on the road to democracy: transition and consolidation

byGinandjar Kartasasmita

National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Tokyo, Japan

2012

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THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO

• a country of 240 million (as of 2010), • an archipelago strung 5000 kilometers along the equator. • more than 13,000 islands, 5,000 are inhabited. • more than 200 ethnic groups and 350 languages and dialects. • 85 to 90% are Muslims.

www.ginandjar.comDay2_GRIPS 2012

Reform

Multi Party

Freedom of Speech

Human Rights

Rule of Law

Good Governance

1999Election

2004Election

DemocraticGovernment

International Acknowledgement

• Strong Parliament• Constitutional

Court• Robust Civil

Society• Free Press

Early Stage of Economic Recovery

Regional Autonomy

Peace in•Aceh•Papua

ConstitutionalAmendments

Return of Poverty Reduction

Fall of New Order

Decentralization

Release of Political Prisoners

Fight Against Corruption

Return of Growth

Return of Economic Stability

Early Stage of Economic Recovery

Foundation for Sustainable

Economic Growth

Independence of Monetary Authority

Dismantling Monopolies

Free and Fair Competition

Good Corporate Governance

Reversed Economic Downturn

Political

Economic

Habibie

Gus Dur

Megawati SBY

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ExternallyInduced

2010Election

2008Crisis

Dissatisfied Public

Nostalgia forOriginal 1945 Constitution

Active Formal Opposition

Call for 5th Amendment

DynamicEconomic

&PoliticalCondition

SBYReelected

SBY vs MEGAWATI

Political Response

Economic Response

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CONTENTS

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW– THE PRE‐COLONIAL KINGDOMS – DUTCH COLONIALISM – RISE OF INDONESIA’S NATIONALISM – CONSTRUCTION OF INDEPENDENCE – BIRTH OF A NATION – WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 1945 ‐ 1949 – RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE – AN ATTEMPT AT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY – THE TURBULENT YEARS – GUIDED DEMOCRACY – THE CONFRONTATION AGAINST THE WEST – SUKARNO: THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY – THE END OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE NEW

ORDER

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CONTENTS

INDONESIA UNDER THE NEW ORDER– POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ORDER – TO WHAT EXTENT WAS INDONESIA A DEMOCRACY ? – “FUSION” OF POLITICAL PARTY (1973) – DEMOCRATIC OR NON‐DEMOCRATIC? – WHAT KEPT THE REGIME IN POWER SO LONG? – DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY – POLITICAL STABILITY – ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY – WHAT WENT WRONG? – A RENEWED MANDATE: WASTED OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE– THE FLASH POINT– THE FINAL CURTAIN – CONCLUSION

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CONTENTS

ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACYHABIBIE GOVERNMENT

– INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING – THE LEGITIMACY DILEMMA – MPR SESSION – MPR SPECIAL SESSION – OPPOSITION AGAINST HABIBIE – HABIBIE’S POLITICAL PILLARS – COMMUNAL STRIFE – LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY – POLITICAL PARTIES AND GENERAL ELECTION 1999 – SOME OF THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL LAWS – IRONICALLY – THE PITFALLS – EAST TIMOR – BANK BALI CASE – THE END OF THE BEGINNING

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CONTENTS

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID GOVERNMENT – DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION – THE EUPHORIA – POLITICAL LIMBO – DISHONORING THE DEAL – ECONOMIC SLIPPAGE – DEJA VU? – CORRUPTION SCANDALS – DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL – IMPEACHMENT

MEGAWATI GOVERNMENT– THE DOWNSIDE – AUTHORITARIAN NOSTALGIA

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CONTENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM– THE CONSTITUTION: A SACRED DOCUMENT? – THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ORIGINAL UUD ‘45 – THE EVOLVING POLITICAL SYSTEM – GOALS OF REFORM – THE METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

– THE MECHANICS OF REFORM AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION – THE AMENDMENT PROCESS – THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1999 – THE SECOND AMENDMENT 2000 – THE THIRD AMENDMENT 2001 – THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2002 – STRONG FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

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CONTENTS

PRACTICING DEMOCRACY: The 2004 General Elections: Significant Beginnings

– CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM – STATE INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION – REMAKING THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS – LEGISLATIVE ELECTION – LEGISLATIVE ELECTION – PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2004 ELECTION – DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS

2009 GENERAL ELECTION DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: An Unfinished

Business LESSONS TO BE LEARNED POST‐SCRIPT

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A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

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THE PRE‐COLONIAL KINGDOMS

RULED BY SEVERAL HINDU/BUDDHIST KINGDOMS.

ESTABLISHED CONTACTS AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER POWERS IN ASIA SUCH AS CHINA, INDIA, AND CONTINENTAL SOUTH EAST ASIA .

IN THE ISLAMIC ERA MOSTLY MUSLIM KINGDOMS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE ARCHIPELAGO.


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FIRST CAME TO INDONESIA AT THE END OF THE 16TH CENTURY AS TRADERS, AND LATER AS COLONIZERS.

THE COLONIAL RULE WAS ESTABLISHED GRADUALLY, ISLAND‐BY‐ISLAND, AFTER CONQUERING OR TRICKING THE VARIOUS KINGDOMS TO SUBSERVIENCE.

BY PLAYING OFF INDIGENOUS KINGDOMS AGAINST EACH OTHER AND EXPLOITING DIVISIONS AND SCRAMBLES FOR POWER WITHIN THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLDS.

THE DUTCH RULED THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO FOR AROUND THREE AND A HALF CENTURIES.


DUTCH COLONIALISM

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RISE OF INDONESIA’S NATIONALISM

MAY 20, 1908 THE BIRTH OF AN INTELLECTUAL ORGANIZATION BUDI UTOMO, COMMEMORATED AS THE “NATIONAL AWAKENING DAY.”

OCTOBER 28, 1928 DECLARATION OF THE YOUTH OATH: ONE COUNTRY, ONE NATION, ONE LANGUAGE: INDONESIA.

IN WORLD WAR II, THE JAPANESE MILITARY DROVE OUT THE DUTCH AND OCCUPIED INDONESIA AS THE NEW COLONIAL RULER.


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CONSTRUCTION OF INDEPENDENCE

THE DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH AT THE HANDS OF AN ASIAN POWER FUELED THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCES.

THE JAPANESE ALLOWED A COMMITTEE TO BE ESTABLISHED TO “INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.”

WHAT PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION THE INDEPENDENT INDONESIA STATE SHOULD BE BUILT?


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THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF INDONESIA’S INDEPENDENCE AGREED ON PANCASILA AS THE STATE PHILOSOPHY.

PANCASILA: 1) BELIEF IN THE ONE AND ONLY GOD; 2) JUST AND CIVILIZED HUMANITY; 3) THE UNITY OF INDONESIA; 4) DEMOCRACY; 5) SOCIAL JUSTICE.


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THE JAKARTA CHARTER: BELIEF IN ONE AND ONLY GOD AND ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF WORSHIP, WITH AN ADDITIONAL STIPULATION THAT THE ISLAMIC SYARIAH (OR LAWS) SHOULD BE PRACTICED BY ITS ADHERENTS.


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BIRTH OF A NATION

ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT NATION HAD ALREADY EXISTED WHEN THE JAPANESE SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIED POWERS.

AUGUST 17 1945, SUKARNO AND HATTA ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE, PROCLAIMED THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA.

AUGUST 18, 1945: THE PROMULGATION OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT WITH SUKARNO AS PRESIDENT AND HATTA AS VICE PRESIDENT.

INDONESIA UNDER THE 1945 CONSTITUTION: A NATIONALIST, NON‐SECTARIAN, UNITARIAN REPUBLIC WITH A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.


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WAR OF INDEPENDENCE1945 ‐ 1949

THE DUTCH REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THEIR FORMER COLONY.

ASSISTED BY THEIR ALLIES PUT AN ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH CONTROL.

THE FLEDGLING NATION HAD ALSO TO FACE DOMESTIC CHALLENGES: MUSLIM EXTREMISTS AND COMMUNIST REVOLT IN 1948.


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RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE

IN DECEMBER 1949, THE DUTCH FINALLY RECOGNIZED THE INDEPENDENCE OF INDONESIA IN THE FORM OF A FEDERATED REPUBLIC.

AUGUST L950 THE FEDERAL STATE WAS ABOLISHED AND THE UNITARIAN REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA REESTABLISHED.

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1950: A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT HEADED BY A PRIME MINISTER RESPONSIBLE TO A PARLIAMENT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WAS ONLY THE HEAD OF STATE AND HAD ALMOST NO POLITICAL POWER.


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AN ATTEMPT AT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN 1955 A FREE AND FAIR MULTIPARTY ELECTION IN THE FIRST

GENERAL ELECTION, TO ELECT THE PARLIAMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY (KONSTITUANTE).

THE WEAK SHORT‐LIVED GOVERNMENTS CREATED A LEADERSHIP VACUUM AND INDECISIVENESS AT TIME WHEN STRONG LEADERSHIP WAS NEEDED.

IN 1957 THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY THE KONSTITUANTE FAILED TO REACH THE NECESSARY

MAJORITY TO GET AN AGREEMENT ON A NEW CONSTITUTION. ON JULY 5TH, L959, THE PRESIDENT SUKARNO DISSOLVED THE

PARLIAMENT AND KONSTITUANTEWITH A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AND RESTORED THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

SUKARNO DECLARED THAT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, HAD FAILED IN INDONESIA AND HAD BROUGHT ONLY DISUNITY AND MISERY TO THE PEOPLE.


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THE TURBULENT YEARS

CENTRAL AUTHORITY BEING CHALLENGED BY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THE REGIONS.

THE DARUL ISLAM CONTINUED TO POSE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

CONFLICT WITH THE FORMER COLONIAL MASTER HAD RESUMED, AS THE DUTCH KEPT THEIR HOLD ON WEST IRIAN.

SINCE MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE DUTCH POSITION ON THE WEST IRIAN ISSUE, INDONESIA TURNED TO THE EASTERN BLOC TO PROCURE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

THE RISE OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS: THE DUAL FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY.


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GUIDED DEMOCRACY

SUKARNO PROCLAIMED “GUIDED DEMOCRACY” AS THE SUITABLE SYSTEM FOR INDONESIA.

THE PROVISIONAL MPR CONFERRED UPON SUKARNO THE TITLE OF THE GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION, WHICH IN EFFECT CARRIED MORE POWER THAN WHAT THE MERE TITLE MAY SUGGEST.

SUKARNO ENDED INDONESIA’S FIRST ATTEMPT AT DEMOCRACY. INDONESIA NOW JOINED THE GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO REVERSE FROM DEMOCRACY TO AUTHORITARIANISM.


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THE CONFRONTATION AGAINST THE WEST

PRESIDENT SUKARNO WAS OPPOSED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW MALAYSIAN STATE, AND ACCUSED IT AS NO MORE THAN A WESTERN NEOCOLONIAL PLOY.

TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY CONFRONTATION, INDONESIA BECAME MORE DEPENDENT ON ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.

SUKARNO DEVELOPED THE IDEA OF FORMING THE NEW EMERGING FORCE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO WESTERN‐DOMINATED INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD REACHED ITS PEAK WHEN SUKARNO ANNOUNCED INDONESIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS IN JANUARY 1965.

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SUKARNO: THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY

THE ORDINARY INDONESIAN PEOPLE LOVED SUKARNO

HE WAS A MAN OF VISION, AN ARDENT NATIONALIST ALBEIT A ROMANTIC IDEALIST.

HE IMBUED AMONG THE PEOPLE THE PRIDE OF BEING INDONESIAN AND SPENT ALL HIS ADULT LIFE PROJECTING THE DIGNITY OF A NATION WITH LONG HISTORY, CULTURE, AND TRADITION.

HE WAS REGARDED IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD AS A GREAT LEADER AND A WORLD STATESMAN


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INDONESIA UNDER SUKARNO TOOK A LEADING ROLE IN ASIAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES SOLIDARITY AND FIGHT AGAINST COLONIALISM

SUKARNO TOGETHER WITH THIRD WORLD LEADERS INITIATED THE NON‐ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WHICH UNTIL TODAY STILL EXISTS

BUT HIS MISGUIDED ECONOMIC POLICIES BASED ON THE NOTION OF A “GUIDED ECONOMY” BROUGHT CHAOS TO THE ECONOMY AND INCREASED SUFFERING FOR THE COMMON PEOPLE


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THE END OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE NEW ORDER

ON SEPTEMBER 30TH 1965, AN ABORTED COUP D’ETAT WAS ALLEGEDLY STAGED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY

TWO MILITARY FIGURES ESCAPED FROM THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, GENERAL NASUTION AND MAYOR GENERAL SUHARTO

PROCEEDED TO MOBILIZE THE LOYAL MILITARY FORCES, AND NEUTRALIZED THE UNITS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THE MUTINY.

THE RIFT OF PRESIDENT SUKARNO AND THE MILITARY CAME INTO THE OPEN.


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ON MAY 11TH 1966 PRESIDENT SUKARNO, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY AND THE PUBLIC, ISSUED A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO ACCEDE AUTHORITY OF DAY‐TO‐DAY GOVERNMENT TO GENERAL SUHARTO

IN THE 1968 THE PROVISIONAL MPR DISMISSED SUKARNO AS PRESIDENT AND APPOINTED GENERAL SUHARTO AS HIS SUCCESSOR, HENCE RISE OF THE NEW ORDER


INDONESIA UNDER THE NEW ORDER

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People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)

Parliament (DPR)

Regional Representatives

Functional Group

Elected directly by the people

Elected by Regional Assembly

Appointed: Representative of mass organization and Civil

Society

MPR is manifestation of the people sovereignty has the authority to: Amend the Constitution. Elect the President and/or Vice

President. Impeach the President and/or

Vice‐President. Determine the State Policy

Guidelines.


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POLITICAL SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ORDER

THE NEW ORDER REGIME RELIED HEAVILY ON A SET OF STRUCTURES OF IDEAS BASED ON INDONESIAN CULTURES, ESPECIALLY JAVANESE CULTURE.

THE NEW ORDER CARRIED OVER THE “GUIDED DEMOCRACY” PRINCIPLES OF THE PRECEDING REGIME, THROUGH A MORE REFINED AND SUBTLE METHOD.

THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR IDEOLOGY BECAME “PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE”; ISLAMIC EXTREMISM RANKED SECOND

THE NEW ORDER TRIED TO DEFINE ITS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY BETWEEN “WESTERN” INDIVIDUALISM AND “EASTERN” COLLECTIVISM.


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IN THE “PANCASILA DEMOCRACY” SYSTEM, THE WESTERN IDEA OF OPPOSITION WAS REJECTED.

THE SUHARTO REGIME WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS POLITICAL PARTIES, GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND ELECTED PARLIAMENT.


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TO WHAT EXTENT WAS INDONESIA A DEMOCRACY ?

GOLKAR, THE RULING ‘PARTY’, WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1964 ORIGINALLY AS AN EXTENDED ARM OF THE MILITARY TO COMBAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PKI) THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS.

THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THE NEW ORDER WAS HELD IN 1971 PARTICIPATED BY NINE POLITICAL PARTIES AND GOLKAR.

IN 1973 THE “FUSION” WAS COMPLETED, IN WHICH THE ISLAMIC PARTIES MERGED INTO PPP, AND THE NATIONALIST AND CHRISTIAN PARTIES “FUSED” INTO PDI.

IN EVERY GENERAL ELECTION FROM 1977 TO 1997 WAS CONTESTED BY THESE THREE PARTIES.

GOLKAR UNFAILINGLY WINNING EVERY ELECTION, GARNERING AT LEAST TWO THIRD OF THE VOTES.


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“FUSION” OF POLITICAL PARTY (1973)

Perti

PSII

Parmusi

NUPPP:

MurbaIPKI

KatolikParkindo

PNIPDI:

GOLKAR


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DEMOCRATIC OR NON‐DEMOCRATIC?

THE WAY THE SYSTEM WORKED DURING THE NEW ORDER OBVIOUSLY DID NOT MEET THE BASIC PRINCIPLES REQUIRED IN A DEMOCRACY IN TERMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATION AS ARGUED BY MOST SCHOLARLY LITERATURE.

THE EXISTENCE OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS WAS HIGHLY REGULATED, AND ONLY THE ONES THAT WERE ESTABLISHED OR RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT WERE ALLOWED TO EXIST, THESE INCLUDING THE BUSINESS, LABOR, JOURNALIST, YOUTH, AND WOMEN ORGANIZATIONS.

THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ARGUMENTS REFUTING THE NEW ORDER’S CLAIM TO DEMOCRACY.


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WHAT KEPT THE REGIME IN POWER SO LONG?

IF INDONESIA WAS NOT A TRUE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, WHAT KEPT THE SYSTEM IN POWER FOR SO LONG AND WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF ITS RESILIENCE?

PABOTTINGI (1995: 225) REFLECTING THE VIEW OF MANY ANALYSTS SUGGESTS THAT “…INCUMBENTS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE NEW ORDER ARGUE ITS LEGITIMACY ON TWO KEY GROUNDS: POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.”

THE ENDLESS POLITICAL STRIFE OF THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND GUIDED DEMOCRACY CREATED ACUTE POLITICAL INSTABILITY THAT RENDERED DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IMPOSSIBLE AND EVEN THREATENED THE SURVIVAL OF THE STATE.


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HUNTINGTON ARGUES THAT MANY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES INITIALLY JUSTIFY THEMSELVES BY WHAT HE CALLS A “NEGATIVE LEGITIMACY,” BASING THEIR CLAIM OF LEGITIMACY ON THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND PROMISING THAT THE NEW REGIME IS COMBATING INTERNAL SUBVERSION, REDUCING SOCIAL TURMOIL, REESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER, ELIMINATING CORRUPTION AND VENAL CIVILIAN POLITICIANS, AND ENHANCING NATIONAL VALUES.

THESE WERE THE EXACT RATIONALES THE NEW ORDER PUT FORWARD WHEN IT EMERGED IN 1966 WITH THE SUPPORT OF STUDENTS, INTELLECTUALS AND VARIOUS MASS AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.

AND INDEED THOSE OBSERVATIONS HELP EXPLAIN WHY THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT UNDER SUHARTO HAD BEEN ABLE TO STAY IN POWER FOR SO LONG: IT DELIVERED!

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AT ITS INCEPTION THE NEW ORDER CONSIDERED ITSELF TO BE A REFORMIST GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY POPULAR MOVEMENTS OF STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS. ITS DRIVE HAD THREE MAIN THRUSTS: A RETURN TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION; TO CREATE POLITICAL STABILITY; AND TO AMELIORATE THE PEOPLE’S SUFFERING THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

THE NEW ORDER CREDO OF “THE DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY,” REFERRED TO POLITICAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND EQUITY. THIS BECAME THE BATTLE CRY OF THE NEW ORDER WITH EVERYTHING ELSE SUBORDINATED TO IT.

AND TO A FAIR DEGREE THE NEW ORDER ACHIEVED ITS GOALS.

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DEVELOPMENT TRILOGY

Stability

Growth Equity


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POLITICAL STABILITY

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM HAD PRODUCED THE INTENDED RESULT: POLITICAL STABILITY THAT HAD ENDURED FOR THREE DECADES, SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH WHICH IN TURN FURTHER REINFORCED ITS CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY.


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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY

POLITICAL STABILITY ASSURED, AND WITH UNIFORMITY OF PURPOSE AND METHOD THE NEW ORDER EARNESTLY EMBARKED ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WAS WIDELY CONSIDERED AS SUCCESSFUL USING VARIOUS STANDARD OF MEASUREMENTS.

AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN EXCESS OF 7% LED TO A MORE THAN 10‐FOLD RISE IN INDONESIANS’ PER CAPITA INCOME AND A DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN POVERTY FROM AN ESTIMATED 70% OF THE POPULATION IN THE L960S TO AROUND 11% BY THE MID‐1990S.


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LIFE EXPECTANCY ROSE AND INFANT MORTALITY DECLINED DRAMATICALLY.

EIGHT OUT OF TEN OF THE POPULATION HAD ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND TWO OUT OF THREE TO SAFE DRINKING WATER, SELF‐SUFFICIENCY IN RICE PRODUCTION.


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WHAT WENT WRONG?

HUNTINGTON (1991: 54‐55) MAKES THE POINT THAT THE LEGITIMACY OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME MIGHT BE UNDERMINED EVEN IF IT DOES DELIVER ON ITS PROMISES.

“BY ACHIEVING ITS PURPOSE, IT LOST ITS PURPOSE. THIS REDUCED THE REASONS WHY THE PUBLIC SHOULD SUPPORT THE REGIME, GIVEN OTHER COSTS (E.G. LACK OF FREEDOM) CONNECTED WITH THE REGIME”(1991: 55).

HE POSITS THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR DEMOCRACY.


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HE CITES THE FAMOUS—ALBEIT MUCH CONTESTED‐‐LIPSET HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: THE WEALTHY COUNTRIES ARE DEMOCRATIC AND THE MOST DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ARE WEALTHY.

HE ARGUES THAT: “IN POOR COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIZATION IS UNLIKELY; IN RICH COUNTRIES IT HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.

IN BETWEEN THERE IS A POLITICAL TRANSITION ZONE; COUNTRIES IN THAT PARTICULAR ECONOMIC STRATUM ARE MOST LIKELY TO TRANSIT TO DEMOCRACY AND MOST COUNTRIES THAT TRANSIT TO DEMOCRACY WILL BE IN THAT STRATUM.” (1991: 60).


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HE MAINTAINS THAT A SOCIAL SCIENTIST WHO WISHED TO PREDICT FUTURE DEMOCRATIZATION “WOULD HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL IF HE SIMPLY FINGERED THE NON‐DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES IN THE $1,000‐$3,000 (GNP PER CAPITA) TRANSITION ZONE” (1991: 63).

FURTHER STUDIES, IN PARTICULAR AN EXTENSIVE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DONE BY PRZEWORSKY ET.AL. (2000: 92) HAS LENT SUPPORT TO HUNTINGTON’S THRESHOLD ARGUMENT.


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IN HIS ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH TO THE MPR ON MARCH 1, 1998, PRESIDENT SUHARTO (1998: 16) REPORTED THAT IN1996, THE YEAR BEFORE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS SWEPT INDONESIA, ITS GNP PER CAPITA HAD REACHED $1,155.

ACCORDING TO HUNTINGTON’S THEORY, AT THAT STAGE INDONESIA HAD ENTERED THE TRANSITION ZONE, WHICH MEANT THAT EVENTUALLY SOONER OR LATER POLITICAL CHANGE WOULD HAPPEN.


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THREE DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT HAD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE LEVEL AND REACH OF EDUCATION ACROSS THE NATION AND SOCIAL CLASSES.

WITH EDUCATION CAME ENLIGHTENMENT AND EMANCIPATION FROM CULTURAL RESTRICTION, FREEING PEOPLE FROM THE SHACKLES OF OLD INHIBITIONS AND TRADITIONS.

WITH EDUCATION PEOPLE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE MORE NEEDS THAN JUST PRIMARY NEEDS OF FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHELTER.


48

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE BROUGHT ABOUT THE OPENING UP NOT OF ONLY THE INDONESIAN MARKET TO FOREIGN GOODS BUT ALSO THE INDONESIAN SOCIETY TO FOREIGN IDEAS.

WITH GLOBALIZATION CAME NOT ONLY THE INTEGRATION OF MARKETS BUT ALSO THE INTRODUCTION AND EVENTUAL INTEGRATION OF IDEAS.

WITH THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING STANDARD RESULTING FROM WIDESPREAD BENEFIT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION A STRONG MIDDLE CLASS HAD BEEN FORMED SOON TO BECOME THE BACK BONE OF THE FORCES FOR POLITICAL EMANCIPATION AND REFORM.


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THE SUPPOSED ULTIMATE VICTORY OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST ALL OTHER SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT (SEE FUKUYAMA, 1992) HAS CHANGED THE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL ATTITUDES, OR AT LEAST THE ELITE’S PERCEPTION, OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS AN EVIL SYSTEM.

THOUSANDS OF INDONESIANS WHO STUDIED AT FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES, MOST OF THEM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, LEARNED FIRST HAND THE SOCIO‐CULTURAL VALUES THAT HAS BEEN THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES THAT RESULTED IN THE AFFLUENCE OF THE WESTERN SOCIETIES.

THEY RETURNED HOME IMBUED WITH THE SPIRIT OF FREEDOM, WHICH WAS A POTENT SOURCE OF INSPIRATION AND MOTIVATION TO CHANGE.


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THE BREAKDOWN OF BARRIERS TO COMMUNICATION, THE MAIN FORCE BEHIND GLOBALIZATION AND THE DRIVE TOWARD A HIGHER DEGREE OF CIVILIZATION, SWEPT INDONESIA WITH READILY AVAILABLE AND UP TO DATE INFORMATION.

IT FREED THE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE CONSTRAINTS OF TIME AND SPACE.

CENSORSHIP WAS NO LONGER RELEVANT, BECAUSE ONE COULD ACCESS INFORMATION THROUGH THE INTERNET, CNN OR CABLE TV, OR JUST TRAVEL.

THE DIFFUSION OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS BY THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY WAS UNSTOPPABLE.

THE INFORMATION BERLIN WALL WAS CRUMBLING DOWN.


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WHEN THE GOVERNMENT CLOSED DOWN THE POPULAR INDONESIA MAGAZINE, TEMPO, BECAUSE OF IT CRITICAL TONE, IT SIMPLY RESURFACED AS AN INTERNET WEBSITE.

PEOPLE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE FALL OF NON‐DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE PHILIPPINES AND KOREA.


52

AT THE HEIGHT OF THE PRAISE FOR THE NEW ORDER ACHIEVEMENT, MANY INDONESIAN SCHOLARS AND CRITICS NOTED THE LACK OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS ONE OF THE MAJOR CRITICISM OF THE NEW ORDER.

THEY ARGUED THAT THE INDONESIAN ECONOMIC SUCCESS HAD BENEFITED THE URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL SECTOR WHILE (RELATIVELY) MARGINALIZING THE RURAL AND TRADITIONAL SECTORS.


53

AN INDONESIAN SOCIAL SCIENTIST, PABOTTINGI, NOTED THAT NEW ORDER ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES THAT HAD RESULTED IN “INORDINATE DOMINANCE OF THE NON‐PRIBUMI IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, PARTICULARLY IN THE URBAN AND MODERN SECTOR”, AND OFFERS A PREDICTION THAT THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE PRIBUMI AND THE NON‐PRIBUMI “COULD WELL BE THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE NEW ORDER”.


54

WHILE ECONOMICALLY THE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO AND INTENTLY PURSUING OPEN POLICIES, POLITICALLY THE GOVERNMENT KEPT A TIGHT A GRIP.

THE TIGHTENING CONTROL OVER POLICIES AND DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT ONLY STRENGTHENED THE FORCES OF CHANGE WITHIN SOCIETY BUT ALSO DISILLUSIONED HIS ORIGINAL AND TRADITIONAL SUPPORTERS, EVEN THOSE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.


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THE EMERGING ROLE OF ISLAM AS A FORCE OF CHANGE SHOULD ALSO NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

UHLIN (1997:82) AGUES THAT MANY INDONESIAN PRO‐DEMOCRACY ACTIVISTS ARE MORE THAN NOMINALLY MUSLIM AND THEY OFTEN USE ISLAMIC DISCOURSES TO MOTIVATE THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY.


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AMONG THE SOCIAL FORCES THAT WERE POISED AGAINST THE NEW ORDER, THE MOST CONSISTENT AND MILITANT WERE THE STUDENTS.

IN THE HISTORY OF THE NATION, EVEN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, THE INDONESIAN YOUTH AND STUDENTS PLAYED PIVOTAL ROLE.

THEY PARTICIPATED IN EVERY IMPORTANT EVENT IN THE NATION COURSE OF HISTORY.


57

THERE IS NO MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN INDONESIA THAT DID NOT INVOLVE THE YOUTH AND STUDENTS.

BY THE 1970S, STUDENT ACTIVISM HAD BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT.

IN 1974 STUDENTS STAGED HUGE DEMONSTRATIONS, AGAINST CORRUPTION AND AGAINST JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT; MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE INCIDENT KNOWN AS MALARI WERE TRIED AND JAILED.


58

IN 1978 THERE WAS AGAIN A WAVE OF STUDENT PROTESTS.

STUDENT ACTIVISM CONTINUED INTO THE 1980S AND 1990S SOME TAKING UP NATIONAL ISSUES LIKE CORRUPTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, OTHERS LOCAL ISSUES, SUCH AS EVICTION OF PEOPLE FROM AREAS DESIGNATED FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR AREA.


59

ALTHOUGH THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS MOST OF THE TIME WERE WIDELY SCATTERED, UNFOCUSED AND UN‐COORDINATED AND WERE ISOLATED FROM BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT, THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL IN GALVANIZING THE SILENT MAJORITY TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES CONFRONTING THE NATION.

UHLIN NOTES THAT THE STUDENT ACTIVISM OF THE LATE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S HAS CONTRIBUTED TO A RADICALIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION IN INDONESIA.


60

WITH ALL THE CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND NORMS, AND THE FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST THE NEW ORDER, FROM OUTSIDE AND WITHIN ITS OWN RANK, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE HUNTINGTON’S PREDICTION WOULD BE REALIZED.

IT WOULD, HOWEVER, STILL NEED A CATALYST TO QUICKEN THE PACE OF CHANGE.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS WAS THE TRIGGER THAT WOULD SET THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE POLITICAL CHANGE.

EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS LED HUNTINGTON (1991: 59) TO BELIEVE THAT CRISES PRODUCED BY EITHER RAPID GROWTH OR ECONOMIC RECESSION WEAKENED AUTHORITARIANISM.


61

EVENTS LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER HAD SHOWN THE SYMPTOMS OBSERVED BY HAGGARD AND KAUFMAN (1999: 76) THAT ECONOMIC CRISES UNDERMINE THE ‘AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS’ FORGED BETWEEN RULERS AND KEY SOCIOPOLITICAL CONSTITUENTS.

THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO SALVAGE HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO WITHDRAW VOLUNTARILY FOLLOWED THEIR GENERAL OBSERVATION THAT “THE RESULTING ISOLATION (OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS) TENDS TO FRAGMENT THE RULING ELITE FURTHER AND REDUCE ITS CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE FAVORABLE TERMS OF EXIT” (IBID.).


62

HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE NEW ORDER WAS FACED WITH SERIOUS CRISES.

ALTHOUGH ARGUABLY THE 1997/98 CRISIS WAS THE SEVEREST AND THE MOST DEVASTATING IN TERMS OF ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERAL POPULACE‐‐ THE NEGATIVE GROWTH OF ALMOST –15% RESULTING IN THE REDUCTION OF REAL INCOME AND INCREASE IN POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT‐‐ STILL OTHER NON‐DEMOCRATIC (BY WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY STANDARDS) REGIMES IN THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL REGION SUCH AS MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE COULD WEATHER THE CRISIS AND THEIR REGIMES SURVIVED AND OUTLASTED THE CRISIS.


63

MANY OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IDENTIFIED ABOVE WERE LONG PRESENT, LATENT IN THE UNDERCURRENT OF INDONESIAN POLITICS FOR YEARS.

BY THEMSELVES HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT PRESENT A SUFFICIENT CHALLENGE CAPABLE OF ENDING SUHARTO’S RULE.

THE NEW ORDER’S CENTRALIZED POWER STRUCTURE AND CAREFUL CONTROL OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WOULD HAVE ENSURED THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT POSITION.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, IN THIS VIEW, HAS CERTAIN INERTIA.


64

BUT THE NEW ORDER DID FALL. MANY STUDIES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN

THEREAFTER, ATTEMPTING TO FIND THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHY PRESIDENT SUHARTO FAILED TO OVERCOME THIS PARTICULAR CRISIS.

MANY OBSERVERS AGREE THAT FOR PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO RESTED HIS CLAIM TO RULE ON HIS ABILITY TO DELIVER ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS DEEPLY UNDERMINED HIS LEGITIMACY AND LEFT HIM AFTER SO MANY YEARS IN POWER, AT LAST, VULNERABLE TO CREDIBLE CHALLENGE FOR POWER.


65

DURING THE 1997/98 CRISIS PRESIDENT SUHARTO WAS DELIBERATING BETWEEN POLICY ACTIONS, AND HIS INDECISIVENESS HAD CAUSED THE CRISIS TO DEEPEN AND EVENTUALLY LED TO HIS FALL.

IT WAS IN CONTRAST WITH THE DECISIVENESS SHOWN BY MALAYSIA’S MAHATHIR AND THE LEADERS OF SINGAPORE IN DEALING WITH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

BRESNAN (1999) FOR ONE REMARKS THAT THE PRESIDENT, “WHO HAD MADE MANY HARD DECISIONS OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE DECADES, WAS UNABLE TO DO SO IN 1998.”


66

OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS OCCURRING IN INDONESIA IN 1998.

THE US AND IMF HAD OFTEN BEEN BLAME FOR THE PROLONGED CRISIS THAT EVENTUALLY LED TO THE FALL OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO.

MANY OBSERVERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE WEST HAD DONE THEIR BEST IN ASSISTING THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT IN FIGHTING THE CRISIS.


67

SOME ANALYSTS, HOWEVER WOULD NOT DISCOUNT THE ROLE THE US PLAY IN THE DOWNFALL OF SUHARTO.

ALTHOUGH FOR MANY YEARS INDONESIA ‐‐AS A STAUNCH ANTI COMMUNIST NATION‐‐ HAD ALWAYS BEEN ABLE TO COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF THE WEST, BY THE MID 90’S INDONESIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST HAD SOMEWHAT SOURED.

AFTER THE COLD WAR ENDED, WITHOUT A COMMUNIST THREAT WESTERN DONOR COUNTRIES WERE INCREASINGLY LESS CONCERNED ABOUT BAILING OUT IN INEFFICIENT FOREIGN ECONOMIES ESPECIALLY THAT ARE FACING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS.


68

MOUNTING CRITICISM ON THE WAY INDONESIA HANDLED THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAD PRECIPITATED STRINGENT CALLS IN THE US CONGRESS TO LINK AID AND ASSISTANCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS.

BEFORE THE CRISIS THERE WERE ALREADY FORCES, IN FAVOR OF POLITICAL CHANGE, ARRAYED AGAINST THE NEW ORDER REGIME.


69

HOWEVER IN THE ABSENCE OF THE NECESSARY CATALYST THOSE ELEMENTS WERE INERT, AND EVEN IF CHANGE SHOULD HAPPEN IT COULD TAKE A LONG WHILE, SUCH AS WHEN SUHARTO PASS AWAY OR SUHARTO BECAME PHYSICALLY INCAPABLE TO LEAD.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS PROVIDED THE CATALYST THAT SET OFF A PROCESS OF CHANGE.

THE HALVING OF PER CAPITA INCOME TRANSLATED INTO SOCIAL MISERY: UNEMPLOYMENT, HUNGER, RIOTS, AND DEATH.



A RENEWED MANDATE: WASTED OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE

REFLECTED IN THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1997, SUHARTO STILL HELD A STRONG GRIP ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

HE WAS READY TO STEP DOWN AND SPENT THE REST OF HIS LIFE IN RELIGIOUS PURSUIT IF THE PEOPLE REALLY DID NOT WANT HIM ANYMORE

MARCH 11TH, 1998 SUHARTO WAS INDEED RE‐ELECTED FOR ANOTHER FIVE‐YEAR TERM BY THE MPR

PAST PERFORMANCES OF DEVELOPMENT WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS A PANACEA, WHILE A GROWING NUMBER, INCLUDING MANY WHO WERE IN THE GOVERNMENT, WERE ALREADY LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM

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THE TIME HAD COME FOR POLITICAL REFORMS, BUT CHANGING THE LEADERSHIP AT THE TIME OF CRISIS WAS NOT REGARDED AS A GOOD IDEA

SUHARTO’S CHOICE OF HABIBIE AS HIS VICE PRESIDENT, APPOINTMENT OF HIS DAUGHTER AND SOME CRONIES TO THE CABINET WAS MET WITH WIDE SPREAD CRITICISM AND ACCUSATION OF NEPOTISM

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A RENEWED START TO REBUILD THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND ENGAGED IN CONCERTED EFFORTS TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY WAS WASTED


72

THE FLASH POINT

WHILE THE ECONOMY SHOWED SAME IMPROVEMENT, IN THE POLITICAL FRONT, THE SITUATION DETERIORATED.

SUHARTO HAD NO INTENTION TO UNDERTAKE REFORMS AS THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION DEMANDED.

HOWEVER, THE ELITES AND LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS REFORM MOVEMENTS WERE STILL WARY OF SUHARTO’S POWER.

THE HIKE IN FUEL PRICES CHANGED EVERYTHING. THE CULMINATION OF POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WAS

REACHED WHEN IN EARLY MAY 1998 UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE IMF, THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A RISE IN FUEL PRICES, WITH THE ACCOMPANYING CONSEQUENCES OF A RISE IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FARES.


73

DURING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND THE STUDENT ON MAY 12, FOUR STUDENTS WERE SHOT TO DEAD (TRISAKTI INCIDENT).

THE FLASH POINT WAS REACHED ON MAY 14TH 1998, IN WHAT WAS THEN KNOWN AS THE MAY RIOTS.

THE MAY 1998 RIOT HAD A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE ASIDE FROM THE INTENSITY OF THE VIOLENCE.

THE RIOTS HAD DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON THE SUHARTO GOVERNMENT.

IT SET THE STAGE FOR THE ENDGAME OF THE POLITICAL DRAMA.

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THE FINAL CURTAIN

MAY 17TH 1998 THE STUDENTS HAD PRACTICALLY OCCUPIED THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING TO PRESSURE PARLIAMENT TO ACT.

THE CALL FOR REFORM AND FOR THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT GREW LOUDER AND WAS JOINED BY A WIDER CIRCLE.

THE SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY, WHICH UP TO NOW HAD BEEN THE FOUNDATION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S POLITICAL POWER, HAD ALSO BEGUN TO CRACK.

MAY 18TH1998 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT ANNOUNCED THEIR COLLECTIVE OPINION THAT SUHARTO HAD TO RESIGN.


75

ON MAY 19TH AFTER MEETING WITH THE MODERATE MUSLIM LEADERS PRESIDENT SUHARTO TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT CALLING AN EARLIER GENERAL ELECTION THAT WOULD FACILITATE HIS EARLIER RESIGNATION, OF REPEALING THE POLITICAL LAWS THAT HAD BEEN THE TARGET OF MANY OF THE REFORMERS’ DEMANDS AND THE CREATION OF A REFORM COMMITTEE.

HE ALSO STATED HIS INTENTION TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET AND FORM A REFORM CABINET.


76

SOME MINISTERS REALIZED THAT THE STATUS QUO COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED ANY LONGER.

MAY 20TH 1998 THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES MET: TO REVIEW THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS, AND DECIDED THAT

THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE GRAVE SITUATION

IF A POLITICAL SOLUTION COULD NOT BE REACHED WITHIN A WEEK THE ECONOMY WOULD COLLAPSE

FORMING A NEW CABINET WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM

THEY WOULD UNANIMOUSLY DECLINE TO JOIN IN THE NEW (REFORM) CABINET.


77

SUHARTO ALSO FAILED TO GET THE SUPPORT FROM PARLIAMENT LEADERS ON ESTABLISHING THE REFORM COMMITTEE.

LOSING THE SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY, THE CABINET, THE PARLIAMENT, AND THE FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE REFORM COMMITTEE, ON MAY 21ST 1998 PRESIDENT SUHARTO RESIGNED HIS PRESIDENCY.

VICE PRESIDENT BJ HABIBIE ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY. THUS ENDED THE ERA OF THE NEW ORDER.


78

CONCLUSION

WHILE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS UNDOUBTEDLY WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE POLITICAL UNREST THAT ENDED SUHARTO’S LONG REIGN, THE FAILURE OF THE NEW ORDER GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL WEAKNESSES OF THE SOCIETY CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DEMISE.

SUHARTO, WHO HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN AGREEING TO NUMEROUS ECONOMIC REFORMS, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY NOT ALL WERE FULLY IMPLEMENTED, SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON A PARALLEL REBUILDING OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.


79

WHETHER SUHARTO COULD HAVE WEATHERED THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IF THE NEW ORDER REGIME HAD EVOLVED INTO A MORE REPRESENTATIVE AND OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL NEVER BE KNOWN.

BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE FAILURE TO CREATE CHANNELS FOR POLITICAL DISSENT LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DESIRE TO SEE THE NEW ORDER REGIME END, EVEN IF THAT ENTAILED A RISK OF OPEN CONFLICT BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ARMED FORCES.


80

THE CRACKS IN THE RANKS OF THE NEW ORDER HAD COME TO THE SURFACE, AS THE NEW ORDER SUPPORTERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE MILITARY HAD GROWN ALIENATED BY THE WAY HE HANDLED THE CRISIS, AND BY HIS INABILITY TO RECOGNIZE THE WEAKNESSES IN THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS AND THE URGENT NEED TO EMBARK ON REFORMS.


81

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE INABILITY OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO TO BRING INDONESIA OUT OF THE CRISIS, COMBINED WITH THE GROWING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS THAT HIS RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS—ECONOMIC AS WELL POLITICAL‐‐WAS DIGGING THE COUNTRY INTO A DEEPER ABYSS, DESTROYED THE HOBBESIAN COMPACT THAT HAD KEPT THE COUNTRY UNITED AND POLITICALLY STABLE ON THE PATH OF DEVELOPMENT.

THE CONCLUSION: CRISIS FORCED A REWRITING OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.


ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY

82

HABIBIE GOVERNMENT

84

THE OBJECTIVES: AS THE COUNTRY WAS DEEP IN CRISIS, A CONTINUATION OF POLICIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMY, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED;

IT HAD TO BE RID OF THE CHARACTERS WHOM PEOPLE SAW AS THE PERSONIFICATION OF NEPOTISM;

IT SHOULD REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF REFORM, AND BE BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA’S VARIOUS SHADES OF INTERESTS AND POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS.


85

THE AGENDA: FOREMOST IN THE POLITICAL AGENDA WAS THE REPEAL OF THE MUCH‐REVILED POLITICAL LAWS THAT WERE THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW ORDER POLITICAL SYSTEM—THE LAWS ON POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTIONS, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES.

ON THE ECONOMY, THE PRIORITY WAS TO ALLEVIATE THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE POPULACE, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO WERE ECONOMICALLY WEAK, AND TO GET THE ECONOMY ON ITS FEET AND MOVING AGAIN.


86

HABIBIE STARTED HIS PRESIDENCY AMIDST WIDESPREAD MISGIVINGS.

THE COUNTRY WAS IN DEEP POLITICAL TURMOIL. HIS CLAIM TO PRESIDENCY WAS QUESTIONED. THE RESIGNATION OF SUHARTO HAD NOT HALTED

THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTESTS. MANY OPPONENTS OF THE NEW ORDER SHIFTED

THEIR ATTACKS TO TARGET HABIBIE.

INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING


87

HIS BIOGRAPHER, BILVEER SINGH (2000), ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HABIBIE BROUGHT WITH HIM MANY NEGATIVE IMAGES OF A NEGATIVE RECORD, “INCLUDING HIS PENCHANT FOR ’WASTEFUL MEGA‐PROJECTS’, HIS POOR OR LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE ECONOMY, HIS LACK OF ACCEPTANCE BY ABRI (THE INDONESIAN MILITARY), OF BEING A FRONT OR TOOL FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND PROBABLY WORST OF ALL, OF BEING NOTHING MORE THAN A PAWN AND PUPPET OF SUHARTO.”


88

THE LEGITIMACY DILEMMA

HABIBIE’S PRESIDENCY FROM THE BEGINNING WAS PLAGUED BY DOUBTERS OF ITS LEGITIMACY.

ONE ARGUMENT AGAINST HABIBIE’S LEGITIMACY WAS BASED ON A TECHNICALITY: THE WAY BY WHICH THE TRANSFER OF THE PRESIDENCY WAS PERFORMED.

OTHER MORE SERIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST HABIBIE TAKING OVER THE PRESIDENCY WERE BASED ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.


89

IN LINE WITH THE MESSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED HIS MANDATE FROM THE MPR, AND THEREFORE IF HE RESIGNED, HE HAD TO RETURN THE MANDATE TO THE SAME INSTITUTION—THE MPR, WHICH WOULD THEN WITHDRAW THE MANDATE AND GAVE IT TO A NEW PRESIDENT.

OTHERS ARGUED THAT SUHARTO AND HABIBIE WAS A “PACKAGE” ELECTED BY THE MPR—AND HABIBIE WAS SUHARTO’S CHOICE FOR VICE PRESIDENT—WHEN SUHARTO RESIGNED, HABIBIE SHOULD ALSO GO, AND THE MPR SHOULD APPOINT A NEW PRESIDENT (AND VICE PRESIDENT).


90

ON THE OTHER HAND HABIBIES’ SUPORTERS ARGUED THAT THE CONSTITUTION STIPULATED THAT SHOULD THE PRESIDENT DIE OR RESIGN, BE REMOVED OR DISABLED FROM EXECUTING THE DUTY OF THE PRESIDENCY, THE VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD REPLACE HIM UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF HIS TERM.

THAT SHOULD MEAN THAT HABIBIE HAD THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOLD THE PRESIDENCY UNTIL 2003.


91

WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, AMONG THE CABINET MINISTERS, THERE WERE ALSO SOME DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE FORMER PRESIDENT’S TERM ENDED.

THEY WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY “TRANSITIONAL” AND A FRESH GENERAL ELECTION SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO ESTABLISH A NEW MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE.

IT WAS BASED NOT ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY BECAUSE THE MESSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS VERY CLEAR, BUT MORE ON POLITICAL AND MORAL GROUNDS.


92

TO MANY OF HIS CRITICS IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE THE FIGURE OF HABIBIE AND SUHARTO, AND THE ASCENSION OF HABIBIE TO PRESIDENCY COULD ONLY HAPPEN BECAUSE OF THAT PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP.

FOR HABIBIE TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM POLITICAL AND MORAL LEGITIMACY, HE HAD TO GET THE MANDATE FOR HIMSELF.

MANY SAW THE EXISTING MPR AS LACKING THE LEGITIMACY TO DECIDE ON WHO SHOULD BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, AS IT WAS THE SAME MPR THAT ELECTED SUHARTO UNANIMOUSLY LESS THEN THREE MONTHS BEFORE.

THEREFORE, THEY ARGUED, A NEW ELECTION SHOULD BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.


93

AFTER AN INTENSIVE BEHIND‐THE‐SCREEN POLITICAL CONSULTATION, A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT EMERGED THAT AN EARLY GENERAL ELECTION SHOULD BE CALLED.

THE DECISION TO CALL FOR AN EARLY ELECTION HOWEVER HAD TO OVERCOME A LEGAL HURDLE.

THE MPR HAD DECREED IN THE MARCH 1998 GENERAL SESSION THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIVE‐YEAR PRESIDENTIAL TERM, A GENERAL ELECTION SHOULD BE HELD IN 2002 TO ELECT A NEW PRESIDENT IN 2003.

AND ONLY THE MPR COULD REVOKE AND AMEND AN MPR DECREE.


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MPR SESSION

ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION, THE MPR MEETS IN: GENERAL SESSION SPECIAL SESSION

DURING THE NEW ORDER, MPR MET ONLY ONCE IN FIVE YEAR IN GENERAL SESSION TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT.

WITH REFORM, MPR MEETS EVERY YEAR IN ANNUAL SESSION TO RECEIVE REPORTS FROM THE EXECUTIVE, THE PARLIAMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, THE SUPREME AUDIT BOARD, AND THE SUPREME ADVISORY BOARD.


95

MPR SPECIAL SESSION

THE MPR CONVENED A SPECIAL SESSION ON NOVEMBER 10‐13, 1998

THE MPR ISSUED DECREES ON:1. THE RESCHEDULING OF THE ELECTIONS2. TO REVOKE THE 1983 MPR DECREE, REQUIRING A

NATIONAL REFERENDUM TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION.3. WITHDRAWING THE EXTRAORDINARY POWERS GIVEN TO

THE PRESIDENT,4. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ON CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND

NEPOTISM —IN WHICH THE FORMER PRESIDENT WAS SINGLED OUT—

5. REVOKING THE GUIDANCE FOR THE PROPAGATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PANCASILA OR P4.


96

6. LIMITING THE PRESIDENTIAL TERMS OF OFFICE—IN THE UNAMENDED CONSTITUTION THERE WAS NO LIMITATION—TO A MAXIMUM OF TWO TERMS. ON THE ECONOMY, THE MPR ISSUED A NEW GUIDELINE ON ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY.

7. AN IMPORTANT DECREE THAT WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT AND LONG‐TERM EFFECT ON THE COUNTRY’S GOVERNANCE WAS A GUIDELINE ON REGIONAL AUTONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION, INCLUDING FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION.

8. ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY, TO HAVE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY FROM POLITICS.


97

THE MPR DECISIONS SERVE AS CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION, IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNANCE, AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INITIATED OR ENACTED BY THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT.


98

OPPOSITION AGAINST HABIBIE THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR MET AMIDST A

TENSE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AS STUDENTS, ENCOURAGED BY DIE‐HARD OPPONENTS OF HABIBIE AMONG THE POLITICAL ELITE, WERE DEMANDING THAT HABIBIE SHOULD BE BROUGHT DOWN.

IN THE DAYS LEADING TO THE SPECIAL SESSION THE CAPITAL WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A MILITARY COMPLEX, WITH SECURITY APPARATUS MANNING STRATEGIC SECTIONS OF THE CITY.

TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY EFFORTS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCE, WIRANTO DECIDED TO RECRUIT CIVILIANS AS VOLUNTEERS (PAMSWAKARSA).


99

UNAVOIDABLY THESE GROUPS OF VIGILANTES WOULD CLASH WITH STUDENTS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CITY, MAKING THE SITUATION EVEN TENSER.

ON THE FINAL DAY OF THE MPR SESSION THINGS CAME TO A HEAD.

THE CARNAGE OCCURRED IN THE SEMANGGI AREA, IN FRONT OF ATMAJAYA UNIVERSITY, A PRIVATE CATHOLIC INSTITUTION, WHICH HAD BEEN A HOTBED OF ANTI‐HABIBIE STUDENTS.


100

IN THE CONFRONTATIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 13, SHOTS WERE FIRED AND AT THE END OF THE DAY 13 HAD DIED, AMONG THEM WERE FOUR STUDENTS AND ONE MILITARY PERSONNEL.

HUNDREDS WERE INJURED, MANY NEEDING HOSPITALIZATION.


101

THE INCIDENT, WHICH CAME TO BE KNOWN AS THE SEMANGGI TRAGEDY, LEFT ANOTHER SCAR ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHE ALONGSIDE THE TRISAKTI TRAGEDY.

ELSEWHERE A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF PAMSWAKRSA WERE LYNCHED BY ANGRY MOBS, MANY IN A GRUESOME MANNER.

AFTER THE MPR SESSION ENDED THE OPPOSITION AGAINST HABIBIE HAD REDIRECTED ITS FOCUS TO THE ELECTION THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

THE UNSEATING OF HABIBIE HAD BECOME THE AGENDA OF MANY POLITICIANS FROM VARIOUS POLITICAL SPECTRA.


102

HABIBIE’S POLITICAL PILLARS

HABIBIE RELIED ON THE SUPPORT OF THREE POLITICAL FORCES: THE MILITARY, GOLKAR, AND POLITICAL ISLAM.

THE MILITARY UNDER GEN. WIRANTO (A FORMER ADC TO PRESIDENT SUHARTO) WAS SUPPORTIVE OF HABIBIE.

BOTH OF THEM, BEING VERY CLOSE TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT, NEEDED AND SUPPORTED EACH OTHER IN THE ENSUING POLITICAL GAME.

AT THE ONSET OF HIS PRESIDENCY HABIBIE HAD VETOED THE OPPOSITION FROM HIS ADVISERS AND SENIOR MILITARY FIGURES TO HAVING WIRANTO CONTINUED IN THE TOP MILITARY POSITION.


103

POLITICAL ISLAM WAS BASICALLY SYMPATHETIC TO HABIBIE, REGARDED AS A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN ABLE TO TURN THE TIDE OF LONG‐TIME PREJUDICE AGAINST ISLAM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS.

HIS POSITION AS THE CHAIRMAN OF ICMI HAD HELPED IMPROVE THE STATURE OF MANY PROFESSIONALS AND POLITICIANS WITH ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS.

AS ICMI GATHERED MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS FROM VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS, HABIBIE’S SUPPORT AMONG POLITICAL ISLAM HAD BECOME MORE WIDESPREAD.


104

THE OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE MOUNTED BY STUDENTS BASED IN THE CAMPUS OF A CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY ALSO HAD DRIVEN MANY MUSLIM STUDENTS TO SUPPORT HABIBIE, OR AT LEAST CHOOSE NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MOVEMENT DIRECTED AGAINST HABIBIE.

UNLIKE THE UNITED FRONT AGAINST SUHARTO SHOWN BY THE STUDENTS IN MAY 1998, THE STUDENTS WERE NO LONGER AS UNITED WITH REGARD TO HABIBIE.


105

COMMUNAL STRIFE

IN THE MEANTIME, THE SECURITY APPARATUS HAD TO DEAL WITH COMMUNAL STRIFE IN SEVERAL REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY: IN EAST JAVA (BANYUWANGI), MALUKU (AMBON), SOUTH SULAWESI, AND WEST KALIMANTAN.


106

ANOTHER TROUBLE SPOT FLARED UP IN ACEH, THE WESTERNMOST PROVINCE OF INDONESIA.

ACEH HAD BEEN LONG SIMMERING IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN SEPARATIST ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION AND THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.

DURING THE NEW ORDER THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT WAS HARSHLY DEALT WITH THROUGH MILITARY ACTION.

ACEH


107

AT THE END OF THE NEW ORDER, THE SITUATION HAD BEEN PUT UNDER CONTROL AND THE REBEL MOVEMENT HAD BECOME MORE OR LESS DORMANT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE STILL REMNANTS OF REBELS UNDER THE NAME OF FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA OR GAM).

IN EARLY 1999, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION BEGAN TO HEAT UP AGAIN.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE UPSURGE OF HOSTILITIES WAS A SERIES OF KIDNAPPINGS AND KILLINGS OF SOLDIERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE ON LEAVE.


108

THE MILITARY MOUNTED AN OPERATION TO RESPOND TO THE ATTACKS AND THE SITUATION FURTHER ESCALATED.

IN THE PROCESS MANY CIVILIANS BECAME VICTIMS OF THE ENSUING VIOLENCE, PROVOKING OUTCRIES OF BRUTALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY.


IN MARCH 1999, HABIBIE, ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, VISITED THE PROVINCE AND INITIATED A DIALOGUE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AT THE GRAND MOSQUE OF THE CAPITAL OF THE PROVINCE, BANDA ACEH.

STUDENTS DEMANDED TO BE ALLOWED TO JOIN THE DIALOGUE AND WERE PERMITTED. IN THE COURSE OF THE HEATED DIALOGUE HABIBIE APOLOGIZED FOR THE EXCESSES COMMITTED BY THE MILITARY IN THE PAST AND PROMISED THAT SUCH THINGS WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. HE PROMISED TO PROSECUTE ANY MEMBER OF THE SECURITY FORCES THAT WAS INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. HE PLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PAY FOR THE REBURIAL OF THE VICTIMS OF THE MILITARYOPERATIONS WHO HAD BEEN BURIED IN MASS GRAVES.


POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED ANDFUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROVINCE WOULD BE INCREASED INCLUDING FUNDING FOR FINANCIAL AID FOR VICTIMS OF PAST MILITARY OPERATIONS.


111

IN SEPTEMBER A LAW WAS PASSED THAT GAVE ACEH A SPECIAL STATUS (LAW NO 44/1999).

THE NEW LAW ON FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION (LAW NO 25/1999) PROVIDED THE PROVINCE WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF AUTHORITY OVER, AND SUBSTANTIAL RETURNS FROM, THEIR NATURAL WEALTH, PARTICULARLY FROM THE GAS FIELDS IN ARUN.


112

THUS TWO OF THE MAIN GRIEVANCES, THE DEMAND FOR SYARIAH LAW AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES, HAD BEEN BASICALLY ADDRESSED.

HOWEVER THE RELAXATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS EXPLOITED BY GAM AS A WAY TO EXPAND THEIR CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AND POPULATION.

AT THE TIME HABIBIE LEFT OFFICE IN OCTOBER 1999, THE CONFLICT IN ACEH HAD BEEN NOT RESOLVED.

(THE ACEH CONFLICT WOULD ONLY BE RESOLVED AFTER THE GOVERNMENT WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH GAM; THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT SIGNED ON AUGUST 15, 2005 IN HELSINKI, FINLAND)


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IRIAN JAYA (PAPUA) WAS ANOTHER HOT SPOT. THE PROVINCE HAD BEEN PLAGUED BY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS DEMANDING INDEPENDENCE FOR YEARS.

AS IN ACEH, THIS SEPARATIST MOVEMENT WAS TRIGGERED BY FEELINGS OF INJUSTICE SUFFERED BY THE PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN (PAPUANS), WHICH, THOUGH WAS ONE OF THE NATURALLY RICHEST PROVINCES OF INDONESIA, REMAINED THE MOST BACKWARD IN THE WHOLE NATION.

PAPUA


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A LAW WAS LATER PASSED TO ALLOW FOR A SPECIAL STATUS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PAPUA, INCLUDING ECONOMIC PRIVILEGES (LAW NO. 21/2001).

ON JULY 17, 2006 PAPUA WAS DIVIDED INTO 2 PROVINCES: PAPUA AND WESTERN IRIAN JAYA.


LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

THE RECOGNITION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

REVOKING THE MUCH HATED NEW ORDER POLITICAL LAWS, AND ESTABLISH NEW LAW ON MULTIPARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS.

FREEING THE PRESS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND CENSORSHIP.


THE DUAL FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY WAS REVOKED

THE POLICE WERE SEPARATED FROM THE MILITARY.

BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS WERE GIVEN STRONG LEGAL PROTECTION.

“POLITICAL PRISONERS” WERE RELEASED FROM DETENTION.

EAST TIMORESE WERE GRANTED A REFERENDUM TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY.


IN JULY 1999 A MULTIPARTY ELECTION WAS HELD. THE ELECTION WAS SUPERVISED BY AN ELECTORAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES AND WATCHED BY THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN OBSERVERS.

IT WAS UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT THE ELECTION WAS OPEN, FAIR AND CLEAN. THE RESULT REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THUS HERALDED THE RE‐BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA.


POLITICAL PARTIES AND GENERAL ELECTION 1999

No Parties Seats Vote (%)1 PDIP 153 342 GOLKAR 120 223 PPP 58 134 PKB 51 115 PAN 34 76 PBB 13 27 PK 7 18 Others 26 109 ABRI 38

Total 462Note: From 48 political parties participating, 21 parties represented


DURING HABIBIE’S PRESIDENCY THE GOVERNMENT WORKED TOGETHER WITH PARLIAMENT TO PRODUCE 67 LAWS THAT FORMED THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC NATION WITH A MARKET ECONOMY.

OF THE 67 LAWS 16 ARE ON THE ECONOMY, 32 ARE POLITICAL LAWS AND 19 CONCERN HUMAN RIGHTS.

FIVE OF THE LAWS ORIGINATED FROM THE PARLIAMENT, IN ITSELF A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM POLITICAL PRACTICES UNDER THE NEW ORDER, WHEN THE PARLIAMENT PLAYED SECOND FIDDLE AND WAS REGARDED AS MERE RUBBER‐STAMP TO THE GOVERNMENT.

IT SHOWED THAT THE PARLIAMENT HAS BEGUN TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY.


SOME OF THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL LAWS

Law No 2/1999 on political parties Law No 3/1999 on general election Law No 4/1999 on the composition and status of the

People’s Consultative Assembly MPR, the parliament DPR, and the regional representative councils

Law No 5/1998 the convention against torture and cruelty

Law No 9/1999 the right to freely speak, demonstrate or strike

Law No 22/1999 on the decentralization of government down to the district level


Some of the important political laws . . .

Law No 25/1999 on fiscal decentralization Law No 26/1999 to revoke the 1963 anti-subversive

activities law Law No 28/1999 on Clean GovernmentLaw No 29/1999 the convention on abolition of all forms

of racial discriminations Law No 35/1999 put the administration of the whole legal

system under the Supreme Court Law No 39/1998 on Human Rights Law No 40/1999 freedom of the press


IT WAS APPARENT AND INCREASINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS DURING HABIBIE’S ERA THAT THE COUNTRY HAD RAPIDLY MOVED TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.

SUCH A RAPID BURST OF LIBERALIZATION WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHLY UNLIKELY WERE THERE WAS NO CRISIS AND SUHARTO STILL WAS PRESIDENT.

THESE REFORMS HAVE COME FROM THE TOP, WHICH IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO YEARNING FROM THE BOTTOM.

YET MANY WOULD AGREE THAT INDONESIANS CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGED IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM HAVE ONLY VERY RECENTLY BECOME SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED ENOUGH TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE AT THE LEVEL OF POLICY.


IT WAS DURING HABIBIE’S ADMINISTRATION THAT MOST OF THE INITIATIVES THAT SIGNIFICANTLY ACCELERATED INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIZATION WERE INITIATED.

THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION HAD BEEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY, ONE REINFORCING THE OTHER ON THE WAY UP, IN CONTRAST WITH THE SITUATION WHEN THE CONFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISES HAD BROUGHT THE COUNTRY DOWN DEEPER INTO THE ABYSS.


IRONICALLY

HABIBIE, WHO INITIATED MOST OF THE BASIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS, FAILED TO GET REELECTED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION


GSAPS‐2006‐Day2 www.ginandjar.com 125

THE PITFALLS

THE EAST TIMOR ISSUE

THE BANK BALI AFFAIR

THE IMF DECIDED THAT FURTHER REVIEW OF ITS PROGRAM SHOULD ONLY BE DONE AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

AFTER TAKING OFFICE HABIBIE DECIDED TO BREAK THE EAST TIMOR LOGJAM: THE SOLUTION OF THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION HAD BECOME ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S PRIORITIES.

EVENTUALLY A CONSENSUS EMERGED WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE EAST TIMORESE TO HOLD A REFERENDUM, OR IN THE POLITICAL JARGON AT THE TIME, A “POPULAR CONSULTATION,” TO CHOOSEBETWEEN A GREATER AUTONOMY WITH INDONESIA OR OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE. THE REFERENDUM WAS TOBE ADMINISTERED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.


EAST TIMOR

OMINOUSLY, BEFORE THE POPULAR CONSULTATION THERE HAD BEEN CLASHES BETWEEN THE PRO‐INTEGRATION AND ANTI‐INTEGRATION GROUPS. THESE ARMED CLASHES HAD AFFECTED THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY AND RESULTED IN PEOPLE BEING DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES, WHICH CREATED A REFUGEE SITUATION.


THE REFERENDUM WAS HELD ON 30 AUGUST. THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR OVERWHELMINGLY CHOSE INDEPENDENCE, WITH 78.5% OF THE VOTERS CHOOSING INDEPENDENCE.

ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1999, EAST TIMOR WAS HANDED OVER TO THE UN AUTHORITIES, WHICH WOULD HELP THE TERRITORY ORGANIZE ITSELF AS A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE. THE RESULT OF THE REFERENDUM SHOCKED THE NATION AND INFURIATED MANY IN THE MILITARY.

AFTER ALL THE SACRIFICES AND SO MANY LIVES LOST, IT WAS NOT EASY TO ACCEPT THAT EAST TIMOR SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM THE FOLD OF THE REPUBLIC.


THE REFERENDUM RESULTED IN AN INFLUX OF REFUGEES WHO SUPPORTED THE INTEGRATION WITHINDONESIA AND WERE AFRAID OF THEIR FATE IN THE NEW INDEPENDENT COUNTRY DOMINATED BY THEIRFORMER ENEMIES TO THE WESTERN PART OF THE ISLAND OF TIMOR. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, IN ANAPPARENT CAMPAIGN TO GET EVEN WITH THOSE WHO CHOSE TO SECEDE, THE LOCAL MILITARY UNIT ANDPARAMILITARY FORCES ENGAGED THEMSELVES IN A DESTRUCTIVE RAMPAGE, DRAWING CONCERN ANDCRITICISM FROM THE WORLD.


ON ONE HAND, HABIBIE WAS PRAISED FOR HIS COURAGEOUS DECISION TO GRANT THE EAST TIMORESE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FATE AND HONORING HIS COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE RESULTOF THE REFERENDUM. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS CONDEMNED BECAUSE OF THE POST‐REFERENDUM CARNAGE. ALTHOUGH THE COUNTRY WOULD BE FREED OF A LONG‐STANDING SOURCE OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BURDEN, DOMESTICALLY HIS DECISION HAD BEEN USED BY HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES TO RALLY MORE OPPOSITION AND TO STOP HIM FROM GETTING REELECTED.


IN THE ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC CONFERENCE (APEC) MEETING IN NEW ZEALAND IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1999, AROUND THE TIME OF THE CARNAGE IN EAST TIMOR FOLLOWING THE REFERENDUM, US PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON TOLD THE COORDINATING MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY, WHO WAS REPRESENTING INDONESIA IN THE SUMMIT MEETING AS HABIBIE COULD NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF THE TENSE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR, OF HIS CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFERENDUM AND ADVISED THE INDONESIAN MILITARY TO REFRAIN FROM USING FORCE AND TO ACCEPT INTERNATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE.

THE SAME CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION IN EAST TIMOR WAS ALSO CONVEYED TO HIM BY OTHER WORLD LEADERS WHOWERE PRESENT, INCLUDING CHINA’S PRESIDENT JIANG CHEMIN, JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER KEIZO OBUCHI, AND AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER JOHN HOWARD.


ANOTHER BLOW CAME IN THE FORM OF WHAT WAS TO BE KNOWN AS THE BANK BALI AFFAIR. IT INVOLVED THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS OUT OF A BANK CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE POTENTIAL BANKS THAT WOULD SURVIVE THE CRISIS, BANK BALI.

PRESIDENT HABIBIE’S CLOSE CIRCLE WAS ALLEGED TO BE INVOLVED IN THE CASE.

BANK BALI CASE


THE EAST TIMOR POST‐REFERENDUM CARNAGE AND THE BANK BALI AFFAIR SOURED RELATIONS BETWEEN HABIBIE, THE IMF AND THE DONORS, CREATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WERE REMINISCENT OF THE SITUATION DURING OF SUHARTO’S FINAL WEEKS. THE TWO ISSUES HAD FROZEN FURTHER DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE IMF. THE IMF DECIDED THAT FURTHER REVIEW SHOULD ONLY BE DONE AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. IT WAS CLEAR IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY AND US SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS BEHIND THE DECISION.


THE END OF THE BEGINNING

OCTOBER 1, 1999 THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED MPR STARTED ITS SESSION

BY THE TIME THE MPR BEGAN ITS FIRST SESSION THE CONTEST FOR PRESIDENCY WAS BETWEEN HABIBIE AND MEGAWATI, WHO REPRESENTED THE TWO PARTIES WITH THE BIGGEST ELECTORAL VOTE.

HABIBIE HAD BEEN NOMINATED BY GOLKAR TO BE ITS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

HOWEVER, AS THE ELECTION TIME DREW CLOSER, A DIFFERENT POLITICAL CONFIGURATION EMERGED.


FOR SOME TIME LEADERS FROM VARIOUS MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN WAGING CAMPAIGNS AGAINST MEGAWATI AND HER PARTY.

BUT THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MEGAWATI HERSELF WAS PARTICULARLY FIERCE. IT FOCUSED ON THE FACT THAT SHE WAS A WOMAN, AND IN THEIR VIEW ISLAM DID NOT ALLOW A WOMAN TO LEAD A NATION.


ANOTHER ISSUE WAS HER RELIGIOSITY. PICTURES WERE DISTRIBUTED SHOWING HER “PRAYING” IN A HINDU TEMPLE.

SOME OF MEGAWATI’S EARLY SUPPORTERS DESERTED HER, MOST NOTABLY ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, THE HEAD OF THE POWERFUL MUSLIM ORGANIZATION NAHDATHUL ULAMA (NU) AND FOUNDER OF THE PARTY PKB, WHO SAW AN OPPORTUNITY BECOME A CANDIDATE HIMSELF.

AMIDST THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING MEGAWATI AND THE WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO HABIBIE AMONG THE POPULACE AS WELL AS AMONG THE ORIGINAL REFORM MOVEMENT, LEADERS OF THE MUSLIM PARTIES JOINED FORCES IN AN ISLAMIC COALITION.


THE COALITION WAS CALLED POROS TENGAH OR CENTRAL AXIS.

THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS PREVENTING MEGAWATI FROM BECOMING PRESIDENT, AS AT THAT TIME MOST OF THE LEADERS OF THE CENTRAL AXIS WERE SYMPATHETIC TO HABIBIE.

HOWEVER THEY ALSO CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD ALTERNATIVE


ON 14 OCTOBER HABIBIE DELIVERED HIS ACCOUNTABILITY SPEECH. HE REPORTED ON THE CHALLENGES THAT HE HAD TO FACE WHEN HE TOOK OVER THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROGRESS THAT THE COUNTRY HAD MADE DURING HIS STEWARDSHIP.

HE ALSO REPORTED HIS DECISION TO ALLOW A REFERENDUM IN EAST TIMOR AND ITS RESULTS, AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE MPR REVOKE THE 1968 DECISION ON THE INTEGRATION OF EAST TIMOR AND INDONESIA.


HE ALSO REPORTED THAT THE INVESTIGATIONS OF FORMER PRESIDENT SUHARTO BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ABOUT ALLEGED ABUSES OF POWER DID NOT FIND ANY INDICATION OF CRIMINAL WRONG DOING, AND HENCE WERE STOPPED.

ON THE 19TH THE MPR VOTED ON HABIBIE’S ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT.

WITH A VOTE OF 355, MORE THAN HALF OF THE MEMBERS OF MPR, HABIBIE’S ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT WAS REJECTED (AGAINST 322 WHO ACCEPTED IT).

HABIBIE EFFECTIVELY WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE


ON THE 20TH THE MPR TOOK THE VOTE FOR PRESIDENT BETWEEN TWO CANDIDATES: MEGAWATI AND ABDURRAHMAN WAHID.

THE RESULT OF THE VOTE: WAHID RECEIVED 373 VOTES AGAINST MEGAWATI’S 313 VOTES.

ALTHOUGH MANY DOUBTED WAHID’S ABILITY TO LEAD THE COUNTRY BECAUSE OF HIS PHYSICAL CONDITION, THE VOTE WAS A REFLECTION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS.


THE JOINED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE ISLAMIC FACTIONS WITHIN GOLKAR AND THE SUPPORTERS OF HABIBIE HAD DEFEATED THE NATIONALIST COALITION OF PDI‐P AND NATIONALIST FACTION WITHIN GOLKAR.

THE REACTION AMONG PDI‐P RANK AND FILE TO THE DEFEAT OF MEGAWATI WAS FEROCIOUS. RIOTS BROKE OUT IN VARIOUS STRONGHOLDS OF PDI‐P, ESPECIALLY IN JAKARTA, SOLO, BALI AND BATAM. THE WORST RIOTS WERE IN BALI AND SOLO.


AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THE MPR WAS TO DECIDED WHO WOULD BE THE VICE PRESIDENT.

BECAUSE OF HER DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, MEGAWATI AT FIRST DECLINED TO BE NOMINATED AS VICE PRESIDENT.

SHE WAS FURIOUS ABOUT HER DEFEAT AND SUSPECTED THAT THE SAME COALITION WOULD DEFEAT HER AGAIN, AS BY THE MORNING OF THE DAY OF THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THE CENTRAL AXIS HAD COME OUT WITH THEIR CANDIDATE, HAMZAH HAZ FROM PPP.

AFTER INTENSIVE PERSUASION MEGAWATI FINALLY AGREED TO RUN. MEGAWATI WON THE ELECTION, GARNERING 396 VOTES AGAINST HAMZAH HAZ’S 284 VOTES.


WHEN THE MPR SESSIONS ENDED THE COUNTRY NEW LEADERS HAD BEEN ELECTED DEMOCRATICALLY. THE FIRST TIME IN INDONESIA’S HISTORY. DEMOCRACY HAD TAKEN ITS HOLD.

THE NEXT CHALLENGE WAS TO CONSOLIDATE THE GAIN, TO MAKE IT ENDURE AND BRING TANGIBLE BENEFIT TO THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE.


ABDURRAHMAN WAHID GOVERNMENT

145

THE ELECTION OF ABDURRAHMAN WAHID TO THE PRESIDENCY ITSELF CREATED ANOTHER LEGITIMACY PROBLEM BECAUSE OF HIS PARTY’S LACK OF SUPPORT SHOWN IN THE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL VOTES WON AND THE FRAGILITY OF THE COALITION THAT PUT HIM IN THE PRESIDENCY.

THE COALITION WAS NOT BASED ON A “POSITIVE” CONSENSUS OF HAVING LAUNCHED THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR THE JOB, BUT ON A “NEGATIVE” COMMON PLATFORM TO STOP MEGAWATI FROM BECOMING PRESIDENT.


146

DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE COALITION ACTED THIS WAY FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. IT WAS A FRAGILE COALITION THAT COULD EASILY BREAK WHEN THE COMMON INTEREST WAS NO LONGER MAINTAINED.

MEGAWATI’S ELECTION TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY PARTIALLY SOLVED THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY.

HAVING MEGAWATI, WHOSE PARTY HAD THE LARGEST VOTE IN THE PARLIAMENT, AS HIS VICE PRESIDENT PROVIDED ABDURRAHMAN WAHID’S PRESIDENCY WITH THE NEEDED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY.

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IT WAS CLEAR THAT WAHID OWED AND WOULD DEPEND A LOT ON MEGAWATI’S SUPPORT TO BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY RULE IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SETTING.


147

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

THE END OF THE HABIBIE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS COMPLETED THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.

DURING HIS PRESIDENCY THE PROCESS OF DISMANTLING THE AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WAS COMPLETED.

IT MET WITH LINZ AND STEPAN’S STANDARD DEFINITION OF WHEN A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IS COMPLETE.

THE COUNTRY WAS ON THE WAY TO STRENGTHEN AND CONSOLIDATE ITS DEMOCRACY.


148

THE EUPHORIA

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAHID‐MEGAWATI GOVERNMENT WAS WELL RECEIVED DOMESTICALLY AS WELL AS INTERNATIONALLY.

EVEN THOSE WHO AT THE OUTSET WERE OPPOSED TO ABDURRAHMAN WAHID’S ELECTION ACCEPTED THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION AS THE BEST AS IT COULD BE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE COUNTRY CAME BACK TO NORMAL, DEMONSTRATIONS STOPPED, STUDENTS RETURNED TO SCHOOLS, THE WARRING FACTIONS LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.


149

THERE WAS HIGH HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURSE THAT THE COUNTRY WAS TAKING. IN CONTRAST TO HABIBIE, WAHID WAS ENDOWED WITH SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CAPITAL AT THE ONSET OF HIS PRESIDENCY.

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID HAD MARGINAL POLITICAL SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE POLITY AS THE ELECTION RESULTS SHOWED.

HE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE LARGER PARTIES THAT HAD LARGER POLITICAL CONSTITUENTS THAN HE HAD.


150

THIS RECOGNITION WAS REFLECTED IN THE WAY HE FORMED HIS FIRST CABINET.

SOME COMMENTATORS WERE CRITICAL OF THE CABINET COMPOSITION, CLAIMING THAT IT DIDN’T REFLECT PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE.

ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NU, THE LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION, HIS SUPPORT WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG AMONG SECULAR AND NON‐ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY THAT HAD LONG BEEN HIS POLITICAL HABITAT.

HE WAS ALSO REVERED BY INTERNATIONAL NGOS FOR HIS UNORTHODOX POLITICAL VIEWS, SUCH AS HIS MODERATE (FOR SOME HIS PRO) VIEW ON ISRAEL.


151

HIS EFFORT TO PUT THE MILITARY UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL ALSO WON HIM ACCOLADES, ESPECIALLY AMONG INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.

HE APPOINTED A CIVILIAN TO BECOME THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE FIRST AFTER SO MANY YEARS.

IT WAS ALSO A FIRST WHEN HE APPOINTED THE NAVY CHIEF AS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE TOP MILITARY POST THAT TRADITIONALLY HAD BEEN RESERVED FOR THE ARMY.


152

HIS IDEA FOR A SOLUTION TO THE ACEH PROBLEM WAS TO AGREE TO THE REFERENDUM THAT WAS DEMANDED BY THE GAM (INDEPENDENT ACEH MOVEMENT).

ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ACTUAL MEASURES DUE TO STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE MILITARY AND MOST OF INDONESIA’S PUBLIC AS WELL MANY ACEHNESE THEMSELVES, HIS STATEMENT ON THE REFERENDUM STRENGTHENED HIS IMAGE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND OBSERVERS.


153

HE ALSO MADE A STATEMENT ALLOWING THE RAISING OF THE REBEL’S FLAG ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF GAM ON 4 DECEMBER AS PART OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. FURTHERMORE HE INITIATED THE NEGOTIATION WITH GAM BROKERED BY AN INTERNATIONAL NGO WITH A BASE IN GENEVA.

HE HAD SHOWN LENIENCE TOWARD THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN IRIAN JAYA BY AGREEING TO THE USE OF NAME PAPUA INSTEAD OF IRIAN JAYA AND, AS IN ACEH, ALLOWING THE FLYING OF THE PAPUAN FLAG THE BINTANG KEJORA (THE MORNING STAR).


154

WAHID ALSO ALLOWED THE ETHNIC CHINESE TO CELEBRATE THEIR HOLIDAYS OPENLY, AS PART OF THE COUNTRY’S HOLIDAYS.

IN A DARING MOVE HE STATED THAT THE BAN ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND COMMUNIST TEACHINGS SHOULD BE LIFTED.

THIS ENDEARED HIM EVEN MORE TO HIS ADMIRERS, ESPECIALLY AMONG WESTERN OBSERVERS AND NGO’S.


155

ALTHOUGH HE WAS THE HEAD OF THE LARGEST MUSLIM ORGANIZATION AND WAS AN ESTABLISHED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE MUSLIM SCHOLAR, HE SET AN EXAMPLE OF TOLERANCE IN RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING THE BASIC ONES SUCH AS THE FIVE‐TIME DAILY PRAYING AND FIDELITY, AND RELIGIOUS SYNCRETISM.


156

POLITICAL LIMBO

HOWEVER GOOD HIS INTENTIONS, WAHID’S UNORTHODOX APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE WOULD BRING HIM AND THE COUNTRY A LOT OF TROUBLE.

HIS DARING DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED POLITICAL NORMS ENDEARED HIM TO SOME ELITES AND FOREIGN ADMIRERS, BUT IT ALSO ERODED HIS POLITICAL SUPPORT, WHICH, WITHOUT MEGAWATI, WAS ON THIN ICE ANY WAY.


157

ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC ROWS WAS OVER THE ISSUE OF OPENING TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

ALTHOUGH THE RATIONALE GIVEN WAS APPEASING THE JEWISH LOBBY THAT WAS DOMINANT IN WALL STREET TO GET THEM TO HELP THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY, IT ENCOUNTERED STRONG REACTION FROM AMONG POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN GENERAL.

STUDENTS FROM VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS STAGED DEMONSTRATION ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.


158

THEY WERE JOINED BY ULAMA AND POLITICAL LEADERS FROM THE CENTRAL AXIS WHO WERE HIS ALLIES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONDUCT THAT HAD DAMAGED HIS CREDIBILITY AMONG MANY MUSLIMS.

IF THE ABOVE ISSUES HAD DISILLUSIONED THE POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY OUTSIDE HIS OWN CLOSE CIRCLE, HIS STATEMENTS ON THE REFERENDUM IN ACEH, AND ALLOWING THE RAISING OF THE REBEL FLAG HAD ERODED HIS CREDIBILITY AMONG THE NATIONALISTS.


159

HIS VIEWS IN REGARD TO SIMILAR ISSUES IN IRIAN JAYA HAD FURTHER DISTANCED HIM FROM THE MAINSTREAM NATIONALISTS WHO REGARDED KEEPING THE COUNTRY TOGETHER AS THE UTMOST PRIORITY.

BUT WHEN HE DISCLOSED THAT HE WANTED TO LIFT THE BAN ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE PROPAGATION OF COMMUNIST TEACHING HE MADE ENEMIES OUT OF BOTH MUSLIMS AND NATIONALISTS.

HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY HAD ALSO BEEN DETERIORATING. HIS PUBLIC STANCE ON ACEH AND IRIAN JAYA HAD HURT HIS STANDING WITH THE MILITARY.


160

HIS CONSTANT ACCUSATIONS OF IMPENDING COUPS, OF GENERALS CONSPIRING TO BRING HIS GOVERNMENT DOWN AND HIS HABIT OF BLAMING THE MILITARY FOR THE DISTURBANCES THAT HAPPENED DURING HIS PRESIDENCY HAD DISTANCED HIM FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

HIS HANDS‐OFF ATTITUDE ON MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE EXASPERATED MANY PEOPLE.

THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP HAD LEFT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LIMBO.


161

THERE WAS A WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT HE WAS THRILLED BY THE TRAPPINGS OF THE PRESIDENCY, AND SEEMED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN ENJOYING IT THAN IN DISCHARGING THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAME WITH IT.

WAHID WAS SEEN BY MANY AS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS IMAGE ABROAD THAN ABOUT ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS AT HOME.

HIS PENCHANT FOR CONSPIRACY THEORY AND CREATING SCAPEGOATS BASED ON HERESY AND THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROOF CREATED CONFUSION NOT ONLY IN THE PUBLIC BUT ALSO AMONG HIS MINISTERS.


162

HE ACCUSED HIS MINISTERS OF CORRUPTION WITHOUT GIVING ANY PROOF.

HE EVENTUALLY FIRED THEM FROM HIS CABINET, BUT DID NOT FOLLOW IT UP WITH PROSECUTION, AS HE SHOULD HAVE IF INDEED HE HAD PROOF OF THEIR CORRUPTION.

HE ALSO SPOKE DEROGATORILY OF HIS VICE PRESIDENT.

HE COMPLETELY IGNORED MEGAWATI IN HER CAPACITY AS HIS VICE PRESIDENT AND DISREGARDED HER SUGGESTIONS


163

HIS TREATMENT TOWARD PEOPLE WHO WERE SUPPOSED TO WORK WITH HIM AND SUPPORT HIM—HIS VICE PRESIDENT, HIS MINISTERS, HIS POLITICAL ALLIES AND THE MILITARY—WOULD SOON THROW HIS GOVERNMENT INTO DISARRAY.

CRACKS IN THE GOVERNMENT SOON APPEARED.


164

THE RANDOM FIRING OF MINISTERS WITHOUT CLEAR EXPLANATION, MANY OF THEM POLITICAL LEADERS, ANTAGONIZED THE POLITY.

IT TRIGGERED A SUMMONS FROM PARLIAMENT, WHICH ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS.

THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT QUESTION HIS RIGHT TO CHANGE HIS CABINET. WHAT THEY DEMANDED THE PRESIDENT ANSWER FOR WAS WHY HE PUBLICLY SAID THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION. THE PARLIAMENT DEMANDED PROOF OF THIS ACCUSATION.


165

AS EXPECTED, WAHID COULD NOT SUBSTANTIATE HIS ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM.

ALTHOUGH THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST HIM ON THIS MATTER, BY THE END OF DECEMBER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAHID AND THE PARLIAMENT SUFFERED BECAUSE OF IT.


166

IT BECAME WORSE WHEN HE MADE A COMMENT THAT WOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INSULT TO THE INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY OF THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, COMPARING THEM TO “KINDERGARTEN.”

THE GOVERNMENT WAS ACCUSED OF DISUNITY, OF BEING RIDDLED WITH INTERNAL STRIFE, AND ACCORDING TO SOME OBSERVERS, “OF HAVING TOO MANY UNPROFESSIONAL MINISTERS WHO WERE INCAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR TASKS PROPERLY AND WHO LACKED LEADERSHIP”.


167

THE CONFUSION, UNCERTAINTY AND INCONSISTENCY WERE NOTABLE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE LACK OR ABSENCE OF DECISIONS WHEN DECISIONS HAD TO BE MADE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY WERE COUPLED WITH RETRACTIONS AND REVOCATIONS OF DECISIONS WHEN THEY WERE MADE.

BY THE END OF DECEMBER 2000, BARELY SIX MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY, WAHID WAS LOSING POLITICAL GROUND.

THERE WERE VOICES IN THE PUBLIC DEMANDING THAT THE NEXT MPR ANNUAL SESSION SHOULD DECIDE ON THE PRESIDENT’S POLITICAL FUTURE.


168

THE MPR MET ANNUALLY IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST AND THE 2000 SESSION WAS SCHEDULED TO MEET ON 7 AUGUST.

PRIOR TO THE SESSION THE PDI‐P, GOLKAR AND THE PARTIES BELONGING TO THE CENTRAL AXIS WERE MANEUVERING TO HAVE WAHID REPLACED BY MEGAWATI.

BY THIS TIME, THE OPPOSITION FROM THE ISLAMIC PARTIES TO MEGAWATI AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HAD SUBSIDED.


169

HOWEVER MEGAWATI WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE FINAL STEP, AGREEING INSTEAD ON A COMPROMISE SOLUTION THAT WOULD ALLOW WAHID TO CONTINUE TO BE PRESIDENT BUT FOR THE DAY‐TO‐DAY AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT.

UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS THE ONLY WAY FROM BEING OUSTED BY THE MPR, WAHID IN HIS STATEMENT INDICATED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMPROMISE.


170

DISHONORING THE DEAL HOWEVER, WITHIN DAYS WAHID INDICATED THAT HE

HAD NO INTENTION OF CARRYING OUT HIS PART OF THE DEAL.

HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD GIVE MEGAWATI ADDITIONAL TASKS AND NOT ADDITIONAL POWER.

HE DID GIVE THE VICE PRESIDENT SOME MINOR TASKS WITH LIMITED FREEDOM OF ACTION.

HE DISMISSED PDI‐P, GOLKAR AND CENTRAL AXIS MINISTERS, SOME OF WHOM HELD IMPORTANT PORTFOLIOS, AND REPLACED THEM WITH PEOPLE OF QUESTIONABLE COMPETENCE AND BACKGROUND EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT THEY HAD CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ABDURRAHMAN.


171

ECONOMIC SLIPPAGE

IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE ECONOMY WOULD FURTHER IMPROVE UNDER WAHID GOVERNMENT.

ACCORDING TO A WORLD BANK REPORT INSTEAD OF IMPROVING THE ECONOMY WAS DETERIORATING.

EARLY SLIPPAGES IN REFORMS AND AN INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN POLITICAL CLIMATE RAISED RISK PREMIUMS AND CONTRIBUTED TO RENEWED DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON THE RUPIAH (WORLD BANK, NOVEMBER, 2001).

THE RUPIAH CONTINUED TO WEAKEN PASSING THE 10,000 LINE TO A DOLLAR.


172

CONFLICTING STATEMENTS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND HIS MINISTERS HAD CREATED CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY, MIRRORING THE ECONOMIC LIMBO DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF SUHARTO'S GOVERNMENT.

WAHID’S FORAYS INTO ECONOMIC POLICIES WERE ILL‐ADVISED AND IRRESPONSIBLE.

THEY WERE NOT BASED ON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND CONSULTATION WITH THE EXPERTS, BUT WERE INTENDED MAINLY TO ADVANCE HIS POLITICAL POPULARITY AT THE COST OF THE ECONOMY.


173

HIS STATEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SALARY OF CIVIL SERVANTS, ADMITTEDLY NECESSARY, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINANCIAL CAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME.

HIS ENCOURAGEMENT FOR PEOPLE LIVING AROUND THE PLANTATION‐ESTATES TO JUST TAKE 40% OF THE LAND SCARED INVESTORS AWAY, AS THE RESPECT FOR LAW AND OF PROPERTY HAD BEEN VIOLATED.


174

DEJA VU? THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIMBO TOOK A TOLL ON

THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF THE PEOPLE. THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONDITIONS

WERE DETERIORATING. THERE WERE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST WAHID

EVERYWHERE. HE RESPONDED BY MOBILIZING HIS SUPPORTERS, AND

HIS FOLLOWERS ATTACKED A NEWSPAPER OFFICE IN SURABAYA, WHEN IT CRITICIZED HIM.

TO SHOW THEIR ANGER AT WAHID'S OPPONENTS HIS FOLLOWERS IN EAST JAVA HAD CUT TREES ALL OVER EAST JAVA, BRINGING A COMMENT FROM WAHID THAT IT WAS BETTER TO CUT THREES THAN HEADS.


175

WAHID HAD ALSO SHOWN A PREPONDERANCE TOWARD NEPOTISM.

AS DISCUSSED ABOVE HE HAD DISMISSED MINISTERS WHO WERE NOT READILY WILLING TO ACCEPT HIS WISHES OR REPRESENTED PARTIES THAT WERE CRITICAL TO HIM, REPLACING THEM WITH SYCOPHANT MINISTERS, SOME PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN SCANDALS OR QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.

WAHID ALSO HAD HIS BROTHER APPOINTED TO A TOP POSITION IN IBRA/BPPPN ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO BACKGROUND IN FINANCE OR BANKING.

A PATTERN OF NEPOTISM RE‐EMERGED, CAUSING MANY TO BE REMINDED OF THE NEPOTISM CHARGES AGAINST SUHARTO.


176

THE FEELING OF DEJA VU WAS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO THE POLITICAL CONFUSION AND THE RESULTING STAGNATION OF THE ECONOMY.

RUMORS FLEW ABOUT CORRUPTION IN HIGH PLACES, SOME FINDING WAY INTO THE MEDIA.

ABUSE OF POWER FOR PERSONAL GAINS RE‐EMERGED INTO THE SPOTLIGHT: APPOINTMENT TO HIGH POSITION IN GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTEDLY TRADED FOR MONEY.

IN PARTICULAR, THE HIGH LEVEL JOBS IN THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES WERE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION.


177

A LUCRATIVE BUSINESS HAD DEVELOPED IN DEALING WITH BUSINESSMEN WHO HAD TO ACCOUNT TO THE AUTHORITIES THEIR BAD LOANS AND OTHER PAST BUSINESS MISCONDUCT.

KWIK KIAN GIE, AFTER HIS DISMISSAL AS THE COORDINATING MINISTER FOR THE ECONOMY, REVEALED THAT DURING A CABINET MEETING WAHID, INSISTED THAT CERTAIN “BLACK CONGLOMERATES” SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE UNDISTURBED AS ENTREPRENEURS.


178

THE FINAL BLOW TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID GOVERNMENT AND ITS AVOWED AGENDA TO FIGHT CORRUPTION WERE TWO SCANDALS INVOLVING THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF KNOWN AS BULOGGATE AND BRUNEIGATE.

THE PARLIAMENT FOUND THAT PRESIDENT WAHID HAD MISUSED HIS OFFICE AND SUMMONED THE PRESIDENT TO ANSWER THE ALLEGATION.


CORRUPTION SCANDALS

179

DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL

THE INDIRECTLY RELATED SCANDALS CREATED SUCH PUBLIC FUROR THAT THE PARLIAMENT WAS DRAWN TO ACT.

THE PARLIAMENT CREATED A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE BOTH CASES.

ON 28 JANUARY 2001, THE SPECIAL COMMISSION REPORTED ITS FINDINGS TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENT.

ON BULOGGATE, THE COMMISSION FOUND THAT THERE WAS STRONG INDICATION THAT PRESIDENT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID “HAD A ROLE IN THE RELEASE AND THE USE OF FUNDS BELONGING TO THE WELFARE FOUNDATION OF BULOG EMPLOYEES.”


180

ON THE CONTRIBUTION FROM THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI, THE COMMISSION FOUND, “THERE WAS INCONSISTENCY IN PRESIDENT ABDURRAHMAN WAHID STATEMENT PERTAINING TO THE QUESTION OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SULTAN OF BRUNEI INDICATING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN FALSE STATEMENT TO THE PUBLIC".


181

THE CONCLUSION OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION WAS A SERIOUS MATTER, BECAUSE IF THE PARLIAMENT ADOPTED IT, THE PARLIAMENT COULD ISSUE A MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT WARNING HIM AND ASKING HIM TO ANSWER TO THE FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION.

IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT PROVIDE SATISFACTORY ANSWERS TO THE MEMORANDUM AFTER THREE MONTHS, THE PARLIAMENT COULD ISSUE A SECOND MEMORANDUM.


182

IF THE PRESIDENT AGAIN FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE SECOND MEMORANDUM, THAN THE PARLIAMENT COULD PROPOSE TO THE MPR TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION TO ASK THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT FOR HIS CONDUCT.

IF THE MPR COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ACCOUNTABILITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE MPR COULD IMPEACH THE PRESIDENT.


183

INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE TO DEFEND HIS PRESIDENCY, WAHID CHOSE TO BE BELLIGERENT.

ONE DAY AFTER THE SPECIAL COMMISSION SUBMITTED ITS REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENT, ABDURRAHMAN MADE A STATEMENT IN A MEETING WITH INDONESIA'S ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS THREATENING TO ISSUE A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE TO DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT IF PARLIAMENT PERSISTED WITH THE MEMORANDA PROCESS.


184

SINCE THE CONSTITUTION HAD CLEARLY STIPULATED THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT IN ANY SITUATION AND FOR ANY REASON, IT WAS SEEN AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DICTATORIAL RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.


185

ON 1 FEBRUARY, THE PLENARY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT ADOPTED THE REPORT AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE COMMISSION AND ISSUED THE FIRST MEMORANDUM.

THE MEMORANDUM STATED THAT WAHID HAD SERIOUSLY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION AND HIS OATH OF OFFICE, AND THE 1998 MPR DECREE ON GOOD GOVERNANCE FREE FROM CORRUPTION, COLLUSION AND NEPOTISM.

THE PARLIAMENT GAVE WAHID THREE MONTHS TO RESPOND TO THE MEMORANDUM.

WHEN THE TIME HAD PASSED AND HE DID NOT RESPOND, ON 30 APRIL THE PARLIAMENT ISSUED THE SECOND MEMORANDUM, AND GAVE WAHID ONE MONTH TO RESPOND TO IT.


186

FINALLY, WHEN BY 30 MAY WAHID STILL DID NOT GIVE A RESPONSE, THE PARLIAMENT DECIDED TO ASK THE MPR TO CALL A SPECIAL SESSION TO CALL THE PRESIDENT TO ACCOUNT ON THE TWO CASES.

UPON RECEIVING THE MEMORANDUM, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MPR DECIDED TO CONVENE AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION ON 1 AUGUST 2001.


187

WAHID UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DECREE TO IMPOSE A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND TO DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT WOULD HAVE A MEANING ONLY IF HE HAD THE POWER EXECUTE IT AND FOR THAT HE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY.

HOWEVER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, HAD OPENLY CRITICIZED THE IDEA OF THE DECREE AND ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT THE ARMY WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT.

THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND CHIEF OF POLICE ALSO REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE DECREE.


188

ON 20 MAY, WAHID SUMMONED THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND SERVED THEM AN ULTIMATUM: IF THEY STILL DID NOT SUPPORT THE DECREE BY THE END (MIDNIGHT) OF THE DAY, THEY WOULD BE REPLACED.

THE MILITARY BRASS REFUSED TO ACCEDE TO WAHID'S DEMAND TO SUPPORT THE DECREE.

THEY ALSO REJECTED ANY CHANGE IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP FOR THE MOMENT.

THOSE WHO HAD BEEN OFFERED THE JOB OF COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SERVICES BY WAHID REFUSED THE OFFER OF PROMOTION.


189

WITH THE MILITARY SOLIDLY REFUSING TO GIVE IN TO HIS DEMAND, WAHID TURNED TO THE POLICE.

AS THE CHIEF OF POLICE HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR HIS POSITION OPPOSING THE DECREE, ABDURRAHMAN MANEUVERED TO REPLACE HIM WITH SOMEBODY WHO WOULD SUPPORT HIM IN HIS PLAN TO DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT.

AFTER HE FOUND AN ASPIRING CANDIDATE AMONG THE HIGH RANKING POLICE OFFICERS, HE ASKED THE POLICE CHIEF TO RESIGN, PROMISING HIM AN AMBASSADORIAL JOB.

THE POLICE CHIEF REFUSED TO RESIGN, CITING THAT THE APPOINTMENT AND DISMISSAL OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE HAD TO HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE PARLIAMENT.


190

AS IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY, THE MAJORITY OF HIGH‐RANKING POLICE OFFICERS JOINTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE CHIEF OF POLICE AND URGING HIM NOT TO RESIGN.

THEY INSISTED THAT THE POLICE WAS A STATE INSTITUTION AND SHOULD NOT BE POLITICIZED.

ALL FORMER CHIEFS OF POLICE ALSO MADE STATEMENTS SUPPORTING THE POSITION OF THE SERVING OFFICERS.


191

WAHID SUSPENDED THE CHIEF OF POLICE WITHOUT FIRING HIM OUTRIGHT, DESIGNATING THE NEWLY APPOINTED VICE CHIEF OF POLICE AS THE ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE.

THE MANEUVER WAS DESIGNED TO CIRCUMVENT THE REQUIREMENT TO GO TO THE PARLIAMENT.

THE MAJORITY OF THE FACTIONS IN THE PARLIAMENT, INCLUDING THOSE REPRESENTING THE MILITARY AND POLICE, REGARDED IT AS A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL BREACH.


192

WITHIN THE POLICE, THE MAJORITY OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE AUTHORITY OF THE ACTING CHIEF OF POLICE.

TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION, ON THAT SAME DAY, 20 JULY 2000, THE LEADERSHIP OF MPR DECIDED TO ACCELERATE THE SPECIAL SESSION THAT WAS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 1 AUGUST 2001 TO DELIBERATE ON THE MEMORANDUM SENT BY THE PARLIAMENT TO 21 JULY.


193

WAHID WAS SUMMONED TO APPEAR IN FRONT OF THE MPR ON 23 JULY TO ANSWER TO THE CHARGES OF THE PARLIAMENT AGAINST HIM.

AT 01:10, MONDAY 23 JULY 2001 WITH WAHID AT HIS SIDE, A PRESIDENT’S SPOKESMAN APPEARED IN FRONT OF A TELEVISED PRESS CONFERENCE TO READ A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT DECREED THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MPR, THE PARLIAMENT, AND THE GOLKAR PARTY AND CALLED FOR THE HOLDING OF A NEW ELECTION WITHIN ONE YEAR.

IT WAS THE ULTIMATE OF THE REVERSE‐DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS THAT HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR THE PAST YEAR.


194

FROM THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE, AS DIAMOND (1999) HAS ARGUED, DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTION ENTAILS MORE THAN DEFENSE AGAINST BLATANT OVERTHROW; IT MEANS DEFENDING CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS, LIMITS AND PROCEDURES AGAINST SUBVERSION OR ENCROACHMENT.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION INVOLVES NOT ONLY AGREEMENT ON THE RULES FOR COMPETING FOR POWER BUT ALSO FUNDAMENTAL AND SELF‐ENFORCING RESTRAINTS ON THE EXERCISE OF POWER.

FOR DEMOCRACY TO BE CONSOLIDATED THERE MOST BE A BROAD NORMATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL CONSENSUS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, HOWEVER POOR OR UNSATISFYING ITS PERFORMANCE MAY BE AT ANY POINT OF TIME.


195

IMPEACHMENT ON THE SAME DAY AFTER CONFERRING WITH THE

LEADERSHIP OF THE MPR, THE SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT SENT A LETTER TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT ASKING FOR A LEGAL GUIDANCE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT’S DECREE.

THE SUPREME COURT GAVE ITS OPINION THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THAT THE CONSTITUTION EXPLICITLY STIPULATED THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT; AND THAT ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION THE PRESIDENT WAS ELECTED BY AND ACCOUNTABLE TO THE MPR.

AS FOR HOLDING A NEW ELECTION, THE NEXT ROUND OF ELECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN DECIDED BY THE MPR AND ONLY THE MPR COULD CHANGE ITS DECISION.


196

ON THE QUESTION OF THE GOLKAR PARTY, ACCORDING TO THE NEW POLITICAL LAW, ONLY THE SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO DISSOLVE A POLITICAL PARTY AND ONLY IF IT WAS FOUND GUILTY TO BE VIOLATING THE ELECTORAL LAW. THUS, THE SUPREME COURT OPINED, THE PRESIDENT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DISSOLVE A POLITICAL PARTY.

AFTER HEARING THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE VOTE WAS TAKEN, AND THE MPR UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED THE DECREE AND DECLARED IT AS ILLEGAL.


197

THE NEXT AGENDA WAS THE PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT SCHEDULED FOR THAT DAY.

SINCE WAHID WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE PRE‐DETERMINED TIME, A VOTE WAS TAKEN TO DECIDE: THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD VIOLATED THE STATE GUIDELINE

BY HIS ABSENCE AND REFUSAL TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT IN THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE MPR AS DETERMINED BY THE CONSTITUTION, AND

TO REMOVE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AS PRESIDENT. TO BE SURE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A VACUUM

IN GOVERNMENT, AT THE SAME TIME THE MPR ALSO DECIDED THAT VICE PRESIDENT MEGAWATI BECOME THE PRESIDENT SUCCEEDING ABDURRAHMAN WAHID.


198

THE NEXT ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS TO ELECT THE VICE PRESIDENT. THE ELECTION FOR VICE PRESIDENT WAS HELD ON 25 AUGUST.

THERE WERE FIVE DECLARED CANDIDATES WHO WERE RUNNING IN THE FIRST BALLOT.

HAMZAH HAZ, THE CHAIRMAN OF A MOSLEM PARTY (PPP), WHO WAS SUPPORTED BY THE COALITION OF THE CENTRAL AXIS AND PDIP, AFTER A THIRD BALLOT WON THE ELECTION.

THE PROCEEDING WAS WIDELY COVERED BY BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEDIA.


199

THE NATION ONCE AGAIN WATCHED DEMOCRACY IN FUNCTION AS THEIR NATIONAL LEADERS WERE CHOSEN BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS.

THE YOUNG DEMOCRACY HAD PASSED A SEVERE TEST AND PROVEN ITS RESILIENCE BY PROTECTING THE INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE FROM A FLOUNDERING AND INCOMPETENT LEADER.


200

THE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID EPISODE IN INDONESIA’S POLITICAL HISTORY HAD DEMONSTRATED HUNTINGTON’S FORESIGHT THAT NEW LEADERS OF DEMOCRACY MIGHT EMERGE AS, “ARROGANT, INCOMPETENT, OR CORRUPT, OR SOME COMBINATION OF ALL THREE.”

IN THAT SENSE THEY WOULD COME TO BE VIEWED AS NO DIFFERENT THAN THEIR AUTHORITARIAN PREDECESSORS, AND MAY EVEN BE CONSIDERED AS WORSE, AS THEY HAVE NOT PRODUCED TANGIBLE PERFORMANCE IN COMPARISON WITH AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHOSE LEGITIMACY WERE BASED ON PERFORMANCE, ON SUCCESSES IN PRODUCING POLITICAL STABILITY OR ECONOMIC BENEFIT OR BOTH.


201

HUNTINGTON ALSO ARGUES THAT, “DEMOCRACY DOES NOT MEAN THAT PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED; IT DOES MEAN THAT RULERS CAN BE REMOVED; AND THE ESSENCE OF DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOR IS DOING THE LATTER BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO THE FORMER.”

AFTER BACKTRACKING ONE OR TWO STEPS, INDONESIA WAS MOVING FORWARD AGAIN IN CONSOLIDATING ITS NEW DEMOCRACY.


MEGAWATI GOVERNMENT

203

WITH MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI BECOMING ITS FOURTH PRESIDENT, THE POLITICAL CYCLE HAD ALSO COME FULL CIRCLE, BECAUSE AS THE WINNER OF THE ELECTION, IT WAS EXPECTED THAT SHE BE GIVEN THE FIRST CHANCE TO GOVERN AND THAT SHE HAD BEEN CHEATED OF HER RIGHT.

HER ASCENDANCY TO THE PRESIDENCY WAS RECEIVED WITH A SIGH OF RELIEF. FOR MANY IT HAD ALSO STRENGTHENED FAITH IN DEMOCRACY.


204

MEGAWATI FORMED HER CABINET BY TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POLITICAL EQUATION.

ALTHOUGH HER PARTY WAS THE BIGGEST IN THE PARLIAMENT, IT WAS FAR SHORT OF THE MAJORITY, WHICH MEANT THAT SHE NEEDED TO FORGE A COALITION.

BUT, AS SHE ALSO LEARNED FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF WAHID GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL ALLIANCE ALONE WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO LIFT THE COUNTRY OUT OF ITS CRISIS.

SHE NEEDED PROFESSIONALS UNBOUND BY PARTY POLITICS. THEREFORE, IN FORMING HER CABINET SHE INCLUDED THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES BUT RESERVED SOME OF THE MAJOR ECONOMIC POSTS FOR NON‐PARTISAN PROFESSIONALS.

MANY OF THE MINISTERS WHO WERE FIRED BY ABDURRAHMAN WERE REAPPOINTED BY MEGAWATI.


205

WITH THE RETURN OF POLITICAL STABILITY AFTER THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT ON THE MACRO LEVEL THE ECONOMY HAD BEGUN IMPROVING.

THE WORLD BANK REPORT IN THE JANUARY 2003, CITED THAT POLITICAL STABILITY, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND CONTINUED FISCAL CONSOLIDATION SUPPORTED THE MARKET AND MACRO‐ECONOMIC STABILITY.


206

THERE WAS A TEMPORARY DISRUPTION TO THE ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT CAUSED BY THE FIRST BALI BOMBING, BUT SINCE THEN THE ECONOMY HAS CONTINUED TO IMPROVE.

BANKS ARE CONTINUING TO RECOVER AND CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING IS PROGRESSING, ALBEIT AT A SLOW PACE.

POLITICAL STABILITY HAS CALMED THE MARKET, SUPPORTED THE FINANCIAL MARKET SENTIMENTS AND RESTORED CONFIDENCE TO CONSUMERS.

INFLATION HAS BEEN CONTROLLED AND THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE RUPIAH HAS BEEN MORE OR LESS STABLE, BETWEEN 8,000 AND 9,000 PER DOLLAR.


207

THERE WERE ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED THE COMMITMENT TO REFORMS.

ON THE MATTER OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS, THE WORLD BANK REPORT WRITES, “THE IMF SUPPORTED PROGRAM, WHICH HAD SLIPPED DURING THE LAST YEAR OF THE GUS DUR GOVERNMENT, WAS QUICKLY BROUGHT BACK ON TRACK, AND HAS, BY AND LARGE, REMAINED THAT WAY.”


208

ANOTHER CHALLENGE TO THE GOVERNMENT WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL DECISION TO END THE DEPENDENCE ON IMF.

IN ITS 2003 ANNUAL SESSION THE MPR DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE IMF PROGRAM.

MEGAWATI’S GOVERNMENT, WITH THE ASSISTANCE FROM THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK, HAS DESIGNED AN EXIT STRATEGY TO COPE WITH THE POST‐IMF CHALLENGES.

IT HAS OPTED TO ENTER INTO A POST‐PROGRAM MONITORING SCHEME WITH THE IMF THAT ALLOWS INDONESIA TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE DIALOGUE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THEREBY KEEPING THE MARKET’S CONFIDENCE ON THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY WITHOUT HAVING TO ASK FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.


209

MEGAWATI’S GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO SUCCEEDED IN DEFUSING THE COMMUNAL STRIFE IN MALUKU AND SOUTH SULAWESI BY BRINGING ALL THE CONFLICTING PARTIES TOGETHER AND EXACTING COMMITMENTS TO CEASE THE VIOLENCE.

THE VOLUNTEERS WHO WERE AIDING THE MUSLIM SIDES IN BOTH AREAS HAVE BEEN RETURNED.


210

MEGAWATI HAS ALSO SHOWN HER RESOLUTENESS IN DEALING WITH THE TERRORISM.

SHE RESPONDED DECISIVELY ON BALI BOMBING. WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME THE

AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CATCH THE PERPETRATORS OF THE BOMBING AND BROUGHT THEM TO THE COURT.


211

THE DOWNSIDE UNFORTUNATELY, THE PICTURE IS NOT ALL ROSY. IN THE FIRST

MONTHS THE NEW GOVERNMENT DISPLAYED INERTIA IN MAKING POLICY.

THE MINISTERS SOON SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE FRAGMENTED. THE CONFLICTING OPINIONS CAME INTO THE OPEN. THE ECONOMIC MINISTERS ESPECIALLY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACT AS A TEAM; COORDINATION WAS VERY WEAK.

PREDICTABLY, THE RIFT IN THE CABINET INFLUENCED THE PERCEPTION OF THE MARKET ON THE CABINET. THIS TOO HAD ITS TOLL ON THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE.

DESPITE THE OPTIMISM DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE WORLD BANK IN THE SAME REPORT ALSO POINTED OUT THAT,

“INDONESIA’S INVESTMENT CLIMATE IS SEEN TO BE DETERIORATING, AND NOW RANKS AMONG THE WORSE IN THE WORLD.”


212

IT CONTINUED TO REPORT THAT INDONESIA IS FACING FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN ITS INVESTMENT CLIMATE, “RANGING FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE AND CRIME, TO CORRUPTION AND BUREAUCRATIC DELAY AND INEFFICIENCY, UNCERTAINTY IN LABOR RELATIONS, AND EXCESSIVE TAXATION BY SOME LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.”

THE ECONOMY ALTHOUGH HAS POSTED A MODEST GROWTH AT A RATE OF AROUND 3.5%, IT IS STILL CONSUMER DRIVEN.


213

THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE PUBLIC WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN MANIFESTED IN MANY POLLS.

ONE OF THE RECENT POLLS, DONE BY THE LEMBAGA SURVEY INDONESIA (INDONESIAN SURVEY INSTITUTE), WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THROUGH JICA, FOUND THAT AROUND 51.6% OF RESPONDENTS WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE COUNTRY.

56% EXPRESSED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE NEW ORDER BECAUSE THEY FELT IT WAS BETTER THAN THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.


214

ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE SURVEY MEGAWATI WAS STILL THE FRONT RUNNER AMONG THE CANDIDATES FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD IMMEDIATELY, GOLKAR WOULD HAVE WON THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION WITH 25.9% OF THE VOTE, TRAILED BY PDIP WITH 17.6%—A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE FROM THE NUMBER ONE POSITION IN THE 1999 ELECTION, WITH 33% OF THE VOTES.


215

AUTHORITARIAN NOSTALGIA

THE REVERSAL IN PUBLIC OPINION ACTUALLY HAD BEEN FORETOLD BY HUNTINGTON, BASED ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION.

HE OBSERVES THAT THE INTRACTABILITY OF PROBLEMS AND THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE PUBLIC WERE PERVASIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW DEMOCRACIES.

WHAT HE CALLS “AUTHORITARIAN NOSTALGIA” WAS AN EXPECTED RESPONSE TO DEMOCRACY AT THAT STAGE.


216

DIAMOND ARGUES THAT THERE IS A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND PERFORMANCE.

HE MAINTAINS THAT THE BETTER THE PERFORMANCE OF A DEMOCRATIC REGIME IN PRODUCING AND BROADLY DISTRIBUTING IMPROVEMENTS IN LIVING STANDARDS, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS TO ENDURE.

AT THE SAME TIME, HE ALSO ADMITS THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES THAT ACHIEVE CONSOLIDATION EVEN IF THEIR PERFORMANCE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SATISFACTORY.

HAVING SAID THAT, HE MAINTAINS THAT MOST OF THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES ARE STILL FAR FROM CONSOLIDATION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE IT UNLESS THEY GENERATE THE KIND OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH THAT BROADLY IMPROVES INCOMES AND REDUCES HIGH RATES OF POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT.


217

HAGGARD AND KAUFMAN MAKE A COMPELLING ARGUMENT THAT ECONOMIC FAILURE CAN HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY.

SUSTAINED POOR PERFORMANCE OR ECONOMIC DETERIORATION LEADS TO AN INCREASE IN CRIME, STRIKES, RIOTS AND CIVIL VIOLENCE, WHILE RAPID SOCIAL CHANGES AND DOWNWARD MOBILITY FOR MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASSES INCREASE THE APPEAL OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS ON THE EXTREME LEFT AND RIGHT.

THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH THE ROLE OF VARIOUS NON‐ECONOMIC FACTORS IS IMPORTANT FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION, SUCH AS ETHNICITY, GENDER AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS IMPORTANT FOR LONG‐TERM DEMOCRATIC STABILITY AND CONSOLIDATION.


218

HAGGARD AND KAUFMAN ALSO WARN THAT THE EROSION OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS COULD LEAD TO THE ELECTION OF LEADERS OR PARTIES WITH AUTHORITARIAN AMBITIONS.

MORE SERIOUSLY, THE DETERIORATION OF SOCIAL ORDER AND INCREASING SOCIAL POLARIZATION MIGHT PROVIDE THE JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION.

THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS DRAW US TO CONCLUDE THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRANSITION HAS BEEN COMPLETED, CONSOLIDATION IS STILL UNFINISHED IN INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY.


219

ALTHOUGH A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION BY ITSELF DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE SURVIVAL OF A DEMOCRACY, THE MERE EXISTENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY INHIBIT ANY ATTEMPT TO REVERSE THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, TO IMPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OR TO STRAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS OF GOVERNANCE.

IN THAT LIGHT, WE WILL DISCUSS THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THAT HAVE JUST BEEN COMPLETED IN INDONESIA.


CONSTITUTIONALREFORM

220

221

IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS, IT WAS HIGHLIGHTED THAT ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES ARE BASIC ELEMENTS IN A DEMOCRACY AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC NORMS IS AN IMPORTANT TASK OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION.

IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, THE CONSTITUTION IS HOW THE DEMOCRATIC NORMS, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES ARE TO BE INSTITUTED.


222

THE CONSTITUTION: A SACRED DOCUMENT?

THE REFORMASI (REFORM MOVEMENT) SPURRED WIDESPREAD INTROSPECTION ON THE FAILINGS OF THE NEW ORDER, SPECIFICALLY OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY.

MANY INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES LAID PART OF THE BLAME ON THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

ACADEMICIANS, UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, POLITICAL PARTIES, NGOS AND THE PRESS WERE QUICK TO POINT OUT WEAKNESSES IN THE CONSTITUTION THAT CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY TO THE LACK OF LAW AND ORDER, SHALLOW CITIZEN REPRESENTATION, OPACITY OF GOVERNANCE, AND THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, ALL ANTITHETICAL TO THE SHARED TENETS OF REFORM.


223

DUE TO COMMON REGARD OF THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AS A SACRED DOCUMENT, SUGGESTIONS TO CHANGE OR EVEN QUESTION ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS HAD ALWAYS BEEN SEEN AS BETRAYING THE IDEALS OF THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC.

THOSE WHO DARED TO SUGGEST A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION WERE REGARDED AS SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS OR WORSE, COULD BE ACCUSED AS ENEMIES OF THE STATE.

THE MPR RESOLUTION IN1998 HAD REMOVED THE REQUIREMENT OF NATIONAL REFERENDUM FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION.

REFORMASI IN POST‐SUHARTO INDONESIA CREATED MORE OF THE RIGHT CONDITIONS FOR CHANGE.


224

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ORIGINAL UUD ‘45

THE CONSTITUTION WAS WRITTEN IN A VERY BROAD AND GENERAL WAY. IT HAS ONLY 37 ARTICLES AND 6 TRANSITORY PROVISIONS.

THERE IS STRENGTH TO THE WAY IT WAS WRITTEN THAT MAKES THE CONSTITUTION FLEXIBLE AND EASILY ADAPTABLE.

THE WEAKNESS IS THAT IT IS SO BROAD, GENERAL AND FLEXIBLE, THAT IT CAN BE—AND HAS BEEN—INTERPRETED IN DIFFERENT WAYS.


225

IT GIVES A LOT OF ROOM TO THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT TO MANEUVER AND CONCENTRATE POWER IN HIS OR HER HANDS, AS HISTORY HAS SHOWN WITH INDONESIA’S FIRST AND SECOND PRESIDENTS.

DESPITE THE ALLOWANCE OF THE TENDENCY FOR THE PRESIDENCY TO HIJACK THE LEGISLATURE, MANY STILL FELT THAT THE MPR ITSELF WAS ALWAYS ENDOWED WITH TOO MUCH POWER BY THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION.

SUCH AN INSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE LED TO THE FAILURE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES AND TO A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE AND THE MPR.


226

THE EVOLVING POLITICAL SYSTEM

Period Constitution System of Government

General Situation

1945-1949 1945 Unitarian/ Presidential

• The system of government was parliamentary

• War for Independence• Rebellion: Communist

(1948), Islamic Extremist

1950 Federal Federal/ Parliamentary


227

The Evolving Political System . . .Period Constitution System of

GovernmentGeneral Situation

1950-1959 Provisional Unitarian/ Parliamentary

• Functioning parliamentary democracy (1955 general election)

• Political Instability• Rebellion: Regional, Islamic

Extremist 1959-1966 1945 Unitarian/

Presidential• Guided Democracy• Campaign to win back Irian

Jaya• Confrontation with Malaysia

and its allies• Deterioratering economy• Coup attempt 1965


228

The Evolving Political System . . .

Period Constitution System of Government

General Situation

1966-1998 1945 Unitarian/ Presidential

• New Order• Stability• Economic progress• Restrained democracy• Concentration of power• Dominant role of military in

politics and governance 1998-Now 1945

(amended)Unitarian/

Presidential• Political reforms• Democratization


229

Political Institutions: 1945 Constitution

Consultative Assembly (MPR)

People’s

President

SupremeAdvisory Board

(DPA)

House ofRepresentatives

(DPR)

Supreme Court (MA)

Supreme Audit Board (BPK)


230

Political Institutions: 1945 Constitution

The People

People Consultative Assembly (MPR)

President

Cabinet

Governor

House of Representatives (DPR)

Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD I)

District House of Representatives (DPRD II)District Chief (Bupati)


231

Political Institutions: 1959‐1966

MPR


(DPA)


(DPR)

Supreme Court (MA)


President


www.ginandjar.com 232Source: Law No. 19/1969

Political In

stitu

tions (1

966‐19

99)

People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)2 x DPR Members (920)

1/3 Appointed

House of Representatives (DPR)360 Elective Members

100 Appointed

Additional Members

Golongan Karya

Political Party

RegionalRepresentatives4 - 7 x Provinces

Governors included

Functional Group ABRI and Non ABRI

Representatives

Non ABRI ABRI

DPRD I 40 s.d 75

20% Appointed

Golongan Politik

Golongan Karya

ABRI NonABRI

DPRD II 20 s.d 40

20% Appointed

Golongan PolitikGolongan Karya

ABRI NonABRI

General Election

The People

233

Political Institutions: 1999‐2004


People’s

President


(DPA)


(DPR)

Supreme Court (MA)



234

GOALS OF REFORM

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON A PRACTICAL LEVEL MEANT CREATING MECHANISMS THAT ENSURED BETTER GOVERNANCE.

REFORMING THE VAUNTED UUD ’45 REFLECTED NEW NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS WHICH INCLUDED:

THE ENDING OF THE MILITARY “DUAL FUNCTIONS”, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPREMACY OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE,

THE INCREASE IN REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY (DECENTRALIZATION), AND

THE CREATION OF A FREE PRESS.


235

ON THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, THIS MEANT:

CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT,

ADDRESSING THE TENDENCY FOR “EXECUTIVE HEAVINESS”.


236

THERE WAS A CONSENSUS IN THE POLITY NOT TO CHANGE THE PREAMBLE OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH CONTAINS PANCASILA AND OTHER BASIC VALUES LAID DOWN BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS.

IT WAS ALSO A CONSENSUS ESTABLISHED AT THE ONSET OF THE AMENDMENT PROCESS NOT TO CHANGE THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.


237

THE METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

THE MODEL OF REFORM THAT ULTIMATELY SETTLED UPON WAS INTENDED TO MINIMIZE CONFLICT AND GARNER THE MOST COOPERATION FROM DISPARATE INTERESTS, FROM ARDENT REFORMERS TO THE MOST RELUCTANT CONSERVATIVES.

TWO FEATURES STOOD OUT: THE INCREMENTAL AMENDMENT PROCESS, WHICH WAS INSPIRED MORE BY THE AMERICAN SYSTEM RATHER THAN A REWRITING THAT WOULD MIRROR THE FRENCH STYLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, AND TO AVOID SETTLING CONFLICT OVER THE MOST CRUCIAL CLAUSES AND LANGUAGE BY VOTING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.


238

REFORM BY ADDENDUM ALLOWED ESPECIALLY THE MORE CONSERVATIVE AND NATIONALIST LEGISLATORS TO FEEL THAT A PART OF RESISTANCE‐ERA HISTORY HAD BEEN HONORED AND PRESERVED FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

INCREMENTAL REFORM ON AN EXISTING CONSTITUTION WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT FUTURE GENERATIONS COULD MORE EASILY TRACE ITS EVOLUTION

CHANGE WOULD BE SLOW BUT GRADUAL, AND CAREFULLY AND COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERED AND IMPLEMENTED


239

THE MECHANICS OF REFORM AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

MPR Working Group

Amendment Process

Comparative Studies

• Germany, • England, • the United States, • Sweden, • Denmark, • China, • Japan, • Russia, and • Malaysia

Public Participation

Regional Visits

Public Meetings

Seminars

NGOs

Constitutional Commissions

• Thailand, • South Korea,• Germany, and • the United States (NGO’s)

Public TV and Media


240

THE AMENDMENT PROCESS

THE 1ST AMENDMENT 1999 THE 2ND AMENDMENT 2000 THE 3RD AMENDMENT 2001 THE 4TH AMENDMENT 2002


241

THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1999

A TERM LIMIT OF TWO CONSECUTIVE FIVE‐YEAR TERMS

RETURNED THE POWER OF LEGISLATION TO PARLIAMENT

AMBASSADORS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO BE CONFIRMED BY THE PARLIAMENT AND NOT SIMPLY APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT


242

THE SECOND AMENDMENT 2000

ENHANCED DECENTRALIZATION AND REGIONAL AUTONOMY.

MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ELECTED THROUGH PUBLIC ELECTIONS. THIS PROVISION SENDS THE MESSAGE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE APPOINTED MEMBERS TO THE PARLIAMENT.


243

ENSHRINING THE SEPARATION OF THE POLICE FROM THE MILITARY.

THROUGH A SEPARATE DECREE THAT IS NOT PART OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BY THE PARLIAMENT. THIS PROVISION SENT A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE MILITARY IS SUBORDINATE TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY.

A NEW SECTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS CONSTITUTED THAT INCORPORATED STATEMENTS FROM THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.


244

THE THIRD AMENDMENT 2001

PROVIDES FOR DIRECT ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT AS A TICKET, WHICH MAY BE PUT FORWARD BY ONE POLITICAL PARTY OR A GROUP OF PARTIES.

TO BE ELECTED, THE CANDIDATE WILL HAVE TO GET MORE THAN 50% OF THE POPULAR VOTE WITH AT LEAST 20% OF THE VOTE IN AT LEAST HALF OF ALL THE PROVINCES.


245

SETS OUT RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT CAN BE IMPEACHED BY THE ASSEMBLY (MPR) AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF PARLIAMENT, IF HE IS PROVEN GUILTY OF CRIME OR IS FOUND NO LONGER SUITABLE TO HOLD THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

THE PARLIAMENT CAN ONLY PROPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT BE IMPEACHED AFTER REQUESTING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT EXAMINE THE CHARGES AGAINST THE PRESIDENT AND AFTER RECEIVING FROM THE COURT A FINDING THAT THE PRESIDENT IS GUILTY AS CHARGED.

THIS MECHANISM IS INTENDED TO PREVENT ABUSE OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS BY THE LEGISLATURE.


246

AFFIRMS THAT JUDICIAL POWER LIES WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURTS BENEATH IT, AS WELL AS THE NEWLY CONSTITUTED CONSTITUTIONAL COURT.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY: TO PRESIDE OVER CHARGES AGAINST THE PRESIDENT IN AN

IMPEACHMENT PROCESS; TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS

BRANCHES OF THE STATE; TO ORDER THE DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND TO

RESOLVE DISPUTES CONCERNING THE RESULTS OF AN ELECTION.

TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS, WHILE THE SUPREME COURT TESTS THE LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL RULES AND DECREES TO EXISTING LAWS.


247

ESTABLISHED THAT APPOINTMENTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY THE PRESIDENT HAVE TO BE PROPOSED BY A NEWLY CONSTITUTED INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION, AND APPROVED BY THE PARLIAMENT.

THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION IS A JUDICIAL WATCHDOG ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO UPHOLD AND SAFEGUARD THE HONOR, INTEGRITY AND CONDUCT OF JUDGES.


248

IN A MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE TO THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, ALTHOUGH INDONESIA REMAINS A UNITARIAN STATE, THE THIRD AMENDMENT CONSTITUTED A BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION.

IT ESTABLISHED THE HOUSE OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH‐DPD), REPRESENTING EACH OF THE PROVINCES EQUALLY, SIMILAR TO THE US SENATE.


249

ESTABLISHED THE RULE ON GENERAL ELECTION. GENERAL ELECTION IS TO BE HELD ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS.

IT PROVIDES THAT THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ELECTION FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ARE POLITICAL PARTIES, WHILE FOR THE REGIONAL COUNCIL THEY ARE INDIVIDUALS.

THE ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT BY AN INDEPENDENT GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.


250

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2002 DEFINES THAT THE MPR CONSISTS OF THE PARLIAMENT

(HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR DPR) AND THE HOUSE OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (DPD).

THIS PROVISION ALSO PERMANENTLY BARRED NON‐ELECTED MEMBERS OF MPR, SUCH AS THOSE REPRESENTING THE FUNCTIONAL GROUPS INCLUDING THE MILITARY OF PAST YEARS.

THE MPR AS THE JOIN SESSION OF DPR AND DPD, ALTHOUGH NO LONGER POSSESSES THE ABSOLUTE POWER IT HAD HAD BEFORE THE AMENDMENT, SILL RETAINS THE AUTHORITY TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION AND IMPEACH THE PRESIDENT AND ELECT PRESIDENT WHEN BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY PERMANENTLY INCAPACITATED.


251

SPECIFIES THAT IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, IF NO TICKET CAN ACHIEVE THE 50‐20% THRESHOLD, THE TWO TICKETS WITH THE MOST VOTES WILL RUN IN ANOTHER DIRECT ELECTION BY THE PEOPLE.


252

INCORPORATION OF CLAUSES RELATING TO SOCIAL JUSTICE.

GUARANTEEING UNIVERSAL GOVERNMENT‐SPONSORED PRIMARY EDUCATION, MINIMUM AGGREGATE EDUCATION SPENDING OF 20% FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT’S BUDGET.

STRENGTHENED LANGUAGE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FRIENDLINESS.


253

Source: Law No. 22/2003

Political Institutions (2003‐Now)MPR

DPR550

DPD4 x Number of Provinces

DPRD Province35 s.d 100

DPRD Kab/Kota20 s.d 45

General Election

The People

Political Parties


254

Political Institutions (2003‐Now)

The People


(DPR)

RegionalRepresentatives Council (DPD)


People’s

PresidentGeneral ElectionGeneral Election


255

STRONG FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

THE MAIN IDEA BEHIND THE REFORMS BEGUN IN 1999 WAS TO ENSURE THAT A NEWLY REVISED CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE STATE, PRIMARILY BY LIMITING THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

INDONESIA IS NOW THE THIRD LARGEST DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD.


256

AT THE SAME TIME THE REFORMS SOUGHT TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE WAS REFLECTED IN THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT WAS ORGANIZED

THE FOUR AMENDMENTS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY BEEN ABLE TO CONCLUDE AND REACHED THOSE OBJECTIVES THUS LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY TO DEVELOP IN INDONESIA, AS THE THIRD LARGEST DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD


PRACTICING DEMOCRACY

257

The 2004 General Elections: Significant Beginnings

258

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

AMONG THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION TWO STAND OUT AS MOST SIGNIFICANT:

THE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (AND VICE‐PRESIDENT),

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BICAMERAL SYSTEM OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.


259

STATE INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION

MPR

Legislative Executive Judiciary

DPD DPR BPK

KPU

President

KPK

MA MK

KY

MPR : Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat People’s Consultative Assembly

DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Lower House

DPD : Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Upper House

BPK : Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Supreme Audit Board

MA : Mahkamah Agung Supreme Court

MK : Mahkamah Konstitusi Constitutional Court

KPU : Komisi Pemilihan Umum General Election Commission

KPK : Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Corruption Eradication Commission

KY : Komisi Yudisial Judicial Commission


260

REMAKING THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

THE NEW LAWS FOR THE 2004 ELECTIONS OF THE DPR, DPD, DPRD, AND THE PRESIDENT AND VICE‐PRESIDENT.

THE NEW ELECTION LAWS STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS THE MAIN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND LOWERS BARRIERS TO ENTRY.

THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (DPR AND DPRD) ARE BASED ON THE PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM WITH OPEN LISTS OF CANDIDATES SUBMITTED BY THE PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTIES.

A CANDIDATE HAS TO BE A CERTIFIED MEMBER OF THE PARTICIPATING POLITICAL PARTY AND AT LEAST 30 PERCENT OF THE CANDIDATES FROM EACH POLITICAL PARTY MUST BE WOMEN.


261

THE CANDIDATES IN THE ELECTION OF DPD ARE INDIVIDUALS.

TO BECOME A CANDIDATE ONE HAS TO COLLECT THE SIGNATURES OF A MINIMUM NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS, THE NUMBER DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF VOTERS IN EACH PROVINCE.

A CANDIDATE FOR THE DPD MAY NOT HAVE SERVED AS BOARD MEMBER OF ANY POLITICAL PARTY FOR FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO BECOMING A CANDIDATE.

MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THE MILITARY (TNI) AND THE POLICE CANNOT RUN FOR A SEAT IN DPD AND ANYONE FROM THOSE SERVICES WISHING TO RUN FOR A SEAT IN THE DPD HAS TO RESIGN BEFORE BECOMING A CANDIDATE.


262

THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF DPR IS 550 (AN INCREASE OF 50 FROM ITS PREVIOUS SIZE) DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE PROVINCES IN PROPORTION TO THE POPULATION.

ALL MEMBERS OF DPR ARE ELECTED, ELIMINATING THE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED PLACES FOR MILITARY AND POLICE.

THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE DPD SHOULD NOT EXCEED ONE‐THIRD OF THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF DPR.

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT GIVE THE DPD LEGISLATIVE POWER.

IRONICALLY, THOUGH THEY HAVE LESS POWER, IT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO BE ELECTED A MEMBER OF DPD THAN TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE PARLIAMENT.


263

THE PRESIDENT AND VICE‐PRESIDENT ARE DIRECTLY ELECTED ON ONE TICKET.

ONLY A PARTY OR A COALITION OF PARTIES THAT HOLDS AT LEAST 15 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN DPR OR RECEIVES 20 PERCENT OF POPULAR VOTES IN THE ELECTION OF DPR CAN NOMINATE CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE‐PRESIDENT.

FOR THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THE THRESHOLD IS LOWERED TO 3 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN DPR OR 5 PERCENT OF POPULAR VOTES.

THE ELECTION IS IMPLEMENTED AND SUPERVISED BY THE COMMISSION FOR GENERAL ELECTION.


264

LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

ELECTORAL PROCESS 24 POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATED IN THE LEGISLATIVE

ELECTION FOR THE DPR AND DPRD ON APRIL 5, 2004 THE DPD ELECTION FEATURED CANDIDATES WHO

CONTESTED FOR SEATS TO REPRESENT THEIR RESPECTIVE PROVINCE IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES.

IN GENERAL, THE ENTIRE ELECTORAL PROCESS PROCEEDED IN A SMOOTH, ORDERLY, SECURE, AND DEMOCRATIC MANNER, AS WITNESSED BY NATIONAL AND FOREIGN ELECTION MONITORING AGENCIES.


265

DPR ELECTION THE RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION FOR MEMBERS OF

BOTH THE DPR AND DPRDS WERE UNFORESEEN AND CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY THE CONFIGURATION OF THE POLITICAL MAP.

THE GOLKAR PARTY REGAINED A PLURALITY WITH A 24.5 MILLION VOTES (21.6%), WITH PDI‐P AS THE FIRST RUNNER‐UP WITH APPROXIMATELY 21 MILLION VOTES (18.5%).

PKB, WHICH CAME IN THIRD, GAINED CLOSE TO 12 MILLION VOTES (10.6%).

OTHER PARTIES WITH SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT INCLUDED THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS), WHICH DREW AROUND 8 MILLION VOTES (7.3%), AND THE NEWLY FOUNDED DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH SECURED ALMOST 8.5 MILLION VOTES (7.4%).


LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

266

DPR ELECTION ONLY 17 PARTIES WON SEATS IN THE NATIONAL

PARLIAMENT. INDONESIAN LAW PERMITS ALL PARTICIPATING POLITICAL

PARTIES TO FILE COURT CHALLENGES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI), IF THEY CAN PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL ERRORS IN THE BALLOT COUNTING PROCESS.

OUT OF THE 24 PARTICIPATING PARTIES, 23 FILED LAWSUITS WITH THE COURT, CONTESTED THE VOTE COUNT.

FOLLOWING A SERIES OF BRIEF COURT HEARINGS, THE COURT REACHED A FINAL VERDICT ON THE ELECTION RESULTS.

THE VERDICT ALTERED THE KPU’S ALLOCATION OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS.


267

DPR ELECTION THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS CHANGED THE

CONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL POWER WITHIN THE DPR. ACCORDING TO THE PREVAILING DPR RULES AND

REGULATIONS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE DPR ARE OBLIGED TO REGISTER AS FACTION MEMBERS. A FACTION MUST CONSIST OF AT LEAST 13 MEMBERS.

FACTIONS WITHIN DPR MAY BE FORMED BY A SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY. THIS IS THE MODEL USED BY THE GOLKAR PARTY FACTION AND THE PDI‐P FACTION.

FACTIONS CAN ALSO BE ESTABLISHED BY A COALITION OF TWO OR MORE POLITICAL PARTIES. SUCH COALITIONS ARE GENERALLY FORMED WHEN A PARTY FAILS TO MEET THE 13‐SEAT REQUIREMENT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT FACTION.


268

DPR ELECTION THE COALITION FACTIONS: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

FACTION, WHICH INCLUDES THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE INDONESIA UNITED AND JUSTICE PARTY (PKPI); AND THE DEMOCRATIC PIONEER FACTION, WHICH MERGES THE CRESCENT AND STAR PARTY (PBB), THE NATIONALIST UNITED DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDK), THE PIONEER PARTY (PP), THE INDONESIA DEMOCRATIC SUPREMACY PARTY (PPDI), AND PNI MARHAENISME.


269

DPR ELECTION DPR MEMBERSHIP IS DIVIDED INTO THE FOLLOWING FACTIONS:

No Faction Seats %1. The Golkar Party 127 23.222. PDI-P 109 19.933. The United Development Party (PPP) 57 10.424. The Democratic Party (PD) 57 10.425. The National Mandate Party (PAN) 53 9.696. The National Awakening Party (PKB) 52 9.517. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 45 8.238. The Democratic Pioneer Star (BPD) 20 3.669. The Reform Star Party (PBR) 14 2.5610. The Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) 13 2.38

547


270

DPD ELECTION THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION ALSO ALLOWED

INDONESIANS TO VOTE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HOUSE OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES (DPD).

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL HISTORY, VOTERS HELD THE RIGHT TO DIRECTLY ELECT MEMBERS OF A NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY.

THE DPD CONSISTS OF 128 MEMBERS REPRESENTING 32 PROVINCES. EACH PROVINCE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SIZE, IS REPRESENTED BY FOUR MEMBERS, I.E. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE RESTRICTED FROM HOLDING POSITIONS IN A POLITICAL PARTY STRUCTURE.


271

DPD ELECTION THE DPD’S MEMBERSHIP FEATURES A BLEND OF

PROMINENT PUBLIC FIGURES ORIGINATING FROM VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS, SOME BEST KNOWN FOR THEIR ROLES IN RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, OR EDUCATIONAL DOMAINS.

OTHER DPD MEMBERS ARE FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING FORMER MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS , LAWYERS AND BUSINESSMEN, RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS AND LEADERS, AND PROMINENT NGO ACTIVISTS.


272

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

NOMINATION OF THE CANDIDATES THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION MARKED THE BEGINNING OF

A NEW CHAPTER IN INDONESIAN POLITICS, AS THE COUNTRY ENTERED A HISTORIC NEW PHASE OF DEMOCRACY.

FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER IN MODERN INDONESIAN POLITICS, THE PRESIDENT AND VICE‐PRESIDENT WERE DIRECTLY ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE.

THIS DEVELOPMENT REFLECTED THE MATURING OF INDONESIA’S CITIZENRY AND CIVIL SOCIETY.

THE DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS ALSO CONSIDERED AS A SIGNIFICANT DEMOCRATIC REFORM.


273

NOMINATION OF THE CANDIDATES THE RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTION, COMBINED

WITH A THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT ESTABLISHED BY THE RELEVANT ELECTION LAW, LEFT ONLY SEVEN PARTIES ELIGIBLE TO INDEPENDENTLY NOMINATE A TICKET WITH PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE‐PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES.

THESE PARTIES WERE: THE GOLKAR PARTY (21.58%), PDI‐P (18.53%), PKB (10.57%), PPP (8.15%), THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (7.45%), PKS (7.34%) AND PAN (6.44%).


274

NOMINATION OF THE CANDIDATES IN THE RUN‐UP TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, SIX

TICKETS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE‐PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES EMERGED: 1. MEGAWATI – HASYIM MUZADI, NOMINATED BY PDI‐P.2. WIRANTO – SALAHUDDIN WAHID, PROPOSED BY THE GOLKAR

PARTY.3. AMIEN RAIS – SISWONO YUDHO HUSODO, BACKED BY PAN.4. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO – M. JUSUF KALLA,

REPRESENTING THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.5. HAMZAH HAZ – AGUM GUMELAR, PROPOSED BY PPP.6. ABDURRAHMAN WAHID – MARWAH DAUD, NOMINATED BY

PKB.


275

NOMINATION OF THE CANDIDATES FIVE OF THESE SIX TICKETS WERE DETERMINED

THROUGH THE POLITICAL PARTIES’ INTERNAL DECISION. ONLY THE GOLKAR PARTY CONDUCTED AN OPEN

ELECTION TO SELECT ITS PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE THROUGH A CONVENTION, WHICH INVOLVED THE PARTY’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FROM THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL UP TO THE PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL.

FOR INDONESIA, THIS WAS A FIRST.


276

FIRST ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

FOLLOWING A SERIES OF VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, KPU OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FIVE OUT OF THE SIX TICKETS MENTIONED ABOVE WERE ELIGIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THE FIVE TICKETS COMPRISED THE OFFICIAL CANDIDATES FOR THE JULY 5, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID AND MARWAH DAUD IBRAHIM FELL SHORT IN THE KPU’S VERIFICATION PROCESS DUE TO HEALTH REQUIREMENTS WHICH DISQUALIFIED PKB PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ABDURRAHMAN WAHID, IN ACCORDANCE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RULES AND REGULATIONS.

THE KPU LATER CONFIRMED THAT THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON HEALTH TEST RESULTS APPROVED BY THE APPOINTED MEDICAL TEAM FROM THE INDONESIAN DOCTORS ASSOCIATION (IDI).


277

FIRST ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THE FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION TOOK PLACE ON

JULY 5, 2004. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND JUSUF KALLA RECEIVED A

PLURALITY OF THE VOTE. THE OFFICIAL RESULTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO‐JUSUF KALLA GAINED 39,838,184

VOTES (33.574%), 2. MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI‐HASYIM MUZADI OBTAINED 31,569,104

VOTES (26.605%), 3. WIRANTO‐SALAHUDDIN WAHID GAINED 26,286,788 VOTES

(22.154%), 4. AMIEN RAIS‐ SISWONO YUDO HUSODO RECEIVED 17,392,931 VOTES

(14.658%), 5. HAMZAH HAZ‐AGUM GUMELAR WON 3,569,861 VOTES (3.009%).

FROM THE ABOVE VOTE TALLY, NONE OF THE TICKETS SURPASSED THE DESIGNATED THRESHOLD OF FIFTY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL VOTES. THE TWO TOP‐PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL TICKETS PROCEEDED TO THE RUNOFF ELECTION.


278

RUNOFF ELECTION THE SECOND ROUND ELECTION WAS HELD ON

SEPTEMBER 20, 2004. SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND JUSUF KALLA WON THE ELECTION WITH A FINAL TALLY OF 69,266,350 VOTES.

THIS FIGURE FAR EXCEEDED MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI‐HASYIM MUZADI’S TOTAL OF 44,990,704 VOTES.

THE OFFICIAL KPU TALLY OF 114,257,054 VOTES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF ELECTION REFLECTED A 60.62% MAJORITY FOR SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND JUSUF KALLA, WHILE MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI‐HASYIM MUZADI RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF 39.38% OF THE ELECTORATE.


279

RUNOFF ELECTION THE PARTIES THAT BACKED MEGAWATI’S TICKET LATER

FORMED A COALITION UNDER THE NAME OF KOALISI KEBANGSAAN (THE NATIONAL COALITION).

THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WERE ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 4, 2004 BY THE KPU.

SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO AND JUSUF KALLA (ALSO KNOWN AS SBY‐JK) WERE OFFICIALLY DECLARED AS PRESIDENT‐ELECT AND VICE‐PRESIDENT‐ELECT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA FOR THE PERIOD OF 2004‐2009.

THEY WERE OFFICIALLY SWORN IN ON OCTOBER 2004, IN FRONT OF A SPECIAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE MPR.


280

SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO (SBY) WAS ELECTED FOR PRESIDENT AFTER A RUNOFF ELECTION, AS HE FAILED TO GARNER MAJORITY VOTE IN THE FIRST ROUND.

DEFEATED THE INCUMBET MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI. BOTH SBY AND HIS VICE PRESIDENT JUSUF KALLA, HAD

BOTH BEEN IN MEGAWATI’S CABINET, AS RESPECTIVELY COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS AND COORDINATING MINISTER FOR PEOPLE’S WELFARE.



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2004 ELECTION

THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTION HAS OPENED A NEW CHAPTER IN INDONESIA’S MARCH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.

MANY HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER WHETHER THE ELECTION COULD TAKE PLACE IN A PEACEFUL MANNER, CHARACTERIZED BY FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY. MANY ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF CLASHES BETWEEN GROUPS OF POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

THIS CONCERN WAS UNDERSTANDABLE, AS AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME THAT INDONESIA HELD ITS ELECTION, INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES ALSO CARRIED OUT ELECTIONS, BUT THESE WERE TAINTED BY PHYSICAL VIOLENCE WHICH RESULTED IN CASUALTIES.

Day2_GRIPS 2012


BY CONTRAST, THE INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTION TOOK PLACE PEACEFULLY, WITHOUT CONFLICTS OR CASUALTIES.

POLITICAL OBSERVERS –DOMESTIC AS WELL AS FOREIGN–UNANIMOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE 2004 ELECTIONS, BOTH THE LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN A FAIR AND OPEN MANNER, WITHOUT MAJOR IRREGULARITIES.

THE ELECTIONS MARKED A SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE STEP TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE.

Day2_GRIPS 2012


DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS

FOR DECADES, THE IDEA OF DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL LEADERS WAS UNTHINKABLE. BUT THINGS CHANGE AND INDONESIA EMBRACED DIRECT REGIONAL ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNOR AND DISTRICT CHIEF/MAYORS IN 2005, WHICH PROMISES TO DEEPEN AND INSTITUTIONALIZE DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL.

THE VILLAGE CHIEF HOWEVER HAD BEEN DIRECTLY ELECTED FOR MANY YEARS, THE ONLY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADERS FOR A LONG TIME. THE ELECTIONS OF THE VILLAGE CHIEFS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN MARKED BY HORIZONTAL CONFLICTS WHICH SOMETIME ARE QUITE VIOLENCE THUS CREATING DOUBT WHETHER INDONESIA WAS READY FOR DIRECT ELECTION FOR ITS POLITICAL LEADERS.

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THE REGIONAL ELECTIONS, WHICH HAD THEIR STARTING POINT IN THE REGIONAL AUTONOMY THAT WAS INTRODUCED IN 2001, WERE HELD IN THE HIGH SPIRIT THAT FOLLOWED THE FREE AND FAIR GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1999 AND 2004, AND MARKED A GIANT LEAP OF FAITH TO EMBRACE A SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN DISREGARDED FOR OVER FOUR DECADES.

Day2_GRIPS 2012


REGIONAL AUTONOMY ITSELF HAS LONG BEEN CRITICIZED FOR DOING LITTLE FOR PEOPLE AT THE LOWER LEVELS OF SOCIETY, SERVING ONLY TO TRANSFER POWER FROM THE HANDS OF UNSCRUPULOUS POLITICIANS IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO EVEN MORE UNSCRUPULOUS ONES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

THERE IS NOW HOPE THAT THE REGIONAL ELECTIONS WILL EVENTUALLY BRING A MORE DEMOCRATIC RULE TO THE LOCAL LEVEL AND LEAD TO THE RISE OF LOCAL LEADERS WHO ARE MORE ACCOUNTABLE AND QUALIFIED, AND ABLE TO CARRY OUT THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE.

Day2_GRIPS 2012

Issue 1998 2008Presidential selection Selected indirectly by the People’s

Consultative Assembly (MPR) every five years

Directly elected through universal suffrage every five years

National parliament Unicameral legislature 500 members, with 20 percent of seats reserved for the military (reduced to 15 percent in 1995). Dominated by Golkar.

Bicameral legislature (DPR and DPD). DPR members (550) elected directly in

multi-member constituencies through proportional representation.

Each province elects four members to the national DPD, for total of 128 members.

Political parties Only three parties legally allowed to contest elections—Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP), Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

24 parties competed in the 2004 general election, and five parties put up serious parties for the presidency.

Presidential-legislative relations

De facto, a rubber stamp body for the president’s policy decisions.

The president’s party (the Democrat Party, PD) holds only 56 of 550 seats in DPR.

DPR is now a serious check on presidential authority.

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DECADE MAKES

Day2_GRIPS 2012 www.ginandjar.com 286

WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DECADE MAKES

Issue 1998 2008

Role of military Reserved seats at all three levels of parliament.

About 6,000 military staff seconded to government positions (as of 1995).

Territorial command system enables military self-financing.

No reserved seats in parliament

Provincial and district executives

Appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs (under tight supervision of the president).

Directly elected.

Provincial and district legislatures

Only three parties legally allowed to contest elections. 15 percent of seats reserved for the military. Dominated by Golkar.

Directly elected in multi-member constituencies in a proportional representation system.

Civil society Tight restrictions on the press and NGOs. Free press and proliferation of NGOs.


2009 GENERAL ELECTION

288

RESULT OF THE POST‐NEW ORDER DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

PARTY SEATS IN PARLIAMENT

2009 2004 1999DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PD) 148 57 ‐

FUNCTIONAL GROUP PARTY (GOLKAR) 107 128 120

INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY – STRUGGLE (PDI‐P) 93 109 153

JUSTICE WELFARE PARTY (PKS)* 57 45 7

NATIONAL MESSAGE PARTY (PAN) 46 52 34

UNITED DEVELOP PARTY (PPP) 38 58 56

NATION AWAKENING PARTY (PKB) 28 52 51

GREAT INDONESIA MOVEMENT PARTY (GERINDRA) 25 ‐ ‐

PEOPLE CONSCIENCE PARTY (HANURA) 18 ‐ ‐

OTHER PARTIES ‐ 49 41

TOTAL 560 550 462

* In 1999: the party’s name was Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)Day2_GRIPS 2012 www.ginandjar.com 289

2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

290

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

Boediono

Megawati

Prabowo

Jusuf Kalla

Wiranto

THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES


NO CANDIDATES VOTES PERCENTAGE

1 MEGAWATI‐PRABOWO 32.548.105 26.79%

2 SBY‐BOEDIONO 73.874.562 60.80%

3 JK‐WIRANTO 15.081.814 12.41%

TOTAL 121.504.481 100,00%

STATISTICSVALID VOTES 121.504.581

NOT VALID VOTES 6.479.174

TOTAL VOTER 127.983.655TOTAL VOTERS 176.441.434

2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION


THE FIRST SBY ADMINISTRATION HAD TO FACE SERIOUS SETBACK CAUSED BY THE ACEH AND NORTH SUMATERA TSUNAMI IN ITS FIRST WEEKS

THE SECOND SBY ADMINISTRATION HAD TO FACE SERIOUS SCANDALS, ALSO IN ITS FIRST WEEKS THE GECKO ‐ CROCODILE CASE THE CENTURY BANK CASE


May 1998-October 1999 Accountability Speech

Rejected Declined to run for

President

August 1945 - March 1968

Elected by the PPKI Impeached by MPRS

October 1999 – July 2001

Elected by MPR Impeached by MPR

Sukarno

B.J. HabibieAbdurrahman Wahid

October 2004 – 2009 Directly elected

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

July 2001 – October 2004

Elected by MPR Lost election to SBY

Megawati

March 1968 - May 1998 Elected by MPRS Resigned under pressure

Suharto

REELECTED2009-2014

REGIME CHANGE IN INDONESIA


POST REFORM GOVERNMENT INDONESIA IS EMERGING FROM LONG PERIOD OF

AUTHORITARIAN RULE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS STATUS AS ONE OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY.

INDONESIA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE REFORMASI (1998) SEEMS TO BE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.

SOCIO‐POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT : AMENDMENT OF 1945 CONSTITUTION, IMPROVEMENT OF CHECKS AND BALANCES SYSTEM, DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL AND REGIONAL EXECUTIVES ELECTIONS, LEGAL REFORM AND DECENTRALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, BIGGER ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY, PEACE IN ACEH.

INTERNATIONAL ROLE: INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN THE WORLD, AMONG OTHERS THROUGH DEMOCRACY FORUM.


DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

298

AN UNFINISHED BUSINESS

DEMOCRACY IS CONSOLIDATED IF IT BECOMES “THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN.”

LINZ AND STEPAN BELIEVE THAT FOR A DEMOCRACY TO BE CONSOLIDATED THERE ARE FIVE INTERCONNECTED AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING CONDITIONS (“ARENAS”) THAT MUST EXIST OR BE CRAFTED; THAT

1) ALLOW AND SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE AND LIVELY CIVIL SOCIETY,

2) AN AUTONOMOUS AND VALUED POLITICAL SOCIETY, 3) A RULE OF LAW, 4) AN EFFECTIVE STATE BUREAUCRACY, AND 5) AN INSTITUTIONALIZED ECONOMIC SOCIETY.

ONE CAN ADD ALSO THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.


IN EARLIER WRITING DAHL ADVANCES THE IDEA THAT, “THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY REQUIRES A STRONG DEMOCRATIC CULTURE THAT PROVIDES ADEQUATE EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE SUPPORT FOR ADHERING TO DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES.”

THE IMPLICATION IS THAT A DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRY WITHOUT A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE ROOTED IN ITS POLITY IS FRAGILE AND COULD WHITHER OR EVEN COLLAPSE IN THE FACE OF SEVERE CRISIS SUCH AS ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS, REGIONAL OR COMMUNAL CONFLICTS OR POLITICAL CRISES CAUSED BY INEPT OR CORRUPT OR FRACTIOUS LEADERS.


HUNTINGTON: DEMOCRATIC CULTURE MEANS THAT THE POLITY UNDERSTANDS THAT DEMOCRACY IS NOT A PANACEA.

HENCE, DEMOCRACIES BECOME CONSOLIDATED WHEN PEOPLE LEARN THAT DEMOCRACY IS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TYRANNY BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO ANYTHING ELSE


SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS WOULD MOST PROBABLY BE CONFRONTED BY THE NEW DEMOCRACY AS IT BECAME MORE CONSOLIDATED AND ACHIEVED A CERTAIN STABILITY, AND MIGHT INCLUDE POLITICAL STALEMATE, INABILITY TO REACH DECISIONS, SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DEMAGOGUERY AND DOMINATION OF VESTED INTERESTS.


THE YEARS AFTER THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT HAS COME TO POWER ARE USUALLY CHARACTERIZED BY THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC COALITION THAT HAD PRODUCED THE TRANSITION, THE DECLINE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INITIAL LEADERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AND THE REALIZATIONS THAT DEMOCRACY IN ITSELF WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT OFFER SOLUTIONS TO MAJOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY.

THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IS HOW TO OVERCOME AND NOT TO BE SUBDUED BY THOSE PROBLEMS.


MAJOR PROBLEMS IN CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

1. INSTITUTIONS : AMBIGUITY BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS; ESTABLISHMENT OF QUASI‐GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, AND CONFUSION OF ROLE AND FUNCTION IN THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

2. POLITICAL ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL ACTS VERSUS PERSONIFICATION OF POLITICAL FIGURES; MONEY POLITICS, MANIPULATION OF MASSES.


3. MAJOR PROBLEMS IN GOVERNANCE INCLUDES: REFORM OF THE BUREAUCRACY QUALITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS CORRUPTION INEFFICIENCY LOW SALARY IMPACT OF PROBLEMS IN BUREAUCRACY ON SOCIO‐

ECONOMIC DOMAINS.


4. NEW PHENOMENA IN POLITICAL LIFE : INTERNALIZATION OF POLITICAL ISSUES BY GRASS ROOT POLITICIANS: WEAKENING OF GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM ETHNO‐NATIONALISM: AS NEGATIVE IMPACT OF

DECENTRALIZATION POLICY (EUPHORIA: FROM SPECIAL AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE)


POLITICAL TRUST AND SOCIAL TRUST: PROBLEM IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (FREQUENTLY CONSTRAINED BY ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION).

PLURALISM: NEGATIVE IMPACT OF PLURALISM IN THE FORM OF HORIZONTAL CONFLICTS BASED ON RELIGIOUS, ETHNICS, SOCIO‐ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL IN‐GROUPNESS FEELINGS)

TERRORISM.


SBY I SBY IIGUSDURHABIBIENEW

ORDER

RECOVERYDEVELOPMENTTRILOGI

AUTORITA‐RIAN TRANSITION DEMOCRATIC

CONSOLIDATION

ECONOMIC+POLITICAL

CRISIS

1966‐1998 1998‐2004 2004‐2005 2009‐2014 2014‐….

STABILIZATION ACCELERATION

TOWARDS

HIGHQUALITYHIGH

PERFOR‐MANCE

DEMOCRACY

WHERE IS INDONESIA NOW

MEGAWATI


LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

309

INDONESIA HAS TRAVELLED A LONG WAY FROM A CLOSE TO AN OPEN SOCIETY, FROM AUTHORITARIAN TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, FROM THE RUIN OF ECONOMIC DESTRUCTION, TO A BUSTLING ECONOMY WITH TREMENDOUS OPPORTUNITY.

INDONESIA HAS LESSONS TO OFFER FROM ITS OWN EXPERIENCE. ITS DEMOCRACY IS HOMEGROWN. NO FOREIGN HAND INTERFERED WITH THEDEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. ALTHOUGH INDONESIA HAS NOT BEEN "ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY," FOR LONG, THERE IS MUCH THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED FOR WHICH ITS CITIZENS MAY BE PROUD OF.


THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS HAVING BEEN COMPLETED, CITIZENS MAY OBSERVE A "SOFTWARE UPGRADE" IN THE DIFFICULT SYSTEM THAT IS THEIR GOVERNMENT.

MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN, HOWEVER. ALTHOUGH THE BASIC TRANSITION FROM

AUTHORITARIAN TO DEMOCRATIC RULES HAS BEEN COMPLETED, CONSOLIDATION IS STILL UNFINISHED IN INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC NORMS IS AN IMPORTANT TASK OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION.

IN THE SOCIETY, THE NORMS HAVE YET TO BECOME PART OF CULTURAL VALUES.


FOR THAT GOOD, STRONG AND COMMITTED LEADERSHIP AT ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY TO BRING ABOUT THOSE CHANGES. GOOD LEADERSHIP IS NEEDED EVERYWHERE AND ALWAYS, BUT IT IS ESPECIALLY NEEDED FOR A COUNTRY GOING THROUGH TRANSITION WITH A HISTORY LITTERED WITH PROMISES BROKEN BY SELF‐SERVING LEADERS.

AS SUCH, NOT ONLY SHOULD REFORMS INSTALL AN EFFECTIVE AND TRANSPARENT SET OF RULES‐BASED INSTITUTIONS, THEY SHOULD ALSO EVOLVE RULES‐BASED MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE BEST OF EACH GENERATION IS BROUGHT INTO THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.


TO PUT IN SIMPLISTIC TERMS, A GOOD SYSTEM IS NOTHING WITHOUT GOOD PEOPLE TO RUN IT. IT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE SYSTEM IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE PEOPLE WHO RUN IT, ON THE CONTRARY, DEMOCRATIZATION ENTAILS FIRST AND FOREMOST ESTABLISHING THE SYSTEM—THE INSTITUTIONS, THE PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES.

THE NEED FOR STRONG CIVIL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS UNIVERSAL TO EVERY COUNTRY AND EVERY HUMAN SOCIETY. INDONESIA’S EXPERIMENT WITH DEMOCRATIZATION IS ONLY ONE MORE EXAMPLE ILLUSTRATING ITS CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.


IN THE POST‐TRANSITION PERIOD, THE INDONESIAN POLITY HAS TO GRAPPLE WITH TWO KEY ISSUES IN CONSOLIDATING ITS NASCENT DEMOCRACY. FIRST, IT IS THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO STRENGTHEN THE POLITICAL CULTURE, DEEPEN DEMOCRACY AND ENHANCE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION.

A STRONG POLITICAL CULTURE WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE SUPPORT FOR ADHERING TO DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES.


THE SECOND KEY ISSUE IS HOW TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED DEMOCRATIC REGIME. REGIME PERFORMANCE CAN BE SEEN AS BOTH POLITICAL OUTPUTS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE REGIME AS WELL AS THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS IT GENERATES.

IN SHORT POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES. REGIME PERFORMANCE SUGGESTS THAT OVER TIME, THE DEMOCRATIC REGIME IS EXPECTED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENTLY POSITIVE OUTCOMES TO BUILD POLITICAL LEGITIMACY.

THE ABILITY OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY TO DELIVER DECENT, OPEN AND CLEAN GOVERNMENT AS POLICY OUTCOMES IS IMPORTANT TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION.


MANY PEOPLE HOLD THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEMS OF MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY DO NOT REALLY GUARANTEE THAT THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE IS IN THE FOREFRONT OF POLITICAL ARGUMENTS. THAT POLICY DECISIONS ONLY SERVE THE INTEREST OF THE PARTIES AND OF THOSE WHO "OWN" THE PARTIES OR ARE DOMINANT FIGURES IN THE PARTIES.

AND MANY ALSO SEE THAT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HAS GIVEN RISE TO RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND DEFAMATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE PRESS, AND NOT THE LEAST TO PORNOGRAPHY, THE DESTRUCTIONS OF MORAL VALUES.


IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT MANY OF THE ISSUES ONLY SHOW THE EXASPERATION OF THE PEOPLE OVER UNMET HIGH EXPECTATION FOR DEMOCRACY TO PRODUCE STABLE POLITICAL SYSTEM, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC WELFARE.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IS, THUS, CHALLENGED TO ADDRESS THESE GRIEVANCES BY ENACTING BETTER AND WELL THOUGHT OF POLICIES AND BY LISTENING MORE TO THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE IN GENERAL, NOT POLITICAL PARTY'S NARROW POLITICAL INTERESTS.

CIVIL SOCIETY SHOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.


AND HERE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS CALLED UPON TO PLAY CRUCIAL ROLE. IN FACT SCHOLARS ARGUE THAT ONE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS "DELIVERING DEMOCRACY," WHICH MEANS UPHOLDING DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND ENSURING THAT CITIZENS CAN ACCESS THEIR RIGHTS IN KEEPING WITH THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY—LIBERTY, JUSTICE, FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND EQUITY.


DEMOCRACIES CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT A STRONG, TECHNICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, HONEST AND RESPONSIVE PUBLIC SERVICE. THE CHALLENGE FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IS THUS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE PUBLIC SERVICE FUNCTIONS WELL AND HARMONIOUSLY IN A DEMOCRATIC SETTING.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE WHO ENTER PUBLIC SERVICE ARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING EXPERTS AND SKILLED MANAGERS, WELL‐GROUNDED IN DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE PART OF ELECTED POLITICIAN NOT TO INTERFERE AND "POLITIZE" PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE THAT WOULD RESTRAIN THEIR CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY.


POST‐SCRIPT

320

THE ROLE OF ISLAM

IT IS TRUE THAT FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC GROUPS, SOME OF THEM MILITANT, DO EXIST IN INDONESIA, BUT THEY ARE MARGINAL AND HAVE LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT.

DESPITE THE RECURRENCE OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOME ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, FOR MANY YEARS, INDONESIA, THE COUNTRY WITH THE LARGEST MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE WORLD, HAS BEEN WELL KNOWN AS A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY CHARACTERIZED BY RELIGIOUS MODERATION AND TOLERANCE.


WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS COMPLETED, THE DEBATE ON THE INCLUSION OF THE JAKARTA CHARTER INTO THE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN MORE OR LESS BEEN CONCLUDED.

THE VOTES AGAINST IT WERE OVERWHELMING, CUTTING ACROSS POLITICAL FAULT LINES.

ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE ATTEMPTS TO REINTRODUCE THE JAKARTA CHARTER IS EVER PRESENT, THE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE CONFINED TO A SMALL MINORITY.

NOT ONLY ARE THE SECULAR NATIONALIST PARTIES AGAINST IT, MANY PARTIES WITH ISLAMIC CREDENTIALS ARE ALSO NOT SUPPORTING IT.


EVEN IF THE JAKARTA CHARTER DOES NOT POSE AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY, ADJUSTING TO AND COPING WITH A DEEPENING RELIGIOUS AWARENESS AND RELIGIOUS PIETY WITHIN THE MUSLIM POPULATION IS STILL A CHALLENGE FOR INDONESIA.

ALTHOUGH INDONESIA IS A PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRY, ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDONESIA HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE TO ATTAIN MORE THAN 40% OF THE VOTES, SINCE THE ELECTION OF 1955 UP TO THE LAST ELECTION IN 2004. THEREFORE, MOST INDONESIAN MUSLIM VOTED FOR PARTIES NOT BASED IN RELIGION.

THE DIFFERENT FROM ONE ELECTION TO ANOTHER IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE VOTES GARNERED BY THE ISLAMIC PARTIES, WHICH CONSTANTLY CHANGES REFLECTING THE POLITICAL MOOD AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE TIME.


IN THE SHORT RUN, HOWEVER, THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC VALUES IN THE MINDS AND LIVES OF THE POPULATION, MOST IMPORTANTLY AMONG THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE POLITICAL ELITE, AND THE YOUNG, MAY AFFECT ATTITUDES OR RESPONSES TO POLITICAL ISSUES THAT INVOLVE ISLAM SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

THE SEPTEMBER 11 ACT OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE US WAS ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY CONDEMNED BY ORGANIZED MUSLIMS AND BY THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL.

EXCEPT FOR A FEW VERY VOCAL FANATICS, INDONESIA’S MUSLIMS WERE OUTRAGED BY WITH HAPPENED IN NEW YORK.


THE FEELING OF OUTRAGE AGAINST TERRORISM THAT HAD TAKEN THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE WAS HEIGHTENED WHEN INDONESIA ALSO BECAME A VICTIM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WITH THE BOMBING IN BALI ON 12 OCTOBER 2002, THE MORE RECENT MARRIOT BOMBING IN JAKARTA ON 5 AUGUST 2002, AND THE SECOND BALI BOMBING IN 2005.

FOR MANY INDONESIAN MUSLIMS, TERRORISM HAD ONLY SUCCEEDED IN CREATING THE WRONG IMAGE OF ISLAM AND ISLAMIC VALUES.


THE NATIONALIST AND ISLAMICS PARTIES BALANCE IN INDONESIA’S DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

(PERCENTAGES OF VALID VOTES)

*) THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA (PKI) WAS STILL IN EXISTENCE

1955 1999 2004 2005

Islamic parties 6 of 29

Parties: 44,01%

13 of 48

Parties: 28%

8 of 42

Parties: 38,99%

11 of 38

Parties: 29,3%

Nationalist/non

Islamic parties*)

23 of 29

Parties: 55,99%

35 of 48

Parties: 72%

16 of 24

Parties: 61,01%

27 of 38

Parties: 70,7%


THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

OBSERVERS OF INDONESIA HAVE PAID MUCH ATTENTION TO THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POST‐NEW ORDER POLITICS AND HOW THE MILITARY PERCEIVE ITS ROLE IN DEMOCRACY.

EVENTS SURROUNDING THE FALL OF SUHARTO SHOWED THAT THE MILITARY HAD BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF POLITICAL CHANGE. ITS ROLE WAS CRUCIAL IN THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION FROM AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TO REAL DEMOCRACY.


IN THE TRANSITION DURING THE HABIBIE PERIOD, THE MILITARY LENT ITS POLITICAL WEIGHT TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY BY SUPPORTING THE CREATION OF LAWS AND RULES THAT DISMANTLED THE OLD AUTHORITARIAN STRUCTURES AND REPLACED IT WITH A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

THE MILITARY HAS SHOWN ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY WHEN IT ACCEPTED THE CONSENSUS OF THE POLITY THAT IT SHOULD NO LONGER TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN POLITICS AND THEREFORE NO LONGER HOLD SEATS IN THE ELECTIVE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

UNDER WAHID, THE MILITARY HAD BEEN STEADFAST IN REFUSING TO BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT TO SUBVERT THE CONSTITUTION AND RESISTED THE PRESSURE TO REVERSE TO AUTHORITARIANISM.


ALTHOUGH MANY RETIRED SENIOR OFFICERS WERE AGAINST CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION, THE SERVING MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FULLY SUPPORTED THE AMENDMENTS THAT HAVE BECOME THE FOUNDATION FOR A STRONGER AND MORE STABLE DEMOCRACY.

THEREFORE IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT THE MILITARY IS NOT A THREAT BUT AN ASSET TO INDONESIA’S DEMOCRACY.


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