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 118-127. Turkish were dissatisfied that

the agreement had left control of the railway to the Armenians. They complained

that this prevented unhindered communication between Soviets and the '

Nationalists. During the Hoscow negotiations, Bekir Sami raised the issue and

subsequently reported that Lenin had concurred that this aspect of the August 10

agreement was faulty and needed rectification. See Bayur~ op. cit., pp. 679-681;

Cebesoy, , pp. 68-69, 73-74; Biyiklioglu, ' p. 70.

60. For an official published version of the Tur~~sh peace settlement, see

Great Britain, Parliament, House of Corr:mons, Treaty Series no. 11, "Treaty of

Peace with Turkey, signed at Sevres lOth August 1920, 11 Parliamentary Papers

(Accounts and Papers), Cmd. 964 (London, 1920).

61. Esayan, op. cit., pp. 110-117, 132-137; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 138-

145; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, pp. 411-412, and Murji ev sa1i midjev, pp. 162-

164; Terterian, op. cit. (Autumn, 1955), pp. 94-99; Djon S. Kirakosian, ed.

Hayastani midjazgayin divanagitutian ev Sovetakan artakin kaghakakanutian

pastatghterum (1828-1929) [Armenia in the diplomatic documents of international

diplomacy and Soviet foreign policy, 1828-1923] (Erevan, 1972), PP~ 457-458.

The non-Soviet sources are apparently inaccurate in giving the date of the

draft treaty as October 21.

62. A1ikhanian, op. cit., pp. 172-177; Vratzian, Hanrapetutiun, p. 436;

S. Kuznetsova, "Krakh turetskoi interventsii v Zakavkaz'e v 1920-1921 godakh,n

Voprosy istorii (no. 9, 1951), pp. 146; S. V. Kharmandarian, "K voprosu ob

ustanovlenii sovetskoi vlasti v Armenia," Istoricheskii arkhiv (no. 6, 1958),

pp. 99-105; Dokumenty vnes~~ei politiki SSSR, III, 325, 674 n.50; Kirakosian,

op. cit., pp. 458-459. Mdivani, who Soviet diplomatic representative

in Turkey in February, 1921, assertedly explained to Turkish officials that the

attempted Soviet mediation was for propaganda purposes in the West and that it

50

was never seriously believed or even desired that the Turks should give

land to the Prmenians. See Bayur, op. cit., pp. 682-683. See also Cebesoy,

op. cit., pp. 117-119; Dokumentv vneshnei nolitiki SSSR, III, 469.

63. Vratzian, Murji ev sali midjev, pp. 173-184, and "Hushner motik

antsialits" [Memories from the recent past], Hairenik P...msagir, II (Nov. 1923),

82-85; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 167-170.

64. Ve1ikaia revo1iutsiia, pp. 429-434; Alikhanian, op. cit., pp. 178-197;

Revoliutsion kocher, pp. 573-578; Komkusi uDragdser, pp. 305-309; Dokumenty

vnesP~ei po1itiki SSSR, III, 346-348.

65. Iu. V. K1iuchnikov and A. V. Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaia po1itika

noveishego v-remeni v dogovorakh, not:akh i deklaratsiiakh, III, pt. 2 (Moscmv,

1929), 41-42; Velikaia revoliutsiia, pp. 438-442; Vratzian, Hanranetutiun,

pp. 438-439; Terterian, op. cit., pp. 100-102; Borian, op. cit., pp. 295-296.

66. Vratzian~ Murdji ev sa1i midjev, p. 188; Oliver Baldwin, Six Prisons

and Two Revolutions (London, 1926), photocopy facing p. 32.

67. Rep. of Arm. Archives, File 11/11 Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 1920 t. J

[Republic of Armenia, 1920], and File 17/17; Poidebard, OE· cit., pp. 70-77;

Alikhanian~ op. cit., pp. 219-235; Kliuchnikov and Sa.banin, on. cit., pp. 71-73,

75-76; Gotthard Jaschke, "Der turkisch-armenische Friedensvertrag von Gumru

(Alexandropol)," Die Welt des !slams, u.s., II (no. 1, 1952), pp. 25-37.

68. Khatisian, op. cit., pp. 270-271; Vratzian, "Rusher, 11 pp. 96-97·

69. See Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III, 378-379, 392-396, 397,

452-454~ 468, 469~ 484-487, 487-488, 507-508; Kirakosian, on. cit., pp. 462-463,

465-467, 485-490, 493-496; Kharmandarian, op. cit., pp. 100-105; J~schke,

"Friedensvertrag," pp. 37-46; Ataturk'u'n soylev ve demerleri, pp. 129-133;

Alikhanian, op •. cit., pp. 235-252.

70. Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 24-135; Vratzian, :t-1urji ev sali midjev, pp. 275-

305, and Kianki ughinerov [Along life's ways}, VI (Beirut, 1967), 5-125;

51

K. Sasuni, Petrvarian apstambutiune February rebellion} (Beirut, 1970);

Yervant Hayrapetian, "The February , 1921; Armenian Revolt, 11 Armenian Review,

X-XI (Summer, 1957-Autumn, 1958); H. Harmandian, 11 The Exile of the Anr..enian

Army Officers," Armenian Review, XI (Spring, 1958), 103-115; Borian, oo. cit.,

pp. 125-135.

' 71. V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed. XLIII (Moscow, 1963),

198-200; Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 55.

72. A. V. Vardanian, Hayastani Karnir banake Y~ghakatsiakan krivnerum

1920-1921 tavakannerin [The Red of Amenia during the civil battles of

1920-1921] (Erevan, 1960); A. M. Hakobian, Hayastani banvorneri ev giughatsineri

haghtanake 1921 tvakani kaghakatsiakan krivnerum [The victory of Armeniats

workers and peasants in the civil battles of 1921] (Erevan, 1960); Revoliutsion

kocher, pp. 590-610 eassim; MnatsaY~nian, op. cit., pp. 327-402; Velikaia

Vratzian, Kia~\i ughinerov,

pp. 126-274; Irazek, [Hakob Ter-Hakobian}, Hotik antsialits [From the recent

past] (Beirut, 1956), pp. 91-153.

73. Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 147-149; Biyiklioglu, op. cit., p. 71;

Jaschke, nFreundschaft," p. 208.

74. Degras, op. cit., pp. 237-242; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, III,

364-365, 391-392, 435-436, 468, 469> 597-604; Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 113-116,

138-156.

75. Cebesoy, op. cit., pp. 139-140, 148; Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 956-964;

• Borian, oo. cit., pp. 162-165, 299-305; Gabriel Lazian, Hayastan ev hai date,.

haievrus haraberutiunneru luisin tak [Armenia and the Armenian Question, in the

light of Arnenian-Russian relations] (Cairo, 1957), pp. 197-198, 243-244, 256-259.

76. Karabekir, op. cit., pp. 1000-1022; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR,

IV (Moscow, 1960), 176-177, 227-228, 249, • 273, 287-288, 292-293, 371-374,

392, 400-4 ' 420-429, 495-497.

77. Borian, op. cit., pp. 163, 300.