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ON THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION*

J A C E K Z A L E ŚN Y * *

1. HORIZONTAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

The choice of the desired political system of the State adequate to the situation in which it found itself as well as to traditions and to the long-term objectives to be pursued was a key issue that had to be established in the Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR. There were no doubts that the separation of powers was to be the foundation of the political system. However, the separation of powers is not a model applied in every country in the same way. It is always implemented in a particular form that takes into consideration a constitutional standard of contem-porary states and local conditions.

The issue of choosing one of the variants of implementing the principle of separation of powers was important for solving growing differences within the political system of the state and for developing stable grounds for the Russian State development, adequate to the aspirations and potential of the multi-national Russian population. As a principle of a political system at the federal level as well as the subjects of the Federation’s level, the principle of separation of powers was laid down in the Constitution of 12 December 1993.1 Approved in a referendum on 12 December 1993, the Constitution entered into force on 25 December 1993, which ended the process of constitutionalisation of the post-Soviet principle of separation of powers.2 It also established a constitutional framework of contemporary Russia.

The legislator laid down the principle of separation of power (in a singular form), as one of the principles of the constitutional political order of Russia, in Article 10

* I would like to express my thanks to Professor Maria Kruk for providing inspiration for this analysis.

** PhD, Assistant Professor, Institute of Political Science of the University of Warsaw1 Konstitutsia Rossiyskoy Federatsii prinyata wsyenarodnim golosovaniyem 12 dekabrya

1993 goda, available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201408010002.2 Sh.V. Zhamaldayev, Rossiyskiy parlamentarizm v uslovyah postkommunistitcheskoy

transformatsii polititcheskoy sistemy, Saratov 2006, p. 132.

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of the Constitution.3 It is articulated at the horizontal level. It stipulates that the state power shall be exercised in accordance with the principle of its separation into the legislative, executive and judicial. However, the legislator does not answer the question of what the mutual relations and interaction between these branches of the state power are.4

In Russia, as a federal state, the horizontal separation of power is supplemented with the vertical separation of power. It co-exists with the problem of separation of power of the Federation and its components, i.e. subjects of the Russian Federation. It is exercised in accordance with the principle of cooperation between the federal authorities and the authorities of the subjects of the Federation, which takes into account competences exercised jointly by the bodies of the federal authority and of the authorities of the subjects of the Federation.5 The implementation of the separation of power at two levels, the federal one and the Federation subjects’ one, complicates the relations between all the bodies of the respective branches of power. In addition, there are local self-governments which also exercise the power of the people, and those are also subdivided into elected representatives’ power and the executive.

By establishing the vertical and horizontal separation of power, the legislator starts from the principle of fusion of powers. The doctrine of the Russian constitutional law emphasises the distinction between the principle of the separation of power and the fusion of the state powers.6 It is clearly stated that the principle of the separation of power does not violate the fusion of the state powers7 understood as the unity of strategic objectives and directions of activity of all bodies of the state authority. Various bodies of the state authority must act to implement the same political values shared by large social groups and targeted at obtaining strategic interests of the state.

The fusion of the state powers means a unity of the entire will of the state authority bodies. It should not be understood as a unity of the state authority bodies or non-separation of functions and competences, but as a unity in the expression of the sovereign’s will, which is revealed in the unity of enacted and implemented law. The fusion of the state powers is substantiated mainly by the fact that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution, the multi-national people are the

3 G. Gadzhiyev, Noviye grani konstitutsionnogo printsipa razdeleniya vlastey, „Sravnitelnoye konstitutsionnoye obozreniye” No. 2, p. 50, 2004; A.Ye. Postnikov, Statia 10, [in:] L.A. Okunkov (ed.), Kommentariy k Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 1996, p. 41.

4 R.Sh. Karayev, Konstitutsionno-pravoviye formy parlamentskogo kontrolya za ispolnitelnoy vlastyu v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Rostov-on-Don 2005, p. 5.

5 A.S. Barto, Vzaimodeystviye organov zakonodatelnoy i ispolnitelnoy vlasti v realizatsii politiche-skih reform (po materialam Krasnodarskogo kraya i Rostovskoy oblasti), Krasnodar 2010, p. 25 ff.

6 See, L.A. Okunkov, Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Konstitutsia i politicheskaya praktika, Moscow 1996, p. 36; S.A. Osetrov, Konstitutsionniye osnovaniya prezidentskoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Samara 2010, pp. 36–37.

7 V.Ye. Chirkin, Osnovy sravnitelnogo gosudarstvovedenia, Moscow 1997, p. 94; Ye.Ye. Prokoshenkova, Razdeleniye vlastey kak princip mehanizma osushchestvleniya gosudarstvennoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2003, p. 118; V.A. Ivanov, Pravoviye osnovy vzaimodeystviya federalnyh organov zakonodatelnoy i ispolnitelnoy vlasti Rossiyskoy Federatsii v zakonodatelnom protsiesse, Moscow 2006, p. 49; A.V. Karelin, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy mechanizm realizatsii principa razdeleniya vlastey v uslowiyah rossiyskogo federalizma, Moscow 2010, p. 26.

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only and indivisible source of power.8 There are not and cannot be three powers. There is only one power and it belongs to the people.9 On the other hand, the state shall separate competences of different bodies based on the principle of fusion of the state powers.10

2. PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE SYSTEM OF SEPARATED POWERS

In the context of the “cooperation” of powers and ensuring the unity of the state power, it is necessary to see the role in the political system that was assigned to the President. The legislator awarded the President a special legal status, which is a peculiarity of the Russian variant of the separation of powers.11 The President of the Russian Federation gained the status that goes beyond the tripartite separation of powers proclaimed in Article 10 of the Constitution.12 He is recognised to be head of state who is neither the executive body nor the legislative body, nor the judiciary.13 In this context, it can be said that the legal and political position of the President does not match the classical tripartite separation of powers or that it even violates it.14 It does not mean, however, that the President is placed above the bodies of the state authority15 and that he plays the role of the superior body in the state. In the

8 R.V. Yengibaryan, E.V. Tadevosian, Konstitutsionnoye pravo, Moscow 2000, p. 204; B.K. Metsayev, Yuridicheskaya priroda kontrolnoy deyatelnosti (teoretiko-pravovoy aspekt), Moscow 2003, pp. 70–71.

9 A.K. Soboleva, Princip razdeleniya vlastey, [in:] A.N. Medushievskiy (ed.), Osnovy konstitutsionnogo stroya Rossii: dvadtsat let razvitya, Moscow 2013, p. 80.

10 See, E.S. Kerimov, Konstitutsionno-pravoviye osnovy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya v sfere finansovoy deyatelnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2006, p. 43.

11 Yu.M. Kozlov, Problemy sovremennogo gosudarstvenno-pravovogo razvitiya Rossii: istoricheskoye naslediye i sovremennost, [in:] M.N. Marchenko (ed.), Razdeleniye vlastey, Moscow 2004, p. 360; Yu.I. Skuratov, Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii, [in:] A.N. Kokotov, M.I. Kukushkin (ed.), Konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossii, Moscow 2007, p. 338; M. Grzybowski, Prawo wyborcze na urząd prezydenta w Rosji [Law regulating election of the President of Russia], [in:] S. Grabowska, R. Grabowski (ed.), Prawo wyborcze na urząd prezydenta w państwach europejskich [Law regulating presidential elections in the European states], Warsaw 2007, p. 150.

12 G.V. Diogtev, Stanovleniye i razvitiye instituta prezidentstva v Rossii, Moscow 2006, p. 75; A.N. Kuriukin, Vzaimodeystviye zakonodatelnoy i ispolnitelnoy vlastey v usloviyah reformirovaniya rossiyskogo obshchestva, Tula 2000, p. 99; I.I. Alipulatova, Parlamentarizm v Rossiyskoy Federatsii kak osnova demokratichieskogo obshchestva, Makhachkala 2004, p. 99; Ye.V. Mandryka, Realizatsiya principa razdeleniya vlastey v Rossii i v Ukrainiye (sravnitelno-pravoviye issledovaniye), Sankt Petersburg 2006, p. 98; M.M. Vasileva, Osobennosti stanovleniya instituta prezidentskoy vlasti v Rossii, [in:] K.P. Kokarev (ed.), Politicheskiye protsessy v Rossii i mire, Moscow 2009, p. 76.

13 D.B. Troshev, Parlamentskiye rassledovaniya kak forma kontrola Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii za deyatelnostyu federalnyh organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti, Moscow 2008, p. 76.

14 A.N. Medushevskiy, Konstitutsionnaya stabilnost i institutsionalniye izmeneniya v rossiyskom politicheskom protsesse, [in:] S. Sulowski, J. Zaleśny (ed.), Mechanizmy rządzenia w państwach Europy Wschodniej [Governing mechanisms in the Eastern European states], Studia Politologiczne Vol. 33, 2014, p. 37.

15 K.V. Agalov, Sistema organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii: konstitutsionno-pravoviye osnovy, Moscow 2003, p. 59. E. Ozhiganov writes about placing the President above the three traditional branches of power in Institutsionalizatsiya otnosheniy mezhdu organami

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light of the Constitution, every body of the state authority independently exercises the competences assigned to them taking responsibility for their functions.

One of two conclusions can be drawn from the constitutional classification of the President. A separate status of the President is placed outside the sphere of power relations and, therefore, it does not represent competences to exercise presidential power because it does not envisage such. In such a case, it would be necessary to face a dilemma: what, if not a form of exercising power, is the President’s post in the Russian Federation?

Another possible deduction goes in a different direction and leads to another conclusion. The status of the President as the head of the state is a sort of power but unlike those contained in Montesquieu’s trias politica. The legislator inspires this thread of thought. Article 11 of the Constitution unambiguously states, inter alia, that the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly (the Council of the Russian Federation and the State Duma), the Government of the Russian Federation, and the courts of the Russian Federation exercise the state power in the Russian Federation. A comparative analysis of Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution allows stating that four groups of entities exercising the state power correspond to three branches of government (the legislative, the executive and the judicial). At the same time, although the President is not assigned executive power (neither the legislative nor the judicial ones), he acts in accordance with and within the provisions of the Constitution and statutes. Those lay down the President’s competences.

3. PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS A COORDINATOR OF HARMONIOUS FUNCTIONING AND COOPERATION OF THE STATE AUTHORITY BODIES

Not classified in the framework of tripartite separation of powers, the President must, which is important to understand the Russian variant of the separation of powers, ensure harmonious functioning and cooperation of all the state bodies.16

ispolnitelnoy i predstavitelnoy vlastey i politicheskiy rezhim v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, [in:] I. Shablinskiy (ed.), Prezident – Pravitelstvo – ispolnitelnaya vlast: rossiyskaya model, Moscow 1997, p. 46. Similar opinions are presented in: O.Ye. Tarasova, Printsip razdeleniya vlastey i grazhdanskoye obshchestvo: dialektika wzaimosvyazi (sotsyalno-filosofskiy aspekt), Krasnoyarsk 2004, p. 100; N.P. Varfolomeyeva, Konstitutsionno-pravovaya priroda i mehanizm razresheniya sporov o kompetentsii organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti, Samara 2007, p. 124; A.A. Romanovskiy, Institut prezidentstva vo Frantsii i Rossii (sravnitelniy analiz), Voronezh 2007, p. 80. On the other hand, A.V. Chepus indicates that the president was made an arbitrator over three branches of power. A.V. Chepus, Konstitutsionnoye zakonodatelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii: genezis, sovremennoye sostoyaniye i osnovniye tendentsii razvitiya, Moscow 2008, p. 144.

16 V.I. Radchenko, Prezident i „razdeleniye vlastey” v Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii, [in:] V.T. Kabyshev, Ye.V. Kolesnikov (ed.), Realizatsia Konstitutsii Rossii, Saratov 1994, p. 26; B.P. Yeliseyev, Sistema organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 1998, p. 82; H.G. Gorshkova, Teoria ispolnitelnoy vlasti: poniatiye i printsipy yeyo osushchestveniya, [in:] A.I. Bobylev, H.G. Gorshkova, V.I. Ivakin, Ispolnitelnaya vlast v Rossii: teoria i praktika yeyo osushchestvenia, Moscow 2003, p. 30; S.Yu. Poyarkov, Priezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii kak ideologicheskiy institut rossiyskogo konstitutsionalizma, Pravo i politika No. 7, 2009, p. 1423;


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He is responsible for the protection of the Constitution and must guarantee that all measures protecting it operate properly and that there are no conflicts in the process of its execution.17 He is not supposed to be a neutral power18 but should play the role of an arbitrator19 in relations between the public authority bodies20 at the horizontal as well as the vertical levels. The function is one of the most important in order to establish and understand constitutional significance of the President and his relations with other public authorities. It constitutes a foundation of his particular competences in relation to the bodies of the legislative, the executive and the judicial power. The President implements his coordinating function in the horizontal aspect, i.e. in mutual relations of state authorities, as well as in the vertical aspect, i.e. in the relations between federal power bodies and authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

The President performs the function of an arbitrator in the state political system with the use of measures laid down in the law and by means of political instruments. Although from the formal legal perspective they are not related to competences shaping the conduct of other participants of political relations, they have enormous importance. It depends on the personal authority of the head of the state, on big social groups’ trust in him and on the scope in which he articulates what they pursue and aspire to. Using his non-authoritative competences, the President is able to motivate other participants of political relations to particular desired conduct. In this aspect, in Russian conditions, we can see a clear contrast between B. Yeltsin’s personal authority on the one hand and V. Putin’s and D. Medvedev’s on the other hand. It did not work well during presidency of the first President of the Russian Federation. B. Yeltsin was gradually losing social trust and an ability to shape the conduct of other participants of political relations. On the other hand, the two other Presidents’ personal authority had an impact (in the case of V. Putin, it still has an impact) and their suggestions, opinions and appeals were met with understanding of the entities to which they were addressed. They did not become the subject of public contestation, negligent silence or another form of repudiation.

The President’s role that consists in ensuring harmonious functioning and cooperation of the state authorities, which is much more significant than political

S.A. Osetrov, Konstitutsionniye osnovaniya prezidentskoy..., pp. 48–49; J. Jaskiernia, Prawidłowości rozwoju systemu politycznego Federacji Rosyjskiej w okresie prezydentur W. Putina i D. Miedwiediewa [Regularities of the development of the political system of the Russian Federation in the period of V. Putin’s and D. Medvedev’s presidencies], Myśl Socjaldemokratyczna No. 4, 2010, p. 43.

17 G.V. Sintsov, Deyatelnost Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii i glav subektovw Rossiyskoy Federatsii v sistemie obespecheniya konstitutsionnoy zakonnosti, [in:] V.V. Komarova (ed.), Konstitutsionnaya zakonnost v realizatsii vlastey na primere Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2015, p. 56.

18 E. Ozhiganov, Institutsionalizatsia otnosheniy..., [in:] I. Shablinskiy (ed.), Prezident – Pravitelstvo..., p. 44.

19 V.Ye. Chirkin, Elementy sravnitelnogo gosudarstvovedenia, Moscow 1994, pp. 18–19; V.I. Radchenko, Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii v sistemie razdelenia vlastey, Saratov 1995, p. 19; A.F. Aliyev, Institut prezidenstva i yego osobennosti v usloviyah Rossii, Moscow 2000, p. 98; D.S. Ashayev, Rol Prezidenta i Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v osushchestvlenii ispolnitelnoy vlasti, Moscow 2003, p. 78.

20 I.D. Hutinayev, Institutsionalizatsia organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2006, p. 130.

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arbitration,21 does not mean that he is a conductor of an orchestra composed of the state authorities.22

Considerable legal importance is attributed to the provisions assigning the President his functions, which are laid down in the Constitution. In accordance with the Constitutional Court rulings,23 all the constitutional requirements for the President’s status, the content of the President’s oath of office or functions should be recognised as legally significant and providing for the capacity of taking particular measures. The general conditions of the President’s status may contain authoritative powers, which are not clearly named but exist potentially as if there were no actual competences. That is why, we can speak about implicit and hidden competences. They are used at the own discretion of a state body, which specifies a generally defined task and establishes (implicit, hidden) competences within its framework.24 In line with the constitutional standards that are general in character, the President has discretionary competences in order to achieve targets and tasks that they specify. He may act volitionally, at his discretion, detailing constitutional functions and, based on them, establishing his defined competences.

The legislator made the President an independent body of the state authority beside the tripartite separation of powers with a position dominating the political system.25 The existence of the independent and dominant presidential power in the Russian state organisation and operation not only broadens the issue of the classical tripartite separation of powers but also adds a specific character to this concept.26 The President is equipped with extended competences in relation to the Parliament and the executive power.

In accordance with the Constitution, the President is the head of the state. This title indicates that in the separation of powers adopted in Russia, the President must ensure the unity of the state powers and personalise the Russian statehood. Being a guardian of the unity of the state powers, the President is a guarantor of harmonious functioning and cooperation between state authorities. This in consequence means that, from the legal point of view, the President is not the head of the state executive power nor is he in any way an element of its system.27

21 M. Krasnov, Zakonodatelno zakreplennie polnomochia Prezidenta Rossii: neobhodimost ili servilizm?, Sravnitelnoye konstitutsionnoye obozrenie No. 4, 2011, p. 95.

22 See, M.V. Baglay, Konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2007, p. 148.23 Sobranie zakonodatelstva RF 1996, No. 19, p. 2320.24 See, D. Kislitsa, „Skrytiye” polnomochiya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, [in:] V.I. Fadeyev

(ed.), Konstitutsionalizm i pravovaya sistema Rossii: itogi i perspektivy, Moscow 2015, p. 351 ff; V.N. Suvorov, Konstitutsionniy status Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2000, pp. 170–171; A.V. Zuykov, Evoliutsia instituta prezidentstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2009, p. 108; A.Ye. Postnikov (ed.), Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federalnogo Sobrania Rossiyskoy Federatsii: k 20-lietu dejatelnosti, kak predstavitelnogo i zakonodatelnogo organa Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2012, pp. 250–251.

25 A.V. Zuykov, Prezident dla Rossii: ot idei do Glavy 4, Sravnitelnoye konstitutsionnoye obozreniye No. 4, 2009 p. 40.

26 See, G.A. Shmavonian, Prezident Rossiyskoj Federatsii, [in:] Yu.L. Shulzhenko (ed.), Konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossii, Moscow 2007, pp. 243–244.

27 H.A. Akkayeva, Printsip razdeleniya vlasti – konstitutsionnaya osnova postroyenia i funktsio-nirovania gosudarstvennogo mehanizma v Rossii, Sankt Petersburg 2005, p. 123.


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4. PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER

As far as the legal aspect of the President’s influence of the Government is concerned, the legislator does not stipulate subordination of the cabinet to the head of the state.28 However, it is necessary to look at what was not articulated through the prism of particular, actually indicated presidential tools shaping the conduct of the federal executive power. Firstly, the President is the subject dominating the process of cabinet formation. Secondly, the existence of the cabinet in a given composition depends on his will. As a result, the head of the state determines the beginning and the end of the executive authority’s operation in a given personal composition. Apart from its collective accountability to the State Duma, the Government is also politically accountable to the President and particular members of the Government, due to the lack of individual accountability to the parliament, to the President and the Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister).29

A question arises about the President’s ability to influence the course of action of the governmental decision-making centre. Does he have power to shape or influence the way in which the cabinet and its agencies act and the content of their decisions? Or, on the contrary, does his influence start and finish at the moment of the Government formation and dissolution?

In practice, the President has control over the Government. The Constitution of 1993 lays down a series of regulations giving the President the competence of authoritarian influence on the Government. He is entitled to fulfil functions necessary to effectively mange governmental activity.30

The analysis of the President’s competences, especially the practice of their execution, allows one to claim that the head of the state’s links with the executive are not only far-reaching, but also that he, in practice, actually manages it.31 The President directs extensively the activity of the Government, but the Government is accountable for inefficiency of its work on its own. At the same time, it should be reminded that none of the provisions of the Constitution appoints the President the head of the executive. One more peculiarity of the relations between the President, the Government and the State Duma must be mentioned. The Government is accountable not only to the President but also to the parliament. The State Duma

28 N.G. Salishcheva, N.Yu. Hamaneva, Pravitelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii v sistemie ispolnitelnoy vlasti, [in:] I.L. Bachilo (ed.), Ispolnitelnaya vlast v Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Problemy razvitia, Moscow 1998, p. 73; A.V. Pavlushkin, Status Federalnogo Sobrania – predstavitelnogo i zakonodatelnogo organa Rossiyskoy Federatsii, [in:] Yu.A. Tihomirov (ed.), Konstitutsionnoye zakonodatelstvo Rossii, Moscow 1999, p. 175; V.N. Suvorov, Prezident i Pravitelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii: konstitutsionniye problemy vzaimootnoshenii, Trudy Moskovskoy Gosudarstvennoy Yuridicheskoy Akademii No. 4, Moscow 1999, p. 21.

29 Compare, A.V. Chepus, Parlamentskaya otvetstvennost Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii: sovremennoye sostoyanie i perspektivy, Moscow 2014, p. 81.

30 V.N. Suvorov, Konstitutsionniy status Prezidenta…, p. 344.31 D.S. Vygolovskiy Konstitutsionno-pravovoye regulirovanie federalnoy ispolnitelnoy vlasti

v Rossii, Rostov-on-Don 2004, pp. 85–86; I.N. Sivkova, Federalniye organy ispolnitelnoy vlasti v Rossii: (konstitutsionno-pravovoy aspekt), Moscow 2004, p. 98; A.S. Chesnokov, Ispolnitelnaya vlast v Rossiyskoy Federatsii: teoretiko-pravovoy analiz, Moscow 2001, p. 46.

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may express no confidence to the Government, which results in, if this is the will of the President, the resignation of the Government.

In the light of the Constitution, the head of the state decides about the structure of the federal executive bodies. Formally, he does it after the Chairman of the Government submits his proposal but such submission is not legally binding for the President. The President may accept the proposal in extenso or reject it. Still, he cannot modify it on his own. He has no competence to maintain some elements of the proposal and repeal some others or modify them, or substitute them with some new ones. However, since he may reject the proposal of the Chairman of the Government, it must be taken into consideration that in a given political situation, he has the power to do this and, thus, ruin the initiative of the Chairman of the Government and, as a result, preclude him from submitting and appointing the candidates for the posts of Deputy Chairmen and federal ministers.

Aware of the above-mentioned dangers undermining the process of cabinet formation, the Chairman of the Government pursues agreement with the President with respect to the proposal concerning the structure of the federal executive bodies. Taking into account his suggestions and arguments becomes an actual guarantee of successful formation of the federal executive structure and, as a result, makes it possible for the Chairman of the Government to submit to the President proposals of the candidates for the posts of cabinet members, and to complete the Government appointment proceedings. In other words, the success of the process of cabinet formation depends on how consensual the Chairman of the Government is and on his ability to listen to the President’s arguments and transform them into decisions.

Pursuant to the provisions of Act on the Government of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government informs the President about the work of the Government on a regular basis. In the relations of dependence binding the President and the cabinet, informing does not have a feature of courtesy unimportant for the decision-making process. The obligation to inform takes the form of a reporting obligation. The head of the cabinet periodically reports on the course of the work of the cabinet, including information to what extent and level it meets the challenges the Russian Federation faces, which the head of the state has diagnosed and referred to the Government for implementation. Through the obligation to inform, the President assesses how efficient the Government is in its activities.

Since February 1998, there has been a practice of public fulfilment of the Government’s obligation to inform, which is a characteristic phenomenon of the implementation of this obligation in Russia. The Chairman of the Government, invited by the President, must appear before him, report and answer questions asked, which is broadcast by public television. The circumstances of the meeting, its course, the nature of the roles played by the participants and the way in which solutions are developed during the meeting show publicly the actual relations between the President and the Chairman of the Government. These are dependencies of superiority and subordination. One entity reports to the other and is given directives on further action, where the dissolution of the Government, in case of insufficient implementation of the President’s will, may be the sanction.


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Within this framework of managing the work of the Government,32 the President has the competence, which is rarely exercised,33 at his own discretion34 to preside over the meeting of the Government. This provision was introduced to the Constitution Bill directly by B. Yeltsin.35 During such Government meetings, political decisions of key importance for the state are made.36 Presiding over the Government, the President does not become the head of the Government.37 He cannot take over the direct management of the Government, does not vote and cannot turn the Government into his cabinet.38 When the President presides over the Government’s meeting, the Chairman of the Government signs the decisions, which serves emphasising that those are not the President’s decisions but the Government’s. This way, the President’s chairing of the Government’s meetings does not produce legal effects but has a political meaning.39

Pursuant to the provisions of Act on the Government, the President has competence to chair the meeting of the Cabinet, i.e. the Government’s management body. This way he can influence the pace of its operations, the course of work, the choice of issues to be discussed, and the method of dealing with and solving them. In fact, the President rarely chairs the Government’s meetings, however, he participates in them every week. The Government’s meetings with the President’s participation become socially and politically significant. It happens that the number of their participants is extended and the chairs of parliamentary factions, members of the Federation Council, and chairs of the federal and regional level state bodies join in.40 These are meetings of the members of the Government with the President, rather than the meetings of the Government with the President’s participation.

The formula of those meetings to a great extent resembles the Government’s meetings chaired by the President. The President makes an introductory speech, determines the objective and the tasks of the meeting, gives orders to the Chairman and members of the Government, listens to their briefs on the fulfilment of earlier requests, expresses approval or disapproval of particular activities and decisions of the Government. At the same time, from the legal point of view, the President’s meetings with the Chairman of the Government and other members of the cabinet are informal and decisions taken in the course of them are not binding.

32 S.N. Pak, Institut Prezidenta v sovremennoy Rossii, Moscow 2001, p. 68.33 I.V. Filippov, Rol Prezidenta v obespechenii razdelenia i wzaimodeystvia vlastej v Rossiyskoy

Federatsii, Moscow 2002, p. 131; S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow 2006, p. 106.

34 S.M. Shahray, O Konstitutsii. Osnovnoy zakon kak instrument pravovyh i sotsyalno-politicheskch preobrazovaniy, Moscow 2013, p. 150.

35 R.R. Aslanyan, Konstitutsionnaya sistema ispolnitelnoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Saratov 2005, p. 123.

36 G.V. Diogtev, Institut prezidentstva v Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Osobennosti pravovogo statusa i kompetentsii, problemy sovershenstvovania, Moscow 2005, p. 205; N.Ye. Kolobayeva, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii (wvprosy teorii i praktiki), Yekaterinburg 2007, p. 108.

37 Compare, G.V. Diogtev, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status prezidentov Rossiyskoy Federatsii i SShA. Sravnitelno-pravovoy analiz, Moscow 2003, p. 116.

38 S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status..., p. 105.39 I.N. Geliyeva, Forma gosudarstvennogo pravlenia v Rossii (konstitutsionno-pravovoy analiz),

Krasnodar 2008, pp. 107–108.40 S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status…, p. 107.

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Nevertheless, because of respect that the members of the Government have for President V. Putin, those “informal” decisions are implemented in a way similar to the decisions taken during the Government’s meetings.41

Apart from determining the structure of the federal executive power, the right to take part in the Government’s meetings and the obligation to report activities to him, there is another, not less important manner in which the conduct of the federal executive is shaped by the President: it concerns his management of particular areas of governmental matters. The influence of the head of the state on particular aspects of the governmental activities results directly from the provisions of the law. It is rooted in the functions and tasks that are laid down in the provisions of the Constitution and specified in the provisions of Act on the Government of the Russian Federation.

Establishing the role of the President in the government system, the legislator stipulates, inter alia, that he must be the guarantor of the Constitution and of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen. He takes measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity. To that end, being elected directly by citizens, which gives him special political authorisation to act,42 he defines, inter alia, the basic guidelines of the domestic and foreign policy of the state, directs the state’s foreign policy, forms and presides over the Security Council of the Russian Federation, approves the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, declares martial law or a state of emergency in the territory of the whole state or its part (as e.g. in the case of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Dagestan in the period 1992–1995).

Although the President’s tasks, expressis verbis laid down in the provisions of the Constitution, do not include ensuring security and defence of the state, we need to look at this issue through the prism of the President’s oath taken when assuming office, his functions as well as particular competences he is awarded by the legislator. The President, inter alia, swears to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state in exercising his powers. The protection of sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the state is among others what determines his activity. The approval of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation is also one of the key constitutional competences of the head of the state in the area of ensuring the state defence.

In other words, such an oath as well as the functions determining the key features of the President’s role together with detailed competences lets us see the President’s special and leading role in the area of the state defence and security. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation also stated that the President’s functions, as determined by the Constitution, are the basis of the President’s decisions and actions undertaken in order to ensure security and territorial integrity, even when they are not directly laid down in the completely defined legal norms (construction of the so-called hidden tasks).43

41 I.V. Filippov, Rol Prezidenta..., pp. 131–132.42 See S.Yu. Poyarkov, Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii kak idelogicheskiy institut rossiyskogo

konstitutsionalizma, Pravo i politika No. 9, 2009, p. 1423.43 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 31 yulia 1995 goda,

Sobranie zakonodatelstva RF, No. 33, p. 3424.


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Considering the importance of those issues for the state,44 one should mention extended competences of the President in the sphere of ensuring state security and defence. The President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He approves the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. He appoints and dismisses the supreme command of the Armed Forces. He awards higher military ranks. He announces partial or full mobilisation. In case of aggression against the Russian Federation or of a direct threat of aggression, the President introduces martial law in the territory of the Russian Federation or in its certain parts and immediately informs the Council of the Federation and the State Duma about this. In case the threat to the state security results from domestic conditions, the President introduces a state of emergency in the territory of the Russian Federation or in its certain parts and immediately informs the Council of the Federation and the State Duma about it.45

The President forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Its main responsibilities are: to define key interests of the society and the state and to diagnose domestic and foreign threats to security; to develop main strategies of ensuring security to Russia and to ensure preparation of federal dedicated programmes of its provision; to develop operational plans of preventing extraordinary situations that can produce negative effects in the social and political, economic, military, ecological, etc. aspects and of dealing with such situations; to develop the President’s proposals to declare, continue and cancel a state of emergency; to develop proposals concerning coordination of federal executive bodies and the executive bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federation in the process of implementation of the decisions concerning security, and to assess their efficiency.

In accordance with the responsibilities assigned under the Constitution, the President, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Security Council, when implementing the provisions of the Constitution, federal constitutional acts and federal acts, heads the federal ministers and other federal executive bodies responsible for defence, security, internal affairs, foreign affairs, prevention of extraordinary situations, elimination of disaster aftermath, i.e. key bodies from the point of view of the quality of the state operations.46 There is no doubt that the relations of key importance for the state are directly subordinated to the President. Within that framework, the President may (with no need for his decisions to be countersigned) manage governmental affairs on his own. He has competence to issue normative acts, guidelines and requests that are binding on the Government, to control it, to give orders to the Chairman of the Government, particular ministers and heads of offices to undertake particular actions.47

44 Z.A. Tangiyev, Federalniye ministerstwa v usloviah soviershenstvovania sistemy i struktury organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti, Moscow 2008, p. 148.

45 For example, on 7 April 1994, the Council of the Federation approved the President’s decree of 4 April on the introduction of a state of emergency in the part of the Republic of North Ossetia and in the Republic of Ingushetia.

46 S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status…, p. 106; V.G. Koloteva, Rol federalnyh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti v politicheskoy sistemie sovremiennoy Rossii (2000–2005 gg.), Moscow 2008, p. 70.

47 V.N. Suvorov, Prezident i Pravitelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii…, p. 22.

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The Federal Government manages particular bodies, coordinates their activity,48 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, federal constitutional acts, federal acts and the President’s decrees and regulations. Therefore, we can speak about double subordination of some ministries and federal offices: on the one hand, in accordance with general rules, to the Chairman of the Government (i.e. to the Government), and on the other hand, in accordance with the competence norm, to the President. Direct subordination of some ministers and heads of services to the President does not make them exempt from the obligation to work in the collectively operating Government and does not eliminate their accountability for acts adopted by the Government or accountability to the Chairman of the Government. The legal formula of double subordination approved by the legislator49 is an untypical and risky solution. In a hypothetical situation of tension between the presidential and governmental sides, which would be reflected in different expectations of some ministries and offices, disturbances might occur in the implementation of the state elementary tasks, and in the organisational plane, this might make the principle of collective action of the Government dysfunctional.

The President’s management of the above-mentioned areas of the executive power is directly laid down in the provisions of Act on the Government of the Russian Federation and in this context does not raise any doubts. On the other hand, a priori, it does not exclude presidential direction in other fields assigned to the federal executive. In this case, the a contrario conclusion not supported by an analysis of detailed provisions would be unjustified.

Although the legislator did not directly determine the nature of the relations between the President and the Government and did not define them as superiority-subordination relations, by assigning the President functions and tasks to perform, placed him in the relation with the federal executive in a position that, on the material plane, matches the features of general superiority over the Government.50 As concerns those tasks, first of all, we can refer to Article 80(3) of the Constitution. Pursuant to it, the President, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the federal laws, defines the guidelines of the domestic and foreign policies of the state, which, in accordance with Article 114 of the Constitution, the Government must implement. He does this in a complex way and without exceptions. In other words, the legislator does not exclude the “policy guidelines” from the President’s competences as ones that are reserved exclusively for the executive.

In general, the Government and its subordinated bodies of the federal executive power implement the guidelines of the domestic and foreign policies of the state

48 A.M. Tarasov, Prezidentskiy kontrol, Sankt Petersburg 2004, p. 307.49 F.M. Alyautdinov, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti v Rossiyskoy

Federatsii, Moscow 2001, p. 32; A.M. Nikolayev, Printsip razdelenia vlastey i jego realizatsia v Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii 1993 g. i tekushchem zakonodatelstvie, Moscow 2002, p. 115.

50 V.N. Suvorov, Prezident y Pravitelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii…, p. 23; also see, A.M. Nikolayev, Printsip razdelenia vlastey…, p. 112; J. Szymanek, Systemy rządów w krajach WNP: metodologia badań ustrojowo-porównawczych [Government systems in the CIS countries: methodology of comparative research], [in:] T. Bodio (ed.), Przywództwo, elity i transformacje w krajach WNP. Problemy metodologii badań [Leadership, elites and transformations in the CIS countries: Problems with research methodology], Warsaw 2010, p. 269.


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defined by the President. When defining the “guidelines of the domestic and foreign policies of the state”, the President decides about the content of governmental decisions. He provides a framework that the federal executive is competent to fill in with particular content. To what extent the framework is fixed, de facto forcing the cabinet to undertake particular resolutions with the content determined in advance, and to what extent it is only a guidance depends on the will of the head of the state. It is he who defines actual roles played by the Government in the federal decision-making process: to what extent these are roles of the main executive but, regardless of everything only an implementer of the President’s policies, and to what extent the Government maintains its subjectivity in the development of policies it implements.

Defining the directions of the domestic and foreign policies of the state, as a sphere of activity specified by the Government decisions and the system of bodies subordinate to it, is of primary importance and critical for the establishment of the relations between the President and the Government. It is a driving force for the Government activity. Also in this meaning, the President does not have to take particular, single executive decisions to establish the content of the governmental policies. He determines them as the one who decides about the strategy of the state policy as the objectives of the policies implemented by the federal executive. With the help of what measures he will achieve that is de facto a secondary issue devoid of the essence of decision-making, i.e. deciding what is important, worth implementing and what does not determine the key issues for large social groups. Setting objectives and establishing an action plan constitute a stage necessary in the process of managing the executive power; this is a stage that preconditions and determines the content of successive choices made by the executive. The constitutional regulation stipulating that the President determines the directions of domestic and foreign policies of the state results in an imperative for the Government action. The legislator did not determine its scope, content, intensity and form in which it should be implemented in the provisions of the Constitution or federal acts. This means that their only legal limitation is a requirement laid down in Article 80(3) of the Constitution that they must be in agreement with the provisions of the Constitution and federal acts. Therefore, the President has the powers to establish the basic directions of domestic and foreign policies of the state, provided that they do not collide with the provisions of the Constitution and federal acts. What must be referred to the fundamental directions of domestic and foreign policies of the state and what should be considered a form of their specification is the expression of the President’s discretion, his perception of political relations and challenges that the Russian Federation faces.51

The President’s actions in the area of domestic and foreign policies determining the space of governmental activity should be considered together with the provisions of Article 113 of the Constitution. In accordance with them, the Chairman of the Government defines the guidelines of the Government activities and organises its work in accordance with the Constitution and federal laws, which is typical in Europe, and in accordance with decrees of the President of the Russian Federation,

51 V.N. Suvorov, Konstitutsionniy status Prezidenta…, pp. 347–348.

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which is typical of the Russian system of government. The Constitution does not lay down the legal nature of the head of the state’ decree. It does not limit its regulations to a given group of issues or to the regulations having the nature of legal norms, i.e. rules of conduct that are general or abstract. In the light of the doctrine and practice, a decree may be non-normative, that is also specific. It may concern any state-related matters. It may contain requests that governmental bodies perform some specified activities or the President’s perception of the nature of activities the Government should undertake.

The President’s acts may be addressed not only directly to the Government but also to its Chairman, particular ministers or heads of the executive bodies, including those who are not directly subordinate to the President. This way, the decisions of the head of the state may be addressed to any federal executive body and are binding on each of them.52 Thus, we may speak of a broad subject matter and a legally important scope of tasks that the President may assign to federal executive bodies. Through decrees, the head of the state implements his strategic superiority over the Government and shapes the conduct of the executive on a day-to-day basis, to which the Chairman of the Government is obliged to adjust while organising the Government work.53

From the point of view of the generality of the defined requirements, the President’s acts addressed to the federal executive power may be divided into two groups: acts determining specific conduct and acts that are of general nature. In the former, the head of the state requests that a given executive body perform a given activity or achieve a particular effect. This type of activity may e.g. concern the implementation by the Government of a particular legislative initiative in a given area. The President has powers to develop the assumptions of a bill and assign a given federal executive body the task to develop it. He has powers to develop (e.g. in his annual speech) a directive on conduct, the application of which and achievement of the required effects are the task of the cabinet.

Apart from the acts in which the President articulates his will in a definite way, in the Russian practice, there are also acts, in which the President expresses his intention in a general way. He does not specify what kind of individual activities an executive body should undertake but wants a generally defined effect (e.g. tax collection efficiency or fight against corruption) to be achieved.

The President’s requests concern governmental matters. It is an argument for the thesis formulated by the Russian constitutional law doctrine54 that the President is competent to direct action in the field of governmental matters, federal executive power, i.e. he may exercise the executive power within the competence of the Government. How would he otherwise take decisions binding on the Government in the form of requests and directives, in order to implement his supremacy over the federal executive body and define its competences, if he were not competent in the sphere of its activities? The Russian doctrine presents the thesis that the President may

52 Ibid., p. 359.53 V.N. Suvorov, Prezident y Pravitelstvo Rossiyskoy Federatsii…, p. 24.54 V.N. Suvorov, Konstitutsionniy status Prezidenta…, p. 207.


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take state decisions and on his own act in the area of the governmental competences although, undoubtedly, the competences of the President and the Government differ substantially. He may take normative and non-normative decisions within a broad scope of the executive power competences.55 The subordination of the Government to the President is not limited to a definite group of issues. It is holistic in nature. The President, as a guarantor of the Constitution, has powers to enact any acts (including those specifically individual) in order to implement the provisions of the Constitution.56

The activity of the Government and subordinate bodies should be coordinated with the activities of the President. The two political power centres’ agreement on their activities serves their coherence, which is a sine qua non condition for the President’s approval of the activities the Government undertakes. Apart from constitutional and statutory mechanisms of cooperation between the federal executive bodies and the President and the practice of political communication, organisational measures are applicable that are aimed at maintaining unity and compliance of the activities of the Government and the President.

The Government agrees with the President not only on bills to be submitted to the State Duma. The projects of some other governmental decisions are also subject to this procedure. It concerns the projects of the decisions that are taken upon the President’s incentive as well as those discussed at the Government’s meeting chaired by the President. Similarly, the head of the state, in order to make agreements, receives projects of governmental decisions concerning the Government’s competences, human and citizen rights and freedoms, state sovereignty protection, state independence and integrity, securing harmonious functioning and cooperation of the state authorities, defining basic directions of domestic and foreign policies of the state, managing foreign policy and the operation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Also projects of the Government’s personal decisions concerning appointments to the federal executive positions subordinate to the President are subject to agreement.

In the same way as the Government agrees planned decisions with the President, the President seeks the Government’s opinion on the President’s plans concerning the issues within the competence of the Government. The President does that in order to make the cabinet take them into consideration in its work. The President submits to the Government his plans concerning legislation on the Government competences. Similarly, the President submits bills on issues within the competence of the Government to the State Duma. In accordance with Article 104(3) of the Constitution, the President submits bills on financial matters to the Government for opinion. He seeks the Government’s opinion on the projects of his decrees and regulations concerning issues within the competence of the Government.

In the light of the legal regulations in force, it is necessary to see the complexity of the system of instruments for coordinating the activity of the Government and the President. They are to ensure the total uniformity of undertakings of the federal

55 Ibid., p. 207.56 Ibid., p. 208.

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executive bodies and the President managing them and, this way the coherence and internal rationality of the policies implemented by the Russian Federation.

Article 115(1) and (3) and Article 114(1)(g) of the Constitution have the same consequences for the relations between the President and the Government. According to the former, the Government adopts resolutions and regulations, and ensures their implementation not only based on and in order to implement the Constitution and federal acts but also normative decrees of the President. Thus, decrees are measures of regulating the organisation, competences and activities of the Federal Government. When determining the directions of the activity of the cabinet and assigning tasks to it, the head of the state has measures to control the Government. The control concerns not only constitutionality of the Government’s activity and its compliance with statutes but also conformity with the President’s decrees. This means a possibility of controlling the policy the Government implements and its coherence with the president’s policy.

If the resolutions and regulations of the Government collide with the Constitution, federal acts or the President’s decrees, the President has powers to quash them on his own and this way react to undesired, from his point of view, decisions of the Government.57 What causes controversies is the fact that he does not have to refer to the Constitutional Court to have them declared unconstitutional.58 Giving the President the derogating power must be confronted with the nature of the Constitutional Court as a specialised body appointed to check constitutionality of legal norms and, originally, having exclusive rights to do that. In a situation when the Government is not the President’s cabinet, there are doubts whether the President’s competence is not in conflict with the principle of separation of powers between federal bodies.59 The President should not adjudicate on the issues of constitutionality of the Government’s normative acts on his own. As a guarantor of the Constitution (Article 80(2) of the Constitution) he should request the Constitutional Court to examine constitutionality of legal provisions. The President’s power to quash the Government’s acts goes beyond the assessment of their lawfulness. This refers to any reasons why the head of the state may interfere in the cabinet’s normative activity. These may be legal reasons as well as economic, social or political ones. What is characteristic of the nature of the relations between the President and the Government, the provisions of the Constitution do not require that the President should substantiate the motives behind his objectives resulting in decisive interference in the Government’s law-making activity. The President’s power to quash the Government’s legal acts may be treated as sui generis President’s supervision over the Government’s legislative activity.

The President has powers to grant competences to the Government. When granting competences, the head of the state not only assigns new forms of activity

57 Ibid., p. 353.58 See, R.M. Dzuzoyev, D.Yu. Priymak, Konstitutsionno-pravovoy status Predziedatela

Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Krasnodar 2009, pp. 97–98.59 See I.A. Yonov, Polnomochiya Prezidenta RF po otmenye aktov Pravitelstva RF i prostanovleniyu

deystviya aktov organov ispolnitelnoy wlasti subektov Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Konstitutsionnoye i munitsipalnoye pravo No. 4, 2004, pp. 39–40.


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to the Government but also indicates necessary actions to be taken, which can be connected with his own understanding of the required cabinet’s policy.

Legislative policy of the Russian Federation is an important area of mutual interaction of the President and the Government. Both, the President and the Government have the right of legislative initiative. Thus, because of the superior competences of the President over the Government, it is necessary for them to work out the forms of cooperation in the field of legislation. This is implemented in many ways. Some of them are directly laid down in legal provisions; others reflect the conduct of political activities. At the same time, some forms of cooperation result from the President’s constitutional tasks; some others depend on the nature of functions performed by the Government and its competences to perform tasks assigned by the President.60

The Government is an active implementer of the President’s annual addresses on the situation in the country and on the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the state delivered to the Federal Assembly. They provide an agenda for the state activities, which the Government should transform into bills. From a legal perspective, the addresses are not legal acts binding for the Government. They do not oblige it to undertake or abandon relevant activities. In practice, if we take into consideration the President’s personal and institutional authority, they cannot be overestimated. They inspire the federal executive bodies to legislative activity. The Government adopts agendas to implement the President’s addresses.61

Legislative cooperation of the President and the Government covers also budgetary issues. It is a specification of the President’s addresses to the Federal Assembly on budget-related matters. The head of the state determines current priorities of financial activity of the state, which, on the part of the Government, results in an obligation to undertake specific actions aimed at their implementation.62

5. CONCLUSION

Summing up, the entirety of the relations between the President and the Govern-ment allows us to state that, although formally the legislator did not define the President to be the head of the executive power, due to the competences assigned to him, he was actually assigned this role, which is confirmed by practice. In other words, although the President of the Russian Federation is not an executive body, he exercises the executive power.

60 S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsonno-pravovoy status…, p. 120.61 For example, the regulation of the Government of the Russian Federation on the complex

of activities to implement the main theses of the Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2007. Sobraniye zakonodatelstva RF 2007, No. 26, p. 3196.

62 S.A. Dmitriyev, Konstitutsonno-pravovoy status…, p. 121.

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ON THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Summary

The analysis is devoted to the President of the Russian Federation as the executive power. The author formulates a thesis that, regardless of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation according to which the federal Government holds the executive power of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian Federation has the competence typical of the executive power.

Keywords: Russian Federation, President, executive power, Government

O WŁADZY WYKONAWCZEJ PREZYDENTA FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

Przedstawiany tekst poświęcony jest Prezydentowi Federacji Rosyjskiej jako władzy wyko-nawczej. Stawia się w nim tezę, że niezależnie od przepisów Konstytucji Federacji Rosyjskiej, zgodnie z którymi federalną władzę wykonawczą sprawuje Rząd Federacji Rosyjskiej, również Prezydent Federacji Rosyjskiej posiada kompetencje typowe dla władzy wykonawczej.

Słowa kluczowe: Federacja Rosyjska, Prezydent, władza wykonawcza, rząd

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