on personal injury

8/4/2019 On Personal Injury

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An excerpt from

The

Science of Ethics

By

Rev. Michael Cronin, M.A., D.D.

Professor of Ethics and Politics

University College, DublinNational University of Ireland

Volume II

Special Ethics

DublinM. H. GILL AND SON, L.

And Waterford


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Whether it is Lawful to put Criminals to Death?

We think it well to quote the words of St. Thomas Aquinas in answer to this ques-tion.

It is lawful to kill brute animals in as much as they are naturally meant

for the service of man, the imperfect being a means to the perfect; now

every part is referred to its whole as the imperfect to the perfect; and,

therefore, every part naturally exists for the whole (as means to its

realisation). Hence we see that if it be expedient for the welfare of the

whole body that some member should be amputated by reason of its

being bad and corruptive of the rest of the body, the removal of that

member is praiseworthy and salutary. But every individual person isrelated to the whole community as part to whole; and hence if any man

be dangerous to the community and is corrupting it by reason of some

crime then it is right and wholesome that he should be put to death for

the sake of the common good.*

This argument brings us a certain distance on our way, but it requires to be

supplemented by another which is also to be found in St. Thomas work. No doubt

the reason why a criminal may be put to death is because he is a corrupt member of

society, and through him the whole community is injured. But still we are left face

to face with the difficulty that a human being even when he commits a crime does

not cease to be a human being. Now, as we saw before, a human being thoughhe is naturally a member of society, is not to be regarded as a mere member, or a

mere part, and though as part he is a means he is not a mere means to society. On

the contrary, he is a person, sui juris and as St. Thomas declares, propter seipsum

existens, in the sense that he is not a mere means to anything else in nature. But

by putting a criminal to death for the common good, society treats him as a mere

means, as a mere member of the organism, to be sacrificed for the good of the

organism. How is this possible?

We answerit is as a rational being that man is a person, sui juris, propter

seipsum existens, and not a mere means to anything else. But by offending against

the law of reason manwithdraws himself

from the order of reason, falls below thatorder; and society is empowered to withhold from such an individual the rights of

*S. Theol., II. II., Q. LXIV. Art. .Vol. I. p. .Q. LXIV, Art. , ad .


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an independent person, treating him as a mere part of society, and may for the sake

of the common good put him to death.

In this deep and far-reaching answer we are given the reason not only why a

criminal may be put to death, but why also an innocent man whose life is a menace

to society (for instance because he is diseased in body, or because a foreign ruler

has decreed to destroy the whole community if a certain innocent man is not put

to death) must still be treated as one who has a right to his life. Such a one has not

receded from the order of reason, and, therefore, he still retains the privileges of a

rational being, and cannot be treated as a mere means to the community in which

he resides. He cannot, therefore, be sacrificed for the good of the community by

being put to death.

St. Thomas merely lays down the abstract principle that a criminal may be put

to death because as a diseased member he is corruptive of the whole of which heis a part. He does not say in what cases he may be put to death. There is really

no general rule assignable, and the cases in which society will put a subject to

death will vary with the temperament and traditions of peoples and the needs of

States. Two things, however, may be noted in this respect. One is that a subject can

only be punished for an external act; for it is through their external acts that men

communicate with their fellow-men, and act as part of the community. Another is

that even though now-a-days States will only put a man to death for crimes which

manifestly and directly affect other parts of the community, e. g. murder, still this

prerogative of the State could be exercised even where the direct effects of the crime

which is committed do not extend to other individuals, where, in other words, the

crime is private and where the only effect on society is that a part of it (the offending

member) has gone bad. A corrupt member, even though its corruption does not

extend outside itself, is a derogation to the dignity and worth of the whole body

politic.

Only the public authority can inflict death. For the killing of a criminal is

lawful only in as much as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community; from

which it follows that the infliction of death appertains to him only who has charge

of the welfare of the community, just as the amputation of a limb is performed by

the surgeon to whom is committed the welfare of the whole body, or by another

deputed by him. Now it is to the public authority that the care of the communityis entrusted, and, therefore, only the public authority or some one commissioned

by that authority may lawfully put a person to death.

Also, a particular individual, when commissioned by public authority to put a

criminal to death, can do so only as representing public authority and the whole


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community. It would not be lawful for him, even when so commissioned, to slay a

criminal for any private end such as vengeance. By harbouring such an intention

he would incur, internally at least, the guilt of homicide.

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