oh 2011 on democracy, violence, and the promise of islam

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On Democracy, Violence, and thePromise of Islam

Irene Oh

John Kelsays Arguing the Just War in Islam enriches the field ofcomparative religious ethics through its nuanced historical treat-ment of war in Islamic jurisprudence. Kelsays work has long beenan important resource for scholarly insights into the field ofIslamic ethics and this addition to the corpus should be laudedespecially for its lucid eloquence, a rare quality that is all too impor-

tant when writing about a topic that is relevant to a broad audience.Substantively, Arguing the Just Warprovides a detailed intellectualhistory of Sharia reasoning and demonstrates how this strand ofIslamic history has evolvedor perhaps more accurately,devolvedto legitimate the crisis of Islamic extremism. One leavesthe book not only well informed about the history of Islam,Sharia, and warfare, but with a model for how oneas a scholar,teacher, and citizenought responsibly, thoughtfully, and respect-fully to engage with a religious tradition that is not ones own.1 With

this volume, Kelsay offers a valuable contribution to the fields ofIslam, just war theory, and comparative ethics. His account ofMuslim jurisprudence on war serves as an accessible reference forscholars and students, and his final thoughts on Islamic religiousgovernance and violence will be sure to fuel many debates on thistimely topic.

Arguing the Just War provides resources for American, non-Muslim readers (as well as Muslims who may not be familiar with

IRENE OH (BA, Swarthmore College; MA, University of Chicago; PhD, Universityof Virginia) is an assistant professor of religion and the director of peace studiesat the George Washington University. She is the author of The Rights of God:Islam, Human Rights, and Comparative Ethics. Her articles have appeared inthe Journal of Religious Ethics, the Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics,and theJournal of Feminist Studies in Religion. Her special interests include com-parative religious ethics, and feminist ethics.

Journal of Church and Statevol. 53 no. 1, pages 5058; doi:10.1093/jcs/csq143# The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. DawsonInstitute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:

[email protected]

1. For a discussion of why and how one might engage with others religioustraditions, see, Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue andConceptions of Courage (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 123.

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sharia reasoning about jihad) for comprehending the motivationsand rationale behind Islamic militants. Kelsay appears to have twoaudiences in mind: one that describes groups like al-Qaeda asnot really Muslim and another that dismisses Islamic militants

as irrational agents. The first audience is typically composed ofwell-meaning moderate Muslims and apologists who understand-ably wish to dissociate violent radicals from the vast majority ofpeaceable Muslims. The second audience, which is the one I

believe Kelsay most convincingly persuades, finds dismissingviolent radicals as irrational easier than admitting that violent rad-icals might have actual reasons for their actions. To the first audi-ence, Kelsay bluntly states, Those who wish to argue that Islamhas nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11 or with the tactics of

Iraqi insurgents will find no comfort here.2 Indeed, the factsare plain that the militants in question identify themselves asMuslim and use religious reasoning to justify their actions.3

Unless one is willing to ignore the statements of the militants them-selves, one cannot deny the central role of religious reasoning in theacts of violent extremists.

Concerning the second audience, Kelsays book forces the readerto resist the temptation to dismiss Muslim militant actors as irra-tional, insane, or monsters. Instead, Kelsay takes on the more

difficult, intellectually rigorous task of tracing the history of jihadas argued by Islamic jurists. Kelsay clearly portrays in his studyan interpretive, textually rooted legalistic tradition that militantMuslims draw upon (though they do so ineptly and not without con-troversy) in waging war in the name of Islam. As philosophersCharles Taylor and Hans-Georg Gadamer have asserted, in orderfor understanding to occur across cultures, we must first accepteach other as moral agents with reasons for believing and actingas we (and they) do.4 Arguing the Just War illustrates how this

process of cross-cultural understanding might take place. Kelsayrightfully dismisses glib characterizations of al-Qaeda and theTaliban, and he offers detailed reasons for why Islamic militantsare able to justify to themselves the acts that they commit.Without these insights into the very foundations of their beliefs,we risk losing both the battle and the war against violent Islamicextremism.

2. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2007), 3.3. Ibid., 3.4. Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985), 116 17; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method,trans. Jowel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad,1991), 385.

On Democracy, Violence, and the Promise of Islam

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On Islamic Intellectual History

Readers will find a wealth of knowledge about Islamic intellectualtraditions in the first three chapters of Kelsays book. For those

who are unfamiliar with the basic outline of Islamic history, hisdescriptions of the beginnings of Islam are helpful not merely forthe information provided, but also for the explanations concerningthe contemporary relevance of events that transpired 1,400 yearsago. He sets the tone of the book and anticipates concerns aboutthe factuality of early Islamic history when he instructs the readerthat there is

no reason to doubt the broad outline of the stories associated withMuhammad and the early Muslims, even as there is no reason to doubtthe historical bias of the broad outlines of the gospel narrative concerningJesus of Nazareth, or of reports concerning the sayings of the rabbis of theTalmud. . . . In all these cases we ought not to push the details. . . . Thepoint of holy history is to answer religious questions: not simply oreven primarily How did these events transpire? but Why did theyoccur?5

For Islamic militants, this early history serves as the templateupon which their activities are based. Using a form of Sharia reason-ing, they draw parallels between the struggles of the early Muslimcommunity and the struggles of Islam in a postcolonial age. AsKelsay goes on to explain, Sharia reasoning did not arise in avacuum, but developed out of the historical need to unite agrowing Islamic community administratively, legislatively, and reli-giously. Sharia rests upon the belief that the early Muslim commun-ity, centered around the prophetic figure of Muhammad,exemplifies virtues and practices that Muslims ought to emulate.By the twelfth century, sharia had evolved into an establishedprocess by which a scholarly class trained in religious and legalhistory could artfully negotiate between history and present cir-cumstance, or between approved texts and new contexts.6

Democratizing Islam

As Kelsay deftly illustrates, the first centuries of Islamic jurispru-dential history are relevant to the study of the jihad today.

However, the major turning point in the history of sharia withregard to the rise of Islamic militants appears to have occurredwith the creation of the twentieth-century Egyptian movement

5. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, 11.6. Ibid., 125.

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known as the Muslim Brotherhood, ikhwan al-Muslimin. Kelsayexplains that with

the Brothers, we actually see something new in the history of Shariarea-

soning. The deference to the learned class as experts in religion is shownas historical accident; for it rested largely on certain social facts: mostMuslims could not read, or if they could, they could not obtain access tothe texts necessary for the practice of reasoning about the Sharia. Bythe 1920s, however, the growth of a professional class, able to read anddiscuss the matters of religion, combined with the increased availabilityof books made possibly by developments in print technology, meantthat deference would no longer be the rule. With Hassan al-Banna [thefounder of the Brothers], the movement toward a serious Islamist move-ment had begun.7

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its south Asian counter-part, the Jamaat-i Islami led by Abul ala Mawdudi, continued torespect the ulema, the learned class of Islamic legal scholars, butthey effectively reserved judgment on matters of practice forthemselves.8 Here, I think, is one of the most valuableandcontroversialarguments Kelsay offers in his book. It is notwithout irony that the process of democratizing Sharia reasoningmade possible the rise of decidedly undemocratic organizations

such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.Kelsay associates the broadening of Sharia reasoning with the

assassination of Anwar Sadat and with the formation of AfghaniArabs, the most infamous of whom, of course, is Osama binLadin. After providing a concise analysis of declarations fromsuch militants, Kelsay reminds us, humbly, that pointing outwhere such statements on militants converge and diverge fromthe opinions of established ulema constitutes the lesser task. Themore arduous and important task solves the crisis of legitimacy.

He explains, For Osama bin Ladin and those who stand with him,the ulema are nearly as irrelevant as the leadership of historicallyMuslim states. At best, they [the ulema] are focused on splittinghairs; at worst, they publish opinions that identify Sharia reasoningwith the policies of acquiescence to Europe and the United States.9

In other words, the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence who have tra-ditionally been respected as members of the learned class are nolonger regarded as authoritative by a significant minority ofMuslims. Not only do the likes of bin Ladin consider themselves

qualified to issue a formal Sharia opinion on the duty of Muslims,including the learned, but they are also capable of mobilizing

7. Ibid., 91.8. Ibid., 95.9. Ibid., 153.


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resistance against Western influence.10 The appeal of these mili-tants appears to lie in their ability to speak to a widespreadsense that current political arrangements are unsatisfactory.11

Current governments of Muslim-majority states are perceived as

weak and corrupt, especially in the face of institutions such as theU.S. military, the World Bank, and the IMF. These observations bymilitant Muslims are not in themselves particularly troublesomeor even inaccurate. For Kelsay, what is disturbing is that the estab-lished ulema appear to agree with the Islamic militants vision ofIslamic governance.

At this point, Kelsey shifts from a discussion primarily concerningthe means employed by Islamic militants to a discussion concerningtheir ends. Even as the ulema critique militants unsophisticated

methods of argumentation and their violent means for achievingsuch ends, they concur on the necessary end of Islamic governanceand, in particular, Islamic political leadership. To be clear, Kelsaydoes not argue against the contributions of Muslim voices in themaking of policy within a democratic, multicultural state, butrather against the establishment of Islam as the religion of astate.12 Islamic governance, he suggests, may err toward the use offorce when force may not be necessary.13 Kelsay also briefly notesthe historical tendency of Christian states to resort to violence but

also acknowledges that the legacy of Christian intolerance consti-tutes one part of the story by which modern democracy was born.14

Democracy and Religion

There are alternatives to the Islamic state envisioned by such mili-tants and ulema. Kelsay describes the work of well-regarded schol-ars such as Abdulaziz Sachedina, Abdullahi An-Naim, and KhaledAbou el-Fadl to make his case for the separation of Islam and the

state. In choosing these scholars, Kelsay provides his readersthree different jurisprudential methods that draw a range of conclu-sions against the establishment of an Islamic state. However con-vincing and sophisticated their argumentation might be, it isnonetheless hard to overlook the significance of the fact that eachscholar has chosen to make the United States his home. While onewould like to believe that the ideas of Sachedina, An-Naim, andAbou el-Fadl are sound enough to stand on their own, their choiceof home in the United States weakens their legitimacy abroad.

10. Ibid., 137 38.11. Ibid., 162.12. Ibid., 166.13. Ibid., 197.14. Ibid.


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One of the qualifications for attaining the rank of ulema in Islamicjurisprudence has been the character of the scholar in question. Avery learned scholar who writes dazzlingly brilliant opinions butwho fails to display the kind of virtue desired in a scholar would

not be qualified to join the ranks of the learned class. In the politicalenvironment of the Muslim states in question, the choice by aMuslim scholar to make the United States their homeeven ifthey frequently visit Muslim-majority stateswould likely be con-strued as an undesirable character flaw, an indication that theyhave gone to the other side. Kelsays selection of Sachedina,An-Naim, and Abou el-Fadl would not help to convince an Islamicmilitant of the error of his ways. To such a militant, these scholarshave sold out to the West. Even the fact that these scholars have

received death threats for their work would not convince Islamicmilitants that moving to the United States was matter of necessityrather than choice.

If these American scholars are unlikely to convince militants of areligiously neutral political structure, could they persuade institu-tional ulema, like those at Al-Azhar? It seems improbable in thissituation as well, especially if the ulema are equally convinced ofthe insidiousness of Western imperialism, even as they remain crit-ical of militants use of violence.15 To be fair, Kelsay is writing pri-

marily for an American audience, and he is right to argue that weought to familiarize ourselves with the kind of reasoning thatSachedina, An-Naim, and Abou el-Fadl employ. Nonetheless, theargument that the democratizing of Sharia has given rise tothe likes of bin Ladin, while convincing, suggests the possibilitythat it might have also given rise to voices that challenge Islamicmilitancy at its core. If the claim that Muslims have the duty toexplore their own consciences has led to the rise of Islamic mili-tancy, then why would the same claim not also lead to the rise

of democratic voices?One prominent Islamic scholar, Abdolkarim Soroush, provides a

counterbalance to the Islamic militants discussed by Kelsay.Soroush, unlike Sachedina, An-Naim, and el-Fadl, lives in Muslim-majority Iran (although he has resided in the United States as a visit-ing scholar) and espouses a vision of Islam that supports demo-cratic Islamic governance.16 Soroushs understanding of Islamicdemocracy aligns with the ideals of governance and religious

15. Ibid., 139 44.16. Abdolkarim Soroush, The Idea of Democratic Religious Government, andTolerance and Governance: A Discourse on Religion and Democracy, inReason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of AbdolkarimSoroush, trans. and ed. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2000), 12230, 13155.


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centralized might better indicate a governments willingness toapply unwarranted force to achieve desired ends, rather than thereligion or ideology of a state.19

While few and arguably no true democracies exist in the Arab

world, about half of all Muslims live in democratic and semi-democratic states.20 The dispersion of Muslims across the globecomplicates any correlation between Islam, especially whendefined as a lived tradition, governance, and violence. Presumablythe majority of Muslims who choose to live in democratic, evensecular states either do not perceive or are able to resolve anytension between their faith and support of their respective govern-ments.21 Countries that currently declare Islam as their state reli-gion apply Islam to civil society in a variety of ways and in varying

degrees. Sharia functions differently in Jordan and Qatar than inSaudi Arabia and Yemen. Admittedly, state-sponsored Islam in rel-atively young, postcolonial nation-states can be unstable, but themajority of young, postcolonial states areunstable for a variety ofreasons, religion being but one.

Given the political and economic repercussions of Western coloni-alism and imperialism in Muslim-majority states, the most diplo-matically effective stance might be to encourage the developmentof indigenous models of democracy, Islamic or otherwise. If the

people of a Muslim-majority state were to elect to have, democrati-cally and justly, an Islamic state, then I think that we would have torespect both the process and the result. This, of course, is a compli-cated scenario, and numerous hypotheticals could be raised, but mymain point is that we ought not to rule out the possibility of a dem-ocratic, Islamic state that applies Sharia to reject violent Islamicextremism on the one hand and state-sponsored secularism onthe other. Indeed, from this perspective, the critical comments ofulema against the use of violence, rather than their agreement

over Islamic governance, become the focus of the argumentagainst Islamic extremism. The cross-cultural conversation thusremains centered upon the means, that is, the use of violence, ofIslamic extremists to achieve their goals, rather than upon the endof Islamic rule. Although the upshot of Islamic governance may

19. Rudolf Rummel, Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?Journal of Peace Research34, no. 2 (May 1997): 16375.20. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Separation of Religion and State in the

Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies,Comparative Politics 37, no. 3 (April 2005): 319; Alfred Stepan, Religion,Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations, Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4(2000): 48 49.21. Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004).


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be problematic, the violent means employed to achieve this end isarguably more so.

ConclusionIn reading Arguing the Just War, I was struck by the depth to which aWestern, non-Muslim (Christian) scholar can engage with a traditionthat is not his own. Really, the only obvious traits in common

between Kelsay and the Islamic militants he investigates in hisbook are their sexmaleand, perhaps, their ageunknown, butone might guess. Kelsays contribution serves as a paradigm forthose who work in comparative ethics and, indeed, for those of uswho make the study of other peoples religious beliefs their liveli-

hood. I was reminded in a conversation with John Kelsay (over anunrelated matter) of a graduate advisor of mine who said that onecan best understand ones own religious tradition only aftercareful contemplation of other peoples religions. Arguing the JustWar in Islam is useful not only for understanding Islam, but essen-tial for reflecting upon the ways in which just war is argued in ourown country. After the careful study of war in Islamic thought,the last pages of Kelsays book urge us, his American audience, toconsider how we ought to think about Islam in our own political

lives. If only we were as reflective as Kelsay, there would be fewerinjustices in the world.


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oh 2011 on democracy, violence, and the promise of islam

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