operation overlord (1944)

8/9/2019 Operation Overlord (1944)

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OBJECT

OPERATIon OVERLORD ,. ~ lSi

,)~ (43) 32 Final7th July, 1943

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1. The object of Operation 'OVERLORD' is to mOW'lt and carry out an operation,with forces and. equipment established in the UNITED K I N G D ~ , : , and with target date1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensiveoperations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient portfacil i t ies to maintain a force of 80me twegty-six to thirty divisions and enablethat force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the UNITED STATES orelsewhere of additional divisions and supporting uhits at the rate of three tofive divisions per month.SELECTIOn OF A LODGD:mrr AREA

2 In order to provide sufficient port facil i t ies to maintain these largeorces, i t will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of~ j o r portSt We must plan on the assumption that ports, on oapture, will be

seriously damaged. and probably bl.ocked , I t will take some time to restore normalfacil i t ies. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenanoe over beaches for anextended peri00 J. A study of the beaches on the BELGIAN and CHAm-lEL coasts shows that thebeaches with the highest -capacity for passing vehicles and stores iruand are thosein the PAS DE CALAIS (p), and the CAEtl ( m ) - C O T E ~ ! T I N (-) area. Of these, theCAE!: beaches are the moat favourable as they are, unlike the others, sheltex:.ed-_from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area betweenthe PAS Dr:: CALAIS and the COTEIITIN as the most s.,-itable for the in i t ia l landing,air factors of optimum air support and rapfd provision of airfields indicating::: he PAS DE CALAIS as the best.choioe, with CAEN aa an acoeptable alternative.4. Thus. taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together,i t appears that either the PAS DE CALAIS area or the CAEH - COTE}ITIN area is themost suitable for the in i t ia l main landing.

Notes: (90 "PAS DE CALAIS ar-ea II has been aSSl'JilOO as the area between GRA V E L I ~ S and the River Sa.-l1IlE.(m) "CAEP ar-ea" is taken as that between the River OP.NE and the base ofthe C O T E ~ I T I N Peninsula."The "COTENTINIl Peninsula is t J peninsula in which CHERBOURG issituated.

(-)

J DEC :-;c..


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2. DEClASSIFIEDA . As the area for the ini t ial landing, the PAS DE CALAIS has many' V ~ O U B advantages such that good a ir support and quick turn ,round for our

~ h i p p i n g can be nchievcd. On the other hand, i t is a focal point of thoenomy fighters disposed for defence, and maximum en0my oir activity can bebr-ought to bear ovor this area with the minimum movement of his nir forces.Moreover, the PAS DE CALAIS is the most strongly defonded aroa on the wholeF P ~ N C H coast. Tho defences would require very heavy nnd s u s t a i n ~ d bombardment from soa and air: pO;1letration would be slow and the rosult of thob o ~ b a r d Q c n t of beach oxits weuld scvoroly limit tho rate of build-up,Further, this arca docs not offer good opporttmities for expansion. I t wouldbo nocossary to develop tho bridgehoad to i n o l t ~ o either tho BELGIAN ports asfar as ANTWEHP or the CHANNEL ports Westwards to include HAVP.,E and nOUEN.But both an advance to A t across tho numerous water o b ~ t a c 1 0 s , ond along f l ~ n k march of some 120 miles to the SEINE ports must be oonsideredunsound o p ~ r a t i o n s of,war unless the G E r o . ~ N forcos ~ r in a state not forshort of f i ~ l collapsu.6. In th0 CAEN - C O T E t ~ I N arun i t would bu possible to make our ini t ia llanding oithor pm'tly on the COTEl\'TIN Peninsula and partly on the CAEN bcachos ,wholly in the COTENTIN or wholly on the CAEN beachos. An attack with purt ofO t forcos in the C O T ~ ~ T I N and P Q ~ t on tho CAEN b ~ a c h o s is , howevor, considoredto bo unsound. I t would entail dividinG o limited forcos by the low-lyingmarshy ground and intricato rivor system ot the neck of tho COTENTIN Peninsula;thus oxposing thum to dofc3t in dotail.

> 7. An attack against the C O T E ~ 1 T I H Peninsula, on the othar hand, has ar - ~ Q s o n a b l c ch55Co of succoss and would onsuru tho 0 ~ r l y capturo of tho port of, ~ r . . B O U R G . Unfortunately, very fow airfields e ~ x i s t in tho COTENTIN and that

a r o ~ is not suitablo for rapid airfiold dovelopmant. Furthermore, tho narrownock of tho Poninsuln would g i v ~ the G E r u ' ~ N S on 03SY task in prevonting us frombrcQking o u ~ a n d expanding our ini t ia l bridcehuod. Mor0ov0r, during the periodof our consolidation in th0 COTE}nIN tho G E P ~ N S would hove timo to reinforcethoir constal trcopa in th0 CAEN area, rendering u subsequont amphibions assaultin thnt orca much morc difticlllt ,8. Thure remains tho attack on tho CAEN beaches. The CAEN sector isweakly held; the dcfunces arc relativoly liGht and tho beaches arc of highc ~ p a c i t y Qnd sheltored from tho prGvailinG winds. Inland tho t0rrain is suitablGfor airfield dov0lopmont ond for tho consolidation of tho in i t io l bridgohcad;and much of i t is unfavourable for counter attacks by panzer divisions. ~ l a x i m u m anomy air opposition can only be brouGht to boar at tho oxpcnsu of tho enemy airdcf'cnco screen covoring the approcchea to G E f f i , ~ A N Y and the limitud number- ofenomy airfields within rango of the CAEN area facil i l tates l o c ~ l neutralisationof thu GERMAN fight or forco. Tho sector suffers from tho d i s a d v Q n t ~ g o that considurublo effort will bo roquired to provido adoquato air support to our assaultforces and SOffiv t i ~ l O must olapse boforo thu c ~ p t u r o of w major port,

Aftur c landing in tho CAEN sector i t would bo n o c 8 s s ~ r y to soizo eitherthe SEINE group of ports or tho BRITTANY group of ports. ,To soize tho SEINE portswould ontail forcing a crossing of tho SEIrffi, which is 1 ~ { 0 l y to r o q ~ i r 8 greotGrforco ~ h a n wo c ~ build up throUBh thG CAEN b 0 ~ c h o s and tho port of CHERBOURG I t should, h o w G v ~ r , bo possiblo to soize thu B R I T T A ~ ~ ports between CHERBOURG nnd

and on t h ~ m build up aufficiont forcus for our final u d v a n c ~ Eastwards.Providod tll!.lt tho nocoeecry a i r s i buntion can f irs t bo achieved, thoc h ~ n c e s of c succossful cttack and of r ~ p i d 8ubsoquunt dovelopment oro so muchg r 0 ~ t G r in this soctor than in any other that ~ io considorod t h ~ t tho ~ d vantGgc3 fnr o ~ t w o i g h tho disadvcntuG8s. DECLASSIFIED


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3. DECLASSIFIEDTHE LODGEMENT AREA SELECTED

9 In the l ight of these factors, i t is considered that ourin i t ia l landing on the Continent should be effected in the CAm area,with ~ v i e w to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprisingthe CHERBOtJRG - BRITTAlIT group of ports (from CHERBOURG to NANTES).

OPEN ING PHASE UP TO THE CAPTURE 0" CHERBOURG10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area wo,uldbe the effecting of a landing in the CAEN sector with a view to the earlycapture and'delelopment of airfield sites in the CAEN area, and of the portof CllERBOURG.11. The main limiting. factors affectiDg such an operation are thepossibility of attaining the neoessary air situation; the number ofoffensive divisions '11hich the enemy can make available for counter attack,III the CAEf area; the availability of landing ships and craf t and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of tho beaches and ports in the sector.u..: Although the strangth of the GAF available in 1944 on the~ e s t e r n front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently eX9cctthat we shall havo a vast numorical superiority in bomber forces. Thef i rs t line strength of the GE..lU.!AN fighter forc'e i s , her-ever- J showing asteady increase and although i t i s unlikoly to equal the size of t)1.e :"force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have avGry largo COI1I.'l.itJ':l0nt 0ntailinr, dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also b operating under serious tact ical disadvantages in the early s t a g ~ s , ~ h i c h will largely offset their numericalsuperiority. B o f o r ~ the assault t a k ~ s place, thGrcfoT8, i t VQll be necessaryto reduce the e f'f'ect.i.vones a of the OAF, particularly that part whi.ch can bobrought to bear against thu ChEN arun,13. The r . o c ~ s s ~ r y air situation to ensurG reasonable chance ofsuccess will thc:rufora require trot the max imem number' of GERHAN fighterforces a r contnined in thu Lmv Countries nod N o r t h - ~ c B t GERMANY, thattho effLctivoncss of t h !ightcr defenco in the CAEN araa is roduoed andthat air reinforcements are prevented from a r r i v 1 n ~ in the early stagesfrom the L ~ D l T E R R A N E A N . A.ove al l , i t will be necessary to reduce theover-all strength o f the GERMAN fighter force between now and the dateof the operation by c.estruction of the sources of supply, by the inflictionof casualties by bringing on a ir battles, and, immediately prior to theassault, by the disorgnnization of GAF installations and control s y ~ t e m in the dArn area.14. As i t is L ~ ? o s s i b l e to forocast with any accuracy the number andlocation of GEID!AN" formations in reserve in 1944, while on the other handthe forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been madein this paper to determino the VJ1.scst employment of our own forces and thento determine t he max imum number of GERHAN formations which they can re.aonably overcumo , Ap


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DECLASSIFIED 4.15. A maximum of thir ty and minimum of twcmty-six equtvnl ent,d i v i s i o n ~ are lilwly t ooe ovai1ablo in tho UNTI'ED KINGDOM. for crosschannel oper!:tions on 1st May, 1944. F\lrthcr build-up can bu at the rateof three to f i v ~ divisions per month.16. ~ 1 n d i n g ships ~ n crwft hcvc been provided to l i f t tho equivalentof three assault ' ivisiQDs and two follow-up diyis10ns---l vri t.hout, 'ovcrhl:ads"end i t has been as sumed thc\t the equivalent of an cdd'itionnl two divisionsc ~ b 2float in ships .17. Airbomc forcos amountdng to two uirbornc divisions nod s ornefive or six pnrnchuto rOBimonts \n l l be :ava1lablo but, largoly OWlllg toshortago of transport ~ i r c r a f t , i t 1s only possible to l i f t the equivalentof two-thirds of o n nirborno division simultanuously, on tho b3sis ofpr0scnt forucGsts.18. Evon if addf.t.Lcnal, landing ships nnd craft could be made nvall-ab'Le , the bcccbcs an the CAW area would T)reclude thtS Land ing of forcosp ' r ( ; : ~ t ( : r t.han the cqufva Ient, of the three : 1 s s ~ u l t and tHO follow-up divisions, for which crnft have nlrecdy been provided Nevertheless, an 0111tround i n c r e ~ s e of ~ l e ~ s t 10 percent in l ~ d i n g ships and cruft is highlydesirable in ardor to provido a greater margin for c o ~ t i n g e n c i e s ~ t h 1 n the framework of the uxisting plan. Furthermore, sufficient l i f t for nfurther a:3S row.t divisi on could most usefully be employed in an a ddi t ionallcndinp- on o t h ~ r beaches.19. ~ u r e 1s no port of . ~ capacity within the sector nlthough therearc n number of small ports of limited v ~ l u u . ~ ; i n t e n o n c G will , thoreforo,of noccssity be largoly over the beaches unti l i t is possible to cnptureand opon up the port of CH1\RBOURG. In view of thtl possibil i t ies of in -terruption by bod wuather i t will be 0 s s ~ n t i n l to provido early someform of improvised sholtered waters.20. Assuming optimum ~ ~ a t h u r conditions, i t should b possible tobuild up the force over the b e ~ c h 0 s to ? totol by D plus 6 of t h equivalentof somo e l o v ~ n divisions ~ n five tank brigodos and thoruafter to land onedivision 0 doy unti l about D plus 24 .

PROPOSED PLANmELn!llr illY PHiJ3E

...

21.. During the preliminnry phose, ~ h i c h must star t f o r t h ~ i t h , nllpossiblo means ~ l \ c l u d 1 n g t: ir and sun act.Lon , propuganda , ptl1tlcol andeconomic pressure, and ~ t ~ g e J must b0 integrated into a combinedo f f u n s i v ~ ~ i m e d at softoning the G E , ~ resistance. In particulnr, airaction should bd directed towards the r ~ d u c t i o n of the G E P ~ ~ air f o ~ c e s on the Dcstcrn front, t h progressive destruction of the G E ~ U N economic

.. . r - - syst.on and t.ne undcrrdrdng of GERHAN mor-a.Le 22. tn 0 rdor to C on tatn the maximum GERMAN forces Fl\lOY from theCAEN area di'lOrsionory oper-at i ons ,should be staged agoinst other orecssuch as t he P J DE CALAIS and the m':DITERRANEAN Coast of FRANCE.

DECLASSIFIED


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c c . s . ~ , ~ ~ ',', , - , , ~ . ~ , : : c , . ~ : ~ ; . w 1.01,"\ J '-A SSA. H- ~ ",t>,' , ~ e , c ..;c. ""! s . - ; \ - ; - ~ ) ,.,~ ~ - ~ . ~ ':' S : , : ' . < ' d \ ~ ~ t 1 ~ l ; . ~ ~ , \ , : __......-; . 11- s; \\O."' ,,\.... \ o ~ 4 1 " L.....li..1 er... '"" ( A " .... \- 1); I . 2. ~ o l \ ~ l ) \ " . . ".... \ A i " ' ~ l.A.f' '+-0" to .Pi" '?,. 'Q,v - ..ltl)""-4"- 5 - .1'\ Ai ~ b " ....",.' D,....... . '

.........~ E P A t L , . T O I l Y PHASE:. DECLASSIFIED ~ : ~ ~ : ~ e t 0..,\0,- ~ ~ : : : ~ 2 ~ O , ~ ~ - -_. -.--'-----. ~ c ..~ ~ t o l & _ ....\ po, ~ ~ J . i + i t > ../lO\ ~ r \ - l l . l f 110; 4 D-:V' A. ""23. Durin{; this ;,hase a ir acb i.on ...: i l l be intensified agai.ns t the GAFparticularly in j J D r t h - ~ ' ; e s t FR:JJCE l i i th a vim: t o r educi nj the effectivenessof the GAF in thD.t ar-ee , a nd l : i l l be ext ended to include at.tac.:e againstco.amun.ica t ions nore direct ly as socd z t ed ""'i th rnove.nenb 01 GERLAN reserves vlhichmi;;ht a:fJect the CA2N' c-.re",. Three navaL assaul t f'or ces -ill be aeueuhLed1"it l l the navaL escoi-ta and Loaded at ports along the 3 0 U n ~ Cocs t of ENGLuiD.1\,0 nav..L caaauLt forces c a r r y i n ~ ; t he follOli-up forces ,:,111 also be assembledanc Loaded, on e :Ln the TlI1J...LS Estuciry ..nd one on the WEST Coast.

24 . Jifter i;. very shoi-t o ir boabard.zent, of the bead: defences three. assaul tJ.ivi.'3ions , . i l l be lunded shi l l t2 on the ChEN beaches (ollohed upon d.;;;.;' by U,e equivc:.lont of' tv.o ta.ru; brigades US regLrents) am a brigaderrouiJ (U;:'; reDhlen to l coroodt t.ea.a}. At the S"..le t Lrae, airborne forces ,ill beused to seize the town 01' C J L ~ t i j and subsidi.::.ry oper'atd ons by c omaendos endpos s i.bLy by c.irborne fore E:S l , i l l be undert-aken to neutl's.lise ~ G e r t o i n coastdefences 2 1 s e i z e / c e r t a i ~ i 2 p o r t ~ n t r iver crossings. The ~ b j e c t of the assaul tf.orccs ' I , i l l be to seize ti'.e general l ine GRrJ;;}CJ:U,.? - B J ~ Y E i J ~ C ' - CAEN.

,.----..; Subsequent action 'ill te,ke tbe for!,1 of &. strong thrust Soubhv.ar-ds~ ; t l . South--:iestt-'81'ds ,",ith a vi.ew to destroyiO[ , e n G j ' l ~ r f'or ce s , acr.juiring s i te s forair f ie lds , e nd c.s.ining depth lo r


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, ' . . i . '_(). unc;"L tl,l"s-, c i l ' c u m s t a n c ~ s , ' t . r \ ; , ucs t su i.babL, .plan woUld tp;x,ar to b"tQ . . . . .s ccur., fiI 's t th" . lGf t f lank 'el1d to 'Cdn s u i n c i ~ n t c:irf iclds for subsequent.02crLtiollil. TLis 'muld be don" by uxtvndinr; the br-i dgehead to the- l in" of theRiv(;l' EURS from D ; ~ " ~ U : to f.;)U:&: .nd t h , : , ~ c ; : , d o n G } h v n l i n ~ ~ r ~ E ~ ' E to. the. S " 5 ,siolzin.:; at tel" S2."" ti.,,, C E . ~ F : T i ; L : : ; , ORL";',,, ~ n lOUit". u t : \ . i ~ S I F I E D

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32. It ' . ' i l l b c s""n the t, t.I, plDn for the. i r , i t i " l LndiJli; is b.sed on two.,) ~ , l ; ; i n . t l r i n C i ~ ) l d S - conc cnbrctd on of fore ... ,:nc tz.ct.Lccl sur prLsc , Goiic0ntrE,t:..onr> r)J: t.b .... I.:ss,;:ult 101'CCS lS co naidcr cd r\JSLl..j), b ~ l i [) . t l . r d ~ .... ndcd cs , due to i t s distEnc,-, f r o ~ ! . 1


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operation overlord (1944)

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