on the evaluation of incentive structures to implement off-hour deliveries 1 felipe aros-vera...

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On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher [email protected] Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E. William H. Hart Professor VREF’s Center of Excellence for Sustainable Urban Freight Systems Center for Infrastructure, Transportation, and the Environment Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

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Page 1: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement

Off-Hour Deliveries

On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement

Off-Hour Deliveries

1

Felipe Aros-VeraResearcher

[email protected]

Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E.William H. Hart Professor

VREF’s Center of Excellence for Sustainable Urban Freight Systems

Center for Infrastructure, Transportation, and the Environment

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

[email protected]

Page 2: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Motivation2

Traffic Congestion

Supply Perspective

Transportation Demand Management

Page 3: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Motivation

TDM has primarily focused on passengercars

Regrettably: the role that TDM could play on freight has been overlooked

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Page 4: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Off-Hour Deliveries

An important freight TDM measure involves the use of public sector incentives to induce a change in delivery times from the regular to the off-hours (7PM to 6AM).

Complexity:

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Delivery time!!!

Behavioral Micro-Simulation (BMS)

Page 5: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Behavioral Micro-Simulation (BMS)

Objective: simulate the carriers’ and receivers’ joint decision process to evaluate TDM policies

Features: deep behavioral foundation embedded in the decision making process followed by carriers and receivers

Fundamental insight: in order for OHD to be implemented, both carriers and receivers have to be better off

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Page 6: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Overall process of the BMS6

Carrier/receiver synthetic generation Randomly select industry segment

o Generate/locate carriero Generate/locate receivers to serve

 

Receiver behavioral simulation Model receiver’s decision to accept OHD

Carrier behavioral simulation Compute costs for base case and mixed operation Model carrier’s decision

Repeat for another carrier-receivers set

End

Change incentives, reset participation counts

Define range of incentives to receivers for OHD

Ordinal logit model (Holguin-Veras et al 2013)

Regular-hour receiver

Off-hour receiver

 a) Base case (no OHD) b) Mixed operation

 Carrier depotLegend:

Output: Truck Trips Market Share Receivers Market Share

Page 7: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Ordered logit model with random effects

This model reproduces receivers’ response to incentives

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ModelIndependent variables Parameter t-stat Parameter t-stat

Constant 0.61 (2.78) 0.22 (1.00)Number of deliveries -0.07 (-9.17) -0.08 (-11.66)

IncentivesOne time incentive in $1000 (OTI) 0.18 (6.95) 0.17 (6.76)Carrier discount in percent (CDR*100) 3.00 (6.81) 3.10 (7.12)Business Support (BS) 0.55 (3.82) 0.51 (3.52)Public Recognition (PR) 0.34 (2.24) 0.38 (2.48)Trusted Vendor (TV) 0.94 (4.29)

NAICSClothing stores, binary variable -2.73 (-4.57) -2.46 (-4.32)Performing arts, binary variable -1.96 (-5.69) -4.80 (-12.38)

Interaction terms: OTI and NAICSOTI for food and beverage stores 0.12 (2.56) 0.20 (4.24)OTI for apparel manufacture stores 0.23 (1.72) 0.11 (1.88)OTI for clothing stores 0.24 (3.18) 0.25 (3.40)OTI for nondurable wholesalers 0.33 ( 6.83) 0.37 (7.62)

Interaction terms: CDR and NAICSCDR for personal laundry -2.11 (-2.98) -2.08 (-3.25)

Interaction terms: Trusted vendor and NAICSTV for food and beverage stores 4.35 (7.29) 2.02 (3.17)TV for performing arts 4.65 (2.56) 13.49 (11.16)TV for clothing stores 5.06 (8.28) 2.24 (4.06)TV for miscellaneous stores retailers 6.59 (13.63) 3.17 (5.86)

Parametersµ(1) 1.88 ( 21.54) 1.91 (21.36)µ(2) 4.56 (34.64) 4.56 (34.14)µ(3) 7.63 (40.45) 7.55 (40.51)Sigma 4.58 (27.64) 4.74 (25.83)

nLog likelihood -1390.89 -1388.50

1522

Model 1 Model 2

1522

Incentives

Interaction terms:OTI and NAICS

NAICS code

Interaction terms:TV and NAICS

Page 8: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

BMS Application to New York City

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Page 9: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Case study: New York City

The island of Manhattan is the economic center of a large metropolitan area of a total population of 20 million with NYC, and its eight million residents, as its center

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CountyPopulation

Establish-ments

Employ-ment

FTA (trips/day)

FTP (trips/day)

FTG (trips/day)

%

Bronx 1,332,650 15,528 224,179 26,320 26,838 53,157 7.45%

Brooklyn 2,465,326 44,043 521,992 75,865 73,431 149,295 20.92%

Manhattan 1,537,195 102,597 2,062,079 182,427 161,144 343,571 48.14%

Queens 2,229,379 41,551 518,953 71,447 68,883 140,330 19.66%

Staten Island 443,728 8,376 100,975 14,464 12,910 27,374 3.84%

Grand Total 8,008,278 212,095 3,428,177 370,522 343,206 713,728 100.00%

Page 10: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Case study: New York City

3 different incentives are evaluatedBusiness support (BS)Public recognition (PR)One time incentive (OTI)

Data: New York Metropolitan Transportation Council

(NYMTC) Best Practice Model (BPM): demand model for the NY metropolitan area

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Page 11: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Use of the NYMTC Best Practice Model11

Origins (NJ) Destinations

(businesses) in Manhattan

Industry sector (NAICS) determines: Number of

stops Location of

businesses

Page 12: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

BMS Considerations: trip generation models

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Page 13: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

BMS Results13

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

16.0%

Truck Trips MS

OTI ($ thousand)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

Receivers MS

OTI ($ thousand)

Page 14: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

BMS Results14

OTI = $2,000avg = 2.7%max = 7.6%min = 1.2%

OTI = $4,000avg = 3.4%max = 7.6%min = 1.3%

OTI = $6,000avg = 4.3%max = 9.9%min = 1.9%

OTI = $8,000avg = 5.5%

max = 11.9%min = 2.6%

OTI = $10,000avg = 7.0%

max = 13.4%min = 3.5%

Page 15: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Results: incentives and impact on OHD

OTI of $1,000 + BS + PR would move more than 2,300 deliveries to the night hours; this corresponds to a reduction of 2% of deliveries. Budget of $2.4 millions

If the incentive reaches $10,000, more than 8,000 deliveries could be moved to the night. Budget of $70 million

Each delivery is estimated to take between 45 and 90 minutes in the regular hours (pilot tests show delivery times of less than 30 min during OHD)

Page 16: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Results: geographic oriented incentives

One of the most remarkable results comes from geographic oriented incentives

The most congested parts of the city; lower and midtown Manhattan, has the largest economic and social benefits

OTI of $10,000, requiring $36 million, could move around 4,100 deliveries, similar numbers than giving incentives to the entire city with the exception that these deliveries are made in the most congested part of the city

Page 17: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Conclusions

The BMS is an important tool for evaluating TDM policies; in this case the set of incentives to foster Off Hour Deliveries

The application to the Manhattan case study provides significant insight into the potential benefits, and limitations: Off-Hour DeliveriesGeographic oriented incentivesSelf Supported Freight Demand Management

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Page 18: On the Evaluation of Incentive Structures to Implement Off-Hour Deliveries 1 Felipe Aros-Vera Researcher arosvm@rpi.edu Jose Holguin-Veras, Ph.D., P.E

Thanks!

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