on characteristics of information in j. j. gibson's ecological approach to visual perception...

Leonardo

On Characteristics of Information in J. J. Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception(Continued)Author(s): Kim JamesSource: Leonardo, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1981), pp. 83-84Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1574530 .

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Leonardo, Vol. 14, pp. 83-88. Pergamon Press, 1981. Printed in Great Britain.

LETTERS

Leonardo, Vol. 14, pp. 83-88. Pergamon Press, 1981. Printed in Great Britain.

LETTERS

Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English or in French. Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English or in French.

MUSIC AND VISUAL COLOR (cont.)

I recognize what John Crawford states in his letter in Leonar- do 13, 349 (1980) on my article in Leonardo 13, 101 (1980) as being true; there are many ways of correlating music with color as James A. Davis brought out in his response to W. Garner in Leonardo 12, 218 (1979), and Arnold Schoenberg's method illustrates one way.

Also I am aware that Schoenberg himself was a painter and thus would have been very conscious of links between visual art and music. I believe this is significant in that it may have influenced his development of a system based on the 12-tone scale as a counterpart to the painter's color circle of 12 hues. Schoenberg's departure from the diatonic system to a chroma- tic system was more radical than Alexander Scriabin's, so that the cleavage between them is difficult to bridge. Perhaps the influence of visual art on the works of Scriabin's 'atonal' and 12-tone periods is being overlooked - a correlation of colors with the 12-tone rows of Schoenberg's system might help to clarify things that have seemed mystifying or unintelligible to listeners in the past [Cf. Leonardo 14, 58 (1981), this issue-ed.]

The linking of Schoenberg's work with Kandinsky's is most interesting - the fact that they arrived at similar results independently is an indication of the atmosphere that pre- vailed at that time in which the barriers between the arts were being broken down. In developing his own style Kandinsky gained reinforcement from the post-impressionists and auves in whose work color was predominant. From the time of the impressionists, color had taken a lead in painting, and more or less concurrently color had taken a lead in music, especially harmonic color. This parallel emphasis on color in both painting and music from the latter part of the 19th century through the early part of the 20th is a phenomenon that needs to be studied more deeply. It was a period of intense concen- tration on unifying elements in the arts that may have signi- ficance for the present in which similar phenomena seem to be taking place, especially in the Occident.

Alan Wells P.O. Box 335

Imperial Beach, CA 92032, U.S.A.

ON CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION IN J. J. GIBSON'S ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL

PERCEPTION (cont.) Robert Shaw in Leonardo 13, 349 (1980) has chosen to interpret the remarks in my article in Leonardo 13, 112 (1980) on the characteristics of information in Gibson's works to mean that I have some complaint against Gibson. Let me say that I have no argument against any formulation by Gibson in anything of his that I have read from 1966 onward. This seems to me to be a fair indication of my commitment to the principles of his ecological approach to visual perception and what one can derive from it.

MUSIC AND VISUAL COLOR (cont.)

I recognize what John Crawford states in his letter in Leonar- do 13, 349 (1980) on my article in Leonardo 13, 101 (1980) as being true; there are many ways of correlating music with color as James A. Davis brought out in his response to W. Garner in Leonardo 12, 218 (1979), and Arnold Schoenberg's method illustrates one way.

Also I am aware that Schoenberg himself was a painter and thus would have been very conscious of links between visual art and music. I believe this is significant in that it may have influenced his development of a system based on the 12-tone scale as a counterpart to the painter's color circle of 12 hues. Schoenberg's departure from the diatonic system to a chroma- tic system was more radical than Alexander Scriabin's, so that the cleavage between them is difficult to bridge. Perhaps the influence of visual art on the works of Scriabin's 'atonal' and 12-tone periods is being overlooked - a correlation of colors with the 12-tone rows of Schoenberg's system might help to clarify things that have seemed mystifying or unintelligible to listeners in the past [Cf. Leonardo 14, 58 (1981), this issue-ed.]

The linking of Schoenberg's work with Kandinsky's is most interesting - the fact that they arrived at similar results independently is an indication of the atmosphere that pre- vailed at that time in which the barriers between the arts were being broken down. In developing his own style Kandinsky gained reinforcement from the post-impressionists and auves in whose work color was predominant. From the time of the impressionists, color had taken a lead in painting, and more or less concurrently color had taken a lead in music, especially harmonic color. This parallel emphasis on color in both painting and music from the latter part of the 19th century through the early part of the 20th is a phenomenon that needs to be studied more deeply. It was a period of intense concen- tration on unifying elements in the arts that may have signi- ficance for the present in which similar phenomena seem to be taking place, especially in the Occident.

Alan Wells P.O. Box 335

Imperial Beach, CA 92032, U.S.A.

ON CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION IN J. J. GIBSON'S ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL

PERCEPTION (cont.) Robert Shaw in Leonardo 13, 349 (1980) has chosen to interpret the remarks in my article in Leonardo 13, 112 (1980) on the characteristics of information in Gibson's works to mean that I have some complaint against Gibson. Let me say that I have no argument against any formulation by Gibson in anything of his that I have read from 1966 onward. This seems to me to be a fair indication of my commitment to the principles of his ecological approach to visual perception and what one can derive from it.

My emphasis on the role of sensation is confined to the description of perception and not to perception itself, in which sensation plays no part. Shaw has, unfortunately, allowed my amusement over Gibson's statement that 'sensation is an incidental luxury to the serious business of perceiving' [Leonardo 4, 27 (1971)] to play too important a part in my subsequent arguments.

For me, as for Gibson, the perceptually informed state is an unbroken continuous act that can be experienced but not described [J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 240]. It cannot be described by its own process since this process is unbroken, and to describe is to ennumerate the possible relations in an event consisting of discrete entities over time. This cannot be done except by a concommitant process, a condition that is satisfied in the human system by the use of that part of the central nervous system that forms part of the perceptual system as a channel of sensation. It seems to me Gibson allowed for this in the quotation used by Shaw from Gibson's article Are There Sensory Qualities of Objects? Synthese 19, 409 (1968-69).

Sensations are discrete and incapable of transformations to produce invariants - they have polar differences of varying magnitude. As Gibson said, there are sensations that can obtrude on to perception and there are special cases of presen- tation of layouts to passive observers that enable one to list various sets of sensations [J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966) p. 307]. I am aware of the difficulties of cataloguing sensations, but I think that many of these difficulties are the result of psychologists' looking at sensations as in some way constitut- ing the raw materials of perception when in actual fact sensations are important for the reason that Gibson himself states, namely, that the study of sensations is important for an understanding of the self and one's awareness of the world.

To describe self-awareness and hence the state of perceiving, it is necessary to have recourse to another state that is capable of discrete sequential comparison with reference to the perceptual state. Sensations seem to me to fit this state, and there is enough work underway in perceptual laboratories and surgical operating rooms that accurately delineates various sensations without resort to analytic introspection. The use of sensations is to describe what perception is like, not what perception is.

I think that in objecting to my use of the term 'mismatch' states he misses the point I made in terms of my understanding what Gibson said - that sensations may arise when either perceptual information is deficient or unavailable to disambi- guate experiences [Gibson's 1966 book, p. 2]. In the case of hallucinations at least, these deficiencies in the psychosomatic perceptual process arise in the 'internal' body part of the resonance. I do not accept Powers' linear function hypothesis as adequate, but feel that those of us who are searching for a dialectical hypothesis might do worse than have a look at his ideas. As I said in my article, the idea of levels is much more

My emphasis on the role of sensation is confined to the description of perception and not to perception itself, in which sensation plays no part. Shaw has, unfortunately, allowed my amusement over Gibson's statement that 'sensation is an incidental luxury to the serious business of perceiving' [Leonardo 4, 27 (1971)] to play too important a part in my subsequent arguments.

For me, as for Gibson, the perceptually informed state is an unbroken continuous act that can be experienced but not described [J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) p. 240]. It cannot be described by its own process since this process is unbroken, and to describe is to ennumerate the possible relations in an event consisting of discrete entities over time. This cannot be done except by a concommitant process, a condition that is satisfied in the human system by the use of that part of the central nervous system that forms part of the perceptual system as a channel of sensation. It seems to me Gibson allowed for this in the quotation used by Shaw from Gibson's article Are There Sensory Qualities of Objects? Synthese 19, 409 (1968-69).

Sensations are discrete and incapable of transformations to produce invariants - they have polar differences of varying magnitude. As Gibson said, there are sensations that can obtrude on to perception and there are special cases of presen- tation of layouts to passive observers that enable one to list various sets of sensations [J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966) p. 307]. I am aware of the difficulties of cataloguing sensations, but I think that many of these difficulties are the result of psychologists' looking at sensations as in some way constitut- ing the raw materials of perception when in actual fact sensations are important for the reason that Gibson himself states, namely, that the study of sensations is important for an understanding of the self and one's awareness of the world.

To describe self-awareness and hence the state of perceiving, it is necessary to have recourse to another state that is capable of discrete sequential comparison with reference to the perceptual state. Sensations seem to me to fit this state, and there is enough work underway in perceptual laboratories and surgical operating rooms that accurately delineates various sensations without resort to analytic introspection. The use of sensations is to describe what perception is like, not what perception is.

I think that in objecting to my use of the term 'mismatch' states he misses the point I made in terms of my understanding what Gibson said - that sensations may arise when either perceptual information is deficient or unavailable to disambi- guate experiences [Gibson's 1966 book, p. 2]. In the case of hallucinations at least, these deficiencies in the psychosomatic perceptual process arise in the 'internal' body part of the resonance. I do not accept Powers' linear function hypothesis as adequate, but feel that those of us who are searching for a dialectical hypothesis might do worse than have a look at his ideas. As I said in my article, the idea of levels is much more

83 83



Letters Letters Letters

complex that Powers laid down nearly 10 years ago. I hope that this letter will go some way to resolve a public

disagreement between two struggling Gibsonians. Kim James

23 Hickmire Wollaston, Wellingborough

Northants, England

ON AESTHETIC EDUCATION IN BELGIAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS (cont.)

There are many noteworthy things in Willy Moerman's article in Leonardo 13, 123 (1980) that contains a description of a new state requirement for aesthetic education in Belgian secondary schools, a requirement that extends over three years and is considered to be part of the work done by students in the humanities. The requirement is, of course, a political accom- plishment of some magnitude. Nothing like it exists in the U.S.A. where most aesthetic education efforts are directed toward the primary level.

The observational and perceptual approach of the first year of Moerman's program strikes me as sensible. And, I am happy to say, the visual arts and music are the principal subjects of study; that is, art is the subject of study. This is refreshing in comparison with official policy rhetoric in the U.S.A. where 'arts education' more and more means getting and distributing funds for pedagogical endeavors intended to meliorate social problems. To its credit, the Belgian requirement seems to have avoided the politicizing of cultural and educational relations.

I shall briefly discuss a number of concepts prominently featured in his article.

1. Moerman speaks of the desirability of 'awakening aesthetic capacity' as one of the major objectives of the aesthetic education requirement. In doing so, he follows contemporary aesthetic opinion that associates aesthetic capacity with the appreciative commerce beholders have with artworks; that is, aesthetic capacity is associated with the contemplative response, the belief being that artworks have the capacity, par excellence, to induce aesthetic experience in a properly pre- pared beholder [H. Osborne, The Art of Appreciation (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970) pp. 16-37; M. C. Beardsley, In Defense of Aesthetic Value, Proc. and Addresses, Amer. Philosophical Assoc. 52, 723 (1979)].

2. If an artwork performs the function of inducing aesthetic experience, then it is important to know how it does this. It does so by virtue of its various elements, relations, qualities and meanings (when there are such). Many of the qualities of artworks have the status of what Moerman calls illusions, namely, illusions of space and of movement, not to mention a range of other qualities commonly referred to a work's physiognomic, emotional or expressive features. I assume it is fairly clear what he means when he uses the term illusion. Illusions by another name are virtual properties, that is, nonliteral properties that may be metaphorically ascribed to artworks but that artworks cannot possess. While that may be, it was precisely such virtual properties that in the 1960s and 1970s certain conceptual artists grew impatient with and attempted to banish from their works. Harold Osborne, in his new interpretation of 20th-century art, suggests that perhaps this move by conceptual artists was based on a misunderstand- ing of image-making. He points out that there is nothing unnatural or unauthentic about virtual properties, nor is anyone fooled when they come across them in artworks. He suggests that perhaps talk about such properties as illusory prompted the tendency to question their artistic integrity. Still further, if by the term illusory one implies something deceptive, again there is nothing deceptive about most virtual properties [H. Osborne, Abstraction and Artifice in Twentieth- Century Art (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) pp. 183 -184]. I have no wish to exorcise the term illusion from the




Northants, England






2. If an artwork performs the function of inducing aesthetic experience, then it is important to know how it does this. It does so by virtue of its various elements, relations, qualities and meanings (when there are such). Many of the qualities of artworks have the status of what Moerman calls illusions, namely, illusions of space and of movement, not to mention a range of other qualities commonly referred to a work's physiognomic, emotional or expressive features. I assume it is fairly clear what he means when he uses the term illusion. Illusions by another name are virtual properties, that is, nonliteral properties that may be metaphorically ascribed to artworks but that artworks cannot possess. While that may be, it was precisely such virtual properties that in the 1960s and 1970s certain conceptual artists grew impatient with and attempted to banish from their works. Harold Osborne, in his new interpretation of 20th-century art, suggests that perhaps this move by conceptual artists was based on a misunderstand- ing of image-making. He points out that there is nothing unnatural or unauthentic about virtual properties, nor is anyone fooled when they come across them in artworks. He suggests that perhaps talk about such properties as illusory prompted the tendency to question their artistic integrity. Still further, if by the term illusory one implies something deceptive, again there is nothing deceptive about most virtual properties [H. Osborne, Abstraction and Artifice in Twentieth- Century Art (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) pp. 183 -184]. I have no wish to exorcise the term illusion from the




Northants, England






2. If an artwork performs the function of inducing aesthetic experience, then it is important to know how it does this. It does so by virtue of its various elements, relations, qualities and meanings (when there are such). Many of the qualities of artworks have the status of what Moerman calls illusions, namely, illusions of space and of movement, not to mention a range of other qualities commonly referred to a work's physiognomic, emotional or expressive features. I assume it is fairly clear what he means when he uses the term illusion. Illusions by another name are virtual properties, that is, nonliteral properties that may be metaphorically ascribed to artworks but that artworks cannot possess. While that may be, it was precisely such virtual properties that in the 1960s and 1970s certain conceptual artists grew impatient with and attempted to banish from their works. Harold Osborne, in his new interpretation of 20th-century art, suggests that perhaps this move by conceptual artists was based on a misunderstand- ing of image-making. He points out that there is nothing unnatural or unauthentic about virtual properties, nor is anyone fooled when they come across them in artworks. He suggests that perhaps talk about such properties as illusory prompted the tendency to question their artistic integrity. Still further, if by the term illusory one implies something deceptive, again there is nothing deceptive about most virtual properties [H. Osborne, Abstraction and Artifice in Twentieth- Century Art (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) pp. 183 -184]. I have no wish to exorcise the term illusion from the critical vocabulary, only to draw attention to some interesting recent commentary on the possible meanings of the term.

3. The connection between art and reality is another problem that animates efforts to understand art, and I do not feel that Moerman addresses its complexity. He apparently

critical vocabulary, only to draw attention to some interesting recent commentary on the possible meanings of the term.


critical vocabulary, only to draw attention to some interesting recent commentary on the possible meanings of the term.


holds some kind of communication hypothesis of art, even if he is not clear about what gets communicated in nonfigurative art. At the same time he holds to the fictional status of all art. This would seem to rule out the possibility of artworks conveying true information about reality. It seems to me that at some point he will have either to address the concept of artistic meaning and truth or to spell out in more detail his notion of artistic communication. So far as the connection between art and reality is concerned, this connection (con- strued as the problem of artistic autonomy and heteronomy) is the theme of an interesting new study [H. G. Blocker, The Philosophy of Art (New York: Scribner's, 1979)].

4. Finally, consider the following statement by Moerman: 'The artistic qualities of an artwork do not depend on a faithful imitation of reality but on the force with which artists express their intentions.' Considerable attention has been given in recent aesthetic writing to the concepts of expression and intention, as well as to the status of aesthetic qualities. Generally, it has been recommended that, because of a tendency to run them together, statements about the intentions of artists, statements about acts of artistic expression and statements about the artistic qualities of artworks themselves should be kept separate. Why? There is first of all the difficulty (in some instances the impossibility) of discovering an artist's intentions; and in the second instance an artwork may exhibit more or less of what an artist intended. It is also helpful to keep distinct a sense of expression that implies the act of making, or of emoting while making, and a sense that construes expression as a certain class of (expressive) qualities of artworks. Behind the distinguishing of the different senses of expression and intention are the variable roles these concepts play in artistic description, interpretation and evalua- tion. That is to say, one wants to be sure whether one is talking about process or product, intentions or qualities [J. Hospers, ed., Artistic Expression (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1971); S. Sicello, Mind and Art (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972)].

The above notes are in no way intended to offset the value of Moerman's course or of the Belgian aesthetic education requirement. Rather they are offered in the spirit of con- tinuing dialogue regarding the relations of theoretical analysis and practice, one of the commendable aims of Leonardo and of its editor Frank J. Malina.

Ralph A. Smith 361 Education Bldg. University of Illinois

Urbana, IL 61801, U.S.A.

ON A PAINTER'S VIEW OF SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND CREATIVITY

In my article in Leonardo 13, 143 (1980) I indicate the two distinct yet related kinds of situations in which artists might be 'at-one' with, or part of, their work. One kind is concerned with the phenomenological experience of painting. As David Carrier says in his letter in Leonardo 13, 262 (1980): 'One might contrast doing something while fully involved and doing that activity while remaining detached.' Here one can be absorbed or not in one's work, work being understood as the physical act of painting. Such absorption also concerns Joan Novosel-Beittel's 'dialogical focus' between the self and one's work mentioned in her letter in Leonardo 13, 351 (1980).

A second kind of situation involves a different conception of work, wherein life itself is the profession. Here work is concerned with the quality and direction of an artist's life and, through the appreciation of an artwork, the quality of life of its viewers. This requires 'a capacity for one to make reflective analysis of one's own activities',as Carrier puts it. In this case, artists may conceive of their physical act of painting as part of their larger life-work, but not exhausting it. Here artists, I believe, 'circumscribe' the physical act of painting and of their self-development as part of their life-work.

Both kinds of situations may interact, for the development









Both kinds of situations may interact, for the development









Both kinds of situations may interact, for the development of one's artworks may affect the direction of one's self- development, and a self-development attitude may affect one's artworks. Indeed, the emergent features of each case

of one's artworks may affect the direction of one's self- development, and a self-development attitude may affect one's artworks. Indeed, the emergent features of each case

of one's artworks may affect the direction of one's self- development, and a self-development attitude may affect one's artworks. Indeed, the emergent features of each case

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