The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 5 | Issue 8 | Aug 01, 2007

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Okinawa and the Paradox of Public Opinion: Base Politics andProtest in Nago City, 1997-2007

Miyagi Yasuhiro, Miyume TANJI

Okinawa and the Paradox of PublicOpinion: Base Politics and Protest in NagoCity, 1997-2007

Miyagi Yasuhiro

Introduced and translated by MiyumeTANJI

Introduction

So much has happened to the Okinawan protestagainst the Futenma base relocation in the past10 years: the formal and informal localresistance has been such that the new U.S.military sea base that was to replace FutenmaAir Station has not been built. However, theelection results in Okinawa continue to producemayors and governors ready to acceptrelocation, largely for economic reasons. Whatexplains this contradiction? How democratichave the local political processes regarding thebase issue been? Miyagi Yasuhiro addressesthese questions in a report, originally written forthe research group Okinawa jizokuteki hattenkenkyukai (Sustainable Development inOkinawa Research Group, headed by MiyamotoKen’ichi), which reflects on the ten years sincethe Nago referendum of 1997 on relocation ofthe US Marine Air Station from Futenma. Therelocation proposal was rejected by a majority.

Miyagi at work

Miyagi requires no introduction to Japan Focusreaders. [1] He is an articulate activist againstthe relocation. Born in Nago in 1959, hepursued a stage acting career in Tokyo in hisyouth, returned to Nago in 1995, and thereafterdevoted himself to community developmentissues as consultant and municipal publicrelations editor. With fellow local citizens hecampaigned for the Nago City referendum in1997, after which he served as a member of theNago City Assembly until 2006. He also ran formayor of Nago in 2002 on a platform ofopposition to the base construction plan. He ismotivated by a love for Nago’s naturalenvironment and a sense of responsibility toprotect it for future generations.

The report centers on the political economy ofUS base relocation: the processes wherebyeconomic interests and policies have corruptedthe democratic representation of the collectivewill of Okinawans. It offers not only a localactivist’s perspective, but also valuable

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economic and political data and analyses,highlighting the local politics of global USmilitary transformation, of which the relocationof the Futenma base is an important part. Thereport clarifies the current conjuncture forEnglish-speaking readers interested in thehistory of Okinawan base politics. (MT)

1. Democracy: Elections and PollResults

Futenma Air Base Relocation Site: Kadena,White Beach or Nago?

First, it is necessary to review the crucialdecisions on base relocation ten years ago. InApril 1996, SACO (the Special Action Committeeon Okinawa) agreed on the return to Japan ofthe property occupied by the US Marine CorpsFutenma Air Station, on condition that analternative facility would be constructed withinOkinawa. However, it was impossible to find aconstruction site that the US military, thegovernment of Japan, Okinawa Prefecture andespecially, the local population all agreed on.The following locations were proposed:

1) The northwest forest area within theKadena Ammunition Storage Area(cancelled due to local opposition);

2) The Kadena Air Force Base, withinwhich the Futenma Air Stationfacility might have been integrated(stalled due to opposition from theUS Air Force and from the threemunicipalities where Kadena base islocated);

3) Reclaimed land on a coastal areaadjacent to Camp Schwab (proposedby the US side but opposed by theJapanese government because ofanticipated local resistance). InSeptember 1996, then Pr imeMinister Hashimoto proposedconstruction of a removable ‘marineheliport’ on Henoko Bay instead;

4) The White Beach coastal area(cancelled due to opposition fromthe Prefecture and local municipalbodies);

5) In the end, the U.S and Japanesegovernments agreed in the SACOfinal report on a site: the coastalarea adjacent to Camp Schwab,without specifying an exact location.Naturally, Nago citizens werealarmed.

Events Leading to the Nago Referendum,December 1997

In April 1996 Nago Mayor Higa Tetsuya, agreedto the Defence Agency’s preparatoryinvestigation of the Camp Schwab site, which hehad been adamantly refusing. In response,regional trade unions and other citizens’ groupsinitiated a referendum. In June, the NagoReferendum Promotion Committee was formed,with a slogan, ‘Important decisions should bemade by everyone in the community’.

In June, at the City Assembly, the Mayor calledfor a consensus formation among citizenswithout a referendum.

In August, the Okinawa Prefecture agreed to apreliminary geographical survey by the NahaDefense Agency Facility Bureau.

More than half of the eligible voters signed apetition organized by the Nago ReferendumPromotion Committee calling for a referendumlegislation bill.

Nago City Assembly rejected the originalreferendum bill, under which voters were simplyasked to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to base construction,and instead passed a bill offering four choicesadding the option to choose ’yes” subject to thecondition of ‘ increased environmentalprotection and economic regeneration’ (seeFigure 1).

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The referendum campaign started, and thecompetition between supporters and opponentsof the new base heated up. The main supporterswere those engaged in local constructionindustry and chambers of commerce, hoping foreconomic regeneration and increasedgovernment subsidies.

The government of Japan actively supported thecampaign. For example, according to the localnewspaper, Okinawa Taimusu, the centralgovernment raised the military base-relatedsubsidies to the hosting local communities from2 billion to 3 billion yen (30 November 1996). Italso suggested that new policies for economicrejuvenation of the northern region ofOkinawa’s main island would be adopted whenthe new base was formally accepted (5December 1996). Members of the Self DefenseForces residing in Okinawa received ‘personalrequests for cooperation’ from then Minister ofDefense Agency, Kyuma Fumio, and NahaDefence Agency Facility Bureau staff knockedon the doors of local residents.

Figure 1. Referendum results (voting rates82.45%)

Election of theMayor of Nago City, February 1998

‘ I h e r e b y a c c e p t t h e h e l i p o r tconstruction; at the same time, I amresigning from office and ending mypolitical career.’ ------24 December,1997, former mayor Higa Tetsuya, at

Prime Minister’s residence.

‘The offshore heliport issue will besuspended, until the Governor ofOkinawa Prefecture makes a decision.’ -----5 January 1998, former deputy mayorKishimoto Tateo, at a press conferenceto announce his decision to run for themayorship of Nago.

Subsequent to Higa’s resignation, the baseopponents agreed to support Tamaki Yoshikazu,Member of the Prefectural Assembly.

‘The focus of this election is to publiclydeclare our opposition to the marinebase, both inside and outside thecommunity.’ -----21 January 1998,Tamaki Yoshikazu at the Citizens’ Rally,‘Forest of 21st Century’ Gymnasium inNago City.

‘I have come to the decision thatOkinawa Prefecture refuses the offshoreheliport construction.’ -----6 February,1998, two days prior to the mayoralElection, Governor Ota Masahideformally declared his opposition.

Candidates’ comments with regard toGovernor’s opposition to the heliport (asreported in Okinawa Taimusu)

Tamaki:

The purpose of this election is to enable thenew mayor and the local residents to stop theconstruction of a new military base. Thereferendum showed the opposition of themajority of citizens, but the former mayor wentagainst the citizens’ will by accepting theheliport at the prime minister’s residence, thenresigning from office. This is outrageous. Thegovernment has not given up. Following theGovernor’s decision to reject the heliport, themost important goal is for Nago City to clearlyrefuse, and in solidarity, stop the construction.The Okinawan Governor’s formal refusal is a

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major boost for our goal, but victory in themayoral election will consolidate it.

Kishimoto:

On the offshore heliport issue, I have reiterated,‘I will wait for the Governor’s decision.’ Now thatthe Governor has expressed his oppositionconsidering general circumstances in Okinawa,the issue has been resolved. Thus, the offshoremilitary base debate that has deeply divided thecommunity no longer exists. This mayoralelection, therefore, is an election as usual; thebase is not the issue in this election. Personally,I wish the Governor had taken a stance with us(Mayor of Nago) last year in January, when adecision had to be made whether or not toaccept the government’s preparatoryinvestigation of the construction site. If hedisagreed with the heliport construction at all, itshould have been then, when the real painstarted for the Nago citizens.

Figure 2. Election result (voting rate 82.35%) :Kishimoto Tateo 51.76% (Brown), Tamaki

Yoshikazu 48.10% (Blue), Tsujiyama Kiyoshi 0.14%(Yellow)

Many voters who voted against the heliport atthe referendum voted for Kishimoto at themayoral election.

Okinawa Gubernatorial Election, November1998

In November 1999, Governor Inamine Keiichi,victorious in the 1998 election, declared thatthe shore off Henoko next to Camp Schwab inNago was the construction site of the newmilitary ‘airport’, part of which would beavailable for local, commercial use. On 27December, Kishimoto Tateo, Mayor of Nago,conditionally accepted this, and, on thefollowing day, the Cabinet Meeting agreed onthe ‘Policy on relocation of the Futenma AirStation’. The decisions made at this CabinetMeeting adjusted to the condit ions ofacceptance by Nago City and OkinawaPrefecture. It was agreed that the Futenma AirStation replacement facility would be used byboth the US military and the local commercialsector; the period of its use would be restrictedby a time limit to be agreed between Japan andthe US; and a tripartite treaty on the conditionsof base operations would have to be agreedbetween Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, andthe Government of Japan.

In the following year, after the G8 summit inKyushu and Okinawa, the Futenma Air StationReplacement Faci l i ty Committee metfrequently. Opponents of the relocationfocussed on problems associated withconstruction, such as the destructive effects onthe env i r onment , and campa ignedinternationally to protect the Okinawa dugong.

In July 2002, the basic plan for the Futenmareplacement facility was agreed. In February ofthe same year, Kishimoto, incumbent mayor ofNago, was re-elected, defeating relocationopponent (this author) by the substantialmargin of 9,000 votes (20,356 to 11,148). InNovember, Governor Inamine was also re-elected by a significant margin, 359,604 votesto Mr Yoshimoto’s 148,401, and Mr Aragaki’s

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46,230.

The ‘Public Opinion Paradox’: The Electionand Poll Result

The conflicting results of the 1997 referendumand the 1998 mayoral election have beenreferred to as the ‘public opinion paradox’.Okinawan voters responded to opinion polls byopposing the new military base construction;but at election times, they placed greatestimportance on economic rejuvenation andimplicitly accepted construction of the newbase.

Asahi poll results

Taking these results into consideration, theparties opposed to the base tried to win byexpanding their support base as much aspossible. However, they lost both elections in2006 – Governorship of Okinawa and Mayorshipof Nago– partly because of the internecinedivisions within the opposition camp.

On Election Day the media reported Ms ItokazuKeiko, the anti-base candidate, was likely towin, according to exit polls. The successor of theformer Governor backed up by the LDP-Komeitocoalition, Nakaima Hirokazu, nevertheless won,thanks at least in some measure to theabsentee votes organized and collected by localcompanies before the Election Day.

In choosing a candidate for the Nago mayoralelection earlier in January 2006, the base

opponents (and the progressive partysupporters) suffered from the similar split thathad plagued the gubernatorial election. Formayor of Nago, the opposition forces endorsedan unusually conservative candidate. Those whodisapproved this decision, however, supportedanother candidate. Because of the inability tounify and concentrate oppositional votes, MrShimabukuro Yoshikazu, endorsed by the LDP-Komeito coalition, won the mayoral election. (MrKishimoto did not run this time, because of illhealth, and he died shortly after the election.)

Just before the mayoral election, the US andJapanese governments proposed a new plan forthe replacement of Futenma Air Station. In thecontext of the overall US military reorganisationin East Asia, the construction site was to beshifted from Henoko to the north, to the coast ofCamp Schwab, where an even larger airportwould be built, with two runways laid in a V-shape. Mr Shimabukuro, the new mayor, aftermaking a campaign promise not to accept thisnew plan, after winning the election agreed toit. Similarly, Okinawan Governor Nakaima alsopromised opposit ion to the V-shapedreplacement facility plan but is currentlyexpected to agree sub jec t to minoradjustments.

Both elections in 2006 raised serious concernsabout the integrity of Okinawa’s democracy,across the political and ideological spectrum.These concerns involved:

1. Lack of transparency: pre-arranged absentee votingdecided the election results.

2. Election promises that werei g n o r e d o r a s s i g n e dinsufficient weight.

The most basic democratic principles are atstake. Yet the issue is not simply about theOkinawan citizens’ public awareness, or abouthow ‘democratic’ Okinawans are as a people. Itis a question of the pressures inflicted on them

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by the Japanese government, which seemsdetermined to use any means to achieve itsobjectives.

Elections and Political Activism

Only the government of Japan can stop the baseconstruction that the citizen activists aredemand ing . On ly the heads o f l oca lgovernments and their parliaments can publiclyrepresent the collective will of the community.Unfortunately, when it comes to selectingmayors and governors, opponents of baseconstruction have repeatedly lost importantelections.

In Okinawa (perhaps not just in Okinawa), itcannot be denied that the media plays aconservative role. This is done by exaggeratingideological differences between conservativesand progressives, and by commentaries usingarbitrary judgements, deepening divisionsamong residents and feeding their disgust andapathy.

The 1997 referendum was the expression ofcollective will of the citizens of Nago. Itrepresented residents’ views. Does this indicatethe existence of ‘civil society’? According toDouglas Lummis, the original definition of ‘civilsociety’ is ‘a realm separate from thegovernment’.[2] The referendum in 1997 wasan activity characteristic of a civil society,namely, not organized by the government.Indeed, it was all the more an act of civil societybecause the government persistently tried tointerfere with it. We need a healthy civil societyfree from the ‘public opinion paradox’. Withoutit, Nago residents’ rejection of the marine base,expressed through the referendum, will neverbecome a reality.

The difficulty is how to cultivate such a civilsociety, how to negotiate the gap between thepolitics of election and activism. Unfortunatelywe have not been able to do this, myselfincluded.

The new base construction could start at anytime, even though it has been stalled for adecade since the SACO agreement. GovernorNakaima and Mayor of Nago City Shimabukuroare different from the combination of Inamineand Kishimoto. The latter team were attackedfor being irresponsible and non-assertive; buttheir stance may also be seen as one of passivedisobedience against the state from theirpowerless position as local government officials.

The most urgent task for us is to overcome thegap between citizen activism and electionpolitics.

2. The Political Economy of OkinawanBases

Following the schoolgirl rape case in 1995, theindignation shown by the Okinawan people roseso as to threaten the Japanese government. Thegovernment responded with a series ofeconomic compensation measures for Okinawa,in addition to inventing the SACO program. Thesubsidies, mainly focused on the constructionindustry, did not work as hoped at the time ofreferendum, but things started to change afterit.

‘Shimada Commission’ Projects

In August 1996, a private consultative body wasestablished under the Chief Cabinet Secretary.Formally named ‘Commission on OkinawanCities, Towns and Villages hosting US Bases’,commonly it was known as the ‘ShimadaCommission’ after its chair. Its aim was toreduce the local people’s frustration about thecontinuing military presence.

The ‘Shimada Commission’ provided funding ondifferent terms:

Projects previously impossible under apartial subsidy system were given 100per cent government funding;The local governments of cities, townsand villages could negotiate directly with

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the Cabinet and the Defence FacilityBureau;Because the projects were not classifiedas ‘public works’, public funding wouldnot be given when renovation wasrequired in the future.

From 1997, 38 industrial projects and 47 planswere approved to proceed by stages towardscompletion in 2007. The total budget to 2006was 75.54 billion yen, and 34 industrial planshad been completed by the time of the 2005financial year.

Of municipal grants in the period up until 2005,Nago City had received 8.188 billion yen,second only to the 15.869 billion yen grantreceived by Kadena Town (which hosts KadenaUS Air Base). The largest sum paid to Nago wentto the Neo Park International Species ProtectionResearch Center (3.322 billion yen, includingland purchase cost and the cost of rescuing aninstitution then on the brink of bankruptcy).

The Shimada Commission projects wereassigned the role of integrating into the marketeconomy publ ic sector industr ies inmunicipalities encumbered with military bases.As Chair Shimada Haruo explained, ‘Above all,feasibility, competitiveness and self-sufficiencyfor market survival are required’.[3]

Shimada’s projects differ qualitatively fromtraditional Okinawan ‘public works’. They wereused as part of the experiment to drasticallyalter the nature of governance along neo-liberallines, as was later exemplified nationally in theprivatization of Japan’s postal service.

In response to the Okinawans’ reaction to the1995 schoolgirl rape case, Tokyo implemented avariety of schemes designed to placateOkinawans. The Shimada Commission’seconomic development schemes served only toerode Okinawa’s ‘self-sufficiency’ and‘sustainability’.

Growing Base-related Income Dependence

Since being chosen as the site for baseconstruction, Nago City’s economy has shownclassic bubble symptoms.

Nago’s income originating from military basesincludes:

Rent (asset revenue);Supplementary subsidies for cities, townsand villages hosting nationally-ownedfacilities;Projects subsidised by the Law related tothe Ma in tenance o f L i ve l i hoodEnv i ronment (ma in ly C lause 8 :‘Subsidised Projects for StabilizingResidents’ Well-being’).

Since 1997 the following have also been added:

Shimada Commission projects;Subsidies and grants to SACO-relatedprojects;Publ ic and non-publ ic economicrejuvenation projects for the Northernregion of Okinawa;s main island.

Base-related income increased two-foldbetween 1997, the year of referendum, and1998 (from 2.38 billion to 4.766 billion yen), andthen kept growing as the government of Japanand Okinawa Prefecture reached basicagreement in the Replacement FacilityCommittee, reaching around 9 billion by 2003.

Figure 3. Ratio of Military Base-related Revenuesin Nago City’s Budgets.

Base-related is indicated in blue, the total inpurple. H9 indicates

Heisei 9, 1997. Source: Nago-shi Kikaku Soumubu

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KikakuZaisei-ka (Financial Planning Section, Nago City

Council).

Main projects funded by military base-relatedsubsidies include:

Shimada Commission projects: facilitymaintenance of Meio University and theNeo Park International Species ProtectionResearch Center;SACO-funded projects: construction ofregional facilities such as communitycenter buildings;Projects for the economic rejuvenation ofthe Northern region not classified aspublic works: i.e. facility maintenance ofthe ‘IT special zone’.

Meio University and the Neo Park ResearchCenter can hardly be considered market-competitive. By taking on these projects, NagoCity was accepting the high risk of futureexpenditure to maintain the facilities once builtthat would likely far exceed the financialresources of a local government. It was anextremely dangerous path.

Since 1998, the growing share of revenuegenerated by subsidies linked to military baseshas also increased total revenues. However, asthe political motive that generated thesesubsidies ceases to exist, the revenue willdisappear, and the quality of public servicesthat residents receive – the most importantpublic goods local government should provide –will deteriorate.

In 2001, with 9.1 billion yen coming frommilitary base-related subsidies, Nago City’scurrent ratio was 87.5%. An adequate currentratio, which indicates financial elasticity andresilience, for urban municipalities is consideredaround 75 per cent, and a rate of 80 per cent orhigher is unhealthy. In 2004, Nago City’s currentratio rose to 95 per cent. At this rate, thefinancial section of Nago City Council estimatesit will reach 100 per cent in 2010.

The City Council ostensibly aims at soundfinancial management, but so long as it pursuesthe immediate economic effects created by thenew base, its financial position will onlydeteriorate.

Cabinet’s 2006 Decision: Determination tokeep Okinawa a ‘Base Island’

Of the governmental decisions made onFutenma relocation, Cabinet decisions have thegreatest weight. On 30 May 2006, the decisionmade on ‘Government In i t iat ives forRestructuring US Forces in Japan’ overrode the‘Government’s Policies on re-locating theFutenma Air Station’, an earlier decisionreached on 28 December 1999. Among others,two important decisions made in 1999 werecancelled:

1) the decision that the new Air Stationwould be partially opened for localcommercial use and that a 15-yearlimit was to be imposed on USmilitary use.

2) that a special economic rejuvenationscheme for the northern region wasto be implemented.

Former Governor Inamine and Nago MayorKishimoto had insisted on the conditions under(1), among others, but now that Inamine hasretired and Kishimoto is deceased, currentpolitical leaders are unlikely to bring them backto the negotiating table. Regarding (2), in 1999,the cabinet promised the then Governor thatspecial subsidies were to be paid to northernmunicipalities irrespective of base construction.That promise has since been forgotten orignored, and, once again, current localgovernment is unlikely to demand subsidies forcommunities not involved in base relocation.

After 1999, the Cabinet Office promised specialdevelopmental support for the northern region.It was the only favourable term Okinawasecured from the government. Not any more.

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Since the 1995 rape case, the Cabinet Chief hasacted as de facto minister of Okinawan affairs,replacing the Okinawa Development Agency. Inother words, the Cabinet Office has been incharge of all Okinawan special developmentprojects and schemes, including the ShimadaCommission Projects. In 2001, the OkinawaDevelopment Agency was abolished and thenew Ministry of Okinawa and Northern TerritoryAffairs, located within the Cabinet Office, tookover. However, it was the Defence Agency thatdominated the making of 2006 Cabinetdecisions, over the Cabinet Office’s head. InJanuary 2007, the Defence Agency wasupgraded to become Ministry of Defence.

Historically, the Japanese institution thatgoverns Okinawa has also been transformedfrom the ‘Development Agency’ to the ‘CabinetOffice’, and now to the ‘Ministry of Defence’.What does this mean?

Although Okinawan political leaders have beenelected, promising economic development firstand foremost, the economic development ofOkinawa is now controlled by the Ministry ofDefence. This fact underpins the government ofJapan’s determination to maintain the island ofOkinawa as a US base island.

3. Henoko’s Geopolitical Location

Opposition protest is not the only reason whythe construction of a new US base in Henokohas been suspended for 10 years. Throughout,the Mayor of Nago has been strongly opposedto base construct ion. Nago c i t izens’disagreement as expressed by the referendum,the conditions of acceptance imposed by theGovernor and Mayor, and environmentalconcerns have all constituted obstacles in theway of new base construction. Despite all thesedifficulties, why do the US and Japanesegovernments insist on Henoko as the substitutefor Futenma?

What the US Military Wants

The oft-cited myth that Camp Schwab in Henokois the only base in Okinawa that was built onlocals’ invitation is groundless. What is closer tothe truth is that the local landowners agreed tothe terms of lease offered by the US militarygovernment, the highest government authorityat the time, in order to prevent the loss oflandowners’ interests and benefits to thecommunity.[4] Any explanation of the reasonfor selecting this location that underestimatesHenoko’s political resistance would also befalse.

At the time of the Nago referendum in 1997, thenew base was going to take the form of aremovable marine heliport. In 1999, that waschanged to a joint military-civilian ‘airport’. In2006 the new base was further widened torequire coastal landfill. In the 10 years of delay,the two governments have exponentiallyincreased the capacity of the substitute airbase.

As reported by an Okinawan local TV networkQAB, two plans were drawn up by the US Navyand the Marine Corps in 1966 for an airport inHenoko. Both included a berth adjacent to OuraBay deep enough to accommodate largevessels. The recent US forces realignmentcouncil agreed on a plan with a V-shapedrunway, and what is called an aircraft parkingapron. It is undeniable that this apron would beused as a berth.

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Above: reproductions of two plans of an airport inHenoko/Oura Bay prepared by the US Marine

Corps and Navy, in January and December, 1966.Source: QAB homepage

(http://www.qab.jp/01nw/05-01-19/index7.html)

The planned construction site has grown muchlarger through the 10 years of delay. It is nolonger a substitute for Futenma Air Station, butit now appears that Japan is constructing whatthe US military has wanted to build since the1960s.[5]

The US and Japanese Governments’Rationale for the Bases

How do the two governments justify theintegration and reduction of US forces inOkinawa?

Since the initial SACO agreement of 1996, theUS Government’s view on integration andreduction has been consistent. The US bases inOkinawa must stay. However, those in urbanareas in the central and southern regions areinconvenient for military operations, andtherefore should be moved to rural and sparselypopulated areas, or combined with bases in

other areas. This is why the benefit of‘packaging’ base facilities has been reiterated inthe 2006 US military realignment councilbetween the US and Japanese governments.

The overall view held by the government ofJapan is not clear, but my understanding is thatit hopes to accommodate US demands whileappeasing municipal governments.

There are some obstacles to US militaryrealignments in Okinawa that are impossible toavoid:

1) any relocation of bases will meet withlocal resident opposition;

2) because the desired sites in thenorthern region are sparselypopulated, relocation there woulddisturb the environment, includingprotected wildlife species.

In the absence of some other alternative, Japanseems determined to build a brand new militaryairbase (plus a military port), aka Futenmasubstitute, giving in to all US demands. Theprice we pay will include precious and rarenatural resources and many other specialqualities of Okinawa.

What are the rationales for constructing the newbase here? What are the compelling strategicreasons for limiting the relocation site ofFutenma Air Station to Okinawa? Are they goodenough to convince the world?

The puzzling thing is that the US does notnecessarily seem to agree. During a US andJapanese Vice Ministerial discussion on USrealignment in April 2004, the US suggested toJapan:

· transferring 2,600 troops in total (800artillery soldiers, 900 from theMar ine reg iment , 700 f romtransport and supply units, and 200from supply units) from Okinawa to

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mainland Japan;

· temporarily relocating the helicopterunit from Futenma to Kadena AirBase within 3 years.

Japan postponed responding to thesesuggestions, and, in the end ignored them.[6] InNovember 2006, the then Defence Agency Chiefreferred to another US suggestion to replaceFutenma with a 500-meter long runway withinCamp Schwab.

Neither expanding the capacity nor relocating toanother Okinawan location is essential to theFutenma closure. Why has there been such astrong push to build an upgraded US air base inHenoko, against all odds?

The answer probably includes many factors –Japan’s international security policy, theJapanese Constitution, Okinawa as a colony, thenation’s independence and the hypocrisy andwish for peace on the part of the majority ofpeople.

Conclusion: Reasons for ContinuedResistance

Finally, let me reflect on future public policyscenarios. The shape of the runway – whetherthe current V-shape plan is appropriate or not –is currently subject to negotiations betweenNago City, Okinawa Prefecture and theGovernment of Japan. Sooner or later, thecurrent plan will be accepted by local politicalleaders.

Aerial projection of the V-shaped runway

After agreement is reached by the Prefectureand Nago City, events will unfold in roughlythree steps:

1) Agreement on basic plan;

2) Environmental assessment (followingthe submission of a methodologyreport, investigations wil l beconducted and then a preliminaryreport will be submitted.)

3) Construction.

When the agreement on the basic plan isreached, the government will promptlycommence the environmental assessment byissuing a methodology report. The residents arealready familiar with the procedures andnecessary action from the previous assessmentprocedures associated with the then plan for acivilian-military airport.

Environmental assessments in Japan arebasically conducted by the industry. Industrialprojects may be adjusted in minor ways but arerarely cancelled because of destructiveenvironmental effects.

Yet citizens’ groups have built networks thatenable the mobilisation of international publicopinion. Persistent campaigning and pressure

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for the cancellation of this project could changethe situation. One citizens’ group has taken thecase of excessive military presence and theabuse of Okinawans’ human rights to the UN.Their action may contribute to such change.There are multiple grounds on which citizenscan mount public actions.

Thanks to the war against terror, it has becomemuch easier for states to legally conductthemselves in ways that are immoral andauthoritarian. It is an illusion that peaceful andfree life can be enjoyed without strife.

The drilling investigation of the construction sitein Henoko, necessary for environmentalassessment, was blocked by determined citizenaction. It would be impossible to expect a massparticipation by ordinary citizens in anothersuch dangerous blockade. Nevertheless, thiskind of direct action is not the only method ofcivil resistance.

There are many tasks left for those of us whofavour a robust civil society: creating multipleforms of resistance to the reckless projects ofthe government; inventing words that cancommunicate that such resistance is humanelysensible and reasonable; critically examiningmunicipal and central government policy andformulating alternatives; producing case studiesof autonomous economic development andimplementing them.

Notes

[1] See, for example, Miyagi Yasuhiro(translated by Gavan McCormack)‘ O k i n a w a - R i s i n g M a g m a ’(https://apjjf.org/admin/products/details/1878), Japan Focus, December 4, 2005.

[2] Kina Shokichi and Charles Douglas Lummis,Hansen heiwa no techou: anata shika dekinaiatarashii koto (Anti-war and peace handbook:new things only you can do), 2006, Shuueisha

Shinsho, 0334A, p18.

[3] Quoted from Chair’s comments from ‘TheReport on the Advisory Panel’s Discussion atInitiating Commission on Okinawan Cities,Towns and Vi l lages host ing US Bases(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/okinawa/review/zatyou.html)’ See my (Miyagi) essay written in2000, ‘Canary’s Song in a Coal Mine: A Critiqueof the Shimada Commission Projects’(http://www5.ocn.ne.jp/~miyagi/report/caranysong.pdf)

[4] Henoko District, Henokoshi (History andCulture of Henoko), 2002, Henoko, Okinawa, p632

[5] See Makishi Yoshikazu (translated byMiyume Tanji), ‘US Dream Come True?The New Henoko Sea Base and OkinawanResistance’, Japan Focus, February 12,2006

[6] Hisae Masahiko, Beigun Saihen (USMilitary Re-Alignment) Koudansha GendaiShinsho, p 91

Miyagi Yasuhiro, born in Nago in northernOkinawa in 1959, was a central figure inthe Nago City Plebiscite Promotion Council(later Council against the Heliport Base)from 1997, and served as a Nago CityCouncilor from 1998 to 2006. He is alsojoint representative to the DugongProtection Campaign Center and author ofseveral works on Okinawa issues and thedugong. Email: miyagi@soleil.ocn.ne.jp(http://mce_host/admin/site_manage/Local%20Settings/Temp/miyagi@soleil.ocn.ne.jp)

This article was written for Japan Focus. MiyumeTanji is a Research Fellow at the Centre forAdvanced Studies in Australia, Asia and the

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Pacific (CASAAP), Curtin University ofTechnology, Australia and the author of Myth,P r o t e s t a n d S t r u g g l e s i n O k i n a w a(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415365007/?tag=

theasipacjo0b-20). She translated andintroduced this article for Japan Focus.

Posted at Japan Focus on August 3, 2007.