organization of american states topic guide

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Hola (Hello) everyone and welcome to the Organization of American States! I’m Sasha, and

I’m one of the staffers for YMUN XL in charge of the OAS committee! I’m a sophomore in Calhoun

College, and am interested in majoring in Economics or Global Affairs. I’m originally from

Baltimore, Maryland, so I love to eat crabs and spice up any meal with some Old Bay.

Aside from working as a staffer at YMUN, I’m also a Security Council Simulation at Yale

(SCSY) USG, and I am a Secretary on the board of the Yale International Relations Association

(YIRA). To continue the international trend, I am also an undergraduate liaison for the Yale World

Fellows Program. Outside of my international activities, I am a Master’s Aide for Calhoun College

and enjoy spending my free time watching 30 Rock, eating fruit salad, or snowboarding.

I am unbelievably excited to be running the OAS committee this year, and am looking

forward to seeing how my OAS delegates deal with the issues Billy and I have laid out! It should be a

weekend of spirited debate, exciting challenges and innovative solutions. Get thinking, because

climate change and the drug trade are now on you! If you have any questions or just want to chat,

feel free to email me at: [email protected].

- Sasha Frankel, Yale ’16

Bom dia and welcome to the OAS! My name’s Billy, and I’m the other staffer in charge of the OAS!

I’m a sophomore prospective Economics major in Pierson College, and I just returned from a

summer abroad in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I grew up just outside Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota—

hometown of Post-It Notes, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and deep-fried candy bars on a stick—and actually

find New Haven in January to be comfortably warm.

In addition to staffing YMUN, I’m also an active member of the Model United Nations Team at Yale

(MUNTY), and I’m on the secretariat for Yale Model Government in Europe (YMGE), this year in

Budapest, Hungary! Outside of Model UN, I’m involved in both the Yale Concert Band and the

Yale Precision Marching Band, and I’m the Public Relations Director of the Minnesota Club at Yale

(a very important position).

I’m really looking forward to meeting all of you this January; I think we’re going to have an amazing

weekend. Sasha and I have been planning this committee for a long time, and we can’t wait to hear

your ideas for how to address these two pressing concerns! In the meantime, if you have any

questions about the committee, the topics, or the best state in the union (Minnesota), please feel free

to shoot me an email! ([email protected]"!!##!!"##$%&'()*+,%-*#.%/01%

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TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee 5 Gangs and the Drug Conduit

Topic History 6 Current Situation 11 Questions to Consider 20

Climate Change Topic History 21 Current Situation 24 Questions to Consider 30

Suggestions for Further Research 31 Role of the Committee 32 Structure of the Committee 33 Footnotes 34

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The Organization of American states is the

world’s oldest regional organization. The

Organization was established in order to achieve

"an order of peace and justice, to promote their

solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to

defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity,

and their independence."$ It utilizes a four-

pronged approach to achieve this goal, based on its

four main pillars: democracy, human rights,

security, and development.

In 1889, the American States decided to

meet periodically to discuss common issues and

concerns. From October 1889 to April 1890, the

First International Conference of American States

was held in Washington, DC.$$ The OAS came into

being in 1948 with the signing of the Charter of

the OAS, where it consisted of the United States

and 20 Latin American nations. The Conferences

of American states then met at various points until

in 1970, they were replaced by the OAS General

Assembly, which now includes all 35 independent

countries of the Western Hemisphere.$$$

http://americancommondefencereview.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/oas-logo-eng.jpg

Initially, the United States prevailed as the

most powerful voice in the assembly, by virtue of

its economic, political and military power. Now,

however, because many Latin American countries

have experienced economic growth, grown more

confident in addressing their own challenges, and

diversified their diplomatic relations, they seek to

gain larger voices within the OAS and establish

their own policies.$% Over time, the OAS has expanded its

activities into areas beyond border disputes and

regional security. During the 1960s, the OAS

greatly expanded its development programs, and

created the Inter-American Court of Human

Rights in 1978 and the Inter-American Drug

Abuse Commission in 1986. The OAS also

emphasized its commitment to democracy by

adapting the Inter-American Democratic charter in

2001. % As global issues continue to develop and

the OAS grows, new committees and powers are

bound to develop. However, the OAS will always

strive to use political dialogue, inclusiveness,

cooperation, and legal and follow up instruments

to maximize its work in the Hemisphere.%$

History of the Committee!

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The Latin American drug trade has

permeated the global market, and with its power

now deeply entrenched within both Latin America

and the world, it remains a driving force behind

Latin America’s social, cultural, and economic

problems. Much of the political problems facing

Latin America in the 1980s have faded away, only

to be replaced by a new onslaught of drug-related

issues.

In the early 20th century, cocaine was legal

throughout the world, causing the rise of Andean

cocaine production. Between 1910 and 1945, a

multi-faceted cocaine policy remained, with some

nations (like the United States) banning non-

medicinal cocaine use, and others openly accepting

the drug.%$$ However, after World War II, UN

drug agencies and the United States worked

together to criminalize cocaine and other drugs: in

Peru by 1948 and Bolivia by 1961. %$$$ Following the

criminalization of cocaine, the illicit drug trade

grew out of the already established cultivation

practices in Latin America.

There are several steps to drug trafficking,

beginning with the cultivation of the crops and

ending with the distribution and active usage of

the final product throughout the globe. The

Andean countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia

are the world’s main drug producers, while

Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean

remain the main terminals through which the

drugs are transported on their way to the United

States of America or to Europe.$& Though Colombia and Mexico are

perhaps the most infamous drug-trafficking

countries, Peru and Bolivia were the two principal

suppliers of coca leave and refined cocaine from

the middle of the nineteenth century through the

mid 1980s. In 1985, Bolivia produced 25 percent of

the world’s coca leaf supply, and Peru 65 percent.

TOPIC I.

Gangs and the Drug Conduit Topic History !

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Colombia, on the other hand, only

cultivated 10 percent or less. However, the United

States soon got involved in the Andean drug trade

as part of its “War on Drugs,” causing coca

cultivation to shift to Colombia in the mid to late

1990s. Under President Victor Paz Estensoro, the

United States financed crop eradication programs

in Bolivia’s Chapare region after 1986.

Additionally, the United States supported in the

interruption of the “air bridge” between the coca

region in Peru and the cocaine laboratories in the

mid 1990s. Eventually, production in Peru and

Bolivia shrunk drastically, and by 2000, Columbia

was cultivating approximately 90 percent of the

world’s coca leaf. &

http://cocagrowers.org/Portals/16/site%20images/CocaLeaves%20%28health%29.jpg Both Peru and Bolivia have experimented

with alternative development programs to

eradicate their drug problems. Peru’s program

began in 1995, and aimed to provide incentives to

encourage farmers to stop coca cultivation.

Bolivia’s began in the mid-1970s, with extensive

international support. However, it is clear that

neither Peru nor Bolivia’s incentives have enabled

the economic value of alternative products to reach

that of illicit crops.&$

Colombia

One of the most affected countries is

Colombia, which has achieved notoriety on the

world stage in the past few years for the business

dealings, political scandals, and guerilla warfare

surrounding its underground drug economy.

However, Columbia only began to develop a

presence in the cocaine market less than 50 years

ago.&$$ In the mid 1970s, marijuana traffickers in

Colombia began exporting small amounts of

cocaine into the United States. They discovered

that by simply hiding small amounts of cocaine

into suitcases and then traveling into the United

States, they could process cocaine in jungle labs for

1500 per kilo and turn around to sell it on the

streets for 50,000 per kilo.&$$$ The profits were

lucrative, and people began to flock to the

burgeoning industry.

The Medellín cartel was among the first

Colombian cocaine smuggling cartels, and

remained one of the most powerful until the

1990s. Its charismatic and determined leader,

Pablo Escobar, joined with Carlos Lehder, a well-

known marijuana smuggler. Lehder convinced

Escobar that cocaine could be flown directly into

the United States on small airplanes, thereby

bypassing the need for frequent trips to the United

States, with cocaine smuggled in suitcases. Huge

profits led the Medellín cartel to re-invest their

money in new labs, airplanes, and an island in the

Caribbean. Until the early 1990s, Medellín

controlled 80 percent of the cocaine trade.

However, in the 1980s, Escobar found himself in a

fight with the Colombian government, which

eventually led to a stand-off. The Colombian

government threatened to extradite the traffickers

to the United States, leading the Medellín cartel to

revolt, and therefore contributing to its own

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internal decomposition. Between 1989 and 1990,

Medellín-related homicides spiked from 730 to

5,300 yearly.&$% Additionally, the United States

financed a drug war against Pablo Escobar, leading

to Escobar’s Death in 1993. The cartel began to

self-destruct, and with the majority of its leaders

either arrested or dead by the mid-1990s, the

Medellín cartel collapsed. &%

http://www-deadline-com.vimg.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Pablo_Escobar_picture__130206181935.jpg

However, the Medellín cartel was not

Colombia’s only drug powerhouse. In the

Columbian city of Cali, the Cali cartel formed, and

was the main rival of the Medellín cartel until

Medellín collapsed in the 1990s. The Cali cartel

saw smuggling as a sophisticated business, and

chose to reinvest their profits in legitimate

businesses, rather than in their own smuggling

efforts. They dominated the cocaine trade by

running their cartel with precise efficiency. They

separated workers into cells to protect

confidentiality, hired lawyers to study the moves

of international prosecutors, and hired engineers

to create equipment that could not be bugged. As

their business grew, they Cali cartel began

working to destroy Pablo Escobar’s Medellín

cartel. They formed “People Against Pablo

Escobar,” which was a group solely dedicated to

ensuring Escobar’s downfall, and they began

supplying information about Escobar to the

Colombian government. As they grew, they

shipped more cocaine into Asia and invested in

political protection, but Cali’s leaders were

eventually tracked down and arrested. By the mid-

1990s, Columbia’s Cali cartel had also fallen.&%$

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After the destruction of the Cali and

Medellín cartels, the Colombian cocaine business

began to fragment. Younger traffickers realized

that large organizations were more visible and

therefore more vulnerable to attack, so smugglers

began to form smaller, more controllable groups

with specialized tasks. For example, one cartelito only smuggled drugs from Colombia to Mexico,

while another cartelito was solely responsible for

jungle labs. Over 300 cartelitos formed to fill the

vacuum left by the absence of the Cali and

Medellín cartels.&%$$ As Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerillas and

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (UAC) militias

grew, they took over coca cultivation and

processing in Colombia. By the late 1990s, the

majority of rural Colombia was controlled by these

two factions. As a result, drug-fueled violence

spiraled out of control in the late 1990s and early

2000s, causing Colombia to become one of the

most dangerous and violent countries in the

world. &%$$$ Despite the relative success of the US

backed “Plan Colombia,” a plan meant to reduce

drugs’ influence in Colombia, as of 2010 Colombia

remained the principle source for cocaine, and

violence was again on the rise.&$&

Mexico Additionally, the United States crackdown

on trafficking routes in Colombia caused a shift

north, to Mexico. As drugs were seized and cartels

dismantled in Colombia, Mexico’s narcotraficantes shifted their role from postmen to wholesalers.

Border towns like Tijuana, Nogales and Juárez

have participated in drug trafficking activities since

the early 1900s, concentrated mostly on alcohol

and patent drugs, and later on opiates and

marijuana. In 1989 a third of the cocaine intended

for the US market entered via Mexico, and by the

late 1990s, that figure reached 75 to 85 percent.&&

The Sinaloa Cartel, led by Felix Gallardo, became

the initial major player.&&$ By the early 1990s, the

Mexican Sinoalan cartel surpassed Medellín’s peak

profits. However, the Mexican Juarez cartel also

began to grow in power, with the real transition

beginning in the mid 1980s. Like Cali, Juárez

groups exploited the government’s drive against

their rival, the Sinoalan cartel, and became the top

drug-trafficking cartel.&&$$ The growth and stabilization of Mexico’s

drug trafficking networks occurred during the rule

of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),

which ruled in Mexico for 71 years. Because the

government was centralized and protected some

drug production in certain regions, Mexican drug

production became an entrenched establishment.

Widespread corruption beneath the PRI

government also created a “working relationship

between Mexican authorities and drug lords”

through the 1990s.&&$$$ However, with the

decentralization of Mexican political power in the

1990s, the stability of the trafficking system began

to fray. Officials no longer regulated competition

among the cartels, and violence subsequently

grew.

By the late 1990s, the Tijuana/Arellano

Felix Organization (AFO) was one of the most

powerful drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico.

It competed with the powerful Juárez

organization, as well as the Sinoalan cartel. In

2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared

an open war on drugs just days after being sworn

in to office. He sent over 50,000 troops onto

Mexico’s streets, invested billions into new

equipment and improved training, and

strengthened the partnership with United States’

anti-drug forces.&&$% The government was highly

successfully in capturing drug leaders, with 25 of

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the 37 most wanted captured during Calderon’s

time in office. However, some observers have

noted that the Mexican kingpin strategy created

more instability and violence in Mexico.

Past OAS Action The OAS established the Inter-American

Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) in

1986. CICAD is a policy forum for discussing and

dealing with the current Latin American drug

problem. Its core mission is “to enhance the

human and institutional capacities of its member

states to reduce the production, trafficking and use

of illegal drugs, and to address the health, social

and criminal consequences of the drug trade.”&&% In

2010, the Hemispheric Drug Strategy expressed

the commitment of member state to deal with the

consequences of the drug trade. The strategy chose

to focus on several key areas to combat drug

trafficking, including institutional strengthening,

demand reduction, supply reduction, control

measures, and international cooperation. Within

these points, CICAD has established several

programs to enhance their progress and assist

Latin American countries in meeting their goals.&&%$ The OAS has historically ruled out any possible

experimentation with legalization and/or

decriminalization.&&%$$

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Despite extensive international effort and

support for new multilateral anti-drug programs,

much remains to be done to combat illegal drug

production and trafficking in the Americas. After

the most recent OAS meeting in June 2013, OAS

nations released a declaration that stated that the

drug problem should be treated “with an

integrated, strengthened, balanced and multi-

faceted approach, with full respect for human

rights and individual liberties, incorporating

public health, education and social inclusion.”&&%$$$ International efforts to promote several variations

on drug and cartel eradication programs have met

with limited success, and it appears that drug

trafficking is once again on the rise.&&$&

South America is the sole producer of

cocaine for the global market, and marijuana and

opium poppy also remain prevalent throughout

the region. The major coca bush zones are

consistent with historical precedent: Andean

countries, like Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, are the

world’s main source for cocaine. Opium poppy is

generally grown in Mexico and Columbia, and

cannabis is cultivated virtually everywhere.

Production, however, is only one small gear in a

larger drug trafficking machine. In order to refine

the raw products into hard drugs, drug

manufactures need the appropriate chemicals.

Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and

Mexico provide these chemicals.&&& There are several factors that make the

Andean region uniquely suited to be the world’s

major drug source. First and foremost is Latin

America’s proximity to the United States, which

remains the largest and most lucrative illicit drug

market in the world. Additionally, poverty, lack of

viable alterative careers, corruption, weakness in

law enforcement, presence of insurgent groups

and geographical impediments to interdiction are

all obstacles the international community faces

when trying to combat drug trafficking. Finally,

uneven political support for counterdrug efforts

makes it difficult to establish a cohesive, joint

policy applicable to the entire region.&&&$

http://static2.123teachme.com/cms_images/wordsm/map_south_america.gif

Additionally, there is much ongoing

discussion on the “balloon effect,” and the best

methods to eradicate drugs throughout the

Americas. When the United States backed Plan

Colombia and other efforts to deconstruct the

drug trade throughout Latin America, rather than

decreasing the quantity of drugs overall, traffickers

just shifted to a new location, much like air does in

a balloon when pressure is applied.&&&$$ The OAS

Current Situation !

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must work together to develop a new framework

to avoid this effect in order to efficiently and

effectively reduce drug trafficking.

Finally, there is significant debate about

the best policy to promote OAS interests

throughout the world. Though drug abuse and

addiction remains a greater problem in Northern

countries, the drug trade’s impacts on the

economy, social fabric, governance and security are

larger in the production countries in the Andes.&&&$$$ According to the most recent OAS report, “a

public health approach is necessary to address

drug use,” and “the drug problem requires a

flexible approach, with countries adopting tailored

approaches that address individual concerns.”&&&$%

Supply and Demand Columbia, Mexico, Peru and Bolivia are

the Latin American countries that play the largest

role in the illicit drug economy. Since overtaking

Peru and Bolivia in drug production in the late 20th

century, Colombia’s role in the global drug

trafficking market has continued to grow. As of

2001, the area under cultivation in Colombia was

62 thousand hectacres, with overall coca

leaf/cocaine production well above the levels of the

1990s.&&&% An estimated 300,000 people in

Colombia are currently exclusively dependent on

the coca economy.&&&%$ However, The World Drug

report has registered a 10 to 20 percent decline in

coca production in Colombia from 2008 to 2009.

Though this is an estimate, it is likely that

recent eradication efforts (to be discussed in a later

section) have met with some success. On the other

hand, the balloon effect is fully visible, as officials

have seen increases in coca cultivation in Peru and

Bolivia.&&&%$$ In 2009, the UNODC recorded a 7

percent increase in Peruvian output.

Additionally, Evo Morales, the current

president of Bolivia, sanctioned the production of

40 thousand acres of coca to meet indigenous

demand, and suspended all cooperation with the

United States’ Drug Enforcement Administration

in 2008.&&&%$$$

http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/imce-share/cocacultivation.jpg

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The balloon effect also caused the rise in

drug trafficking in Mexico, which is now has one

of the largest drug economies in the world. 95

percent of cocaine destined for the United States

flows through Mexico, and it is the largest supplier

of marijuana and methamphetamine to the United

States’ market.&&&$& Finally, though Mexico only

supplies a small portion of heroin for the global

market, it supplies the majority of heroin destined

for the United States.&'

In regards to demand, though the demand

for cocaine in the United States is on the decline,

Columbian traffickers are adapting to the constant

flux of the drug market to ensure steady profits. As

such, they are looking to new markets to fill the

void left by somewhat declining United States

demand. Officials in Europe, including in Spain

and the United Kingdom, have noticed an increase

in trafficked cocaine. According to the European

Police Organization (EUROPOL), 250 metric tons

of cocaine enters the European market annually.&'$

Additionally, Colombians are moving into the

Asian markets, specifically China and Thailand,

with Hong Kong as the gateway.&'$$ It is estimated that in 2007 and 2008, 16 to

17 million people used cocaine worldwide. Of this,

North America accounted for 40 percent of global

consumption, while the European Union

accounted for more than 25 percent. These two

regions in total accounted for more than 80

percent of the worldwide cocaine market, which in

2008 was estimated to be US$88 billion.&'$$$ Cocaine use in Latin America has also increased

over the past decade, and is now estimated to be a

2.6 percent usage rate in Argentina and a 2.4

percent usage rate in Chile.&'$% Though these levels

are relatively low, they represent a major increase

in Latin American usage of the past few years.

Officials note that cocaine consumption in

particular has increased along transit pathways en

route to larger consumption markets. Latin

American countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador,

Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and the

Honduras have also seen a rise in drug use. Due to

major increases in consumption, market demand

has exploded, leading to a proliferation of new

organizations, trafficking routes, and suppliers.&'%

Drug Trafficking Organizations As drug supply, demand, and policy has

evolved over the past several years, so have the

drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) responsible

for the production, transit, and sale of illicit drugs.

In Colombia, FARC retains control of the drug

trade, with 9,000 combatants, control of seven

regional blocs and 71 fronts across the country.

FARC is involved with every aspect of the drug

trade, and is thought to earn between US$200

million and US$300million per year.&'%$ FARC

originally used this money to sustain an insurgent

war against the government, but in recent years

the insurgency has fallen by the wayside, and the

organization has turned towards the narcotic

sector as an economic endeavor.

Colombia’s drug economy also sustains

several other DTO’s, including several

paramilitaries that have since combined under the

UAC and morphed into a dedicated trafficking

entity. As part of a government brokered deal in

2006, many traffickers surrendered their weapons,

but the government was overwhelmed by the

number of participants and unable to follow

through on incentives promised, thereby causing

the disillusioned traffickers to reconfigure into

new entities that also focus exclusively on the drug

trade. Another infamous Colombian group, Norte

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del Valle, was powerful after the fall of Medellín

and Cali, but is now weakened by infighting and

arrests.&'%$$ Colombia’s National Liberation Army

(ELN), once notorious for its kidnappings and

‘disappearances’, is now moving away from

kidnappings and into the drug trade, inspired by

the drug trade’s far more lucrative profits. Finally,

there are an estimated 300 to 350 smaller

syndicates in Colombia that operate on a highly

specialized level to produce and move drugs. &'%$$$ In Peru and Bolivia, where drug

production is once again on the rise, there are

several amorphous, nonspecific groups that traffic

illicit drugs. Locals cultivate the fields, and all

processing is done in Brazil and Argentina.&'$& In

Peru, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, appears

to be reviving drug activities. Its members are re-

establishing relationships with coca growers, and

it is beginning to tax the coca industry in its area of

control.' The situation in Peru and Bolivia will

have to be closely monitored in the coming years,

as worldwide drug policy can have a huge impact

on the trajectory of these developments.

In Mexico, seven powerful DTOs occupy

different regions: the Gulf cartel, La Familia, Los

Zetas, the Beltrán-Leyva Organization, the Sinaloa

Cartel, the Tijuana Catel, and the Juárez Cartel.'$ The Gulf Cartel was historically the most

powerful, but after the efforts of the Calderón

administration and the defection of Los Zetas in

2010, the Gulf Cartel’s leadership structure

collapsed and power diminished.'$$ La Familia

emerged in 2006 to fill the security void left by the

central government, but has since become

systematically involved in drug trafficking. They

now have over 4,000 members, with a confirmed

presence in 77 cities in Mexico.'$$$ Los Zetas was

founded by a group of deserters from the Mexican

Army’s Special Forces. It was originally an elite

group beneath the Gulf Cartel, but since its

defection, its individual influence remains strong.

It has, however, encountered some recent setbacks,

including the arrest of its top four commanders.

The Beltrán Leyva Organization broke from the

Sinoala Federation in 2008, but has proved itself

capable of resisting Sinaloa competition and

control ever since. Although the group remains

prominent, its influence has diminished slightly

due to the loss of some of its senior members. The

Sinaloa cartel is one of the most active players on

the Mexican narcotics scene. Sinaloan distribution

cells can be found throughout the United States

and Latin America. The Juárez Cartel was thought

to be responsible for half the drugs entering the

United States, though that number has likely

waned in recent years. Its members are most

famous for their excessive violence. The Tijuana

cartel, once one of the biggest and most violent

cartels in the country, has also had its power

diminish in recent years, specifically as a result of

the elimination of its highest leaders. The Sinaloa

federation has moved in and begun to control

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some of Tijuana’s previous turf.'$% The result of

this instability has been a proliferation of smaller

and more specialized gangs, like Colombia after

the fall of Medellín/Cali.'%

http://www.csmonitor.com/var/ezflow_site/storage/images/media/images/map-of-mexican-drug-cartels/9337207-1-eng-US/Map-of-Mexican-drug-cartels_full_600.jpg

The Mexican DTOs can essentially be split

into two competing blocs, as a result of recent

alliances and familial debts. The Sinaloa

federation, Gulf Cartel and La Familia formed

‘The New Federation’ in February 2010. The

remaining four syndicates have a general pattern

of allegiances. Total Mexican DTO earnings in

North American alone are estimated to be between

US$13.6 billion and US$48.4 billion annually.'%$ Robert Stutaman, a former DEA agent, noted

“The average drug trafficking organization,

meaning from Medellín to the streets of New

York, could afford to lose 90% of its profit and still

be profitable.”'%$$ DTOs also contribute to the

funding of terrorist organization, as it is believed

that both Hamas and Hezbollah have raised funds

through South American DTOs.'%$$$

Combatting the Trade: Crop Eradication and DTO Deconstruction Throughout the history of the modern

drug war, countries, governments and

organizations have tried several methods of crop

eradication in an attempt to stem drug trafficking

at the source. Manual removal, mechanical

removal and aerial removal (done by spraying

herbicides) have all been tested, to varying degrees

of success. Though the benefits of a successful

eradication effort are obvious, there are many

critics that argue that eradication does not fulfill its

goals. Manual and mechanical eradication require

time and human resources and aerial is not always

legal or feasible and is expensive. Recently, despite

claims to the contrary, the OAS concluded that

herbicide used for aerial fumigation in Colombia

has not damaged humans or wildlife.

Nonetheless, eradication is a high-risk

operation, with the potential for losses of

thousands of dollars. Eradication efforts also often

nudge farmers to adapt, as one might adapt to

changing weather or other organic conditions. In

Colombia, farmers developed coping mechanisms

and did not reduce the total crop size.'$& In general,

eradication, alternative development and

interdiction are most effective when implemented

together rather than independently.'&

http://www.humanrightsanddrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/custom/plane.jpg

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As discussed above, Mexico’s previous

President, Felipe Calderón, waged a violently

aggressive war against Mexico’s drug cartels.

Inciting violence and riots, and leaving thousands

dead in its wake, this effort has inspired debate

about how to best tackle drug trafficking

organizations. Currently, the majority of the

globe’s effort to deconstruct DTOs is taking place

in Mexico, where cartels hold the power. Mexico’s

new President, Enrique Peña Nieto, who took

office in December 2012, is expected to take a hard

stance against drug trafficking, put perhaps in

different ways. It is expected that reducing

criminal violence will be Peña Nieto’s top priority,

as opposed to Calderón’s focus on dismantling

gangs.'&$ Calderón’s administration has left a

society with less powerful drug cartels, but more

disorganization in the criminal world and a more

unstable security environment.'&$$ The OAS will

have to contend with changing perspectives on

drug trafficking organizations when evaluating

international illicit drug trafficking and developing

multilateral guidelines.

Crime and Violence Crime and violence are inexorably linked

to the illicit drug trade, and remain a major

problem despite international effort to combat

increasing violence. Latin America and the

Caribbean have among the highest crime rates in

the world, as drug trafficking criminality has

replaced political conflicts as a major source of

violence in many Latin American countries.

Additionally, DTOs corrupt and undermine local

police institutions and law enforcement officials,

so the population loses respect for the importance

of the law. Much of the violence is concentrated in

the production and transit nations (Colombia and

Mexico), though it is increasing in Belize, Brazil,

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela,

and more.'&$$$ It is estimated that a 10 percent

increase in the price of cocaine triggers an increase

in the homicide rate in drug trafficking countries

of 1.2 to 2 percent.'&$%

Though many consider Plan Colombia to

have failed in drug eradication and its plan to stem

drug supply, it has met with several successes in

regards to Colombia’s crime rates and violence.

Security has significantly improved throughout

Colombia, in correlation with the loss of power

and decrease in size of Colombia’s major DTOs.

The number of homicides has declined

substantially, as have the number of kidnappings.

It is estimated that the government of Colombia

now has full or partial control over 90% of the

country, up from 70% in 2003.'&% Nevertheless,

independent drug organizations either collude

with or fight with FARC, leaving large swathes of

rural land controlled by FARC vulnerable to gang

violence. In addition, there is a distinct lack of

police security in rural areas, as one or two

policeman may be in charge of an area of several

OAS 17

!

hundred square kilometers.'&%$ Furthermore, small,

competing gangs create disorganized crime rather

than “doing what would be good for business-

keeping murder rates low and attention at a

minimum.”'&%$$

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/drugviolence.afp_.jpg

Violent crime in Central America,

particularly in Honduras, El Salvador, and

Guatemala, is also on the rise. Stuck between

major drug produces in South America and major

drug consumers in North America, Central

America is uniquely (and unfortunately) perfectly

positioned to encounter the negative side effects of

the spillover of illicit drug trafficking. High

poverty rates ensure a supply of willing recruits for

trafficking cartels, and the Central American

region is overrun with weapons and highly trained

gunmen working for DTOs.'&%$$$ As future policies

are developed, the world must consider the spread

of violence into new regions, and the effects this

increase may have on the region’s economy,

political structure, and social fabric.

The current situation in Mexico has

improved dramatically, given the excessive crime

and violence of the past few years. Most estimates

put the number of people killed in drug related

violence at around 60,000.'&$& During 2012, the

number of murders was down 8 percent from the

same period in 2011, and in Ciudad Juárez,

homicides have fallen 90 percent since their 2010

peak.'&& However, most analysts project that a

decline in organized crime killings will occur much

more slowly than their rise during Calderón’s

administration, despite Peña Nieto’s call for

reducing organized crime related homicides by as

much as 50 percent.'&&$ Peña Nieto has emphasized

a lower profile approach to combating drug

violence in Mexico, though it remains to be seen

how his specific policies develop.'&&$$ Additionally,

since 2010 the previously concentrated violence has

dispersed to new areas and included more

municipalities.'&&$$$ Pervasive corruption within

government-funded law enforcement officials

remains a problem, as exemplified in Mexico,

where in 2010 “nearly one-tenth of the officers in

the federal police force were dismissed for failing

to pass anticorruption tests.”'&&$% In May 2013, following the OAS report on

drugs in the Americas, OAS secretary-general Jose

Miguel Insulza called for a continued debate on

drug related violence.'&&% Though it is hard to

measure the precise, statistical correlation between

drug production and usage and violence, it is clear

that one exists. With increases in drug production

and proliferation of drug cartels comes a rise in

general crime and violence. As exemplified by

Latin American countries, drug-related violence is

firmly entrenched within the fabric of the illicit

drug underworld, and is an issue that will face

many OAS sessions to come.

OAS 18

!

Guatemala ; Colombia ; Bolivia

These nations openly wish to “debate

alternatives to the war on drugs.” They wish to

consider decriminalization as an option because

they believe that it may decrease profitability and

open resources to be redirected to other issues of

importance. They have defended the traditional

use of coca leaves, and President Santos of

Colombia has gone so far as to consider

decriminalizing all drugs.

Ecuador; Costa Rica; Chile ; Panama These nations are supportive of the policy

to debate alternatives. They have expressed some

support for President Santos of Colombia, though

they are not as enthusiastically nor fully in support

of decriminalization as other nations.

United States ; Canada These nations, while publicly supportive

of a debate and discussion around new alternatives

to combat illicit drug trafficking, are not ready to

support decriminalization.

United Nations A UN convention, reaffirmed in 2009,

imposes a blanket prohibition on drugs. This

includes even the traditional use of coca leaves

(from which cocaine is extracted) by Andean

Indians for chewing and tea.lxxvi

OAS Report

The report represents the first time any

significant multilateral agency has outlined serious

alternatives to prohibition, including legal market

regulation or reform of the UN drug

conventions.'&&%$$

Bloc Positions !

OAS 19

!

Questions to Consider!!1. How is it best that the world’s drug problem be approached? Supply side eradication? Minimization of

demand? Treated as a public health issue? A combination of several?

a. Delegates will have to consider a myriad of options when deciding how to best approach the drug

problem. This question is meant to inspire thoughts about a variety of perspectives.

2. Is it best to have one large umbrella policy for the world, so that nations can be assured of consistency and

requirements? Or should there exist many different options for each individual country?

a. Previously, the majority of global drug policies have been large umbrella policies that have the

majority of the world adhere to their policy. Is it time for greater flexibility for individual situations,

or is this too inconsistent and too complicated?

3. Consider decriminalization versus prohibition. Where does your country stand?

4. How does poverty play into the drug problem?

5. Should drug trafficking organizations be treated differently than regular leaders? What is the best way to

reduce their power?

a. Essentially, this question is meant to get delegates thinking about human side to drug transit.

Should the OAS recommend a military-style policy of violence (think Calderón), or should the OAS

try a different approach? Will reconciling with DTOs send the wrong message to other criminal

organizations or other DTOS?

6. How can the OAS ensure that countries are following through on whatever requirements or suggestions it

puts forth? Should the OAS recommend enforcement or incentive techniques? If yes, what kind? If no, why

not?

OAS 20

!

Suggestions for Further Research! 1. OAS official website: http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp

2. CICAD: http://www.cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/main/policy/default_eng.asp.

3. OAS Report on Drugs in the Americas:

http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf

4. Various news outlets for articles on the development of the drug trade (BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, The

Economist, The Guardian, etc.)

5. Drug Policy Alliance’s info on Latin America: http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-trafficking-latin-

america/leaders-views#Santos

6. Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas report:

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf

7. The Latin American Drug Trade report:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf

OAS 21

!

Over the past century, the average global

temperature has risen 1.4ºF. Climatologists—

alarmed by such a sudden, unprecedented increase

in temperature—have warned of the threatening

nature of continued warming. Sea levels are

expected to rise, extreme temperatures and

weather will become the norm, and arable land

could become scarcer, among other dangers.

These effects threaten both millions of human

lives and the livelihoods of millions more. Meanwhile, scientists have arrived and

remain at a consensus that the number one cause

of climate change is human activity. Both NASA

and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) have come to this

conclusion, and in 2010, the National Research

Council stated that, "Climate change is occurring,

is very likely caused by human activities, and poses

significant risks for a broad range of human and

natural systems.”'&&%$$$ NASA and the NOAA,

along with the majority of climatologists, have also

concluded that greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions—especially carbon dioxide (CO2)

emissions—hold responsibility for the warming of

the atmosphere due to their ability to trap heat in

the atmosphere via the greenhouse effect.

The Americas find themselves at a unique

crossroads in the history of carbon emissions and

climate change. Home to the United States, the

largest carbon emitter for much of the past

century; the Amazon Rainforest, which has

absorbed much of the world’s carbon yet also has

faced intensive deforestation; and a number of

nations experiencing surges in economic

development in recent history, the Americas serve

as a microcosm of the global history of climate

change.

Emissions

http://www.climatechangeconnection.org/emissions/images/SmokeStacks.jpg

To begin with the United States and

Canada, these nations have led the world in carbon

emissions for much of the past century. The

United States alone, now the world’s second-

largest emitter, after China, produces over 18% of

the world’s share of emissions. Historically, North

America’s share of the hemisphere’s carbon

emissions have largely been tied to energy

production and transportation.

Latin America, on the other hand, has

contributed a more modest share of the world’s

carbon emissions. With about 8.5% of the world’s

population and GDP and about 12% of the world’s

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Latin America

only contributes a slightly higher-than-average

share of GHG emissions. Around 60% of both the

region’s GDP and emissions originate in Brazil

and Mexico, and unlike their northern neighbors,

a large portion of this results from land-use

change, largely due to deforestation in regions

including the Amazon. In Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,

TOPIC II.

Climate Change Topic History !

OAS 22

!

Guatemala, and Peru, land-use change accounts

for more than 60% of GHG emissions.'&&$&

http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jschmidt/Latin%20American%20GHG%20Emissions.JPG

Efforts to Reduce Emissions Signed in 1997 and effective in 2005, the

Kyoto Protocol was the first major effort to reduce

emissions on a global scale. Key elements of the

agreement included binding emissions reduction

targets for developed nations and the creation of

an “adaptation fund” for developing nations that

climate change threatens. Unfortunately, neither

of the two wealthiest OAS nations are parties to

the agreement. The United States notably refused

to sign the agreement, and in 2011, Canada

renounced the agreement after experiencing

dramatic increases in its emissions, instead aiming

to create its own “made in Canada” program.'&&& In 2009, the Copenhagen Accord—the

document agreed upon by delegates to the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change—was signed by the majority of OAS

member nations. (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador,

Nicaragua, and Venezuela refrained from

participating, opting instead to hold their own

“People’s Conference”.) Like in its successor, the

Kyoto Protocol, developed nations agreed to

specific emissions targets; both the United States

and Canada agreed to 17% emissions reductions

compared to 2005 levels. The agreement also

included components encouraging deforestation-

related emissions reductions, with Brazil agreeing

to a 37% reduction in emissions compared to

“business as usual”. The agreement, however, has

been largely criticized for its nonbinding targets

and its inability to enforce goals.'&&&$ In 2010, Bolivian President Evo Morales

hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate

Change in Chochabamba, Bolivia. The

conference, which was attended by more than

30,000 participants form over 100 countries (most

notably Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and

Venezuela), was a response to failed attempts to

address climate change at conferences headed by

developed countries. After four days of talks and

speeches by numerous outspoken Latin American

leaders, including Morales and then-Venezuelan

president Hugo Chavez, the participants agreed

upon a “People’s Accord”, which demanded that

rich countries pay a “climate debt” to the poorer

nations who will suffer the brunt of climate change

OAS 23

!

and the formation of an international tribunal to

punish those countries and corporations

responsible for much of the world’s climate

emissions.'&&&$$

http://www.projectallende.org/archives/cochabamba.jpg

Some nations have even taken specific

actions to reduce emissions. Brazil, for example,

developed an extensive infrastructure for the use of

sugarcane ethanol in its cars. Sugarcane ethanol,

which is estimated to produce 70-90% less

emissions than gasoline, is sold alongside gasoline

at Brazilian gas stations, and almost all Brazilian

cars can burn both fuels. Additionally, many

Caribbean and Andean nations have developed

sophisticated monitoring techniques for their coral

reefs and glaciers, respectively.Error! Bookmark not defined.i

OAS Commitment Cletus Springer, Director of the OAS

Department of Sustainable Development, has

expressed the organization’s commitment to

addressing climate change concerns. In his words,

"Climate change poses perhaps the gravest threat

to development prospects of the hemisphere, in

particular to small, island developing states [and

those] countries with low-lying coastal, arid, and

semi-arid areas or areas vulnerable to floods,

drought, and desertification."'&&&$$$

Within the OAS, the Department of

Sustainable Development’s Energy and Climate

Change division was created to reduce emissions

through its Sustainable Energy Partnership for the

Americas (SEPA) program. With an aim to make

funding for energy projects more accessible to

member nations by developing financial

mechanisms to enable private and public

investment, SEPA laid the first step for the OAS

into climate change action.'&&&$%

OAS 24

!

The Americas also serve as a microcosm of

the current climate change debate as the OAS

includes members who emit large and small

quantities of emissions and who have more and

less at stake with regard to climate change’s

dangers. On the whole, emissions in the region

appear to be decreasing, with the majority of this

progress coming from the north. As of 2013,

carbon emissions in the United States are at their

lowest point since 1994—13% below 2008 levels.

To the south, Latin American emissions are not

increasing, but at the same time, they are

remaining relatively constant, leaving a significant

amount of room open for improvement.'&&&% Deforestation

Deforestation, especially in the Amazon

Rainforest, continues to pose a major threat to the

world’s climate. The region is estimated to

contain around 10% of the world’s carbon stores,

and deforestation—particularly via burning large

swaths of forest—releases major amounts of

carbon into the atmosphere. Today, only 60% of

Latin America’s original rainforest area remains,

and unfortunately, the situation is only worsening.

This major contributor to climate change is

continuing at a rate of 2% per year—equivalent to

approximately the land area of the entire nation of

Panama.'&&&%$

http://www.unique-southamerica-travel-experience.com/images/amazon-deforestation.jpg

Current Situation!

OAS 25

!

Addressing the causes of deforestation,

however, remains complicated. Agricultural

interests drive much of the deforestation, as

logging, soy farming, and cattle raising become

more and more lucrative industries every year.

Further complicating the issue is Brazilian law.

Legally, farmers in the Amazon must preserve at

least 80% of the area’s original forest; this law

goes largely ignored. Most of the lawbreakers,

however, are not wealthy farmers owning huge

swaths of land; rather, most turn to deforestation

because the land is cheap and because they lack

access to expensive agrichemicals and the intensive

farming techniques employed in other parts of the

country.'&&&%$$ Sea Levels and Temperature To begin with, rising sea levels in Mexico,

Central America, and the Caribbean pose a serious

threat to the livelihoods of millions of residents

and to the economic development of the region.

The increased salinity of lagoons and freshwater

reserves is expected to damage wetlands, and vital

crops, such as forests and banana trees, risk being

lost due to increased levels of soil salinity. By

2080, climate change in Caribbean countries alone

will account for a nearly $11 billion loss in GDP, or

about 11% of the region’s GDP.

Furthermore, rising temperatures in the

Caribbean will devastate the sea’s coral reefs.

Current models predict the disappearance of all

Caribbean coral by 2060 or 2070, destroying the

homes to around 65% of all Caribbean species.Error!

Bookmark not defined.i This, in turn, will also impact the

Caribbean economies, with high estimates adding

around $6 billion more to the region’s GDP loss

by 2050.

!

!!!!!!!!!!

!http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf Water Resources

Much of the reduction in rainfall in arid

and semi-arid regions, including parts of Chile,

Argentina, northeast Brazil, and northern Mexico,

has been attributed to climate change, and these

reductions show little sign of ending. In 1995,

around 22 million Latin Americans lived in water-

stressed watersheds, a number that is expected to

increase by 6 to 20 million people by 2055.

On top of that, the melting of the Andean

glaciers will carry a devastating economic impact

for the region. Hydropower supplies the vast

majority of Andean nations’ electricity, providing

50% of Ecuador’s, 70% of Bolivia’s, and 68% of

Peru’s electricity. While short-term melting has

increased the flow of water toward hydroelectric

stations, long-term prospects for hydropower

seem bleak due to the potential for the

disappearance of the Andean glaciers.Error! Bookmark not

defined.i

Natural Disasters

Latin America experiences more climate-

related disasters per capita than any other region

of the world. Between 1970 and 2009, more than

three million residents of Latin America were

directly affected each year by droughts, floods,

OAS 26

!

and/or tropical storms—disasters that left an

average of 100,000 people homeless and caused an

average of $1.6 billion in damage each year.

Unfortunately, this situation is expected to only

worsen as climate change accelerates over the next

few decades.

http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/uploads/images/article-images/04mexico.601_.jpg

Flooding is an integral part of Central and

South America’s climate. Between 2000 and 2009,

239 floods affected the region, leaving behind large

amounts of damage and suffering. Despite these

staggering numbers, however, it is not the

common occurrence of floods that cause the most

damage and fatalities; rather, it is when these

floods occur at irregular times—or fail to occur at

all—that the most problems materialize.

Residents of areas such as the Amazon Basin and

the Brazilian Sertão adapt their ways of life to

accommodate flooding, but as climate change

causes flooding to become less predictable,

residents will not be able to predict and prepare

the necessary precautions.

Furthermore, the number of tropical

storms affecting the region, particularly in Central

America and the Caribbean, continues to grow.

Between 1970 and 1979, only 19 storms hit the

region; between 2000 and 2009, 93 storms

impacted the region. This growth has largely been

attributed to rising sea temperatures, and these

storms pose a major threat to the safety and

economic development of the region as each storm

can threaten hundreds to thousands of lives and is

estimated to lead to a .6% reduction in an affected

nation’s GDP per capita.'&&&%$$$

Agriculture Agriculture tends to be extremely

vulnerable to climatic changes. Two important

crops in the region, maize and coffee, are

particularly vulnerable to changes in temperature.

Maize, a staple throughout much of the

hemisphere, generally requires temperatures

below 36ºC—a temperature that cannot be

guaranteed as climate change accelerates. Coffee, a

crucial cash crop for many Latin American nations,

can be even more selective; Arabica coffee, for

example, grows best at temperatures between 18ºC

and 21ºC with declines in yield approaching zero

as temperatures rise to 34ºC.'&&&$&

OAS 27

!

http://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/images/Latin-America-Land-Value-M3.jpg

Irregularities of floods and droughts in

certain areas also pose a significant threat to Latin

American agriculture. Brazil’s Sertão (the interior

region of Brazil’s northeast), for example,

experiences consistent cycles of drought and

flooding that require complicated water-

management techniques. Already poverty-

stricken, this region, among others, would face

even more suffering should the flooding required

for agriculture arrive more irregularly.&( Overall, agricultural prospects under

current climate change scenarios look grim. By

2100, agricultural yields are expected to fall by 12%

under the best-case scenario and by 50% under the

worst-case scenario, which in turn will lead to

dramatic increases in poverty.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/17619_LowCarbonHighGrowth_English_PDF.pdf

Average estimates for Brazil by 2050 show

a reduction in agricultural productivity of 18%,

and it is estimated that this will cause an increase

in rural poverty of up to 3.2%.Error! Bookmark not defined.i

Economies Complicating the situation, however, are

the rapid economic growth in Latin America and

the fragile economies of many OAS nations. Over

the past decade, much of the hemisphere has

experienced unprecedented economic growth.

Brazil, for example, achieved a 7.2% GDP growth

in 2010, and as of 2012, now has a larger economy

than the United Kingdom.&($ How to continue this

OAS 28

!

growth in a sustainable manner, however, remains

in question.

Additionally, the economic stability of the

hemisphere presents a hurdle for climate-change

activists. In the north, both the United States and

Canada are still recovering from the Great

Recession, and in the south, many nations,

particularly Argentina, have historically fought

high inflation rates when their government

increased spending. Any action to address climate

change, therefore, must take into account these

delicate situations.

The Future

As a major producer of GHG emissions,

the western hemisphere has the ability to

significantly mitigate the magnitude of climate

change. Conservative estimates from the past few

years place Latin America at being able to reduce

its electricity production emissions by 10% and its

deforestation by 46%, in addition to GHG

emission reductions due to adopting more energy-

efficient technologies.

Reducing emissions alone, however, does

not appear to be a feasible option for the members

of the OAS. Due to their inability to enforce

emissions reductions overseas, OAS members

must work to adapt to the inevitable climatic

changes they will face in the coming century.

Many Latin American nations are now looking

into new drainage technologies for areas expected

to be hit by greater flooding, greater disaster-

preparedness programs, improved water

management, and the creation of marine

protection areas. Additionally, experts are calling

for social programs to be created to assist those

who will be economically affected by climate

change.Error! Bookmark not defined.i

OAS 29

!

United States; Canada

As the two wealthiest nations in the

region, the United States and Canada produce the

majority of the hemisphere’s GHG emissions and

also possess the greatest resources to reduce their

emissions. The United States, in particular, faces

conflicting internal political pressures, however,

especially related to how necessary emissions

reductions are. Additionally, the United States

often pursues a protectionist trade policy, which

may impede the spread of Brazilian sugarcane

ethanol.

Brazil ; Mexico As the largest economies and GHG

emitters in Latin America, Brazil and Mexico find

themselves in between the United States and much

of the region. On one hand, their more rapid

economic growth would allow them to pursue

better technologies, but on the other hand, they

would face a greater economic burden from any

climate agreement than their neighbors—

especially Brazil with regard to deforestation.

Central America ; the Caribbean These nations, which tend to be less

economically developed than Brazil and Mexico,

will likely face the brunt of the effects of climate

change and therefore feel the greatest urgency to

address the issue.

Bolivia ; Cuba ; Ecuador; Nicaragua ; Venezuelaxcii

Composed of the most staunchly “anti-

American” members of the OAS, the Bolivarian

Alliance for the Americas formed their own climate

conference, the People’s Summit in Chochabamba,

Bolivia. Following the conference—a response to

the Copenhagen summit on climate change—

Bolivian president Morales and then-Venezuelan

president Chavez demanded that rich nations pay

a “climate debt” to poorer nations that face the

brunt of climate change and the formation of an

international tribunal to punish countries and

corporations that produce much of the world’s

emissions.

Bloc Positions!

OAS 30

!

Questions to Consider!!!1. Whose responsibility is it to reduce emissions? Just developed nations, or every nation?

2. How can Latin American nations reduce their emissions? What types of laws, regulations, or other actions

can governments take? And what kinds of cooperation are necessary between Latin American nations in

order to ensure the success of those actions?

3. How can nations enforce environmental laws, especially those related to deforestation? How can

hemispheric agreements be enforced?

4. How can Latin America balance economic development and emissions reductions?

5. What steps can Caribbean nations take to adapt to rising sea levels? How can other nations help?

6. How can nations prepare for future, more irregular natural disasters?

OAS 31

!

Suggestions for Further Research OAS official site: http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp

The World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/

Report on climate change in Latin America:


Inter-American Development Bank: http://www.iadb.org/

The Economist: http://www.economist.com

The Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org

Ecologic Institute: http://www.ecologic.eu !!

UNCSW 32

!

Role of the Committee!The OAS General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States and holds one

regular session a year. The OAS has seven essential purposes, including providing a common action in the event

of aggression, strengthening the peace and security of the hemisphere, seeking the solution of political, economic,

and juridical crisis that may arise among member states, preventing possible causes of difficulties between

members and ensure the pacific settlements of disputes, promoting cooperation in matters concerning economic,

cultural, and social development and strengthening representative democracy with respect for the principles of

nonintervention.&($$$ It has a delegation from every member state, and its powers are as follows:

To decide the general action and policy of the Organization, determine the structure and functions of its organs,

and consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American states;

To establish measures for coordinating the activities of the organs, agencies, and entities of the Organization

among themselves, and such activities with those of the other institutions of the inter-American system;

To strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies;

To promote collaboration, especially in the economic, social, and cultural fields, with other international

organizations whose purposes are similar to those of the Organization of American States;

To approve the program-budget of the Organization and determine the quotas of the member states;

To consider the reports of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the observations and

recommendations presented by the Permanent Council with regard to the reports that should be presented by the

other organs and entities, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91.f, as well as the reports of any organ

which may be required by the General Assembly itself;

To adopt general standards to govern the operations of the General Secretariat; and

To adopt its own rules of procedure and, by a two-thirds vote, its agenda.xciv

Today, the OAS serves several roles in Latin America, including providing electoral oversight, assisting in

security operations, providing support for disaster management and development projects, and monitoring

human rights.xcv Several independent institutions carry out specialized functions for the OAS, in addition to its

most basic agenda. The OAS’s General Fund, which supports the General Secretariat, has approximately $80

million dollars yearly. The Special Fund, to which contribution by member states is voluntary, supports specific

programs and initiatives with approximately $70 million a year.xcvi

UNCSW 33

!

Structure of the Committee The OAS is comprised of the 35 independent states of the Americas, and the General Assembly is its supreme

decision-making body. Each member can send one delegate—often the minister of foreign affairs—to the annual

meeting, and each delegate receives one vote. Only a simple majority is required to pass most resolutions in the

General Assembly.

At the disposal of the delegates of the General Assembly are six secretariats and various committees, including:

• Secretariat for Political Affairs

• Executive Secretariat for Integral Development

• Secretariat for Multidimensional Security

• Secretariat for Administration and Finance

• Secretariat for Legal Affairs

• Secretariat for External Relations

• Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs

• Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs

• Committee on Hemispheric Security

Decisions of the General Assembly tend to be more formal and contain preambular paragraphs. Generally

decisions are relatively short, but lengths of decisions can vary significantly.

Dialogue also tends to be more formal in the General Assembly; debate, however, does tend to be spontaneous,

despite its formal nature.

To submit your position papers and for all questions, please contact either member of the senior staff:

Sasha Frankel: ([email protected])

Billy Thomas: ([email protected])

Please also make sure you are registered on the delegate forum, your advisors should provide you with a sign up ink. For the latest information, updates, topic guides and more, visit Yale Model United Nations online at: http://ymun.yira.org

For the second year, YMUN will be offering a competitive essay competition. For the rules and guidelines visit: http://ymun.yira.org/essay-contest/

Interested in participating in a challenging new program for highly motivated and exceptional delegates? Apply for the Global Exchange Program at: http://ymun.yira.org/global-exchange/

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UNCSW 34

!

NOTES

i Who We Are, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp

ii Our History, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_history.asp.

iii Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf.

iv Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013,


v Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, April 8, 2013,


vi What We Do, Organization of American States, 2013, http://www.oas.org/en/about/what_we_do.asp.

vii Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011,

https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/forum/files/vol42-issue2/Debates3.pdf.

viii Ibid.

ix Drug Trafficking in Latin America, Drug Policy Alliance, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-trafficking-latin-america.

x Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow Wilson

Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf.

xi General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013,

http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf.

xii The Colombian Cartels, PBS Frontline,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html.

xiii Ibid.

xiv Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011,


xv The Colombian Cartels, PBS Frontline,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html.

xvi Ibid.

xvii Ibid.

xviii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow

Wilson Center for International Scholars: Latin American Program,


xix Ibid.

xx Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011,


xxi Harvard report

xxii Paul Gootenberg, “Cocaine’s Blowback North: A Pre-History of Mexican Drug Violence,” LASA Forum, Spring 2011,


xxiii June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research

Service, April 15, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf.

xxiv David A. Shirk, The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2011,

http://cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/AboutCICAD/about_eng.asp.

xxv Mission Statement, Organization of American States, December 13, 2012,

http://cicad.oas.org/Main/Template.asp?File=/Main/AboutCICAD/about_eng.asp

.xxvi Ibid.

xxvii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow



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xxviii Fox News Latino, OAS Meeting In Guatemala Ends With No Change In Drug Policy, Fox News Latino, June 08, 2013,

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/06/08/oas-meeting-in-guatemala-ends-with-no-change-in-drug-policy/.

xxix June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research


xxx Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking

and U.S. Counterdrug Programs, Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2010,

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf.

xxxi Ibid.

xxxii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow



xxxiii General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013,


xxxiv General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013,


xxxv Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow



xxxvi Ibid

xxxvii Ibid.

xxxviii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1076.pdf.

xxxix William dean, et al, The War on Mexican Cartels, Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012,

http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf.

xl Collen W. Cook, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2007,

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf.xli Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


xlii Steven Hyland, The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking, Origins, September 2011,

http://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking/page/0/7.

xliii Drug trafficking, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/.

xliv Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



xlv Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



xlvi Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


xlvii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


xlviii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


xlix Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


l Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



li William dean, et al, The War on Mexican Cartels, Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012,

http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf.

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lii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


liii Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


liv Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


lv Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group,

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf

.lvi Steven Hyland, The Shifting Terrain of Latin American Drug Trafficking, Origins, September 2011,

http://origins.osu.edu/article/shifting-terrain-latin-american-drug-trafficking/page/0/6.

lvii Oriana Zill and and Lowell Bergman, Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving, PBS Frontline,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/math.html

lviii Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



lix Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



lx Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking


http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142364.pdf

lxi Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group,

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf.

lxii Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group,

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf.

lxiii Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana Sun Wyler and June S. Beittel, Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking



lxiv General Secretariat, The Drug Problem in the Americas, Organization of American States, 2013,


lxv Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, Foreign Policy at Brookings,

March 2009,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_mexico_

drug_market_felbabbrown.

lxvi Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia, Foreign Policy at Brookings,

March 2009,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_mexico_

drug_market_felbabbrown.

lxvii Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 21st Century, Woodrow



lxviii Michael Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central America, Council on Foreign Relations,

http://www.cfr.org/world/countering-criminal-violence-central-america/p27740.

lxix Q&A: Mexico’s Drug Related Violence, BBC News, July 16, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-

10681249.

lxx Alejandro Hope, Peace Now? Mexian Security Policy after Felipe Calderón, Latin America Working Group,

http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Mexico_Security_Hope.pdf

lxxi June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research

Service, April 15, 2013,

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lxxii Q&A: Mexico’s Drug Related Violence, BBC News, July 16, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-

10681249.

lxxiii June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Congressional Research


lxxiv Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, Rand Corporation, 2011,


lxxv Joe Hitchon, OAS Chief Calls for “Long Awaited” Debate on Drug Policy, IPS News Agency, May 25, 2013,

http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/oas-chief-calls-for-long-awaited-debate-on-drug-policy/.

lxxvi Let them chew coca, The Economist, January 20th, 2011,

http://www.economist.com/node/17961902?zid=312&ah=da4ed4425e74339883d473adf5773841.

lxxvii Jamie Doward, Western leaders study ‘gamechanging’ report on global drugs trade, The Guardian, May 18, 2013,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/18/western-leaders-game-changing-drugs-report.

lxxviii Climate Change Facts: Answers to Common Questions. ([2013]). EPA.

http://epa.gov/climatechange/basics/facts.htmllxxix De la Torre, A., Fajnzylber, P., & Nash, J. (2009). Low Carbon, High

Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change. World Bank.


lxxx The Kyoto Protocol: key sections and dates. (2005, February 16). The Guardian.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/feb/16/environment.climatechange

lxxxi Key points in the “Copenhagen Accord”. (2009, December 19). Financial Times. http://blogs.ft.com/energy-

source/2009/12/19/key-points-in-the-copenhagen-accord/#axzz2bssgKxuZ

lxxxii Shultz, J. (2010). Latin America Finds a Voice on Climate Change: With What Impact?. NACLA Report On The

Americas, 43(4), 5-6. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=52343010&site=ehost-live

lxxxiii Kiernan, J. (2010). Climate Change and OAS Commitment. Americas, 62(3), 36.

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=50407351&site=ehost-live

lxxxiv Kiernan, J. (2010). ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE OAS. Americas, 62(5), 10-11.


lxxxv Goldenberg, S. (2013, February 1). US carbon emissions fall to lowest levels since 1994. The Guardian.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/feb/01/us-carbon-emissions-lowest-levels

lxxxvi Grasso, D. (2012). Sustainable Economic Development in the Face of Climate Change in Latin America: A Path

Forward. Environmental Engineering Science, 29(8), 731-733. doi:10.1089/ees.2012.2908.op


lxxxvii Adam, D. (2009, May 31). Amazon rainforests pay the price as demand for beef soars. The Guardian.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/31/cattle-trade-brazil-greenpeace-amazon-deforestation

lxxxviii RUBIN, O., & ROSSING, T. (2012). National and Local Vulnerability to Climate-Related Disasters in Latin America:

The Role of Social Asset-Based Adaptation. Bulletin Of Latin American Research, 31(1), 19-35. doi:10.1111/j.1470-

9856.2011.00607.x http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=67650818&site=ehost-live

lxxxix Perfecto, I., Vandermeer, J., & Lin, B. B. (2008). Synergies between Agricultural Intensification and Climate Change

Could Create Surprising Vulnerabilities for Crops. Bioscience, 58(9), 847-854. doi:10.1641/B580911


xc Arons, N. (2004). Waiting for Rain: The Politics and Poetry of Drought in Northeast Brazil. University of Arizona.xci Inman,

P. (2012, March 6). Brazil’s economy overtakes UK’s to become world’s sixth largest. The Guardian.

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-largest

xcii OFFICIAL SUBMISSION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA ON BEHALF OF CUBA, BOLIVIA,

ECUADOR AND NICARAGUA; ALBA - PTT MEMBER STATES, TO THE UNFCCC AD-HOC WORKING GROUP ON

LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ACTION. (2010). http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/official-

submission-of-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela-on-behalf-of-cuba-bolivia-ecuador-and-nicaragua-alba-ptt-member-

states-to-the-unfccc-ad-hoc-working-group-on-long-term-cooperative-action-1/at_download/file

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xciii Anne Marie Fitterer, The Organization of American States, Towson University, Spring 1997,

http://www.towson.edu/polsci/ppp/sp97/oas/OAS.HTM.

xciv General Assembly, Organization of American States, August 9, 2013,

http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/overview.asp.

xcv Brianna Lee, The Organization of American States, Council on Foreign Relations, April 13, 2012,

http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p2.

xcvi Brianna Lee, The Organization of American States, Council on Foreign Relations, April 13, 2012,

http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p2.

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