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O N C O M M E R C I A L A V I A T I O N S A F E T Y

ISSUE 67 THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THEUNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN 1355-1523

SUMMER 2007

The Official Publication ofTHE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ISSN: 1355-1523 SUMMER 2007 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY

contentsFOCUS is a quarterly subscription journaldevoted to the promotion of best practises inaviation safety. It includes articles, either originalor reprinted from other sources, related tosafety issues throughout all areas of airtransport operations. Besides providinginformation on safety related matters, FOCUSaims to promote debate and improvenetworking within the industry. It must beemphasised that FOCUS is not intended as asubstitute for regulatory information or companypublications and procedures.

Editorial Office:Ed PaintinThe Graham SuiteFairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey. GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195e-mail: admin@ukfsc.co.ukWeb Site: www.ukfsc.co.ukOffice Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday

Advertisement Sales Office:UKFSCThe Graham Suite,Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195email: admin@ukfsc.co.ukWeb Site: www.ukfsc.co.ukOffice Hours: 0900 - 1630 Monday - Friday

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FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose ofimproving flight safety and, unless copyright isindicated, articles may be reproduced providingthat the source of material is acknowledged.

Opinions expressed by individual authors or inadvertisements appearing in FOCUS are thoseof the author or advertiser and do notnecessarily reflect the views and endorsementsof this journal, the editor or the UK Flight SafetyCommittee.

While every effort is made to ensure theaccuracy of the information contained herein,FOCUS accepts no responsibility for anyerrors or omissions in the information, or itsconsequences. Specialist advice should alwaysbe sought in relation to any particularcircumstances.

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Editorial 2

Chairman’s Column 3

Club328 4by Derek Murphy

Preventing Wheel/Brake-Area Fires 8by Brian Webber

Fuel Conservation Strategies 11by Bill Roberston

UKFSC Members List 14

Safety in Numbers 16by Paul Spooner

Fly on the right 18by Alex Fisher GAPAN

A view of Flight Data Monitoring 20by Simon Searle

Drinking and Flying just don’t mix 21

New UK legislation and criminal penalties for air carriers 23by Sue Barham

Seminar 24

Front Cover Picture: A Dornier 328 on the stand at Southampton International Airport

Editorial

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More Effort Needed

Not a day goes by when I do not askmyself; “Are we really making aviation any safer?”

Safety professionals all over the world are working hard to improve the aviationsafety statistics and yet when you readthe various safety magazines it is difficultnot to have doubts.

Perhaps it is because the material weread regularly always tends to be aboutincidents and accidents and so there islittle reinforcement of the positive effectsthat safety related work is having.

In general terms aviation safety is definitelyimproving. So, what areas remain aconcern to aviation safety managers?

Top of our list are level busts. There are fartoo many aircraft that through one reasonor another, bust the level that they arecleared to. The reasons for this vary widelybut in spite of raising the awareness of thisproblem the number of level bustscontinues to increase. Human factors arecited as the main cause but in spite of allour efforts to raise the awareness ofaircrew, they still fail to change theirbehaviour. What do we have to do to getthe message across?

Runway incursions in Europe appear tobe on the increase. Aircrew and groundcrew still do not pay sufficient attention to the radio and therefore enter the activerunway whilst it is occupied by anotheraircraft. We continue to try to raise theawareness of this problem but for somereason we are not able to get themessage through to those who operateon the runways and taxiways. Do weneed to have a major disaster beforepilots sit up and take notice?

The quality of radio transmissions leavesa lot to be desired. Because of this, a number of incidents occur, that shouldnot normally present themselves. Some ofthe difficulties are caused by (a) one aircrafttaking the clearance of another (b) failure toread back clearances correctly (c) readingback the clearance correctly but then takingthe wrong action (d) failing to make contact

when handed over from one controller to another (e) making calls on the wrongfrequencies. Most of these problems couldbe avoided by listening attentively andwriting down the clearances so they couldbe read back and action taken correctly.Have we been too quick off the mark inmoving away from a manual system to an automated one?

Radio congestion has become a majorconcern. Some of this congestion couldbe alleviated by paying more attention to the radio procedures and making sure the transmission is correct the first time.National and regional accents also affectthe clarity of radio transmissions.

Poor decision making and poor captaincyalso give rise for concern. These daysthere seems to be an ever shorter timefrom pilot qualification to becomingCaptain. This means that in general theexperience of some Captains is less. Theseyoung and less experienced Captains arethen responsible for monitoring andmentoring young First Officers. If you donot have much experience to pass on thenit is unlikely the First Officer will learn much.Fortunately the training in mostorganisations is good and therefore someof these issues are overcome bycomprehensive training. This does notnecessarily help with decision making.

The problem does not necessarily lie with the aircrew. All too often aircraft are damaged on the ramp and theperpetrator fails to notify anyone of thedamage caused. The result of this andpotential for an accident does not bearthinking about. There is a very real needto create the correct work environment so that those who cause the damage are not reluctant to come forward andreport it. This sector of the aviationindustry is under pressure to cut its costto win contracts. The airlines are continuallysqueezing them for better prices. Oftentheir employees are poorly paid and thereis not sufficient money to ensure propertraining. It is therefore no wonder that theycause damage and fail to report it.

The short term gains achieved duringcontract negotiation are far outweighed by the damage caused to aircraft and the potential for an accident. For somereason we seem unable to interest thecompany accountants in this matter.

The lack of suitable qualified engineers is a further cause for concern. Aircraftengineering is no longer attractive to youngschool leavers. You can get a better paidand more comfortable job working in the IT sector. Young people do not find shiftwork in the cold and wet very attractive.Many qualified aircraft engineers have leftthe industry for other employment.

The result is that with fewer qualifiedengineers the working practices arechanging. Fortunately the aircraftmanufacturers are making aircraft that areeasier to maintain and so the improvementson the one hand is countering the lack ofskill on the other. However this trend cannot continue indefinitely. Eventually we willget to the point where we will have aproblem occurring that will go unchallengedby an engineer.

The introduction of the low cost carrierhas not done much to help with any ofthe above. Conventional carriers aretrying to compete but their cost model isnot the same and therefore cutting staffand trimming budgets does nothing toimprove safety.

If we intend to get on top of these safetyissues and not just pay lip service to safetythen we need to be making far more effortto ensure that these areas are addressed.

Chairman’s Column

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This is my last column as Chairman. It hasbeen a very interesting and enjoyable 12months providing me with an insight intoareas that while certainly appreciated didnot loom large on my radar.

It was this thought that made me considerwhat else I could be missing. Indeed,what else could we be missing as anindustry, to further improve safeoperations. How do we resource, identifyand analyse our future safety demands.

Many of our “life” decisions should bebased on what was done previously byothers in similar circumstances. We doneed to review; we do need to look back.Developments in safety is in manyrespects based on not repeating thesame event time after time, recalling the old adage “there are no newaccidents, only new people”.

The answer may lie in looking at what we did in the past.

From the very beginning accidents were a product of aircraft development.Improved design, international rules andregulations has improved safety to anacceptable level. However, we shouldremind ourselves that 2007 has not beena particularly good start, where 7 majorlosses have killed some 250 people.

The cause of these accidents have yet tobe determined; but human error is always

a factor. Improvements have, over time“designed out” almost all mechanical and system reliability problems. As anexample, just look at engine reliabilitythese days; unbelievable low rates ofremoval and the ability to absorb damageand continue to operate is commonplace. So all that remains is how to dealwith human error, the cause of over 85%of all accidents.

To further improve our performance, the same effort that was applied tosystem development is needed.Reducing the cause of human error willrequire a greater commitment in terms of resources equal to and perhapsgreater than those expended to obtainimprovements in systems.

Having been successful in designing out system difficulties, how on earth canwe design out our inbuilt human factorcomplexities? Sadly, there is no easyanswer and many of the good and thegreat continue to study this aspect withfar better knowledge than I have. But as a first step we need to reducecomplacency, improve safety awareness,through an in depth knowledge of risk.

Surely, safety is a sub-set of risk so bylooking at risk rather than safety mayprovide us with the answer to identifyingthe root cause of the terribly complicatedand complex issue of trying tounderstand why we do the things we do.

If you agree with me that the next big stepto improve safety and safe operation is“people based” then surely, improvementsin the way we train our people is key.Greater efforts are required from selectionto recruitment and by the way, retention of our most valuable asset our people. Our safety seminar this October is entitledTechnical Innovation and Human ErrorReduction, I strongly suggest you attend.

So let’s look back at what we did as anindustry to improve system reliability anduse the lessons learnt to take us to the nextphase of improving safety by fullyunderstanding the complexities of humanerror through a thorough knowledge of risk.

Fly safe.

Look Both Waysby Ian Crowe, Willis

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE OBJECTIVESUK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE OBJECTIVES

■ To pursue the highest standards of aviation safety.

■ To constitute a body of experienced aviation flight safety personnel available for consultation.

■ To facilitate the free exchange of aviation safety data.

■ To maintain an appropriate liaison with other bodies concerned with aviation safety.

■ To provide assistance to operators establishing and maintaining a flight safety organisation.

In recent years there has been a markedincrease in the number of passengerschoosing to take advantage of theconvenience and flexibility offered byprivate jet travel.

As commercial air travel generallybecomes an increasingly less enjoyableexperience, especially in light of the recentterror threats and the need to be morestringent on check in procedures, morebusiness travellers are turning to privatecharter. Being unable to carry onboardlaptops, mobiles and blackberries in theinitial week of the tight security after theterrorist threat in August 06 proved asource of distress for many of them and aprompt to look at a new service.

In 2006 some 850 new jets were deliveredto customers. In the years ahead thisnumber will get higher as the new breed ofVery Light Jets (VLJs) enter the market. Asignificant shift is the amount of businessjet travel expansion in the Rest of Worldcatching up with the USA, its traditionalmarket. Europe alone is expected to havea total share of 16% of worldwide aircraftdeliveries over the next five years.

As the economy grows globally, businessjets have become an ever importantbusiness tool. Almost every company inthe industry claims to have the best safetystandards. But how can a customer reallydetermine what defines standards?

When it comes to providing clients withsafe, professional aviation services,Club328 is one of the best. Safety startslong before take-off and at Club328 thesafety of clients and staff is paramount,forming the foundation of everything theydo. The new technology aircraft and strictpilot training schedule along with stringentmaintenance and operating proceduresensure the safest operating environment. New CEO Elaine Young explains that

Club328 “have the commitment andresources to ensure that safety is nevercompromised. We genuinely believe in ahands on approach, adding value everystep of the way for a select group ofclients. We are not the largest and wechoose not to be. This gives us the abilityto maintain the best dispatch reliability,customer service and safety record of anycompany in the Private jet sector”.

There are obvious safety implications inthat private air charter is synonymous withsecurity, confidentiality and sensitivity. Youalmost certainly know the passengerprofiles or the person in the next seat! Aspart of its service Club328 uses aspecialist security company where thecustomer feels that such services arewarranted. The Middle East and EasternEurope provide destinations well withinthe reach of the company’s aircraft andthe provision of discrete, non-invasivesecurity personnel, all ex-military andtrained to the exacting standards of theBritish Special Forces, does much toprovide peace of mind to business, VIP,and celebrity passengers.

Club328 aims to deliver a discrete travelservice tailored exactly to the needs of thecustomer, even to the extent of a redcarpet if necessary! Its crews are trainedthat after the obvious priority of air safetythe client is the most important factor. Theaircraft Captain is required to meet his/herclients landside and ensure that their

passage to the aircraft via security,customs and immigration checks is asseamless as possible. In the meantimethe rest of the crew are required to checkall the organisational niceties of thejourney ready for an immediate start oncethe doors are closed.

Private charter has the appeal of flyinglocally. There are dedicated businessaviation airports such as Northholt,London Biggin Hill and Farnborough inthe UK and some 2,000 private airfields inFrance and Germany alone. The benefitsof using Cannes or St Tropez over Nice,where the scheduled airlines go, areclear. Club328 works with selected FBO’s,local airport authorities, law enforcementand security officials to determine whetheradditional security measures arenecessary to ensure clients peace ofmind when flying to any selected airfield.

Club328 is based at SouthamptonInternational Airport and caters to a widevariety of clientele from private clients,businesses, and entertainmentpersonalities to heads of state. It operatesRaytheon Premier 1 light jets, Dornier328-300 corporate jets and the ever-popular Hawker 800 series. The aircreware very experienced in the industry and,are drawn from scheduled airlines, themilitary and from other corporateoperators. The company’s flightattendants too have all previously workedwith the major carriers at international and

Club328

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by Capt. Derek Murphy

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regional level. Above all Club328 operatesvery much as a team and if not flying allthe aircrew are actively involved in othercompany activities to help improve theservice. The company CEO, Elaine Young,joined in 2006 equipped with a broadportfolio of industry, commercial andoperational experience including seniorpositions with both easyJet and bmi. Topof Elaine’s priorities is safety and to thatend she not only chairs the monthlySafety Review Board but takes a veryactive part in ensuring that herresponsibilities as an AccountableManager are fully served.

“We never say that safety is a given andwe engender an open culture whichpromotes safety at all times”

This philosophy has worked in thecompany’s favour as it has a very lowturnover of flight crew. There is also a fineline between commercial expedience andsafety where there can only be onewinner. As a result some lucrative winterwork has been declined on safetygrounds, particularly to some of the more

marginal Alpine resorts. To their credit thecustomers are receptive to this point ofview and share Elaine’s premise that:“at Club328 we will do whatever we canto minimise any risk.”

The flight safety duties are shared atClub328 by Captain Derek Murphy whohas the epithet of Flight Safety Manager.Derek is an experienced captain and iswell known throughout the industry for hisparticipation in the UK Flight SafetyCommittee. He has added an evenstronger safety bias to the company team.This is vital as Club328 continues to grownot just in terms of regulatory compliancebut also in commercial terms. A companywith a good safety reputation is one withan advantage over its competitors.

Working with Jeppesens

In a relatively new development, Club328Operations Department now works handin hand at Southampton with operationspersonnel from international flightplanning specialists Jeppesens.

Jeppesens provides the trip planningadvice and solutions that enable Club328to offer the very best service. Efficient andaccurate international trip planning isessential for the operation. With theJeppesen system Club328 operationscan get decisions on unusual airfields,slots and overflight requests quickly.Rapid answers allow the prospectiveclients to be advised in quick time. Armedwith the Jeppesen information Club328talk through a flight booking with a clientand tailor a full itinerary including specialrequests for catering, entertainment andprovision for junior travellers. (The SonyPSP is invaluable in keeping childrenpleasantly occupied long after the noveltyof air travel has worn off!) Some clientscan be flexible, especially those lookingfor a short ski break who will occasionallyask Club328 for advice – even to proposea resort where there is a lot of snow!There are many airports which thecompany serves which are closer to thepopular ski resorts than the main hubairports of Zurich and Geneva. Chamberyis popular and Club328 also uses thesmall St Gallen Airport in Austria.

Club328’s Dornier 328, with its capacioushold, is very popular for group skiing andgolfing trips.

Trip planning

The saying "an ounce of prevention isworth a pound of cure" holds true in life as well as in air travel. All pilots will preparefor unexpected events by planningalternate options prior to every flight. They will take into account many factorsincluding weather, fuel, airport runwaylengths and the weight and balance of the aircraft. Jeppesens lends expertise to Club328 on itinerary and route planning;internet access to trip status and reports;overflight and landing permits en routecharge reports, airfield slots andcomputerised JetPlan flight plans.

Once the route is planned, the pilot will research alternate airports and routesand will be prepared with the necessarycharts, radio frequencies and airportinformation on hand. Route changesoften come at the expense of clients’time, and cause inconvenience. Theentire Club328 team will work diligently to minimise the impact of theseunplanned events, contacting FBO’s and operators and coordinating details(ie: ground transportation, catering) toaccommodate any schedule changes. All changes are accomplished diligentlyand always with safety at the forefront of decisions.

Club328 also delivers FlightWatchservices, in conjunction with Jeppesen;advising other operators of any planningrequirements from the obvious one offlight plan submission to Notam provision,airfield briefings, the provision of fuel andcrew accommodation and the vitalprovision of Met information.

Club328 and the future

Club328 is looking to expand its businesswith third party managed aircraft. It isunique in having a sister company at itsbase, Jet Engineering Support Services(JETS) which has European EASA 145approval to perform maintenance andtechnical services on the Dornier 328,Premier 1 and Hawker aircraft. JETS,founded two years ago, also supportsthird party customers and the hangar atSouthampton frequently contains a potpourri of aircraft in various states ofmaintenance. JETS is able to provideessential background on all Club328aircraft, including aircraft provenance,records and history data enhancingawareness and improving safety andmaintenance standards. Club328 onlyengages aircraft operated with thehighest safety standards; paralleling the

standards used by commercial airlines.The full time Safety & Standardsdepartment is dedicated to enhancingsafety and providing supervision andoversight to deliver the highest possiblestandards in all areas of its business.

From its beginnings in 2004 Club328 hasdeveloped an ethos of commercialdevelopment based on safety and a closeworking relationship with trusted serviceproviders. The client base grows by theday and the company sees itself in thenear future as one of the flagships of thecorporate aviation industry.

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in association with

Nigel Bauer & Associates

QUALITY MANAGEMENT FOR OPERATORSJAR-OPS Quality Systems, documentation & auditing

5 days - LGW - 03 Sep, 19 Nov 07Now in its 12th year, this course is still about using quality for safety and business

enhancement, with regulatory compliance as routine. Nigel Bauer’s IRCA certificatedInternal Auditor Training course is incorporated in the 5 days, set in an airline

environment. May be economically presented ‘in-company.’

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMSSMS training for air & ground operators

3 days - LGW - 26 Nov 07A working level course on Safety Management Systems from regulatory requirements through an emphasis on planning and implementation of risk management, to ERPs

and the Safety case. Also available in-company

Also available on demand:Auditing in an Operational Environment (3 days)

Audit Improvement Workshop (2 days)Quality for Senior Management (2 days)

For further details including In-Company courses and consultancy or auditing services please contact:

Shape Aviation Ltd:Tel +44 (0) 1780 721223 e-mail: info@shape.aero

Fax +44 (0) 1780 720032 url: www.shape.aero

Nigel Bauer & Associates:Tel +44 (0) 1243 778121 e-mail: info@nigelbauer.co.uk

Fax +44 (0) 1243 789121 url: www.nigelbauer.co.uk

safety notice

Produced by Division of Safety Effective Date: 09/05/07 Contact: Richard Schofield Tel: 01489 615310

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In response to a level bust reported as an Airprox in 2006 and following input from operators NATS has conducted a review of the use of ‘Expect’ clearances in the en-route airspace in the UK. CAP 413 Radiotelephony Manual does not include standard phraseology for passing or reading back ‘Expect’ clearances. In the absence of standard phraseology the controllers at some NATS units use the following phraseology:

“ABC123 descend FL310, expect FL250 level XXXXX”

All of the NATS en-route air traffic control centres have experienced level busts involving the use of an ‘Expect’ clearance. Input from operational staff and pilots has confirmed that there are a number of occasions when a clearance including an ‘Expect’ level causes confusion and/or may not be correctly read back. It appears that it is the inclusion of two flight levels in the same transmission that is giving rise to the misunderstanding.

The NATS review has concluded that:

• The use of ‘Expect’ clearances is valid when managing sector workload

• There are concerns with the routine use of ‘Expect’ clearances

• The commonly used phraseology does not conform to Human Factors advice which is that where an instruction contains an executive and a conditional element, the executive element should be transmitted last. This is already the case with conditional clearances around a runway.

NATS has determined that the phraseology for ‘Expect’ clearances should be standardised.

Standard Phraseology

From the 1st of June 2007 when an ‘Expect’ level clearance is passed it shall be used in the following standardised form:

“ABC123 expect FL200 level by XXXXX, descend (now) FL280”

The word ‘now’ is optional. Pilots are requested to read back the clearance in the order in which it is passed and to seek confirmation from ATC if any doubt exists about the cleared level.

NATS controllers have been advised that:

• They should be selective about when they use ‘Expect’ clearances, should not use it as a matter of routine and that it may not be appropriate for all pilots.

• Where the expect level phraseology is used, controllers should be vigilant in listening to the readback and in carefully monitoring the descent or climb of the aircraft.

EXT 1/2007 Use of ‘Expect’ Clearances and Phraseology

While most wheel/brake-area fires pose no serious threat to the airplane orpassengers, they can be alarming enoughto cause cabin evacuations and costlydelays. This article describes properwheel/ axle greasing techniques duringwheel and brake maintenance andhighlights the importance of not allowingflammable solvents to collect in wheelheat shields during cleaning proceduresto minimize the potential for wheel/break-area fires.

Many airlines, particularly those operatingcarbon-braked airplanes, have experiencedwheel/brake-area fires due to excessivegrease buildup, incorrect grease usage, thepresence of flammable cleaning solvents inwheel heat shields, or the accumulation ofhydraulic fluid on the brake. In the rareinstances when wheel/brake-area fires dooccur, the grease, solvent, or hydraulic fluidis ignited following landing by heatgenerated by the application of the brakes.

Wheel/brake-area fires are occasionallyreported following normal operating braketemperature condition landings (see fig. 1).The cause of the fires can usually beattributed to the ignition of excessive greasethat has accumulated on the axle in thebrake assembly cavity (see fig. 2). Inaddition, some wheel heat shields canretain residual cleaning fluids after beingsaturated with flammable solvents during

maintenance. Wheel/brake-area fires havealso been reported due to ignition ofhydraulic fluid associated with leaks orhydraulic system maintenance (see fig. 3).While these fires generally do not causemajor damage to the airplane or endanger

passengers and crew, they can promptevacuations that can lead to injuries,temporarily take the airplane out of service,and result in costly repairs. Yet mostwheel/brake-area fires can be avoided byfollowing some simple procedures:

■ Clean all grease from the axle beforereinstalling the wheel and/or brakeassembly.

■ Use only approved greases in smallquantities at the points where thewheel and brake will contact the axle.

■ Follow wheel supplier ComponentMaintenance Manual (CMM) cautionsregarding the use of flammablecleaners on wheel heat shields,including not using dunk tanks on“sealed” heat shields.

What Causes Wheel/Brake-Area Fires

Wheel/brake-area fires are typically caused

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by Brian Webber, Mechanical Systems Engineer, Service Engineering

Preventing Wheel/Brake-Area Fires

Figure 1: Brake-area fire events since 1996 (Excluding dragging brakes, brakemisassembly, or wheel bearing seizures)

Figure 2: Removed brake following fire from excessive amounts of grease

ALTHOUGH THESE FIRES DON’T CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE, THEY CAN LEADTO DELAYS, ADDED MAINTENANCE COSTS, AND EVACUATIONS.

ALTHOUGH THESE FIRES DON’T CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE, THEY CAN LEADTO DELAYS, ADDED MAINTENANCE COSTS, AND EVACUATIONS.

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by a buildup of grease on the axle duringservice or the application of excessiveamounts of grease during wheel/tirechanges and brake installations, and thepresence of a heat source, namely thebrakes. During brake lubrication, excessivegrease can also collect in the cavitybetween the piston housing and torquetube pedestal bushing due to a damagedor missing grease seal or excessivelubrication through the brake pistonhousing axle bushing lubrication fitting.

Wheel/brake-area fires have also beenlinked to cleaning fluids retained in theheat shield. Some heat shield designscan absorb cleaning solvents, causingthe shield to become saturated withflammable cleaning fluids if they aresprayed or immersed during cleaning.During normal braking on landing, thetemperatures in the main landing gearwheel/brake area can cause grease andresidual cleaning fluids in these areas to

ignite. Carbon brakes normally operate atslightly higher temperatures than steelbrakes, which explains why nearly all reportsare associated with carbon brakes. Thesetypes of wheel/brake-area fires usuallyoccur within the first few cycles following awheel or brake change, or followinglubrication of the piston-housing greasefitting when a grease seal is damaged ormissing. Fires due to leaking hydraulicsystem components can occur immediatelyfollowing fluid spillage onto a hot brake.

Preventing Wheel/Brake-Area Fires

Because their cause is well known,wheel/brake-area fires can be preventedby following proper maintenanceprocedures. These include:

■ Cleaning existing grease from theaxle. When removing or installingwheels and brakes, it is essential to

remove old grease from the axle (seefig. 4), Because cleaning fluids andsolvents can damage carbon brakesand titanium components, a dry ragmust be used to remove the grease.

■ Removing old grease from the axleevery time wheels and brakes areinstalled or removed.

■ Using only approved greases in smallquantities. While it is important tohave adequate lubrication within thewheel bearings, only a thin layer ofgrease is necessary at the wheel/axleinterface for wheel/tire installations.Similarly, only a thin layer of greaseneeds to be applied to the interfacesurfaces of the brake and axle sleeveswhen installing brakes (see fig. 5).When applying grease to the axlebushings on the brake assembly, it isimportant to completely fill thegrooves in the bushings with grease.

■ Being certain that the brake axlebushing grease seal (on airplanes thathave them) is not damaged beforeinstalling brakes and that the greaseseal is properly installed per theapplicable Airplane MaintenanceManual (AMM) or CMM instructions.

■ Following wheel supplier CMMcautions when cleaning wheel heatshields. The main wheel heat shieldmust be cleaned by following themanufacturer’s recommendedmaintenance procedures in theappropriate supplier CMM. Spraying or immersing certain heat-shield designs in cleaning fluids can trap residual fluids withinthe shield, which can lead to asubsequent fire. The wheel heatshields should be removed accordingto the supplier CMM during wheel-cleaning operations.

Additional Information

The recommendations in this article areprovided in addition to the standard AMMstatements to use only approved “wheelbearing” greases and not apply excessiveamounts of grease during main gear wheel

Figure 3: Removed brake following fire from hydraulic fluid leak

and brake installations. This informationcan be found in AMM chapters 12 and 32.The specific wheel and brake componentcleaning maintenance practices can befound in the applicable supplier CMM.

Boeing also updated a Maintenance Tip inJuly 2006 titled “Main Landing GearWheel/Brake-Area Fires” that addressesthis issue (707 MT 32-002 R1, 727 MT 32-002 R1,737 MT 32-010 R1,747 MT 32-045R1 ,747-400 MT 32-022 R1 ,757 MT 32-016R1 ,767 MT 32-026 R1,777 MT 32-021 R1).

Training Aid

Boeing has developed a training aid tohelp maintenance personnel visualize andunderstand proper wheel and axle greasingand cleaning techniques. This aid is a 12-minute digital video disc (DVD) titled “MainLanding Gear Wheel/Brake Area FirePrevention: Maintenance Tips.” Boeingrecommends showing this DVD toengineering and maintenance personnelassociated with landing gear duties duringcrew meetings. This DVD (VPS48559) isavailable from Boeing Data and ServicesManagement at csd.boecom@boeing.com

Summary

Wheel/brake-area fires, while usually not serious themselves, can result in minorairplane damage, possible injuries to crew members and passengers whenevacuating an airplane, and flight delays.Most wheel/brake-area fires, however, canbe avoided simply by following propermaintenance procedures for cleaning and greasing components. For moreinformation, please contact Brian Webber at brian.k.webber@boeing.com

This article is reprinted from AERO Magazinewith the permission of the Boeing Company.

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Figure 4: Essential step: existing (old) grease being removed

Figure 5: Thin layer of grease being applied to brake/axle sleeves

This article is the first in a series explorlng fuel

conservation strategies.

Used appropriately, the cost index (CI) feature of the flight managementcomputer (FMC) can help alrlinessignificantly reduce operating costs.However, many operators don't take full advantage of this powerful tool.

Cost Index Defined

The CI is the ratio of the time-related costof an airplane operation and the cost offuel. The value of the CI reflects therelative effects of fuel cost on overall tripcost as compared to time-related directoperating costs.

Time cost ~ $/hr In equation form: CI=

Fuel cost ~ cents/lb

The range of allowable cost indices isshown in Figure 1. The flight crew entersthe company-calculated CI into thecontrol display unit (CDU) of the FMC.The FMC then uses this number andother performance parameters tocalculate economy (ECON) climb, cruise,and descent speeds.

For all models, entering zero for the CIresults in maximum range airspeed andminimum trip fuel. This speed scheduleignores the cost of time.

Conversely, if the maximum value for CI isentered, the FMC uses a minimum timespeed schedule. This speed schedule

calls for maximum flight envelope speeds,and ignores the cost of fuel (see fig. 2).

Cost Index Usage

In practice, neither of the extreme CIvalues is used; instead, many operatorsuse values based on their specific coststructure, modified if necessary forindividual route requirements. As a result,CI will typically vary among models, andmay also vary for individual routes.

Clearly, a low CI should be used when fuelcosts are high compared to other operatingcosts. The FMC calculates coordinatedECON climb (see fig. 5), cruise, anddescent speeds (see fig. 6) from theentered CI. To comply with Air TrafficControl requirements, the airspeed usedduring descent tends to be the mostrestricted of the three flight phases. The descent may be planned at ECONMach/Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) (based on the CI) or a manually enteredMach/CAS. Vertical Navigation (VNAV) limitsthe maximum target speed as follows:

■ 737-300/-400/-500/-600/-700/-800/-900:The maximum airspeed is velocitymaximum operating/Mach maximumoperating (VMO/MMO) (340 CAS/.82Mach). The FMC-generated speedtargets are limited to 330 CAS indescent to provide margins to VMO. TheVMO value of 340 CAS may be enteredby the pilot to eliminate this margin.

■ 747-400: 349 knots (VMO/MMO minus16 knots) or a pilot-entered speedgreater than 354 knots (VMO/MMOminus 11 knots).

■ 757: 334 knots (VMO/MMO minus 16knots) or a pilot-entered speedgreater than 339 knots (VMO/MMOminus 11 knots).

11

Fuel Conservation Strategies: Cost Index Explainedby Bill Robertson, Senior Safety Pilot, Flight Operations

VARIABLE FUEL PRICES, FUELTANKERING, AND FUEL HEDGING

MAKE THE COST INDEXCALCULATIONS COMPLICATED.

VARIABLE FUEL PRICES, FUELTANKERING, AND FUEL HEDGING

MAKE THE COST INDEXCALCULATIONS COMPLICATED.

12

■ 767: 344 knots (VMO/MMO minus 16knots) or a pilot-entered speedgreater than 349 knots (VMO/MMOminus 11 knots).

■ 777: 314 knots (VMO/MMO minus 16knots) or a pilot-entered speedgreater than 319 knots (VMO/MMOminus 11 knots).

FMCs also limit target speeds appropriatelyfor initial buffet and limit thrust.

Figure 3 illustrates the values for a typical757 flight

Factors Affecting Cost Index

As stated earlier, entering a CI of zero inthe FMC and flying that profile would resultin a minimum fuel flight and entering amaximum CI in the FMC and flying thatprofile would result in a minimum timeflight. However, in practice, the CI used byan operator for a particular flight falls withinthese two extremes. Factors affecting theCI include time-related direct operatingcosts and fuel costs.

Time Cost

The numerator of the Cl is often calledtime-related direct operating cost (minusthe cost of fuel). Items such as flight crewwages can have an hourly costassociated with them, or they may be afixed cost and have no variation withflying time. Engines, auxiliary power units,and airplanes can be leased by the houror owned, and maintenance costs can beaccounted for on airplanes by the hour,by the calendar, or by cycles. As a result,each of these items may have a directhourly cost or a fixed cost over a calendarperiod with limited or no correlation toflying time.

13

In the case of high direct time costs, theairline may choose to use a larger CI tominimize time and thus cost. In the casewhere most costs are fixed, the CI ispotentially very low because the airline isprimarily trying to minimize fuel cost.Pilots can easily understand minimizingfuel consumption, but it is more difficult tounderstand minimizing cost whensomething other than fuel dominates.

Fuel Cost

The cost of fuel is the denominator of theCI ratio. Although this seemsstraightforward, issues such as highlyvariable fuel prices among the operatinglocations, fuel tankering, and fuel hedgingcan make this calculation complicated.

A recent evaluation at an airline yieldedsome very interesting results, some ofwhich are summarized in Figure 4. A rigorous study was made of the optimalCI for the 737 and MD-80 fleets for thisparticular operator. The optimal CI was determined to be 12 for all 737models, and 22 for the MD-80.

The table (see fig. 4) shows the impact ontrip time and potential savings over thecourse of a year of changing the CI for atypical 1,OOO-mile trip. The potential annualsavings to the airline of changing the CI isbetween US$4 million and $5 million a yearwith a negligible effect on schedule.

Summary

CI can be an extremely useful way tomanage operating costs. Because CI is a function of both fuel and nonfuelcosts, it is important to use itappropriately to gain the greatest benefit.Appropriate use varies with each airline,and perhaps for each flight. Boeing FlightOperations Engineering assists airlines'flight operations departments incomputing an accurate CI that will enablethem to minimize costs on their routes.For more information, please contactFlightOps.Engineering@boeing.com.

This article is reprinted from AERO Magazine

with the permission of the Boeing Company.

Figure 5: The effect of cost index when climbing to cruise altitudeA cost index of zero minimizes fuel to climb and cruise to a common point in space

Figure 6: The effect of cost index when decendingA cost index of zero minimizes fuel between a common cruise point and a common endof descent point

14

Full members

ChairmanCTC Aviation Services LtdCapt. Robin Berry

Vice-ChairmanMonarch AirlinesCapt. Tony Wride

TreasurerAir ContractorsCapt. Anthony Barrett-Jolley

Non Executive Board MemberRAeSPeter Richards

Aegean AirlinesCapt. Dimitris Giannoulatos

Aer ArannCapt. Paddy Callahan

Aer LingusTom Curran

AIG AviationJonathan Woodrow

AirclaimsPaul Clark

Air ContractorsCapt. Anthony Barrett-Jolley

Air MauritiusCapt. Francois Marion

Air SeychellesBen L’Esperance

ALAEDave Morrison

Astraeus LtdJohn Denman

BA CityflyerKeith Manktelow

BAE SYSTEMS Reg. A/CAlistair Scott

BALPACarolyn Evans

Belfast Intl. AirportAlan Whiteside

BMEDNicholas Young

bmi regionalPeter Cork

British AirwaysSteve Hull

British InternationalCapt. Terry Green

CAADave Lewis - MRPSSarah Doherty - Safety Data Dept.David McCorquodale - Flight Operations

CargoLux AirlinesMattias Pak

Cathay Pacific AirwaysRick Howell

CHC ScotiaMike Whitcombe

CityJetCapt. Tom Murphy

Club328Capt. Derek Murphy

Cranfield Safety &Accident Investigation CentreDr. Simon Place

CTC Aviation Services LtdCapt. Robin Berry

CTC Service Aviation (LAD)Andrew Cripps

DARARichard Allen

DHL AirPeter Naz

Eastern Airways UK LtdCapt. Jacqueline Mills

easyJetCapt. Lance Jordan

European Air Transport NV/SAVincent Lambotte

European Aviation Air CharterRon Hendrick

EVA AirwaysTBA

Excel AirwaysGraeme Stagg

First Choice AirwaysPhilip Luxton

FlightLineBob King

Flight Data Services Ltd Capt. Simon Searle

FlyglobespanCapt. Steve Rixson

Flyjet LtdJonathan Dalgliesh

Members ofTHE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ADVERTISING IN THIS MAGAZINEADVERTISING IN THIS MAGAZINE

Focus is a Quarterly Publication which has ahighly targeted readership of 32,000 Aviation

Safety Professionals worldwide.

If you or your company would like toadvertise in Focus please contact:

Focus is a Quarterly Publication which has ahighly targeted readership of 32,000 Aviation

Safety Professionals worldwide.

If you or your company would like toadvertise in Focus please contact:

Advertisment Sales Office:

UKFSC, The Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport,Chobham, Woking, Surrey. GU24 8HX.

Tel: +44 (0)1276 855193admin@ukfsc.co.uk

15

GAPANCapt. Alex Fisher

GATCOTBA

GB AirwaysCapt. Rob Alabaster

Goodrich Actuation Systems LtdGary Clinton

Gulf Air CoCapt. Manin Al Said

Heathrow Airport LtdTim Hardy

Hong Kong Dragon Airlines LtdKwok Chan

Independent Pilots AssociationPeter Jackson

Irish Aviation AuthorityHarry McCrink

Jet2.comDavid Thombs

Libyan AirwaysEngr. Tarek Derbassi

Limit AviationJerry Flaxman

LoganairCapt. Sarah Hendry

London City AirportGary Hodgetts

Lufthansa Consulting GmbHTBA

Malaysia AirlinesCapt. Ahmed Zuraidi

Manchester Airport plcSimon Butterworth

Monarch AirlinesCapt. Tony Wride

MyTravelChris King

NATSRichard Schofield

NetJetsCapt. Catherine Thompson

Panasonic AvionicsStefan Suri

Penauille ServisairMike Cooper

PrivatAirJan Peeters

Qatar AirwaysTBA

Rolls-Royce PlcPhillip O’Dell

RyanairCapt. George Davis

SBACMartyn Graham - SecretariatVic Lockwood - FR Aviation

ScotAirwaysNigel McClure

Shell AircraftGrant Campbell

Singapore AirlinesTBA

Smiths AerospaceNigel Moody

SR Technics Ireland LtdFrank Buggie

Superstructure GroupEddie Rogan

TAG Aviation (UK) LtdMalcolm Rusby

TAM Brazilian AirlinesCapt. Marco Castro

Thomas Cook AirlinesCapt. Roger Chandler

Thomsonfly LtdJez Last

Virgin Atlantic AirwaysJohn Dunne

WillisPeter Bull

Group members

bmiDavid Barry

bmi Eng.Willam Taylor

bmi babyJeremy Purry

Bond Offshore HelicoptersTony Duff

Bond Offshore Helicopters (Maint)John Crowther

Bristow HelicoptersCapt. Derek Whatling

Bristow Helicopters Eng.John Parker

EurocypriaCapt. Constantinos Pitsillides

Cyprus AirwaysAndreas Mateou

flybe.Neil Woollacott

flybe. Aviation ServicesSteve McNair

MODDASC Col. Steve Rowland-JonesDASC Eng. Wg Cdr Ian Woodhouse

QinetiQMaj. Mark Chivers

QinetiQ Eng.Keith Wigmore

RAeSPeter Richards

RAeS Eng.Jim Rainbow

Co-opted AdvisersAAIBCapt. Margaret Dean

CHIRPPeter Tait

GASCoJohn Thorpe

Legal AdvisorEdward SpencerBarlow Lyde & Gilbert

Royal Met. SocietyDr John Stewart

16

Safety in Numbers

Introduction

Situated in Prestwick, Scotland,Shanwick control provides a proceduralcontrol service to over 1400 flights dailyover the North Atlantic. Our boundariesstretch from approximately 10 degreeswest out to 30 degrees west, and fromlatitude 45 north to 61 north. That equatesto nearly 630,000 square miles ofairspace to control.

Daily there are two main flows of traffic.This is due to passenger demands, timezone differences and restrictions on nighttime landing. Westbounds normally flyduring the day and the eastbounds bynight. The majority of these flights arepacked into just a few hours, as is shownby the graph below.

One of the best ways to actively managethese flights is to produce a set of trackseach day, one for the westbounds andanother for the eastbounds. Where thetracks are, is dependant on the jet streamthat flows across the Atlantic. As there isno radar in the Atlantic Ocean, (radar canonly operate out to 250nm) Shanwick usesprocedural control. The controllersseparate aircraft based on flight level,position, time and speed. Prior to enteringShanwick’s airspace, the pilot will receivean oceanic clearance based on hisrequest, which must be read backcorrectly. The clearance contains therouting and level that the pilot must fly. Onentering the ocean, pilots are required toreport their position, level and subsequentpositions every 10 degrees of longitude.

In November 2006, Shanwick incollaboration with the Canadian Air Traffic

Service Provider, Nav Canada, successfullyintroduced a new computer system to aidcontrollers in separating aircraft. Thecontroller’s workstation has two screens.The left hand screen shows the strip displayand messages from the aircraft. The righthand screen is the geographical display.For the first time over the Atlantic,controllers now have a pictorial display ofwhere the aircraft should be.

Gross Navigation Errors

So what happens when a pilot’s positionreport does not match up with his actualclearance? The computer checks everyposition report, and any non-conformancesare highlighted to the controller. Thecontroller’s first action is to confirm whetheror not the pilot gave an incorrect position orlevel by mistake. If the pilot re-confirms hisincorrect report, then the controller will passthe correct clearance to the pilot for them toread back. This is called an Intervention toprevent a Gross Navigation Error. Lastyear there were 127 such interventions inthe North Atlantic.

If the pilot states he is flying to the correctposition but actually flies off course by 25nautical miles or more, then a GrossNavigation Error or GNE has occurred.Last year there were 32 GNEs in the North

Atlantic. It may not seem much, but in anincreasingly busier and more complexairspace, there is little room for error.

Investigations have established that mostGNEs and ATC interventions are the resultof flight-deck error. 80% of GNEs occurbecause the pilot flies his flight plan routerather than the clearance given. Mostreroutes issued by a controller are givenbecause another aircraft is already on theoriginal route.

So how can we mitigate against these errors?■ Correctly copy down the clearance.

Check for errors. Reprogram theFlight management system andagain check for errors.

■ Update the plotting chart in line withthe new clearance and plot yourposition 10 minutes after every 10degrees longitude.

■ When in the ocean, cross check theLong Range Navigation systems.

■ Clearly mark the master flight planand discard the others.

■ Fly the clearance.■ Crosscheck the flight management

system taking into account theexpanded co-ordinates. Remember55N 30W may have been incorrectlyinputted as 5530N. It has happenedon more than one occasion.

by Paul Spooner, Bank Supervisor, Shanwick Oceanic, NATS

17

Only if the above instructions areincorporated into your standardoperating procedures, and are carriedout every time you fly the ocean, willwe be able to reduce these errors.

Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP)

Introduced in 2004 by the North AtlanticSystems Planning Group, this procedurewas implemented to try and reduce thechances of a mid air collision by distributingaircraft laterally. This could be either from aGNE or a vertical height deviation.

Several years ago when aircraft’s navigationsystems were not entirely accurate, aircraftcould quite possibly be flying 2 or 3 milesoff track, therefore separating themselves.Nowadays, with aircraft flying with muchmore precision, aircraft on the same trackbut at different levels, are now stacked oneabove the other with no lateral separation. SLOP can be flown by all aircraft withautomatic offset programming capabilityand will reduce the risk of a vertical collisionby 67%. SLOP gives pilots the opportunityto fly either the centreline of a track, oreither, one or two miles right of track. It is atthe pilot’s discretion and does not requirean ATC clearance. Pilots should make theirchoice based on visual acquisition, TCASand communications with other aircraft.There is also no requirement to maintain aparticular offset for the whole flight.Full details of the procedure can be foundat http://www.nat-pco.org

Currently only 10% of aircraft are offsettingregularly, which means 90% of aircraft arestill flying the centreline. If an aircraft wereto have a GNE at your level or the aircraft

below suddenly climbs due turbulence,which offset would you rather be on.

And the Benefits to Airlines?

This is two fold. Firstly, by applying boththe procedures to prevent GNEs and flyingSLOP, there will be a significant increase insafety over the Atlantic Ocean. Secondly, ifthere is a significant increase in the usageof SLOP and a decrease in GNEs then wecan start to reduce our separations.Longitudinal separation is at present, 10 minutes flying time between aircraft. In 2008, subject to SLOP and GNEs, thiscould be reduced to as much as 5 minutesbetween pairs of ADS and FANS reportingaircraft. These could effectively double ourairspace capacity at prime flight levels and

provide more aircraft with economicallevels. Aircraft would also be more likely toobtain climbs whilst within our airspace.

NATS are committed to continuallyimproving safety, but we require your helpin order to achieve this.

When it comes to safety and economyPLEASE USE SLOP.

18

On 29 September 2006, A GOL B737-800 and a private Embraer Legacybusiness jet collided at FL360 some 200miles north of Brasilia, over the AmazonJungle. The Embraer’s left winglet hit the737’s left wing, and the 737 crashedkilling all on board. The Embraer wasluckier, and made a successfulemergency landing at the Cachimbo airbase.

Both aircraft were equipped withtransponders and TCAS, so how could ithave happened? But the technicalitiesdivert attention from a vastly moreimportant point: was it simply bad luckthat the aircraft were so close togetherhorizontally that they collided?

The answer, as everyone flying todayknows full well, is ‘No’. Thanks to GPS,horizontal accuracy worldwide is nowofficially less than a typical wingspan.There is no protective scatter, no fat left inthe solution (published accuraciesunderstate the problem: put two GPSreceivers together in the same place and,because they have the same ionosphericerrors, they will agree their position toonly a few metres). If you make a mistakein the vertical plane on a two-way airway,you can expect to find someone comingright for you at Mach 1.6.

We have been here before. In June 1999,a BA 747-400 and a Korean Airlines (KAL)747 came within an estimated wingspanof a mid air collision over China, while

both of them were responding to TCASalerts (the estimate came from the co-pilot’s remark that half the KAL 747 ‘filledP1’s DV window’, see fig 1). Extraordinarydetective work by BA engineer, AndrewRose, showed that a single wiring faultwould cause the failure of the altitudecomparison function. Andrew led KALengineering to a single bent connectorpin on the rear of the Transponder. Asubsequent undetermined error in KAL’saltimeter encoding was therefore notdetected, resulting in the intermittenterroneous transmission of own altitudedata to KAL’s TCAS equipment, and thatof other aircraft. The result was that thetwo TCAS units issued ResolutionAdvisories which brought the two aircrafttogether instead of separating them.

After such a close shave, BA naturallycarried out an investigation that resultedin a number of recommendations. In addition to several TCAS-specificissues, the final recommendation was that the issue of offset tracks should bepursued as a potential mitigation (the twoaircraft involved in this incident being onreciprocal tracks). Since 1999, BA isaware of at 8 TCAS incidents whereincorrect altimetry appears to be involved,five of which concerned aircraft pairs onreciprocal tracks. It is likely that this ismerely the tip of the iceberg, as manyother operators may not be able toidentify the problem.

It is obvious, however, that TCAS failuresare not the only possible source ofaltitude conflicts, though they do have theunique effect of both causing the errorand preventing its resolution by TCAS.Other potential errors include humanerrors in TCAS interpretation (e.g.Uberlingen), and ‘straightforward’ levelbusts. These can be due to simple errorsor misunderstandings, autopilotanomalies and turbulence. An example ofan incident involving both of the last twowas the Turkish Airlines A340 incident inOctober 2000, which suddenly left itsflight Level on a NAT track, narrowlymissing an A330 on the same track 1000ft above. The AAIB investigation (Bulletin6/2001) recommended:

a) 2000-68 - That the CAA takeforward a recommendation to theappropriate international bodies thatthey reconsider the need forcommanders to inform ATC of alllateral offset manoeuvres of less than2 nm in Oceanic airspace, irrespectiveof the reason for the manoeuvre.b) 2000-70 - That the CAA takeforward a recommendation to theappropriate International bodies toconsider standardising lateral trackoffset procedures which areindependent of wind direction.

In November 2000 ICAO issued StateLetter AN13 11-6.00 96 which recognisedthe problem and introduced guidelines forthe application of track offsets. These were

Fly on the right - A mid air mitigationby Alex Fisher GAPAN

Figure 2 Micro offsets could protect both opposite and same direction traffic.

Figure 1 ‘Half the KAL 747 filled the P1 DVwindow’ – a 747 on an adjacent standseen from the P2 seat.

confined, however, to ‘Remote or oceanic’airspace and to aircraft equipped withGNSS navigation. But it is obvious thatrisks are higher over land due to greatertraffic density and proportion of non-cruisetraffic. Over land, DME/DME gives highlyrepeatable results so that two FMSequipped aircraft can be expected tooverlap, as we all know; both the BA andthe KAL 747 were DME/DME FMSequipped. Serious thought needs to begiven widening the application of offsetprocedures. The AAIB’s recommendationsapply to all RVSM airspace.

‘Flying on the right’ is good, but it isn’tenough to protect against both oppositeand same direction traffic, we needrandom offsets too. But we cannot applyrandom offsets of more than a mile without

blundering into nearby routes…. Onesimple modification to the most commonFMS solves the problem of integratingoffsets in congested airspace: the ability to‘micro’ offset in steps of 0.1 nm. Mostcurrent FMS limits offsets to whole milevalues. The change would increase thenumber of random choices available by 10without eroding separation standards, seefig 2. Such a change would not be difficult;it should be added to future systems andbe available to present units throughupgrades. In fact the B737NG can alreadydo this, and there are lots of them around.

After the Uberlingen mid air, there wasimmediate action in ICAO (mandatingadherence to RAs). The silence after theBrazilian accident is therefore deafeningand puzzling.

Action:

■ Lobby your union, employer, andregulator to persuade ICAO to widenthe scope of the offset rule beyondthe oceans, and remove the Annex 2requirement to fly the centreline, andto specify future fit FMS capable ofmicro offsets.

■ If you are on a two way airway, fly onthe right, no more than 1 mile.

■ If you can randomly apply offsets in0.1 nm steps, do so on both one andtwo way routes.

1919

Offsets - Frequently raised Objections

This will introduce new errors Offsets are current technology and well protected (check yourflight manual for how the FMS prevents you from applying anoffset on the approach for instance)

Europe doesn’t have many two way routes No, but it has some, and anyway aircraft fly world wide.

Random routes offer better protection True, but the world doesn’t yet have a totally random route structure

Retrofit of micro capable FMS will be expensive Maybe, but who said retrofit is necessary? – there are aircraft(737NG) that are capable of micro offsets now, to the benefitof all. As more aircraft are able to fly micro offsets, theprotection just increases

This will increase controller workload Why? It will be invisible to the controllers; the pilot makes therandom choice of offset, not ATC

It would be better to eliminate two way airways and/or Good ideas, not incompatible with pilot selected offsets, butthey to code the routes to fly right of the nominal track. don’t protect same direction traffic.

Offsets are incompatible with low-RNP routes We should be so lucky as to have such things, until then, fly offsets.

The risk isn’t worth the effort I wish it were. In recent years there have been 3 well knownhead-on midairs (Canada, India and Brazil), and the risk can only increase (see main text)

20

Although this very effective safety tool has now been around for some years,Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) has onlycome into general use since it became an ICAO standard on the 1st January2005 and then only for aircraft with a maxTOW of over 27 tonnes. It is howeverinteresting to note that some states havedeclared a difference, delaying itsintroduction, in some cases indefinitely.

Unfortunately the weight limitation meansthat a number of operations fall throughthe net, with data not being captured on smaller aircraft. Experience also showsthat some operators with mixed fleets tendonly to include in their programmes thosemandatory aircraft that they operate. This decision is quite clearly made onfinancial grounds. The direct effect of this has to be that operators are forced to expect different standards on theirvarious fleets. Having said that it is alsointeresting to note that if an operator is a member of IATA or even wishes to join a code share with such a member, thedreaded IOSA (IATA Operational SafetyAudit) will very probably come into forceand within that there is a requirement forsome parallel form of monitoring forsmaller aircraft to be put in place. The following statement from the IOSAchecklist demonstrates this very clearly:

“ORG 3.3.13 The Operator shall have a flight data analysis programme that is non-punitive and contains adequatesafeguards to protect data sources. The programme shall include either:

i) a systematic download and analysisof electronically recorded aircraft flightdata, orii) a systematic acquisition, correlationand analysis of flight informationderived from a combination of someor all of the following sources:a) aircraft FDR readouts;b) confidential flight and cabin crewoperational safety reports;

c) flight and cabin crew interviews;d) quality assurance findings;e) flight and cabin crew evaluationreports;f) aircraft engineering andmaintenance reports.

(Note: this is a Parallel Conformity Optioneffective until 31 December 2008.)”

At this point it should be added that the probability of this expiry date beingextended or withdrawn completely is understood to be high.

Certainly the cost of this programme to an operator is not cheap both in manhours and financial terms, but in the termsof safety the benefits are enormous. The matter of man hours can be overcomeby outsourcing the analysis of data to athird party. It has to be said that there areadvantages and disadvantages to both anin-house and an outsourced programme.However at the end of the day the finalanalysis and resolution of an event mustlay with the operator.

Then there are the problems of ensuringpilot fraternity are dealt with fairly and inaccordance with the requirement of ICAOto ensure the programme is non-punitiveand data sources are adequatelysafeguarded. Where the pilot force isunder the umbrella of a union, terms forthe operation of the programme need tobe agreed with them. Even if no suchumbrella exists there is still a need to gainthe trust of the pilots and reduce theirconcern over this “spy in the sky”. Bestpractice indicates that some effectiveform of protocol is necessary.

Apart from observing whether or not pilotsare operating an aircraft in accordancewith company Standard OperatingProcedures (SOPs), the programme canbe very useful for deciding if those SOPsare actually achieving their aim or ifchanges are needed. A particular area

that this can be useful is diminishing thechances of rushed and /or unstableapproaches.

The attached chart shows how theprogramme demonstrated a particularlanding technique which resulted in along delay between the main wheelstouching the ground and reverse thrustbeing available and selected.

Arrows 1 and 2 respectively show wherethe main wheels touched down and thesquat switch made. Arrow 3 indicateswhere the reverse thrust starts toincrease. This indicates an elapsed timeof some 16 seconds. When this isconverted into distance at the landing IASof around 122kts, it takes littleimagination to realise how much runwayis being taken up.

A view of Flight Data Monitoringby Simon Searle

1. 2. 3.

21

Better understanding of how many unitsof alcohol you consume before you flyand the time needed for these to clearfrom your system, could put an end toheadlines proclaiming “Drunk pilotarrested in cockpit”, and increase notonly safety in the aviation industry, butalso the perception of flying as one of thesafest modes of passenger transport.

As passengers recoil in horror from newsof pilots being drunk on duty, if pilots,their managers and all aviationprofessionals could get up to speed andbe reminded about the fundamentals ofhow alcohol affects the system, theseincidents would be thin on the ground,and perhaps even disappear.

All professionals within the aviation industryare aware of the need to abstain fromdrinking prior to going anywhere near anaircraft, but it is naive to believe that itdoesn’t happen. The problem with having adrink the day or night before you fly is thatresidual levels of alcohol will still remain inthe body’s system, and you will not bealcohol free. Waking up without a hangoverand feeling completely fine and capable thenext morning does not mean you are safeto fly, bearing in mind the low alcohol limitfor pilots of 9 microgrammes per 100ml ofbreath. With this figure in mind, any alcoholconsumed that remains in the bodywithout clearing can put pilots at risk frombeing impaired through drink and hencesubject to arrest if caught. And if you arestopped while driving to the airport withlast night’s residual alcohol still in yoursystem, the police can convict you of a DR20 offence of driving or attempting to drivewhile unfit through drink.

Any airport or aviation employees,including airside and all ground staff,who fly and drive as part of their workcan also be subject to the problems ofalcohol abuse, if they drink in an airport

bar before they fly, or drink on an aircraftwith their meal. Anyone who flies andintends to hire or collect a vehicle is atrisk, especially employees who fly tocountries where the alcohol limit is evenlower, as in Sweden. If you are a flight orground employee from overseas, thecomplications can be increased if you arenot used to UK driving laws and customs,specifically driving on the left-hand side ofthe road for the first time. An average of100,000 people are arrested each year inthe UK for drink driving, and this figurecould be drastically cut if the driversconcerned knew how many units ofalcohol they had consumed beforegetting behind the wheel of their cars.

Making sense of the many problems andproviding solutions for possible alcoholmisuse, especially when consumed priorto entering the workplace, has been themission of Roger Singer of Avoidd. Heruns courses for companies and theiremployees who want to get the facts onalcohol and even drug misuse in theworkplace with regards to currentlegislation, and has worked with manyblue-chip clients including British Airways,First Great Western, Corgi, the RoyalSociety for the Prevention of Accidents(ROSPA), Tappins Coaches, the BritishArmy and Southern Electric. Feedback

from his courses has been universallypositive, with a Drink Driver awarenesscourse for Corgi’s 220 drivers producingcomments including: “I never realisedhow easy it was to drink-drive, now I knowhow not to”, and Tappins Coaches FleetRisk Manager David Walker said: “Thesessions were enjoyed by all, some veryexperienced drivers simply didn’t realisejust how little it takes to be over the limitand, more relevant, how long it takes toreturn to zero.”

Roger Singer runs courses all-year round,and airport, aviation and aerospacemanagers and employees who would like further details can contact him on Tel: 0870 609 4562. His company’sAvoidd website is at www.drinkdrive.co.uk

Drinking and Flying just don’t mix

22

The United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee

Chief Executive

Applications are invited from experienced safety professionals for the immediate appointment to this post. The successful applicant will preferably have a substantial career in safety.

The office is located at Fairoaks Airport, Surrey, where a small but dedicated team supports the aviation industry in a wide variety of tasks.

The successful applicant will:• manage and motivate a small team• manage the annual budget• need to travel and represent the UKFSC worldwide

The successful applicant will also need to have:• a working knowledge of IT• outstanding people skills and confidence in speaking to large groups• a command of the English language• good writing skills and be able to edit our magazine• the ability to plan and manage meetings, events and seminars

Interested parties are to e-mail their application together with their Curriculum Vitae to: The Chairman, UK Flight Safety Committee at admin@ukfsc.co.uk. The final selection interviews will be notified and held at Fairoaks Airport.

23

The Civil Aviation (Provision of Informationto Passengers) Regulations 2006: criminalpenalties for failure to identify operatingcarrier: These regulations came into force inthe UK on 16 January 2007 and containenforcement provisions in relation to ECRegulation 2111/2005 on the establishmentof a list of air carriers banned from operatingwithin the EU and on informing passengersof the identity of the operating carrier.

The regulations in fact have nothing to dowith the EU carrier blacklist. Instead, theyfocus on the second aspect of ECRegulation 2111/2005 relating to theobligations of “air carriage contractors”, i.e.airlines, tour operators and potentially alsotravel agents to inform passengers as to theidentity of the carrier who is to operate aircarriage. Under the EC Regulation, the aircarriage contractor is obliged on reservationto inform the passenger of the identity of theair carrier which will operate the flight; wherethe identity is not known at the time ofreservation (which will often be the case withthe sale of package holidays where theairlines to be utilised may not be confirmedfor some time), the passenger must beinformed as soon as the identity is known.

The EC Regulation contains standardprovisions requiring Member States toestablish “effective, proportionate anddissuasive penalties” for infringement and,in line with common practice in theimplementation in the UK of enforcementmeasures, the UK statutory instrumentcreates criminal offences for failure of aircarriage contractors to meet theseinformation requirements. That in itself is byno means unusual though those involved inselling air carriage should also note that theUK regulations provide for the possibility ofindividual criminal liability on the part of anydirector, manager, secretary or similarofficer to whose neglect the failure toprovide the required information may beattributable or who is proved to haveconsented to or connived in thecommission of the offence. Bothcompanies and individuals face a fine ifprosecuted and convicted.

The Airport Slot Allocation Regulations2006: These regulations came into effect on1 January 2007 and replace the Airport SlotAllocation Regulations 1993.

Airport slot allocation is the subject of EClegislation. EC Regulation 793/2004 oncommon rules for the allocation of slots atCommunity airports made significantamendments to the original slots regulation(No. 95/93) and, with this new UK statutoryinstrument, English law now catches upwith the applicable EC regulatory provisionswhich have in any event been in force forsome time. Of particular note is the fact thatthe new statutory instrument maintains theposition that any air carrier which transferslots in breach of the EC Regulation isguilty of a criminal offence and liable to afine; criminal sanctions can also apply toany director, manager or officer of the air

carrier who is implicated in the commissionof the offence. Such individuals in theorycould face imprisonment for involvement inunlawful transfer of slots though thatultimate sanction is perhaps rather unlikely.

The general view is that slots are not assetsof the carrier and there are significantrestrictions on carriers’ ability to deal inslots. A slot transfer is lawful only if it is fromone route or type of service to anotheroperated by the same air carrier; or withinthe same corporate group; as part of anacquisition of the capital of an air carrier; ina total or partial takeover; or if it is a “onefor one” exchange between air carriers - thelatter being the mechanism by which slotscan in effect be “traded” but only on aswap basis from one carrier to another.

New UK legislation and criminal penalties for air carriersby Sue Barham – Barlow Lyde & Gilbert

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UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION

Annual Seminar 20071st/2nd October 2007

The Radisson Edwardian Hotel Heathrow

SEMINAR OBJECTIVEThe continuing growth in technical innovation has without doubt helped to reduce the number of accidents. However, someof these developments have introduced unexpected challenges for the operators. The formulation of good procedures helpsto mitigate these challenges, but there is a consensus within the industry that major difficulties still exist. This Seminar willhighlight the problems encountered and propose strategies for the future.

0800 - 0900 Registration

Session Chairman - Capt. Tony Wride - Monarch Airlines

0900 - 0910 Welcoming Introduction - Capt. Robin Berry – Chairman - UKFSC

0910 - 0945 Keynote Speech - Dr Kathy Abbott – FAA

0945 - 1020 Future ATM/Single European Sky - Mark Green – GATCO

1020 - 1040 Refreshment Break

1040 - 1115 R-NAV, B-RNAV, P-RNAV - Andy Shand – British Airways

1115 - 1150 Passenger Entertainment in the 21st Century - Stuart Seeney – Panasonic Avionics Corp.

1150 - 1225 Flying the Emb195 - Capt. Bob Horton – flybe.

1225 - 1255 Questions

1255 - 1400 Lunch

1400 - 1435 The Complexity of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) - Cdr Paul Brundle, RN

Defence Aviation Safety Centre

1435 - 1450 Comfort Break

1450 - 1525 Airbus - The Way Forward - Peter Potaki - Airbus

1525 - 1600 Maintenance Human Factors - Howard Leach - RAeS

1600 - 1630 Questions

1630 - 1645 Closing Speech - Capt. Robin Berry – Chairman - UKFSC

PROGRAMME1st October 20072000hrs Seminar Dinner

After Dinner Speaker - Simon Phippard - Rolls Royce

2nd October 2007

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SEMINAR INFORMATION

•Hotel AccommodationHotel accommodation is not included in the Seminar Registration Fee. A rate of £147 (including breakfast &VAT) has been negotiated with the Radisson Edwardian Hotel (valid only until 30th August). If you requireaccommodation please contact the hotel directly on Tel. +44 (0) 20 8759 6311 and quote Block Booking Code1001 UKF when making your reservation.

•Seminar DinnerDress for Dinner – Black Tie

•Cancellations/RefundsCancellations received prior to 25th August 2007 will be refunded 50% of registration fee. Refunds after this date will not be given.

If you are unable to attend why not nominate a colleague to take your place.If so, please advise the UKFSC Fairoaks office of any changes prior to the Seminar.

SEMINAR REGISTRATION FORM

Please complete in full one registration form per person. (Photocopies accepted)

(Please print clearly)

First Name: Surname:

Company: Job Title:

Address:

Tel No: Fax No:

e-mail:

PAYMENT INFORMATION

Seminar Fee: UKFSC Member £200 ■ Non-UKFSC Member £250 ■

This includes the Seminar Dinner on the evening of 1st October, lunch, refreshments and car parking. This does not include hotel accommodation - please see ‘Seminar Information’.

Payment is by Sterling cheque only. No credit cards are accepted. Bank transfer is available, details on request (pleasenote an additional cost of £6 will be added to cover handing charges). The UKFSC is not VAT Registered.

Sterling cheques should be made payable to UK Flight Safety Committee.

■ Do you plan to attend the Seminar Dinner on Monday 1st October? ■ Yes ■ No

■ Do you require a Vegetarian alternative? ■ Yes ■ No

Please send your completed registration form with your cheque to: UK Flight Safety Committee, Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey GU24 8HX

Tel: +44 (0)1276 855193 Fax: +44 (0)1276 855195 email: admin@ukfsc.co.ukConfirmation will be sent to you on receipt of your Registration Form and payment.

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