operator e-jets news rel 21

Issue No. 21 – August 2008

Issue No. 21 August 2008

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From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC), brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization and efficiency in daily operation.

E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance. Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to EMBRAER Customers.

Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at Flyembraer Portal at

http://www.flyembraer.com

- Login (enter username and password);

- Select “Maintenance” and then “Technical Support”;

- Select “E-Jets NEWS for Operators”;

- Click on desired E-JETS NEWS.

If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS publication can be addressed to:

E-JETS NEWS

Tel: +55 12 3927 7075

Fax: +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: [email protected]

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third party without EMBRAER’s written consent. Also, no article published should be considered authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.


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Integrity Tests (I-BIT) Tips – Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS Released No. 12, EMBRAER would like to share some additional tips concerning the Flight Controls Integrity test.

During the Flight Controls Integrity Test (AMM TASK 27-00-00-710-801-A), it was reported that this test was interrupted during the accomplishment of the test itself and, even after a second attempt, the test did not pass successfully.

After further investigation, it was found that if the I-BIT test is interrupted for any reason, a power reset must be performed (in accordance with AMM TASK 24-42-02-860-802-A/200). When the I-BIT test fails, the fault is recorded in the FCM NVM and must be cleared before a new attempt; otherwise, the test will not successfully pass.

If any failure is detected during the test, EMBRAER suggests continuing with the AMM TASK until the “FLT CTRL TEST FAILED” (amber) is displayed in the EICAS and identify in the CMC ACTUATOR INTEGRITY TEST page (15 OF 15) which BIT has been triggered.

Perform a new power reset and re-do the test. If the same BIT previously identified triggers again do the applicable corrective maintenance action.

AMS Controllers – RECIRC SMK DET FAIL – Update


As an update of E-Jets NEWS Nos. 15 and 16, EMBRAER would like to inform that Brazilian Authorities (ANAC) classified the Black Label Design Change Approval as level 1. This classification level will require the TCCA, FAA and EASA change evaluation. Therefore, EMBRAER is expecting the Design Change Approval in Oct/08.

Control Column Oscillation with AP Engaged – Update

Effectivity: EMBRAER 190

As informed in E-jets NEWS Release No. 12 and 20, EMBRAER released SNL 170-22-0010 and 190-22-0009 this week in order to inform operators about Control Column Oscillation with AP Engaged when the VS (Vertical Speed) Flight-Director mode is activated by the pilot and a command in the Guidance Panel VS wheel is inserted.

As an interim solution, EMBRAER recommends the following:

• FOL 170-007-066 informs pilots about the correct procedure to be taken. Revision 1 was recently released.

• FIM tasks 22-11-00-810-91T-A (for AFCS channel 2) and 22-11-00-810-91U-A (for AFCS channel 1) must be accomplished to check the system.

The Solution will be addressed through load 23.

EMBRAER 190 MLG Internal Nitrogen leakage – Update


As an update on the subject in reference, which was previously presented in the E-Jets NEWS releases Nos. 15 and 20, EMBRAER would like to inform the following:

• Endurance tests of new AGT seal PN 2000A1751K01 achieved 20.000 cycles and no leakage was noted. Although the seal has already been approved, the endurance test will be extended up to 30.000 cycles. After that, the seal will be removed and inspected for any sign of damage.

Note: Each cycle in the tests being performed at Liebherr laboratory consists in reproducing, in average, the profile of the Landing Gear operation considering the Taxi-in,


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Takeoff, Landing and Taxi-out (gate-to-gate).

• AMM task 32-11-04 to replace the floating piston seal released in Aug/2008. This task is based on the procedure currently followed by Liebherr in the cases where the seal replacement was necessary. The main points are summarized below:

o Jacking the aircraft (1000 mm between ground and wheel axle);

o Fluid and Nitrogen pressure release;

o Sliding tube removal from shock strut main fitting (seals removal);

o Sliding tube disassembly (floating piston, separator piston and bearings seals removal);

o Let floating piston into oven for 2 hours;

o Sliding tube assembly;

o Sliding tube installation on shock strut main fitting;

o MLG servicing and lowering of the aircraft;

o Special tools are required and it is estimated aircraft downtime of 16 hours.

• The new seal will be introduced in the next scheduled revision of the AIPC. A PIL was released in Aug/2008;

• SB release and introduction of the new seal in the production line will occur from Oct/2008 onwards.

Note: With AMM and AIPC released in Aug/2008, if leakage is suspected (refer to SNL 190-32-0022), the new seal could already be introduced without the need to wait for the SB release in Oct/2008.

Liebherr field support can be provided to assist in the seal replacement.

CF34-10E Engine, Center Vent Tube deformed, second field event reported – Update


As informed in E-Jets NEWS Release No. 17, EMBRAER received a second report about deformation on the CF34- 10E Center Vent Tube (CVT) (the first event was mentioned in E-Jets NEWS release No. 4).

During a pilot routine walk-around inspection, it was found that the engine position # 1 CVT was misshaped (oval form). In addition, an oil streak on the centerbody, an oil puddle in the chevron nozzle and on the ground, below the exhaust area, were observed.

The CVT was replaced but the engine failed the oil consumption test and the operator’s engineering decided to remove it. The relation between the CVT deformation and high oil consumption has not yet been confirmed. The engine is currently at the engine shop for analysis and repair.

GE will conduct a test, by the end of September, on the removed CVT in order to evaluate the possibility of adding operational limits for CVT in the deformed condition.

No action in the field is necessary.

Recommendations for Autobrake Disengagement with New BCM – Update


In E-Jets NEWS Release No. 18, issued in May 2008, information about the non-expected behavior related to the disengagement of the autobrake system on landing identified in aircraft with new Brake Control Module (BCM) and the recommendations for autobrake disengagement with new BCM was provided.


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The new BCM PN 142-071142 for the EMBRAER 170 and PN 142-091141 for the EMBRAER 190 is being introduced by EMBRAER though SB 170-32-0036 and SB 190-32-0023 in order to improve software robustness and eliminate some misbehavior identified in the previous version. Aircraft are being delivered with these new modules installed since February, 2008.

Investigation has shown that, on aircraft equipped with these modules, when the autobrake is manually disengaged by the autobrake selector knob or the thrust lever, a sudden pressure spike may occur after the first brake application with a pedal deflection higher than 20%. It was confirmed that this new BCM software presents this side-effect. Despite the fact that it does not affect aircraft safety, an improvement to eliminate this characteristic is required.

EMBRAER would like to inform the following updates in this matter:

• The solution for this issue will be a new BCM PN 142-091142. This BCM part number will be the same for both EMBRAER 170 and EMBRAER 190 and will require Primus EPIC Load 23 or newer.

• Flight Operation Letter (FOL) No. 170-2008-021 and Operational Bulletin (OB) No. 170-004/08 have been issued to inform the above scenario to operators’ flight crew.

• SNL 170-32-0016 and SNL190-32-0010 - LANDING GEAR SYSTEM – AUTOBRAKE SYSTEM have been revised and will inform above scenario to operators.

• It was identified that compliance with the autobrake disengagement procedure through the brake pedals at 80kt, as recommended in Standard Operating Procedures Manual (SOPM) section 5 – Normal Procedures, avoids any autobrake disengagement non-expected behavior.

MOD implementation guide


SNLs 170-00-0037 and 190-00-0033 have been issued to provide a basic guidance for the Operators regarding the E-Jet's equipment improvements available.

These documents bring information about minor changes implemented via MOD that also may be requested during shop visits. It is important to highlight that the AIPC must always be consulted to verify the fleet's part number effectivity.

Potable Water Filling Process Interruption – SNL


EMBRAER has released SNL 170-38-0015 and 190-38-0016 about interruptions observed while filling the potable water tank, causing this process to take more time than normal. Investigation indicated that water splashes over the water level sensor during the filling process.

When the water splashes over the water level sensor, it sends a signal of FULL quantity to the Water and Waste System Controller (WWSC) that commands the Fill/Drain Valve to close. Once closed, the F/D Valve waits 10 seconds to reopen and restart the process. This may occur some times during the process. Refer to the mentioned SNL for maintenance action and final solution.

INVERTER FAIL events


SNLs 170-24-0032 and 190-24-0026 have been issued to inform Operators about the INVERTER FAIL events observed on the fleet.

These documents bring information about the system operation, the events observed on KGS and Marathon equipment, developed improvements and recommended actions as well.


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Flap Actuator Overtravel Stop


EMBRAER received a report from an E-190 operator that during replacement of a flap actuator (part number C155811-1), it was noticed that the actuator’s overtravel stop was incorrectly installed on this unit (see the picture below).

Further investigation revealed that the following flap actuators serial numbers are susceptible to have this discrepancy: 1102, 1101, 1100, 1099, 1098, 1097.

Nevertheless, all E-190 operators who may have one of these units installed in their fleet are being informed about the action plans to schedule the replacement of such units.

In additional, EMBRAER would like to advise that there is no side-effect if one of these actuators is found on the airplane.

SB 170-52-0030 / 190-52-0012 Revision


Due to the low reliability of the EMDL (Electro-mechanical Door Latch) PN AS-52-0081 (with electrical locking/ unlocking activation by optical sensors), it has been redesigned to have micro-switch activation. The new PN AS200-00075 was made available in the AIPC 52-51-03.

However, PN AS-52-0081 is improved for EMI protection and re-identified to PN AS200-00004 by the accomplishment of SBs 170-52-0030 and 190-52-0012 and the PN AS200-00075 is two-way interchangeable with the latter. Thus, the need to replace the PN AS-52-0081 with the new PN AS200-00075 requires the accomplishing of the SBs.

In view of the 30 man-hour required to accomplish SBs 170-52-0030 and 190-52-0012 and the need to upgrade the EMDL to PN AS200-00075, EMBRAER decided to revise the mentioned SBs in order to split them into two parts: Part I for harness replacement and Part II for EMDL replacement. Therefore, the upgrade of the latch may be done by implementing only SB Part II and SB Part I, which requires 30 man-hours, can be scheduled to a heavy check.

The mentioned SBs revision shall be available in September/2008.


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APU Fire Test’s Time Exceeded Causes Auto-shutdown of the APU


During analysis of aircraft data due to reports of APU auto-shutdown, EMBRAER noticed that some of them were related to the time the APU Fire Test Button was pressed when performing the Fire Test.

When pressing the Fire Test Button in the Fire Extinguisher Panel in the cockpit, no more than 10 (ten) seconds are allowed when performing this test. Trespassing this time will immediately shut the APU down. This is not recommended if it is not an emergency case, because it may cause damage to the APU system, as the APU is immediately shut down without the usual one-minute cooldown period.

EMBRAER Flight Operations Support Team will include a caution note in the Airplane Operations Manual (AOM), alerting for the possibility of undesired APU shutdown due to exceeded time limit to perform the APU fire test. This caution note is expected to be issued in the next AOM revision, scheduled to Oct/08.

FADEC Spurious Maintenance Messages on the FHDB


Some changes were implemented on LDIs V08.2 and V08.3 in order to avoid the recording of FADEC spurious maintenance messages on the FHDB when engine shutdown is commanded.

Although the number of spurious maintenance messages was reduced on the FHDB, they are still being recorded.

EMBRAER is working to release the final solution in a future LDI version.

SNL for Passenger / Service Door Handle Cover


EMBRAER has issued SNLs 170-25-0028 and 190-25-0021 about improvements in the passenger / service door lining handle cover.

Investigation indicated that this cover could possibly detach from the main lining assembly either due to hinge pin not properly crimped or due to specific installations with adhesive between the arm/disarm door assembly.

Refer to the SNLs in question for further details and maintenance action.


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Slat Actuator Jammed – Troubleshooting Tip


The purpose of this article is to share some troubleshooting tips concerning Slat Fail events.

According to a report from an operator, after a slat fail event during the extension of the slat surface, the slat actuator was primarily identified as the root cause of such event. The actuator was then removed and replaced by a new one; however, a new slat fail event took place during the retraction of the slat surface.

Further investigation revealed that the mechanical rigging was found to be out of limit. The mis-rigging condition on the slat mechanism may cause a slat failure event due to the fact that it does not keep the adequate clearance between the slat track and the rollers, as can be seen in the picture below:

Therefore, in order to prevent this kind of event, the instructions of the AMM TASK 27-80-00-820-801-A - Slat Control System (Mechanical) – Rigging - must be accomplished after the replacement of the Slat Actuator.

EMBRAER 170/175 – TR Isolation Control Unit (ICU)


EMBRAER has received reports from the field regarding wear on CF34-8E TR ICU PN P528A0001-01 or P528A0001-02, in particular to its Inhibition Lever Brackets.

Since EIS, this PN had no changes in its design (SB 78-0028 for lever improvement is related to painting).

Root cause analysis has started by GE on the recovered parts where some possibilities are under investigation.

Field data showed that failures are concentrated on:

• Mean age of faulty units is 8200 hours,

• More than 3 years in service.

Field impact associated with this issue may be the impossibility to inhibit the ICU; therefore, it might be necessary to replace the affected part.

As an interim solution, a GE TI-00142 with a fly-on for some specific conditions has been issued, also avoiding unnecessary removals.

Returned units will be covered by warranty if below 3 years since aircraft delivery and 9000 FH, whichever occurs first. This disposition will be reevaluated after root cause confirmation.

Brackets are not line replaceable. Temporary repair development is planned for the third quarter of 2008.

Service Letter CF34-8E-MHD-78-32-610-R00 was released with more details on this issue.

GE Field Support Representative should be contacted to get a copy of those documents.


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Emergency/ Parking Brake Handle not holding up


EMBRAER has received reports of Emergency/ Parking Brake Handle not locking up due to the presence of dirt in its locking mechanism (items 380 to 410 on fig).

In events where the Emergency/ Parking Brake Handle is not locking up, EMBRAER recommends that operators should remove the handle and inspect it in order to determine whether the cause can be dirt in the locking mechanism, if positive, EMBRAER recommends that the operator should remove, clean, reinstall the handle, and verify system operation.

EMBRAER will discuss the need of issuing an observed FIM Task to help operators to address this failure.

Replacement of Incorrect K9 Relay during Troubleshooting of Forward and Center “EBAY FANS FAIL” CAS Messages


A case of improper K9 relay replacement during troubleshooting of the FWD and CENTER EBAY FANS FAIL messages displayed on the EICAS has been reported.

The avionics compartment cooling system contains two K9 relays: one is installed in the EICC (located in forward e-bay) and the other one is installed in the RICC (located in the center e-bay). Only the K9 relay installed in the EICC is related to the FWD and CENTER EBAY FANS FAIL CAS messages.

Additionally, aircraft factory-delivered with modified EICCs (SN A0426 or higher) have the new K9 relays that contain some improvements incorporated (date code 0736C or later).

For further information, refer to SNL 170-21-0004/ 190-21-0024.

LOAD 21.2 – Flight Level Limited to FL 370


Some operators have reported that the scratchpad message "EXCEEDS CERT CEILING" was coming into view when a flight level above FL 370 was entered on the MCDU. This is an FMS unexpected behavior, particularly related to aircraft with Load 21.2 installed.

Initially, this effect was observed only after Load 21.2 field installation, when a Power Down/ Power Up procedure was performed before the APM installation. Further analysis revealed that this may also occur during the normal aircraft operation.

EMBRAER released new revisions for Service Newsletters 170-00-0034 and 190-00-0030 providing clarification and the required intermediate action.


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Aileron Torque Tube Chaffed By Landing Gear Freefall Cable


EMBRAER has received some reports from the field regarding chaffing marks in the aileron quadrant torque tube caused by landing gear freefall cable, as shown in the picture below. In addition, EMBRAER would like to advise that no immediate action is needed if the airplane is found with the reported chaffing marks.

An interim procedure is being developed in order to provide a means to prevent the chaffing condition. Also, EMBRAER is evaluating a possible acceptable damage limit for the torque tube. As soon as the analysis result and solution are available EMBRAER will share this information to all operators.

Electrical Connector – Useful Information about Evaluation of Visual Aspects


SNLs 170-20-0001 and 190-20-0001 have been issued to provide an auxiliary guideline for an identification of oxidation and corrosion on electrical connectors and the recommended actions.

It is important to highlight that the information contained in these SNLs are meant to be only a reference, SWPM (Standard Wiring Practices Manual) must always be consulted for any wiring issue.

EMBRAER 190/ 195 Radial Tires


EMBRAER would like to inform operators that the radial tire was certified for use on the EMBRAER 195 main gear and it is already available in the AIPC.

This radial tire is the same as that of the EMBRAER 190 and can be used as an alternative to the originally certified bias tires. Since the nose wheel radial tire was previously certified, now operators have a complete set of radial tires to install on the aircraft.

The radial and the bias tires were developed to have the same external dimensions and the same speed/load/ pressure rating. The inflation pressure is also the same for both tires. In despite of having the same external dimensions, the radial and bias tire are designed and manufactured according to different parameters, compounds and materials.

The differences in the number of beads in association to other design characteristics make the radial tire lighter than the bias tire. The table below presents the tire weights.

On the bias ply tire, each ply makes an angle different from 90 degrees to the circumferential line of the tire. On the radial tire, the belt plies are wrapped around the bead at an angle of 90 degrees. The pictures below illustrate the difference.


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EMBRAER only authorizes the mixing of bias and radial tire types in different legs, for example:

- LH MLG with two radial tires and RH MLG with two bias tires, or vice versa.

- NLG with two radial tires or two bias tires.

This configuration will not affect aircraft handling, performance, and brake control system functionality. If you do not obey this precaution, damage to the equipment can occur. The radial tire is manufactured by Michelin and the bias tire is manufactured by Dunlop. To request the radial tire, operators must contact Michelin.

Emergency Light System Update


The emergency light system has been under investigation since 2005. The results of this investigation have revealed that some modification on the circuit board of the ELPU will be necessary in order to solve the main issues.

Thus, EMBRAER has been working together with C&D/ Diehl (manufacturer of the ELPU) to have a solution available this semester.

The results of the investigation and the steps EMBRAER has already accomplished are given below:

1) Regarding the EMBRAER production line – handling procedure:

• The manufacturer has informed that when the battery has been in stock longer than 6 months, it may be damaged if installed directly on the aircraft (without prime), so EMBRAER implemented a charging procedure at EMBRAER production line that charges the batteries before they are installed on the aircraft (Jul/2007).

2) Regarding the Operator’s stock - handling procedure:

• Also, the stock of each operator should have a similar handling procedure implemented.

• An SNL is already available to inform the operators about it (SNL 170-33-0019 and SNL 190-33-0025).

3) Regarding the 1-minute test (FAP TEST BUTTON);

• There is an issue on the circuit board of the ELPU (Emergency Light Power Unit) for the daily test performed by the FAP (Flight Attendant Panel) test button. There is an internal counter in the ELPU that is not working properly and if the aircraft stays without power for more than 36 hours and the FAP TEST BUTTON is pressed, an


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unexpected behavior could occur (e.g. lights remain ON for more than 1 minute after TEST). For this reason some internal components of the ELPU will be modified/ included in order to correct that.

• An SNL is already available to the operators providing inform on an interim solution for this case (SNL 170-33-0017 and SNL 190-33-0023).

4) Regarding the battery discharge during extended parking (RETURN TO SERVICE);

• There is also an issue with the circuit board of the ELPU that controls the battery charge.

• An SNL is already available to the operators providing inform on an interim solution for this case (SNL 170-33-0018 and SNL 190-33-0024).

NOTE: Failure modes 3 and 4 are not related with each other, so the operator has to follow the recommendation for both separately in order to avoid delays, etc.

To summarize, the ELPU design will be modified to improve the overall performance of the unit in general and correct the malfunction identified in the circuit board. After the installation of the new ELPU, the SNLs mentioned in items 3 and 4 will be canceled.

A Service Bulletin will be released by the end of September 20008 and a retrofit campaign with rotable parts will be set with each Operator in order to retrofit the WW Fleet with new batteries and the new ELPU.

XBLEED FAILED OPEN CMC Message


A recent case of XBLEED FAIL made evident that the system cannot correlate this CAS message when the crossbleed valve fails open (CMC message XBLEED VLV (OPEN) [C1]/WRG FAULT).

Further investigation confirmed that this correlation has not yet been incorporated to the updated LDI versions. Incorporation is planned for LDI 09.

See below an example of flight deck maintenance merged FHDB of this case.

Acronyms

AD = Airworthiness Directive

AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog

AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual

AMS = Air Management System

ANAC = Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority)

AOM = Airplane Operations Manual

APU = Auxiliary Power Unit

BCM = Brake Control Module

CAS = Crew Alerting System

CMC = Central Maintenance Computer

CMM = Component Maintenance Manual

DLS = Data Load System

EICAS = Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System


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ELPU = Emergency Light Power Unit

EMDL = Electro-mechanical Door Latch

EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual

FADEC = Full Authority Digital Electronic Control

FAP = Flight Attendant Panel

FCM = Flight Controls Module

FHDB = Fault History Database

FIM = Fault Isolation Manual

FMS = Flight Management System

FOL = Flight Operations Letter

IBIT = Initial Built-In Test

ICU = Isolation Control Unit

LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information

LRU = Line Replaceable Unit

MCDU = Multifunction Control Display Unit

MLG = Main Landing Gear

MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List

NLG = Nose Landing Gear

NVM = Non-Volatile Memory

OB = Operational Bulletins

PIL = Parts Information Letters

PN = Part Number

SB = Service Bulletin

SN = Serial Number

SNL = Service Newsletter

T/S = Troubleshooting

Note: All abbreviations used in EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

operator e-jets news rel 21

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