ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE REPORT Mapping of Structural Obstacles to Capacity Building of the

Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and the Afghanistan Geological Survey

IQC NUMBER: AID-306-I-00-12-00544 CONTRACT NUMBER: AID-306-TO-13-00003 23 July 2013

The rocks and fine minerals on display in the AGS Geological Museum.

This confidential document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by ECC Water & Power LLC.

CONFIDENTIAL – This document is not for general distribution as it contains sensitive information and is the property of the USAID.

DISCLAIMER

The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Table of Contents 1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...................................................................... 3 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 4

2.1 Background ........................................................................................................... 4 2.2 Main Findings ....................................................................................................... 4

3 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Technical Approach .............................................................................................. 5

4 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ............................................................................ 6 4.1 Ministry Organizational Structure ........................................................................ 6

4.1.1 Rationalization of Ministry ‘Authorities’ ........................................................... 6 4.1.2 Communication with Provincial Offices of the Ministry .................................... 7 4.1.3 Place of the Gender Unit in the Structure ........................................................... 7 4.1.4 Direct Management of the AGS by the Minister ................................................ 7

4.2 Ministry Buildings ................................................................................................ 8 4.3 Ministry Information Technology ........................................................................ 8 4.4 AGS Organizational Structure .............................................................................. 9 4.5 AGS Buildings .................................................................................................... 10

4.5.1 Overall comment ............................................................................................... 10 4.5.2 Easy access for disabled workers ...................................................................... 10

5 CAPACITY OF MINISTRY MANAGEMENT ......................................................... 11 5.1 Capacity of Ministry Senior Management Team ............................................... 11 5.2 Capacity of Ministry 2nd and 3rd Tier Management ........................................... 11

6 CAPACITY OF AGS MANAGEMENT ..................................................................... 12 6.1 Capacity of AGS Senior Management Team ..................................................... 12 6.2 Capacity of AGS Technical and Administrative Staff ....................................... 12

7 STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF AGS TRAINING .......................................................... 13 7.1 AGS English Language Training ....................................................................... 13 7.2 AGS Computer Training .................................................................................... 14 7.3 AGS Field Training of Geologists ...................................................................... 15 7.4 AGS Field Training of Laboratory Technicians ................................................. 15 7.5 Under-capacity in Basic Remote Sensing .......................................................... 16 7.6 AGS Training in Specialised Remote Sensing ................................................... 16 7.7 Under-capacity in Geohazard Detection ............................................................. 17 7.8 Under-capacity in Science of Paleontology ........................................................ 17 7.9 Under-capacity in Analysis of Coal .................................................................... 18 7.10 Zero-capacity in Field Analysis of toxic Mercury .............................................. 18 7.11 Zero-capacity in Field Analysis of toxic Chromium-6 ....................................... 19 7.12 Zero-capacity in detection of toxic Erionite ....................................................... 19 7.13 Zero-capacity to detect Zeolite Minerals ............................................................ 20 7.14 Zero-capacity to conduct 3-D Ore Modeling ..................................................... 20

8 UNDER-CAPACITY DUE TO INTERVENTIONS .................................................. 21 8.1 Under-capacity from Friction between Donors .................................................. 21 8.2 Under-capacity from Failure to Train Procurement ........................................... 22 8.3 Under-capacity through failure to utilize and develop female professionals ..... 22 8.4 Under-capacity from lack of Equipment or Training ......................................... 23

9 AGS FAILURE TO LIFT PUBLIC AWARENESS ................................................... 24 9.1 Limitations of AGS Website .............................................................................. 24 9.2 Limitations of AGS Geological Museum ........................................................... 24 9.3 Limitations of Entrances and Conference Rooms .............................................. 24 9.4 Under-capacity in Drilling and Engineering ...................................................... 25

10 ANNEX – PHOTO ALBUM - AGS DRILLS ............................................................. 27

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1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGS Afghanistan Geological Survey

ASI Adam Smith International (DFiD contractor)

ASM Artisanal and small-scale mining

BGS British Geological Survey (DFiD contractor)

CBAGS Capacity Building of AGS Project (component of WB SDNRP)

CO Contracting Officer

COP Chief of Party COR Contracting Officer’s Representative

Cr Chromium

DFiD Department for International Development (UK government agency)

ECC Environmental and Chemical Corporation

EWP ECC Water & Power LLC

FLAG Flag International

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH [German Society for International Cooperation Ltd.]

GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH [German Agency for Technical Cooperation Ltd.]

H.E. His Excellency

IT Information Technology

MBA Masters in Business Administration degree qualification

MIDAS Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability

MoMP Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (formerly Ministry of Mines)

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

PMU Project Management Unit

SDNRP Sustainable Development of Natural Resources Project (WB-funded)|

SME Small and medium-sized enterprise

TO Task Order

TFSBO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations

UK United Kingdom

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD United States currency unit

USG United States Government

WB The World Bank

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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 Background

The purpose of the Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS) project is to provide technical support and assistance aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) and relevant private sector entities related to extractive industries and energy development, thereby complementing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) strategy.

The MIDAS task order contract was executed on 31 March 2013 between the USAID and ECC Water & Power LLC (EWP). EWP is a joint venture of Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC) and WorleyParsons Limited. ECC is the joint venture managing partner.

2.2 Main Findings

Some of the main findings: 1. The Senior Management of the Ministry is strong, dynamic and effective. 2. The General Management of the Ministry is relatively weak. 3. The Senior Management of the AGS is significantly less effective. 4. The AGS is not an arm’s length agency, but a Ministry unit with little autonomy. 5. The Ministry has expanded its operations and is now rationalising its ‘Authorities’. 6. The Ministry has grown rapidly and its buildings and site are now a constraint. 7. The Ministry IT Strategy is important and requires substantial funding. 8. The AGS lacks capacity to detect highly toxic minerals (e.g. erionite, cinnabar, native

mercury) and highly toxic trace elements associated with coal (e.g. uranium, arsenic, fluorine) and associated with chromite ore (e.g. hexavalent chromium).

9. Female staff at AGS are demoralized due to lack of gender sensitive career structure that enables women to advance. In particular where managers understand the social and family care role, and apply creative solutions to take into account female engineers need for field experience even when social norms tend to dictate against it.

10. There appears to have been limited attempts to apply civil service rules and regulations relating to quotas for persons with disabilities, and non-discrimination on the base of sex, ethnicity or other factors.

11. The AGS has zero capacity to produce 3-D ore models that are essential for the pipeline of occurrences>deposits>tenders>contracts.

12. The AGS has minimal drilling capacity to convert sufficient occurrences>deposits to sustain the pipeline, or to properly document deposits>tenders>contracts.

13. The AGS/MoMP lacks sufficient capacity to procure equipment, spare parts, training or consumables in order to maintain the smooth operations of AGS activities such as the AGS Laboratories or AGS drilling rigs.

14. A direct consequence of item 11 is that the challenge for MIDAS on-budget procurement is more daunting than previously assumed.

15. The AGS website is out-of-date, and is still parked inside the BGS website. 16. The AGS Museum and Foyers can raise the status of geologists and mine engineers,

inform the public on mining, be a launch-pad for tenders and a backdrop for signing contracts, train geologists and mine engineers and attract them to AGS careers.

17. The AGS engineering workshops merit re-equipping to maintain drills and trucks, be a training centre for mine engineers and be a mine awareness centre for local people.

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3 INTRODUCTION

3.1 Technical Approach

This report seeks to identify some of the critical structural obstacles to capacity building of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and the Afghanistan Geological Survey. In doing so, the report attempts wherever possible to present practical solutions whereby the obstacles may be eliminated or circumvented.

The study is intended to assist the Senior Management of the Ministry in identifying priorities for action as part of the Ministry’s Annual Plan, and to identify potential gaps that merit attention by the Ministry, MIDAS and other international donor projects.

Previous studies by international donors have tended to blur and generalize issues. Instead the present report seeks to reveal precise measures that need to be addressed in the short term in order to open pathways inside these organisations for rapid capacity building.

In doing so, our technical approach deliberately ignores the myriad of issues that are important but are peripheral to the core functions of these organizations, and we also focus on only on structural issues that can be addressed in the short-term.

The report presents 50 precise recommendations for action by the Ministry with the support of MIDAS or other international donors.

We are aware that our list of recommendations is incomplete but the list is long enough to illustrate the extraordinary diversity of challenges to capacity building in the Ministry and AGS, and the considerable benefits that will accrue if some or all of the recommendations are followed.

The report drills down to highlight particular individuals and units that we view as obstacles to capacity building. For this reason, the report is confidential to USAID as it recommends individuals for retraining and others for replacement.

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4 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE The organizational structure of the Ministry and AGS is dealt with in the following sections. Rather than discussing these organizations department-by-department, section-by-section, this report seeks to highlight specific obstacles to capacity building.

4.1 Ministry Organizational Structure

The structure of the Ministry is presented in the organizational chart below, taken from the Ministry website. The large size of the Ministry is clear; which is a strength and weakness.

4.1.1 Rationalization of Ministry ‘Authorities’

The large size gives the Ministry considerable ability to respond to the needs of the diverse extractive industry. But the continuing expansion of the Ministry is testing its functionality to the limits of efficiency and effectiveness. In this regard the most notable is the realization by the Ministry that it is no longer realistic to spawn a new ‘Authority’ for each large project, such as the Aynak Copper Project Authority, Hajigak Iron Ore Authority, Amu Darya Oil Authority and Sherberghan Gas Authority. As they increase in number, these ‘Authorities’ ultimately become unmanageable. The Ministry has begun to rationalize the ‘Authorities, starting by merging the Amu Darya Oil Authority and Sheberghan Gas Authority into the new Petroleum Authority. This renders makes the management more effective and creates a centre of excellence for investors, regulation, policy and staff retention.

Recommendation 1: Encourage the rationalization and merging of ‘Authorities’ into single commodity bodies able to justify national and international respect and support.

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4.1.2 Communication with Provincial Offices of the Ministry

A second feature of the Ministry is the recent creation of Ministry Provincial Directors across the country, beginning with provinces of high interest to the Ministry such as Logar and Bamiyan. This move is essential to help the Ministry encourage responsible mining in the provinces, not only large mining enterprises but also SMEs and ASM. To be effective, the Provincial Directors require considerable financial and material support. In particular, the Provincial Directors need high-speed internet communications with the Ministry and AGS, integrated with modern video-conferencing and distant-learning facilities. To better serve communities, women should be put in managerial or leading positions in the Provincial units.

Recommendation 2: Encourage the training, equipping and telecoms of Provincial Directors in order that they become integrated on a daily basis with the Ministry and AGS, and able to draw upon the full range of support services in order for the provinces and their communities to gain immediate public access to maps, documents, tenders and technical advice.

Recommendation 3

4.1.3 Place of the Gender Unit in the Structure

: Ensure the presence of female staff in provincial directorates at managerial and leading levels.

A third feature of the Ministry is that the positioning of the Gender Unit under the Directorate for Administration and Finance limits its role to one of internal human resource issues.

Recommendation 4

4.1.4 Direct Management of the AGS by the Minister

: In order to deal with the myriad of gender issues in the mining processes and to support best practice including in tendering, contracting, oversight, monitoring, and community liaison, it is recommended that either the Gender Unit is placed under the Policy and Programs Directorate, or a new post of National Gender Policy Advisor is created to work in tandem with the Director of Policy and Programs.

A fourth feature of the Ministry is that for decades the incumbent Minister has direct management of the Afghan Geological Survey as its President.

Direct management by The Minster is to the mutual advantage of Minister and AGS, and highlights the importance of the AGS as a national institution. For this reason it warrants the elevation in status of the AGS Directorate to attract the very best professional geologist in the country with a stature appropriate to attracting international investors, to lift the national status of geologists, and to give the highest level professional advice to H.E. The Minister.

Recommendation 5

Recommendation 6: as a matter of urgency, to create a stand-alone AGS website by transferring the AGS pages from the BGS website which has taken care of them for many years. This will raise the AGS status, enable swift revision of the out-of-date content, greatly increase the number of site visitors, and enable every visitor to be tracked.

: as a matter of urgency, implement measures to elevate the status and effectiveness of the AGS Directorate commensurate with the importance of the AGS to Afghan national development.

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4.2 Ministry Buildings

The Ministry has outgrown the space available in its original building, its annexes and on it’s headquarter site. The location of the headquarters makes it vulnerable to annexation by the space requirements of the immediately adjacent Presidential Palace.

Recommendation 7: A verbal request was received recently by MIDAS from the Ministry Senior Management for MIDAS help in total relocation of the Ministry headquarters to a new site, already identified. We are awaiting further details, and this proposal might or might not be highlighted by the Ministry for on-budget MIDAS support.

4.3 Ministry Information Technology

The Ministry IT Strategy exists only on paper, and addresses the fundamental issue of the Ministry having fragmented IT networks and lacking the means to use IT effectively to communicate properly with its far-flung provincial offices. In addition IT speeds are not fast enough for certain key requirements of AGS work.

Recommendation 8: A verbal request was also received by the Ministry for MIDAS to implement the Ministry IT Strategy in its entirety. The Ministry will submit its IT Strategy to MIDAS in the next few weeks, together with notes from its independent IT consultants. The cost of implementing the Ministry IT Strategy is as yet unknown but is expected to be large, involving many Terabytes and dedicated server to satellites. Once assessed and costed, this would be a plausible candidate for on-budget MIDAS funding.

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4.4 AGS Organizational Structure

The structure of the Afghanistan Geological Survey is presented in the organizational chart below, created from not only the Ministry website but also from discussions with the AGS management plus our mapping of the job title and team unit of every member of AGS staff.

The organizational structure shows the AGS to consist of four Directorates: hydrocarbons (oil and gas), solid minerals, environmental geology and geo-information. Each Directorate consists of ‘teams’ focused on a particular activity, and so far we have identified 23 teams. However, as yet we have been unable to properly define the teams under the Hydrocarbon (Oil and Gas) Directorate.

We discovered that the AGS structure is considerably more complex than the organizational chart suggests. In particular, and not shown above, is that embedded inside the AGS is a large Administration and Finance unit of the Ministry itself. Close study reveals that the AGS has negligible administration or financial management of its own, and that the embedded Ministry unit carries out these functions. In addition the 70-strong embedded Ministry unit covers many of the routine transport, catering, gardening, kindergarden needs of the AGS.

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The reader’s attention is therefore drawn to our conclusion that the AGS is not a stand-alone institution under the Ministry but is actually an integral part of the Ministry itself. This finding has a wide range of possible implications beyond the scope of this brief study.

Recommendation 9: As part of an ongoing long-term study of the AGS structure, to examine the effectiveness or otherwise of the chimera-like interlocking of the AGS and Ministry.

4.5 AGS Buildings

4.5.1 Overall comment

The AGS Main Building and AGS Annex are both in fairly good condition, although there is evidence of a backlog of routine maintenance of heating pipes and decoration beginning to cause problems.

4.5.2 Easy access for disabled workers

Although we have not conducted a survey, it is probably true that neither the AGS nor the Ministry fully comply with Afghan legislation for the employment of disabled people. This is disappointing, in view of the Ministry being progressive overall compared with other government institutions.

A common problem in employing disabled people is the presence of entrance stairs and flights of stairs. However in the case of the AGS, the rear access to the AGS Annex is at ground level in order to give immediate access to the corridor of the AGS Laboratory, and this corridor extends along the entire length of the ground floor of the AGS Main Building. The opportunity therefore exists to employ wheelchair-confined workers and other mobility confined workers anywhere along the ground floor of the AGS, subject to construction of appropriate toilet and washroom facilities.

Recommendation 10: MIDAS should consider encouraging the AGS Management to recruiting a group of wheelchair confined workers to be employed in a team on the ground floor of the AGS to conduct basic remote sensing using Google Earth to detect geohazards and industrial quarrying and to prepared detailed maps of faults and joints.

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5 CAPACITY OF MINISTRY MANAGEMENT

5.1 Capacity of Ministry Senior Management Team

The Ministry Management Team is now impressive regarding its professionalism and ability, and is gaining valuable on-the-job experience due to the challenges posed by the rapid expansion of the mining sector. Overall, the Ministry Senior Management Team has sufficient capacity to manage the Ministry, but hampered by the managerial weakness of the lower management levels.

Recommendation 11: no change, except to consider shadowing by up to 4 MBA-level Assistant Managers as part of succession planning for second tier management.

Recommendation 12: MIDAS to support the Ministry Senior Managers in undertaking donor mapping within the Ministry and the AGS, in order to minimize wasteful duplication of effort, encourage synergies between donors, and ensure gaps in donor support are filled.

5.2 Capacity of Ministry 2nd and 3rd Tier Management

The Second and Third Tier Management is significantly less impressive and ill-suited to the demands of the rapidly changing and expanding minerals sector, and therefore the Ministry management capacity is very weak in-depth. Much of the time of the Senior Management is exhausted in intervening to get results from the Second and Third Tier Management.

Recommendation 13: As a stop-gap, targeted training and mentoring of existing managers.

Recommendation 14: For long-term succession planning, to send all potentially good in-house successors to local universities to gain MBAs. Meanwhile to cover the inevitable gaps, and to engender some competition, to appoint at least 6 Assistant Managers as new blood who already have good local MBAs. The Assistant Managers would rotate every few months as shadows to existing managers in order for each to gain wide experience and to demonstrate their capabilities to several Departments.

Recommendation 15: The MBA Shadows should not operate in isolation but should collaborate on a daily basis under the direction of one of the Deputy Ministers and give a monthly presentation to H.E. The Minister on the progress made in building capacity across the Ministry. Meanwhile the Minister, Deputy Minister and Senior Management Team would give the MBA shadows authority to intensify donor mapping and to recommend to each Head of Department and HRD the precise needs of each Department for training and equipment. In essence, while the Head of Department would continue his/her activities much as before, his/her MBA Shadow would map out and implement Capacity Building Measures at Departmental level regarding goals, training, equipment, recruitment etc. connecting firmly to the overall mission and annual plan of the Ministry.

Recommendation 16: To address Gender Balance, at least a third of the MBA shadows should be women.

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Recommendation 17: All managers require training in how to sensitively plan work for female staff and how to supervise female workers. Promotions and placement on tours abroad should be tracked to show any particular gender or other biases.

6 CAPACITY OF AGS MANAGEMENT

6.1 Capacity of AGS Senior Management Team

The AGS Management Team, in contrast to the Ministry Management Team is relatively weak in terms of management expertise, although quite strong in terms of management experience. This weakness is in part due to the severe difficulties during post-Russian times for AGS staff to gain western-style qualifications in management or earth sciences, and the retirement of older highly experienced and qualified staff. While some of the AGS Senior Managers possess vast experience, all lack the managerial and technical qualifications that are normal in management teams of all national Geological Surveys that we are familiar with. Overall, the AGS lacks sufficient Management Capacity to manage the AGS in much more than a status-quo manner.

Recommendation 18: as a stop-gap, targeted training of all AGS Senior Managers and selective mentoring of those managers who hold particularly important posts such as AGS General Director, AGS Deputy Director, Head of AGS Laboratories etc.

Recommendation 19: appointment of at least 6 MBA-level Assistant Managers as 'MBA Shadows' to assist the Senior Managers on a rotating basis, and to allow the Senior Managers to be given 12-month training on the AGS premises that count as a one-year credits towards the award of a BA or MBA degree at a recognized Kabul-based university, followed by a one-year 'gardening leave' to physically attend the university and gain the actual degree. Meanwhile the MBA Shadows would run the Departments so vacated, under the one-day-a-week guidance of the absentee Manager.

6.2 Capacity of AGS Technical and Administrative Staff

The AGS Technical and Administrative Staff are, generally, weak in technical and administrative skills and qualifications, even though their experience is often considerable and relevant. The skills shortage is in spite of many years of effort in delivering training and mentoring by DFiD/BGS, DFiD/ASI, WB SDNRP/CBAGS and USGS. While excellent progress is being made in some units, it is still true that overall the AGS lacks the Technical and Administrative Capacity to fully meet the demands put upon the organization and its staff by the Ministry and investors.

Recommendation 20: deeper analysis must be conducted to determine why the AGS technical and administrative staffs have, with some exceptions, failed to gain sufficient capacity to execute their tasks, and the following sections highlight some lessons learned from the failure of training by international donors to meet expectations.

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7 STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF AGS TRAINING

7.1 AGS English Language Training

British Geological Survey

English Language Training of AGS staff by the BGS/DFiD project was conducted on the AGS premises from 2005 to 2008 and was reasonably successful. AGS staff were first tested and graded to attend Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, Intensive and Advanced. Each course was of 3-month duration using the modern training book system (ICRC) and tape recordings, videos and vocabulary assets. Also contributing to success was the teacher being an Afghan citizen who had lived for a long time in India and was therefore fluent in English, Dari and Pashtu.

Adam Smith International

English Language Training of AGS staff was continued by the BGS/ASI project along the same lines as the BGS but with UK native speakers as trainers. This was unfortunate, as it rendered the courses much less flexible and somewhat boring, and the courses began to suffer from low attendance.

GIZ

The World Bank CBAGS Project planned to continue some of the English Language Training of AGS staff, but this was denied by the AGS management in the belief that all the AGS staff should be good enough at English now. Bereft of further English Training, and with only limited translator support, many of the AGS staff were unable to participate fully in the GIZ technical training and so became disillusioned, frustrated and were unable to advance their technical know-how as much as they should. Capacity building was seriously impaired, particularly of older women.

USAID

To reverse this terminal decline in the teaching of English and computer studies, USAID created a suite of fully IT equipped training rooms on the top floor of the AGS. The USAID project included procuring and installing equipment for two classrooms, an office, a computer lab, and a student break area. For English training, the methodology was to conduct English proficiency placement tests and developing separate classes for basic and advance learners. The expected results of the English and Computer training were a) to improve the quality of Afghan job performance and career development, leading up to participation in the upcoming USGS training program focused on capacity building, data collection/analysis, and geospatial infrastructure; b) improved English language skills in writing, listening, and speaking; c) improved computer skills through an internationally accredited program such as the International Computer Driving License certification program; d) enhanced training facilities to conduct current and future training at AGS; e) enable employees to contribute to Afghanistan’s national development by providing improved data on mining and mineral resources, which will in turn promote foreign direct investment in the mining sector.

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The Gender Unit of the MoMP organized training courses for women civil servants including female staff from the AGS. A year of English tuition was organized for 18 female staff starting in July 2012 and run by a female trainer. She continues to give support to women. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the training methods rely on rote learning, and do not embrace more interactive and stimulating approaches, which are usually required for adult learners.

Recommendation 21: MIDAS should evaluate ways to optimize the USAID facilities for AGS training.

Recommendation 22: MIDAS should recruit a full-time English Language Trainer and a full-time Computer Trainer and deliver daily training courses to AGS technical staff in the USAID training rooms.

Recommendation 23: MIDAS should explore with a Kabul-based university for delivery of modules during AGS/MoMP office hours that contribute partly or fully to a recognized Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration for a class of 20-25 AGS/MoMP staff.

Recommendation 24: MIDAS should negotiate with a Kabul-based university for delivery of an intensive one-year Master’s Degree during MIDAS/MoMP office hours to 10-15 AGS technical in geology or mining, partly by thesis and partly by lecture courses, open to AGS staff who are already competent in English and computer usage, and who already hold either a Bachelor’s degree in geology or mining, or who have accrued at least 5-year’s experience in geological laboratories, geological fieldwork or AGS-based geological work.

Recommendation 25: Proportionate inclusion of women to be the norm for training courses.

7.2 AGS Computer Training

British Geological Survey

Early Computer Training of AGS staff by the BGS/DFiD project was successful due to good organization and good trainers. AGS trainees were happy and keen. The training room (now vanished) held 15 PCs and operated in 3 one-hour training sessions per day, giving a throughput of 45 trainees per day for 3-month courses in MS Office (Word and Excel). The Trainer was an Afghan Tajik, paid 3,000 USD per month (i.e. 1,000 USD per course).

Adam Smith International

Subsequent Computer Training of AGS staff by the ASI/DFiD project was less effective, perhaps in part attributable to dwindling demand, but also due to less effective teaching.

GIZ

The Computer Training Room ceased to exist with the start of the WB SDNRP CBAGS project by GIZ, because at the time it was thought by the AGS management that this phase of capacity building was no longer needed. With the wisdom of hindsight this was ans error.

USAID

USAID intervened to reverse this terminal decline in computer training. (See earlier section).

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7.3 AGS Field Training of Geologists

British Geological Survey

The BGS began the first Field Training of Geologists. This was at a basic level and essential, because for several decades the AGS geologists had been unable to do any fieldwork. BGS paid each trainee on the BGS-sponsored field teams an allowance of 45$/day for training in field geology techniques in areas far from Kabul. While some field allowance is appropriate, the BGS levels were far higher than the civil service norm, leading to immediate success but storing up future difficulties.

United States Geological Survey

The USGS began Field Training of Geologists, and investigation suggests that the AGS field teams sponsored by the USGS received not only equipment but also monthly bank transfers at levels several times their Government salaries. This was extraordinary as the professional USGS staff were usually unable to go in the field due to USGS security concerns.

Eventually AGS field training was conducted by the USGS in Turkey and Thailand. The training was to a high standard, but there is no real substitute for training geologists in the country where they will conduct their fieldwork after the training.

World Bank SDNRP CBAGS

The CBAGS project by GTZ (now rebranded as GIZ) was essentially a World Bank follow-on of the DfID project by BGS. A crisis ensued as the former BGS field teams expected and demanded 45$/day from GTZ but this was refused due to WB rules. A generous but more realistic sum of 20$/day was imposed but considerable friction remained as the AGS geologists had become dependent on receiving more than twice this sum. CBAGS was exceptional in making special attempts to include female professionals in fieldwork, by renting a separate house for them over two weeks. However most other trainings have not been designed with any special attempt to ensure women can fully participate.

7.4 AGS Field Training of Laboratory Technicians

British Geological Survey

The BGS also began Field Training of AGS Lab Technicians to sites near Kabul. The BGS paid each trainee an allowance of 15$ for half day training in field sample collecting techniques. The BGS levels were higher than warranted, leading to immediate success but storing up difficulties. The frequency of the half-day training seems to have been excessive, and ultimately became motivational payments for AGS Laboratory staff. This training was helpful for women because usually they miss out on field training due to sites being far away.

World Bank SDNRP CBAGS

The CBAGS Project ended the Field Training of AGS Lab Technicians as it was no longer justified. AGS Lab staff who had enjoyed this perk were confused, upset and some angry enough to threaten GIZ advisers with violence. Eventually the situation calmed down.

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7.5 Under-capacity in Basic Remote Sensing

WB SDNRP-1 CBAGS-1

In 2008 GIZ delivered introductory training of AGS staff in basic remote sensing and mapping using Google Earth, using sites in Afghanistan as examples. This included know-how in producing 3-D topographic images of Kabul, Aynak, Hajigak etc each with the 1:250,000 scale geological maps draped upon them; and plotting of plutons, faults, folds. The AGS field teams then made use of Google Earth to assist their field mapping, but little further training was given as with a few exceptions most areas only had very low resolution imagery.

WB SDNRP-1

In 2011, SDNRP-1 used the much-improved Google Earth to detect and map quarries in parts of Afghanistan, and particularly to plot and describe hundreds of industrial brick kilns across the country and over 10,000 km of karez water transfer tunnels were plotted. Major geohazards were detected such as catastrophic rock-falls and rubble-dammed lakes. In spite of these successes, systematic use of Google Earth by the AGS stopped in February 2012 due to lack of a dedicated unit and slowness of Internet.

Recommendation: as below under geohazards.

7.6 AGS Training in Specialised Remote Sensing

The USGS undertook pan-Afghan remote sensing using aircraft and substantial computing and software power1

Recommendation 26: the merit of adding MBA degree training as a supplementary benefit is worth considering not only to improve staff retention (by lock-in contracts) but also to enable these staff to gain access to higher Government salaries.

. The data belongs to the Afghan government. Large sums were spent to transfer the data to the AGS involving special 'clean room' data storage rooms in the AGS Annex. A team of about 18 AGS staff received long-term high-level GIS training from USGS experts in how to manage and use the data. The data packages include nonfuel mineral deposits (20 to 50 digital layers of geology, geophysics, and hyperspectral and remotely sensed imagery for each of 24 key areas). AGS, with the USGS, is developing an integrated GIS data framework for Afghanistan that consists of geologic and topographic map data, satellite imagery and accompanying databases, data documentation, and a system for the efficient archiving, retrieval, and distribution of data to a wide user community. The AGS plans to have a fully functional data center in operation by the end of 2013, but the trainees appear to receive such large supplementary payments that staff wastage is to be anticipated once the training is complete.

1 Wood, Eric and Kalaly Siddiq, 2013. Building Capacity in the Afghanistan Geological Survey. Esri. http://events.esri.com/uc/2013/infoWeb/OnlineAgenda

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7.7 Under-capacity in Geohazard Detection

Afghanistan is infamous for death and destruction of villages and infrastructure by natural geohazards such as floods, rock-falls, mud flows, snow avalanches, break-outs of rubble-dammed ephemeral lakes, ice dammed lakes etc. While the AGS has a small Geohazard Team it lacks any capacity in geohazard detection by simple remote sensing. No training has been given to the Team in rapid blanket mapping of geohazards using Google Earth and other simple methods. This is a decade-long gap in donor support.

Recommendation 27: MIDAS should give short awareness training to AGS Geohazard Team in the use of Google Earth in detection of geohazards.

Recommendation 28: MIDAS should assist the AGS to establish and train a Remote Sensing Mapping Team, consisting of desk-bound staff (women and disabled) to map geohazards across Afghanistan using only Google Earth, at the same time mapping industrial quarrying, brickworks, artisanal mining, faults, folds, plutons etc.

7.8 Under-capacity in Science of Paleontology

It is worth reminding the reader of not only the scientific importance and public interest in fossils but also vital importance of fossils in modern economic geology:

- Relative dating of sediments, enabling accurate correlation of rock layers. - Detection of faults and determining the magnitude and direction of the movements. - Geological mapping and prediction of oil and gas basins. - Geological mapping and prediction of coal basins. - Geological mapping of metallogenic sedimentary basins. - Determining the metallogenesis of Aynak and other syn-sedimentary copper deposits.

In post-Russian times, the AGS lost all its expertise in the study of fossils (paleontology). Indeed AGS corporate memory of paleontology was lost to such a degree that the institution was blissfully unware of Aynak being Asia’s most important sites for large fossil mammals such as giant elephants, rhinoceros and short-necked giraffe. Regarding economic paleontology, the AGS lost its expertise in recognizing and identifying microfossils essential in exploration for oil, gas, coal, phosphates and Aynak-style copper.

WB SDNRP-1 CBAGS-1

In 2008 GIZ continued the efforts of BGS/DfiD and delivered much-needed introductory training of AGS staff in basic paleontology.

Today the AGS has a small Paleontology Team but it does not seem to have received any significant training by international donors. The Paleontology Team lacks the technical knowledge to correctly identify fossils, and the technical equipment and library necessary for the staff to do so.

Recommendation 29: MIDAS should assess the capacity of the AGS Paleontology Team, deliver initial training and give consideration to equipping a small Paleontology Laboratory and Paleontology Library.

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7.9 Under-capacity in Analysis of Coal

The AGS Laboratory includes a small Coal Analysis Laboratory that we have not yet fully assessed. The staffs have some equipment but have not been trained fully in how to use it. We are informed that the equipment is designed to give data regarding the quality of the coal (e.g. calorific value, sulfur content, carbon content, moisture content, chlorine, ash content etc.). Even so it seems that the ‘Coal Lab’ lacks the equipment and expertise to detect, quantify and assess the presence of trace elements severely harmful to human health and the environment, notably uranium, mercury and fluorine which are now very serious issues in Mongolia, China, Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan and India. It would be naïve and negligent to assume that the coals of Afghanistan are free from such dangerous pollutants. Donor projects have so far failed to assist the AGS to address this fundamental issue.

Recommendation 30: MIDAS should train the AGS Coal Laboratory and the AGS Coal Team in the environmental risks of heavy metals and fluorine in coal, and how to detect them.

Recommendation 31: MIDAS or other donor project should assess the existing testing equipment of the AGS Coal Laboratory, train staff in its use, and procure the laboratory equipment necessary for detection of environmental pollutants.

7.10 Zero-capacity in Field Analysis of toxic Mercury

Afghanistan includes one of the world’s largest mercury provinces and mercury ore (cinnabar and native mercury) has been mined here for several thousand years. It is believed that some artisanal and small-scale mining of mercury continues. Remarkably and regrettably the USGS highlights the potential of Afghan’s mercury provinces as potential gold exploration areas and indeed suggests a local mercury industry could be established.

Mercury is a major health concern worldwide and mercury poisoning is expected to be serious in many Afghan households due to the widespread use of phials of liquid mercury as a traditional hair cosmetic in Kabul and elsewhere.

The AGS has only limited capacity to detect and analyze traces of mercury. In contrast, worldwide geologists and environmentalists use mercury ‘sniffers’ that measure traces of mercury in air and soil samples. This allows mercury hotspots to be detected, mapped and avoided, as well as safeguarding the exploration teams.

Recommendation 32: MIDAS or other donors should purchase at least one mercury ‘sniffer’ and train AGS Laboratory staff and AGS geologists how to use it in the field and field, and field tests should be conducted urgently.

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7.11 Zero-capacity in Field Analysis of toxic Chromium-6

Chromium-6 (hexavalent chromium) is a highly toxic heavy metal, and until recently it was believed that the main ore of chromium – chromite – was risk-free as it contains only harmless chromium-3 (trivalent chromium). However it is now realized that chromite is generally associated with traces of birnessite, a mineral closely related to potassium permanganate and a strong oxidizer that converts harmless Cr-3 to toxic Cr-6. Accordingly tens of thousands of rural people in India’s main chromite-mining district are suffering from Cr-6 heavy metal poisoning because the Cr-6 enters the local water supply

Significant deposits and occurrences of chromite exist in Afghanistan and in 2011 the WB SDNRP alerted NEPA, AGS and Deputy Minister of the potential risks of Cr-6 heavy metal poisoning, and circulated technical information on the subject.

Two AGS field teams are currently exploring for chromite in Logar and other provinces, and a tender has was issued in July 2013 for SME chromite mining in the catchment of the Logar river. It is does not appear that the AGS field teams are fully aware of the risk of Cr-6, and they lack the field test kits required to detect Cr-6 in soils and groundwater. In spite of the BGS, USGS and WB promoting chromite mining, they have not equipped the AGS with the test kits or checked the capacity of the AGS Laboratory to test for Cr-6 or presence of birnessite. This is reckless, putting local communities – and AGS geologists – at serious risk of heavy metal poisoning.

Recommendation 33: in view of the urgency, MIDAS should consider immediate purchase of field testing kits for Cr-6 detection in soil and water, and deliver training to AGS geologists and NEPA in Logar province.

7.12 Zero-capacity in detection of toxic Erionite

Erionite is a fibrous zeolite mineral recently recognized as being much more dangerous than asbestos dust in causing dangerous respiratory diseases such as mesothelioma. Knowledge of zeolite minerals in Afghanistan is extremely limited and therefore the presence of erionite is not yet confirmed, although recent work by the USGS indicates erionite is a prime suspect of abnormally high incident of respiratory diseases among US war veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq 2

Recommendation: as below for zeolites.

. The AGS does not seem to have received any donor training in how to detect erionite in the field or laboratory, and lack the laboratory equipment to confirm its presence.

2 http://minerals.cr.usgs.gov/projects/minerals_health/highlights.html

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7.13 Zero-capacity to detect Zeolite Minerals

Other than dangerous toxic erionite, the zeolite family includes minerals with remarkable economic benefits to livestock and human health3. In particular some zeolites are now used for low-cost bulk purification of potable water by elimination of toxic metals such as uranium family elements in waste and leakage from nuclear reactors (e.g. Chernobyl, Windscale and Japan); and surprisingly the use of zeolite as food additives for livestock such as sheep, goats and cows producing a 20% increase in weight of the animals.4

We strongly suspect that these highly beneficial minerals are present in Afghanistan suitable for SME quarrying for the local and international agricultural and water-cleaning industries. The AGS has zero-capacity to detect zeolites in the field, having received no training in how to do so, and lacking the essential laboratory equipment to confirm zeolites.

Recommendation 34: MIDAS should consider delivering introductory training in zeolites to AGS Laboratory staff and field geologists.

Recommendation 35: MIDAS or other donor project should consider establishing scanning electron microscope (SEM) capability to the AGS Laboratory, necessary to identify zeolites of all types and to allow Afghanisation of economic micropaleontology and other fields.

7.14 Zero-capacity to conduct 3-D Ore Modeling

3-D modeling of ore deposits is an essential step in measuring, visualizing and promoting large mineral deposits, and in allowing mine planning stage-by-stage from exploration to exploitation and ultimately mine closure.

There has never been any 3-D ore modeling capacity in Afghanistan, with this essential step in the investment pipeline being totally dependent on foreign specialists. For instance, international experts of the DfiD/BGS project used Vulcan software to produce 3-D ore modeling of the Aynak copper deposits from the Russian drilling, but the AGS received only the Vulcan viewer. The Vulcan viewer can only be used, as the name implies, for viewing a Vulcan 3-D ore model rather than producing or modifying the 3-D ore model itself.

Recommendation 36: MIDAS is currently in negotiation with Micromine, proprietors of leading 3-D ore modeling software for supply of software and Internet-training to enable desk-bound AGS staff (women and disabled) to be Geological Technicians under the guidance of AGS Geologists.

3 Baatar Tumenbayar and Robin Grayson (2013 – in preparation). Monograph on the Zeolites of Mongolia. 4 as above.

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8 UNDER-CAPACITY DUE TO INTERVENTIONS

8.1 Under-capacity from Friction between Donors

While friction between international donors is commonplace worldwide, it can sometimes have unpredictable and potentially severe consequences. This is apparent in AGS, as the following two examples illustrates.

AGS Director - In Russian times, the AGS was headed by highly qualified highly experienced General Directors at PhD level who commanded the respect of all AGS staff, all Ministry staff, donors and investors. Without any effective Succession Planning, the post of AGS Director later became vulnerable to dumbing-down. This decline became precipitous when the reluctance of a PhD-level General Director to sign approval papers for the USGS to issue rather high payments to AGS staff led to a public shouting match between the incumbent AGS Director and the large group of AGS staff not receiving their regular USGS payments. A Deputy Minister was called in to resolve the crisis and the matter was only resolved when a Bachelor-level candidate willing to sign the approval papers was appointed. The end-result was that the AGS lost a highly respected, highly qualified Director, and gained a Director with lower qualifications and lower experience in management, administration, geology, mining, English etc. Meanwhile most AGS staff received no such payments from the World Bank, and have modest per diems for fieldwork, and are not affected by such maneuverings but gain a less able AGS Director.

AGS Scanning Team - The AGS Scanning Team were trained by the BGS in the vital task of scanning all the maps and reports in the priceless AGS Archive. Significant motivational payments were made by the BGS/DFiD to the scanning team with good results, albeit a somewhat grey area in appropriateness. The World Bank inherited responsibility for the AGS Scanning Team via CBAGS, but WB rules prohibited any such payments. As a direct result, the output of the Scanning Team fell to a derisory level, and only brief spurts of proper activity took place if a direct request for a particular document was made by H.E. The Minister. The AGS Scanning Team was recently disbanded due to the Department of Defense introducing high-speed scanners allowing virtually the entire AGS Archive to be scanned.

Recommendation 37: As a first positive step in inter-donor cooperation and coordination, the MIDAS team has agreed with the WB SDNRP-2 CBAGS-2 team leader to interact on a daily basis to exploit synergies without duplication, and to identify gaps and address them in conjunction with the senior management of the Ministry.

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8.2 Under-capacity from Failure to Train Procurement

Failure of international donors to properly train AGS staff in procurement procedures can frustrate capacity building. For instance, the BGS did an excellent job in equipping the AGS Laboratories with world-class rock thin sectioning equipment, and in training the AGS staff to operate the machinery. After BGS departed the stock of vital consumables approached exhaustion, remaining stocks were hoarded for priority jobs and output plummeted. Lacking knowledge of how to order consumables, the World Bank CBAGS international staff were called in to find the suppliers, contact the suppliers and to fill in ordering forms on behalf of the AGS Laboratory. Unfortunately, the AGS procurement staff was unable to convert these into a format appropriate to the Ministry Procurement system, so finally the output of rock slides ceased for a number of months.

Recommendation 38: MIDAS will need to address the issue of capacity training of AGS/MoMP procurement staff in:

1 How to procure minor equipment, spares, consumables and services in a timely transparent manner.

2 How to specify, tender and issue contracts for larger items of equipment, training and services.

3 How to engage with MIDAS and USAID in order to receive and properly utilize the on-budget MIDAS funds for MoMP capital projects.

8.3 Under-capacity through failure to utilize and develop female professionals

AGS has 19 female engineers. A Gender Assessment undertaken by MIDAS in July 2013 found them demoralized due to lack of consideration for promotion and training opportunities but still very keen to advance professionally.

Recommendation 39: All capacity building projects need to take into account ways to ensure women’s full participation. The best way to do this is to design it in consultation with female staff from AGS.

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8.4 Under-capacity from lack of Equipment or Training

Failure to supply vital equipment and training is a recipe certain to demoralize staff and prevent capacity-building. This has negatively affected the AGS on a number of occasions.

GIZ in CBAGS-1 and CBAGS-2

The AGS staffs were unable to specify much-needed laboratory equipment for the Ministry Procurement System, a problem solved only by the intervention of CBAGS international advisers on a voluntary basis to prepare proper specifications and dummy tender notices. The problem then shifted to the Ministry Procurement System whose staff were unable to convert these documents into official tender documents and therefore no laboratory equipment could be supplied. The situation remained unresolved for several years. When the equipment finally arrived, the tenders had neglected to include more than minimal commissioning and operator training in the price and therefore much of the equipment remains unusable and unused.

This failure-prone procurement system of the Ministry has contributed to what appears to be chronic underspending of much of the Ministry's allocated budgets, and perhaps also to the substantial underspending of the large WB SDNRP projects on capital items and consultants. Insufficient equipment, late commissioning of equipment, little or no operator training, insufficient spare parts and similar factors have caused the AGS and Ministry to be several years behind where it could and should be regarding critically important AGS laboratory capacity, AGS drilling capacity and mobilization of capacity building projects. For instance, the gap between CBAGS-1 and CBAGS-2 more than a year by which time the corporate memory and momentum was largely lost, similarly between DfiD follow-on projects, Cadastre follow-on projects and so forth. In this donor-generated stop-go-stop environment it is difficult to inspire good management or to attract and retain high-calibre staff.

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9 AGS FAILURE TO LIFT PUBLIC AWARENESS

9.1 Limitations of AGS Website

The AGS website has high technical content but is frozen in time, and is embedded in the BGS website. The AGS website is therefore unable to contribute effectively in attracting local and international investment in the mining sector, and is underperforming in projecting an exciting image capable of raising the status and morale of AGS staff, or of assisting the recruitment and retention of new staff to the AGS.

Recommendation 40: as discussed earlier, to create a stand-alone AGS website by transferring the AGS pages from the BGS website which has taken care of them for many years. This will raise the AGS status, enable immediate revision of the out-of-date and sometimes misleading content, greatly increase the number of site visitors, and enable every visitor to be tracked.

9.2 Limitations of AGS Geological Museum

The AGS Museum houses Afghanistan’s major collections of geological specimens, including many from Russian-times. Although the displays are good, they fall far short of standards of international geological museums, and are of little interest to the general visitor.

The AGS Museum could be transformed into an asset able to inform the public and media about the merits of mines and mining, by dioramas and video presentations of Aynak and other projects. The target audience would be coach-loads of students from universities and mine-affected communities, and as a backdrop to launch of tenders and award of contracts.

Recommendation 41: MIDAS should consider engaging an international museum expert to prepare a costed proposal to achieve the results desired above, in conjunction with on-the-job training of Museum staff in best practice for curation, promotion and display.

9.3 Limitations of Entrances and Conference Rooms

The AGS has two entrance Foyers but both are dreary and have lackluster drab displays. This projects a very poor image to visitors and investors and does nothing to raise the morale of AGS staff. The route from the Foyers to the AGS Museum is drab and unclear.

The AGS has several conference rooms which fully meet the needs of the AGS and Ministry for hosting conferences and large workshops. However the conference room’s décor and facilities are soviet and ill-suited to modern media and PowerPoints.

Recommendation 42: MIDAS should consider re-equipping the audio-visual facilities of the AGS conference rooms, including adding cinema-sized screens and effective black-out.

Recommendation 43: MIDAS should consider engaging a local designer/architect to prepare a sketch design for remodeling the AGS Foyers as a hybrid between a business hotel reception and a mining museum entrance, able to attract AGS staff, visitors and investors.

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9.4 Under-capacity in Drilling and Engineering

During Russian-times the AGS had a substantial number of drilling rigs of many types, and these were vital in proving all the large deposits that feature in the priceless AGS Archive that is the source of most of the deposits in the pipeline of tenders and contracts. Indeed without the AGS drilling rigs the pipeline of tenders and contracts would consist mainly of high-risk occurrences tendered only as relatively low-value Exploration Licenses of little interest to large mining companies rather than low-risk deposits tendered as high-value Mining Licenses attractive to large mining companies.

Shortly before the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, all the AGS drilling rigs were pulled back to their home depot in the AGS engineering workshop complex, where numerous new unused drilling rigs and accessories were already stored, often still in their original crates. Much of the equipment is valuable and an initial assessment in 2009 by Bernd Braeutigam (TL MIDAS component 2) and Robin Grayson (DTL MIDAS component 2) for WB SDNRP-1 CBAGS-1 showed much of the drilling equipment to still be usable and the models were still being manufactured in Russia, Slovakia, Poland and elsewhere (see ANNEX 1).

In recent times, the USAID has assisted the AGS to conduct successful drilling for coal in northern Afghanistan using several drilling rigs.

In 2010 the Ministry purchased several new hard-rock drilling rigs from China and The Task Force had hoped to use them in 2012-2013. Unfortunately these new drilling rigs were never commissioned by the manufacturer who also neglected to deliver any training. The Task Force (TFSBO) hopes to overcome these serious inherited issues before the start of 2014. Meanwhile TFSBO has relied on the single private drilling contractor in Afghanistan capable of meeting the drilling requirements for North Aynak and elsewhere.

The AGS depot is noticeably run down, and the engineering workshop is now antiquated albeit with most of its lathes etc being fairly well maintained. The staff of the AGS depot appear to be quite highly skilled in mechanical engineering and are almost exclusively male but appear to be appreciably older than staff in the Ministry headquarters or AGS main campus.

Recommendation 44: The Task Force should be encouraged to persevere in bringing the 3 new Chinese drilling rigs into full operation before the start of 2014.

Recommendation 45: MIDAS should complete the technical reassessment of the older AGS drilling rigs and associated equipment and assist the AGS in making contact with the original manufacturers regarding spare parts, commissioning and training.

Recommendation 46: MIDAS should consider funding the cannibalization of more than a dozen placer gold drilling rigs by the AGS engineers to produce two or more operational rigs before the start of 2014.

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Recommendation 47: MIDAS should prepare a procurement schedule and cost estimate for on-budget procurement of equipment, spare parts and training from the original manufacturers to bring into full operation more than half a dozen drilling rigs made in Russia, Slovakia and elsewhere capable of coring 100 to 500 metres deep.

Recommendation 48: MIDAS to prepare a proposal jointly with the Ministry for a single tender under the MIDAS on-budget funds to refurbish the entire AGS engineering workshop and equip it with modern machine tools, lathes etc in order to maintain and repair drilling rigs, trucks for transporting drilling rigs and supply vehicles, generators etc necessary to detect and define deposits to sustain and expand the pipeline of tenders and contracts.

Recommendation 49: MIDAS to propose to the Ministry the establishment at the AGS engineering centre under MIDAS on-budget funds of 6 drilling teams with new and refurbished equipment sufficient to put in the field 6x3=18 drilling rigs operating simultaneously for 10 months per year undertaking continuous coring across a wide range of deposits, together with down-hole geophysical logging; and the construction of a Core Shed to house, curate and sample the cores obtained.

Recommendation 50: MIDAS to require that after a period of 4 years of AGS drilling that the 6 drilling teams to be spun out into the private sector as independent drilling contractors to the emerging mining industry and to the Ministry.

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10 ANNEX – PHOTO ALBUM - AGS DRILLS

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