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Operations and Requirements

A Practical Approach to ManagingDP Operations

Suman MuddusettiShell International Exploration and Production, Inc.

Doug PhillipsGlobal Maritime, Inc.

October 17-18, 2006

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A Practical Approach to Managing DP OperationsAn Operator’s Perspective

Suman Muddusetti & Doug PhillipsShell International Exploration and Production Inc.

& Global Maritime Inc.

GLOBAL MARITIMEMARINE, OFFSHORE AND ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS

October 17-18, 2006

Increasing use of DP Vessels in Shell’s Marine Construction Activities

3,380

4,400

6,300

2,985

3,900

3,300

2,940

2.860

WATER DEPTH

(ft)

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

FOUND/MOORPRE-INSTALL

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

HOSTINSTALLATION

N/A

YES

N/A

N/A

NO

N/A

N/A

N/A

TOPSIDELIFT

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

EXPORTLINES

YES

N/A

YES

N/A

N/A

N/A

YES

N/A

RISERSFLOWLINES

YES

N/A

YES

N/A

N/A

N/A

YES

N/A

UMBILICALS

N/A2004Holstein

YES2005Bonga

YES2003Na Kika

SHELLPROJECT

N/A2001Brutus

N/A1999Ursa

N/A1994Auger

NO1996Mars

SUBSEAYEAR

N/A1997Ram Powell

Increasing use Experience Base ??of DP Vessels

WORLDWIDE: NUMBER OF DP DRILLING UNITS

1 5 9 12

3948

110

10

20

30

40

50

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

YEAR

WORLDWIDE: NUMBER OF DP CERTIFICATES

574

879

100 108

758755

20218110983816865571 6 7 93 71

373

822

440

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

YEARSource: Nautical Institute

VENDOR 1: DP SYSTEMS SOLD (ANNUAL AVERAGE)

24

111150

0

50

100

150

200

1974 - 1995 1996 - 2005 2005

YEARS

Managing DP Operations

BackgroundWhy manage?Experience at Shell & industryShell’s philosophyDP vessel requirementsKeys to success

The Potential Consequences of a Loss of Position

An Operator’s PerspectiveHarm to personnel: >1,040 peopleHarm to environment: IrrevocableDamage to assets: $50 Million - $1 BillionLoss of revenue: $ 15 Million/dayDelays in revenue: Day(s) - year(s)Loss of reputation: Intangible

Human factors: Poor procedures, poor design, insufficient testing/commissioning/QA, and/or operator errorDP systems: Complex and require personnel and equipment to work together seamlessly for safe operationsReported incidents from 1994 to 2003: Total # = 371 (LOP1 = 43%, LOP2 = 57%)

Loss of position 1 (LOP1): Major loss of position Loss of position 2 (LOP2): Minor loss of positionLost time incident (LTI): Downtime through loss of redundancy

Attention to human factors: LOP1 LOP2 LTI

Nearly 98% of the Incidents may have been Mitigated by Attention to Human Factors

Source: IMCA Database

EnvironmentalForce(9%)

Electrical(4%)

Power Generation(11%)

Thrusters(18%)

Equipment: Power/Thrust Fault 32%

References(13%)

DP Computer Hardware(2%)

DP Computer Software(24%)

Equipment: DP Fault 38%

OperatorError(21%)

LOSS OF POSITION CAUSES(Total # = 371)

Operator Fails To

Control

Operator Fails To

Control

Vessel inadequately equippedLoss of Position6

VESSEL

Lack of familliarity with vessel systemsLoss of Position5

H M

Lack of Management of ChangeLoss of Position4

Gaps in FMEASafe configuration not specified (complex vessel)7

Gaps in FMEASignificant single point failure exceeding design intent8

L

Operating outside of design intentBlackout1

POTENTIAL

Operator errorLoss of Position2

Gaps in FMEALack of Management of ChangeSafe configuration not specified

AUDIT FINDINGS

CAUSEINCIDENT

Non-adherence to proceduresLoss of Position3

9

The Bonga Experience - Lessons Learnt

Position Trace

503780

503785

503790

503795

503800

503805

503810

679425 679430 679435 679440 679445 679450 679455 679460 679465

East

North

30 meters

A High Impact Incident at Bonga

What Worked What did not Work

Engagement by Operator Facilitated Incident Free Execution

BONGABONGA

Relied on audits: Focused on the availability of documentation and not on content

Audits: Lacked emphasis for DP vessels

Marine Warranty Surveyor (MWS) personnel:Lacked skill sets to oversee DP related activities

EPIC contract: “Leave it to contractor” approach

NA KIKA NA KIKA && HOLSTEINHOLSTEIN

Operator: Engaged early onIndepth technical review of vesselsVessel’s capabilities established by trialsOperational parameters established

Audits: Preceeded by technical reviewsNot a “tick in the box” exerciseOpportunity taken to educate project team

Engagement: With Contractors project and operational teams

Work Activities: Undertaken within the vessel’s capabilities

0123456789

1011121314151617

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

TIME (year)

RATE (% per 1000

operational days)

Blackout

Disconnection

Source: Petrobras S.A. Keynote Presentation, Dynamic Positioning Conference, MTS 2005

Proactive Operator Engagement Reduces DP Incident Rates

Shell’s Philosophy for Managing DP Operations

PRIMARY TOOLS FOR ASSESSMENTPRIMARY TOOLS FOR ASSESSMENT

Failure Mode Effects AnalysisProving trials documentsCapability plotsContractor’s operational philosophy

Shell’s Shell’s PhilosophyPhilosophy

Determine the configuration for the

safest mode of operation

UnderstandWorst case failuresSingle point failuresVessel’s DP capability

Undertake critical activities with vessel’s DP system configured

for safest mode of operation

Have robust contingency plans in place

FMEA FailingsIf FMEAs considered only

already known & reported incidents then 97.6% of likely DP incident

causes may be identified

VESSEL PROJECT TEAMSeen as a deliverable to obtain ClassImproperly specifiedProving trials are insufficient

REGULATORYApproval given without adequate reviewOperational issues not understood

FMEA PRACTITIONER

Experience based (not analytical)Lack of multidisciplinary teamLack of resources

VESSEL OPERATIONS TEAMSits on a shelfSeldom used or understood

FMEAFMEALack of Ownership

Validation of Capability Case of Actual vs. Theoretical

Development of Field/Well Specific Operational Guidelines

Results of FMEA reviewResults of Proving/Field TrialsVessel’s capabilityConsequences of loss of positionContractor’s operational philosophySIMOPSWork activityContingency planning

VESSEL MUST OWN

THIS DOCUMENT

Contingency Planning

Process: Carry out & implementHAZID HAZOP’sMitigation measures

Contingency plans: Robust & developed Operators project teamContractors project team and operational team

Contingency Plans: Effective & executablePre task drillsDemonstrate skills (if required)

Contingency Planning: Work Activity

Contingency Planning: Execution

Contingency Planning: Demonstration of Skills

The Development of Shell’s DP Vessel Requirements

Shell - EPP (Construction): Learning prompted the development of“Dynamically Positioned Vessel Requirements” document

Specifies the minimum requirements for DP vessels engaged in construction activitiesBecomes part of a RFQ/ITT package

Shell - EPP (Other communities) Adopted the document and made it into a Design Engineering Practice (DEP)In use by Deepwater (regional)In process of becoming a Global DEP

Requirements: Are applicable to the following activities

Construction (includes Subsea & Pipelines)Accommodation supportDrilling & Well Intervention (additional requirements TBD)

DEP Requirements Specifies: Submission of Following Documents

FMEA*Proving trialsAnnual trials AuditsModifications since last FMEAPower system discrimination, Selectivity, Calibration Bus tie philosophyDP

Incidents and service reportsCapability plots and proving trialsOperations manual

DPO experienceExamples of WSOG or FSOG

DEP Requirements Specifies:FMEA Fundamentals

FMEA REQUIREMENTS

FMEA must defineSafest mode of operationWorse case failuresSignificant single point failures

FMEA must beUpdated after major modificationsReviewed and updated in the last 5 years

Annual trials must be adequateAction items from annual trials

Must be closed outOr in the process of close out

FMEA MUST COVER

Governor and AVR failure modesMain switchboard control power failure modesDP control system I/O arrangementPosition reference processingOne line drawings of DGPS, HPR, and other PRSNetworksCommunicationsConsequence analysis

DEP Requirements Specifies: Project Specific Training When Necessary

PST is used to provideAn overview of the projectCriticality of the specific operation(s)

PST must coverWorst case failureSignificant single point failures of the DP systemConfiguration for the safest mode of operationDP and Contingency Planning requiredDevelopment & practical use of WSOG or FSOG

PST must be Conducted at suitable training facilityOn equipment similar to that on the vessel

REQUIRED ATTENDEESREQUIRED ATTENDEES

Master(s)Chief Mate(s)DPO(s)Chief Engineer(s)Chief Electrician(s)

Keys to Success

Operator engagement Understand DP vessel’s capabilityReview operational managementProvide appropriate tools to project teams

Stakeholder involvement Foster collaboration (contractors, operators, professional associations, training centers, and vendors)Train personnel (operators, contractors, vessel management, etc.)Share learning (failures and successes)

Training center effectivenessIdentify training needsConsider project specific simulator training

Thank You

GLOBAL MARITIMEMARINE, OFFSHORE AND ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS