6 Ministry of Defence

A. Office lor ,.. Nuc:Jear Regul"tlon

ENCLOSURE 1 TO MOD-ONR GENERAL AGREEMENT DATED APRIL 2015

LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION

AND

THE DEFENCE NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATOR

setting out their intentions for coherent, complete and seamless regulation of the Defence Nuclear Programme

INTRODUCTION

1. The General Agreement between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is an administrative agreement that outlines the relationship between MOD and ONA in discharging their respective roles and responsibilities for nuclear, radiological and conventional health and safety (H&S) in respect of the Defence Nuclear programme (DNP). It sets down how the MoO intends to fulfil its statutory duties under relevant health and safety legislation as it applies to the DNPl related facilities and activities. In addition it outlines the ONR's responsibilities and authority for independent regulation of the MOD's nuclear related facilities and activities. The General Agreement allows for Letters of Understanding (LoU) to be agreed when it is appropriate to further clarify working-level relationships between the Defence Regulators and ONR.

2. Regulatory LoUs have been in place since 2003 for both the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme and the Nuclear Weapon Programme. The original LoUs were replaced by a single LoU in November 2006 to reflect the formation of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulalor (DNSR) and the developing relationship between ONR (then Nil) and DNSR in pursuit of effective regulation. The 2006 LoU identified managerial measures necessary to give effect to the coordinated approach with the emphasis on the development of jointly determined and implemented strategies and plans. This LoU updates the previous one to reflect changes in legislation and other organisational changes since then, and it provides additional information to inspectors as they undertake their duties in regulating the DNP.

3. This Letter of Understanding:

a. Provides the high-level intentions2 for coherent , complete and seamless regulation3 of the DNP which is achieved by working in a joined up manner4

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, Covering both the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) and the Nuclear Weapon Programme (NWP). 2 These intentions will be developed into detailed instructions and guidance in the documentation of each regulator. 3 Coherent, complete and seamless regulatioo is also called 'joined up' regulation and is intended to ensure that whilst the different regulators have different authorities, the duty holders can provide information once, on a given topic, and receive co-ordinated responses from the regulators. In practice, it will be achieved by close alignment of Licence and Authorisation Conditions. common understanding of risks and hazards by regulators, sharing of information, and the adoption of common regulatory principles and

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b. Sets out what is expected of working level regu lation to reflect an integrated approach.

c. Encourages a holistic approach to the regulation of the DNP.

d. Recognises that it is not possible or appropriate to prescribe working level practice in detail but better to encourage a common regulatory vision and associated values.

e. Promotes an approach to regulation where joint lessons are learned through the exchange of information and regulatory experience.

PURPOSE OF COHERENT, COMPLETE AND SEAMLESS REGULATION

4. While regulators cannot delegate their responsibilities to others, close collaboration in areas where their authorities coincide and interface is recommended in the Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators thereby minimising the burden on Duty Holders. Effective and efficient regulation is achieved by ONR and DNSR working closely to ensure coherent, complete and seamless regulation of all DNP activities whilst providing the means for the delivery of the respective Visions and Missions identified in Table 1.

ONR DSA Vision: An exemplary regulator that inspires respect, Vision: Demonstrably safe, environmentally sound, trust and confidence. effective and available Defence capability.

Mission: To provide efficient and effective regu lation Mission: To provide independent assurance to the of the nuclear industry, holding it to account on Secretary of State that his policy on safety in behalf of the public . Defence is being promoted and implemented in the

conduct of Defence activities. DNSR

Vision: Nuclear capability which is demonstrably safe and available to meel Defence needs. Mission: To regu late the nuclear hazards of the Defence Nuclear Programme, as a trusted independent reQulator in Defence.

Table 1 - Vision and Mission of ONR, DSA and DNSR 6

5. The relevant legislation is complex; in particular, DNP faci lities and activities have exemptions, derogations or dis·applications from legislation. The relevant legislation also applies generally only to UK territory; defence nuclear assets are routinely deployed outside this area. The visions and missions of both ONR and DNSR, whilst differently worded, share a common aim to regulate Duty Holders so that they achieve safe operating conditions, prevent accidents and provide for mitigation of accident consequences, thereby protecting workers and the public from undue radiation hazards resulting from their activities whilst holding the Duty Holders to account. Given the complex legal situation and the delivery of the DNP through a range of management arrangements encompassing industry under contract, departments and branches of MOD and the Royal Navl. the shared aim can only be achieved by maintaining a dose working relationship, and providing each other with mutual assurance. The role of DNSR as the

philosophies. As such, this LOU supports ONR's and DNSR's compliance with the Regulators' Code - Better Regulation Delivery Office April 201 4. 4 The Genera l Agreement between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Off ice for Nuclear Regulation

(ONR) January 2015 Paragraph 2 5 From 1 April 15 the Defence Safety Authority is Ihe authority Ihal is responsible for Ihe Defence

regulation of Health, Safely and Environmental Protection. 6 Taken from respective strategies; DNSR Strategy 2013·2023 Version 1.031 October 2013 and ONR

SIrategy 2015 50 2020 December 2014 7 Collectively referred 10 as Defence

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Competent Authority in respect of the designs of propulsion reactors and nuclear weapons and Defence Radioactive Material Transport is especially important in this relationship.

6. In general, the authorities of both organisations with respect to the ONP are summarised in Table 2 below:

ONR DNSR Regulation of nuclear safety on GB nuclear sites Regulation of nuclear safety through life of the (Licensed Sites and any sites during thei r NIA §5 submarine Nuclear Reactor Plant (NRP) and

I period of responsibility)' Competent Authority to ONR on the NRP. Regulation of conventional safety, including IRRs Regulation of nuclear safety through life of the and REPPIR on or around GB nuclear sites , Nuclear Weapon and Competent Authority to ONR Defence Authorised Sites, nuclear new build on the Nuclear Weapon. construction sites and HSWA §6 (supply chain) design and manufacture of items intended exclusively or primarily for use on a nuclear site. Regulation of radiological protection and emergency Defence Competent Authority for transport of DNP response (solely IRRs and REPPIR), on related Class 7 goods (including fad-waste) Operational Berths (also called Nuclear Warsh ip mtes).

Regulation of nuclear safety on DNSR Authorised Sites and Act ivities including packaging and transoort ooerations.

Table 2 - ONA and DNSA Authorities

7. The DNPJs delivered through a mixture of sites, including those owned and operated by the Crown, owned by the Crown but operated by Contractors (GOCO) and contractor owned and operated. DNP sites and activities are regulated as outlined in Table 3 below.

DNSR ONR

AUTHORISEE ONR RESPONSIBLE

SITE/ACTIVITY I LICENSEE FOR COMMENT

ACCREDITEE IRRiREPPIRi

Conv H&S RRMPOL Manufacturing and .I .I RRMPOL Neptune ONR Licensed Sites, operated Derby Rosyth Royal Dockyard Ltd ONR .I .I Babcock Licensed Site, Rosyth operated

Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd Babcock ONR Licensed & DNSR .I .I .I operated Authorised Site, Devonport

BAE Systems Marine Ltd ONR .I .I .I BAE Systems Licensed & DNSR Authorised operated Site, Barrow-in-Furness AWE Aldermaston ONR Licensed .I .I .I AWE pic & DNSR Authorised Site operated

AWE Burghfield ONR Licensed & .I .I .I AWE pic DNSR Authorised Site operated

B CADMID cycle _ Concept, Assessment. Design. Manufacture, In Service and Disposal wflich includes activities within the supply chain.

"Ibid .

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DNSR ONR

AUTHORISEE ONR RESPONSIBLE

SITE/ACTIVITY I LICENSEE

FOR COMMENT

ACCREDITEE IRRJREPPIRJ

ConY H&S

HM Naval Base Clyde ON SA ,/ ,/ Not Licensed due Authorised Site to Crown Control

HM Naval Base Devonport DNSR ,/ ,/ Not Licensed due Authorised Site to Crown Control

Vulcan Naval Reactor Test ,/ ,/ Not Licensed due Establ ishment DNSR Authorised to Crown Control Site Devonport Royal Dockyard ltd ,/ ,/ Not Licensed as 5 Basin DNSR Authorised Site NAP in means of

transport Nuclear Powered Warsh ip Berths ,/ Not Licensed as DNSR Authorised through Naval ,/ NRP in means of Reactor Plant at Sea (IRR & REPPIR transport Authorisation only) Nuclear Weapons whilst deployed ,/ Not Licensed due at Sea to Crown Control

and location Overseas Facilities including TEUTATES' o DNSR Authorised ,/

throuah AWE Authorisation Defence Nuclear Material ,/ Transport DNSR Authorised Site.

Nuclear Reactor Plant Design Through Life- DNSA Authorised ,/ Activities

Nuclear Weapon Design Through ,/ Life- DNSR Accredited Activities

Table 3 - Regulation of DNP Sites and Activities

8. To achieve the objectives of paragraph 4, and recognizing the different focus of the regulators;

a. For the NNPP, ONA will lead on regulation of nuclear and radiological hazards on both Licensed and Authorised sites, including assessment of nuclear safety in relevant facilities, and DNSR will take assurance from this regulation that the through life safety of the reactor is not compromised by site based activities.

b. For the NNPP, ONSA will lead on reactor plant build, upkeep and maintenance regulation and provide assurance to ONR to support their judgements and decisions in discharging their statutory responsibilities as regulators of the site licensees. ONSR will lead for permissioning of plant hold points in staged commissioning from closure of the reactor following core load but ONA may permission the same hold points for reasons relating to its authority.

c. For the NWP, where the AWE sites are both Licensed and Authorised, then ONR will have authority up to the point of assembly of the fissi le material to conventional explosives, bul at all times DNSR will be responsible for regulating the through life safely of

10 Overseas DNP facilities made available under Govemmenl to Government arrangements.

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the nuclear weapon. Further detailed arrangements related to AWE are included in the MOD·ONR General Agreement.

d. Where DNSR has regulatory responsibilities overseas then lessons learnt from engagement with other regulators should be shared with ONA.

PRINCIPLES FOR COHERENT. COMPLETE AND SEAMLESS REGULATION

9. Recognising the respective authorities, and to make the most of the strengths and position of each regulator, to maximise regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, ONR and DNSR are committed to making the most of the potential benefits of working closely together through adopting the following principles:

a. Mutual understanding of regulatory philosophies (vision, values etc) and each other's responsibilities.

b. Acceptance that each regulator may seek and accept assurance from the other.

c. Efficient and effective use of resources through appropriate targeting of activity, based on a common ONRI DNSR understanding of risks which will be achieved through dialogue between respective regulators.

d. Clarity of understanding by Duty Holders of regulatory expectations through the representation of a single regulatory view wherever possible and at the right time.

e. Reduction of the regulatory burden on Duty Holders by minimising the differences in regulatory requirements.

f. Openness and transparency, taking due cognisance of security restrictions, between ONR and DNSR, to build trust and understanding whilst sharing information, knowledge and learning from experience.

COHERENT. COMPLETE AND SEAMLESS WORKING AND ORGANISATION

10. A number of organisational requirements flow from the Purpose and Principles. There is a need for:

a. Regular and effective communications between regulators.

b. Training in the complexities of the DNP, its regulation and the roles and responsibilities of each regulator.

c. The development, review and maintenance of Intervention plans and strategies that take into account the concerns and interests of both regulators and encourage a holistic view of risks across programmes whilst supporting the delivery of individual authorities.

d. Mutual assurance between ONR and DNSA. In particular, ONR will utilise inputs from DNSR when making regulatory judgements and considering ALARP issues taking into account the through life safety requirements of the nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon and Defence needs; similarly, DNSR will utilise inputs from ONR when considering the potential impact of the licensed site or facility on the through life safety requirements of the nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon.

e. Arrangements to exchange information on incident and event reporting from DNP

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sites, highlighting when reporting to Ministers" on such events and on the respective annual assurance reporting for DNP sites and activities.

1. Arrangements to share information in answering requests under the Freedom of Information Act (Fol), Environmental Information Regulations (EIR), Parliamentary Questions (POs) and other Official Correspondence.

g. Mechanisms to ensure that consistent messages are given to duty-holders, and the wider public, by both regulators, through sharing draft documentation for review and comment, as appropriate (e.g. DSNR Annual report and CNI Annual Statement).

Intervention Strategies

11. Strategies identify and express longer-term regulatory intentions for securing effective nuclear and radiological safety standards. ONR and DNSA have derived individual strategies for the delivery of their remits. However, where practical and beneficial , joint intervention strategies for sites regulated by both DNSR and ONA may be derived, so that all inspectors work in a way that is consistent with overall ONR I DNSA regulatory aims for the DNP.

12. The intervention strategies should:

a Follow the principles set out in paragraph 9.

b. Identify the main longer-term regulatory concerns and interests.

c. Be informed by the knowledge both regulators hold about Duty Holders and their state of compliance with requirements (eg. derived from regulatory review processes).

d. Identify future Duty Holder projects and associated regulatory interest.

e. Identify regulatory inspection and assessment leads for particular issues or geographical areas.

f. Be agreed by both regulators, and shared with Duty Holders.

g. Be reviewed as appropriate by the jointly chaired Intervention Management Groups (IMGs) lor the Propulsion and Weapon SUb-programmes.

Intervention Plans

13. Intervention plans are developed and implemented to deliver the strategies. Again it is expected that , where appropriate, they will be implemented in a coordinated manner sharing input and output information (assessment and inspection) at routine information exchanges such as intervention co-ordination meetings. The most visible will be those relating to sites, although there may also be plans for other activity.

14. The site intervention plans should:

a. Follow the principles set out in paragraph 9 and the expectations of relevant strategies.

-b. Contain routinely the following regulatory activities as appropriate:

Compliance inspections (including system based inspections).

11 As per DNA and DNSA respective Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria.

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ii Interventions to correct known current deficiencies.

iii Interventions to influence future improvements.

iv Interventions to inform assessment and permissioning.

c. Scope out regulatory activity intended to address nuclear safety issues not revealed by any of the above (for example safety culture issues, funding constraints, productivity pressures that may affect safety, ).

d. Identify regulatory leads for particular activities (including inspection, assessment and permissioning).

e. Promote joint ONR I DNSR inspection activities where there is a shared interest.

f. Identify outputs and 'deliverables'; where appropriate, single reports or letters signed by both organisations should be considered.

g. Be reviewed through the jointly chaired IMGs for the Propulsion and Weapon sub-programmes.

REHEARSAL AND TESTING OF SITES' EMERGENCY ARRANGEMENTS

15. ONR and DNSR should share information on the review and assessment of operators' emergency plans. DNSR will consult with ONR on proposed dates, scope and scale of scenarios for demonstrating emergency arrangements and both organisations will undertake assessments but, where practical, take mutual assurance from each other's assessments:

a. Operator: The lead on feedback to an operator following the assessment of an on-site emergency exercise should be ONR for licensed sites and DNSR for other sites; ONR and DNSR should support the lead organisation as appropriate. A joint exercise assessment letter should be produced under signature of both DNSR and ONA.

b. Local Authority: For Level 2 and 3 REPPIR tests, ONR should lead lor the assessment of the Local Authority demonstration of all off-site emergency plans. DNSR should provide input to ONR, and provide feedback to the MOD Authorisee/Duty Holder, on the Military/MOD Coordinating Authority contribution to the off- site arrangements.

c. Transport: For transport of Defence Nuclear Material field demonstrations, DNSR will be the lead assessor for the MOD response.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION

16. Both ONR and DNSR have enforcement powers derived from their individual authorities though warrants, statutes, delegations and other mandates. To promote coherent regulation, they will inform each other, in advance, of any relevant proposed enforcement action at any DNP site (licensed andlor authorised).

ENGAGEMENT WITH OTHER REGULATORS

17. In fulfilling their responsibilities, both DNSR and ONR have agreements with other regulators, both statutory (such as Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and the Health and Safety Executive) and Defence (Defence Maritime Regulator and Defence Munitions, Explosives and Ordnance Safety Regulator) . Where the issues discussed impact on the interlace of the ONR and DNSR responsibilities, then there will be benefit for a coherent approach to regulation of the DNP, if there is regular exchange of information between DNSR and ONR on such engagements.

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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

18. Much of the information on the DNP used by both ONR and DNSR is subject to government security restrictions. Within these constraints, DNSR and ONR will co-operate to share information and knowledge to the best effect of the DNP. This will include drafts of Quarterly Reports and Annual Reports and other formal responses that may impact on the other organisation. Each organisation should endeavour to inform the other of any prospective release into the public domain of information relating to defence regulation or other related activities, see the MOD-ONA General Agreement. In particular, DNSR and ONA should advise each other on receipt of Freedom of Information requests relating to DNP sites or activities and exchange drafts of proposed responses.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

19. The ONR Defence Programme Director and the Head of DNSR should provide the necessary resources to deliver the intentions for complete, efficient and effective regulation under this LoU and in particular promote a culture that should develop mutual trust and understanding between DNR and DNSR. :

20 DNR's Superintending Nuclear Inspectors for the Defence Sub-programmes and DNSR's Lead Nuclear Propulsion / Weapon Regulators should:

a. Determine priorities and consequent resources (including for reactive work where this may have a significant impact) to deliver the strategies within their individual purviews.

b. Develop, review and maintain intervention strategies and plans jOintly where appropriate.

c. Monitor delivery of outputs from the plans.

d. Ensure that there are adequate arrangements for communications, both between regulators and with duty holders.

e. Plan and prepare the inputs to regulatory review activity.

f. Develop, review and maintain internal instructions and guidance which give effect to joint regulatory activities (including for abnormal occurrences and Fol requests).

21. Nominated ONR Site and DNSR Principal Inspectors should:

a. Develop intervention strategies and intervention plans.

b Ensure that significant change proposals, emergent findings and details of abnormal occurrences are shared, and develop coherent and consistent responses, including formal enforcement.

c. Develop coherent and consistent, approaches to the planning and assessment of emergency exercises.

d. Share information from the assessment of safety documentation.

e. Exchange draft LLC reports before meetings

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f. Arrange regular information exchange meetings.

g. Ensure that plans are communicated to duty-holders.

ROUTINE LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS

22. There are regular interactions at the site and detailed project levels between DNSR and ONR inspectors and these should continue to foster coherent, complete and seamless regulation of the defence sites. In addition more formal meetings at a senior level should be held, in particular:

a. Level 0 Senior Level Regulatory Interface Meeting (RIM). An annual formal meeting should be held and co-chaired between the ONR eNI and Director DSA (or by agreement their deputies or other nominees), to review the workings of this LoU, discuss relevant matters and address outstanding issues that have been escalated.

b. An annual ONR-DNSR conference should be held, alternatively led and supported by each organisation, where matters of mutual regulatory interest are presented for discussion and exchange of information to promote effective and efficient regulation of the defence sites, and where the practical aspects of implementing this LoU are reviewed, as appropriate, to ensure that it remains effective or to identify any amendments to it.

c. ONR and DNSR should support the secondment of staff from their respective organisations and attendance at relevant training courses hosted by the respective organisations.

23. All ONR and DNSR Inspectors should respect and adopt the principles set out in this document and work to the instructions and guidance on the regulation of the DNP set out in the internal documentation of each regulator.

~ Dr R A Savage D Langbridge

ONR Defence Programme Director Head of DNSR

;;0 April 2015 ~

:; 0 April 2015

Annex:

A. Transport: Respective roles and responsibilities for transport of radioactive materials for the Defence Nuclear Programme.

9

ANNEX A TO LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING

between

The Office for Nuclear Regulation

and

The Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator

on their

RESPECTIVE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FOR THE DEFENCE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

SCOPE

1. This Annex describes the principles of the relationship between the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) in respect of the transport of radioactive material (RAM) associated with the Defence Nuclear Programme 12

(referred to as 'Defence RAM' below).

BACKGROUND

2. The Defence Nuclear Programme (DNP) encompasses all phases of the acquisition, operation, support and disposal of the United Kingdom's naval nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. This programme requires the transportation of RAM overland in Great Britain and by air in RAF aircraft into and out the UK and safety is of paramount importance. The Secretary of State for Defence is answerable to Parliament for the safety of Ihe DNP.

3. For the purposes of this agreement the ONP includes any RAM transport activities associated with the defence nuclear programmes of friendly nations, to the extent that they take place in the UK.

4. The legal situation relating to safety of RAM transport associated with the ONP is complex. In general, legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 applies to defence activities, whether conducted directly by Crown employees or under contract. Specific Acts and Regulations may, however, be dis-applied to defence activities or provide exemptions from them. Various 'competent authority' functions relating to RAM transport are allocated to different Secretaries of State, and hence to various government organisations including the CAA, the MCA, and in particular the ONR and the ONSR. There are a number of regulations relevant to the transport of defence radioactive material13

5. ONR was created under the Energy Act 2013, as an independent public corporation, and took on the full range of its statutory functions and powers on 1 Apr 14. As part of its functions, ONR is responsible for the safe transport and security of civil Class 7 (radioactive)

12 Radioactive materials are used in defence equipment outside the DNP; such materials and their packages are not 'Nithin the scope of this LoU .

' 3 The Caniage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009, 51 2009 No 1348. The Caniage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment (Amelldment) Regulations 2011 , Sf 2011 No 1885. The Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine Pollutants) Regulations. The Air Navigation Order 2005. SI2OO5 No 1970. The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations 2002, 51 2002 No 2786. The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) (Amelldment) Regulations 2009, 51 2009 No 1492. The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) (Amelldment) Regulations 201" 51 2011 No 1454. The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) (Amendment) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 No 3054.

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goods moved by road, rail or inland walerway in Ihe UK, 10 Ihe exlenl sel oul in Ihe Energy Act 2013 and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 ('the 2009 Regulations').

6. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (OECC) exercises the policy functions corresponding to ONR's Class 7 regulatory functions, including policy responsibility for any new legislative proposals, European or other international obligations, or political commitments relating to the transport of radioactive material by road, rail or inland waterway.

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (Class 7) - COMPETENT AUTHORITIES AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

7. In respect of the transport of radioactive materials within Great Britain other than by air or sea the responsibilit ies of the competent authorities are as defined in Regulation 25 of the 2009 Regulations as amended.

8. For purposes of this Letter of Understanding, the key Competent Authority responsibilities are as follows:

a. DNSR, on behalf of the Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence, is the Competent Authority in relation to Class 7 goods in the circumstances specified in Regulation 25 (3)(b) of the 2009 Regulations;

b. ONR is the Competent Authority for those functions in relation to the carriage of Class 7 goods for which the SofS Defence is not the Competent Authority (except for the function in sub-section 1.10.1.6 of ADR (register of driver training certificates). Such lunctions include Ihe approval by ONR of packages used lor Ihe Iransport of radioactive materials; this approval function extends to all modes of transport;

c. Competent Authority functions which are common to all classes of dangerous goods ("all class" functions) are the responsibility of the SofS Transport. In practice this means that ONR will consult, and as appropriate advise the Department for Transport (OfT) in all cases where the exercise of its Class 7 responsibilities has "all class" implications.

9. Enforcement responsibilities for the transport of dangerous goods are as set out in Regulation 32 of the 2009 Regulations as amended. In relation to the matters for which they are the Competent Authority, ONR and DNSR are responsible for ensuring proper enforcement of the 2009 Regulations in relation to the transport of Class 7 goods by road, rail (except to the extent that the Office of Rail Regulation or OfT is the enforcing authority) and inland waterways (to the extent that the 2009 Regulations apply to such transport).

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE: POLICY ISSUES

10. It is the policy of the Secretary of State for Defence that 'where defence has exemptions, derogations, or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that, so far as is reasonably practicable, produce outcomes at least as good as those required by UK legislationq~ . In practice this policy is implemented by requirements in JSP 815 'Defence Health and Safety and Environmental Protection', JSP 518 'Regulation of the Nuclear Propulsion programme', and JSP 538 'Regulation of the Nuclear weapon Programme' that all duty holders within the DNP comply (worldwide) with the IAEA 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material', which form the technical baSis of UK and mosl foreign legislalion lor Ihe Iransport of RAM.

14 Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection in Defence: A Policy Statement by the SolS for Delence dated August 20t4

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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

11 . In implementing existing international agreements ONR and DNSR act on behalf of the UK Government within their respective areas of responsibility.

12. In developing changes to International Agreements and changes to the IAEA regulations OfT maintains and develops UK land transport regulations and represents the UK in international forums covering dangerous goods in general. In practice, as explained at Paragraph 8 above, ONR advises OfT where ONR's exercise of Class 7 responsibilities impacts on OfT's "all class" functions. Additionally, ONR typically leads the UK delegation in RAM transport specific international forums including the lAEA. DNSR is consulted on proposed changes to international agreements and, on occasion, assists in representing the UK when requested to do so by OfT or ONA.

13. At present it is not customary to transport RAM for the purposes of the ONP by air in civil aircraft or by sea in civil vessels 's.

14. The ONR has delegations from other government bodies to act for them in approving packages for the transport of radioactive materials. In practice, ONR exercises this responsibility through Agency Agreements with the following bodies:

a. on behalf of the Civil Aviation Authority in accordance with the Authorisation under paragraph 15 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and agreement under section 13(4) of HSWA made between the CAA and the Executive16 on 26 October 2011;

b. on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport in accordance with the agreement under section 13(4) 01 HSWA made between Ihe Secrelary 01 State lor Transport and the Executive6 on 28 October 2011 ; or

c. on behalf of the Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland) in accordance with the agreement under section 13(4) of HSWA and section 28(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 made between the Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland) and the Executive6 on 25 January 2012.

Additionally, ONR is also party to a Memorandum 01 Understanding (MoU) with DECC" . The MoU sets out details of the working relationship between DECC and ONR, including how in practice they will exercise their respective policy and regulatory responsibilities for the transport of radioactive materials.

15. DNSR currently has no delegations from other UK government bodies, although there are specific 'defence' andlor 'armed service' exemptions' from related legislation. In the event that it becomes desirable to transport defence RAM by sea DNSR may seek an MOA with the MCA similar to that which exists between ONR and MCA.

, Sit is however possible that it may become desirable to ship part or all of decommissioned submarines by sea at some future point.

\5 For 'Executive'read 'ONR', following the creation of the independent ONR on 1 April 2014. 11 As of November 2014 still in drafting.

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AGREEMENT

Regulatory Approach

16. It is agreed that it is desirable that both organisations regulate in a generally similar manner and generally expect from both civil and defence duty-holders similar standards of package design safety reports and management systems for nuclear and radiological safety. To facili tate this it is agreed that the ONA and the ON SA will endeavour to:

a. Provide similar technical guidance to their own staff and to duty holders. To this end the DNA and the DNSR will share generic guidance provided to their staff and to duty holders, and will offer each other an opportunity to comment on such documents prior to issue, and prior to major changes to them.

b. Develop and promote a common position on changes to UK and EU legislation affecting RAM transport.

c. Develop and promote a common position on changes to IAEA Standards affecting RAM transport.

d. Exchange operational experience on a regular basis.

17. It is recognised that on occasion there will be circumstances where defence needs lead to some departure from civi l RAM transport practice, in particular certain defence packages will contain both Class 1 and Class 7 material.

Responsibilities in Certain Emergency Situations

18. In the event of an emergency involving RAM in transport then any necessary regulatory involvement would normally be provided by the competent authority wh ich regulated the material prior to the incident.

19. In the event that it is necessary in emergency to transport RAM of unknown origin, or RAM deposited with hostile intent, then if defence assets/packages are used to transport it the DNSR will act as the competent authority/regulatory lead, if civil assets are used the DNR will act as the competent authority/regulatory lead.

Dual Usage

20. In the event that both civil and defence duty holders wish to make use of the same package deSign, or of variants of the same design, then one joint approval or separate civil and defence approvals are necessary. DNR and DNSR will exchange information on any such proposal and agree how the assessment will be conducted and the approvals granted. The DNSR and the ONA will endeavour to present a 'united front' to such applicants and will come to any necessary 'intra-government' agreement prior to inform ing the duty holder the decision of the agreed joint approach. It is also agreed that any given aspect of a Package Design Safety Report will normally be assessed by either the DNR or the DNSA on behalf of both organisations. Compliance inspections and witnessing of physical testing of packages may well however be conducted by joint teams.

21. The following table sets out typical responsibilities. Individual cases may be handled differently by agreement.

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Primary use Secondary ONR DNSR use

Defence None No involvement Act as primary approval body Civil None Act as primary approval No involvement

body Package having both civil & Preferred option, ONR and DNSR to agree how the defence use'8. various aspects of the package assessment is to be

allocated between ONR and DNSR. ONR and DNSR to jointly issue a CoA signed by both parties. [Alternative (non-preferred) option: ONR and DNSR both assess the package and issue separate CoAs] indeoendentlv.

Defence Civil Issue approval based on Act as primary approval body the DNSR certification, or countersign DNSR approval

Packages for the bulk shipment Act as primary approval 11 legally necessary due to of uranium ores and uranium body defence use or mixed civil & hexafluoride. defence use issue approval

based on the ONR certification, or countersign ONR approval

Packages for defence RAM If legally necessary issue transported by sea, or by land approval based on the and sea (if any) . DNSR certification, or

countersign DNSR approval.

Emergency regulatory Where civil programme Where defence assets approvals/oversight for assets are used. (including AWE assets) are packages/operations to remove used. RAM of unknown or hostile origin from an incident site. See also

I para. 19 above.

Transport Event Reporting

22. DNR and DNSR will endeavour to require similar RAM transport event reporting requirements from duty holders; these will be based on the 2013 DNR INFl requirements.

18 E.g a 'Type 8 ' radwaste package designed for both civil and defence use.

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