operational resilience analysis and capacity building in ......operational resilience analysis and...
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OperationalResilienceAnalysisandCapacityBuildingintheUSVirginIslands
DavidL. Alderson,PhDAssociateProfessor,OperationsResearchDepartment
Director,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool
Workshop:FundamentalsofMicrogrid AnalysisandDesignSandiaNationalLaboratories&UniversityoftheVirginIslands
St.CroixCampus(24Oct2018)&St.ThomasCampus(26Oct2018)Unclassified.Distributionunlimited.Materialcontainedhereinrepresentsthesoleopinionoftheauthoranddoes
notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseoritscomponents.
NavalPostgraduateSchool(NPS)America'snationalsecurityresearchuniversity
HistoryHighlights1909 Founded at U.S. Naval Academy
1951 Moved to Monterey, CA Operations Research Curriculum
• Facilitiesofagraduateresearchuniversity
• FacultywhoworkfortheU.S.Navy,withclearances
• Studentswithfreshoperationalexperience
FY2017:• 65M.S.and15Ph.D.programs• 612faculty• 1432residentstudentsincludes
(166international/47countries)• 909distributedlearningstudents
• OperationsResearch(OR)isthescienceofhelpingpeopleandorganizationsmakebetterdecisionsusing– mathematicalmodels,statisticalanalyses,simulations– analyticalreasoningandcommonsensetotheunderstandingandimprovementofreal-worldoperations.
• ORoriginatedduringWorldWarII.ThemilitaryusesORatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.
• BiggestusersofOR:moderncorporations– Supplychainlogistics– Manufacturingandproductionplanning– Scheduling
• NPShastheoldestORinstructionalprogramintheU.S.
OperationsResearchatNPS
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NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefense(CID)OperationsResearchDepartment
DavidAldersonAssociateProfessor,ORDirector,NPSCenterfor
InfrastructureDefensePh.D.,StanfordUniversity,
2003
GeraldBrownDistinguishedEmeritus
Professor,ORMember,NationalAcademy
ofEngineeringPh.D.,U.C.L.A.,1974
W.MatthewCarlyleProfessor&Chair,OR
Ph.D.,StanfordUniversity,1997
JavierSalmerónAssociateProfessor,OR
Ph.D.,UniversidadPolitécnica (Spain),1998
RobertDellProfessor,OR
Ph.D.,S.U.N.Y.Buffalo,1990
DanielEisenbergResearchAssistant
Professor,OR
Ph.D.,ArizonaStateUniversity,2018
DanNussbaumVisitingProfessor,ORChair,NPSEnergy
AcademicGroup
Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniv.,1971
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AlanHowardDeputyDirector,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup
MBA/MIMinInternationalManagement,2000
NPSEnergyAcademicGroup(EAG)JackTempletonProgramManager,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup
MSMDefenseSystemsAnalysis,NPS,2013
WhatisCriticalInfrastructure?• CriticalInfrastructure(CI):“systemsandassets,whetherphysicalorvirtual,
sovitaltotheUnitedStatesthattheincapacityordestructionofsuchsystemsandassetswouldhaveadebilitatingimpactonsecurity,nationaleconomicsecurity,nationalpublichealthorsafety,oranycombinationofthosematters” --Section1016(e)oftheUSAPATRIOTActof2001
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CriticalInfrastructureSystems:NPShasauniqueperspectiveandcapability
• Wehavebeenstudyingcriticalinfrastructurefordecades.
• Welookatourowndomesticinfrastructurethroughtheeyesofintelligentadversaries.
• Wehaveconductedover150“redteamanalyses”toplanattacksonourowninfrastructure(anddeterminehowtomounteffectivehardeninganddefensiveefforts)
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CriticalInfrastructureSystems:NPShasauniqueperspectiveandcapability
GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideas forhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures
• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI
• Wehavebeenstudyingcriticalinfrastructurefordecades.
• Welookatourowndomesticinfrastructurethroughtheeyesofintelligentadversaries.
• Wehaveconductedover150“redteamanalyses”toplanattacksonourowninfrastructure(anddeterminehowtomounteffectivehardeninganddefensiveefforts)
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Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats
• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
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Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats
• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought
• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Whatcangowrong(interdiction)
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Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats
• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought
• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Whatcangowrong(interdiction)
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Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats
Idea#2:Avoidgettingstuckonpredefinedthreatscenarios.• SurpriseHappens.Thingswehavenotimagined.• Tunnelvision(onthelastdisaster).Needtobeproactive,notreactive.
“Wewillnotbeabletodeterallterroristthreats,anditisimpossibletodeterorpreventnaturalcatastrophes.Wecan,however,mitigatetheNation’svulnerabilitytoactsofterrorism,otherman-madethreats,andnaturaldisastersbyensuringthestructuralandoperationalresilienceofourcriticalinfrastructureandkeyresources”(p.27)
“Wemustnowfocusontheresilienceofthesystemasawhole– anapproachthatcentersoninvestmentsthatmakethesystembetterabletoabsorbtheimpactofaneventwithoutlosingthecapacitytofunction” (p.28)
U.S.NationalStrategyforHomelandSecurity(2007)
Apolicyshifttoward“operationalresilience”
Most recently: U.S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013.
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“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”
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“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”
• Alistofassets• Aninterconnected(network)system thatworkstoachieveaparticularfunction
HowtoThinkAboutCriticalInfrastructure(CI)
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“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”
• Alistofassets• Aninterconnected(network)system thatworkstoachieveaparticularfunction
✖✔
HowtoThinkAboutCriticalInfrastructure(CI)
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“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”
• Alistofassets• Aninterconnected(network)system thatworkstoachieveaparticularfunction
✖✔
Wewanttomakeouroperations(publicandprivate)resilienttodisruptiveevents.
Weneedourinfrastructuresystemstocontinuetofunctionevenwhen“badthings”happen.
HowtoThinkAboutCriticalInfrastructure(CI)
Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.
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• DODDirective3020.40:MissionAssurance(2016)
DODhasrecentlyreorganizeditseffortstoprotectdefense-relatedcriticalinfrastructureunderabroaderprogramofmissionassurance
• Keyrecognition
– Assets worktogetherassystems toprovidefunction
– Functionenablescapability
– Capabilitysupportsmission
• Focusneedstoremainontherelationshipbetweentheinfrastructureassetandthemissionsitsupports
Ashifttoward“operationalresilience”
Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.
• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought
• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Whatcangowrong(interdiction)
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought
• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Whatcangowrong(interdiction)
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Idea#4:Resilienceisnotaboutwhatyouhave,itsaboutwhatyoudo!Thisisacommonmisperception.(Thinkofsafety asanotherconceptwiththisfeature…)
Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds
Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds
Movegoods/servicesfromareasofsupplytodemands:• Mustincludeinfrastructure
ownersandoperators• Bothpublicand private!
Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds
Movegoods/servicesfromareasofsupplytodemands:• Mustincludeinfrastructure
ownersandoperators• Bothpublicand private!
Idea#6:Oftenrepresentedasflows throughnetworks.
Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective
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• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse
Whatweneedtodo(operation)
Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds
Movegoods/servicesfromareasofsupplytodemands:• Mustincludeinfrastructure
ownersandoperators• Bothpublicand private!
Idea#6:Oftenrepresentedasflows throughnetworks.
Idea#7:Measure performance.Definemissionsuccess.
BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex
• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.
• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.
• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.
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BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex
• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.
• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.
• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.
Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror
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• Whendetermininghowbesttoprotectsystems,anaturalquestionis,“Whatcomponentsaremostcritical?”
• Betteryet:Whichcomponents,iflost,wouldbemostdisruptivetosystemfunction?
Definition:Acomponentiscritical iflosingitwouldsignificantlyreducesystemfunction(relativetothereductionfromlosingothercomponents).
Let’suseahistoricalexampletoillustrate…
Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror
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TheRussianRailNetwork(circa1955)
DatafromFigure7of:Harris,T.E.,andRoss,F.S.(1955),FundamentalsofaMethodforEvaluatingRailNetCapacities(SECRET,
declassified1999),RM-1573,RANDCorp.
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WhatisthecapacityoftheUSSRtodelivermaterieltoEuropeviarail?
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2
52
3W 3E 2S
13N
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ORIGIN
ORIGIN
originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut
13SB
2
3
9
3
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WhatisthecapacityoftheUSSRtodelivermaterieltoEuropeviarail?
3025.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14
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3W 3E 2S
13N
12
ORIGIN
ORIGIN
originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut
13SB
2
3
9
3
6
WhatisthecapacityoftheUSSRtodelivermaterieltoEuropeviarail?
KeyInsight:Thecapacityofanetworkisequaltothesizeofthesmallestbottleneck.(a.k.a.“max-flow,min-cuttheorem”)
Butwhatarcsare“mostvital”?
25.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14
Findingthe“MostVital”Arc(s)isnottrivial!• Itrequiresyoutoconsidernotonlythecurrentpathsthroughthenetworkbutalsoanyalternatepaths
• Because…thesystemcanadjustitsflowsinresponsetoadisruption!
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Findingthe“MostVital”Arc(s)isnottrivial!• Itrequiresyoutoconsidernotonlythecurrentpathsthroughthenetworkbutalsoanyalternatepaths
• Because…thesystemcanadjustitsflowsinresponsetoadisruption!
Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)
• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut
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Findingthe“MostVital”Arc(s)isnottrivial!• Itrequiresyoutoconsidernotonlythecurrentpathsthroughthenetworkbutalsoanyalternatepaths
• Because…thesystemcanadjustitsflowsinresponsetoadisruption!
Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)
• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut
Ingeneral,noneofthese“guessingrules”work!
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity)
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity) 2minimumcapacitycuts!
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity)
largestcapacityarc
2minimumcapacitycuts!
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity)
largestcapacityarc
arcswithlargestflowinoptimal(maxflow)solution
2minimumcapacitycuts!
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity)
largestcapacityarc
arcswithlargestflowinoptimal(maxflow)solution
2minimumcapacitycuts!
arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut
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counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc
(15,20)
(5,5) (10,10)
(0,100)
(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)
(10,10)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
i j(flow, capacity)
largestcapacityarc
arcswithlargestflowinoptimal(maxflow)solution
2minimumcapacitycuts!
arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut
mostvitalarc
Ingeneral,youcannotreliablyguess.Instead,determiningamostvitalarcrequiressolvinganetworkinterdictionproblem.
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
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OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe
stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe
stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)
2. Tolearnhowto“defend”thesesystems,firstfigureouthowtoattack them
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe
stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)
2. Tolearnhowto“defend”thesesystems,firstfigureouthowtoattack them
3. TolearnhowtoattackCI,firstlearnhowittooperateit(i.e.,howitworks)
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe
stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)
2. Tolearnhowto“defend”thesesystems,firstfigureouthowtoattack them
3. TolearnhowtoattackCI,firstlearnhowittooperateit(i.e.,howitworks)
WecalltheseAttacker-DefenderandDefender-Attacker-Defendermodels.
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
WecalltheseAttacker-DefenderandDefender-Attacker-Defendermodels.
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Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)
•Ithelpstofocusesonsystemoperation.•Ithelpstodiscovervulnerabilities.•Ithelpstouncoverinterdependencies.•Ithelpstothinkaboutmitigation.
Ourexperience:Large-scale,long-terminterruptionsincriticalinfrastructureservicescanbecausedbythingsmuchsmallerthantwoCategory-5hurricanes!
Idea#10:Investingforresiliencecanworkbetterwhenyoutothinkaboutthesystemasawhole.•Hardening(reinforcement)•Redundancy(backups,spares)•Capacityexpansion•Newinfrastructure
Thismeansstudyingmorethanjust“howweactuallydoitnow”.
Itrequireswealsoconsider“howcouldwedoitnow(andinthefuture)”!
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Wehaveusedscoresofthesemodelstoassessresilienceforawiderangeofsystems
OperatorModels• Shortest-pathproblems• Max-flowproblems• Min-costnetworkflowproblems• Multi-commodityflowproblems• Projectschedulingproblems• Linearprograms• Integer-Linearprograms• Nonlinearprograms• Nonlinear-Integerprograms
Applications• Electricpower• Potablewater• Fuelpipelines• Roadwaytransportation• Multi-modalshipping• Ports• Supplychains• Telecommunications
– Underseacables– Wirelessnetworkdesign
• Interdependentinfrastructures
These techniques scale up to realistic size and fidelity, and admit a host of standard models, many already in use by system operators.
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Case Study: Guam Power Authority
Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., Brown, G., and Wood, R.K., 2012, Resilience Report: The Guam Power Authority Electric Power Grid: Analyzing Vulnerability to Physical Attack (U), Center for Infrastructure Defense Technical Report NPS-OR-12-002, May. Distribution authorized to DoD and DoD Contractors only due to infrastructure vulnerability analysis (10 May 2012). Other requests for this document must be referred to President, Code 261, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000 via the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218.
Prepared for: Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Airbase Technologies Division, 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 2, Tyndal Air Force Base, FL 32403-5323.
BothAttacker andDefender Analysis
Guam Power Authority’s transmission system(115-13.8 kV):
~100 buses~50 HV lines~50 transformers10s of substations 10s of generating units:
>550 MW
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Case Study: Hawaii
Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., and Brown, G., 2018, Resilience Report: Analysis of Hawaiian Electric Power Grid to Physical Attack (U), NPS Technical Report NPS-OR-18-001R, February. Restricted distribution (PCII).
Prepared for: Department of Homeland Security, Infrastructure Protection Division.
Attacker, Defender,&SpareParts Analysis
• 10s buses• ~100 high-voltage AC
transmission lines• no DC lines• ~100 transformers• 10s generating units: total
gen. capacity of ~2,500 MW• Total load: ~1,200 MW
• Can a small number of coordinated attacks inflict significant damage for which repair would require considerable reconstitution time? What is the best means of hardening against such attacks?
• How can a limited stockpile of medium- and high-voltage spare transformers contribute most to mitigating vulnerability, i.e., to “increasing system resilience.”
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CriticalInfrastructureSystems:NPShasauniqueperspectiveandcapability
GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideasforhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures
• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI
• Wehavebeenstudyingcriticalinfrastructurefordecades.
• Welookatourowndomesticinfrastructurethroughtheeyesofintelligentadversaries.
• Wehaveconductedover150“redteamanalyses”toplanattacksonourowninfrastructure(anddeterminehowtomounteffectivehardeninganddefensiveefforts)
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Ourresearchispartofabroaderteameffort
OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts
Effort1 - Modelingandanalysisofinterdependentcriticalinfrastructuresystems
– Energy(emphasisonelectricpower)– Water(emphasisonpotablestorageanddistribution)– Transportation– Telecommunications
Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan
– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA
Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI
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27Feb2018 ProjectStart(fundsavailable)21Mar remoteparticipationinUSVIEnergyRoundtable26-30Mar 1st NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT11-15Jun 2nd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT14-15Jun UVI/VITEMAHazardMitigationWorkshop21Sep MSThesisbyLCDRBrendanBunn20Oct Technicalreport(finaldraft)22-26Oct 3rd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STJ,STT
• BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.
• AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).
OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts
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228proposedinitiativesacrossavarietyofsectors:• ClimateAnalysis(5)• Energy(17)• PrivateSectorComms (14)• PublicSectorComms (11)• Transportation(24)• Water(11)• SolidWaste andWastewater(26)• HousingandBuildings(11)• Health(21)• VulnerablePopulations(12)• Education(20)• Economy(9)• Non-profit,Philanthropy,and
VoluntaryOrganizations(6)• GovernmentResponse(41)
Lotsofproposedchanges!
OpenQuestions:
• Howtoassesstheimpactofthesechanges(good/bad)?
• Howtoprioritize?
https://www.usvihurricanetaskforce.org/
OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts
KeyConcept:TheNeedforanOperationalViewofResilience
ReportContributions:1. Explainingthestructure,function,andtensionsassociatedwithcritical
infrastructurethatwerechronicproblemspriortothehurricanes.2. Documentinghurricaneresponse,recovery,andmitigationactivitiesfor
theseinfrastructuresystemsafterthehurricanes.3. Discussingthesechangesinthecontextofpotentialbarrierstoresilience.
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AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).
WefaceseveralbarrierstoresilienceBarrier1:Wedon’tfullyunderstandhowvulnerableweare.• owners,operators,orcommunitieswhomanageinfrastructureoftendo
nothavecompleteknowledgeabouttheirvulnerabilities
Barrier2:Wedon’tknowhowbesttocreateresilience.• Tradeoffs/tensionsbetweendifferentmechanismstoachieveresilience• Prioritizationisdifficult
Barrier3:Wedon’thaveincentivestocreateresilience.• Hardtoinvestinmitigatingsomethingthathasneverhappened• Moralhazard:disincentivesforinvestment
Barrier4:Wedon’tknowhowtogovernforresilience.• Rules/regulationsworkagainstimplementationofdesiredchanges• mismatchbetweeninfrastructuregovernanceandinfrastructureoperation
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Reference:AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).
OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts
Effort1 - Modelingandanalysisofinterdependentcriticalinfrastructuresystems
– Energy(emphasisonelectricpower)– Water(emphasisonpotablestorageanddistribution)– Transportation– Telecommunications
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Power– WaterInterdependencies
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a morerealistic(USVI)waterdistributionsystem
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IEEE13-buselectricitydistributionnetwork
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BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.
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Green CayProsperity
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Feeder 8
Feeder LegendFeeder 01, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 02, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 03, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 04, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 05, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 06, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609
Feeder 09, Three Phase, 14.3999996185303
Feeder 10, Three Phase, 14.3999996185303
Ongoingwork:St.Croixelectric+water
OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts
Effort1 - Modelingandanalysisofinterdependentcriticalinfrastructuresystems
– Energy(emphasisonelectricpower)– Water(emphasisonpotablestorageanddistribution)– Transportation– Telecommunications
Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan
– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA
Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI
67
ContactInformation
• Dr.DavidAldersonDirector,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool831-656-1814,[email protected]://faculty.nps.edu/dlalders
• NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefensehttp://www.nps.edu/cid
ReferencesandAcknowledgments• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,Carlyle,W.M.,andWood,R.K.,2017,"Assessingand
ImprovingtheOperationalResilienceofaLargeHighwayInfrastructureSystemtoWorst-CaseLosses," TransportationScience,doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2017.0749.
• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,andCarlyle,W.M.,2015,“OperationalModelsofInfrastructureResilience,” RiskAnalysis35(4):562-586(receivedAwardforBestPaperof2015inRiskAnalysis).
• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle.2014.“AssessingandImprovingOperationalResilienceofCriticalInfrastructuresandOtherSystems.”A.Newman,J.Leung,eds.,TutorialsinOperationsResearch:BridgingDataandDecision.InstituteforOperationsResearchandManagementScience,Hanover,MD,180-215.
• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle,L.A.Cox.2013.“Sometimesthereisno‘mostvital’arc:assessingandimprovingtheoperationalresilienceofsystems.”MilitaryOperationsResearch18(1)21-37.
• Brown,G.,Carlyle,M.,Salmerón,J.andWood,K.,2006,“DefendingCriticalInfrastructure,” Interfaces,36,pp.530-544.
ThisresearchwassupportedbytheOfficeofNavalResearch,theAirForceOfficeofScientificResearch,andtheDefenseThreatReductionAgency. 19