organizational behavior and human decision...

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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Egalitarianism makes organizations stronger: Cross-national variationin institutional and psychological equality predicts talent levels and theperformance of national teams q

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05.0020749-5978/� 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

q We thank Sean Fath, Eric Anicich and Anne Lorgeoux for their research support.We would also like to thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful comments and suggestions, as well as participants in the INSEAD OBbrownbag.⇑ Corresponding author. Address: INSEAD, Organisational Behaviour Area, Bou-

levard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France.E-mail address: [email protected] (R.I. Swaab).

Please cite this article in press as: Swaab, R. I., & Galinsky, A. D. Egalitarianism makes organizations stronger: Cross-national variation in institutiopsychological equality predicts talent levels and the performance of national teams. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014),dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05.002

Roderick I. Swaab a,⇑, Adam D. Galinsky b

a INSEAD, Franceb Columbia Business School, Columbia University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 10 January 2013Accepted 19 May 2014Available online xxxxAccepted by: Michael Morris, Ying-yi Hongand Chi-yue Chiu

Keywords:CultureInstitutionsEqualityTalentPerformance

The current research examined whether cross-national variation in egalitarianism predicts talent levelsand organizational performance. We propose that national variation in egalitarianism predicts coun-try-level talent because egalitarianism influences policymaking at the institutional level and everydaysocial interactions at the psychological level. We compared the relative impact of institutional and psy-chological measures of equality using the context of international performance in the most popularworldwide sport – football (soccer). Both institutional and psychological measures of equality were asso-ciated with greater national team performance. Egalitarian countries also had higher talent levels, whichmediated the link between egalitarianism and performance. Furthermore, psychological equality medi-ated the effects of institutional equality on performance: Countries with greater institutional equalityhad better performing national teams because they psychologically endorsed egalitarianism. Overall,the findings support a serial mediation model: institutional equality ? psychological equality ? top tal-ent levels ? performance. Importantly, psychological equality at Time 1 predicted the performance ofnational football teams at Time 2 more than a decade later. All of these effects held when controllingfor a host of country-level variables. The forces of equality appear to be a critical driver of talent levelsand ultimately performance. These findings demonstrate that both institutional practices and normativesystems help determine talent levels and have important implications for organizational performance.

� 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Although highly skilled talent is often key to effective perfor- Because talent levels drive the performance of teams, organiza-
mance, teams, organizations, and societies often fail to capitalizeon their available pool of talent. For example, a study of 40 globalcompanies found that these firms identified insufficient talent lev-els in key strategic positions as undermining their capacity to per-form at higher standards (Ready & Conger, 2007). In addition, asurvey of more than 1300 executives in 23 EU countries by theBoston Consulting Group (2007) identified talent levels as the mostimportant capability to strengthen, yet the one that was least welldeveloped in most organizations. Perhaps not surprisingly, the fail-ures in talent development are an increasing source of concern toCEO’s; in fact, CEOs have been documented to spend over 20% oftheir time on talent issues (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006).
tions, and countries, it is important to understand if and how talentlevels can be managed more effectively.

The present research investigates how the cultural contextinfluences talent levels. We focus on one specific feature of culture– egalitarianism – which has been prominent in research on cross-cultural differences and research on status and power, but has notbeen examined as a factor directly linked to talent levels. Egalitar-ianism relates to the extent that societies provide equal rights tocitizens and encourages norms and values that individuals areequal (Schwartz, 2014); egalitarian societies also are less likely totolerate abuses of power inequality (Schwartz, 2001).

We propose that egalitarianism matters for talent levelsbecause it influences policymaking at the institutional level andeveryday social interactions at the psychological level. At the insti-tutional level, egalitarianism reflects the initiation, enactment andenforcement of laws dealing with political rights, civil liberties, anddiscrimination. Societies with strong egalitarian institutionsprovide citizens more equal opportunities, thereby opening thedoors to a larger and more diverse pool of talented individuals.

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2 R.I. Swaab, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx

At the psychological level, egalitarianism includes a shared sys-tem of norms and values that people should be treated equallyirrespective of their socioeconomic, gender, or ethnic background(Schwartz, 2014). Societies that strongly endorse psychologicalequality may also facilitate the development of talent because theycreate more supportive climates that increase the motivation ofotherwise stigmatized or underrepresented people to capitalizeon their opportunities. For example, one study found that theextent to which multiculturalism is valued within organizationspredicts the engagement and productivity of its minority members(Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009). Another study found that sexistideologies decrease opportunities for women (Brandt, 2011).

In the following sections, we present a model that identifieshow different forms of egalitarianism may influence a country’stalent levels. We then test our model in the context of cross-national differences in talent levels and the performance ofnational football (soccer) teams, which represents the most popu-lar sport in the world with more than 270 million active playersworldwide (FIFA, 2007). A national football team can be thoughtof as both a team and an organization. The actual performance unitis the team on the field. However, national teams are an output andrepresentation of a larger organization: national football associa-tions, i.e., the governing bodies for football within each country.These organizations are responsible for organizing national compe-titions and the selection of coaches, players, and training programsfor participation in international matches. We believe that ourmodel has equal implications for the talent and performance ofboth organizations and teams.

Our model contains a number of core hypotheses. First, we pro-pose that institutional equality is an important predictor of organi-zational performance. Second, we suggest that the extent to whichegalitarianism is psychologically endorsed as a normative systemwill also be an important predictor of organizational performance.Third, we predict that talent levels will mediate the effects of egal-itarianism on organizational performance. Fourth, and building onrecent research in economics, psychology, and sociology showingthat cross-cultural differences are often determined by institu-tional differences (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Gelfand et al.,2011; Siegel, Licht, & Schwartz, 2011), we propose that institu-tional equality effects on talent and performance will be mediatedby psychological equality. Ultimately, our model is a serial media-tion model. Finally, we hypothesize that psychological equalitypredicts performance over long periods of time because normativesystems – once adopted – exert a continued impact on humanbehavior (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006; Schwartz, 2006).

The goal of the current research is to test our model for howegalitarianism impacts organizational performance. We hypothe-sized that institutional equality predicts psychological equality,which then facilitates the level of top talent and ultimatelyperformance.

Cross-cultural differences in egalitarianism

An important source of cultural variation in cross-culturalresearch is whether cultures endorse ‘‘egalitarianism’’ or havestrong shared societal views that see all people as moral equals incontrast to cultures that legitimize unequal distribution of power,roles, and resources on the basis of attributes such as wealth, gender,education and ethnic background. Egalitarianism can be reflected ininstitutional equality and psychological equality. Institutionalequality is reflected in institutions that prescribe the formal rulesand constraints to guide social interaction within a society (North,1990). For example, countries with greater institutional equalityprovide better mechanisms to protect equal rights between its citi-zens such as the freedom of expression, belief or personal autonomy,

Please cite this article in press as: Swaab, R. I., & Galinsky, A. D. Egalitarianismpsychological equality predicts talent levels and the performance of national tdx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05.002

and equal opportunities (Schwartz, 1999). Psychological equalityconstitutes a normative system that endorses the belief that ‘‘allpeople are of equal worth and should be treated equally in society’’(Schwartz, 2001, p. 65; Schwartz, 2014).

We argue that institutional equality and psychological equalityhave important implications for talent development because theyinfluence peoples’ opportunities to develop their talent as well astheir motivation to use those opportunities. As a result, more egal-itarian countries should have greater levels of talent because theyopen opportunities for all parts of society and motivate those peo-ple to do well. By contrast, more hierarchical countries likely createinefficiencies as certain groups and individuals never get theopportunity to fulfill their potential or have their motivationundermined. If a key resource for high performance is talent, thencultures that facilitate higher talent levels will have a competitiveadvantage. The focus of the present paper is on how cross-nationalvariation in egalitarianism, at both the institutional and psycholog-ical levels, affects the level of talent and the performance ofnational football teams.

Institutional equality

Countries differ in their level of institutional equality. We defineinstitutional equality as the extent to which societal institutionsprovide different people and groups equal rights and opportunities.Countries can achieve greater institutional equality by creatingmechanisms such as civil liberties and the separation of powersthat limit the concentration of power in the state’s elite (e.g.House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). These institu-tions and policies provide its citizens with more equal rights andopportunities regardless of their ethnic, gender, or socioeconomicbackgrounds (e.g. Boudon, 1974).

The idea that cross-national variation in institutional equalitycan increase talent levels is consistent with research on social net-works, which shows that access to a more diverse set of contactsand institutions facilitates the adoption of practices that help peo-ple get ahead in life (DiMaggio & Garip, 2012). Unequal access tosocial networks often deprives people of opportunities and lowerstheir performance. For example, social networks have strongeffects on employment opportunities (Marmaros & Sacerdote,2002), CEO compensation (Shue, 2011), and student performance(Fletcher & Tienda, 2009). Social networks help reify inequality –their effects have been used to explain higher quality jobs for peo-ple with higher socio-economic status than for those with lowersocio-economic status (Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Lin, 1999), formen than for women (Ensel, 1979), and for whites than for AfricanAmericans (Holzer, 1987; Korenman & Turner, 1996). In contrast,greater institutional equality increases the access to various net-works and better connects people to the opportunities that couldhelp them to improve their talent.

As a result, we propose that countries with greater institutionalequality produce higher talent levels than countries that deprive asubset of its citizens access to opportunities. Institutional inequal-ity leaves talented people from stigmatized or low-status groupsleft out. Until the 1980s for example, black football players weresignificantly underrepresented and underpaid in the English pre-mier league, despite the fact that clubs with more black playersperformed significantly better (Szymanski, 2000). Recent researchdemonstrates that cross-national variation in institutional equalityis also directly linked to the development of the most basic ofskills. In a study exploring the gender differences in math ability,the gender gap favoring men was shown to disappear in countriesthat offered greater participation to women in economic andpolitical life (Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). Thus, wepredict that countries with greater institutional equality will havehigher levels of top talent and better performing national teams.

makes organizations stronger: Cross-national variation in institutional andeams. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2014), http://



R.I. Swaab, A.D. Galinsky / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (2014) xxx–xxx 3

Psychological equality

Egalitarianism may also affect performance through a psycho-logical route. In the study on gender differences in math perfor-mance (Guiso et al., 2008), it is likely that egalitarian countriesnot only provided better opportunities, but also created morepsychologically encouraging environments for women to developtheir math skills.

We define psychological equality as the extent to which a soci-ety’s prevailing normative value system encourages and motivatesequal treatment of others. Research has established psychologicalequality as an important dimension in cross-cultural research.For example, Schwartz (1994, 2014) found that egalitarian socie-ties are ones whose citizens say that equality should guide every-day social interactions. In contrast, citizens of hierarchical societiesview social power and authority as important regulators of socialinteraction. Research by Hofstede (1980, 2001) focused on egalitar-ianism’s polar opposite, power distance, defined as ‘‘the extent towhich a society accepts the fact that power in institutions andorganizations is distributed unequally’’ (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45).Low-power-distance societies are classified as cultures where peo-ple relate to one another more as equals regardless of their socialpower, whereas high-power-distance societies are classified as cul-tures where the less powerful accept relations that are moreunequal and authoritarian. Egalitarianism is a key factor in thework by Triandis (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995;Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), who argued that differ-ences in individualism versus collectivism do not just constitute apure dichotomy, but can also include horizontal relationships thatemphasize equality between people or vertical relationships thatemphasize hierarchical differentiation between people. Fiske(1992) made a similar distinction to describe different ways toallocate scarce resources and identified equality matching toreflect egalitarian principles and market pricing to reflect hierar-chical endorsement.

Cultural differences in psychological equality have importantimplications for a society’s talent levels because they guide day-to-day social interactions (Fiske, 1992; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz,1994; Triandis, 1995). Because people in egalitarian societies areexpected to view others as moral equals, these countries providea more supportive climate that increases the engagement andmotivation of otherwise stigmatized or underrepresented groupsand leads them to use the opportunities available to develop theirtalent. Consistent with this notion, Plaut et al. (2009) studied acompany in the United States and found that the extent to whichWhites valued multiculturalism directly predicted the psychologi-cal engagement of minorities. Likewise, the extent to which socie-ties value sexist ideologies helps perpetuate gender inequality(Brandt, 2011), which is associated with poor performance onobjective measures of achievement (Adams, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, & Steele, 2006; Logel et al., 2009). Finally, more egalitar-ian environments have been shown to increase feelings of self-efficacy and control, adding to peoples’ satisfaction and productiv-ity (Huselid, 1995).

In contrast, people in less egalitarian societies are more likely totake the unequal distribution of social roles as fixed, comply withthe obligations and rules attached to these roles, show deferenceto high-status individuals, and expect deference from low-statusindividuals (Schwartz, 1999). Indeed, high-status individuals fromthese cultures often invoke their power to prevent those belowthem from improving rising in the social hierarchy (e.g. throughovert discrimination and negative stereotyping, see Bourdieu,1973; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) or because they believe it is legit-imate to encourage different rules for different people (Brett,2008). The more frequent use of status markers by high-statusindividuals is also likely to create more threatening environments


than in egalitarian societies. This can undermine the ability of low-status individuals to develop their talent more fully, even if they domanage to secure opportunities. For example, low-status individu-als tend to suffer from anxiety (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,2003), stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995), cognitiveimpairments (Croizet & Claire, 1988; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky,& van Dijk, 2008) and superstitions (Burger & Hemans, 1988).

We predict that countries that endorse equality at the psycho-logical level will also have higher levels of top talent and betterperforming national teams because these normative systemsenable, encourage and motivate individuals to better use theopportunities made available to them.

The relationship between institutional equality and psychologicalequality

Although institutional and psychological equality are conceptu-ally distinct, they are interrelated as well. Recent research in psy-chology, economics, and political science suggests that cross-cultural differences in values and norms find their origin in theevolution of institutions. In a study of 33 nations, Gelfand et al.(2011) illustrated that ‘‘tight’’ cultures, i.e., those with strongnorms and low tolerance of deviant behavior, were more likelyto have been ruled by autocratic institutions and suffered greaterhistorical threats (e.g. greater population density, history of con-flict, natural disasters) than ‘‘loose’’ cultures, i.e., those with weaknorms and high tolerance of deviant behavior.

Based on historical evidence from the evolution of states likethe Roman Empire, Mayan city-states and medieval Venice,Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that equality in today’sworld is the result of different political and economical trajectorieswhich resulted in institutions that enabled citizens to equally par-ticipate in economic opportunities (inclusive societies that areegalitarian) or withheld these privileges for a smaller, select elite(extractive societies that are hierarchical). Moreover, they arguethat differences in psychological equality across cultures ‘‘aremostly an outcome of institutions, not an independent cause’’(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 57, although see Brandt (2011)for a demonstration of when psychological equality leads to insti-tutional differences).

Siegel et al. (2011) provide empirical support for the claimsmade by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), showing that historicaland institutional factors predicted approximately half of the vari-ance in Schwartz’s measure of psychological equality. Specifically,they found that societies that are historically more fractionalizedare also less egalitarian, presumably because citizens are less likelyto promote others’ welfare voluntarily, leading to lower expendi-tures on public goods. In addition, they found that psychologicalequality in the late 20th Century was positively predicted byefforts in the 19th century to expand social and political rights(Siegel et al., 2011).

Together, these findings suggest that societies come to psycho-logically endorse equality after they institutionalize egalitarianpractices. Recent work has found that the cultural orientations thatflow from these institutional differences are relatively stable andexert their influence over long periods of time (e.g., Guiso et al.,2006). Indeed, once adopted, normative systems are hard tochange (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 2014), and psychological equal-ity may reinforce the effects of institutional equality on a vast arrayof outcomes. For example, high-status groups in less egalitariansocieties may propagate system-justifying ideologies of their supe-riority, which are then accepted by members of low-status groups(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000).

Overall, once egalitarianism has been institutionalized (i.e.institutional equality), it is also enacted in, and reinforced bynormative systems (i.e. psychological equality) that enable and





motivate a more diverse pool of talent to use the available oppor-tunities. This, in turn, should lead to higher levels of talent devel-opment and greater performance over longer periods of time.

The present research tests the relative and directional impactthat different forms of egalitarianism – institutional and psycho-logical – have on the level of talent. We predict that (a) institu-tional equality is positively associated with the level of talentbecause it facilitates the normative systems that encourage egali-tarianism at the psychological level, (b) psychological equality ispositively associated with the performance of national teamsbecause it enhances the quality of the talent pool, and (c) thatthe effects of psychological equality remain robust over longperiods of time.

Study context

We used data from the Fédération Internationale de FootballAssociation (FIFA) on the performance of national football teamsto test our hypotheses. Sports data provide an ideal context for orga-nizational research because variables of interests are measured withgreat precision and involve highly motivated participants (Goff &Tollison, 1990). Sports data has produced a considerable amountof objective information that enables hypothesis testing in a rela-tively controlled field environment (Wolfe et al., 2005). Indeed,sports data is increasingly used as a context to study psychologicalphenomena in teams and organizations (e.g. Halevy, Chou,Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2012; Swaab, Schaerer, Anicich, Ronay, &Galinsky, in press). To date however, sports data has not been usedto test how organizations can optimize their talent pool.

The international football arena is an ideal setting to examinethe impact of cultural differences on talent and organizational per-formance. Similar to studying teams and talent embedded in anorganizational culture, national football teams are composed ofplayers with similar national cultural backgrounds (unlike clubteams that recruit players from different national cultures). Thus,our focus on cross-national differences in egalitarianism, talentlevels, and national team performance enables us to make infer-ences about the impact of national culture on talent developmentand team performance within organizations.

Method

Independent variables

Institutional equalityInstitutional equality was assessed in two ways. First, we used

the Civil Liberties Index published by the Freedom House (free-domhouse.org, 2009). This index is composed of four subcatego-ries, each measured using multiple items related to institutionalequality: freedoms of expression and belief (four items, e.g. ‘‘Arereligious institutions and communities free to practice their faith andexpress themselves in public and private?’’), associational and organi-zational rights (three items, e.g. ‘‘Is there freedom of assembly, dem-onstration, and open public discussion?’’), rule of law (four items, e.g.‘‘Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of varioussegments of the population?’’), and personal autonomy withoutinterference from the state (four items, e.g. ‘‘Is there equality ofopportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?’’). The mea-sure assigns a numerical rating for each measure and 195 countriesand 14 territories ranging from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7(lowest degree of freedom). The index is developed annually basedon a research and ratings process using a broad range of sourcesof information (Gastil, 1991, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology#.UxWOcV577Z0). We multipliedthe measure by �1 so that higher scores indicated greaterinstitutional equality.


Second, we used the Voice and Accountability Index from theWorld Governance Indicators published by the World Bank as anadditional measure of institutional equality (Kaufmann, Kraay, &Zoido-Lobaton, 1999a; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999b,http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq-12,2009). This measure captures perceptions of the extent to whichcitizens in over 200 countries are able to participate equally inselecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, free-dom of association, and a free media (e.g. human rights, civil liber-ties, favoritism in decisions of government officials). The measureassigns a numerical rating for each country ranging from �2.5(i.e. lowest equality) to +2.5 (i.e. greatest equality). The index isestimated annually employing 31 different qualitative indicatorsfrom 13 reputable sources, which should provide more precisemeasures of institutional equalities than any individual indicatorby itself.

The Civil Liberties Index and the Voice and Accountability Indexare both reliable over time (correlations between the annual mea-sures in the 10 years preceding our measure exceed r’s P .91). Bothmeasures have been validated through their wide use as proxies ofinstitutional equality in other research (see for example Barro,1999; Gelfand et al., 2011; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoldo-Lobaton,1999; Isham, Kaufmann, & Pritchett, 1997 for the Civil LibertiesIndex and Fredriksson, Neumayer, & Ujhelyi, 2007; Globerman &Shapiro, 2002; Jakopin & Klein, 2011; Kock & Gaskins, 2014;Rothstein, 2011; Sung, 2012 for the Voice and AccountabilityIndex) and strongly overlap with related concepts such as the UNGender Empowerment measure (r’s P .76, p < .001) and the UNGross Enrollment Ratio for Education (r’s P .53, p < .001). Together,these findings suggest that these indices are valid and accuratelycapture important aspects of institutional equality differencesamong nations.

Because both Civil Liberties Index and the Voice and Account-ability Index capture equality in rights and opportunities and arestrongly correlated (r = .97, p < .001), we standardized both mea-sures using a z-transformation and combined them into one mea-sure of institutional equality. Using each institutional equalitymeasure separately in the analyses replicates the results reportedbelow.

Psychological equalityOur measure of psychological equality was taken from the Sch-

wartz Value Survey (SVS). This survey produces country levelscores based on aggregated individual responses from more than70,000 people in 75 different countries (Schwartz & Boehnke,2004) and reflects 6 items measuring egalitarianism on a 7-pointscale: (1) Equality (equal opportunity for all), (2) Social justice(correcting injustice, care for the weak), (3) Loyal (faithful to myfriends, group), (4) Honest (genuine, sincere), (5) Helpful (workingfor the welfare of others), and (6) Responsible (dependable, reli-able). Because the aggregated country scores represent ‘‘centraltendencies of the normative system’’, this measure reflects theprevalence of egalitarian norms and values (Schwartz, 2014).

We selected the SVS measure of egalitarianism rather thanother measures because it is theory driven, covers a very widerange of cultures, and is based on samples that were matched oncritical characteristics. For example, one of the samples studiedwere urban school teachers teaching the full range of subjects ingrades 3–12 in the most common type of school systems in eachof nation. Although Schwartz himself acknowledges that no singlegroup represents a culture, teachers play an explicit role in valuesocialization and are presumably key carriers of culture in mostsocieties (Schwartz, 1994). Thus, the data sampling and matchingmake this measure a relatively pure representation of national dif-ferences in equality norms and values.


http://freedomhouse.org

http://freedomhouse.org

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology#.UxWOcV577Z0

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology#.UxWOcV577Z0

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq-12




We also selected the SVS measure of egalitarianism because it isreliable and valid. The measure is reliable because the items areinternally consistent in Schwartz’s own research using differentsamples (e.g. college students, Schwartz, 1994, 1999) as well asin research using managerial samples (e.g. Brett & Okumura,1998). The measure is also widely accepted as a measure of egali-tarianism (Morris, 2014; Wan & Lu, 2014; Yamagishi, 2014) andstrongly overlaps with related concepts like Social Dominance Ori-entation (�.79, p < .05; Fischer, Hanke, & Sibley, 2012), GLOBE’sgender egalitarian values (r = .67, p < .001), GLOBE’s power dis-tance values (r = �.43, p < .01) and Hofstede’s power distance index(r = �.45, p < .001). Together, these findings lend legitimacy to theclaim that the SVS egalitarianism scale is reliable and valid andaccurately captures important aspects of cultural differencesamong nations in psychological equality.

Dependent variable

Data from the FIFA rankings that report on the performance of199 national teams between 2006 and 2011 was used because FIFAissued a new and more precise ranking system beginning in 2006.Rankings are calculated using the performance of a given country’steam in all international matches during the preceding four years.The procedure awards points on the basis of the games’ results(win, draw, defeat), importance of the match (friendly, qualifier,regional cup, World Cup), strength of the opponents, regionalstrength, period (gradual decline in importance of results), andthe number of matches considered per year (minimum of 5matches). More points indicate better performance. Performancewas measured using the average points between 2006 and 2011because rankings remained largely unchanged during this period(r’s > .86, p < .001). Analyses for each individual year replicatedthe results reported below.

Mediator: Top talent

Top talent level was coded by taking the percentage of playerswithin each national team that were contracted by one of theworld’s elite club teams. To assess elite club team status, we usedthe Deloitte Football Money League ranking of clubs by revenuegenerated from football activity (Houlihan et al., 2010). This is agood indicator of top talent because the clubs that employ theseplayers are active in the world’s best divisions, pay the highestwages, and are widely perceived as the most prestigious (seeAppendix for the list of teams included in the ranking).

Based on the rankings for 2008–2009 and 2009–2010, and asample of more than 6000 professional players, a top talent ratiowas computed for each national team roster during the 2010World Cup qualification phase by dividing the number of playersin each country’s national team active in one of these elite clubsby the total number of players selected to represent the nationalteam. We only included players that were selected twice or moreto represent the national team during the qualification phase.Although the analyses reported reveal similar results with differentcut-off points (i.e. including all players selected, including playersselected at least once), we chose to include players who wereselected twice or more to get a better measure of the team’s regu-lar composition. Higher values indicated a greater ratio of top tal-ent. Player data is available at www.national-football-teams.com.

Control variables

We collected a set of country controls that could potentiallyexplain (a) the effects of institutional and psychological equalityor (b) have direct effects of football talent and performance.


We wanted to show that our hypothesized model involvinginstitutional and psychological equality occurred over and aboveany effects of economic inequality. Countries differ in their levelof economic inequality (i.e., income differences between citizens).Greater economic equality is typically achieved by smaller differ-ences in pay before tax (as in Japan) or by redistribution throughtaxes and benefits (as in Sweden) and has been associated withgreater trust among citizens, greater social mobility (Wilkinson &Pickett, 2009) and better health outcomes (Kondo, Sembajwe,van Dam, Subramanian, & Yamagata, 2009). However, measuresof income equality do not necessarily translate from more equalaccess to more economic opportunities (Goldthorpe, 2009). Givenour theory works through equal opportunity instead of equal dis-tribution of income per se, we did not expect economic inequalityto predict performance. We measured economic equality using theGini coefficient prepared by the CIA World Factbook of 2009. TheGini coefficient is a measure of income inequality within a countryand ranges between 0 and 100. Low Gini coefficients indicate amore equal wealth distribution, with 0 corresponding to completeequality, whereas higher Gini coefficients indicate more unequaldistribution, with 100 corresponding to complete inequality. Ginicoefficients were standardized and multiplied by �1 so that higherscores indicated greater equality in income distribution.

Prior research demonstrated that greater national wealth ispositively associated with football performance (Hoffmann, Ging,& Ramasamy, 2002; Kuper & Szymanski, 2009), presumablybecause it provides better opportunities to develop football talent.In addition, it has been shown that a country’s population size islinked with football success (Hoffmann et al., 2002), likely becausemore populous countries can draw on a greater pool of talent andtherefore be more successful than less populous countries. Thus, todemonstrate that egalitarianism is associated with football perfor-mance beyond economic and demographic variables, we controlledfor GDP per capita and population size as our primary control vari-ables. Consistent with past research, we used the log of these twovariables (Bernard & Busse, 2003). Data for 2009 was obtainedfrom the World Bank website.

To confirm that findings were not affected by a country’s polit-ical stability that could limit peoples’ opportunities, we collectedthe ‘‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’’ index from theWorldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank. Basedon data from seven representative sources and twenty measures,this index captures perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-ment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional orviolent means, including politically-motivated violence and terror-ism (e.g. armed conflict, terrorist threats, frequency of political kill-ings). We used the percentile rank that assigned each country ascore varying between 0 (most unstable) and 100 (most stable).

Equality has been associated with better health outcomes suchas higher life expectancy and lower rates of infant mortality, AIDS,and depression (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). In order to confirmthat our findings were not affected by health outcomes, we alsocontrolled for life expectancy as measured in years. The measurewas obtained from the World Bank database for 2009.

Since previous work has found that an average annual temper-ature in the region of 14 �C is associated with the best sporting per-formance (Hoffmann et al., 2002), we also controlled for climate.Climate was measured using the squared distance between theaverage annual Celsius temperature in a country’s capital cityand the 14 �C mark because deviations in either direction hampersports performance (Hoffmann et al., 2002).

Because higher talent levels and better performance of nationalteams could simply be explained by the total amount of resourcescountries invests in football, we included the total number of foot-ball trainers and support staff as measured by the FIFA big countstudy (FIFA, 2007). The FIFA study surveyed all their member


http://www.national-football-teams.com




associations to provide FIFA with the number of trainers and staffmembers that came under the association’s jurisdiction. Becausethis measure is strongly affected by population size, we used thelog of this variable.

Coaches of national football teams do not have to be from thecountry they are coaching (e.g., Columbia’s current head coach isfrom Argentina, the USA’s head coach is from Germany etc.).Although this does not mean that these coaches are not influencedby the prevailing norms and values of their adopted country, acoach who does not share the nationality of the country they coachmay make for a less direct pathway between institutional and psy-chological equality and the selection of talent for the nationalteam. To confirm that our findings would not be affected by coachnationality, we controlled for whether the national team coachduring the 2008–2010 World Cup qualification period shared thesame nationality as its players (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0).When countries had multiple coaches during the qualification per-iod because they fired an underperforming coach or the coach ter-minated his contract himself, we used the percentage of samenationality coaches during this period.

Finally, it is possible that some countries simply do better atdeveloping top talent levels and performance because they havea longer history of playing football. To confirm that our findingswould not be affected by the length of a country’s football history,we controlled for the year in which each country founded theirnational football federation (www.national-football-teams.com).

Data analysis

Because our dependent variables national team performanceand top talent were based on count data and then averaged, weused a mixed regression method (Tweedie with log link) to analyzedata (Little & Rubin, 1987). Wald Chi-Square was used to testhypotheses.

We also examined the impact of outliers using leveragabilitystatistics (Hat values). The leverage value measures how far anobservation is from the others in terms of the levels of the indepen-dent variable and ranges in value from 0 to 1. Observations withleverage values larger than 2(k + 1)/n (with k being the numberof predictors and n the sample size) are considered to be poten-tially influential outliers (Chatterjee & Hadi, 1988).

1 The impact of institutional equality on performance remained marginallysignificant (B = .210, SE = .125, p = .093) when we only included the 69 observationsin Models 4–7.

2 The impact of institutional equality on top talent remained marginally significant(B = .652, SE = .372, p = .080) when we only included the 69 observations in Models4–7.

3 When we only included the 69 observations in Models 4–7 and entered bothinstitutional equality and top talent as simultaneous predictors of performance, theeffect of institutional equality remained nonsignificant (B = .055, SE = .110, p = .615)whereas top talent remained a significant predictor (B = 1.292, SE = .238, p < .001).

4 When we excluded control variables but only included the 69 observations inModels 4–7 and entered both institutional equality and top talent as simultaneouspredictors of performance, the effect of institutional equality remained nonsignificant(B = .107, SE = .066, p = .104) whereas top talent remained a significant predictor(B = 1.490, SE = .210, p < .001).

Results

Table 1 presents the univariate descriptive statistics and corre-lations between variables. Top talent and national team perfor-mance were highly correlated with the number of trainers andstaff and football history, indicating that countries that invest morein football and/or have a longer football tradition, also have moretop talent and better performing national teams. Top talent andnational team performance were also highly correlated with popu-lation size, GDP per capita, climate, and life expectancy, indicatingthat countries that were more populous, richer, had less extremeclimates, and better health outcomes also had higher talent levelsand better performing national teams. Table 1 further reveals thatcountries scoring higher on the institutional equality index alsoendorsed psychological equality more, and that institutional equal-ity was positively associated with both talent and national teamperformance. Likewise, countries that endorsed psychologicalequality more had higher talent levels and better performingnational teams.

To test our multi-stage model, we first examine the effect ofinstitutional equality on top talent and national team performanceand whether top talent mediates this relationship. Second, weexamine the effect of psychological equality on top talent and


national team performance and whether top talent mediates thisrelationship. Third, we examine the simultaneous impact of insti-tutional equality and psychological equality and test whether psy-chological equality mediates the effects of institutional equality ontalent levels and national team performance. Fourth, we testwhether psychological equality and top talent mediate the effectof institutional equality on national team performance in a serialfashion. We end with longitudinal analyses of psychological equal-ity at Time 1 on performance at Time 2 more than a decade later.

The impact of egalitarianism on national team performance and toptalent

Tables 2 and 3 report the results of regression models testingthe impact of institutional equality and psychological equality onnational team performance and top talent levels. We first exam-ined the effects of our control variables in this regression model.Log GDP per capita and Log trainers and staff were positively asso-ciated with top talent levels and national team performance(Model 1, Tables 2 and 3). Countries with a longer football historyalso had higher top talent levels (Model 1, Table 3).

Institutional equality

The relationship between institutional equality and nationalteam performance was positive and statistically significant (Model2, Table 2). The impact of institutional equality on performanceremained significant after removing seven countries with highleverage values (i.e., outliers) from the analyses (B = .214,SE = .099, p = .032).1

Institutional equality was also significantly and positively asso-ciated with the level of top talent, over and above the control vari-ables (Model 2, Table 3). The impact of institutional equality on thelevel of top talent remained significant after nine countries withhigh leverage values were omitted from the analyses (B = .835,SE = .371, p = .024).2 Thus, top talent levels and national team per-formance were higher in countries that institutionalized greaterequality between citizens.

Mediation by top talentWhen both institutional equality and top talent were entered as

simultaneous predictors of performance, the effect of institutionalequality became nonsignificant whereas top talent remained a sig-nificant predictor (Model 3, Table 2).3 Similar effects were foundwhen control variables were omitted such that the effect of institu-tional equality remained nonsignificant (B = .030, SE = .051, p = .560)whereas top talent remained a significant predictor (B = 2.512,SE = .234, p < .001).4 To test the significance of the indirect effect(i.e., the path through the mediator), we used the bootstrapping pro-cedure (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) which produces a 95% confidenceinterval for the indirect effect; when zero is not included in the95% confidence interval, significant mediation is said to be present.


http://www.national-football-teams.com



Table 1Correlations between variables.

No. Types Variables Obs. Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 IV Institutionalequality

189 .022 1.00

2 IV Psychologicalequality

75 4.68 .27 .51**

3 Control GINI 130 �.001 1.00 .30** .154 Control Log GDP per

capita195 8.97 1.32 .58* .36** .42**

5 Control Log population 194 15.32 2.31 �.33** �.12 �.04 �.24**

6 Control Life expectancy 182 69.51 10.06 .53** .40** .46** .79** �.137 Control Political

stability191 48.19 28.16 .68** .33** .33** .68** �.51** .50**

8 Control Climate 189 90.57 65.04 �.12 �.06 �.12 �.17* �.20** �.21** �.029 Control Log trainers/

staff197 7.79 2.12 .10 .36** .16* .08 .73** .19** .11 �.26**

10 Control Coachnationality

194 .55 .49 .12 .10 .14 .07 .05 .17** �.04 �.09 .06

11 Control Football history 199 1942.01 29.94 �.34** �.40** �.16 �.35** �.33** �.42** �.16* .19* �.47** �.16*

12 MED Top talent 199 .07 .15 .29** .55** .16 .22** .36** .21** .09 �.24** .48** .12 �.41**

13 DV National teamperformance

199 398.84 331.98 .25** .53** .20* .29** .50** .29** .06 �.29** .67** .11 �.48** .78**

Note: IV = independent variable, MED = mediator, DV = dependent variable.* p 6 .05.

** p 6 .010.

Table 2The impact of institutional equality, psychological equality, and top talent on national team performance.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

Institutional equality .171* .081 .052 .023(.125) (.082) (.130) (.117)

Psychological equality .726** .206 .685** .189(.225) (.231) (.247) (.245)

Top talent 1.422** 1.201** 1.198**

(.236) (.266) (.266)GINI .039 .041 .013 .079 .043 .077 .042

(.056) (.055) (.050) (.062) (.056) (.063) (.056)Log GDP per capita .220** .191* .155* .217* .174 .204 .169

(.082) (.083) (.076) (.103) (.093) (.109) (.098)Log population .038 .055 .001 .064 �.010 .064 �.010

(.045) (.045) (.043) (.052) (.050) (.052) (.050)Life expectancy �.014 �.014 �.007 �.024 �.014 �.024 �.014

(.009) (.009) (.008) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.012)Political stability �.002 �.005 �.003 �.001 �.001 �.002 �.002

(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)Climate �.001 �.001 .000 �.001 .000 �.001 .000

(.001) (.001) (.001) (.007) (.001) (.001) (.001)Log trainers/staff .131** .115** .095** .076 .080* .077 .081*

(.036) (.037) (.034) (.041) (.037) (.041) (.037)Coach nationality .006 �.028 �.043 .136 .124 .134 .123

(.102) (.102) (.092) (.115) (.103) (.115) (.103)Football history �.004 �.003 .000 �.001 .002 �.001 .002

(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)Intercept 10.378 9.109* 4.153 2.267 .871 2.784 1.100

(4.384) (4.373) (4.013) (5.568) (4.881) (5.688) (4.989)Observations 122 122 122 69 69 69 69Log-likelihood �839.15 �837.39 �822.03 �479.51 �470.71 �479.43 �470.68Likelihood ratio v2 67.25** 70.78** 101.50** 42.46** 60.06** 42.613** 60.10**

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Model 3 shows top talent mediates the effect of institutional equality on performance. Model 5 shows top talent mediatesthe effect of psychological equality on performance. Model 6 shows that psychological equality mediates the effects of institutional equality on performance. Model 7 showsthat top talent mediates the effects of institutional equality and psychological equality on performance.

* p 6 .05.** p 6 .010.


Continuing to include for the full set of control variables, the result of5,000 resamples demonstrated that top talent mediated the effect ofinstitutional equality on performance (CI Low = 4.89; CIHigh = 111.05). Similar effects were found when control variableswere omitted (CI Low = 60.10; CI High = 176.62). These analyses sug-gest that countries with greater institutional equality had better per-forming national teams because they had higher talent levels.


Psychological equality

The relationship between psychological equality and nationalteam performance was positive and significant (Model 4,Table 2). This relationship remained significant after one countrywith a high leverage value was omitted (B = .856, SE = .227,p < .001).




Table 3The impact of institutional equality and psychological equality on top talent.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Institutional equality .704* .194(.311) (.389)

Psychological equality 2.045** 1.917**

(.619) (.676)GINI .222 .213 .245 .235

(.179) (.175) (.181) (.182)Log GDP per capita .508* .405 .325 .297

(.261) (.267) (.305) (.322)Log population .174 .207 .224 .221

(.138) (.136) (.147) (.146)Life expectancy �.066 �.070* �.070* �.072*

(.029) (.029) (.036) (.036)Political stability �.003 �.014 �.002 �.001

(.008) (.009) (.009) (.010)Climate �.002 �.002 �.003 �.003

(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)Log trainers/staff .268* .232* .141 .145

(.110) (.111) (.113) (.113)Coach nationality .167 .083 .174 .185

(.316) (.313) (.324) (.324)Football history �.016* �.013* �.010 �.010

(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)Intercept 22.451 19.027 4.152 5.583

(14.142) (13.966) (16.265) (16.452)Observations 122 122 69 69Log-likelihood �26.44 �24.137 �1.32 �1.21Likelihood ratio v2 47.46** 52.08** 41.23** 41.46**

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Model 4 shows that psychologyequality mediates the effect of institutional equality on top talent.

* p 6 .05.** p 6 .010.


The relationship between psychological equality and top talentlevels was also positive and significant (Model 3, Table 3). In addi-tion, this relationship remained significant after five countries withhigh leverage values were omitted (B = 2.244, SE = .624, p < .001).Thus, top talent levels and national team performance were higherin countries that endorsed psychological equality more strongly.

Mediation by top talentWhen both psychological equality and top talent were entered

as simultaneous predictors of performance, the effect of psycholog-ical equality became nonsignificant whereas top talent remained asignificant predictor of performance (Model 5, Table 2). Similareffects were found when control variables were omitted such thatthe effect of psychological equality remained nonsignificant(B = .317, SE = .229, p = .166) whereas top talent remained a signif-icant predictor (B = 1.482, SE = .252, p < .001). We then tested thesignificance of the indirect effect and found that top talent medi-ated the effect of psychological equality on performance (CILow = 208.50; CI High = 678.81). Similar effects were found whencontrol variables were omitted (CI Low = 328.15; CI High = 784.97).These analyses suggest that countries with stronger psychologicalequality had better performing national teams because they hadhigher talent levels.

Psychological equality as a mediator of institutional equality

To examine whether the effect of institutional equality on toptalent levels and national team performance were mediated bypsychological equality, we ran additional analyses. When bothequality measures were entered as simultaneous predictors oftop talent levels, the effect of institutional equality became nonsig-nificant whereas psychological equality remained a significant pre-dictor of talent (Model 4, Table 3). Similar effects were found whencontrol variables were omitted such that the effect of institutional


equality remained nonsignificant (B = .320, SE = .232, p = .167)whereas psychological remained a significant predictor(B = 2.450, SE = .670, p < .001). We then tested the significance ofthe indirect effect and found that psychological equality mediatedthe effect of institutional equality on top talent (CI Low = .03; CIHigh = .15). Similar effects were found when control variables wereomitted (CI Low = .03; CI High = .10). Thus, countries with greaterinstitutional equality had higher talent levels because theyendorsed psychological equality more strongly.

Similar effects were found for the effects on national team per-formance. When institutional equality and psychological equalitywere entered as simultaneous predictors of performance, psycho-logical equality remained significant but institutional equality didnot (Model 6, Table 2). Again, similar effects were found when con-trol variables were omitted such that the effect of institutionalequality remained nonsignificant (B = .129, SE = .082, p = .115)whereas psychological remained a significant predictor (B = .836,SE = .256, p = .001). The indirect effect was also significant (CILow = 34.77; CI High = 214.47). Similar effects were found whencontrol variables were omitted (CI Low = 38.22; CI High = 160.99).Thus, countries with greater institutional equality also had betterperforming national teams because they endorsed psychologicalequality more strongly.

The separate and combined analyses of institutional equalityand psychological equality support our prediction that countrieswith greater institutional equality have higher talent levels andbetter performing national teams because they come to psycholog-ically endorse equality more. This finding is consistent with recentfindings showing that cross-cultural differences in egalitarianismfind their origins in institutional differences (Siegel et al., 2011).The finding that psychological equality had stronger effects on tal-ent and performance than institutional equality is also consistentwith social psychological research showing that endorsing egali-tarianism creates a more supportive environment that facilitatesthe development of talent (Plaut et al., 2009).

To test the full multi-stage model, we ran additional analyses.We entered institutional equality, psychological equality, and toptalent levels as predictors of performance, and found that onlytop talent remained significantly associated with national teamperformance (Model 7, Table 2). Similar effects were found whencontrol variables were omitted such that the effect of institutionalequality and psychological equality remained nonsignificant(B = .095, SE = .071, p = .182 and B = .180, SE = .247, p = .467, respec-tively) whereas top talent remained a significant predictor(B = 1.451, SE = .250, p < .001). To test the indirect effect of institu-tional equality on performance through psychological equality firstand then top talent levels, we used the ‘‘process’’ macro providedby Hayes (2013) that allows estimating direct and indirect effectsin multiple mediation models with mediators operating in serial.All control variables were included. The analyses showed a signif-icant indirect effect of institutional equality on performancethrough psychological equality and top talent levels when operat-ing serially (CI Low = 29.83; CI High: 180.02). Similar effects werefound when control variables were omitted (CI Low = 30.16; CIHigh = 177.86).

These analyses support our multi-stage model of egalitarianismand national team performance. We found that institutional equal-ity predicts national team performance because it first encouragesstronger endorsement of psychological equality, which then facili-tates the level of top talent (Fig. 1).

The impact of psychological equality on changes in national teamperformance over time

Although the psychological equality measures were taken priorto performance and talent measures, the aforementioned findings




National Team Performance

PsychologicalEquality

InstitutionalEquality

Fig. 1. The effect of institutional equality on national team performance was first mediated by psychological equality and then by top talent levels. Standardized coefficientsare presented; numbers in parentheses are the coefficients obtained when all predictors were entered simultaneously in the model; ns = not significant. *p 6 .05; **p 6 .010;

Fig. 2. Scatter plot of the correlation between psychological equality within acountry at T1 (1994–1997) and national team’s football performance at T2 (2009–2010).


do not answer whether psychological equality affects changes infootball performance over time. Therefore, we wanted to test thehypothesis that greater psychological equality can increase perfor-mance. If stronger psychological equality at Time 1 predicted anincrease in football performance more than a decade later, whilecontrolling for football performance at Time 1, this would suggestthat psychological equality enhances football performance. Thisapproach can provide evidence that psychological equality pre-cedes football performance, which is key to demonstrating causal-ity (Brandt, 2011; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

In this longitudinal analysis, we measured national team perfor-mance at Time 2 using the standardized mean FIFA ranking pointsfor the 2009–2010 World Cup qualification phase; this perfor-mance measure was significantly associated with psychologicalequality (Fig. 2). We then selected the period between 1994 and1997 for our Time 1 measure because the majority of the Schwartzdata collection took place during this period (Schwartz & Boehnke,2004). We excluded countries that were entirely based on data col-lection before or after this period; importantly, analyses using theentire psychological equality data collection revealed similarresults. Our T1 measure of performance was the standardizedmean FIFA ranking points during 1994–1997.5 T1 performancewas positively associated with psychological equality (B = 1.393,SE = .367, p < .001). Furthermore, we included the mean log GDPper capita, log population size, and life expectancy during 1994–1997. We used the 1996 political stability measure because thiswas the first year of measurement and no measurement took placein 1997. Because no specific data was available for the 1994–1997

5 1994 was also the first complete year for which monthly FIFA rankings wereavailable.


period for the number of football trainers and staff, economic equal-ity, climate, and football history, they were dropped from the analy-ses. Including the 2009 data for these control variables does notchange the significance of the results reported below.

Table 4 shows the results of the longitudinal analyses. We firstexamined the direct effects of all control variables on nationalteam performance at T2. The relationship between national teamperformance at T1 and T2 was positive and significant (Model 1,Table 4), showing that countries that did better between 1994and 1997 also did better during the 2010 World Cup qualificationphase.

National team performance at Time 2 was then regressed onnine variables—psychological equality at Time 1 and the full setof control variables (Model 2, Table 4). Across 47 countries, stron-ger psychological equality at Time 1 predicted higher football per-formance at T2 when controlling for the effects of footballperformance at Time 1. Similar effects were found when controlvariables were omitted such that stronger psychological equalitypredicted higher football performance (B = .924, SE = .339,p = .006) when controlling for the effects of football performanceat Time 1 (B = .838, SE = .116, p < .001). The impact of psychologicalequality at Time 1 on T2 performance was also significant after twocountries with high leverage values were omitted (B = .934,SE = .390, p = .017).

These findings show that stronger psychological equality pre-dicts increases in football performance over time. The relationshipbetween psychological equality at Time 1 and football performanceat Time 2 is impressive because football performance at Time 1was strongly related with psychological equality at Time 1 andfootball performance at Time 2.

This analysis shows that psychological equality predictedincreases in international football team performance over a 15-year period. These findings support our prediction that the effectsof psychological equality remain robust over time.

General discussion

The current analyses found that egalitarian countries hadgreater talent levels and better performing national football teams.We explored the effect that two different forms of egalitarianism –institutional and psychological equality – had on talent levels andnational team performance. Both institutional and psychologicalequality predicted top talent levels and performance, with talentmediating the effects of institutional equality and psychologicalequality on performance. In addition, psychological equality med-iated the effects of institutional equality on both top talent andperformance. Overall, we found evidence of serial mediation withthe effects of institutional equality mediated by psychologicalequality, which were in turn mediated by top talent (Fig. 1). Finally,we found that psychological equality predicted changes in footballperformance over time.

Importantly, these effects occurred even when controlling foreconomic and demographic factors, political stability, health out-comes, climate, the level of country investment in football,




Table 4The impact of psychological equality at Time 1 on national team performance at Time2.

Model 1 Model 2

Psychological equality 1.061**

(.384)Log GDP per capita T1 .003 �.097

(.059) (.144)Log Population T1 �.012 �.014

(.024) (.056)Life expectancy T1 .009 .030

(.007) (.020)Political Stability T1 �.001 �.006

(.002) (.004)Football history �.001 .001

(.002) (.004)Team Performance T1 .807** .857**

(.058) (.121)Intercept 1.321 �6.736

(3.590) (7.683)Observations 157 47Log-likelihood �120.50 �39.63Likelihood ratio v2 192.89** 57.48**

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.*p 6 .05.** p 6 .010.


whether the national team coach shared the same citizenship ashis players, and the length of a country’s football tradition. Theforces of equality appear to be a critical driver of talent levelsand ultimately performance.

Theoretical contributions

The current research makes a significant contribution to the lit-erature on talent development by demonstrating that the culturalcontext has important consequences for whether talent is discov-ered, developed, and realized. Although organizations struggle tocapitalize on their talent pool (and often direct their focus exter-nally to attract talent), our research suggests that organizationscan actively manage their cultures to develop their own talent poolby institutionalizing egalitarian practices.

Our results also contribute to the literature on the origins ofcross-national variation in norms and values by documenting thatsocial policies geared towards creating equal opportunities encour-ages the development of psychological equality. Recent work ineconomics and psychology has shown that cultural norms and val-ues find their origin in institutional differences between countriesgoing back more than a century (e.g. Gelfand et al., 2011; Siegelet al., 2011). The current finding that psychological equality med-iated the effect of institutional equality on talent levels and perfor-mance is consistent with this research. Prior research has shownthat once adopted, norms and values are hard to change and exerttheir influence over long periods of time (e.g., Guiso et al., 2006).The present research extends this work by showing that theseeffects hold in the domains of talent development and nationalteam performance.

The current work makes a significant contribution to the cross-cultural literature by demonstrating the effects of egalitarian nor-mative systems on talent and performance. The aggregated SVSscores represent ‘‘central tendencies of the normative system’’, atthe societal level (Schwartz, 2014) and tap into perceived equalitynorms (Morris, 2014; Wan & Lu, 2014; Wan et al., 2007; Yamagishi,2014; Zhou et al., 2009). Although the SVS scores were aggregatedto the level of the country and not directly based on the partici-pants in our sample (i.e. professional football players), they, at leastin part, represent what people who interacted with them view arethe norms for social relationships in their country.


It is important to note that the SVS measure of psychologicalequality captures both norms and values (Morris, 2014;Schwartz, 2014) and recent research shows that the correlationbetween the two is not perfect (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim,2009). Future research could further explore the relative signifi-cance of norms versus values and how each uniquely influencestalent and performance. It is possible that countries that endorsepsychological equality may increase the level of talent becausetheir citizens personally value equality. This view is consistentwith earlier research on culture that examined how personal val-ues, programmed by early socialization, shape peoples’ decisionsand organizational outcomes (Harrison & Huntington, 2000;Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, Neuyen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990;Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). In addition, psychological equalitymay represent a social norm, a belief about what a country’s cit-izens believe to be important. The norm of equality may thenincrease the level of talent because of people’s perceptions ofwhat they think others believe (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi,Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Wan et al., 2007). One way to capturewhether cultural norms and values have similar or differentialeffects on talent development and performance would be tomanipulate and measure them independently.

Our results leave unclear whether institutional equality influ-ences talent and performance more strongly through values versusnorms. Unfortunately, reliable instruments measuring equalityvalues versus norms separately for large sets of countries areunavailable. However, prior research has shown that the effectsof cultural values require alignment of personal values with socie-tal values (Li, Kwan, Liou, & Chiu, 2013; Zhang & Chiu, 2012). Incontrast, the effects of norms require intersubjective awareness(Chiu et al., 2010; Shteynberg et al., 2009; Wan, Torelli, & Chiu,2010). As a result, the effects of cultural values are more context-independent, whereas the effects of norms are more context-dependent (Fischer, 2006; Wan et al., 2007).

Morris and Leung (2010) discuss the tendency for Westernsto prioritize novelty in creativity but Easterners to prioritizeusefulness. Because an account of this cultural difference hastargeted norms, they propose that this cultural difference shouldarise more strongly in contexts that activate social norms. Totest this idea, Erez and Nouri (2010) had Israelis and Singapore-ans either work alone or in the presence of their peers. Theyfound that creative performance did not differ between thetwo cultures in the alone condition. However, in the peer condi-tion, Israelis produced a greater number of novel solutionswhereas Singaporeans produced more useful solutions. Asanother example of this approach, Anicich, Swaab, andGalinsky (2014) found that cultural differences predicted successin Himalayan mountain climbing expeditions, but only formono-cultural teams and not for solo climbers. In both of thesecases, cultural norms are likely activated only in the presence ofother group members.

In order to examine whether institutional equality affects talentand performance through values and/or norms, future researchcould assess the impact of institutional equality on a variety ofsports. If our results reflect an effect of cultural values, then thelink between institutional equality and talent should be robustacross various sports regardless of whether they are done individ-ually or in teams (e.g. individual sports like tennis swimming ver-sus team sports like basketball and football). However, if ourresults reflect an effect of cultural equality norms, then the effectsof institutional equality may be more pronounced in team sports.

Implications for practice

Our findings have important implications for decision-makersand organizations. First, they suggest that talent pools can be




6 Although the World Values Survey measures cultural attitudes across multipletime periods, it does not include a measure of psychological equality. Althoughseveral items measure gender egalitarianism, these items are not measured consis-tently across multiple data collection waves, making longitudinal analyses hard toapply.


utilized more effectively by implementing policies geared towardscreating more equal opportunities. Second, they suggest that orga-nizations and countries should create a climate of psychologicalegalitarianism by promoting psychological equality that helps thefull panoply of its talent capitalize on those opportunities andachieve their full potential. The finding that psychological equalitymediated the effects of institutional equality offers insights intohow various forms of egalitarianism may operate. It is likely thatinstitutional equality opens the doors for a greater pool of talentby providing more equal opportunities. Psychological equality,then, reinforces and amplifies these effects by cultivating a sup-portive environment that engenders a sense of self-efficacy for allorganizational members. Similar to the finding that organizationalsupport of multiculturalism predicts minority engagement (Plautet al., 2009), organizations that endorse psychological equalitymay increase the engagement, persistence, and motivation of itscitizens.

The strong link between egalitarianism and national teamperformance does not preclude non-egalitarian countries fromachieving high performance as long as these countries effec-tively invest in their talent pools. Indeed, close inspection ofFig. 2 shows a number of former Soviet Bloc countries (e.g. East-ern Bloc countries like Czech Republic and Romania and SovietRepublics like Russia and Ukraine) performing well in footballwhile scoring low on psychological equality. A likely explanationfor this finding is the way that talent pools have been managedin these countries: sports where it was possible to obtain inter-national fame (e.g. football) were highly subsidized and coaches/teachers were encouraged to look out for young talent (Kontos& Feltz, 2008). Indeed, when we coded each country’s affiliation(1 = Soviet Bloc, 0 = Not Soviet Bloc) and added Soviet Bloc affil-iation as a variable in the models testing both institutionalequality and psychological equality (i.e. similar to the Model6, Table 2 and the Model 4, Table 3), former Soviet Bloc affilia-tion increased top talent levels (B = 1.867, SE = .482, p < .001)and national team performance (B = .566, SE = .164, p < .001).Importantly, the effects of psychological equality remained sig-nificant even when controlling for this Soviet bloc effect: thelinear effect of psychological equality remained significant inboth models, B = 4.004, SE = .793, p < .001 for top talent andB = 1.259, SE = .280, p < .001 for performance. These findings sug-gest that countries that do not create institutional or psycholog-ical equality can also achieve athletic excellence by increasingthe quality of the talent pool through direct governmentinvestment.

Limitations and future research

The current research has limitations that are important toaddress in future research. For example, because we analyzedarchival measures for institutional and psychological equality aswell as talent levels and performance, a more precise test of theproposed multi-stage model would include experimental researchthat manipulates psychological equality and norms to provideinsight into the processes that underlie the link between egalitar-ianism, talent levels, and performance.

Because we examined the impact of egalitarianism on foot-ball performance, it remains unclear if and how the presentfindings extend beyond the football and the sports domain. Apossible reason for why the effects of egalitarianism may beparticularly strong in football is precisely because it is the mostpopular activity worldwide, both in terms of active players andin terms of spectators (FIFA, 2007). This means that countriesthat select football talent have access to a greater and morediverse set of motivated people compared to when they selecta team of polo players. In addition, football is an extremely


egalitarian sport to participate in because it requires littleequipment; one only needs a ball, pitch and some other playerswhereas practicing polo may require many resources (e.g.horses, equipment). Future research should further explorewhether the effects of egalitarianism are contingent upon theavailability of a large and motivated talent pool and/or the levelof investment required.

We believe the current findings have important implicationsoutside of the sports arena and in more traditional organizationalforms. The work by Plaut et al. (2009) that multicultural valuesincreased the engagement of its minority employees suggests thatpsychological equality will matter not only on the playing field.Furthermore, organizational practices designed to be egalitarianwill likely lead to and be reinforced by organizational norms thatencourage equality.

Football has recently suffered from match-fixing scandals.These events suggest that our measure of national team perfor-mance may not have been perfect. However, it appears that mostof this match-fixing happened in games between clubs or non-competitive games between (lower ranked) national teams andthus yielded fewer ranking points. Moreover, we believe that con-cerns about match-fixing are also offset by the inclusion of our toptalent measure because it is very unlikely that players are con-tracted by an elite club based on match-fixing.

Although the mediation of institutional equality by psychologi-cal equality suggests that institutional differences form the foun-dation for psychological forms of egalitarianism to emerge, wealso suspect that the relationship between institutional and psy-chological equality is reciprocal and mutually reinforcing (see alsoGelfand et al., 2011; Schwartz, 2014 and Tabellini, 2008). That is,countries that endorse equality more strongly will be more likelyto also create more equality through its institutions. Indeed,Brandt (2011) found that sexist attitudes at Time 1 predicted gen-der equality at Time 2 across 57 countries. Likewise, Tabellini(2008) showed that, over time, cultural values are strongly corre-lated with the current functioning of government institutions. Itis clear that both institutional and psychological equality playimportant independent and reciprocal effects on talent develop-ment and performance. Future research should further investigatethis by examining the impact of institutional equality at Time 1 onpsychological equality at Time 2, controlling for psychologicalequality at Time 1. This is an interesting question to address in fol-low-up research because unfortunately psychological equality hasnot been documented systematically across multiple timeperiods.6

Conclusion

As teams, organizations, and societies need highly skilled talentto stay competitive, they can benefit from managing their talentpools more effectively. Combining insights from the cross-culturaland organizational literatures, we proposed that for organizationsto capitalize on their talent pools, they need to create cultures thatnot only provide more equal opportunities but also lead people topsychologically endorse equality. Our results demonstrate thatinstitutional and psychological forces that help produce a largerand better pool of talent can help make nations, companies, andteams stronger.





Appendix

Elite clubs included in top talent measure ranked by revenue.

Ppd

Rank

lease citesychologx.doi.org

Club

this article in press as: Sical equality predicts tale/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05

Revenue (€ million)

waab, R. I., & Galinsky, A.nt levels and the perform.002

Country

1.
Real Madrid 438.6 Spain 2. Barcelona 398.1 Spain 3. Manchester United 349.8 England 4. Bayern Munich 323.0 Germany 5. Arsenal 274.1 England 6. Chelsea 255.9 England 7. Milan 235.8 Italy 8. Liverpool 225.3 England 9. Internazionale 224.8 Italy
10.
Juventus 205.0 Italy 11. Manchester City 152.8 England 12. Tottenham Hotspur 146.3 England 13. Hamburg 146.2 Germany 14. Lyon 146.1 France 15. Marseille 141.1 France 16. Schalke 139.8 Germany 17. Atlético Madrid 124.5 Spain 18. Roma 122.7 Italy 19. Stuttgart 114.8 Germany 20. Aston Villa 109.4 England 21. Fiorentina 106.4 Italy 22. Borussia Dortmund 105.2 Germany 23. Bordeaux 102.8 France 24. Newcastle Uniteda 101.0 England 25. Sevilla 99.6 Spain 26. Valencia 99.3 Spain 27. Benfica 98.2 Portugal 28. Everton 96.6 England 29. Werder Bremen 96.5 Germany 30. Napoli 95.1 Italy 31. Fulham 94.2 England 32. West Ham United 87.6 England
a Only included in 2008–2009 ranking.

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