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BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company. Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved. On-Orbit Performance of a Triple- Voted, COTS-Based Computer Keith Williamson Boeing Space & Intelligence Systems This document contains public domain information and technical data approved for public release. The technical data approved for public release is authorized for export in accordance with and under the authority of the U.S. Government's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 22 CFR 125.4(b)(13) and Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review (DFOISR) 00-S-0818. This document does not contain technical data as defined in the ITAR 22 CFR 120.10 9 December, 2009

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BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company.Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

On-Orbit Performance of a Triple-Voted, COTS-Based Computer

Keith WilliamsonBoeing Space & Intelligence Systems

This document contains public domain information and technical data approved for public release. The technical data approved forpublic release is authorized for export in accordance with and under the authority of the U.S. Government's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 22 CFR 125.4(b)(13) and Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review (DFOISR) 00-S-0818. This document does not contain technical data as defined in the ITAR 22 CFR 120.10

9 December, 2009

Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Overview

Boeing Space & Intelligence Systems developed the SPACEWAY® satellite for Hughes Network Systems

Three satellites launched 2005 - 2007SPACEWAY-3 satellite is a key element of the HughesNetIP-over-Satellite Internet service

SPACEWAY payload electronics are based almost exclusively on terrestrial COTS technologies, using architectural approaches to SEU mitigation

Payload Control Computer (PCC) is based on COTS microprocessor, memories, and ASIC technology

Large performance advantages vs. Rad Hard By Process (RHBP) componentsOn-orbit PCCs have accumulated over 20 years of power-on time with zero service-affecting errors due to SEU (or any other source)SPACEWAY success with architectural SEU mitigation is driving current Boeing R&D in fault-tolerant spaceborne computing

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

SPACEWAY® Satellite PayloadRegenerative (demod/remod) payload with on-board digital signal processor and fast packet switchFull-mesh, single-hop connectivity at up to 16 Mbps per terminal

10 Gbps total capacityMassive frequency reuse via phased array spot beams

112 fixed uplink beams (FDMA/TDMA)24 agile, electronically steered and shaped downlink beams (TDMA) provide 784 microcells on ground

Payload Control Computer

Demod

Demod

Demod

Demod

Fast Packet Switch

Mod

Mod

Mod

Mod

Digital Signal Processor

RF Switch Matrix

Ka-BandDown Conv.

Receive PhasedArray

Antenna

Ka-BandUp

Conv.

Transmit PhasedArray

Antenna

SPACEWAY Communications Payload

SPACEWAY Digital Signal Processor

Channelization (FDM decoding)DemodulationError-correction decodingTDM descramblingPacket switchingTDM formattingRecoding,Remodulation

DSP Hardware Functions

~62 trillion operations/second

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Digital Signal Processor (DSP)ASIC Technology

Switchover to commercial ASIC technologies enabled major advances in DSP functionality and performance Boeing has extensive experience in qualifying and utilizing commercial technologies in high-availability spaceflight applications

Semiconductor process characterization for space environmentPackaging, mechanical and thermal designMulti-layered approach to SEU mitigation (architecture through circuit design)

SEU mitigation approach requires no modifications to commercial ASIC libraries and has minimal impact on software design or performance

SPACEWAY ASIC DesignsASIC Type

Process (IBM)

Size (MGate)

Memory (% Gates) Function

FPS SA-27 5.1 74 Fast Packet SwitchSMOD SA-27 2.5 44 Modulation

DEMOD SA-27 2.3 54 DemodulationPCTI SA-12 1.9 45 Configuration InterfacePSC SA-12 1.3 12 Computer SupportAC SA-12 1.1 40 Tx Antenna ControlAX SA-12 0.07 0 Tx Antenna Element

DSP Comparison

Parameter ICO (1995)

Thuraya (1998)

SPACEWAY (2001)

Performance (TOPS)* 3.6 14 62

ASIC Technology 0.7 μm Rad Hard

0.25 μm IBM SA-12

0.18 μmIBM SA-27

# ASICs 2300 360 390Physical Units 4 2 1

Mass (Kg) 270 190 124Power (W) 2200 2300 2100

*Normalized to 8x8 fixed-point multiply

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

SPACEWAY® Payload Control Computer (PCC)

Uplink/downlink bandwidth management140K uplink bandwidth requests/allocations per second

User terminal accounting2 million-terminal database

General payload command and control functions

CPU Upsets per

Month *Spacecraft Operator Launch Date

Computer POH

(Master + Slave) Avg Max

2.2 567

2.33.4

SPACEWAY 1 DirecTV Apr 2005

Computer Failures

75,900 Hrs65,700 Hrs35,000 Hrs

0SPACEWAY 2 DirecTV Nov 2005 0SPACEWAY 3 HNS Aug 2007 0

PCC Software FunctionsPowerPC 750LPowerPC

750LPowerPC 750L

128 MB EDAC

SDRAM

128 KB Boot

PROM

Processor Support Chip

(PSC)

Application I/O

Application Memory

(EEPROM)

PCC Master

PowerPC 750LPowerPC

750LPowerPC 750L

128 MB EDAC

SDRAM

128 KB Boot

PROM

Processor Support Chip

(PSC)

PCC Slave

PCI Bus

PCC Hardware Architecture

On-Orbit SEU Performance

*Based on PSC voting logic telemetry5

Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Triple-Voted Computer Architecture

Processor Fault Control Scratchpad

SRAM

DMA Controller

Flash Controller

SRAM Controller

SDRAM Controller

Flash Mem

SRAM/CRAM/PROM

DDR/DDR2SDRAM

SpacewirePCI/PCI-X Bridge

Test Access

SERDES

High-Speed Serial I/O

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

Transceivers

Enhanced Processor Support Chip (ePSC)

3rd generation architecture based on triple-voted PowerPC 750 processor

Gen-1 (SPACEWAY): PPC750L @ 375 MHz (860 DMIPS)Gen-2/3: PPC750GX-LP @ 933 MHz (2100 DMIPS)Utilized in 4 satellite programs, both GEO and LEO

High fault tolerance via CPU lock-step triple modular redundancy (TMR) and other architectural SEU mitigation approachesUp to 4 GB DDR/DDR2 SDRAM

64 bit data @ 133 MHz 17 Gbs throughput (DDR)

Wide range of I/O types for application flexibilityInter-unit communication (Spacewire, Gb Ethernet)Application-unique expansion via PCI/PCI-XMulti-computer mesh (high-speed serial)Development/test access (serial, GbE, JTAG, etc.)

Performance optimizations for packet-based communication applications

Low-latency scratchpad RAM Packet-aware scatter/gather support in DMA controller

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

CPU Fault RecoverySoftware controls the response to CPU faults, minimizing impact of recovery actions on system performance

Software schedules CPU “resync” operations to remove detected or latent errors in CPU stateResync can be periodic, on-demand, or bothSPACEWAY example:

– Resync once per 96 ms SPACEWAY “frame” period– 500 μs worst-case resync time; < 0.5% overhead

CPU resync is triggered with a software-controlled interrupt:

1. Interrupt service routine saves “majority” CPU state– CPU registers are saved to main memory– Caches are flushed to main memory

2. All CPUs are hard reset3. Boot code restores CPU registers and “returns”

from the resync interrupt

CPU/Memory SEU Mitigation

Processor Fault Control Scratchpad

SRAM

DMA Controller

Flash Controller

SRAM Controller

SDRAM Controller

Flash Mem

SRAM/CRAM/PROM

DDR/DDR2SDRAM

SpacewirePCI/PCI-X Bridge

Test Access

SERDES

High-Speed Serial I/O

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

PPC750 GX1 MB L2

Transceivers

Enhanced Processor Support Chip (ePSC)

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Cycle-by-cycle majority voting of processor buses

Cycle-by-cycle majority voting of processor buses

Masking logic immediately disables faulted CPU, preventing error propagation

Masking logic immediately disables faulted CPU, preventing error propagation

Strong EDAC codes enable correction of double-device faults

Strong EDAC codes enable correction of double-device faults

Configurable background scrubbing to remove latent errors

Configurable background scrubbing to remove latent errors

Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Embedded Computing HardwareTrends & Challenges

NEEDS BARRIERS ENABLERS SOLUTIONS

Continual improvement in system performance

Highly diverse data processing

Performance sensitivity to memory latency & bandwidth

Product size/power constraints

Power impact of increased core frequency

Moore’s Law• Available die area

Advanced design & verification methods

On-chip integration• Memory controllers• Application-specific

accelerators• I/O interfaces

System on Chip (SoC) microprocessor products

Multicore SoCs

Compatible product families

Terrestrial Applications

COTS SoC utilization to reduce program costs

High reliability & availability

• Soft error tolerance

Evolutionary paths to avoid obsolescence issues

Lower real-time determinism due to shared resources

• Multicore!

Challenging verification, validation & certification

Fewer “hooks” for SEU mitigation

Industry cooperation• AVSI study for

aviation applications

Prevalence of SOI technology in SoC products

• Latchup immunity• Lower SEU rates

Aerospace Applications

Multiple approaches being studied for space applications

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Multicore SoC SEU Mitigation Approaches

Class Approach Primary Mitigation Examples Devel

Cost Perf

Rad-Hard By Process (RHBP)

Semiconductor Process

ASIC Library

ASIC/Subsystem Architecture

Middleware

ASIC/Subsystem Architecture

Broad Reach BRE440 High Low

Rad-Hard By Design (RHBD) Maestro High High

Rad-Hard-By-Architecture (RHBA) Boeing PPC SoC High High

Rad-Hard By Software (RHBS)

Honeywell DM, JPL/NASA Research ? ?

Rad-Hard-By-Architecture (RHBA) None Low High

Custom SoC, Internal Mitigation

COTS SoC, External Mitigation

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Research Opportunity

Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Conclusions

The SPACEWAY® payload computer continues to meet/exceed its mission requirements

20+ accumulated power-on years with 100% service availability

No other deployed spaceflight computer has demonstrated this level of fault tolerance and performance

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Architectural SEU mitigation approach enables extensive leverage of terrestrial COTS components and technologiesThis approach provides a potential path to achieving much higher levels of performance using COTS multicore SoC technology

Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

References

[1] Sunderland et al., “Second Generation Mega-gate ASICs for the SPACEWAY Satellite Communications Payload”, NASA Symposium on VLSI Design, May 2003

[2] Bickel, “Fault Tolerant Processing Architecture”, US Patent No. 6,938,183 B2, Boeing, Aug 2005

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Copyright © 2009 Boeing. All rights reserved.

Contact Information

Keith WilliamsonEngineering Project Manager

Boeing Space & Intelligence SystemsEl Segundo, California(310) [email protected]

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